We have talked alot both on our radio show (“Vondran legal hour”) and on our blogs about our NO ADVANCE FEE wachovia and world savings loan modification program.  Some people have wanted to see proof and we can certainly appreciate skepticism especially when there are so many foreclosure rescue scams out there.

We have provided proof of some of our results on our website CONTINGENCYMODS.COM.

Here is a recent loan modification we were able to obtain for a California homeowner which ushers in a great Easter with a mortgage payment just over $700 a month and a 2% interest rate (start rate).  The modification also offers a chance to earn principal reduction for timely payments.  Not a bad deal at all. If you have a note that was originated by World Savings or Wachovia (both of which are now owned by Wells Fargo, and your loan may therefore be serviced and owned by Wells Fargo) and if your loan is a “pick-a-payment” loan which gave you multiple payment obligations when you first got it, and, assuming you have a hardship and can afford a reasonable monthly loan payment, please give us a call to see what we can do for you. We have had people that want to litigate these loans (which we do not presently do) and we have watched them lose their houses when we may have had a chance to get them something through our proven channel.  It is a true shame, but some people just don’t get it. While these results are nice, we cannot and do not guarantee any specific results, and each case is determined on its own basis.

We also cannot guarantee timeframes but I would say typically we can results within 1-3 months and sometimes faster if there is a sale date approaching.  At any rate, no guarantees are made, but with nothing out of pocket, what do you have to lose?  Contact us at (877) 276-5084. PS – this is the ONLY lender or loan servicer we submit loan modifications for.

Well, we have talked about the 25 billion dollar settlement between the various state attorney generals and the five big banks (citi, ally financial, wells fargo, bank of america, and jp morgan chase), but now we have something concrete.   The 25 billion dollar attorney general settlement agreements have appeared on the internet for review.  You can click on the settlement agreements with the various lenders.

There are some basic categories such as new servicing standards, consumer relief sections, monitoring and enforecement provisions, and liability releases.  I am not going to go into everything in this blog post, we have discussed this on another post.  The big questions are:

1.  How will this help you, the individual borrower?

2.  Who will get what?  There don’t seem to be any guidelines for who will get the help (i.e. no guarantees to anyone in particular – remember, this was the same problem with HAMP)

3.  Will this help the overall economy?

4.  Is this a fair settlement given the types of abuses outlined in the settlement agreements (which literally run the gamut, and which the lenders basically denied in every court case I have ever seen or heard of).  Typical abuses we have been talking about for the past five years which are documented in these settlement agreements (as this song goes, it was NOT “just may imagination, running away with me” as we were trying to explain to the judges).  Sample lending and loan servicer abuses outlined in these settlement agreements include:

a.  Violations of False Claims Act

b.  Bankruptcy abuses including filing bogus proof of claims. We have talked about this on our website (http://www.UltimateBK.com)

c. Problems with originating loans

d.  Problems with servicing loans

e.  HAMP – telling people not to make payments then denying loan modifications We have talked about this on our website (http://www.TrialPLanFraud.com)

f.  Wrongful conduct relating to foreclosure (ex. robosigning).  We have talked about this on our website (http://www.RobosignerAudits.com)

Basically, everything we said was going on that was wrong, is confirmed by this settlement agreement.

We have also talked about the potential shortcomings of this settlement agreement – no principle reduction for fannie and freddie loans for example.

Here is another attorney who had something to say about the mortgage settlement, give a listen to Matt Weidner’s point of view on the settlement agreement.

At the end of the day, please share your stories with us as to whether or not this settlement does anything for you.

I came across this today from the California Attorney General website.  Just a quick post for you to review that discusses a California homeowner bill of rights which is “designed to protect homeowners from unfair practices by banks and mortgage companies and to help consumers and communities cope with the state’s urgent mortgage and foreclosure crisis.”

The memo states:

“California communities and families are being devastated by the mortgage and foreclosure crisis. We must ensure the deceptive practices that caused it never happen again,” said Attorney General Harris. “The California Homeowner Bill of Rights will provide basic fairness and transparency for homeowners, and improve the mortgage process for everyone.”

The legislation builds on the California commitment announced by Attorney General Harris earlier this month, which is expected to result in $18 billion of benefits for California homeowners. That agreement included reforms for mortgages owned by the five banks that were signing parties. The California Homeowner Bill of Rights will strengthen those protections, make them permanent, and apply them to all mortgages in the state.

“When I secured the California commitment, I made clear it was only one of many steps I am taking to comprehensively address the mortgage and foreclosure crisis,” Attorney General Harris continued. “I want to thank Senate President pro Tem Steinberg, Assembly Speaker Pérez and all the other lawmakers who are supporting this urgent package of legislation for homeowners.”

“I want to congratulate the Attorney General on the victory she won on behalf of the people of California,” said Speaker John A. Pérez. “Our state has suffered greatly as the result of bad actors in the banking and financial industries, and this settlement holds them accountable as we continue the difficult work of recovering the housing market and stemming the tide of foreclosures, evictions and auctions.”

“Millions of Californians have already lost their homes to foreclosure and the mortgage crisis is far from over,” said Senate President pro Tem Darrell Steinberg. “This landmark settlement negotiated by Attorney General Harris helps thousands of Californians but thousands more need the same help. We need to put these protections into law so that more people can save their homes.”

The press release also goes on to discuss some new bills that would hopefully be passed and states what they might do to help the California homeowner:

If passed, the following bills would:

ASSEMBLY BILL 1602 / SENATE BILL 1470- THE FORECLOSURE REDUCTION ACT OF 2012

Authors: Assemblymen Mike Eng and Mike Feuer; Senators Mark Leno, Fran Pavley, and Senate President pro Tem Darrell Steinberg
-Require creditors to provide documentation to a borrower that establishes the creditor’s right to foreclose on real property prior to recording a notice of default.
-Require creditors to provide documentary evidence of ownership, the chain of title to real property, and the right to foreclose, at the time of the filing of a notice of default.
-Prohibit creditors from recording a notice of default when a timely-filed application for a loan modification or other loss mitigation measure is pending.
-Prohibit creditors from recording a notice of sale when a timely-filed application for a loan modification or other loss mitigation measure is pending.
-Prohibit creditors from recording a notice of sale while a borrower is in compliance with the terms of a trial loan modification or after another loss mitigation measure has been approved.
-Require creditors to disclose why an application for a loan modification or other loss mitigation measure has been denied.
-Require that notices of foreclosure sales be personally served, including notices of foreclosure sale postponement.
-Provide homeowners with a private right of action in instances in which the requirements set forth in the legislation are not followed

ASSEMBLY BILL 2425 / SENATE BILL 1471 – DUE PROCESS REFORM LEGISLATION

Authors: Assemblywoman Holly Mitchell; Senators Mark DeSaulnier and Fran Pavley
-Require creditors to provide a single point of contact to borrowers in the foreclosure process who will be responsible for providing accurate account and other information related to the foreclosure process and loss mitigation efforts.
-Require creditors to provide a dedicated electronic mail address, facsimile number and mailing address for borrowers to submit information requested as part of a loan modification, short sale or other loss mitigation option.
-Authorize borrowers to challenge the unlawful commencement of a foreclosure process in court.
-Impose a $10,000 civil penalty on the recordation or filing of “robosigned” documents, defined as documents that contain information that was not verified for accuracy by the person or persons signing or swearing to the accuracy of the document or statement.
-Require that certain documents be recorded in a county recorder’s office.

ASSEMBLY BILL 2314 / SENATE BILL 1472 – BLIGHT PREVENTION LEGISLATION

Authors: Assemblywoman Wilmer Carter; Senator Fran Pavley
-Prevent blight enforcement actions from being taken against new purchasers of blighted property for 60 days, provided that repairs are being made to the property.
-Require banks that release liens on foreclosed property to inform local code enforcement agencies of the release so that demolition of blighted property can proceed.
-Increase fines against owners of blighted property from $1,000 per day to $5,000 per day, and allow the imposition of the costs of a receivership over blighted property to be imposed directly against the owner of blighted property.

ASSEMBLY BILL 2610/ SENATE BILL 1473 – TENANT PROTECTION LEGISLATION

Authors: Assemblywoman Nancy Skinner; Senator Loni Hancock
-Require purchasers of foreclosed homes to honor the terms of existing leases and give tenants at least 90 days notice before commencing eviction proceedings.

ASSEMBLY BILL 1950 – ENHANCEMENT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL ENFORCEMENT

Author: Assemblyman Mike Davis
-Impose a new $25 fee to be paid by servicers upon the recording of a notice of default. The fee would be deposited into a real estate fraud prosecution trust fund that would support the Attorney General’s efforts to deter, investigate and prosecute real estate fraud crimes, including the work of the Mortgage Fraud Strike Force.
-Extend the statute of limitations from one year to four years from the date of discovery for violations of law commonly occurring in connection with foreclosure-related scams, including acting as a real-estate agent without a license and charging up-front fees for loan modification services.

SENATE BILL 1474 / ASSEMBLY BILL 1763 – ATTORNEY GENERAL SPECIAL GRAND JURY

Authors: Assemblyman Mike Davis; Senator Loni Hancock
-Authorize the Attorney General to impanel a special grand jury for the purposes of investigating and indicting multi-jurisdictional financial crimes against the state.

________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

We applaud any steps that may actually help homeowners.  We would still like to see SB 94 repealed at least as to lawyers, so that they can be represented in the homeowners dealings with the banks.  But I believe SB94 sunsets in 2013 so that may happen anyway, we will keep you posted.

More and more California Notaries are finding their way into civil foreclosure lawsuits.

We are seeing more and more notary “produce the transaction log” letters being sent out by California lawyers to various notaries in both California and elsewhere.  We have talked about California notary duties on our websites, in particular on our Robosisgner website.  This phenomena is happening, i think, due to the $25 billion mortgage settlements that were based in part on allegations of robosigning and notary fraud.  More California homeowners and their attorneys seems to be filing written demands to notaries to produce their journal books verifying that certain documents (such as a deed of trust) were actually signed.  Some homeowners I believe are starting to examine their rights under the settlement to see if they can get a slice of the settlement pie.

Other California property owners (and former owners who have already been foreclosed on) I believe are also demanding to see the notary transaction books as part of making a decision to file a civil lawsuit to either stop a foreclosure sale, or seeking damages against the broker, lender, and notary, for “wrongful foreclosure”, fraud, elder abuse, or other types of legal action.  Regardless, the notary demand letters are flying, and some people have asked for more information on the topic.  We have prepared this brief overview of California Government Code Section 8620 which talks about the notary duty to keep a notary journal, and the duty to respond to public requests.

As you can see, the law does impose certain duties on a California notary to keep notary records and respond to public demands.  If the notary journal is lost, destroyed, etc., the notary has a duty to notify the California Secretary of State “immediately” under Cal. Gov’t Code Section 8602(d).

If you are suing a notary, or being sued as a notary, you might want to investigate our services.  We are seeing a rash of civil lawsuits wrongfully naming notaries and joining them as defendants in a civil lawsuit merely because they were the notary on the transaction.  This is not to say there is no such thing as notary fraud.  It’s just that every case needs to be investigated for its merits immediately upon receiving a summons and complaint alleging wrongful conduct.  Contact us at (877) 276-5084 if you have needs in this area.

More information can also be obtained in the California Notary Public Handbook.

The not

Here’s one situation that came up recently.   The borrower had a first and second mortgage (both were refinance loans – non-purchase money loans).  The borrower was not making loan payments and they received a notice of default.  Prior to the trustee sale date, the borrower filed for bankruptcy protection (Chapter 7 no asset case).  The senior lien holder sought to lift the automatic stay in bankruptcy and the motion was granted.  The house was thereafter sold at private foreclosure sale.  After the sale, the bankruptcy discharged (eliminating any personal liability on the first and second mortgage).  However, the junior mortgagee, believing itself to be a “sold out junior” (one action rule – we have talked about this on other posts) sought to collect on the second mortgage debt.  The borrower sought to reopen the bankruptcy case arguing the action to collect the debt violated the bankruptcy discharge.  The junior lien holder argued they were not scheduled on the bankruptcy petition so their debt was not discharged.  So what happens in this situation?   A similar situation arises where an unscheduled (omitted creditor) seeks to file a lawsuit after the chapter 7 no asset bankruptcy case was discharged.  Here is one argument to look at and some case law that supports the proposition that the debt was discharged even if it was not listed on the bankruptcy petition.

Here is a general look at two cases that address this point (In re Hicks and Beezley).  The following is general legal information only and should not be relied on as legal advice and may not be accurate or up to date.  Please consult a bankruptcy attorney to discuss your case.  This article is limited to the situation where  a creditor seeks to collect on an alleged debt after the debtor receives a discharge in a chapter 7 “no-asset” case.

In re Hicks, 184 B.R. 954, 27 Bankr.Ct.Dec. 676 (Bkrtcy.C.D.Cal., 1995).

This is a case that involved a chapter 7 no-asset bankruptcy case.  The debtor filed for bankruptcy protection and the bankruptcy petition omitted an alleged creditor who claimed liability on two promissory notes.  Eight months after the bankruptcy was discharged on February 1993, the alleged creditor filed a civil lawsuit seeking to collect on the notes.  The Plaintiff’s attorney was sent a copy of the Notice of Discharge, but ignored it and continued to proceed with the case.

The Plaintiff thereafter sought to reopen the bankruptcy to schedule the alleged debt, and then to discharge it.  The Court held that although it is permissible to reopen a bankruptcy to afford further relief to the debtor, there was no need to do so in this case as the alleged debt was already discharged.  The Court discussed 11 U.S.C. 524(a) discharge injunction which the court stated: “operates as an injunction against any post-discharge enforcement of any discharged claim as a matter of federal law.”  The court went on to state that: “reopening this case to permit determination of whether this creditor should be liable for a violation of the discharge injunction is appropriate.”

A similar case in the 9^th Circuit Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion.  In the case of Beezley v. California Land Title Co. (In re Beezley), 994 F.2d 1433, 1434 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam), the court was faced with another no-asset Chapter 7 bankruptcy case and a subsequent action to collect on a debt following the bankruptcy discharge.  In Beezley, the alleged creditor (who had obtained a default judgment prior to the filing of the chapter 7 bankruptcy, but who was omitted on the schedule of creditors), sought to recover from the debtor and enforce the debt following the Chapter 7 discharge order.  The debtor raised the defense of discharge.  Ultimately the legal issue was whether or not the bankruptcy debt was discharged in the no-asset chapter 7.  The Court discussed the difference between debts that are automatically discharged in a chapter 7 no-asset case –whether scheduled or not, (11 U.S.C. 523(a)(3)(A)), from those that are not automatically discharged if unscheduled, (11 U.S.C. 523(a)(3)(B)).  Debts covered under Section “A” are automatically discharged whether they are scheduled or not in the no-asset chapter 7 case.  Debts that fall under Section “B” (basically debts that result from intentional fraud, willful injury, false statement or embezzlement) may arguably survive the discharge, but it is Plaintiff’s burden to prove such exemption, the failure of which results in a discharge violation.

Section 524 of the bankruptcy code is clear and unambiguous as to what is required to prove a violation of the discharge injunction order under section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code:

“A discharge “operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action . . . to collect, recover or offset any [discharged] debt as a personal liability of the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2). A party who knowingly violates the discharge injunction can be held in contempt under Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. See Renwick v. Bennett, (In re Bennett), 298 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002). The party “seeking contempt sanctions has the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the sanctions are justified . . . ‘[T]he movant must prove that the creditor (1) knew the discharge injunction was applicable and (2) intended the actions which violated the injunction.’” ZiLOG, Inc. v. Corning (In re ZiLOG, Inc.), 450 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).

This gives you a general idea of the way a California bankruptcy court might review these types of cases where a lawsuit is filed, or collection efforts are taken after the discharge in the no-asset Chapter 7 bankruptcy case.  If you are facing an aggressive creditor seeking to collect on a debt following your bankruptcy discharge, consider contacting our firm to discuss.  You may have legal rights to assert against the creditor.  We can be reached at (877) 276-5084.  Ask for “ATTORNEY STEVE” – More bankruptcy information can be found at Ultimate BK.

Okay, here comes the latest window dressing of the day and a settlement that may force what the banks should have done voluntarily and that is give principle reductions to California homeowners.  Here is a link to the mortgage settlement with the California Attorney General.  Here are a few snippets from the Attorney General on the settlement:

-    ”California families will finally see substantial relief after experiencing so much pain from the mortgage crisis,” said Attorney General Harris. “Hundreds of thousands of homeowners will directly benefit from this California commitment.”

-     “This outcome is the result of an insistence that California receive a fair deal commensurate with the harm done here. We insisted on homeowner relief for Californians and demanded enforceability so homeowners actually see a benefit that will allow them to stay in their homes, and preserved our ability to investigate banker crime and predatory lending,” continued Harris.

Here is the part of the press release that concerns me:

As part of the separate California guarantee, banks must enact a minimum of $12 billion in principal reductions for California homeowners. Failure to achieve this minimum level of reductions will result in substantial cash payments of up to $800 million that the banks will have to pay to the state.

So apparently 12 billion is earmarked for homeowner principal reduction, but if, just if, the banks don’t give that amount then they pay 800 million (a much small amount) TO THE STATE?  Is this a back door way to give California a BAILOUT??  Somebody please talk to me here?  Am I missing something?  Now I have not seen any draft of the settlement agreement as this settlement just came out, but something seems amiss with a clause like this.

The next issue is WHO GETS THE PRINCIPAL REDUCTION?  WHAT IS THE CRITERIA?  WILL THE IMPLEMENTATION BE FAIR?  HOW WILL THIS WORK?

Well, according to the press release not all counties will be included in the principal reduction program (okay, then who gets it)?  Here is what the press release says:

County-specific payments are based on the number of homeowners and the depth of the foreclosure crisis. It is estimated that homeowners in the following counties will accrue the following level of benefits over the three-year life of the commitment.
- Los Angeles: $3.92 billion
- Riverside: $1.59 billion
- San Bernardino: $1.13 billion
- Sacramento: $820 million
- Stanislaus County: $368 million

Here are other details made public (and my comments in bold):

The financial benefits of this historic agreement extend to homeowners whose loans are owned or serviced by one of the five largest mortgage lenders.

HARRIS SAID: ”I will continue to fight for principal reductions for the approximately 60 percent of California homeowners whose loans are owned by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,” Attorney General Harris added.

Benefits include:
- More than $12 billion is guaranteed to reduce the principal on loans or offer short sales to approximately 250,000 California homeowners who are underwater on their loans and behind or almost behind in their payments.

Supposedly there will be major relief in the first year of the program.  
- $849 million is estimated to be dedicated to refinancing the loans of 28,000 homeowners who are current on their payments but underwater on their loans.

So how will they decide who gets to reap the benefit of an underwater refi?  This money would go fast.
- $279 million will be dedicated to offering restitution to approximately 140,000 California homeowners who were foreclosed upon between 2008 and December 31, 2011.

Who qualifies for restitution?  What is the criteria?  How much will each person get?  What type of violations must you have?
- $1.1 billion is estimated to be distributed to homeowners for unemployed payment forbearance and transition assistance as well as to communities to repair the blight and devastation left by waves of foreclosures, targeted at 16,000 recent foreclosures.
- $3.5 billion will be dedicated to relieving 32,000 homeowners of unpaid balances remaining when their homes are foreclosed.

What?  32,000 homeowners will have their mortgages cancelled?  Is that what I am hearing?  Is this a lottery?
- $430 million in costs, fees and penalty payments.

I suppose this goes to the state and is badly needed.

OH, AND THE SETTLEMENT CREATES 42 MORE JOBS:

California will expand its Mortgage Fraud Strike Force, adding to the more than 42 members already working on the team.

The press release (video) is scheduled for 11:00 a/m this morning and hopefully you can see it here.

We will keep an eye on this and see how it plays out.  Hopefully this is not just more window dressing.

California Foreclosure Case – Lona v. Citibank (scroll to the bottom) Okay, we have been talking about predatory lending for some time now.  We have talked about California homeowners being steered into loans that virtually guaranteed their foreclosure sale.  We have talked about lenders and real estate brokers that falsely stated income on loan applications, and we have talked about non-judicial foreclosure sales and the challenges involved in trying to set aside the foreclosure sale, including the lender “tender” rule (the rule that the banks argue in almost every foreclosure case basically arguing to the judge that you cannot challenge the foreclosure sale unless you tender the full balance of your loan).  Of course very few people have the financial ability to pay the lender off on the loan, much less a borrower in default on a mortgage loan.  At any rate, the Lona cases that recently came down from the California Court of Appeals (yes, the decision what thankfully cited for publication) takes an interesting view of stated income loans, the underwriting of these loans, and the tender rule in California (and its exceptions which the court was adept in pointing out). So here goes, here are the facts of Lona v. Citibank. The borrower was Mr. Lona, who apparently was of mexican decent and had an 8th grade education.  He also apparently had two pieces of property, both in foreclosure.  As to the foreclosure case at issue, Lona originally had a loan in the amount of 1.24 million dollars.  In January of 2007 Lona claimed he was responding to an advertisement to refinance his loans.  In response to the ads, Lona contacted the loan broker (First net mortgage) and applied for a loan.  The loan application was for what we call a “stated income loan” (this is where the borrower states the amount his gross monthly income is and/or sometimes the unscrupulous loan broker will just fill this in themselves).  At any rate, the loan application stated that Lona made $20,000 per month ($240,000 per year) when this in fact, apparently was not true (he was a mechanic at a mushroom farm).  Lona claimed his annual income was only $40,000 ($3,333 per month).  The loan was ultimately approved based on these figures, and both a first and second mortgage were originated. The first mortgage was for 1.125 million and was a 5/1 adjustable rate mortgage (loan was fixed for five years then would adjust).  The CAP on the loan was 13.25% and the interest rate was 8.25%.  The monthly payment on the first mortgage alone was $12,381.36.  The second mortgage was a 15-year fixed mortgage in the amount of $350,000 and had a 12.25% interest rate and $327,000 Balloon Payment.  In a nutshell, Lona claimed he could barely read english, did not read his loan documents, and that such were not adequately explained to him.  Nevertheless, he signed the loan documents and 5 months later he was in default on the loans (keep in mind the monthly combined payment on the loans was $12,381.36 over 4x’s his monthly income).  At some point after the loan was originated, the loan was sold to Citibank (probably part of a securitized loan scheme, but this is not confirmed) and EMC became the loan servicer of the loan.   The lender thereafter initiated foreclosure proceedings (filed a notice of default and notice of sale etc.) and sold the house via non-judicial foreclosure sale in August of 2008.  The house apparently went back to Citibank who recorded a trustees deed upon sale and thereafter moved to evict Lona from the property. Lona, however, did not go quietly into the foreclosure night.  Instead, he filed a civil suit alleging a variety of causes of action, and basically sought to set aside the foreclosure sale (these were the two claims that survived demurrer and which were remaining against Citibank and EMC).  The trial court found for Defendants in their motion for summary judgment, basically arguing that Defendant’s could not tender the loan balance, and must be held liable for his own actions in signing the loan.  The court also noted that the borrower had been living in his house for free for some time.  Further, the trial court ruled there was no evidence of any procedural irregularity or prejudice to the California homeowner Plaintiff. The Plaintiff appealed the grant of summary judgment arguing essentially that there was no requirement to tender the loan balance because the loan itself (and deed of trust) was illegal and unconscionable / unenforceable given that only his income was used to qualify him for the loan and that his credit did not warrant such a loan.  He also argued that given this, he did not need to tender the loan balance to try to set aside the foreclosure sale.  The unlawful detainer proceeding was consolidated with the Civil Action. The Courts holding in Lona v. Citibank The Court reversed the trial court and sent the case back for a trial on the merits.  The court ruled there was no tender requirement because the Plaintiff was attacking the very validity of the debt (which is one of the exception to the tender rule) and that there was a question of material fact as to the unconscionable / illegal nature of the loan contract.   In addition, there was a failure of Defendant to meet its burden for summary judgment on these issues, and the tender argument of Plaintiff was not addressed. Here is some key language pulled from the case:

I.               Elements of a Cause of Action to Set Aside Trustee’s Sale

After a nonjudicial foreclosure sale has been completed, the traditional method by which the sale is challenged is a suit in equity to set aside the trustee’s sale.  (Anderson v. Heart Federal Sav. & Loan Assn. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 202, 209-210.)  Generally, a challenge to the validity of a trustee’s sale is an attempt to have the sale set aside and to have the title restored.  (Onofrio v. Rice (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 413, 424 (Onofrio), citing 4 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (2d ed. 1989) Deeds of Trusts & Mortgages, § 9.154, pp. 507-508.) On summary judgment, a “defendant . . . has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if that party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action.”  (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Neither the parties’ briefs nor the papers they filed below on the motion for summary judgment discuss the elements of an equitable cause of action to set aside a foreclosure sale.  The parties do not cite any cases that expressly set forth the elements. “ ‘It is the general rule that courts have power to vacate a foreclosure sale where there has been fraud in the procurement of the foreclosure decree or where the sale has been improperly, unfairly or unlawfully conducted, or is tainted by fraud, or where there has been such a mistake that to allow it to stand would be inequitable to purchaser and parties.’ ”  (Lo v. Jensen (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1097-1098 (Lo), quoting Bank of America etc. Assn. v. Reidy (1940) 15 Cal.2d 243, 248; see also Angell v. Superior Court (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 691, 700.) Case law instructs that the elements of an equitable cause of action to set aside a foreclosure sale are:  (1) the trustee or mortgagee caused an illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive sale of real property pursuant to a power of sale in a mortgage or deed of trust; (2) the party attacking the sale (usually but not always the trustor or mortgagor) was prejudiced or harmed; and (3) in cases where the trustor or mortgagor challenges the sale, the trustor or mortgagor tendered the amount of the secured indebtedness or was excused from tendering.  (Bank of America etc. Assn. v. Reidy, supra, 15 Cal.2d at p. 248; Saterstrom v. Glick Bros. Sash, Door & Mill Co. (1931) 118 Cal.App. 379, 383 (Saterstrom) [trustee’s sale set aside where deed of trust was void because it failed to adequately describe property]; Stockton v. Newman (1957) 148 Cal.App.2d 558, 564 (Stockton) [trustor sought rescission of the contract to purchase the property and the promissory note on grounds of fraud]; Sierra-Bay Fed. Land Bank Ass’n v. Superior Court (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 318, 337 (Sierra-Bay) [to set aside sale, “debtor must allege such unfairness or irregularity that, when coupled with the inadequacy of price obtained at the sale, it is appropriate to invalidate the sale”; “debtor must offer to do equity by making a tender or otherwise offering to pay his debt”]; Abadallah v. United Savings Bank (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1109 (Abadallah) [tender element]; Munger v. Moore (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 1, 7 [damages action for wrongful foreclosure]; see also 1 Bernhardt, Mortgages, Deeds of Trust and Foreclosure Litigation (Cont.Ed.Bar 4th ed. 2011 supp.) § 7.67, pp. 580-581 and cases cited therein summarizing grounds for setting aside trustee sale.) Justifications for setting aside a trustee’s sale from the reported cases, which satisfy the first element, include the trustee’s or the beneficiary’s failure to comply with the statutory procedural requirements for the notice or conduct of the sale.  (Knapp, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at pp. 96-99 [alleged irregularity in default notice and sale notice]; Sierra-Bay Fed. Land Bank Ass’n v. Superior Court, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 337 [to set aside sale, “debtor must allege such unfairness or irregularity that, when coupled with the inadequacy of price obtained at the sale, it is appropriate to invalidate the sale”]; 6 Angels, Inc. v. Stuart-Wright Mortgage, Inc. (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1284 [“mere inadequacy of price, absent some procedural irregularity that contributed to the inadequacy of price or otherwise injured the trustor, is insufficient to set aside a nonjudicial foreclosure sale”].)  Other grounds include proof that:  (1) the trustee did not have the power to foreclose (Bank of America v. La Jolla Group II (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 706 [trustee’s sale invalid because borrower and lender had entered into agreement to cure default; loan was therefore current and lender did not have right to foreclose]; Dimock v. Emerald Properties (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 868, 878 (Dimock) [where original trustee completed trustee’s sale after being replaced by new trustee, sale was void because original trustee no longer had power to convey property]); (2) the trustor was not in default, no breach had occurred, or the lender had waived the breach (System Inv. Corp. v. Union Bank (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 137, 154 (System) [borrower was not in default because it was excused from performance by lender’s prior breach of contract; bank waived amount allegedly due]; Van Noy v. Goldberg (1929) 98 Cal.App.604 [debt had not matured]); or (3) the deed of trust was void (Saterstrom, supra, 118 Cal.App. at p. 383 [trustee’s sale set aside where deed of trust was void because it failed to adequately describe property]; Stockton, supra, 148 Cal.App.2d at p. 564 [trustor sought rescission of promissory note on grounds of fraud]; see also 1 Bernhardt, Mortgages, Deeds of Trust and Foreclosure Litigation, supra, § 7.67, pp. 580-581.  We shall discuss this element further in section V. B. of this opinion.

A.   Assertion That Loans Were Not Unconscionable

As a third ground for their motion, Citibank and EMC challenged the allegations of Lona’s second amended complaint that the trustee’s sale was “ ‘improperly held . . . due to the unconscionable and illegal nature of the loan agreement and deed of trust.’ ”  The moving parties did not specify which element of the cause of action this part of their motion addressed.  Arguably, it implicated both the first and third elements of the cause of action.  Lona contends that the trustee’s sale should be set aside on the grounds that the loan was void ab initio because it was unconscionable and that he was excused from the tender requirement because the loan was unconscionable.First, Citibank and EMC argued that a trustee’s sale could not be set aside for unconscionability because the only basis for setting aside a trustee’s sale is irregularity in the foreclosure procedure.  We have already rejected that contention. Second, Citibank and EMC argued that Lona failed to establish that the loans were unconscionable.  In essence, they asked the court to find, as a matter of law, that the loans and deeds of trust were not unconscionable. Before proceeding further, we review general principles governing the “judicially created doctrine of unconscionability.”  (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 113 (Armendariz), abrogated in part on another ground in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. __, __ [131 S.CT. 1740, 1746].)  “Unconscionability analysis begins with an inquiry into whether the contract is one of adhesion.  [Citation.]  ‘The term [contract of adhesion] signifies a standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.’ ”  (Ibid.)  The record here suggests that the deeds of trust and the notes were contracts of adhesion.  They appear to be standard forms that were drafted by the lender or others and presented to Lona for signature.  There was no evidence in the record that Lona had any role in negotiating the terms of the contracts. “If the contract is adhesive, the court must then determine whether ‘other factors are present which, under established legal rules—legislative or judicial—operate to render it [unenforceable].’  [Citation.]  ‘Generally speaking, there are two judicially imposed limitations on the enforcement of adhesion contracts or provisions thereof.  The first is that such a contract or provision which does not fall within the reasonable expectations of the weaker or “adhering” party will not be enforced against him.  [Citations.]  The second—a principle of equity applicable to all contracts generally—is that a contract or provision, even if consistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties, will be denied enforcement if, considered in its context, it is unduly oppressive or “unconscionable.” ’  [Citation.]  Subsequent cases have referred to both the ‘reasonable expectations’ and the ‘oppressive’ limitations as being aspects of unconscionability.”  (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 113.) “In 1979, the Legislature enacted Civil Code section 1670.5, which codified the principle that a court can refuse to enforce an unconscionable provision in a contract.  [Citation.]  As section 1670.5, subdivision (a) states:  ‘If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.’ ”  (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 114.)  Subdivision (b) of the statue provides:  “When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court in making the determination.” “ ‘[U]nconscionability has both a “procedural” and a “substantive” element,’ the former focusing on ‘ “oppression” ’ or ‘ “surprise” ’ due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on ‘ “overly harsh” ’ or ‘ “one-sided” ’ results.  [Citation.]  ‘The prevailing view is that [procedural and substantive unconscionability] must both be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of unconscionability.’  [Citation.]  But they need not be present in the same degree.  ‘Essentially a sliding scale is invoked which disregards the regularity of the procedural process of the contract formation, that creates the terms, in proportion to the greater harshness or unreasonableness of the substantive terms themselves.’  [Citations.]  In other words, the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.”  (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 114.) Absent unusual circumstances, evidence that one party has overwhelming bargaining power, drafts the contract, and presents it on a take-it-or-leave-it basis is sufficient to demonstrate procedural unconscionability and require the court to reach the question of substantive unconscionability, even if the other party has market alternatives.  (Gatton v. T-Mobile USA (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 571, 586.) In their motion, Citibank and EMC asserted that Lona voluntarily entered into the loans and received the benefits of the loan and that it was undisputed that he signed the loan documents, which set forth the terms of the loans.  The defendants focused on Lona’s allegations that the loans were unconscionable because of the potential increase in the interest rate on the first loan from 8.25 to 13.25 percent and the balloon payment on the second loan.  Citibank and EMC argued that these terms “had no impact whatsoever on [Lona’s] inability to make the monthly Loan payments,” because the interest rate on the first loan was fixed at 8.25 percent for the first five years and the balloon payment was not due for 15 years and Lona defaulted within the first year after entering into the loans.  We are not persuaded that the increase in the interest rate on the first loan or the amount of the balloon payment on the second loan are sufficient in and of themselves to support the claim that the loans were unconscionable.  However, Citibank and EMC’s assertion that these allegedly unconscionable terms of the loan did not cause the default does not necessarily dispose of Lona’s claim that the loans were void ab initio because they were unconscionable. In addition to alleging unconscionability based on the interest rates and balloon payment provision, the second amended complaint alleged that the loans were unconscionable and illegal because they “were made to [Lona] without reasonable consideration of his ability to repay the loans . . . given his income at the time” and that the interest rate “far exceeded what was reasonable given his credit rating at the time of application.”  Citibank and EMC’s motion did not address these allegations.  The moving parties presented no evidence regarding Lona’s income, credit rating, or credit worthiness.  And when Lona raised these factual issues in response to the motion for summary judgment, the moving parties did not respond; they did not discuss Lona’s evidence or provide any legal argument regarding the impact of that evidence.  They did not file anything in reply.  In our view, the defendants failed to meet their burden on summary judgment because their motion failed to address all of the allegations of the Lona’s second amended complaint regarding the alleged illegality of the loan. On summary judgment, an alternative method by which a defendant may meet its burden of showing that an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim cannot be established is to present evidence that the plaintiff “does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.”  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.)  But unlike federal law, summary judgment law in California requires the defendant to present evidence, and not simply point out through argument, that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain the needed evidence.  (Aguilar, at p. 854.)  Such evidence may consist of the deposition testimony of the plaintiff’s witnesses, the plaintiff’s factually devoid discovery responses, or admissions by the plaintiff in deposition or in response to requests for admission that he or she has not discovered anything that supports an essential element of the cause of action.  (See Villa v. McFerren (1995) 35 Cal.App. 4th 733, 749; Leslie G. v. Perry & Associates (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 472, 482; Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 590.) At the hearing on the summary judgment motion, Citibank and EMC argued that there was no evidence to support Lona’s allegations, that Lona had not alleged any facts that would create triable issues, and that Lona relied on conclusions and not facts, which was not enough to avoid summary judgment.  Citibank and EMC’s evidence in support of their motion for summary judgment consisted of the loan documents and documents related to the trustee’s sale, as well as the declaration of an employee of EMC describing and authenticating the documents.  They did not submit any discovery responses by Lona.  To the extent that their summary judgment motion relied on the claim that Lona had no evidence to support the allegations of his complaint, Citibank and EMC relied solely on argument and did not present the type of evidence necessary to demonstrate that Lona did not possess and could not reasonably obtain, needed evidence.  (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854.)  Thus, Citibank and EMC failed to meet their burden on summary judgment to show that Lona had no evidence that supported his claims. In addition, with regard to this ground, the record reveals triable issues of material fact.  In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Lona presented evidence that he had only an eighth grade education, his English was limited, no one explained the documents to him, and he did not understand what he was signing.  He presented evidence that, while the loan brokers told him what the initial interest rate and monthly payments were, they did not tell him how high the interest rate could increase on the first loan and that no one explained the balloon payment to him.  The loan documents appear to be on standard, pre-printed forms in English and there is no evidence Lona had any role in negotiating the terms of the loan.  In our view, this was sufficient evidence of unequal bargaining power, oppression or surprise to raise a triable issue regarding procedural unconscionability. In addition, there was uncontradicted evidence that Lona earned only $40,000 per year at the time the loans were approved, that only his income was considered in qualifying for the loan, and that the monthly payments were approximately four times his monthly income.[2]  Given the extreme disparity between the amount of the monthly loan payments and Lona’s income, this was sufficient to create a triable issue on the question of whether the loans were overly harsh and one-sided and thus substantivelyunconscionable.  And while this evidence may not ultimately be persuasive at trial, in this case, it was sufficient to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Since Citibank and EMC failed to address all of the allegations of the complaint regarding the alleged unconscionability of the loans and failed in their burden to show that Lona did not have any evidence to support his claims, we cannot say that they have met their burden of demonstrating that the loans and deeds of trust were not unconscionable as a matter of law.  In addition, Lona submitted sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue with regard to the alleged unconscionable nature of the transaction. Our holding does not mean that a borrower may defeat a motion for summary judgment in an action to set aside a trustee’s sale merely by alleging that he or she did not understand the terms of the loan documents signed or could not afford the loan.  In this case, the primary reasons for reversing the summary judgment are the moving parties’ failure to address all of the allegations of the second amended complaint and their failure to properly demonstrate that Lona had no evidence to support his claims.  In addition, after Lona’s opposition argued that the loan was void for illegality at the time of signing and submitted evidence that demonstrated an extreme disparity between Loan’s income and the amount of his monthly payments, Citibank and EMC made no effort to address this evidence, with argument or legal authority.

B.   Tender Requirement

Because the action is in equity, a defaulted borrower who seeks to set aside a trustee’s sale is required to do equity before the court will exercise its equitable powers.  (MCA, Inc. v. Universal Diversified Enterprises Corp. (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 170, 177 (MCA).)  Consequently, as a condition precedent to an action by the borrower to set aside the trustee’s sale on the ground that the sale is voidable because of irregularities in the sale notice or procedure, the borrower must offer to pay the full amount of the debt for which the property was security.  (Abadallah, supra, 43 Cal.App.4th at p. 1109; Onofrio, supra, at p. 424 [the borrower must pay, or offer to pay, the secured debt, or at least all of the delinquencies and costs due for redemption, before commencing the action].)  “The rationale behind the rule is that if [the borrower] could not have redeemed the property had the sale procedures been proper, any irregularities in the sale did not result in damages to the [borrower].”  (FPCI RE-HAB 01 v. E & G Investments, Ltd. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1018, 1022.)

C.   Exceptions to the Tender Requirement

There are, however, exceptions to the tender requirement.  Our review of the case law discloses four exceptions. First, if the borrower’s action attacks the validity of the underlying debt, a tender is not required since it would constitute an affirmation of the debt.  (Stockton, supra, (1957) 148 Cal.App.2d at p. 564) [trustor sought rescission of the contract to purchase the property and the promissory note on grounds of fraud]; Onofrio, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 424.) Second, a tender will not be required when the person who seeks to set aside the trustee’s sale has a counter-claim or set-off against the beneficiary.  In such cases, it is deemed that the tender and the counter claim offset one another, and if the offset is equal to or greater than the amount due, a tender is not required.  (Hauger, supra, (1954) 42 Cal.2d at p. 755.) Third, a tender may not be required where it would be inequitable to impose such a condition on the party challenging the sale.  (Humboldt Savings Bank v. McCleverty (1911) 161 Cal. 285, 291 (Humboldt).  In Humboldt, the defendant’s deceased husband borrowed $55,300 from the plaintiff bank secured by two pieces of property.  The defendant had a $5,000 homestead on one of the properties.  (Id. at p. 287.)  When the defendant’s husband defaulted on the debt, the bank foreclosed on both properties.  In response to the bank’s argument that the defendant had to tender the entire debt as a condition precedent to having the sale set aside, the court held that it would be inequitable to require the defendant to “pay, or offer to pay, a debt of $57,000, for which she is in no way liable” to attack the sale of her $5,000 homestead.[3]  (Id. at p. 291.) Fourth, no tender will be required when the trustor is not required to rely on equity to attack the deed because the trustee’s deed is void on its face.  (Dimock, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at p. 878 [beneficiary substituted trustees; trustee’s sale void where original trustee completed trustee’s sale after being replaced by new trustee because original trustee no longer had power to convey property].) In their motion for summary judgment, Citibank and EMC asserted that Holland v. Pendleton Mtge. Co. (1943) 61 Cal.App.2d 570, 577-578 (Holland) establishes another exception to the tender requirement.  Although one treatise interprets the case that way (see 4 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (3d ed. 2000) Deeds of Trust, § 10:212, p. 686), we do not agree that Holland establishes an exception to the tender rule, since the tender requirement was not at issue in Holland and the court did not discuss the tender requirement.  We discuss Holland nonetheless because Citibank and EMC relied on it in their motion. In Holland, the trustee’s sale was continued four times and the property was sold to the beneficiary/lender.  (Holland, supra, 61 Cal.App.2d at p. 573.)  The court held the sale was void because the trustee had not complied with the statutory requirements for noticing the fifth and actual sale date.  (Id. at pp. 575-577.)  After the sale, the trustor remained in possession of the property and paid the lender $35 per month.  (Id. at p. 577.)  The parties disputed whether the payments were rent or were made pursuant to a new agreement with the lender to redeem the property.  (Ibid.)  In light of the irregularities in the notice of the sale, the appellate court held that the trustor should be allowed to set aside the sale.  It also directed the trial court to determine whether the parties had entered into a new agreement and the nature of the monthly payments, and ordered that any amounts due be paid “after judgment.”  (Id. at pp. 577-578.)  Although the court did not discuss the tender requirement, the treatise authors have interpreted Holland as holding that a court “may permit the trustor to set aside the foreclosure sale on condition that payment be made after entry of judgment.”  (4 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate, supra, Deeds of Trust § 10:212, p. 686.)  In our view, the appellate court in Hollandwas providing guidance to the trial court on remand regarding the monthly payments and did not establish a fifth exception to the tender requirement.

D.   Analysis of Tender Requirement Element

We begin our analysis by reviewing the allegations of Lona’s second amended complaint (hereafter “complaint”).  Lona alleged that the trustee’s “sale was improperly conducted due to fraudulent conduct of the foreclosing party and the unconscionable and illegal nature of the loan agreement and deed of trust . . . .  The loan agreements were void for illegality from the inception and . . . voidable based on the unconscionable nature of the loans [and] violation of stated Public Policy.”  The complaint also alleged that Lona was “excused from tendering the cure amount prior to seeking equitable relief, due to the fraudulent conduct of the foreclosing party, its failure and refusal to comply with statutory pre-requisites to the right to foreclose and the illegal and unconscionable nature of the contract.”  Thus, the complaint alleged both irregularity in the foreclosure process and illegality of the underlying contract. In their summary judgment motion, Citibank and EMC attacked the tender requirement element of Lona’s cause of action and argued that his cause of action to set aside the trustee’s sale failed because he did not tender the amounts due on the first loan before filing suit and that none of the exceptions to the tender requirement applied.  Citibank and EMC’s arguments regarding the exceptions to the tender requirement cited and distinguished Holland and Humboldt but failed to discuss the exception relating to the legality of the loan and the validity of the debt, which Lona relied on in his complaint. In opposition to the motion, Lona argued that there were other exceptions to the tender rule, including those set forth in Stockton and Hauger.  He argued that he was not required to tender to seek equitable remedies or damages because:  (1) the deed of trust “was illegal from the time of formation and therefore, unenforceable and non-assignable”; and (2) his “claims would offset any amounts claimed to be due under the void agreements.”  Thus, Lona’s opposition relied on two exceptions to the tender requirement that Citibank and EMC had not addressed.  Lona also argued that a tender was not required because his claim was based on the illegality of the loan contract, and not any irregularity in noticing or conducting the trustee’s sale. As noted, the issues on summary judgment are framed by the pleadings.  (Varni, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at pp. 866-867.)  To prevail on their summary judgment motion, Citibank and EMC had to show that Lona could not establish the tender requirement element of his cause of action by showing both that Lona had not tendered and that the exceptions to the tender requirement that Lona relied on in his complaint did not apply.  It was undisputed that Lona did not tender the amounts due before filing suit.  Citibank and EMC failed to meet their initial burden on summary judgment because their motion was based on the exception in Humboldt and the holding in Holland, which Lona’s complaint did not rely on, and did not address the exception from Stockton (tender not required when borrower’s action attacks validity of debt), which was the exception that Lona had pleaded in his complaint.[4]  We hold that Citibank and EMC did not meet their burden of showing that Lona could not state a cause of action to set aside the trustee’s sale on the ground that he could not establish the tender requirement because their motion did not address the exceptions to that element that Lona relied on in his complaint.  A defendant that moves for summary judgment has the burden to show that it is entitled to judgment with respect to all theories of liability asserted by the plaintiff.  (Lopez v. Superior Court(1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 705, 717.)

Need to learn more about California Short Sale trends for 2012 – Listen in to our real estate radio show free?

We have a great show coming up on the VONDRAN LEGAL HOUR (out internet real estate radio show).  Listen in as we invite California short sale realtor Allen Brodetsky of Boutique Realty onto the show to discuss the important foreclosure prevention topic of Short Sales and how they work.  Many homes in California cannot be saved via foreclosure, modification , or bankruptcy, in these cases, it is wise to have a working knowledge of how a short sale works, and when you might want to consider going that route.

Here are some of the topics we hope to cover which I believe are the most frequently asked California short sale questions:

1.  What are you seeing out there – trends in California short sales?

2.  Are lender’s doing short sales?

3.   Who is your favorite and least favorite lender/servicer in re to
short sales?

4.  What happens when there is a first and second mortgage?  (are
lenders still doing these)?

5.  How long does it take to get a short sale approved on average?

6.  Who pays for a short sale?  Are there up front fees?

7.  Some people want to hire their “uncle joe” (cousin realtor) to do
a short sale – are there any pitfalls in that approach?

8.  Talk to me about “arms length transactions” (this is a problem we
run into from time to time as a law firm) – Do you see lender/
servicers allow family and friends to make short sale deals?

9.  What are the benefits of a short sale vs foreclosure?

10.  I hear now that there are refinances for underwater homes – do
you know about that program?

11.   In your experience, are banks foreclosing faster now or not?

12.  Are the servicer/lenders offering any cash incentives (“cash for keys”) to the homeowner in exchange for a short sale?

13.  Do you negotiate HAFA short sales?

Allen Brodetsky is a CALIFORNIA SHORT SALE REALTOR with experience in the short sale trenches.  There is no cost to listen in to the show.  Simply click on the Vondran Legal Hour link above.  We look forward to hearing from you.

California Attorney General not real keen on talks of banks settling foreclosure cases.  She does not want to allow banks to settle cases that have not been investigated.  Read more here.

Here is more on the foreclosure settlements with the California Attorney General from the LA Times.   Californian’s for a Fair Settlement are urging Harris to reject any offers that do not include principal reduction for troubled homeowners.

This group is demanding 5 key things before they would agree that settlement with 5 major banks is proper:

• imposing a fairly applied principle reduction;
• a narrow release of liability;
• an overhaul and reform of the system that would include banning banks from continuing to foreclose on families while they are undergoing loan modification;
• requiring banks to give homeowners a single point of contact;
• penalties for banks who fail to hold up their part of the agreement;
• assurance that homeowners who were kicked out of their homes without due process will receive fair and ample restitution.