Wiley: Foreign Policy Analysis: Table of Contents

Managing the Transatlantic Gap: The Rise of Spain

Damon Coletta — Thu, 19 May 2005 00:00:00 -0700

Among the many frustrations hampering cooperation between Western allies is the transatlantic gap in defense capabilities. Many analysts find little reason for hope that the gap might close in the near future due to the growing differential in aggregate defense spending between the U.S. and Europe. In recent years, however, Spain set an intriguing precedent for small states entering the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). Defying economies of scale, Spain used progressive institutions at domestic and international levels along with creative geopolitics to engage both the U.S. and traditional powers in Europe. The result was that Spain, without dramatic increases in defense spending, still managed to narrow the transatlantic gap along vital dimensions. These included increased participation in the development of high-technology defense and aerospace systems as well as a stronger, independent voice in global affairs.

Foreign Policy Orientation, Strategic Interaction, and the Initiation of International Crises

James Meernik — Thu, 19 May 2005 00:00:00 -0700

In recent years, scholars studying U.S. foreign policy and the diversionary use of force have begun to focus more attention on when foreign regimes time crises with the U.S. Many argue that U.S. domestic conditions play a role in this. I argue that these models should take into consideration the foreign policy relationship between foreign governments and the U.S. I develop a theory of crisis initiation that considers the foreign policy orientation of states that may initiate a crisis with the U.S., and second, when the crisis may occur. I argue that by virtue of their foreign policy orientation, some regime leaders will be more likely than others to initiate a crisis with the U.S. Those regimes that are either closely aligned with the U.S. or closely identified with anti-U.S. interests will be much more likely to initiate crises with the U.S. than those whose foreign policy interests do not lead to such intimate ties of friendship or enmity. I develop and test hypotheses predicting what regime characteristics will be predictive of crisis initiation and when such crises are likely to occur. The results demonstrate that regime type matters more than U.S. domestic conditions in predicting where and when crises involving the U.S. will take place.

Understanding the Unilateralist Turn in U.S. Foreign Policy

David Skidmore — Thu, 19 May 2005 00:00:00 -0700

How should we explain the recent unilateralist turn in U.S. foreign policy? Some accounts treat growing American unilateralism as a passing aberration attributable to the neoconservative ideology of the Bush administration. This paper, by contrast, traces U.S. unilateralism to the structural effects, at home and abroad, of the end of the Cold War. Internationally, the removal of the Soviet threat has undermined the “institutional bargain” that once guided relations between the U.S. and its major allies. Absent Cold War imperatives, the U.S. is less willing to provide collective goods through strong international institutions and other states are less likely to defer to U.S. demands for special privileges that exempt the U.S. from normal multilateral constraints. Domestically, the end of the Cold War has weakened the ability of presidents to resist the appeals of powerful veto players whose interests are threatened by multilateral commitments. These factors suggest that American unilateralism may have deeper roots and more staying power than many expect.

Centralizing Advisory Systems: Presidential Influence and the U.S. Foreign Policy Decision‐Making Process

David Mitchell — Thu, 19 May 2005 00:00:00 -0700

This study is motivated by a simple yet vitally important question for an understanding of U.S. foreign policy. Quite simply, how does a president's choice of management style influence the U.S. foreign policy decision-making process and decision outcomes? Presidents play a critical role in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy; however, the presidential studies literature and foreign policy analysis literature arrive at very different conclusions regarding how presidents influence the policy process and both are often inaccurate. This study develops an Advisory Systems Typology to address how presidents influence the decision-making process. In addressing this question, this study overcomes the deficiencies of both the presidential studies and foreign policy analysis literature. Four different types of decision-making processes are produced by a president's choice of advisory structure and level of centralization. In addition, the study identifies “unstructured solutions” that indicate how the presidential advisers and president choose to resolve policy disagreements, thereby providing an indication of the decision outcome. The identified decision-making processes and their associated decision outcomes are explored using four cases of decision making on security policy drawn from the Nixon (Vietnam War), Carter (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II), Reagan (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks I), and Clinton (Bosnia conflict) administrations. The case studies are constructed using the method of structured–focused comparisons, whereby a set of theoretically based questions and anticipated observations to those questions are made in order to guide the research and allow for comparison of decision making within and between cases.