The other day, while taking my kids to school, I held up traffic by trying to cut over a lane to make a left turn, and a car stuck behind me honked long and loud.  My son, Lucas (10), said matter of factly, “You deserved that, Dad.”  (I think he was right.)  Of course, I then had to go Socratic on him and try to figure out what he means by ‘desert’, and I won’t bore you with the details.  But it reminded me of an issue I’ve raised here before (e.g., here), and I’d like to get more explicit answers from people, especially skeptics about ‘genuine desert’ (by way of skepticism of ‘desert-entailing’ free will).  Let me pose the questions this way:

1. Either (a) I didn’t deserve to be honked at (children don’t deserve to be reprimanded for bad behavior, top musicians don’t deserve their awards, bad politicians don’t deserve to be voted out of office, etc.) or (b) I did deserve it (they do deserve it).
2. If (a), is it because even low-level degrees of desert are unjustified for the same reasons that all desert is unjustified—i.e., we lack the powers of self-creation, sourcehood, agent causation, or unconditional choice that would be required for any and all desert?  (If so, does this mean that Lucas was implicitly assuming that I have such metaphysical powers when he made his comment? And I was misusing the concept when I thought I deserved to be honked at—and that others deserve things—since I don’t think people have such powers?)
3. If (b), is it because ‘desert’ is properly used in different ways, and it applies to my case and other low-level desert cases because those cases don’t require the metaphysical powers, but it does not apply to other cases that seem to involve more significant degrees of desert, like deserving to be punished retributively?  (If so, does this mean that Sandusky or this guy do not deserve blame and punishment, but I do, because the concept is being applied differently across the cases? Or does it mean that they deserve blame in the same watered down sense as I do, but not in the genuine sense that would justify more significant responses, such as retributive punishment?)
4. Or is there some other explanation I’m missing?

Of course, I think I deserved my low-level reprimand for the same reasons most people deserve blame and punishment, praise and reward (when they do and to the degree that they do):  I had the capacities to recognize that what I was doing was (low-level) wrong (i.e., d-baggish), and I had the opportunity to act differently (in the ordinary sense that nothing prevented me from exercising my capacities to recognize what I was doing, to choose and act otherwise, etc.).  And I think that’s roughly what Lucas was implicitly assuming (I also think he’d be quite good at picking up on mitigating circumstances based on these compatibilist conditions—from fanciful manipulators to ordinary excuses such as my being unable to see whether there were cars behind me or our being really late for school or my being so tired I couldn’t think straight, etc.). 

Skeptics (and libertarians?) about desert tend to focus on heinous crimes and criminals, perhaps thinking that if those guys (Robert Harris, Hitler, etc.) don’t deserve blame, then obviously no one does.  But this strategy may make the case more plausible, both because those guys may seem so crazy that it’s hard to distinguish whether what they lack is libertarian powers or compatibilist capacities and because those crimes are the sort that invoke the G-Strawsonian idea of heaven-and-hell responsibility/desert.  I’m thinking the case is harder to make working from the bottom up rather than the top down.  Convince us that no one deserves anything, including clearly rational, knowledgeable, self-controlled people, to any degree (and in both directions—blame and praise), or explain why low-level desert is different in kind from the sort of desert that you claim is not justified.

Yep, that's right: P.F. Strawson's landmark article was originally published in Proceedings of the British Academy in 1962.

In honor of its remarkable influence over the past half-century, The College of William & Mary is hosting a two-day conference this fall, Responsibility & Relationships, that will explore Strawsonian themes in contemporary moral philosophy, psychology, and the law, including new work on blame, punishment, and the moral emotions. And you're all invited.

The website for the conference is here.

It's happening on September 27-28, 2012, and participants include Laura Ekstrom, John Martin Fischer, Bennett Helm, Pamela Hieronymi, Jeanette Kennett, Adrienne Martin, Victoria McGeer, Jeffrie Murphy, Dana Nelkin, Paul Russell, Tim Scanlon, David Shoemaker, Dan Speak, Galen Strawson, R. Jay Wallace, and Gary Watson.

Information about how to register will come soon. For now, just save the dates, and plan on joining us for some great philosophy and, I hope, a beautiful few days exploring America's Historic Triangle.

Oh, and spread the word.

Thanks to the hard work of Oisín Deery, the website for the Society for Philosophy of Agency is now up here.  The Society is now accepting applications for membership.  Membership is free and open to graduate students, professional philosophers, and researchers working on issues about human agency who work primarily in cognate fields (e.g., law, neuroscience, psychology, theology, etc.). 

All you need to do to apply for membership is send an email to <philosophyofagency[at]gmail.com> with your name, email address, and institutional affiliation (if applicable).  You will be added to the Society's email list.  Your information will not be shared with anyone. 

The Society's first event will be held in a group session meeting on Friday, April 6, 2012, at the Pacific Division Meeting of the APA.  It will be a panel discussion on "The Current State and Future of Philosophical Research on Action and Agency" featuring Jeanette Kennett, Alfred Mele, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Eddy Nahmias, and Manuel Vargas.

Call for Papers: Narrativity: Interpretation, Embodiment and Responsibility 3rd Workshop in the series Moral Agency, Deliberative Awareness, and Conscious Control & Special Issue of Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Erasmus University of Rotterdam, the Netherlands & Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany. Special slots reserved for PhD's and junior researchers! Friday - Sunday 19-21 October 2012 Location: International School for Philosophy, Leusden, The Netherlands (within easy reach of airport Schiphol, Amsterdam)

The reasons we provide to understand, explain, and justify ourselves can be seen as attempts to interpret our behavior in broader narratives (our own, that of the audience and/or the narratives figuring in our society). These narratives create coherence in our behavior, and greatly enhance our capacity for interpersonal understanding. However, findings in the behavioral, cognitive and neurosciences raise questions about the extent to which the reasons we give and the overarching narratives they are part of correspond with the actual influences on and causes of our behavior. These findings seem to indicate that our attempts to account for the origins of our actions should primarily be seen as rational reconstructions. This raises issues about the relation of narratives to our identity and actions. How do our attempts to fit our behavior into acceptable narratives influence who we are and what we do? What can we learn from the behavioral, cognitive and neurosciences about the embodiment and function of narratives? Can narratives obstruct a clear view on ourselves? If so, can we identify criteria to assess the adequacy or correctness of narratives and our attempts to fit our behavior into a narrative?

This workshop invites papers that explore the relevance of narratives and reasons as intermediates between ourselves and society, with an eye on (i) the implications for philosophical accounts of our practices of responsibility, and (ii) the empirical findings with regard to the role of narrativity and interpretation in our everyday interactions. Suitable topics include: • The relevance of narratives to understanding human action and responsibility • Self-narrative, social interaction (including inter-group interaction) and embodiment • Conditions of adequacy for narratives (especially self-narratives) in relation to our practices of responsibility • The relation between self-understanding and action • Conditions of adequacy of interpretation (e.g., how can we distinguish between an adequate reconstruction of one's reasons and confabulation?) • How to understand the empirical findings with regard to the role of narrativity and interpretation in our everyday interactions.

There will be 4 slots of 40 minutes for junior researchers (20 minutes talk, 20 minutes discussion), and 7 or 8 slots for the other invited participants (45 minutes talks and 45 minutes discussion). A selection of the papers presented on the workshop will be eligible for publication in a special issue of Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (http://www.springer.com/philosophy/philosophical+traditions/journal/11097). Please indicate whether you want your paper considered for publication in this issue.

More information: http://maureensie.wordpress.com/workshops/workshop-iii/ If you're interested, please send us an extended abstract (about 1,500 words) of your intended paper and a short (!) bio (related to your research) or list of publications, before May 2012. Notification of acceptance will be based on the abstracts and can be expected in June. The paper itself is expected three weeks before the start of the workshop, that is, before October 1st. Preferably your paper should not yet be submitted for publication at the time of the workshop.

Deadlines Closing date: May 1st 2012 Notification of acceptance: June 2012 Deadline Draft Papers: End of September 2012 Send your PDF's or plain text to: fwb-workshopma@eur.nl (subject heading: narrativity-submission or narrativity-inquiry)

practical information The workshop will start with a lunch on Friday (around 12.00), and end after the lunch on Sunday (around 14.00). Invited speakers will be expected to pay 220 euro for accommodation and meals (includes: two breakfasts, three lunches, two conference dinners, and two nights in a single room). All-inclusive participation to the workshop for non-speakers will be 520 euro; participation without dinner and accommodation, but including lunch: 250 euro. Reduction of 40% (150 euro) available for unwaged (PhD) students under the age of 30. Like our 2011 workshop, this workshop will be held at conference centre 'International School for Philosophy' (Leusden/Amersfoort), which is beautifully located in the woods nearby Utrecht & Amsterdam, the Netherlands (http://www.isvw.nl/nl/english/). It is easy to reach by public transportation.

Organizing committee Maureen Sie, Nicole van Voorst Vader, Arno Wouters (Erasmus University Rotterdam) and Leon de Bruin (in collaboration with the research group of Albert Newen, Ruhr-Universität Bochum)

Maybe the most attractive feature of retributivism in the philosophy of punishment is that it has a principle of proportionality.  Proportionality is intimitately connected with desert.  As the criminologist Andrew von Hirsch (who has written a fantastic series of books and articles on this topic) describes it, the proportionality principle dictates that punishment should be  “commensurate to the degree of blameworthiness of the conduct,” where “blameworthiness depends both on the harmfulness of the conduct and on the degree of culpability of the actor.” (Reply to Bedau, J Phil, 1978).  According to von Hirsch, the proportionality principle is “a basic requirement of fairness.”  

The big problem for retributivists is trying to match deserved punishments to particular crimes.   What punishment does someone deserve for armed robbery (where no one was physically harmed)?  Ten years in prison?  Five years?  Two years and probation?  Flogging?   Retributivists have a notoriously hard time coming up with a theoretical basis to answer this question, and our intuitions are hazy at best.  So what does the proportionality principle really entail? 

One possibility, championed by my new favorite criminologist Norval Morris, is to adopt a ‘range only’ view of proportionality, according to which a criminal’s blameworthiness yields only upper and lower limits of deserved punishment.  Our intuitions may not tell us precisely what sentence a criminal deserves for armed robbery, but we have a good sense of what kinds of punishments would be undeserved.   Morris argues that punishments within that range are fair, deserved, and proportionate.  According to Von Hirsch though, the range-only view is open to “a fundamental objection”: it would allow two offenders who are equally blameworthy to receive different punishments.  This is just the kind of unfair outcome the proportionality principle is supposed to rule out.   

Von Hirsch addresses this problem by employing a well-known distinction between cardinal and ordinal proportionality.   Cardinal proportionality is absolute: it ‘anchors’ the severity of the punishment to the seriousness of the crime.  Because of the haziness of our intuitions, cardinal proportionality has to remain ‘range only’, issuing upper and lower limits where punishments would obviously be either too severe or too light.  Ordinal proportionality is relative.  It requires that like crimes be treated alike.  If two criminals commit crimes of equal seriousness (and are equally blameworthy), then they should receive the same punishment.  Von Hirsch faults Morris for failing to account for the requirement of ordinal proportionality.

The analogy von Hirsch gives is university grades.  The standards for ‘A’ papers vs. ‘B’ papers etc, are real but indeterminate (cardinal proportionality) and may depend on other factors about the university.  But once those standards are set, we should give papers of equal quality the same grade (ordinal proportionality).  According to Von Hirsch, the same reasoning applies in criminal justice.

All this may sound plausible when considered abstractly, but I want to argue that  punishments that violate ordinal proportionality are not unfair.   There is a significant disanalogy in the grading example.  When a student writes a bad paper, there’s no victim (except maybe the instructor who has to comment on it).   My claim is that presence of a victim diminishes the requirement of ordinal proportionality and that range-only view is sufficient for fair and deserved punishments. 

Here’s an example, borrowed from Freaks and Geeks, a show I’ve been watching lately with my daughter.  In one episode, Lindsay the older sister wants to go out with the cool kids (especially James Franco) on Halloween so she ditches her Mom, who was looking forward to their tradition of handing out cookies to kids.  While driving around, her friends bring out the eggs and start throwing them at houses and then at trick-or-treaters.   When it’s Lindsay’s turn, she throws one (reluctantly, under pressure) and ends up hitting her little brother Sam, who has had a bad night already.  She’s mortified, makes them go back, but her brother just goes home humiliated.  Lindsay makes the kids drop her off at home right away, and they arrive at the same time.  The mother sees Sam and asks who threw the egg at him.  Sam looks at Lindsay, knowing that if he tells his Mom, she’ll be grounded for a long time.  He thinks about it but then says he doesn’t know who the person was.   Linsday is spared.  Her punishment is just the look of hurt and contempt on her brother’s face.

Now imagine the same events occurring in a neighboring town, except in that in that case the brother (Tom) is angry enough to tell his mother that his sister (Lauren) threw the egg.   The mother is furious and grounds Lauren for two weeks.  Does anyone have the intuition that Lauren’s punishment is unfair or undeserved because Lindsay received a far lesser one?  I certainly don’t.   Two weeks grounding seems about right for pelting defenseless trick-or- treaters with eggs from a car (cardinal proportionality), and nothing about what happened to Lindsay makes Lauren’s fate unjust or undeserved.  In fact, assuming she has the same moral compass as Lindsay, I doubt Lauren would complain about the relative inequality of their fates if she knew about them.  So this seems like a case where ordinal proportionality is violated yet both Lauren and Lindsay—who are equally blameworthy—received the punishments they deserved.

Now you might disagree.  Maybe you think that what’s unfair is that Lindsay got off scot-free, that she did not in fact get the punishment that she deserved.  But I think that’s not right either.   First, she feels terrible guilt.  Second, she has to endure the contempt of her younger brother, who knows how hard she’s working to impress some kids who will probably never accept her anyway.   That too seems like a reasonable punishment for what she did.  It was Halloween, after all.  Kids throw eggs.  Furthermore, to the extent that you disagree, I’d argue that has nothing to do with Lauren’s punishment, but rather it’s because you think that Lindsay’s punishment falls below the reasonable lower limit—in other words, that it violates cardinal proportionality. 

So to sum up this long post, it’s no coincidence that von Hirsch loves to present grading and award fellowships as examples, because there aren’t any victims.  (In fact, I’d agree with Von Hirsch about punishment for ‘victimless crimes.’)  But the presence of a victim introduces a new element that diminishes ordinal proportionality.  Sam was able to have a say in how Lindsay would be punished, and there’s nothing wrong or unfair about that—even if a different brother did something else in the same situation.    When there is a victim, then, the ‘range-only’ view of proportionality and desert is sufficient.   What does everyone else think?

Does anyone know why Widerker (2002, 316) calls the following assumption "IVD"?

"If determinism is true, then no agent could have avoided acting as he did ..."

Tamler Sommer's Relative Justice: Cultural Diversity, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility is now out.  Here's info at Amazon and here at Princeton University Press.  Congratulations!