On the other hand, when the pitcher couldn’t find the zone, was stalling between pitches, and was walking guys, I wasn’t alone among the fielders in getting bored. And when you’re bored, you’re less ready to leap into action on the off-chance the ball actually does come into play.

So one area in which I think defensive metrics have plenty of room to improve is in figuring out just how much this interplay between a pitcher and his fielders exists and (more importantly) how much it matters to run prevention. Does the efficacy of the defense change depending on anything the pitcher does? When Scott Baker or Mark Buehrle work quickly, does their defense play better than when another pitcher wastes as much time as he can out there? Does Kevin Slowey’s propensity to pound the strike zone encourage his defenders to stay more alert than, say, Clayton Kershaw or AJ Burnett?

I don’t know. Nobody has any numbers for that yet.

But there’s also the possibility that this interplay works in the opposite direction. From an interview with CJ Wilson:

The moral of the story is that a guy like me or Feldman or whatever, who was a reliever, that wants to be a starter for Texas, that should be just an overall positive thing that the organization has come a long way (from years ago) when we had such a stigma attached to being a pitcher in Texas. Now, it’s like people are really excited to play here, to pitch with Elvis Andrus at shortstop, and Mike Young at third base, and Kinsler at second and Chris Davis at first. For me, that’s a big thing for us, is that our defense is so much better that people are excited to be pitchers now for us.

And that’s definitely interesting. For the longest time, pitchers didn’t want to pitch in Arlington, and free agents wouldn’t sign with the Rangers for that very reason. At the time, everyone blamed that on the “bandbox” nature of the stadium; after all, pitchers don’t want to pitch in an environment virtually guaranteed to induce more home runs.

But maybe, just maybe, it was never the stadium after all? If pitchers don’t like giving up home runs, maybe the reason is that they just don’t like giving up runs in the first place. And there’s no doubt that for many years, the Rangers were an offensively-oriented team, with sluggers and run producers throughout the lineup but nary a defensive whiz to be found.

And that’s changing now; they have a strong defensive infield and a small outfield that minimizes the impact of their outfielders’ range. And suddenly the pitchers are a lot happier.

David Pinto writes: “Better defense means less frustration for the pitcher and less work as he doesn’t need to get four outs in an inning.”

One of the reasons Twins fans are excited about 2010 is the drastically improved middle infield — JJ Hardy and Orlando Hudson figure to combine for some good-to-excellent defense, and third base is Punto’s best position (ie, the one at which he plays the best defense).

I don’t think it’s possible to guess how many runs the Twins’ new infield will save over 2009; but we can take a look at some UZR numbers and compare them.

2009 Twins infield

Actual 2009 UZR/150, sorted by playing time (decreasing)

• 2B: Nick Punto: 9.4 UZR/150, Alexi Casilla: -20.9 UZR/150, Matt Tolbert: -12.7 UZR/150
• 3B: Joe Crede: 23.4 UZR/150, Brendan Harris: -26.3 UZR/150, Brian Buscher: -12.2 UZR/150, Matt Tolbert: 10.6 UZR/150
• SS: Orlando Cabrera: -14.8 UZR/150, Nick Punto: 4.7 UZR/150, Brendan Harris: -14.8 UZR/150

2010 Twins infield

Career UZR/150

• 2B: Orlando Hudson: 2.6 UZR/150
• 3B: Nick Punto: 19.9 UZR/150
• SS: JJ Hardy: 11.2 UZR/150

Hudson is getting older and his defense probably won’t be as good as everyone thinks it is — but there’s little chance he’s as bad at it as Casilla and Tolbert were in 2009. Meanwhile, 3B stays close to constant with Punto manning it most of the time, and SS takes a huge jump up.

Now, I don’t think these numbers can tell us how much the Twins’ run prevention will improve in 2010.* But I think it’s fair to say that the improved infield defense will help with preventing runs — though less than it might given the staff’s propensity for giving up fly balls.

* But if you believe UZR is an accurate statistic, we’re talking in the range of 3-5 wins. As in, the Twins got 5 wins better simply by improving the infield defense, without taking into account the offensive production of either Hardy or Hudson. Like I said, maybe UZR can’t be trusted. Either way, this sounds like a whole lot of improvement. More than I would have guessed … and it sure paints the projections of the Twins struggling to reach 85 wins in a different light.

So this summer, when all the Twins’ pitchers seem happier than usual, will it be because of their lower ERAs? Or will both the happiness and the lower ERAs be because of the improved defense?

He notes that the Twins are paying for a 2.5 win player and Span seems to be better than that; he notes that Span has skills that could pay him well in arbitration (high batting average and stolen bases); he notes that Span’s switch to CF could drive his value further; he notes that Span is only 26 and could still see his performance improve.

But his take on the timing of the deal with regards to the economy is what I find perhaps most interesting, and is something I feel I didn’t articulate well enough in my own post:

What particularly makes this deal great from a team perspective for me is the timing of the deal. Many economists say that we are starting to move out of the recession, and that suggests that the marginal value of a win will likely start climbing in 2012 if not before that. By the time 2014 rolls around, $6.5 million may only buy one win instead nearly two. Even more than that, the likely inflation of the win market could make the non-guaranteed 2015 team option look fantastic if Span is still a productive player at the time.

Precisely. These contracts for Blackburn and (especially) Span may be most valuable in that they’re effectively locking in not only the players’ apparently undervalued status, but also the deflated cost of a win on the market. That $9M option for a 2.5-3.3 WAR player in 2015 would be an absolute no-brainer if the market rebounds and a win costs $5M or more by then.

Moore predicts we’ll see teams follow the Twins’ lead and lock in the currently deflated market rates for their pre-arbitration players. I think he’s right, and I think it’s mighty interesting that the Twins seem to be on the forefront of exploiting a new trend in baseball economics.

And as you may have guessed, I remain extremely interested in how this trend effects Mauer’s contract; ie, whether the Twins can lock in a mega-deal at today’s deeply discounted rates.

The terms of his deal are as follows:

1. $0.75M (second pre-arbitration year, age 26)
2. $1M (final pre-arbitration year, age 27)
3. 3M (first arbitration year, age 28)
4. $4.75M (second arbitration year, age 29)
5. $6.5M (third arbitration year, age 30)
6. $9M (team option for first free agent year, age 31)

I’ve always read on Fangraphs that the arbitration years are typically set at 40%/60%/80% of a player’s market value; but that doesn’t seem to be the case here. If the option is his full market value, this contract gives him 33%/52%/72% … but if the option represents a 10% discount (which would not be unusual at all), his arbitration years are paying him just 30%/47%/65%. At first blush, this contract seems like a highly team-friendly deal even before considering how Span is being valued.

But that raises the interesting question: How is Span being valued? We’re all familiar with his story by now: a minor league track record that looked a lot like a first-round bust, a fourth-outfielder; shows up in the majors and has a breakout rookie campaign, compiling 2.6 WAR in a partial season; establishes himself as a star-caliber player with 3.9 WAR in his first full season. It’s possible that 2009 was a career year, and he can’t keep up that pace … but he was 25 years old and it’s also possible that he hasn’t even reaching his peak yet.

CHONE projects him at 3.3 WAR, which would peg the market value of a win in this contract at $3M/win. If CHONE is being optimistic and he’s actually, say, a 3 WAR player, the Twins are paying $3.3M/win. If CHONE is being way too conservative and Span’s true talent level is actually 4 WAR, then the Twins are paying just $2.5M/win (which is way too low, I think, implying that Span is being paid as a 3.3 WAR player at most).

I’ve seen mixed reactions to this contract since it first hit Twitter yesterday. Many people are thrilled that the Twins have “locked up” Span for the next 5 years, ignoring that he was already under team control for all five of those years. I saw one opinion, from Thrylos98, claiming that the Twins are paying him too much (I can’t understand how he could back that claim up, though). And I’ve seen others who seem to think this deal is pointless except for the option year covering his first free agent year, giving the Twins none extra year of control over Span’s career.

But let’s take a look at it from the perspective of risk — risk is the reason players sign extensions like these, and it’s also what teams have to worry about when offering them. Span could have simply declined to sign this extension and go year-to-year through his arbitration years, trying to maximize the amount he gets paid,* though by doing so he’d risk a career-ending injury or a collapse of his skills. So he gives up some money in return for the security of the long-term contract — but typically not that much.

* And given the low percentages of his value he’s being paid, it’s a good assumption that he’d make quite a bit more year-to-year even if you don’t think that either he’s going to continue producing star-level 4 WAR seasons OR the economy will recover even a little bit over the next five years.

From the team’s perspective, there are more risks involved. If they didn’t offer the extension and were going to go year-to-year, they’d still have Span on the team for the next five years, but would be risking the following:

• 2009 was not Span’s peak, and he continues to improve in his age 26 and 27 years
• The economic environment in baseball improves, driving up the cost of wins so they’d have to pay him more even if he stops playing as well
• He successfully adapts to CF, driving up his value (a CF is a lot more valuable than a corner OF)

On the other hand, by offering this contract they open themselves up to these risks:

• 2009 was Span’s peak, and his 4+ WAR upside is an illusion
• He gets injured and can’t play (or can’t play at his normal level)
• He can’t handle CF and has to move back to a corner, causing personnel problems or at least reducing his actual value

Obviously the downside here is bad — you don’t want to be stuck paying a guy millions of dollars not to produce. But I think it’s fair to say that the Twins determined that the upside outweighs the downside. The Twins get cost certainty, they ensure that Span will be affordable for the next six years, through his age 31 season. If they want to cut payroll in the future, it’s very likely that this contract will be extremely tradeable — teams would love to snap up a CF in-or-near his prime on a team-friendly contract.

Instead of looking at this as the Twins having locked Span up, it’s better to see it as having him locked in. But how much money did they just save, over what would have happened if they’d gone year to year?

Assuming Span is a 3.3 WAR player and standard 40%/60%/80% arbitration and $3.5M/win, his arbitration years and first year of free agency would have looked like this:

• $4.6M
• $6.9M
• $9.2M
• $11.5M

Or, if he keeps putting up 4 WAR seasons:

• $5.6M
• $8.4M
• $11.2M
• $14M

So the Twins saved themselves somewhere between $9M and $16M over 2012-2015, not taking economic recovery or salary inflation into account. Whether you think that amount of money is worth taking on the risk of the longterm contract is a judgement call, and obviously the Twins’ front office thought it was worth it.

Me? I think this is an even better deal than the Blackburn contract, and I’m glad to see the Twins locking in their players at affordable salaries for years to come. This is yet another sign that the team expects to contend for the foreseeable future; they’re using their assurance of steadier revenue for good rather than simply lining their pockets; they’re taking advantage of the economic climate to get good deals and lock in a lower cost per win than normal.

But perhaps most of all, Denard Span will be a Twin for at least 5 more years. I think it’s time to make my “Span Fan” t-shirts that I’ve been thinking about for a while.

View from behind the plate. I could get used to watching games from here.

Pretty sweet scoreboard

Clubhouse

Inside of a suite. Not too shabby

One of the club rooms

People camping out for tickets

Kirby!

View from the pressbox

Inside the pressbox

This is where the bat Killebrew used to hit #573 will go. When they find it.

Minneapolis skyline

One of the many bars in Taget Field. Ballpark tavern I believe.

View from the party deck. PARTY!

Back to the Future? No. Fire pit on the party deck

Party deck. Backwards

Not a bad way to watch a ballgame.  Not a whole lot of narration, so just drink it in folks.  Outdoor baseball in a month.

“This might change our thinking,” said Jim Rantz, the Twins director of minor leagues. “For now, he’s a starter. We might have to revisit that.”

Gutierrez was drafted in the first round, and was a closer in college; however, the main reason he was a closer in college was because he had had Tommy John surgery and they were limiting his innings. I think it’s likely that the Twins wouldn’t have drafted him so high if they thought he was just a reliever.

So it made perfect sense to make him a starter and see if he could stick; he has a worm-killing sinker, but needs to develop a secondary pitch (or two) to really have a legitimate shot. He shouldn’t have been on the Major League radar for this season; 2011 at the earliest.

But now, the Twins are letting their trepidations about 2010 interfere with their plans for the future. That’s a serious problem.

It was more than possible that Gutierrez eventually returned to the bullpen — in fact, it was likely. One possible reason they have him starting in the first place is just to let him face more batters. But it’s important to let a player’s performance dictate whether his role changes, especially at this stage in his development.

The Mets make mistakes like rushing their prospects — and it wrecked Gomez and Guerra before we ever got our hands on them. The Twins should avoid those same mistakes. I mean, if there’s one thing we can all agree on, it’s that the Twins should not try to emulate the Mets.

I’m probably overreacting to this news. But I think about trends a lot — I’ve been encouraged by the trend that the Twins seem to be targeting high-upside talent more than they had in the past — and this seems like something we should keep an eye on.

Although, if there is free beer I rescind all promises because I may get drunk.

A trade could yield a closer to replace Joe Nathan and would protect the franchise in the future from having one player on their roster consuming 20 to 25 percent of their payroll, a formula that rarely works in baseball.

This is mind-bogglingly dumb, of course, and Rob Neyer is quick to tell us why:

You know what’s an even better idea: Not targeting a reliever when trading your single most valuable commodity. Trading for a reliever would be a terribly short-sighted move, designed to net an extra two or three wins in one season (granted, two or three wins might make a difference this season). Trading Mauer, if it simply must be done, should be designed to net the Twins twice that, at the very least.

The disposition of this situation will go a long way toward determining the future of this franchise. Signing Mauer would be good. Trading Mauer for a scad of talented young players could be good. Trading Mauer for a reliever might set the franchise back five years.

But let’s assume that Bill Smith is smarter than Souhan, and wasn’t planning on trading the best player in baseball for a relief pitcher. Can we reasonably assume, though, that he’s smart enough to get more than two draft picks’ worth of value in a trade?

Don’t forget about the Garza/Bartlett for Young trade, which has looked pretty bad so far. Perhaps the better comparison, though, is the Santana trade,* which has also looked awful.

* It’s kind of remarkable, actually, that the Twins had the best pitcher in the league and were essentially forced to trade him — and then, just two years later, they have the best player in the league and may well be forced to trade him too.

I wouldn’t be too confident in Smith’s ability to land any mega-prospects in return for Mauer; the same problem that cropped up in the Santana negotations could crop up here too: namely, teams will be unwilling to give up much in a trade* because they also want to spend a huge sum on a long-term contract for Mauer.

* Is it just me or does this scenario only seem to happen to the Twins? When other teams are trying to unload a star in a rent-a-player type deal, they actually get prospects in return as opposed to having to thank a richer team for giving their best player some money and taking him off their hands for nothing.

Obviously, the best thing for the Twins would be to sign him to a team-friendly contract … but that’s unlikely. Given Smith’s trade-making ability, it’d probably be best to just wait out this season and take the draft picks. But what if they did sign him?

If the Twins signed Mauer to a deal worth $25 million a year — which might be what it takes — what might they have to pay to keep Morneau, who was considered the more valuable player until last season?

Okay, first of all, “considered more valuable by whom?” Morneau only beat Mauer for the 2006 MVP because writers like Souhan don’t understand that the only reason Morneau’s RBI totals were so lofty was because Mauer was always on base in front of him. I don’t need to go over this argument again, I hope, but the point is this: Mauer is more valuable than Morneau, and everybody knows it.

Secondly, Morneau is already under contract through 2013. He’ll be 33 years old the next time he’s on the market. It’s really not worth thinking about right now, since it’s a few years away, but have you seen what’s happened to the market for sluggardly sluggers who are past their prime? Let me give you a hint: Morneau probably won’t be signing a Mauer-sized deal when he’s 33 years old in 2014.

Plus, everyone’s making a bunch of noise about Mauer’s $25M salary taking up too large a percentage of the team’s payroll. But the Twins have been contending for a decade with payrolls of $60M — is it unrealistic to think that they could raise the payroll to $90M or so (which they’ve already done), pay Mauer his huge salary, and continue to contend?* It’s not the ideal model, probably, but the Twins have shown that they can build a 25-man roster for $60M and contend; wouldn’t you expect them to be able to build a 24-man roster for $60M, add the best player in the game, and still be able to contend?

* I’m using the word “contend” here, because I think it’s accurate. If the Twins have such a huge chunk of their payroll tied up in Mauer, and he’s healthy, I believe they’ll be a contender in basically every year of Mauer’s contract. But if he gets hurt or becomes ineffective, this all goes out the window. The Twins are basically screwed — and that’s a gigantic risk for a team that simply can’t afford to make big mistakes.

It’s a tough decision, another one for Bill Smith, who’s had plenty of these franchise-altering decisions to make in his brief tenure at the top of the Twins. On the one hand, do you take the biggest PR hit any team could possibly suffer, while simultaneously taking a huge step back for the current season (when you’re moving into a new taxpayer-funded stadium, no less), by trading your homegrown superstar? Or, on the other, do you sign him to a deal you can’t afford, for more years than you’re comfortable with, and risk having to explain to those same fans 8 years from now that the payroll is basically sunk because we’re paying $25M for an injured 3B/1B who doesn’t hit home runs? Or do you go for broke now, let him go to free agency at the end of the year, and move on without him, letting the payroll peak in 2010 and dwindle afterwards once The Hope Named Mauer has left the state?

It’s easy for us, as fans. We’re going to be fans either way, and the only thing that’s really at risk is our enjoyment during September and October — that’s not a lot at risk. For Smith, it’s his reputation, his career, his life that hinges on this decision, and on others like it. It’s not an easy choice, or an obvious choice.

But he kind of has to get it right.

The problem, though, is the context of that link. He did it in a post called “HireGardy.com” in which he lumps us in with a bunch of crazed anti-Gardenhire internet people. He defends Gardy, who he likes as a manager, against the attacks of bloggers and commenters around the world. And he calls us the “informal” anti-Gardy blog, which is funny given that of the other two sites he points to, one is hosted on blogspot and the other is just a one-page site that complains about Gardenhire but has no other content or usefulness. I guess that means he didn’t spend much time reading.

My dad has frequently told me that I should change the name of the blog — that people are turned off when they hear that the site is called “Fire Gardy,” and perhaps don’t even visit (thus discovering that we don’t actually want Gardy to be fired). He also made the valid point that Gardy will someday not be the manager any more, thus making the website pointless. Those are all good points, of course, but I think the name has a nice ring to it.

I actually think Gardy is a good manager — in the past I’ve tried to quantify the contributions a manager makes and found that Gardy is consistently one of the top managers. It seems like every year, he’s voted 2nd or 3rd in the AL Manager of the Year voting, and I’ve never had reason to quibble with the selection.

Of course, I have a bunch of reasons why I don’t like the things Gardy does — the name doesn’t exist solely because it sounds good. For a team that’s consistently one of the youngest in the league, he has far too much of a preference for veteran players (despite talent). The players in whom he places his undying trust — like when he says Punto needs his at bats because he’ll bat with the game on the line a lot and he needs to be ready for it — well, let’s just say they’re not the players I would choose to trust. I think I’d handle the bullpen differently, with less of an emphasis on predefined roles and faith in the magic of the later innings … but I suppose you can’t really argue with his results.

He rips apart one comment, taking it down point-by-point; that comment basically touched on every weak argument people have against Gardy, which is presumably why Posnanski picked it.

I don’t mean to pick on one comment — the point is we get a LOT of seemingly angry anti-Gardy stuff like that around here. And a lot of it just seems petty to me. Look, I think he’s a great manager. A lot of people think he’s a fraud. That’s fine. I can point to five division champions. A lot of people can point to his weak division and playoff failure. That’s fine. I can point to a team that has consistently won and players who consistently play well for him as the season goes along. A lot of people can point to Gardy’s bizarre individual decisions and they would rather credit other people for the Twins’ success. That’s fine too.

And yes, I think it’s funny that people seem to go to Posnanski to complain about Gardenhire. Maybe it’s because he likes Gardy, and is one of the few people to admit that on the internet. Maybe it’s because he’s just the biggest person to admit it on the internet.

I wish Gardy were better at dealing with young players — it happens to be my opinion that he destroyed Alexi Casilla and would have destroyed Carlos Gomez if he hadn’t been traded. I wish he cared more about “getting outs” than “eating innings” … perhaps saving us from watching guys like Carlos Silva, Sidney Ponson, Ramon Ortiz, and Livan Hernandez go out and lose baseball games. I wish he at least gave the impression that he’s thought through how he wants to handle a pitching staff, rather than just leaning against the conventional wisdom — after all, conventional wisdom isn’t going to help you win when you have fewer resources than your competitors. You have to do something new!

But without a doubt, something Gardy does is working. And it’s working great. And anyway, if Gardy did everything the way I would, then what would I hve to write about? My favorite thing about Gardy — aside from, you know, all the winning — is that he’s a constant, undying source of fun things to write about.

He came in in the 3rd inning, struck out the first batter, then walked the next two and was taken out with right elbow soreness. He’s gone back to MN to get an MRI.

One theory is that this is just a normal setback after his offseason surgery to break up scar tissue in that elbow. Another is that it’s a more severe injury. There’s no real information about it, but it’s definitely a reason to worry.

My optimism was invalid, though, now that we’ve learned that Nathan actually has a torn UCL, which is the very same ligament that needs to be repaired in Tommy John surgery.

They’re not certain if it’s a full tear or a partial tear — Gardenhire called it “significant” — and Gardenhire says it’s the sort of thing you can’t tell until you get in and do surgery. Tommy John surgery.

Apparently, they’re saying it’s “totally Nathan’s decision” as to whether to have surgery or not. The plan, for now, is to try to avoid surgery:

While surgery certainly looks to be imminent, Nathan will take two weeks to let the swelling in the area subside. He’ll work with the trainers to strengthen the muscles around the elbow. And then he will try to pitch. He’s prepared to pitch in pain – given the huge expectations placed on the 2010 Twins – and is prepared to tests the limits of his tolerance level.

Personally, I’d be shocked if he’s able to pitch with a torn UCL … and perhaps more shocked if the Twins even let him. The Twins famously prefer to let pitchers do several months rest & rehab prior to doing the surgery that was obviously necessary from the start (see Crain, Neshek, Liriano, Bonser) … and that looks like what’s going to happen here. I kind of expect them to string us along until June, when they finally have the surgery they should be having now, delaying Nathan’s eventual return to the second half of 2011, at which point he still won’t even be full strength. Nathan should have the surgery now, and Nathan won’t be part of it.

Or at least, that’s my opinion. I know the Twins don’t share it. But that raises the question about what the Twins should do for a closer this year. Here are the options, as I see them:

• Blindly hope Nathan is okay
• Neshek
• Rauch
• Crain
• Mijares
• Slama or Delaney
• Someone else from the minors
• A new acquisition
• Closer by committee

Alright … so I’m guessing most teams who lose an elite closer like Nathan don’t have so many internal options to choose from,* so the Twins probably aren’t totally screwed here.

* It’s worth noting that there aren’t very many teams with an elite closer like Nathan, and that they are probably really deep. The Yankees and Red Sox probably do have similar bullpen depth … only the Royals have a closer of Nathan’s caliber without a bunch of bullpen arms behind him. Maybe the Mets. So maybe I’m wrong to make that statement.

I think Mijares is out, given that Gardy doesn’t trust him and he’s a lefty, which will be more useful in a non-closer role. I don’t think much of Crain at the moment, and I don’t think Gardy does either.

If it were me, I’d go with the committee. La Velle disagrees:

I don’t think the Twins will go with a closer-by-committee. They had all kinds of trouble in 2008 when they tried a set-up man by committee, and Gardenhire regretted doing that. We’ll be on the watch for any signals that point to whomever fills that role.

And that’s a good point, though it explains more why the Twins won’t than why they shouldn’t.

So I don’t know what the Twins are going to do. We’ll keep you posted on the news as we know more. But I don’t believe this sinks the Twins’ playoff hopes; regardless of how great Nathan is, the Twins have a deep bullpen, some good arms, and even the best relievers don’t make a huge difference. Given the same innings and leverage, Nathan isn’t much more valuable than a healthy Neshek, for example.

According to a tweet from Joe C:

The #Twins have signed Nick Blackburn to a four-year, $14 million contract. The deal includes an $8 mil club option for 2014.

At the moment, that’s all the details I have on his deal. But let’s take a look at it, shall we?

He has two years of service time, which means he’s currently entering his third and final pre-arbitration year. Thus, this 4-year deal buys him out through all three arbitration years, plus an option for his first year in free agency.

Normally, arbitration salaries are set at 40%/60%/80% of your free agent value in each year. Blackburn produced 2.5 WAR in 2008, and 3.0 WAR in 2009 (and is currently projected for 2.5 WAR in 2010). If we set his true talent level at 2.5 WAR, this four year contract should look something like this:

1. $1M (typical value for final pre-arbitration year, this could go up or down by a few hundred K)
2. $3.5M (2.5 WAR x 40% == 1 WAR … free agent salaries are $3.5M/win this winter)
3. $5.25M (2.5 WAR x 60% == 1.5 WAR at $3.5M/win)
4. $7M (2.5 WAR x 80% == 2 WAR at $3.5M/win)
5. $8M team option (2.5 WAR at $3.5M/win is $8.75M)

As you probably noticed, these values add up to more than $14M. Normally, players give a discount for the security of a long-term contract. This deal is about 83% of what Blackburn could have expected if he’d gone year-to-year (and performed as well as he has the last two years every single time). That seems like a larger-than-normal discount, which means the Twins did a good job at the negotiating table (even the option is discounted from his expected value).

It’s possible that the Twins have managed to value wins at an even lower rate than this discounted winter shows … the value of this contract makes sense at about $3.2M/win.

So the Twins negotiated themselves a good, team-friendly contract here. Maybe all that practice trying to deal with Mauer has been good for them. But is the value of the contract really the most important consideration here?

For starters, they’ve now locked up perhaps their most consistent starting pitcher for four seasons; Blackburn has also shown himself capable of stepping up in big games (which can’t be measured, but teams and teammates and managers and fans all love those guys). Blackburn is the team’s only groundball pitcher, during an offseason in which they’ve re-upped on infield defense with the addition of Hardy & Hudson. If they expect to make a commitment to Hardy, it makes sense to lock up Blackburn. Plus, this will lend some consistency to the starting rotation. They’ve got a solid, consistent starter for his age 28-31 seasons, which are often a pitcher’s best.

Of course, there are downsides — Blackburn could get hurt or be ineffective. He hasn’t shown much risk of injury, but that could happen at any time for a pitcher. Plus, it blocks the pipeline of pitching talent. With both Baker and Blackburn signed to long-term deals, the space in the rotation for younger (perhaps more talented) pitchers is pretty thin; especially until Baker and Blackburn are considered “veteran presences,” thus removing the need to sign a guy like Pavano (or Livan Hernandez, or Ramon Ortiz, or whatever other guy they feel will give them a 5.95 ERA every 5 days).

I think you can’t be too worried about injuries in this situation. They could happen, but if you go by that logic you’d never sign anyone. And if a group of young pitchers starts knocking hard on the door and Blackburn seems like he should be the odd man out, plenty of teams are looking for consistent workhorses who are groundball machines, excel in big moments, and are signed to team-friendly deals — it shouldn’t be hard to find a taker in a trade and get something back for Blackburn. Especially if he pitches well, besting his 2.5 WAR valuation.

I didn’t really expect to like a long-term deal for Nick Blackburn, but I do. This was a good move for the Twins, and hopefully is an indication of the kind of successful negotiations they can execute, when it comes to the Mauer deal.