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Catholic schools protest Marcos hero’s burial

2016-08-16T06:00:00.000-07:00

Catholic schools protest Marcos hero’s burial

MANILA, Aug. 16, 2016 — Allowing a hero’s burial for former President Ferdinand Marcos will dishonor the efforts of those who fought the dictatorship, including the mother of President Rodrigo Duterte, said Catholic educators.
Contrary to Duterte’s claim that Marcos’ burial will bring “healing,” the Catholic Educational Association of the Philippines (CEAP) said it would mock many Filipinos’ sacrifices.
“Given the gravity of Mr. Marcos’ crimes against the people and country, his burial at the Libingan will not heal or foster unity,” said CEAP in an open letter to Duterte.
Public outrage
“It will invalidate all that many heroes have spent their lives fighting for—heroes such as your beloved mother, whom we honor and remember as one of the strongest crusaders in the fight for democracy and justice,” it added.
The CEAP was referring to Duterte’s mother, Soledad Duterte, who was a leading anti-Marcos figure in Davao.
Duterte’s plan to give the late dictator a hero’s burial at the Libingan ng mga Bayani on Sept. 18 triggered public outrage.
On Sunday, several groups, including Church people, braved bad weather and staged a rally at the Luneta Park to express their objection to the planned hero’s burial for Marcos.
The CEAP, composed of 1,425 member-schools, colleges and universities, reiterated that Marcos does not belong in the heroes’ cemetery.

Not a hero
“He was not a hero,” stressed the group.
“We look forward to your promise of change being fulfilled, of old wrongs being redressed. We ask that you take the biggest step in rectifying one of the country’s oldest wrongs.”
“President Rody, we ask nothing that you have not already promised. Justice. Unity. Healing,” added CEAP.
The group also urged the President to grant Marcos’ deathbed wish to be buried next to his mother in Ilocos Norte.
“At his deathbed, Mr. Marcos himself asked that he be buried next to his mother in Ilocos, where he is revered and loved,” the CEAP said.
“Fulfilling Mr. Marcos’s deathbed wish will give us all the unity and closure that this country desperately needs,” it said. (CBCPNews) http://www.cbcpnews.com/cbcpnews/?p=82434

Protests vs Marcos burial in Libingan ng mga Bayani

2016-08-16T05:00:00.000-07:00

Protests mount vs Marcos burial in Libingan ng mga Bayani

Dee Ayroso August 11, 2016 http://bulatlat.com/main/2016/08/11/protests-mount-vs-marcos-burial-in-libingan-ng-bayani/

Public opposition continues to build up as the Duterte administration prepares to bury the remains of ousted dictator Ferdinand Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) on Sept. 18.
Various lawmakers, groups and even government agencies, such as the National Historical Commission have spoken out against giving a hero’s burial for Marcos, which they said equates to an exoneration of the Marcos family’s crimes against the people, and brings them closer back to power in Malacañang.
This week, Inquirer.net reported that Malacañang released a memo from Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana, dated Aug. 7, ordering the Armed Forces of the Philippines to draft the plans for the transport and interment ceremony of Marcos’ remains in the LNMB. The memo referred to a verbal order given by Duterte on July 11. During his electoral campaign, Duterte had said he will allow the burial of Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
In Congress, progressive lawmakers filed House resolution 197 opposing the move, calling it a “monumental historical distortion,” as giving a hero’s burial for Marcos sends “the absurd message that the Filipino people overthrew a ‘hero’ during People Power I and that the international community’s sympathy for that uprising is wrong.”
“The Marcos dictatorship violently suppressed political dissent, committed crimes against humanity, plundered the country’s resources, and perpetuated US imperialism’s stranglehold on the nation,” said the proposed House resolution, filed by seven Makabayan bloc lawmakers on Aug. 11.
Marcos died in exile on Sept. 28, 1989 in Hawaii, where his family was flown by the US government to escape the first People Power in 1986. In September 1993, President Ramos allowed the repatriation of the dictator’s remains, but refused to give him a hero’s burial.
Marcos’ remains has since been preserved and kept on display in a refrigerated glass coffin in the Marcos Museum and Mausoleum in Batac city, Ilocos Norte.
The proposed house resolution said the Marcos family signed an agreement with the Ramos administration, which allowed the repatriation of the ousted dictator, on the following conditions: it will be brought home without fanfare; it will be buried in Ilocos Norte, and with military honors only up to the rank of major.
The Makabayan proposed resolution cited the human rights violations from 1976 to 1983, that “formed the apex of a pyramid of terror:” 3,257 killed, 35,000 tortured, 70,000 incarcerated, 737 Filipinos “disappeared” from 1976 to 1983. During martial law, the word “salvaging” came to mean summary execution, as mutilated bodies were dumped in public areas. Up to 2,250 salvaged victims were documented, “dumped on roadsides for public display to create widespread fear.”
The proposed resolution also cited how Marcos plunged the country into a “cycle of ever-growing debt,” as foreign debt had ballooned, from $1 billion in 1966 when Marcos took power, to $28 billion in 1986 at the time he was ousted. Ibon Foundation said debts incurred under Marcos alone will be shouldered by Filipino taxpayers up to 2025. On the other hand, the late Solicitor General Frank Chavez estimated that Marcos had up to $13.4 billion stashed in various Swiss banks.
“Marcos and his family have never acknowledged these grave violations and have never apologized to the Filipino people up to the present,” the resolution said.
During this year’s elections, martial law victims formed the Campaign Against the Return of the Marcoses in Malacañang (Carmma) to thwart the vice presidential bid of Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. The younger Marcos lost to administration bet Leni Robredo by a small margin of votes, and has recently petitioned for a recount.
This weekend, various groups are staging protests against the Marcos burial: at the National Council of Churches in the Philippines in Quezon City on Aug. 13, and in Luneta, Manila on Aug. 14.
‘Marcos’ bronze coffin insults martial law victims’
The Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan) scoffed at the reported bronze casket being prepared for Marcos’ remains, in stark contrast to how hundreds of martial law victims, the desaparecidos, were “abducted, murdered and buried in unmarked graves.”
“The wealth illegally amassed by the Marcoses will again be used to ‘honor’ the late dictator, in the same way it is used to whitewash his sins. State honors and the Marcos family’s ostentatious display of wealth are doubly insulting to the victims of the dictatorship,” said the Bayan statement.
Solid bronze caskets cost up to $30,000, Bayan said.
The youth group Anakbayan called the impending burial a “travesty of justice and distortion of history,” as they said the Marcos dictatorship has yet to pay for the thousands of youth activists, “the cream of the crop” who were killed for fighting martial law.
“It does not matter if the Libingan ng mga Bayani was originally a cemetery for soldiers, one of Duterte’s justifications for burying Marcos there as a soldier. Giving Marcos a hero’s burial sends a wrong signal that crimes against humanity and plunder will be celebrated by the state,” said Vencer Crisostomo, Anakbayan chairperson, in a statement.
“We are reminding President Duterte not to use his office simply to give favors to those who supported his electoral campaign. The Marcos burial, in particular, should not be made just to repay political debts to his close friend Bongbong Marcos,” Crisostomo said.
The Alliance of Concerned Teachers said a hero’s burial for Marcos equals “rewriting history” and insults martial law victims and their families.
“It took a people’s movement to topple the late fascist-dictator Ferdinand Marcos. To honor his memory by burying him in the Libingan ng mga Bayani sends a distorted message to our children that dictators and plunderers can be called heroes and accorded honors,” said ACT national chairperson Benjie Valbuena.

Revising history | Marcos burial at Libingan ng mga Bayani

Benjie Oliveros August 11, 2016 http://bulatlat.com/main/2016/08/11/revising-history-marcos-burial-at-libingan-ng-mga-bayani/

When pressed about why he is allowing the burial of the late dictator Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani despite the numerous protests, President Duterte justified his decision by saying: “He was a president and a soldier. Simple.”
Well and good if the matter is as simple as that. If Marcos were any other president or any other soldier, there could be no argument about allowing his or her burial at Libingan ng Bayani. After all, that cemetery has been reserved for them, and any soldier or veteran, whether a private or a general, has the privilege of being buried there, if the soldier or his or her family so wishes. I suppose the same is true for dead presidents.
But the case of the late president Marcos is far more complicated than what President Duterte makes it appear to be. By declaring martial law and usurping all power to himself, the late dictator Marcos plunged the nation in one of the, if not the darkest period in the country’s history.
Thousands of people, in the prime of their lives, were victimized: killed, forcibly disappeared, tortured, imprisoned, and forcibly displaced. Gross violations of human rights under the Marcos dictatorship are not myths or urban legends; these have been proven multiple times by the testimonies of the living victims and the relatives of the dead and the disappeared. Even the Federal District Court of Hawaii found, beyond reasonable doubt, that indeed the late dictator Marcos and his minions violated the rights of thousands of Filipinos. The Federal court awarded $1.9 billion in damages to the victims and their relatives.
Burying Marcos with full honors not only would rub salt to the wounds of the victims and their relatives, it would disregard the fact that thousands were victimized and worse, it practically would justify these violations.
Added to this, the callous act of burying Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani would deny the fact that the Marcos dictatorship plunged the country into deep political, economic, and social crisis. The country experienced an oil crisis, rice crisis, sugar crisis, dollar crisis, among others.
The late dictator’s son boasts of the infrastructure projects under Marcos, without revealing that these buried the country into debt, which the nation has been paying up to now. He boasts of the Marcos family’s version of unity, while ignoring the fact that the late dictator used the full machinery of the state to create an atmosphere of fear in the hope of eradicating all forms of opposition to its rule. The Marcos family boasts of eliminating the stranglehold of oligarchs on the economy, but centralized all wealth and established a monopoly of strategic, profitable businesses in the country.
The historical significance and political implications of the burial of the dictator Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani are not lost on the Marcos family. This is why they have been spending to preserve his remains for almost three decades already. They have the money to construct a mansion to bury his remains. They could even buy a whole memorial park to bury him there.
But they chose to wait. And burying the remains of the late dictator Marcos with full military honors would just as well be the launching pad for the return of the Marcos family to Malacañang through the son Bongbong.
While justifying his decision to allow the burial of Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani with what appears to be simple logic and legalities, the historical significance and political implications of this decision are likewise not lost on the Duterte administration. For one, President Duterte has, several times, publicly acknowledged his friendship with the Marcos family. He boasted that his father served under Marcos. During his campaign, Duterte declared that if he wins and then fails to complete his term, he would be more than willing to leave the reins of government to Bongbong. President Duterte has also declared that he would appoint Bongbong to a Cabinet position once the prohibition on losing candidates expires.
Just last Tuesday, in a tirade against Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno, President Duterte asked her if she would rather that he declares martial law, because of his perception that Chief Justice Sereno was blocking his anti-drug campaign by issuing a letter advising judges named by the president in his list of government officials allegedly involved in the illegal drugs trade not to surrender without a warrant. Was the mention of declaring martial law a mere rhetorical question?
Last week, August 3, in a speech, President Duterte declared that his administration intends to destroy oligarchs then singled out businessman Roberto Ongpin. Is he emulating the purported campaign against oligarchs by the late dictator Marcos?
What about Duterte’s controversial anti-drugs campaign that has claimed the lives of hundreds of poor Filipinos, totally disregarding the principles of due process and human rights? Does this not reflect the mindset and ways of the late dictator Marcos?
Let us just hope that this is just a case of overreaction, and that the similarities between what Marcos did and what Duterte has been doing and appears to be intending to do stops here. But still, the historical significance and political implications of the burial of Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani, with full honors, should not be lost on the Filipino people. After all, it is the people who shape history.

Martial law survivors urge high court to stop hero’s burial for Marcos

Ronalyn V. Olea August 15, 2016 http://bulatlat.com/main/2016/08/15/martial-law-survivors-petition-high-court-stop-planned-heros-burial-marcos/

Sixty-five-year-old Carmencita Florentino joined fellow victims of martial law in filing a petition with the Supreme Court seeking to stop the plan to bury the late dictator Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
Florentino, her husband Ernesto and their only daughter Gemma, then only eight years old, were dragged by soldiers from their home in Tatalon, Quezon City on June 18, 1977. Florentino and Gemma were brought to Camp Crame where they stayed in different detention cells for a month. Ernesto was jailed at Camp Bagong Diwa and was released after three months.
Their incarceration, however brief, left a scar on their lives.
After being released from detention, the family had to report weekly to the military. This only stopped when Marcos was toppled through a popular uprising in February 1986.
Tears formed in Florentino’s eyes when asked of her message to President Rodrigo Duterte.
“It’s so painful. It’s like erasing the sins of Marcos,” Florentino told Bulatlat in an interview.
Florentino who was among the thousands who filed the historic classic suit against the Marcoses said burying Marcos would distort historical facts, particularly the atrocities during the Marcos dictatorship.
“What about the thousands who were tortured, who were raped?” Florentino said, adding that there were enormous pieces of evidence proving human rights abuses during martial law.
“We’re still alive,” Florentino said. “We have not forgotten.”
Implications
Neri Colmenares, president of the National Union of Peoples’ Lawyers (NUPL) and was also detained during martial law, said the executive’s plan would have legal implications on the cases filed against the Marcoses.
Colmenares said the Marcoses would brag that the late dictator is a hero and would use it to their advantage.
Legal grounds
In their petition for certiorari and prohibition, martial law survivors maintained that the existing laws prohibit the burial of Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
Citing the Armed Forces of the Philippines regulations on allocation of cemetery plots at the Libingan ng mga Bayani, petitioners said Marcos is not qualified.
The petitioners said that the the Libingan ng mga Bayani was created by virtue of Republic Act 289 and Sec. 1 provides that the purpose of the construction of a national pantheon is “to perpetuate the memory of all the Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes and patriots for the inspiration and emulation of this generation and of generations still unborn.”
“The burial of Ferdinand Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani simply mocks and taunts Section 1 of RA 289,” the petitioners said.
The petitioners noted that apart from the human rights violations during the Marcos dictatorship, the fact remains undisputed that Marcos and his family, during his term, acquired billions worth of ill-gotten wealth.
“The crimes of Marcos against the Filipino people and even against humanity involved moral turpitude,” the petitioners said.
The petitioners maintained that the memorandum dated 07 August 2016 issued by Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana with the subject “Interment of the late Former President Ferdinand Marcos Sr. at LNMB” and the directive on the interment of Marcos issued by Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez by command of General Ricardo R. Visaya are “patently illegal and were made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.”
Other petitioners include National Artist for Literature Bienvenido Lumbera, Makabayan president Satur Ocampo, Bayan chairperson Carol Araullo, film director Bonifacio Ilagan and members of Samahan ng Ex-Detainees Laban sa Aresto (SELDA).

The Fall of the Dictatorship

2016-05-22T21:01:00.000-07:00

The Fall of the Dictatorship

from http://www.gov.ph/featured/the-fall-of-the-dictatorship/

I. Introduction
President Ferdinand E. Marcos assumed power on December 30, 1965, and became the second president reelected to office in 1969. There were efforts to maneuver the 1971 Constitutional Convention to permit his continuing in office.^{^[1]} With the swell of student radicalization and increasing number of violent demonstrations, Marcos played up middle-class fears and used these to justify the imposition of Martial Law on September 23, 1972 by virtue of Proclamation No. 1081.
Martial Law was not just an invocation of the President’s emergency powers under the 1935 Constitution—Marcos went further to assume all governing powers, excluded civilian courts, and systematically replaced the 1935 Constitution with the 1973 Constitution for his own ends. The replacement of the Constitution was done under dubious circumstances.
First, Marcos ordered a viva voce plebiscite on January 10–15, 1973 in which the voting age was reduced to 15 to ratify the new Constitution.^{^[2]} Military men were placed prominently to intimidate voters. Reports indicated that mayors and governors were given quotas for “yes” votes on the constitution and negative votes were often not recorded.^{^[3]} Results report that 90 percent of the citizens have voted for the constitution even though some communities did not participate in the “citizens assemblies.”^{^[4]} Over the next few years, Marcos would hold four more plebiscites—in 1973, 1975, 1976, and 1978—through citizen assemblies to legitimize the continuation of martial rule.^{^[5]}
Second, he intimidated the Supreme Court to approve it. Using the stick and carrot method on the justices of the Supreme Court, President Marcos was able to force the Supreme Court to uphold martial law and the new constitution. Previously, around 8,000 individuals, including senators, civil libertarians, journalists, students, and labor leaders, were arrested and detained without due process upon the declaration of martial law.^{^[6]} With many of them filing petitions to the Supreme Court for habeas corpus, they challenged the constitutionality of the proclamation. However, the Supreme Court issued its final decision, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary, which essentially validated the constitution. This would be the final legitimizing decision on the constitutionality of Martial Law: in G.R. No. L-35546 September 17, 1974, the Supreme Court dismissed petitions for habeas corpus by ruling that martial law was a political question beyond the jurisdiction of the court; and that, furthermore, the court had already deemed the 1973 Constitution in full force and effect, replacing the 1935 Constitution.
After the landmark decision, Chief Justice Roberto V. Concepcion went into early retirement, 50 days before his originally scheduled retirement date, in silent protest over the majority in the Javellana v. Executive Secretary case. He argued against the validity of the new constitution and its questionable aspects, together with Justices Claudio Teehankee, Calixto Zaldivar, and Enrique Fernando.
Martial law imposed government control over all forms of media. On September 22, 1972, Marcos issued Letter of Instruction No. 1, ordering the Press Secretary and Defense Secretary to assume control over all media outlets. All periodicals were padlocked,^{^[7]} and media personalities who had criticized Marcos, his family, or his administration were taken to Camp Crame without any charges being filed. Among them were publishers Joaquin “Chino” P. Roces (Manila Times) and Eugenio Lopez Jr. (Manila Chronicle), and columnists Max Soliven and Luis D. Beltran.^{^[8]}
Marcos issued at least eleven Presidential Decrees that suppressed press freedom. Journalists who did not comply with the new restrictions faced physical threats, libel suits, or forced resignation.^{^[9]} With such stringent censorship regulations, most of the periodicals that were allowed to operate were crony newspapers, such as Benjamin Romualdez’s Times Journal, Hans Menzi’s Bulletin Today, and Roberto Benedicto’s Philippine Daily Express. These newspapers offered “bootlicking reportage” on the country’s economy while completely eschewing political issues.^{^[10]}
Hence, President Marcos’ absolute rule had a “cloak of legality”^{^[11]} and incontestability, making it nearly impregnable. However, specific factors converged and eventually led to the fall of the dictatorship and the eventual restoration of democracy in the Philippines.
II. Factors that led to the Fall of the Dictatorship
A. Opposition to Martial Law in the 1970s
Popular anti-Marcos sentiment existed for the duration of Martial Law. According to David Wurfel, there were three paramount types of opposition to martial law during the 1970s: reformist opposition, revolutionary opposition, and religious opposition.^{^[12]}
Reformist Opposition
The reformist opposition, also known as the legal opposition, was composed of members of the upper-middle class. Using nonviolent tactics, they advocated political (not necessarily socioeconomic) reforms. However, the reformist opposition was not a united movement, but an amalgamation of different middle- and upper-class groups who had different motives. It was for this reason that Marcos tolerated them, so long as they were incapable of viably replacing him or attaining the support of the masses.^{^[13]} David Wurfel writes:

Disunity within the reformist opposition also reflected the diversity of interests and the lack of ideology within the middle class. The reformers shared certain values, such as support for the rule of law, constitutional legitimacy, free elections, and the protection of personal freedoms, and they agreed on the need to replace Marcos. But they agreed on little else. On nationalism, land reform, and the autonomy of labor organizations there was everything from explicit demands to complete silence. Once discussion went beyond the basic characteristics of the political process, the question of what to reform was a divisive one.^{^[14]}

1978 was a watershed year for the reformist opposition because it was the first election year in the country since 1969. The reformist opposition was divided on the issue of boycotting the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP) elections set for April 7.
Senator Gerardo “Gerry” Roxas refused to reactivate the Liberal Party for the elections because Marcos failed to address their concerns regarding electoral reform; to participate in such an unfair election would have given it credibility, and the Martial Law regime undue legitimacy.^{^[15]} Jose W. Diokno, a former Nacionalista and long-time critic of Marcos and Martial Law, was also adamantly opposed to the IBP elections.^{^[16]}
The most prominent opposition movement that participated in the IBP elections was the newly formed Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) party of former senator Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr., who was imprisoned at that time.^{^[17]} Ninoy was initially apprehensive about running in the election, but he decided to push through with his candidacy to give the populace a chance to air out their frustration against the government. He campaigned from his jail cell, even appearing for a 90-minute television interview.^{^[18]} Ninoy’s candidacy inspired an outpouring of popular support that culminated in a noise barrage on the evening before the elections. At 8:00 p.m., residents in Metro Manila took to the streets, making whatever noise they could “to let Ninoy Aquino in his prison cell know that the people had heard his message.”^{^[19]} They banged on pots and pans, honked their car horns, and shouted their throats sore in support of Ninoy and LABAN.^{^[20]} However, the elections were a total shutout for LABAN, with Marcos’ Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) winning 91 percent of the seats in the IBP.^{^[21]}

Ninoy Aquino’s manifesto for the Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) campaign for the elections. Photo from Ninoy: The Willing Martyr by Alfonso P. Policarpio Jr.

In 1981, Marcos officially lifted Martial Law, but since all decrees issued during that time were still in force, the lifting was merely a symbolic gesture. In the June presidential elections of that year, he ran under the KBL, his main opponent being Nacionalist Alejo Santos. Unlike in the 1978 IBP elections, the reformist opposition was united in its stance to boycott the polls,labeling it a sham after Marcos refused the conditions they had previously proposed, such as a minimum campaign period, a purging of voters’ lists, equal time and space for the opposition, and a reorganization of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).^{^[22]}
Revolutionary Opposition
The government’s use of communist and secessionist threats as justification for Martial Law only contributed to the growth of the political opposition and the amassing of recruits to the New People’s Army (NPA)^{^[23]} and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the provinces in the 1970s.^{^[24]}
When Martial Law was declared, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was immediately mobilized. Formed by students and politicians from Mindanao, its goal was to create the Bangsa Moro Republik (Moro National Republic), composed of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) attempted to seize their “illegal” firearms supplied by Libya, sparking a war that lasted from 1973 to 1977.^{^[25]}
Over the course of the war, 13,000 people were killed while over a million were displaced. At the height of the conflict, the government spent an estimated $1 million a day to contain the rebellion. However, internal problems within the MNLF prevented them from exploiting Marcos’ weakness. Patricio Abinales and Donna Amoroso write:

Its military leaders lacked combat experience and suffered major battlefield losses, while its political leaders split along ethnic lines (Tausug versus Maguindanao) over tactical issues. As the MNLF lost on the military front, its politician allies also began to defect, making separate peace pacts with Marcos and presenting themselves as a “moderate alternative” to the revolutionary Moro nationalists. Government overtures and the cooperation of conservative Arab states eventually led to negotiations and a de facto cease-fire in 1977. The MNLF was no match for Marcos diplomatically and the decline of Arab support made the continuation of conventional warfare impossible. . . . By the time Marcos fell, the MNLF had lost its dynamism as well.^{^[26]}

In contrast, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) strengthened as Marcos’ dictatorship weakened; as opposed to the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP), which surrendered in 1974. Following the principle of “centralized command, decentralized operations,” the CPP established autonomous, regional, self-sustaining chapters all over the Philippines. Not only did this give CPP cadres more freedom to experiment with tactics appropriate to their localities, it also helped them survive the loss of many original leaders, either to prison or death.^{^[27]} In November, 1977, the Armed Forces scored an important victory over the communist rebels with the capture of Jose Maria Sison and other important party leaders leading to the disarray of the Communist Party. But the triumph was short-lived and was too late as the influence of the CPP grew stronger within the provinces.^{^[28]}
Party growth was fastest in areas where human rights violations were high due to military presence. By the late 1970s, the CPP could claim a guerrilla force of 15,000, around the same number of cadres, and a “mass base” of around one million. While AFP forces also experienced rapid growth during this period and were better equipped, there was a difference between the two. Gregg Jones writes that “[d]espite a high rate of illiteracy, communist soldiers could explain why they were fighting and what they were fighting for. In contrast, most government soldiers were poor peasants or slum dwellers who enlisted in the government army not out of political conviction but because of economic deprivation.”^{^[29]}
Through the Kilusang Mayo Uno (the May First Labor Movement) and the League of Filipino Students, the CPP was able to gather labor unions and solidify its control of important schools. The CPP also made “anti-imperialist” alliances with nationalist senators like Lorenzo Tañada and Jose Diokno, who could lend credibility and publicity to claims of the Marcos government’s human rights violations.^{^[30]}
Religious Opposition
Martial Law also faced opposition from the religious sector. Mainline Protestant churches have been vocal in their opposition of the dictatorship since 1972; by 1978, they were holding mass protest actions, and by 1981, they held boycott campaigns for the April plebiscite and the June presidential elections.^{^[31]} Meanwhile the Catholic Church, which sympathized with Marcos’ anti-communism, maintained a position of “critical collaboration” while paying attention to the opposition among its members.^{^[32]} This allowed it a degree of autonomy when it came to carrying out their social projects, which focused on alleviating poverty and defending the poor against communism. However, the provincial clergy started becoming radicalized after seeing the effects of the Marcos dictatorship on the poor. They formed Christians for National Liberation, which clandestinely used Church “social action” programs to get foreign funding through private donor agencies that shared the same views.^{^[33]} Abinales and Amoroso write:

Church leaders were appalled by this radical infiltration, but could do little about it. To attack its own rank and file for following the official Church position on human rights and social justice would open the hierarchy to charges of supporting the dictatorship. A serious breach opened up within the Philippine Church.^{^[34]}

When Jaime Cardinal Sin replaced the conservative Rufino Cardinal Santos as Archbishop of Manila, one of his first acts was to issue a letter condemning the summary arrest of Jesuit Frs. Jose Blanco and Benigno Mayo. They were arrested during a raid on the Sacred Heart Novitiate in Novaliches, in 1974. Sin presided over a prayer vigil for the detained priests, “which more than 5,000 persons attended, the largest anti-martial law protest at the time.” In 1975, Sin declared his opposition to a Marcos decree “banning all labor strikes.” US President Gerald Ford was visiting Manila, so Marcos beat a hasty retreat and confined the prohibition to strategic industries. The harassment continued. Church-owned media, which had escaped closure in 1972, was shut down in 1976–1977, among them the weekly newspaper and radio station of Bishop Francisco Claver’s diocese in Bukidnon, Davao’s radio station, and Church magazines in Manila. The government threatened to tax Church properties and subject them to urban land reform. Sin’s policy of “critical collaboration” during this time began to give away to active resistance, as the religious indignation spread over the continuing arrests and more of the clergy became radicalized. Sin may have thought to steal the thunder from the radical priests by hurling the bolts himself. Protestant groups began to rally against Marcos in 1978. By 1979, Sin was firmly on the path to his preeminent role in the overthrow of Marcos.^{^[35]}

About 5,000 demonstrators, organized by students, attempted to march to Malacañan Palace on October 10, 1976 to protest at four years of Martial Law imposed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Its main purpose was to protest at the referendum-plebiscite scheduled to take place on October 16. Video from Associated Press.

On January 17, 1981, in an effort to calm the growing opposition of the Catholic Church, President Marcos lifted martial law (if by name only) via Proclamation No. 2045 in preparation for the first state visit of Saint Pope John Paul II on February 17, 1981.

[WATCH: Lifting of Martial Law, January 17, 1981]
On January 17, 1981, on Constitution Day (8 years after the 1973 Constitution was promulgated), President Ferdinand E. Marcos decreed Martial Law officially lifted. In this video excerpt, President Marcos reads from Proclamation No. 2045. Video from PTV4.

In the events leading to the important state visit, the Coconut Palace was commissioned by First Lady Imelda Marcos to be built at the cost of ₱37 million as the guesthouse of the Pope. However, the Pontiff refused, saying it was too ostentatious, given the state of the poor in the country.^{^[36]} Moreover, during his visit in Malacañan Palace, the Pope delivered a speech explicitly condemning the human rights violations committed under the regime. He said:
“Even in exceptional situations that may at times arise, one can never justify any violation of the fundamental dignity of the human person or of the basic rights that safeguard this dignity.”^{^[37]}
Since then, the Catholic Church had withdrawn its support of the Marcos administration.
B. Marcos’ Health and the Issue of Succession
As early as 1979, the health of President Marcos had been deteriorating.^{^[38]} This was kept a secret at first, but it was common knowledge then that Marcos was already sick, especially at the time of the assassination of Ninoy Aquino.^{^[39]} Marcos’ health status worsened by mid-November of 1984. Blas Ople, Marcos’ Minister of Labor, divulged the situation for the first time on record on December 3, 1984, saying that Marcos was “in control but cannot take major initiatives at this time.” He stated that, “The health of our leader is undergoing certain vicissitudes, problems which started a year ago.”^{^[40]} On October 28, 1985, according to congressional and US intelligence sources quoted by the Washington Post, Marcos was diagnosed with an “incurable, recurring sickness” called systemic lupus erythematosus.^{^[41]} This disease was further complicated by Marcos’ diabetes.^{^[42]}
Marcos’ failing health, coupled with the looming threat from the anti-capitalist left, led to widespread concern for a stable succession among the country’s economic elite—the main beneficiaries of Martial Law’s crony capitalism.^{^[43]} The plebiscite held on April 7, 1981, ratified the constitutional amendment creating the Executive Committee, composed of at most 14 members, at least half of which were Assemblymen.^{^[44]} The Committee was meant to be “a stepping stone for future leadership in the country . . . a high-level training ground for future Prime Ministers and Presidents.”^{^[45]} It was deemed necessary at that time because no one member of the administration’s Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) was deemed capable of taking over for President Marcos in the event of his death, resignation, or incapacitation; it was implied that the Committee member who performed the best would be Marcos’ successor.^{^[46]} Contenders for the presidency started positioning themselves to gain the upper hand. For instance, there were attempts to discredit Prime Minister Cesar Virata and the programs associated with economic technocrats, while Imelda Marcos’ strove to repair her tarnished image (especially in the provinces) while pushing her son Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. further into the public eye.^{^[47]}
However, Marcos’ deteriorating health necessitated clearer guidelines for determining a successor. Another plebiscite on January 27, 1984, ratified the constitutional amendment abolishing the Executive Committee and restoring the Office of the Vice President,^{^[48]} to be filled in the upcoming 1987 elections^{^[49]}—which never came because Marcos announced snap elections in 1985. The same plebiscite also designated the speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting president should the presidency be vacated before the 1987 presidential elections.^{^[50]}

Ousted President Marcos and Imelda Marcos in exile at the backyard of their villa overlooking Honolulu, Hawaii on March 1988. Diagnosed with systemic lupus erythematosus, he had several surgeries for kidney dialysis a year after this photo was taken. Marcos died on September 28 of the same year, due to heart, kidney and lung failure. Photo by Gamblin Yann.

C. The Collapse of the Philippine Economy
Economist James Boyce commented, “If the central aim of economic development is the reduction of poverty, then the Philippine development strategy in the Marcos era was an abysmal failure.”^{^[51]} In the last years of the Marcos regime, the Philippine economy was almost grinding to a halt. This was so, despite the fact that the Marcos administration implemented its three-pronged development strategy: (1) The green revolution^{^[52]} in agriculture^{^[53]}, (2) growth and diversity in agricultural and forestry exports, and (3) massive external borrowing. The profit from these three strategies were amassed disproportionately to the wealthiest in the population, thereby causing a large disparity between the rich and the poor.
In the case of agriculture, the higher rice yields saved land for export crops and saved foreign exchange for non-rice imports, but these gains never trickled down to the poor. In addition, there were government intervention, cronyism and monopolization of agricultural markets such as that of sugar and coconut.^{^[54]} In these cases, key government agencies were managed by Marcos associates and cronies, whose operations were not audited.^{^[55]}
Sugar was the country’s second most important export in the Marcos regime. Specifically, in the mid-1970s, sugarcane plantations doubled to more than 500,000 hectares. This increase, however, did not translate to an increase in harvest and profit, which led ultimately to a stagnation and eventual decline in the mid-1970s.^{^[56]} As early as 1974, a government sugar monopsony was established to participate in world trade and reap the benefits of increasing world prices in sugar. When the sugar market declined in 1975 – 1976, the trading responsibilities were transferred to PHILSUCOM^{^[57]} (Philippine Sugar Commission), headed by Roberto Benedicto, and to NASUTRA^{^[58]} (National Sugar Trading Corporation), headed by an associate of Marcos.
Under Benedicto’s chairmanship, the PHILSUCOM was empowered to buy, sell, and set prices for sugar; and to buy and take over milling companies. He also set up the Republic Planter’s Bank, which became the sugar industry’s main source of finance during that time.^{^[59]} For this, Benedicto was accused of “using his position to great advantage over the past several years to forge an economic fiefdom, to amass great wealth and to develop considerable political influence in sugar growing areas”. The US Embassy reported that Benedicto had several profit mechanisms:

bribery; acceptance of payoffs or bribes from traders lobbying for guaranteed profit margins of sugar prices in the domestic market.
smuggling of sugar supplies; at least 600,000 metric tons of raw sugar was reportedly missing from the NASUTRA warehouses
withholding of taxes, PNP loan payments, as well as export trading costs;

These operations “amount to a significant and growing drain on the economy of the country.”^{^[60]} Moreover, the sugar-marketing monopoly effectively protected the interests of the sugar hacienderos close to Marcos, while small landowners bore the brunt of the crisis, causing widespread starvation among sugar plantation workers (specifically in Negros), reaching the international media.^{^[61]} Furthermore, other large-scale sugar owners grew resentful of President Marcos because of the sugar-marketing monopoly that did his bidding and the subsequent land-grabbing.^{^[62]} At the end of the Marcos regime, the Philippine sugar industry nearly collapsed. The majority of the planters were in debt and sugarcane plantation dwindled.^{^[63]}
In the case of coconuts, beginning in 1973, the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) monopolized export and increased coconut tax in order to stabilize market prices.^{^[64]} Coconut marketing during the Marcos era was monopolized by a “single entity with effective control over virtually all copra purchases and over the production and sale of coconut oil on the domestic and export markets.”^{^[65]} This monopoly was technically made possible by Marcos’ presidential decrees, providing for levies on all coconut production and an establishment of a bank. While these changes were imposed to benefit the the coconut growers, in practice, the main beneficiaries were Eduardo Cojuangco, the so called “Coconut King,” and Juan Ponce Enrile, two of President Marcos’ closest associates.^{^[66]}
In in the case of foreign loans, the primary pretext was for Philippine domestic investment and building public infrastructure. However, these loans were diverted to a few private companies, all of which were under Marcos cronies, eroding the quality and quantity of domestic investments; the rest were diverted to banks abroad. An example of striking evidence of this was the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, which was built at the cost of $1.2 billion but never generated a kilowatt of electricity under the Marcos regime. “The losers were the Philippine people,” writes Raymond Bonner, “the poor, on whose behalf the billion dollars could have been better spent, as well as the middle class and the wealthy, who would have to shoulder this economically backbreaking colossus.”^{^[67]}
In 1973, Marcos decided that the Philippines had to have a nuclear power plant—then considered the hallmark of a modern nation—because it fit in with Marcos’ ostentatious vision of himself and the country. However, such an endeavor at that time was problematic: at best, the power plant would have generated power for only 15 percent of Luzon’s population. Security was another issue: there were four active volcanoes located within 100 miles from the proposed site. Furthermore, the Philippines was one of the poorest nations setting out on the nuclear path; only Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea were building nuclear power plants in East Asia, and they were far better off economically and technologically.^{^[68]}
The power plant was the largest and most expensive construction project in the country’s history. Given the monumental expense, funding the project out of the government’s treasury was impossible, so the government turned to Export-Import Bank in Washington, DC, for assistance. In 1975, $277 million in direct loans and $367 million in loan guarantees was approved by Ex-Im Bank chairman William J. Casey, one of Marcos’s biggest supporters. It was the largest loan package the bank had approved anywhere.^{^[69]}
Westinghouse Electric initially submitted a vague, undetailed $500 million bid for two plants. General Electric, on the other hand, submitted four full volumes detailing cost and specifications, conducted nuclear power seminars in Manila, and invited Philippine officials to visit its plant in California. Marcos, brooking no opposition, gave the contract to Westinghouse. After Westinghouse secured the contract, it submitted a serious proposal amounting to $1.2 billion for just one reactor—almost 400 percent higher than the original bid of $500 million. Marcos was guaranteed a cut of nearly $80 million, which Westinghouse transmitted through Marcos crony Herminio Disini using a “maze of channels, cutouts, and stratagems.”^{^[70]} Raymond Bonner elaborates:

Disini owned a construction company, which he had purchased with a government-backed loan and which had been awarded, without bits, a cost plus fixed fee contract for all civil construction at the nuclear power plant site. The price of the equipment for the project “was inflated, as a way to cover the cost of the fees to Disini,” a lawyer who worked on the project explained to Fox Butterfield of The New York Times. Westinghouse set up a subsidiary in Switzerland, which funneled the money into Disini’s European bank accounts. The Swiss subsidiary, after entering into the deal with the Philippine government, assigned the contract to the Westinghouse International Projects Company, which had been established solely to handle the Philippine project. Westinghouse International, in turn, entered into a subcontract with the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, the parent company in Pittsburgh. Westinghouse officials repeatedly denied any wrongdoing with the project.^{^[71]}

By 1986—more than a decade and $1.2 billion later—the power plant was still not operational.^{^[72]}

Bataan Nuclear Power Plant. Photo courtesy of Vinnell Belvoir Corporation.

The old economic elite, whom President Marcos called the “oligarchy,” relatively tolerated the systematic favoritism of the administration on crony companies. This changed In 1981, when Filipino Chinese business tycoon Dewey Dee of the Binondo Central Bank left the country for Canada, leaving nearly P600 million in debt, seriously compromising the crony corporations. Government banks announced a rescue fund of approximately P5 billion in credit and equity capital, which the old elite found unfair, launching a barrage of public criticism.^{^[73]}
The impoverishment of the economy led to the loss of support of the middle class and the small-time landowners and farmers in the regions on the Marcos administration. Poverty, aside from human rights violations by the military, also became a means for rebel groups to recruit citizens to their cause. In 1978, the strength of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) grew from 6,900 to over 20,000 regulars.^{^[74]} In 1980, the New People’s Army formed 26 guerrilla fronts with over 16,000 regulars, and the Communist Party of the Philippines have attracted 40,000 mass activists.^{^[75]}
D. The Assassination of Ninoy Aquino
After three years of exile in the United States, Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr., the foremost leader of the Marcos opposition, decided to come back to the Philippines, intending to restore democracy in the country and convince President Marcos for an orderly succession. Previously, Aquino had been incarcerated by the military for seven years before being released for bypass surgery in the United States. Ninoy Aquino’s conversation with journalist Teodoro Locsin Jr. before he went back to the Philippines was revealing.^{^[76]} He was quoted as saying:

“I’ll go to Marcos, if he’ll see me. I’ll appeal to his sense of history, of his place in it. He would not be publishing all those books of his if he did not care for the judgment of history, if he did not want to look good in it. And that would be possible, I’ll tell him, only if there was an orderly restoration of democracy and freedom for our people. Otherwise, there would be only revolution and terrible suffering. I give the moderate opposition five years to restore democracy, after that there will be only the Communists as an alternative to Marcos or his successor. I’ll offer my services to him, but my price is freedom for our people.”^{^[77]}

He departed from Boston on August 13, 1983. Despite news of a death threat, Ninoy maintained in an interview on August 21, 1983 that “if it’s [my] fate to die by an assassin’s bullet, then so be it. […] [I have] to suffer with our people and [I have] to lead them.”

Ninoy Aquino’s assassination. Photo taken from Ninoy: Ideals & Ideologies 1932-1983.

Aquino landed in the Manila International Airport via China Airlines Flight 811 at 1:05 p.m. on August 21, and was escorted by armed men out of the plane. Minutes later, gunshots were heard. The former senator was shot dead by an assassin’s bullet to the head. When the news of Ninoy’s death spread, approximately seven million came to his funeral procession on August 31, the biggest and longest in Philippine history. This singular event further eroded the people’s support of the Marcos regime.
E. The Failure of the Snap Election of 1986
In the first week of November 1985, when President Marcos was interviewed in the David Brinkley Show, he stated his intention to call for a snap election, even going so far as to invite the members of the US Congress to observe, calling the accusation of fraud as unfounded.^{^[78]} This, it seems, was an attempt to consolidate support and show the United States the legitimacy of the Marcos administration. The announcement for a snap election within three months was ahead of schedule; the next regular elections were supposed to be held in 1987. The President was overconfident; he disregarded the objections of his family, his Cabinet, and his party.^{^[79]} Even First Lady Imelda Marcos, who was abroad at the time, was also reportedly taken aback by the announcement.^{^[80]} However, as recent scholarship suggests, this confidence only showed his isolation from the people whose support on his administration had already waned. Marcos’ Labor Minister, Blas Ople writes:

He (Marcos) couldn’t say that he was beleaguered and encircled, that he was losing the support of Washington and the international community and that he needed a breakthrough to reestablish his ability to govern. He was never that frank with us but we knew why.^{^[81]}

Marcos had to consolidate his forces if the election would go to his favor. As it was before the declaration of Martial Law, Marcos needed the support of the military. While acting Chief of Staff General Fidel V. Ramos was next in line as the Chief of Staff, the president knew that he needed Fabian Ver back. Ver was on leave, as he was being prosecuted in the Aquino-Galman murder case. By December 2, 1985, Ver and 26 other suspects were acquitted in a legal decision that caused public outrage.^{^[82]}
Meanwhile, prior to the snap election announcement, a “Convenor Group” was formed, composed of Lorenzo Tañada, Jaime V. Ongpin, and Cory Aquino, to select a presidential candidate for the opposition. Cory was regarded as the rightful candidate, the “people’s choice,” who was also promoted by Jaime Cardinal Sin.^{^[83]} For fear of being left out, Salvador Laurel of the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO) and Eva Kalaw of the Liberal Party (LP) formed the National Unification Committee’s (NUC).^{^[84]} Laurel was nominated by the NUC’s Nominating Convention held at the Araneta Coliseum as the presidential candidate of the opposition party for the coming Snap elections.^{^[85]}
Meanwhile, Cory Aquino announced her intention to run if a snap election was to be held, and if she had the support of a million citizens.^{^[86]} She was successful in gaining this support. The opposition, therefore had two frontrunners: Aquino, and former Senator Salvador “Doy” Laurel. However, in the same year, on December 7, Laurel decided to give way to Aquino. Though initially reluctant, Laurel was eventually convinced that their tandem was the only way the opposition stood a chance against the overwhelming influence of Marcos and the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL), and decided to run as Aquino’s vice president. In Teodoro L. Locsin Jr.’s article in the Philippine Free Press, Cory served as the “symbol of unity.” He further wrote:

“Cory would be the presidential candidate, and Doy who had spent substance and energy to create ex nihilo a political organization to challenge the Marcos machine must subordinate himself as her running mate.”

Aquino and Laurel ran together under the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO).^{^[87]}

President Ferdinand E. Marcos attends a rally prior to the Snap Elections. Photo by Peter Charlesworth.

Cory Aquino with her son, Benigno S. Aquino III. on the campaign trail, 1986. Photo from Teddy Locsin Jr.

During the 1986 snap elections, President Ferdinand E. Marcos used gender as an issue in his campaign broadcast against rival for the presidency, Corazon C. Aquino. This broadcast warns that a woman would not be able to handle the challenges of the post.

Businessman Jose Concepcion headed a group of concerned citizens to revive the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), established in 1957 after the fraud of the 1949 Presidential election, as the citizens’ watchdog on the counting of votes. It had a successful run in the legislative elections of 1984, releasing an unofficial untampered count. KBL attempted to discredit NAMFREL, but due to international pressure, COMELEC gave the watchdog organization official observer status.^{^[88]}
Massive poll fraud and rampant cheating marred the vote on the day of the elections, February 7, 1986. Thousands of registered voters—who had voted successfully in previous elections—found their names suspiciously missing from the lists.^{^[89]} Approximately 850 foreign correspondents flew in to observe,^{^[90]} including a delegations headed by U.S. senators and congressmen, who saw vote rigging happen.^{^[91]} On February 9, 35 COMELEC employees and computer operators at the COMELEC Tabulation Center walked out in protest due to the wide discrepancy between the computer tabulation and the tally board, showing blatant manipulation of electoral results.^{^[92]} In the countryside, precincts were hounded by the military and ballot-rigging was rampant. NAMFREL, in turn, showed Aquino in the lead with almost 70 percent of the votes canvassed.

Afraid of ruling party goons who have been known to snatch ballot boxes to throw them away or to stuff them with favorable manufactured votes, vigilantes form human barricades for boxes being brought from precincts to municipal halls for official tally. Photo by Ben Avestruz, People Power: The Philippine Revolution of 1986.

On February 9, 1986, thirty-five tabulators manning the COMELEC’s quick count computer terminals walked out during the 1986 snap elections. Photo from Bantayog Museum.

LIST OF 35 TABULATORS WHO WALKED OUT^{^[93]}
Linda (Kapunan) Angeles-Hill	Rory Asuncion	Zoe Castro	Mario Lavin
Myrna “Shiony” Asuncion-Binamira	Bot Bautista	Charles Chan	Thess Baltazar-Roberto
Jane Rosales-Yap	Erlyn Barza	Nori Bolado	Euly Molina-Legro
Cooly Culiat-Medina	Rubi Macato-Slater	Erick Celestino	Nitro Palomares-Castro
Alicia Torres	Dennie Estolas-Vista	Marissa Contreras-Legaspi	Maite de Rivera
Ernie Alberto	Achie Concepcion-Jimenez	Bambi Flor-Sena	Bing Romero-Justo
Marisa Briones-Allarey	Maleen Cruz-Ngan	Naz Gutierrez III	Vangie Saludares
Marissa Almendral	Mina Fajardo Bergara	Luchie Lavin	Irma Sunico-Buno
Gi Antonio-Silva	Jules Valderrama	Celine Vinoya-Rivera

By February 15, 1986, in an unprecedented announcement that was met with public outrage, the Batasang Pambansa proclaimed Marcos and Arturo Tolentino as the winners of the presidential and vice-presidential race respectively, by virtue of Resolution No. 38. Opposition assemblymen walked out of the Session Hall in protest.

Twenty-six parliamentary members walk out from the floor of the National Assembly just before the assembly proclaimed President Ferdinand Marcos winner of the February 7 election. The official tally had Marcos the victor over Corazon Aquino by 1.5 million votes. Photo by Jun Brioso.

This led to the opposition’s indignation rally in Luneta the next day where Cory Aquino spoke to around two million people in Luneta, in what would be known as the Tagumpay ng Bayan rally. At the event, Aquino called for massive civil disobedience and boycott of Marcos-crony owned companies and products. The Aquino-Laurel ticket also proclaimed victory.
The International Observer Delegation, composed of 44 delegates from 19 different countries who observed the electoral process, also released their report citing disturbing anomalies in the election results and subsequent intimidation of voters.^{^[94]}

Supporters of Cory Aquino and Salvador Laurel holding a ‘Victory of People’ or ‘Tagumpay ng Bayan’ rally, February 16, 1986. Photo from LIFE Photo Collection.

February 25 was chosen as the day of President Marcos’ inauguration.^{^[95]} As inaugural invitations were sent to the diplomatic corps, none of embassies sent their congratulatory remarks to Marcos, except for Soviet ambassador Vadim Shabalin, who was apparently in Malacañan for a courtesy call. When President Marcos informed him of the supposed result of the election, the ambassador offered his compliments, which is now cited as a grave diplomatic error.^{^[96]} The silence of foreign governments alarmed the administration.
On February 22, 1986, Marcos sent Labor Minister Blas Ople and Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor to the United States, and sent J.V. Cruz and Presidential Assistant for General Government Jacobo Clave to Europe, in a last ditch effort to legitimize his win in the presidency. Roberto Benedicto and Arturo Tolentino were to be sent to Japan, and the ASEAN countries respectively.^{^[97]}
Because of the calls for a boycott of crony companies announced by Cory Aquino, San Miguel Corporation fell in the stock market. The Manila Bulletin also lost a significant number of readers.
F. Coup Plot by the RAM
The Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) emerged in 1982 as a small, secret group intent on strengthening military rule through a coup d’état.^{^[98]} Initially, it was composed of Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and a handful of regular officers from the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), who harbored resentment against General Fabian Ver, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
The divide between PMA-trained regulars and officers from the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) was already evident in the early years of Martial Law. Marcos appointed ROTC officers to the top positions in the army, navy, and air force, passing over senior PMA graduates.^{^[99]} When Ver succeeded Romeo Espina as Marcos’ Chief of Staff, Ver was quick to isolate his rivals. “Ignoring merit or seniority,” writes Alfred McCoy, “he played upon ethnicity, blood, and school ties to pick favorites for key commands.”^{^[100]} Himself an alumnus of the University of the Philippines reserve program, he promoted former reservists and retained them even after their mandatory retirement, thus stifling the upward mobility of PMA-trained regulars.^{^[101]}
By early 1985, the RAM was a fully organized group with a leadership committee of 11 men and a membership base of around three hundred. Although relatively small, the RAM had the support of a majority of AFP officers, especially the PMA regulars.^{^[102]} By the middle of the year, the RAM went public, yet popular suspicion regarding the movement’s integrity arose due to its inclusion of former military torturers.^{^[103]} Still, most media outlets ignored their human rights record, choosing instead to paint the RAM as reformers.^{^[104]}
Plans for a Christmas coup in 1985 were started in August, but when President Marcos unexpectedly called for snap elections in November,^{^[105]} RAM leaders had to rethink their strategy, and the coup was postponed for the following year. When Marcos was proclaimed the winner in the fraudulent February 7 elections, the RAM leaders agreed to launch their coup at 2:00 a.m. (“H-hour”) on Sunday, February 23, 1986.^{^[106]}
The plan was as follows: At 1:30 a.m., Colonel Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan and twenty commandos would cross the Pasig River on rubber rafts and break into the Malacañan Palace, arresting President Marcos and Imelda. At 2:00 a.m. Lieutenant Colonel Eduardo “Red” Kapunan would command a hundred-man strike team to attack the security compound on the southern bank of the Pasig. Using smoke grenades as cover, they would detonate bombs and kill General Fabian Ver. The explosions would serve as a signal for two motorized RAM columns to break through the gates of the security compound. Major Saulito Aromin’s 49th Infantry Battalion would launch a simultaneous maneuver, posing as pro-Marcos reinforcements to reinforce Honasan’s commandos and secure the Palace. At 2:30 a.m, the Presidential Security Command would transmit false orders to eight pro-Marcos battalions in the capital to keep them from moving. At the same time, Colonel Tito Legazpi would capture Villamor Airbase and radio RAM units in the provinces to fly to Manila. At 3:00 a.m., just an hour after the coup’s launch, Enrile would issue Proclamation No. 1, establishing a revolutionary government.^{^[107]}
Yet for all the RAM leaders’ confidence in their plan, they did not have the command experience to successfully carry out the complicated operation, after almost ten years of sitting in air-conditioned offices.^{^[108]} And to make matters worse, Ver knew of the coup. On the Thursday before the planned coup, he summoned his senior officers and engineered a trap. He ordered a navy demolition team to plant bombs and mines along the palace riverfront. As the rebels made their way toward the palace on rafts, Ver would blind them with powerful spotlights. Marcos’ son, Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., would be brought out with a loud hailer, giving the rebels a final chance to surrender. If the rebels did not stand down, they would be blown sky high.^{^[109]}
The rebels only realized that their plan had been compromised on the Friday night before the coup, when Honasan and Kapunan saw a large number of troops amassing at Malacañang. They informed Enrile about the situation, and the assault on the palace had to be called off.^{^[110]}

The map used by General Fabian Ver to plan out the attack on Camp Crame and Camp Aguinaldo, superimposed onto a current aerial photograph of the area. This map was drawn on a blackboard and remains on display in the Presidential Museum and Library.

Faced with only two options—dispersing or regrouping—Enrile chose the latter as the “more honorable” option.^{^[111]} He announced his defection from Marcos on Saturday night in a press conference at Camp Aguinaldo, alongside Lieutenant General Fidel V. Ramos, Ver’s deemed successor.^{^[112]} In the first critical hours of the uprising, RAM leaders called on former PMA classmates and comrades, pleading for support or at the very least neutrality, thus undermining Marcos’ defenses.^{^[113]}
At 9:00 p.m., Jaime Cardinal Sin made his famous announcement over Radio Veritas, beseeching the people to bring food and gather at Camps Aguinaldo and Crame to support Enrile and Ramos. An hour later, Enrile finally reached Cory Aquino via telephone.^{^[114]} Aquino was at an anti-Marcos rally in Cebu City. She was informed of the coup^{^[115]}, but she was also suspicious of Enrile’s motives. Half a day later, she announced her support for the rebellion and asked the people to help.^{^[116]}
On that first night, people came to EDSA by the thousands with whatever provisions they could offer: pans of pancit, boxes of pizza, tins of biscuits, bunches of bananas.^{^[117]} Edwin Lacierda, presidential spokesperson of President Benigno S. Aquino III, was there to witness: “More than a rally,” he recalls, “all of us came to EDSA to break bread and fellowship with all who were willing to stand in the line of fire and take the bullet, as it were, for freedom and change of government.”^{^[118]}
Thus began the four-day EDSA People Power Revolution. The revolution was a peaceful one, with soldiers being coaxed with food, prayers, flowers, and cheers by people from all walks of life who sat, stood, and knelt in prayer in front of the tanks.^{^[119]} For instance, on February 24, the government-controlled Channel 4 was liberated by women who were sent into the compound to negotiate with the loyalist soldiers.^{^[120]} Church-owned radio station Radio Veritas did a marathon coverage of the revolution; disc jockey June Keithley, who averaged seventeen hours on air daily over the four days, kept the public informed in between airings of Ang Bayan Ko, Tie a Yellow Ribbon, and a curiously resurrected political jingle from the 1950s called Mambo Magsaysay.^{^[121]}
In the evening of February 22, Marcos personally telephoned General Prospero Olivas five times, ordering him to disperse the crowd at Camp Aguinaldo, because their presence would complicate an assault. A mentee of Ramos, Olivas feigned compliance and countermanded Marcos’ orders. Marcos then turned to General Alfredo Lim, the Metrocom district commander, but Lim was also loyal to Ramos and disregarded Marcos’ orders.^{^[122]}
In addition to the reluctance of Marcos’ officers, Marine Commandant Artemio Tadiar also pointed out the military incompetence of Ver’s plan, saying, “Every inch of the palace was occupied, literally.” “There were […] over eight thousand men packed so tightly in the narrow streets around the palace that they had no room to maneuver, and reinforcements were still arriving.”^{^[123]}
On February 24, at 5:00 a.m., Marcos was heard over the radio, “We’ll wipe them out. It is obvious they are committing rebellion.”^{^[124]} On that Monday morning, government troops headed by Marine battalions began their advance to Camp Crame from different directions as a dozen of helicopters encircled the camp. At 6:20 a.m., the tensed crowd around the Constabulary Headquarters waited with uncertainty as the helicopters approached.^{^[125]} Wurfel narrates one of the pivotal events of People Power as fear turned into loud cheers from the crowd:

When eight helicopters circled over Camp Crame on Monday morning, fears of bombardment were still high, but they landed and joined the rebels. This was probably the military turning point; thereafter military defections took place at an increasing pace. Yet Ver threatened to bomb and strafe Camp Crame, and Marcos held a press conference where he insisted, “I don’t intend to step down as President. Never, never!”

At 8:30 a.m., government troops broke into the rear of Camp Aguinaldo and trained their howitzers and mortars on Camp Crame. By 9:00 a.m., General Josephus Ramas gave the Fourth Marine brigade the “kill order” while civilians were still inside, but the brigade’s commander Colonel Braulio Balbas hesitated. Instead, he told Ramas, “We’re still positioning the cannons.”^{^[126]} Ramas would ask Balbas to attack four times, and each time, Balbas stalled. Marcos lost control of the Marines.^{^[127]}
At around the same time, a rebel frigate anchored at the mouth of the Pasig River had its guns aimed at Malacañan, just three kilometers away. Earlier that morning, Naval Defense Force chief Commodore Tagumpay Jardiniano told his men that he had declared himself for Enrile and Ramos. His men stood up and applauded, and Marcos lost control of the navy.^{^[128]}
At 9:15 a.m., Marcos, together with Ver appeared on television for a Press Conference. Ver requested Marcos permission to attack Camp Crame. But Marcos postured on TV to restrain Ver, saying, “My order is to disperse without shooting them.”^{^[129]} However, when Marine commandant General Artemio Tadiar met with Ver later, Ver confirmed that Marcos approved the kill order on Crame.^{^[130]}
Following a rocket attack from the rebel helicopters, General Ver radioed the wing commander of the F-5 fighters in Manila, ordering them to bomb Camp Crame. Francisco Baula, the squadron leader and RAM member, answered sarcastically: “Yes, sir, roger. Proceeding now to strafe Malacañang.”^{^[131]} At 1:00 p.m., General Ver gave secret orders to Major General Vicente Piccio to launch an air attack on Camp Crame, to which General Piccio replied, “But, sir, we have no more gunships. They have just been destroyed.”^{^[132]} Marcos lost control of the air force.
After Marcos lost complete control of the military, his presidency came to an end the following day, on February 25, 1986.

Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile (right) is joined by Lieutenant General Fidel V. Ramos as he announces his defection from the Marcos administration. Photo taken from Bayan Ko!

III. Conclusion
From February 22 to 25, 1986, hundreds of thousands of people amassed at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA), Metro Manila’s main thoroughfare, calling for the peaceful ouster of the dictator. On February 25, 1986, Corazon C. Aquino and Salvador H. Laurel took their oaths in Club Filipino as President and Vice President respectively. Meanwhile, Marcos was inaugurated in the Ceremonial Hall of the Malacañan Palace and delivered his inaugural address in Maharlika Hall (now Kalayaan Hall) on that same day. Rocked by key military and political defections and the overwhelming popular support for Aquino, Marcos was forced to depart with his family a few hours later for exile in Hawaii, effectively ending Marcos’ two-decade long dictatorial rule.
By March 1986,^[133] intelligence sources surfaced indicating that President Marcos was planning to stage widespread bombing and arson operations throughout Manila, so he could impose another martial law—called “Operation Everlasting.” The plan was to neutralize all opposition by arresting all opposition leaders, the entire executive council of NAMFREL^[134] and the RAM rebels in a planned concentration camp in Caballo Island near Corregidor.^[135] Hence, the EDSA People Power Revolution averted a resumption of an oppressive regime that would have curtailed the country’s civil liberties in the years to come.

The Philippines had its “longest day” on February 25, 1986, as it started the day with virtually no president, had two presidents by noon, and one president before midnight. TOP, oath taking as President by Corazon C. Aquino at Club Filipino before Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee. BOTTOM, President Ferdinand E. Marcos sworn in Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino in the Ceremonial Hall, Malacañan Palace.

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Boyce, James K. The Political Economy of Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1993.
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Buszynski, Leszek. Gorbachev and Southeast Asia. New York, NY: Routledge, 1992. Link.
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Endnotes
^{^[1]} “Editorial:Constitutional Convention or Malacañang Kennel?” Philippine Free Press, January 22, 1972, accessed February 18, 2016, link.
^{^[2]} Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office (PCDSPO), Philippine Electoral Almanac, rev. and exp. edition (Manila: PCDSPO, 2015), 115.
^{^[3]} David Wurfel, Filipino Politics: Development and Decay, (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press), 116.
^{^[4]} Ibid.
^{^[5]} PCDSPO, Philippine Electoral Almanac, 116-120.
^{^[6]} Rigoberto Tiglao, “The Consolidation of the Dictatorship,” in Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of People’s Power, eds. Aurora Javate-De Dios, Petronilo Bn. Daroy, and Lorna Kalaw-Tirol (Manila: Conspectus Foundation Inc., 1988), 26.
^{^[7]} Rosalinda Pineda Ofreneo, The Manipulated Press: A History of Philippine Journalism Since 1945 (Mandaluyong City: Cacho Hermanos Inc., 1984), 135.
^{^[8]} D. H. Soriano, Amadeo R. Dacanay, Paulina F. Bautista, and R. R. Marcelino, The Roces Family, Publishers: With a History of the Philippine Press (Quezon City: Islas Filipinas Publishing, 1987), 125; Dominador D. Buhain, A History of Publishing in the Philippines (Quezon City: Rex Book Store, 1998), 98.
^{^[9]} Gerald Sussman, “Politics and the Press: The Philippines Since Marcos,” Philippine Studies 36, no. 4 (1988): 495.
^{^[10]} Tiglao, “The Consolidation of the Dictatorship,” 30.
^{^[11]} Ibid. 29.
^{^[12]} David Wurfel, Filipino Politics: Development and Decay (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1988), 204.
^{^[13]} Ibid., 205.
^{^[14]} Ibid.
^{^[15]} Ibid., 208-209.
^{^[16]} Ibid., 206.
^{^[17]} Manuel F. Martinez, Aquino Vs. Marcos: The Grand Collision (Quezon City: Manuel F. Martinez, 1987), 342.
^{^[18]} Ibid., 340-341.
^{^[19]} Emmanuel S. de Dios, “The Erosion of the Dictatorship,” in Aurora Javate-de Dios, Petronilo Bn. Daroy, and Lorna Kalaw-Tirol, eds., Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of People’s Power (Metro Manila: Conspectus Foundation, 1988), 70.
^{^[20]} Ibid.
^{^[21]} PCDSPO, Philippine Electoral Almanac, 122.
^{^[22]} Ibid., 125.
^{^[23]} Patricio Abinales and Donna Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines (Pasig City: Anvil Publishing, 2005), 217.
^{^[24]} Ibid., 219; Benigno Aquino Jr., “Jabidah! Special Forces of Evil,” Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines. March 28, 1968, accessed November 27, 2015, http://www.gov.ph/1968/03/28/jabidah-special-forces-of-evil-by-senator-benigno-s-aquino-jr/; Proclamation No. 1081 s. 1972 (September 21, 1972); “Third Republic,” Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines, accessed November 27, 2015, http://www.gov.ph/featured/third-republic/.
^{^[25]} Abinales and Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines, 217.
^{^[26]} Ibid., 217 and 219.
^{^[27]} Ibid., 219.
^{^[28]} Manuel Quezon III, “Road to EDSA”, Today Newspaper, February 25, 1996, February 22, 2016, http://mlq3.tumblr.com/post/3415013093/the-road-to-edsa.
^{^[29]} Gregg Jones, Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerrilla Movement (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 225-226.
^{^[30]} Abinales and Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines, 220.
^{^[31]} De Dios, “The Erosion of the Dictatorship,” 128.
^{^[32]} Abinales and Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines, 220.
^{^[33]} Ibid.
^{^[34]} Ibid.
^{^[35]} Manuel L. Quezon III, “The Road to EDSA,” Today, February 25, 1996, accessed February 18, 2016, link.
^{^[36]} Katherine Ellison, Imelda: Steel Butterfly of the Philippines, (Lincoln, Nebraska: iUniverse, Inc., 1988), 206.
^{^[37]} “One can never justify any violation of rights’: John Paul II stands up to a dictator,” GMA News Online, April 27, 2014, accessed February 16, 2016, link.
^{^[38]} Alfred W. McCoy, Closer than Brothers: Manhood at the Philippine Military Academy (London and New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 226.
^{^[39]} Editorial, “If,” Philippine Free Press, August 23, 1986, link.
^{^[40]} “Aide confirms illness of Marcos,” The New York Times, December 4, 1984, accessed February 10, 2016, link.
^{^[41]} “Marcos reported stricken by fatal illness,” Chicago Tribune, October 18, 1985, accessed February 10, 2016, link.
^{^[42]} “Marcos seriously ill with rare disease lupus, U.S. sources say,” Los Angeles Times, January 17, 1986, accessed February 10, 2016, link.
^{^[43]} Wurfel, Filipino Politics, 235.
^{^[44]} PCDSPO, Philippine Electoral Almanac, 123.
^{^[45]} Muego, “The Executive Committee in the Philippines,” 1159.
^{^[46]} Ibid.
^{^[47]} Ibid., 1167.
^{^[48]} PCDSPO, Philippine Electoral Almanac, 128-129.
^{^[49]} Carolina G. Hernandez, “Reconstituting Political Order,” in Crisis in the Philippines: The Marcos Era and Beyond, ed. John Bresnan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 182.
^{^[50]} PCDSPO, Philippine Electoral Almanac, 130.
^{^[51]} James K. Boyce, The Political Economy of Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era, (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1993), 347.
^{^[52]} The Green Revolution was a strategy of introducing new rice technologies to Philippine agriculture, utilizing scientific research of international agencies and applying it to Philippine crops such as rice.
^{^[53]} Boyce, Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era, 90-91.
^{^[54]} John M. Nelson, Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 232.
^{^[55]} Ibid., 233.
^{^[56]} Boyce, Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era, 169-170.
^{^[57]} Ibid., 210.
^{^[58]} Nelson, Economic Crisis and Policy Choice, 232.
^{^[59]} Boyce, Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era, 210.
^{^[60]} Ibid., 211.
^{^[61]} Ibid., 180.
^{^[62]} Jeffrey Riedinger, Agrarian Reform in the Philippines: Democratic Transitions and Redistributive Reform, (California: Stanford University Press, 1995), 130.
^{^[63]} Boyce, Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era, 212.
^{^[64]} Nelson, Economic Crisis and Policy Choice, 232.
^{^[65]} Boyce, Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era, 205.
^{^[66]} Ibid,, 205.
^{^[67]} Ibid., 348.
^{^[68]} Raymond Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy (New York, NY: Times Books, 1987), 264.
^{^[69]} Ibid., 265.
^{^[70]} Ibid., 267.
^{^[71]} Ibid.
^{^[72]} Ibid., 265.
^{^[73]} Wurfel, Filipino Politics, 238.
^{^[74]} Abinales and Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines, 219; Aquino, “Jabidah! Special Forces of Evil,” http://www.gov.ph/1968/03/28/jabidah-special-forces-of-evil-by-senator-benigno-s-aquino-jr/; Proclamation No. 1081 s. 1972; “Third Republic,” http://www.gov.ph/featured/third-republic/.
^{^[75]} Rigoberto Tiglao, “The Consolidation of the Dictatorship,” in Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of People’s Power, eds. Aurora Javate-De Dios, Petronilo Bn. Daroy, and Lorna Kalaw-Tirol (Manila: Conspectus Foundation Inc., 1988), 66.
^{^[76]} Teodoro M. Locsin, “The Conscience of the Filipino: The Sacrifice,” Philippine Free Press Online, August 20, 1986, accessed February 16, 2016, link.
^{^[77]} Ibid.
^{^[78]} Gemma Nemenzo Almendral, “The Fall of the Regime,” in Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of People’s Power, eds. Aurora Javate-de Dios, Petronilo Bn. Daroy, and Lorna Kalaw-Tirol (Metro Manila: Conspectus Foundation, 1988), 176.
^{^[79]} Ibid., 180.
^{^[80]} Gemma Nemenzo Almendral, “The Fall of the Regime,” 180.
^{^[81]} Ibid., 177.
^{^[82]} Ibid., 185.
^{^[83]} Wurfel, Filipino Politics, 296.
^{^[84]} David G. Timberman, A Changeless Land: Continuity and Change in Philippine Politics (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), 131.
^{^[85]} “Salvador Laurel Diary,” Philippine Diary Project, June 12, 1895, link.
^{^[86]} Wurfel, 183.
^{^[87]} PCDSPO, Philippine Electoral Almanac, 132.
^{^[88]} Almendral, “The Fall of the Regime,” 200.
^{^[89]} Ibid., 201.
^{^[90]} Ibid.
^{^[91]} Table: Composition and Distribution of U.S. Observer Delegations for the February 7, 1986 Presidential Elections, January 15 to February 15, 1986, from the reconstructed files of COMELEC, Office of the President/National Media Production Center-International Center, and Embassy of the Philippines, Washington, D.C..
^{^[92]} COMELEC Employees’ Union, “COMELEC UNION: 1986 poll employees’ walkout provided spark for EDSA People Power Revolt,” InterAksyon.com, February 24, 2013, accessed February 11, 2016, link.
^{^[93]} Reynaldo Santos, “1986 COMELEC Walkout Not about Cory or Marcos,” Rappler, February 25, 2013, accessed February 15, 2016, link.
^{^[94]} International Observer Delegation, A Path to Democratic Renewal: A Report on the February 7, 1986 Presidential Election in the Philippines, accessed February 17, 2016, link.
^{^[95]} Nick Joaquin (Quijano de Manila), The Quarter of the Tiger Moon: Scenes from the People Power Apocalypse (Manila: Book Stop, 1986), 11.
^{^[96]} Leszek Buszynski, Gorbachev and Southeast Asia (New York, NY: Routledge, 1992), link.
^{^[97]} Joaquin, TheQuartet of the Tiger Moon, 13.
^{^[98]} McCoy, Closer than Brothers, 231.
^{^[99]} Ibid., 225.
^{^[100]} Ibid., 227.
^{^[101]} Ibid., 229-230.
^{^[102]} Ibid., 232.
^{^[103]} Ibid., 237
^{^[104]} Ibid., 233.
^{^[105]} Ibid., 233-234.
^{^[106]} Ibid., 241.
^{^[107]} Ibid., 237-238.
^{^[108]} Ibid., 238.
^{^[109]} Ibid., 241.
^{^[110]} Ibid., 243.
^{^[111]} Joaquin, The Quarter of the Tiger Moon, 19.
^{^[112]} McCoy, Closer than Brothers, 244.
^{^[113]} Ibid., 245.
^{^[114]} Angela Stuart-Santiago, “Chronology of a Revolution,” accessed on February 18, 2016, link.
^{^[115]} Cory Aquino was informed by Bel Cunanan, ibid.
^{^[116]} McCoy, Closer than Brothers 246.
^{^[117]} Joaquin, The Quartet of the Tiger Moon, 19.
^{^[118]} Edwin Lacierda, “Where were you?” Rappler, February 25, 2015, accessed February 17, 2016, link.
^{^[119]} Wurfel, Filipino Politics, 305.
^{^[120]} Joaquin, The Quartet of the Tiger Moon, 62.
^{^[121]} Ibid., 44.
^{^[122]} McCoy, Closer than Brothers, 244.
^{^[123]} Ibid., 248.
^{^[124]} Angela Stuart-Santiago “Chronology of a Revolution,” accessed on February 18, 2016, link.
^{^[125]} Ibid.
^{^[126]} McCoy, Closer than Brothers, 251.
^{^[127]} Ibid.
^{^[128]} McCoy, 250.
^{^[129]} Santiago, “Chronology of the Revolution,” link.
^{^[130]} Ibid., McCoy, Closer than Brothers, 251.
^{^[131]} McCoy, Closer than Brothers, 251-252.
^{^[132]} Santiago, “Chronology of the Revolution,” link .
^{^[133]} Associated Press News Archive, “Military reveals arson, bombing plot during Marcos’ last days with Am-Philippines”, March 6, 1986, accessed on February 22, 2016, http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1986/Military-Reveals-Arson-Bombing-Plot-during-Marcos-Last-Days-With-AM-Philippines/id-6f34fa5e77ac9e74672552beed788564
^{^[134]} Beth Day Romulo, Inside the Palace: The Rise and Fall of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, (Feffer & Sons, 1987), p. 223-225.
^{^[135]}Bryan Johnson, Four Days of Courage: The Untold Story of the Fall of Marcos, (Canada: McClellan and Stewart, 1987), 267

a three to six month program to weed out illegal drugs

2016-05-07T20:57:00.000-07:00

Imagining a three to six month program to weed out illegal drugs in the city (May 2016)

A person from a poor community, with poverty as an aggravating factor, although raised by his/her family as a law-abiding person, may learn negative values and skills from peers and acquaintances. Skills for illegal activities, such as theft or drug pushing, may be learned from others whom that person associates with. If the said individual’s social bonds with family, schools and community are weak, there is higher propensity for him/her to continue with delinquent or criminal activities. However, if the social bonds are strong, that person may feel guilt and decide to conform to family or school values such as honesty and industriousness. Elements of social control likewise have to be strong: the support of the family, community, and government/law enforcers should be there to prevent delinquency and criminality.

Deviant and criminal behavior can be eliminated by removing the rewards of bad behavior, increasing the consequences, or controlling the rewards and consequences for the behavior, to effect reformative or restorative interventions. Also, since positive behaviors reinforce positive behaviors, the rewards for positive behaviors may be encouraged, good values and new skills can be taught and learned during the intervention/counselling. For example, an accused person charged with theft can undergo counselling interventions that focus on strengthening personal values such as honesty, respect for others and property, and for skills development trainings for the said offender to learn decent ways to earn. The offender can then return to society as a reformed person who can aspire and live a decent life through decent, legal, and sustainable work or livelihood. Counselling is an essential part of character building, rehabilitation, and reform.

The effective use of social control methods may be promoted to keep individuals from committing deviant or criminal behavior. Curfew for minors and surveillance against alcohol and drug abuse go together to prevent residents from undesirable behavior, minimize crime-conducive situations or exposure to substance abuse, especially after curfew hours. Barangay officials should also constantly remind residents to obey laws/ordinances and to report abuses. These policies may work by keeping the community involved in maintaining law and order, especially for the minors.

With the broad aim of improving physical security, designing out crime and achieving tight coupling (connection) among the police, courts, corrections and the communities in the city, the problem of illegal drugs may be solved. The presence of "motivated offenders" (drug lords and dealers) and "suitable targets" (drug users/addicts), and the absence or lack of "capable guardians" or law enforcement (police and courts for drug-related crimes) are assumed. With the aim of addressing both predatory crimes and drug proliferation, the city to be secured should be equipped with high definition surveillance cameras placed in strategic locations for law enforcers (also equipped with body cameras when conducting law enforcement operations) to strictly monitor the movement of suspected drug dealers. Other criminal behaviors can also be monitored with those cameras. Civilian watchdogs and media should also have access to live video feeds.

Since the police and anti-drug groups already have the intelligence capabilities and lists of persons-of-interests in the illegal drug trade, the city can strictly enforce its laws against drugs with the help of technology: surveillance cameras, interconnected database systems, communications, educational / informational media platforms, and others. Drug users and addicts should be encouraged to enter rehabilitation programs. Likewise, facilities and personnel should be prepared for the task and supported by the government. The police and support groups are to be instructed to lawfully arrest all drug dealers and stop the drug syndicates through due process. Police work should be done properly, cases should be filed and acted upon swiftly by the courts, and the corrections should be decongested (by adding new facilities and personnel). To augment the police force and make barangay officers “capable guardians” in communities, proper trainings and greater coordination with police should be done. Residents may also play a support role in reporting undesirable elements. But more importantly for residents, community institutions such as schools and churches should effectively promote good values and avoidance of drugs or other illegal activities as part of their activities.

Scalawags and other corrupt officials in the police and military, and members of crime syndicates, should all be weeded out, arrested and prosecuted during the first three months. There should be suitable rewards for effective implementors of the program, and adequate protection for crusaders and their families. Law enforcers should address the bane of repeat offenders, abusive government officials, and perpetrators of heinous crime. However, the reimposition of the death penalty should no longer be considered as a deterrent. Certainty, rather than severity, of the penalties and effective law enforcement would deter crime and facilitate justice.

The city may be grouped into geographic sectors in weeding out drugs and syndicates, while increasing the number and capacities of police and capable guardians of the city. This may be done until the entire city is covered by the tightly coupled network of anti-drug police organizations, in cooperation with the communities, courts, and corrections.

Applying tight coupling among the police, courts, corrections, and communities, their increased coordination and capabilities to prosecute and rehabilitate offenders, can radically diminish the number of drug offenders and prevent the return or entry of other criminal elements in the city. Citizens are to be accustomed to proper safekeeping of communities and maintenance of good health among members of the community, as well as enforcement practices that strictly abide by ethical, legal, and humanitarian standards.

Illegal drugs is a global problem that may be as threatening as terrorism. It is a menace that needs remedy because it damages or destroys the lives of its victims as well as the families and friends of those affected. At the end of the program, there should already be no more motivated offenders, suitable targets/victims, and there should be more capable guardians in the city. The program may be implemented by other city units or adapted as a nationwide program. This should only be part of an integrated and holistic package that includes comprehensive structural, organizational, and cultural reforms.

Marcos myth, historical revisionism

2016-04-23T08:00:00.000-07:00

a compilation of statements and articles:

Statement of the UP History Department:

"MALAKAS AT MAGANDA: Marcos Reign, Myth-Making and Deception in History"

Matakot sa kasaysayan pagkat walang lihim itong di nahahayag.
(Fear history for it respects no secrets.)
--Gregoria de Jesus, Lakambini ng Katipunan

The darkness of dictatorship descended upon the Philippines when Ferdinand E. Marcos declared martial law in 1972 and the dictator ruled the nation with impunity.

Great danger now lurks behind a deceptive nostalgia for a past that never really existed--that the Marcos years were a period of peace and prosperity. This is patently Marcos myth and deception. Under martial law, the country was plunged into a climate of repression and plunder and then into a social crisis that exploded in the 1980s.

Marcos myth-making and deception are not new. Martial law itself was set up by grand deception. Marcos raised the Red scare to justify martial rule, but the communist movement then was still in its infancy; it was in fact under martial law that the communist and Moro rebellions grew in leaps and bounds. Marcos claimed to break up an old oligarchy, but martial law instead created a new type under his control, a crony oligarchy. Marcos also couched his dictatorship in deceptive legalese--“constitutional authoritarianism,” but it only served his yearning for perpetuity in power. The fact is martial law rudely preempted the 1971 constitutional convention, which sought to prohibit Marcos from extending his hold on power. He thereafter ruled for 14 years until he was ousted.

To prop up authoritarian control, the Marcos propaganda machine contrived deceptive images of Philippine society as in the slogans “New Society” and “City of Man,” which sought to paint a picture of a “compassionate society”; but Imelda Marcos actually put up whitewashed fences to hide urban blight and squalor from foreign tourists. The Marcoses also portrayed themselves in the likenesses of the legendary personae of Malakas at Maganda in the Filipino origin myth, which made them appear as fount of life in murals and photographic visuals. But the dictatorship actually engendered some of the darkest and direst years of Philippine history.

Economic crises characterized the Marcos years, as economists have consistently revealed, the most telling indicator was the extent of poverty. Poverty incidence grew from 41% in the 1960s to 59% in the 1980s. Vaunted growth was far from inclusive and driven by debt, which further weighed down on the nation. From 1970 to 1983, foreign debt increased twelve times and reached $20 billion (Dr. Manuel Montes, 1984). It grew at an average rate of 25% from 1970 to 1981. Much went to unproductive expenses like the Bataan Nuclear Plant, which was unsound and wasteful.

The Marcos regime then imposed an International Monetary Fund debt-repayment program that resulted in new taxes, massive lay-offs and a towering inflation that stood at 54% in 1984. While wages nominally rose by 29%, prices increased by 92% and the economy declined by 5.5% in 1984. BusinessWorld Research (2016) reckoned for 1984 the highest misery index (inflation + unemployment rates) between 1966 and 2015. From the mid70s, the situation resulted in the massive outflow of labor overseas. The grinding poverty of the majority showed in a sharp increase in two areas, infant mortality and insurgency. Crime rates increased; rebellion surged.

Even as inflation cut away at the allocations for health and education, there was an obvious increase in the military budget. Government also increased its contribution to government corporations held by favored friends. Monopolies were created in the sugar and coconut industries that pampered a select group. Marcos cronies made a lot of money through behest loans, which were repaid by tax money. Meantime the international media documented shopping sprees, not to mention lavish parties, by the Marcoses that gave scandal due to the scale of wanton spending. Marcos thus earned an infamous Guinness entry as a man believed to have stolen the most from a single country.

To say then that EDSA interrupted our becoming like Singapore is a big joke, a malicious lie. Marcos had mismanaged the economy; it was in shambles long before the EDSA revolt. From 1970 to 1980, among East Asian and Southeast Asian countries, the Philippines registered the lowest GDP per capita at 3.4% (An Analysis of Economic Crisis, ed. Dr. Emmanuel de Dios, 1984).
Peace and order, a spurious claim, actually meant an iron-fisted clampdown on civil liberties. Through presidential decree and executive order backed by the full force of the military apparatus, Marcos padlocked Congress, jailed the opposition, gagged media, emasculated unions, and banned student councils. Thousands were jailed without warrant and due process, not to mention countless killings and disappeared. Yet the national crime rate climbed continuously from 183 in 1976 to 279 (per 100,000) in 1980 (De Dios, ed. 1984 citing Philippine Constabulary data). In 14 long years, repression had also stunted the growth of independent-minded new leaders from the younger generation.

Today the Filipino people continue to seek peace and prosperity as the social structuress that gave rise to inequities, debt-dependence, poverty, corruption, human rights violations, rebellion, and criminality have remained after the EDSA revolt. What we ought to do is to expand the spaces for people empowerment and inclusive socio-economic development, uphold selfless public service, seek truth and justice in all corridors of government, render our obligations to Inang Bayan, and make sure that the tyranny of the past will never be written out of history.

We need to critically evaluate the past so that we do not blindly look for solutions to problems of underdevelopment from those who prospered under the dictatorship or those who allow the same sources of social inequities and injustice. We enjoy greater freedoms today precisely because we fought the Marcos regime and the purveyors of Marcos values that, once in the past, bled this nation dry.

The sad thing indeed that could happen is to fall for the trap of seeking a better society from a mythical “golden” past. In that past, Marcos myth-making served to hide the power grab and greed of a Malakas at Maganda. Today Marcos deception seeks to evade accountability.

We reject deception and demand accountability!

Department of History
College of Social Sciences and Philosophy
University of the Philippines
Diliman, Quezon City

March 28, 2016

UP history profs slam 'mythical' golden era under martial law

By Rosette Adel (philstar.com) | Updated March 30, 2016 - 6:57pm

http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/03/30/1567657/history-profs-slam-mythical-golden-era-under-martial-law The professors of the University of the Philippines (UP) History Department on Wednesday issued a statement clarifying that the martial law era under late President Ferdinand Marcos is not a period of peace and prosperity. The professors decried that the distortion of history is a "deceptive nostalgia" that never really occurred, citing that the darkness of dictatorship started when Marcos declared martial law in 1972.
“The darkness of dictatorship descended upon the Philippines when Ferdinand E. Marcos declared martial law in 1972, and the dictator ruled the nation with impunity,” the professors said.
“Great danger now lurks behind a deceptive nostalgia for a past that never really existed—that the Marcos years were a period of peace and prosperity. This is patently Marcos myth and deception. Under martial law, the country was plunged into a climate of repression and plunder and then into social crisis that exploded in the 1980s,” it added.
The professors warned the voters to not fall for the myth describing the Marcos years as the country's “golden age." The statement denounced the deception and demanded accountability from the Marcoses.
“The sad thing indeed that could happen is to fall for the trap of seeking a better society from a mythical ‘golden’ past. In that past, Marcos myth-making served to hide the power grab and greed of a Malakas at Maganda. Today, Marcos deception seeks to evade accountability. We reject deception and demand accountability!” the statement read.

They further explained that even economists know about the extent of poverty during the martial law era.
“Economic crises characterized the Marcos years, as economists have consistently revealed the most telling indicator was the extent of poverty. Poverty incidence grew from 41 percent in the 1960s to 59 percent in the 1980s,” the professors said.
“Vaunted growth was far from inclusive and driven by debt, which further weighed down on the nation. From 1970 to 1983, foreign debt increased twelve times and reached 520 billion. It grew at an average rate of 25 percent from 1970 to 1981,” they cited.
In a televised interview, vice presidential candidate Sen. Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said EDSA interrupted the growth of Philippine economy that could have led to development similar to Singapore’s.
“Kung walang EDSA, baka para tayong Singapore ngayon. Bakit ko sinasabi ‘yun? Sinasabi ko ‘yun dahil pareho ang mga basic na services na dinadala ng Singapore, pareho ang mga sektor na dini-develop ng Singapore,” Bongbong said.
“Two-thirds ng utang natin ngayon ay dito sa administrasyon na ito kaya’t papaano nila gagawin na hindi katumbas talaga dun sa kanilang sinasabi 'yung kanilang talagang ginagawa?” the senator added.
The UP professors responded by saying Marcos Jr.’s statement is a “big joke” and a “malicious lie,” citing that the country posted the lowest gross domestic product during the Marcos years.
“To say then that EDSA interrupted our becoming like Singapore is a big joke, a malicious lie. Marcos had mismanaged the economy; it was in shambles long before the EDSA revolt. From 1970 to 1980, among East Asian and Southeast Asian countries, the Philippines registered the lowest GDP at 3.4 percent,” they said.
On March 2, more than 400 professors of the Ateneo de Manila University also released a statement condemning the "willful distortion" of the country's history saying the Marcos era is a golden past. They described the twisting of history as “shameless refusal to acknowledge the crimes of the martial law regime.”

Ateneo profs condemn historical distortion of Marcos era

By Patricia Lourdes Viray (philstar.com) | Updated March 3, 2016 - 4:06pm

http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/03/03/1559107/ateneo-profs-condemn-historical-distortion-marcos-era

More than 400 professors of the Ateneo de Manila University (ADMU) on Wednesday condemned the "willful distortion" of the country's history. "We deplore the shameless refusal to acknowledge the crimes of the Martial Law regime," the Ateneo community said in a statement signed by 412 faculty member and formators.
This statement is in response to the call of vice presidential aspirant Sen. Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos Jr. that judgement about his late father's administration should be left to history teachers and students.
The Ateneo professors stressed that the dictatorship of the late President Ferdinand Marcos was one of the darkest periods of Philippine history.
"We condemn, in strongest possible terms, attempts by some individuals and particularly public figures, to whitewash the Marcos regime's wanton violation of human rights and to distort its political-economic record," the statement read.
The ADMU statement also called on those who are running for office in the May 9 elections to take a definite stand on the human rights violations during the Marcos era.
"We challenge them to join our call never again to allow the conditions of tyranny to take root in our society," the statement read.
The statement also expressed its opposition against any attempt to give Marcos a hero's burial at the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
In his speech during the 30th anniversary of the EDSA People Power Revolution last week, President Beingno Aquino III stressed that the Marcos regime was not the country's "golden age."
"Napapailing na nga lang po ako, dahil may mga nagsasabi raw na ang panahon ni Ginoong Marcos ang siyang golden age ng Pilipinas," Aquino said.

Environmental advocates against the return of the Marcoses to Malacañang

http://bulatlat.com/main/2016/04/20/environmental-advocates-against-the-return-of-the-marcoses-to-malacanang/

This unity statement was signed on April 19, at the Environmental Gathering Against The Return of the Marcoses to Malacanang held at Balay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines Diliman in Quezon City. We, environmental advocates and organizations, unite against the return of the Marcoses to Malacañang. We are campaigning against the bid of Senator Bongbong Marcos to be the vice president in the coming May 2016 election.
During the martial law years (1972-1986), the dictator Ferdinand Marcos implemented policies and projects which wrought massive environmental pollution and destruction. The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, for instance, led to massive deforestation and commodification of our forest resources. From 1965 to 1986, seven million hectares of our forests were lost because of Marcos’ timber licensing agreements.
Despite strong opposition from communities, the Marcos government constructed the first dirty coal power plant in 1983, the Calaca Coal-Fired Plant in Batangas. Up to the present, locals continue to bear the brunt of the displacement and pollution caused by the power plant.
Marcos attempted to implement numerous corrupt-laden and extremely hazardous projects such as the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP), the Chico River Dam Project in Kalinga, and the Kaliwa-Kanan Dam in Rizal.
These attempts were derailed because of the strong people’s resistance. Environmental heroes and martyrs like Kalinga chieftain Macliing Dulag and Calaca fisherfolk leader Erning Castillano sacrificed their lives in the struggles against these destructive projects
.
The environmental crimes committed during the dictatorship are bound to happen again if Bongbong gets one step closer to Malacañang. Until now, Bongbong and the rest of the Marcoses have refused to admit or show remorse over their sins and crimes in the past.
Bongbong is linked to entities that have unscrupulous environmental records. Jose Singson Jr., one of the major donors of Marcos’ 2010 senatorial bid, is suspected of harbouring applications and ongoing operations of illegal and destructive magnetite mining operations in the Ilocos region. His relatives, the Romualdezes, are one of the biggest large-scale mining elites in the country. Sen. Marcos has promised to give more incentives to corporate mining once he takes on the vice presidency.
The gargantuan personal funding of Marcos is suspected to have been seeded by their $10-billion ill-gotten wealth, some of which are likely sourced from the various destructive mining and other extractive projects during the dictatorship.
Thus, the growing consensus across the Philippine environmental movement is that the unrepentant environmental criminals that are the Marcos dynasty should never again be allowed to return to power.
Protect our environment!
Oppose the return of Marcoses to Malacanang!
NO VOTE for Bongbong Marcos!
Signatories:
Envi Vote Alliance
Amianan Salakniban
BUKAL Batangas
Center for Environmental Concerns
Citizen Disaster Response Center
GreenResearch
Kalikasan PNE
NILAD
PUSOD Inc.
SIBAT
UP Minggan
UP Saribuhay
AGHAM
AGHAM Youth
BAYAN NCR
Hustisya
CARMMA
KADAMAY
PALAMAKAYA

Marcos deception seeks to evade accountability—UP Dept. of History

By: Aries Joseph Hegina INQUIRER.net 3:17 PM March 30th, 2016

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/776985/marcos-deception-seeks-to-evade-accountability-up-dept-of-history

Salary / Compensation Adjustment of Personnel in Philippine Government 2016

2016-02-19T06:27:00.001-08:00

Executive Order No. 201, s. 2016

Signed on February 19, 2016

MALACAÑAN PALACE
MANILA

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 201

MODIFYING THE SALARY SCHEDULE FOR CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL AND AUTHORIZING THE GRANT OF ADDITIONAL BENEFITS FOR BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY AND UNIFORMED PERSONNEL

WHEREAS, Congress, under Item 1 of its Joint Resolution No. 4, (s. 2009), inscribes, as among the governing principles of the Compensation and Position Classification System (CPCS), the payment of just and equitable compensation to all government personnel in accordance with the principle of equal pay for work of equal value and one that is generally comparable with those in the private sector doing comparable work in order to attract, retain and motivate a corps of competent civil servants;

WHEREAS, to ensure this, the same Joint Resolution sets a periodic review of the government’s CPCS taking into account the changes in skills and competency requirement in the bureaucracy, the relative demand for certain expertise, the possible erosion in the purchasing power due to inflation, and other factors;

WHEREAS, Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 985 and Item 17 (iv) of the above Joint Resolution authorize the President, upon recommendation of the Department of Budget and Management, to periodically revise or update the CPCS as well as the policies on and levels of allowances, benefits and incentives applicable to all government personnel; and

WHEREAS, Congress has appropriated an amount of P57.91 Billion in Republic Act (RA) No. 10717 or the Fiscal Year 2016 General Appropriations Act (GAA), to cover the requirement to implement the compensation adjustment of civilian personnel and military and uniformed personnel in the National Government.

NOW THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO, III, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:

Section 1. Compensation Adjustment Strategy. To ensure that the compensation structure of government personnel is comparable with the prevailing rates in the private sector thereby attracting and retaining competent and committed civil servants, the existing CPCS is hereby revised or updated to conform with the following:

a) Raise the minimum salary for Salary Grade 1 from the current rate of Nine Thousand Pesos (P9,000) to Eleven Thousand Sixty Eight Pesos (P11,068) to make it even more competitive with the market rates;

b) Bring the compensation of government personnel closer to their private counterparts to at least 70% of the median of the market for all salary grades;

c) Eliminate overlaps in between salary grade allocations of government personnel to recognize differences in duties and responsibilities of the positions;

d) Maximize the net take home pay of government personnel through the inclusion of additional benefits; and

e) Strengthen the performance-based incentive system in recognition of government personnel who play a greater role and carry a heavier responsibility in attaining performance targets and delivering results.

For the military and uniformed personnel (MUP), the compensation adjustment strategy shall be aligned with the objective of mitigating the fiscal crisis building up in their pension system and pursuing the pension reform.

Section 2. Coverage. The modified Salary Schedule authorized herein shall apply to all civilian personnel in the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Branches, Constitutional Commissions and other Constitutional Offices, Government-Owned or Controlled Corporations (GOCCs) not covered by RA No. 10149, and local government units (LGUs); regardless of appointment status, whether regular, contractual or casual; appointive or elective; and on full-time or part-time basis.

The new Provisional Allowance Schedule and the Officers’ Allowance shall apply only to the military personnel of the Department of National Defense (DND) and the uniformed personnel of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA).

The Mid-Year Bonus, Enhanced Performance-Based Bonus (PBB), and Productivity Enhancement Incentive provided herein shall apply to both civilian personnel, and MUP, except for the increase in Hazard Pay which applies only to the MUP.

However, individuals whose services are engaged through job orders, contracts of service, consultancy contracts, and service contracts with no employer-employee relationship are excluded from the salary increase and benefits authorized herein.

Section 3. Modified Salary Schedule, including Step Increments. The modified Salary Schedule for Civilian Personnel, to be implemented in four (4) tranches, shall be as follows:

First Tranche

Salary Grade	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 4	Step 5	Step 6	Step 7	Step 8
1	9,478	9,568	9,660	9,753	9,846	9,949	10,036	10,132
2	10,159	10,255	10,351	10,449	10,547	10,647	10,747	10,848
3	10,883	10,985	11,089	11,193	11,298	11,405	11,512	11,621
4	11,658	11,767	11,878	11,990	12,103	12,217	12,333	12,448
5	12,488	12,644	12,725	12,844	12,965	13,087	13,211	13,335
6	13,378	13,504	13,630	13,759	13,889	14,020	14,152	14,285
7	14,331	14,466	14,602	14,740	14,878	15,018	15,159	15,303
8	15,368	15,519	15,670	15,823	15,978	16,133	16,291	16,450
9	16,512	16,671	16,830	16,992	17,155	17,319	17,485	17,653
10	17,730	17,900	18,071	18,245	18,420	18,634	18,775	18,955
11	19,077	19,286	19,496	19,709	19,925	20,142	20,362	20,585
12	20,651	20,870	21,091	21,315	21,540	21,769	21,999	22,232
13	22,328	22,564	22,804	23,045	23,289	23,536	23,786	24,037
14	24,141	24,396	24,655	24,916	25,180	25,447	25,717	25,989
15	26,192	26,489	26,790	27,094	27,401	27,712	28,027	28,344
16	28,417	28,740	29,066	29,396	29,729	30,066	30,408	30,752
17	30,831	31,183	31,536	31,893	32,255	32,622	32,991	33,366
18	33,452	33,831	34,215	34,603	34,996	35,393	35,795	36,201
19	36,409	36,857	37,312	37,771	38,237	38,709	39,186	39,670
20	39,768	40,259	40,755	41,258	41,766	42,281	42,802	43,330
21	43,439	43,974	44,517	45,066	45,621	46,183	46,753	47,329
22	47,448	48,032	48,625	49,224	49,831	50,445	51,067	51,697
23	51,826	52,466	53,112	53,767	54,430	55,101	55,781	56,468
24	56,610	57,308	58,014	58,730	59,453	60,187	60,928	61,679
25	61,971	62,735	63,508	64,291	65,083	65,885	66,698	67,520
26	67,690	68,524	69,369	70,224	71,090	71,967	72,855	73,751
27	73,937	74,849	75,771	76,705	77,651	78,608	79,577	80,567
28	80,760	81,756	82,764	83,784	84,817	85,862	86,921	87,993
29	88,214	89,301	90,402	91,516	92,644	93,786	94,943	96,113
30	96,354	97,543	98,745	99,962	101,195	102,442	103,705	104,984
31	117,086	118,623	120,180	121,758	123,356	124,975	126,616	128,278
32	135,376	137,174	138,996	140,843	142,714	144,610	146,531	148,478
33	160,924	165,752

Second Tranche

Salary Grade	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 4	Step 5	Step 6	Step 7	Step 8
1	9,981	10,072	10,165	10,258	10,352	10,453	10,543	10,640
2	10,667	10,761	10,856	10,952	11,049	11,147	11,245	11,345
3	11,387	11,488	11,589	11,691	11,795	11,899	12,004	12,110
4	12,155	12,262	12,371	12,480	12,591	12,702	12,814	12,927
5	12,975	13,117	13,206	13,322	13,440	13,559	13,679	13,799
6	13,851	13,973	14,096	14,221	14,347	14,474	14,602	14,731
7	14,785	14,916	15,048	15,181	15,315	15,450	15,587	15,725
8	15,818	15,969	16,121	16,275	16,430	16,586	16,744	16,903
9	16,986	17,142	17,299	17,458	17,618	17,780	17,943	18,108
10	18,217	18,385	18,553	18,724	18,896	19,095	19,244	19,421
11	19,620	19,853	20,088	20,326	20,567	20,811	21,058	21,307
12	21,387	21,626	21,868	22,113	22,361	22,611	22,864	23,120
13	23,257	23,517	23,780	24,047	24,315	24,587	24,863	25,141
14	25,290	25,573	25,859	26,149	26,441	26,737	27,036	27,339
15	27,565	27,887	28,214	28,544	28,877	29,214	29,557	29,902
16	30,044	30,396	30,751	31,111	31,474	31,843	32,215	32,592
17	32,747	33,131	33,518	33,909	34,306	34,707	35,113	35,524
18	35,693	36,111	36,532	36,960	37,392	37,829	38,272	38,719
19	39,151	39,685	40,227	40,776	41,333	41,898	42,470	43,051
20	43,250	43,841	44,440	45,047	45,662	46,285	46,917	47,559
21	47,779	48,432	49,094	49,764	50,443	51,132	51,831	52,539
22	52,783	53,503	54,234	54,975	55,726	56,487	57,258	58,040
23	58,310	59,106	59,913	60,732	61,561	62,402	63,255	64,118
24	64,416	65,296	66,187	67,092	68,008	68,937	69,878	70,832
25	71,476	72,452	73,441	74,444	75,461	76,491	77,536	78,595
26	78,960	80,039	81,132	82,240	83,363	84,502	85,657	86,825
27	87,229	88,420	89,628	90,852	92,093	93,351	94,625	95,925
28	96,363	97,679	99,013	100,366	101,736	103,126	104,534	105,962
29	106,454	107,908	109,382	110,875	112,390	113,925	115,481	117,058
30	117,601	119,208	120,836	122,486	124,159	125,855	127,573	129,316
31	152,325	154,649	157,008	159,404	161,836	164,305	166,812	169,357
32	177,929	180,700	183,513	186,372	189,274	192,221	195,215	198,255
33	215,804	222,278

Third Tranche

Salary Grade	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 4	Step 5	Step 6	Step 7	Step 8
1	10,510	10,602	10,695	10,789	10,884	10,982	11,076	11,173
2	11,200	11,293	11,386	11,480	11,575	11,671	11,767	11,864
3	11,914	12,013	12,112	12,212	12,313	12,414	12,517	12,620
4	12,674	12,778	12,884	12,990	13,097	13,206	13,315	13,424
5	13,481	13,606	13,705	13,818	13,932	14,047	14,163	14,280
6	14,340	14,459	14,578	14,699	14,820	14,942	15,066	15,190
7	15,254	15,380	15,507	15,635	15,765	15,895	16,026	16,158
8	16,282	16,433	16,585	16,739	16,895	17,051	17,209	17,369
9	17,473	17,627	17,781	17,937	18,095	18,253	18,413	18,575
10	18,718	18,883	19,048	19,215	19,384	19,567	19,725	19,898
11	20,179	20,437	20,698	20,963	21,231	21,502	21,777	22,055
12	22,149	22,410	22,674	22,942	23,212	23,486	23,763	24,043
13	24,224	24,510	24,799	25,091	25,387	25,686	25,989	26,296
14	26,494	26,806	27,122	27,442	27,766	28,093	28,424	28,759
15	29,010	29,359	29,713	30,071	30,432	30,799	31,170	31,545
16	31,765	32,147	32,535	32,926	33,323	33,724	34,130	34,541
17	34,781	35,201	35,624	36,053	36,487	36,927	37,371	37,821
18	38,085	38,543	39,007	39,477	39,952	40,433	40,920	41,413
19	42,099	42,730	43,371	44,020	44,680	45,350	46,030	46,720
20	47,037	47,742	48,457	49,184	49,921	50,669	51,428	52,199
21	52,554	53,341	54,141	54,952	55,776	56,612	57,460	58,322
22	58,717	59,597	60,491	61,397	62,318	63,252	64,200	65,162
23	65,604	66,587	67,585	68,598	69,627	70,670	71,730	72,805
24	73,299	74,397	75,512	76,644	77,793	78,959	80,143	81,344
25	82,439	83,674	84,928	86,201	87,493	88,805	90,136	91,487
26	92,108	93,488	94,889	96,312	97,755	99,221	100,708	102,217
27	102,910	104,453	106,019	107,608	109,221	110,858	112,519	114,210
28	114,981	116,704	118,453	120,229	122,031	123,860	125,716	127,601
29	128,467	130,392	132,346	134,330	136,343	138,387	140,461	142,566
30	143,534	145,685	147,869	150,085	152,335	154,618	156,935	159,288
31	198,168	201,615	205,121	208,689	212,318	216,011	219,768	223,590
32	233,857	238,035	242,288	246,618	251,024	255,509	260,074	264,721
33	289,401	298,083

Fourth Tranche

Salary Grade	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 4	Step 5	Step 6	Step 7	Step 8
1	11,068	11,160	11,254	11,348	11,443	11,538	11,635	11,732
2	11,761	11,851	11,942	12,034	12,126	12,219	12,313	12,407
3	12,466	12,562	12,658	12,756	12,854	12,952	13,052	13,152
4	13,214	13,316	13,418	13,521	13,625	13,729	13,835	13,941
5	14,007	14,115	14,223	14,332	14,442	14,553	14,665	14,777
6	14,847	14,961	15,076	15,192	15,309	15,426	15,545	15,664
7	15,738	15,859	15,981	16,104	16,227	16,352	16,477	16,604
8	16,758	16,910	17,063	17,217	17,372	17,529	17,688	17,848
9	17,975	18,125	18,277	18,430	18,584	18,739	18,896	19,054
10	19,233	19,394	19,556	19,720	19,884	20,051	20,218	20,387
11	20,754	21,038	21,327	21,619	21,915	22,216	22,520	22,829
12	22,938	23,222	23,510	23,801	24,096	24,395	24,697	25,003
13	25,232	25,545	25,861	26,181	26,506	26,834	27,166	27,503
14	27,755	28,099	28,447	28,800	29,156	29,517	29,883	30,253
15	30,531	30,909	31,292	31,680	32,072	32,469	32,871	33,279
16	33,584	34,000	34,421	34,847	35,279	35,716	36,159	36,606
17	36,942	37,400	37,863	38,332	38,807	39,288	39,774	40,267
18	40,637	41,140	41,650	42,165	42,688	43,217	43,752	44,294
19	45,269	46,008	46,759	47,522	48,298	49,086	49,888	50,702
20	51,155	51,989	52,838	53,700	54,577	55,468	56,373	57,293
21	57,805	58,748	59,707	60,681	61,672	62,678	63,701	64,741
22	65,319	66,385	67,469	68,570	69,689	70,827	71,983	73,157
23	73,811	75,015	76,240	77,484	78,749	80,034	81,340	82,668
24	83,406	84,767	86,151	87,557	88,986	90,439	91,915	93,415
25	95,083	96,635	98,212	99,815	101,444	103,100	104,783	106,493
26	107,444	109,197	110,980	112,791	114,632	116,503	118,404	120,337
27	121,411	123,393	125,407	127,454	129,534	131,648	133,797	135,981
28	137,195	139,434	141,710	144,023	146,373	148,763	151,191	153,658
29	155,030	157,561	160,132	162,746	165,402	168,102	170,845	173,634
30	175,184	178,043	180,949	183,903	186,904	189,955	193,055	196,206
31	257,809	262,844	267,978	273,212	278,549	283,989	289,536	295,191
32	307,365	313,564	319,887	326,338	332,919	339,633	346,483	353,470
33	388,096	399,739

Section 4. Mid-Year Bonus. Beginning FY 2016, a Mid-Year Bonus equivalent to one (1) month basic salary as of May 15, shall be granted to those who have rendered at least four (4) months of satisfactory service and are still in the service as of same date, to be given not earlier than May 15 of every year. This shall be in addition to the Standard Allowances and Benefits under the Total Compensation Framework embodied in the Congress Joint Resolution No. 4 (s. 2009). The existing Year-End Bonus equivalent to one (1) month basic salary and Cash Gift at prescribed rates shall be given in November of every year.

Section 5. Enhanced Performance-Based Bonus. The existing PBB granted to qualified government personnel, including those in LGUs, shall be enhanced to strengthen its results orientation, to be given in an amount equivalent to one (1) month basic salary up to two (2) months basic salary, to be implemented in two (2) phases starting in FY 2017. The PBB shall be subject to the achievement by departments or agencies, including LGUs and individual employees of their performance targets or commitments and compliance with good governance and other conditions.

The grant of the enhanced PBB shall be based on a progressive rate system. As the position and responsibility in improving agency performance becomes higher, so is the amount of PBB.

The Inter-Agency Task Force on the Harmonization of National Government Performance Monitoring, Information and Reporting Systems created under Administrative Order No. 25 (s. 2011) shall prescribe the conditions on eligibility and procedures for the grant of the enhanced PBB, including the ranking system to recognize differences in levels of performance.

Section 6. Productivity Enhancement Incentive. Beginning FY 2016, the Productivity Enhancement Incentive shall be given not earlier than December 15 of every year to all qualified government employees at Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000) each for the purpose of improving the government employees’ productivity.

Section 7. Provisional Allowance Schedule for Military and Uniformed Personnel. A monthly Provisional Allowance shall be given to the MUP to be implemented in four (4) tranches, as follows, in lieu of increases in base pay:

*DND*	*DILG*		*PCG*	*NAMRIA*	*Monthly Provisional Allowance*
*DND*	*BJMP and BFP*	*PNP and PPSC*	*PCG*	*NAMRIA*	*First* *Tranche*	*Second* *Tranche*	*Third* *Tranche*	*Fourth* *Tranche*
Candidate Soldier					267	547	842	1,149
Private	Fire/Jail Officer I	Police Officer I	Apprentice Seaman/ Seaman Third Class	Apprentice Seaman/ Seaman Third Class	342	700	1,071	1,457
Private First Class			Seaman Second Class	Seaman Second Class	514	1,050	1,612	2,199
Corporal	Fire/Jail Officer II	Police Officer II	Seaman First Class	Seaman First Class	673	1,378	2,120	2,899
Sergeant			Petty Officer III	Petty Officer III	836	1,718	2,650	3,633
Staff Sergeant	Fire/Jail Officer III	Police Officer III	Petty Officer II	Petty Officer II	992	2,043	3,157	4,339
Technical Sergeant			Petty Officer I	Petty Officer I	1,196	2,471	3,826	5,268
Master Sergeant	Senior Fire/ Jail Officer I	Senior Police Officer I	Chief Petty Officer	Chief Petty Officer	1,429	2,954	4,584	6,325
Senior Master Sergeant	Senior Fire/ Jail Officer II	Senior Police Officer II	Senior Chief Petty Officer	Senior Chief Petty Officer	1,688	3,500	5,442	7,525
Chief Master Sergeant	Senior Fire/Jail Officer III	Senior Police Officer III	Master Chief Petty Officer	Master Chief Petty Officer	2,081	4,331	6,760	9,384
First Chief Master Sergeant	Senior Fire/Jail Officer IV	Senior Police Officer IV	First Master Chief Petty Officer	First Master Chief Petty Officer	2,651	5,547	8,711	12,165
Cadet		Cadet	Cadet		2,651	5,547	8,711	12,165
Probationary Second Lieutenant					2,651	5,547	8,711	12,165
Second Lieutenant			Ensign	Ensign	3,341	7,030	11,104	15,598
First Lieutenant	Inspector	Inspector	Lieutenant Junior Grade	Lieutenant Junior Grade	4,092	8,661	13,761	19,452
Captain	Senior Inspector	Senior Inspector	Lieutenant Senior Grade	Lieutenant Senior Grade	5,003	10,652	17,026	24,215
Major	Chief Inspector	Chief Inspector	Lieutenant Commander	Lieutenant Commander	5,853	12,533	20,156	28,849
Lieutenant Colonel	Superintendent	Superintendent	Commander	Commander	7,061	15,228	24,671	35,584
Colonel	Senior Superintendent	Senior Superintendent	Captain	Captain	8,304	18,016	29,370	42,639
Brigadier General	Chief Superintendent	Chief Superintendent	Commodore	Commodore	9,708	21,189	34,760	50,799
Major General	Director	Director	Rear Admiral	Rear Admiral	10,679	24,795	40,935	60,222
			Vice Admiral	Vice Admiral	11,747	28,198	46,594	68,713
Lieutenant General		Deputy Director General	Admiral	Admiral	12,922	31,221	51,873	76,825
General		Director General			14,214	35,260	63,977	95,399

The Provisional Allowance shall be given as an interim measure to supplement the total compensation of MUP until such time that their Base Pay Schedule is rationalized in consideration of the pension implications of base pay adjustment of personnel in the active service under existing laws.

Section 8. Hazard Pay. The Hazard Pay of all military and uniformed personnel shall be increased from the current rate of Two Hundred Forty Pesos (P240) per month to the following rates:

a) Starting January 1,2016, Three Hundred Ninety Pesos (P390) per month;

b) By January 1, 2017, Five Hundred Forty Pesos (P540) per month;

c) By January 1, 2018, Six Hundred Ninety Pesos (P690) per month; an

d) By January 1, 2019, Eight Hundred Forty Pesos (P840) per month.

Section 9. Officers’ Allowance. An Officers’ Allowance shall be given to the following MUP ranks, likewise as an interim measure until such time that the Base Pay Schedule is modified and rationalized, at the rates below:

*DND*	*DILG*		*PCG*	*NAMRIA*	*Monthly Officers’ Allowance*
*DND*	*BJMP and BFP*	*PNP and PPSC*	*PCG*	*NAMRIA*	*First* *Tranche*	*Second* *Tranche*	*Third* *Tranche*	*Fourth* *Tranche*
Captain	Senior Inspector	Senior Inspector	Lieutenant Senior Grade	Lieutenant Senior Grade	1,000	3,000	4,500	7,000
Major	Chief Inspector	Chief Inspector	Lieutenant Commander	Lieutenant Commander	1,500	4,500	6,500	11,000
Lieutenant Colonel	Superintendent	Superintendent	Commander	Commander	2,000	6,000	8,500	13,000
Colonel	Senior Superintendent	Senior Superintendent	Captain	Captain	3,000	7,500	10,500	15,000
Brigadier General	Chief Superintendent	Chief Superintendent	Commodore	Commodore	4,000	9,000	12,500	17,000
Major General	Director	Director	Rear Admiral	Rear Admiral	5,000	10,500	15,000	20,000
			Vice Admiral	Vice Admiral	6,000	12,000	18,000	25,000
Lieutenant General		Deputy Director General	Admiral	Admiral	7,000	13,000	21,000	30,000
General		Director General			9,000	18,000	25,000	35,000

Section 10. Compensation Adjustment for LGU Personnel. The modified Salary Schedule and additional benefits authorized herein for civilian personnel may likewise be granted to LGU personnel, subject to the following:

a) Authorization from their respective sanggunian as provided under Sections 447(a), 458(a) and 468(a) of RA No. 7160; and

b) Compliance with the Personnel Services (PS) limitation set under Sections 325 and 331 of RA No. 7160.

LGUs shall likewise comply with the following rules in the implementation of the modified salary schedule and grant of additional benefits:

i. The implementation of the modified Salary Schedule for LGU personnel, including the rate of Representation and Transportation Allowances, shall further correspond to the LGU’s income classification and shall not therefore exceed the percentage of the Salary Schedule in Section 3 hereof, as follows:

Percentage of the Salary Schedule
	For Provinces/Cities	For Municipalities
Special Cities	100%
1st Class	100%	90%
2nd Class	95%	85%
3rd Class	90%	80%
4th Class	85%	75%
5th Class	80%	70%
6th Class	75%	65%

ii. The basic pay of barangay personnel shall be in the form of honoraria which shall not exceed the percentage of the Salary Schedule corresponding to the income classification of the LGU. They may likewise receive Mid-Year Bonus and Year-End Bonus based on the monthly honoraria as of May 15 and October 31 of the year, respectively, and Cash Gift of Five Thousand Pesos (P5.000).

However, the minimum Year-End Bonus of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000) for the punong barangay and Six Hundred Pesos (P600) for other mandatory barangay officials shall not be subject to the PS limitation.

Section 11. Implementation Schedule. The modified Salary Schedule and additional benefits authorized herein shall be implemented in National Government Agencies as follows, subject to appropriations by Congress:

Starting January 1, 2016, the first tranche salary schedule for civilian personnel and the first tranche Provisional Allowance, Officers’ Allowance and Hazard Pay for MUP, together with the Mid-Year Bonus.
By January 1, 2017, the second tranche salary schedule for civilian personnel and the second tranche Provisional Allowance, Officers’ Allowance and Hazard Pay for MUP, the Mid-Year Bonus and half of the enhanced PBB;
By January 1, 2018, the third tranche salary schedule for civilian personnel and the third tranche Provisional Allowance, Officers’ Allowance and Hazard Pay for MUP, the Mid-Year Bonus and full amount of the enhanced PBB; and
By January 1, 2019, the fourth tranche salary schedule for civilian personnel and the fourth tranche Provisional Allowance, Officers’ Allowance and Hazard Pay for MUP, the Mid-Year Bonus and full amount of the enhanced PBB.

For covered GOCCs and LGUs, the implementation of the compensation adjustments shall be in at least four (4) years depending on their respective financial capability, with each tranche starting not earlier than the dates stated above. GOCCs and LGUs which do not have adequate or sufficient funds shall partially implement the modified Salary Schedule and authorized benefits. In case of partial implementation, the same shall be at uniform percentage across all positions for every GOCC/LGU.

Section 12. Retroactive Application. The first tranche implementation of the modified Salary Schedule for civilian personnel, the grant of the Provisional Allowance, Officers’ Allowance and increased Hazard Pay for the MUP, shall be effective January 1, 2016.

For covered GOCCs and LGUs, the retroactive application of the first tranche shall be subject to their financial capabilities and compliance with other requirements under existing laws.

Section 13. Exempt Entities. The following exempt entities shall not be covered by the modified Salary Schedule and additional benefits authorized herein: (i) government agencies, including GOCCs that are exempted from the coverage of RA No. 6758, as amended, as provided in their respective enabling law or charter; and (ii) GOCCs governed by the CPCS established by the Governance Commission for GOCCs (GCG) and approved by the President of the Philippines, under RA No. 10149.

They shall be governed by their respective CPCS which shall be made effective upon the recommendation of the DBM or the Governance Commission for GOCCs, as the case may be, and approval by the President of the Philippines.

Section 14. Applicability to Certain Officials. Consistent with the policy under Section 6 of Article VII and Section 10 of Article VI of the Constitution, the salaries authorized herein for the President, Vice President and Members of Congress shall take effect only after the expiration of the respective terms of the incumbents.

The implementation of this Executive Order with respect to the regular members of the Cabinet shall be effective starting July 1, 2016.

Section 15. Funding Source. The funding sources for the amounts necessary to implement this Executive Order shall be as follows:

a) For national government agencies funded in the GAA, the amount needed for the compensation adjustment in FY 2016 shall be charged against the appropriations provided in the FY 2016 GAA.

The funding requirements for the compensation adjustment in FYs 2017, 2018 and 2019 will be included in the proposed annual National Expenditure Program submitted to Congress for its approval. The DBM, following the compensation adjustment strategy embodied in Section 1 hereof, and consistent with its authority under Section 7 of RA No. 6758, as amended, shall then be authorized to implement or adjust the compensation corresponding to the appropriations provided in the GAA.

b) For GOCCs, the amounts shall come from their respective corporate funds in the corporate operating budgets approved by DBM.

c) For LGUs, the amounts shall be charged against their respective funds in accordance with the pertinent provisions of this Order and RA No. 7160.

Section 16. Implementing guidelines. The DBM shall issue the guidelines necessary to implement the provisions of this Order.

Section 17. Separability. Should any provision of this Order be declared invalid or unconstitutional, the other provisions unaffected thereby shall remain valid and subsisting.

Section 18. Repeal. All other rules, regulations and issuances, or parts thereof which are inconsistent with this Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly..

Section 19. Effectivity. – This Order shall take effect immediately upon its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

DONE, in the city of Manila, this 19th day of February, in the year of our Lord, Two Thousand and Sixteen.

(Sgd.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III

By the President:
(Sgd.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR.
Executive Secretary
Source: Malacañang Records Office
Office of the President of the Philippines. (2016). [Executive Order]. Manila : Malacañang Records Office.

*copied from The Official Gazette of the Philippines http://www.gov.ph/2016/02/19/executive-order-no-201-s-2016/

photo albums

2015-01-24T04:11:00.002-08:00

iBlog: The 10th Philippine Blogging Summit

#SignUpVsPork @ Manila

People's Initiative Against Pork --- Manila

Teachers launch project and exhibit for Manobos

UP CMC, students and alternative media commemorate Int'l Day to End Impunity

a glimpse of history -- #PopeFrancisPH

2015-01-19T23:15:00.000-08:00

Millions of Filipinos felt jubilant, not minding the long hours under the rain, as they received blessings during the concluding mass led by no other than Pope Francis. The historic event was held last January 18 at the Rizal Park in Manila, Philippines. Pope Francis was in the country last January 15-19, 2015 "to confirm us in our faith as we face the challenges of witnessing to the Joy of the Gospel in the midst of our trials". The theme of the Apostolic Visit to the Philippines was “Mercy and Compassion”.

Here are some scenes during the Papal visit https://flickr.com/photos/fred_dabu/sets/72157650376855672/ (in Luneta and https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.10204336084457121.1073741889.1079790069&type=1&l=95e9484bb4 in Mendiola-Malacanang, Manila) captured with a Pentax PH K-50. It's also the first time I field-tested my camera's weather sealing.

An assessment of Altermidya: A new network of Filipino alternative media organizations (Part VI)

2014-12-30T04:24:00.001-08:00

VI. Conclusion and Recommendations*

Alternative media groups and practitioners held the 'First National Conference of the Alternative Media' on October 9 and 10 at the Plaridel Hall auditorium of UP CMC, Diliman, Quezon City.

Journalists from more than 30 independent media organizations participated in discussions about the country's alternative media experience. The delegates formed Altermidya, People’s Alternative Media Network.

The network aims to strengthen independent media organizations and amplify the voice of society's marginalized sectors. The network pledged to actively support campaigns for justice and an end to impunity, in time for the commemoration of the Ampatuan Massacre. It is supporting media workers in corporate media who are protesting against unfair management policies. It adopted pooled editorials calling for the enactment of a genuine Freedom of Information law and for continuing the fight against corruption in government, among other issues. It has published and broadcasted its positions on these issues and successfully carried out these coordinated activities from October to December 2014.

1. Altermidya and its member organizations should continue improving, learning and developing themselves based on the discussion about their strengths, best practices, weaknesses and opportunities.

At barely two months old since its founding, Altermidya has already accomplished vital steps toward establishing itself as a reliable network of alternative media practitioners. It is continuously striving to improve itself and its members as it reaches out to the public whom it seeks to enlighten and develop strong relations with. The network is in the process of preparing more detailed plans for the coming year, based on the lessons and resolutions shared during two-day conference.

Altermidya should encourage its members to study ways of improving the form and content of outputs of alternative media groups. It should remind its network of organizations to share their products to a wider, broader public. As one member organization noted: “Increased popularization of content rests on its attractiveness and usefulness to (its) audiences.” Members of people’s organizations are highly encouraged to “share the content to their own networks... Both the possibilities and limitations of the social media in disseminating works online is evolving, (the organization) is constantly trying to study, experiment, and learn from our own experiences and that of others.”

2. Altermidya and its member organizations should strengthen their relationship with people's organizations.

The most important recommendation is for Altermidya and alternative media groups to strengthen their relationships with people’s organizations. This is the soul of alternative media, its first task is to grow roots and to develop a “strong and vibrant relationship with people’s organizations.” This relationship is seen as vital to the existence and growth of alternative media groups. “It is also the foundation of the continued success and recognition of our projects and programs,” as stated by a member organization. All the issues and concerns mentioned in this paper revolve around and can be resolved with the help of people's organizations, and society in general, from which and for whom the alternative media groups owe their existence.

3. Altermidya and its member organizations should continue being flexible, dynamic and determined to discover and adapt new ways to better serve the people's organizations and the society.

The network encourages its members to further study their experiences and make improvements on the presented recommendations and plans. Meticulous or a more rigorous assessment and detailed planning should immediately be conducted, first by the member organizations, and then the Altermidya network should consolidate and improve upon the assessments and plans. The details will have to be identified, fleshed out, and expanded upon according to their respective organization’s specific needs and goals. Afterwards, the network can prepare the detailed and consolidated assessment and plan for the coming year.

Specific recommendations may include, for instance: online and print publications can explore marketing, inviting advertisers, and consider implementing other income generation activities to be able to distribute low-cost, if not totally free newspapers or magazines, in addition to their online platforms. Multimedia and online news groups can produce daily or weekly news casts or simultaneous radio and online broadcasts… New staff members for social media engagement, multimedia production, and other highly-technical work, can be trained and designated to perform the identified tasks. Scholarships for journalists, grants for projects and relevant trainings can be identified, applied for, and availed. Cross-trainings among groups, joint projects and sharing of resources can be planned and implemented. Membership and a broader network of supporters can be expanded to span across the nation and the international community. Year-end assessment and planning conferences can be carried out in the coming days.

Overall, the potentials for producing a weekly or daily news cast and for reaching a wider segment of society through the new network are great. The online, print, video and radio broadcast formats for regular news casts can be done, once the various expertise of member organizations are consolidated and enhanced under Altermidya. Trainings for practitioners, as well as community organizers, can be done via the network. These goals could be achieved within a timeframe of a couple of months to less than a year.

Altermidya has within its grasp the orientation, tools and human resources it needs to jumpstart its operations toward fulfilling its objectives of strengthening alternative media in “propagating and enhancing the advocacies of people’s organizations, promoting people’s rights, and galvanizing the people into action to effect change.” Altermidya, People’s Alternative Media Network can be expected to work with utmost dedication and proficiency towards accomplishing its nine objectives.

Further studies to see how the network is responding to challenges and dealing with previously identified organizational issues and concerns are also recommended.

*Part VI of a paper submitted for PA 210 - Organization Studies, UP NCPAG, December 2014.

*************************

References

Arkibong Bayan. (2014, October). 1^st National Conference of the Alternative Media, Plaridel Hall, UP College of Mass Communication, Diliman, QC, October 9-10, 2014. Retrieved from http://www.arkibongbayan.org/2014/2014-10Oct10-altermidya/AlterMidya.htm

Bergold, J. & Thomas, S. (2012). Participatory Research Methods: A Methodological Approach in Motion. Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 13 (1). Art. 30, http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs1201304. Retrieved from http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/1801/3334

Magtoto, R. (2014, October 17). Altermidya: Formed to Make the People’s Voice Stronger. Bicoltoday.com. Retrieved from http://bicoltoday.com/2014/10/17/altermidya-formed-to-make-the-peoples-voice-stronger/

Olea, R. (2014, October 12). National network of alternative media outfits formed. Bulatlat.com. Retrieved from http://bulatlat.com/main/2014/10/12/national-network-of-alternative-media-outfits-formed/

Olea, R. (2014, October 12). Marcos-era mosquito press shares lessons with new breed of alternative media. Bulatlat.com. Retrieved from http://bulatlat.com/main/2014/10/12/then-and-now-marcos-era-mosquito-press-shares-lessons-with-new-breed-of-alternative-media/

Raneses, N. (2014, November 28). Orientation Seminar on Quality Management System (QMS) ISO 9001:2008 for Officials and Employees of UP System Offices. Lecture conducted from University of the Philippines Diliman, Quezon City.

Sharma, A., Cimilluca, D., & Peers, M. (2014, July 16). Media Squeeze Fuels Fox Bid for Time Warner. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http://online.wsj.com/articles/21st-century-fox-offered-to-buy-time-warner-1405511112

Smith, M. (2001). ‘Peter Senge and the learning organization’, the encyclopedia of informal education. Retrieved from http://infed.org/mobi/peter-senge-and-the-learning-organization/

Unpublished reports and draft documents (constitution and bylaws) from Altermidya.

"Climate Change, Resilience and Environmental Justice"

2014-03-12T21:30:00.000-07:00

Some photos from "Climate Change, Resilience and Environmental Justice", a public forum with Commissioner Naderev "Yeb" Saño of the Philippine Climate Change Commission and Mr. Jose Leon Dulce of Kalikasan People's Network for the Environment, January 22, 2014, 9am-12nn, CAS Little Theater, UP Manila, Padre Faura, Ermita. https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.10201907256737946.1073741850.1079790069&type=1&l=38ef906c7e

(article excerpts)

"With the Philippines as one of the most vulnerable countries in the world due to climate change, Saño urged the audience to “fight for our future.” He said climate change is affecting every aspect of life, with the impoverished communities as the most affected.

“We need the whole world to take action,” Saño said. He said the international climate change negotiations are little steps, but just too little to stop global warming.

Dulce said the people should transform this crisis into an opportunity “by organizing themselves to claim social, environmental and climate justice.”

The forum was part of the Political Science Week celebrations of the Department of Social Sciences, CAS, UP Manila."

Read more about climate change here: "COP 19 Philippines' National Statement" http://climate.gov.ph/newsandupdates/cop-19-philippines-national-statement-0

"Stop the madness that climate change causes for countries like the PH"

http://www.interaksyon.com/article/74610/speech--stop-the-madness-that-climate-change-causes-for-countries-like-the-ph

free publications' backup

2014-03-12T21:00:00.000-07:00

I believe in sharing and making backups of free publications that's why I stored or republished some of them in digital platforms such as Issuu.com and Dropbox. In case the main website containing those free downloadables crashes or becomes inaccessible for whatever reason, their readers can still search for and access backup files. Here are some of the newsletter issues I laid out for the Philippine College of Surgeons (PCS). The "PCS Newsletter" was renamed as "Incisions" in 2012. I'm considering reposting more publications in the weeks ahead.

digital footprints

2014-03-12T00:00:00.000-07:00

It's been a year since my last post. I ought to get back to writing opinion articles, taking photos and videos, or maybe I should try something new in Blogger. I wonder how much has changed in 12 months. While I think about my digital footprints, here are some of my recent articles published in the UP Forum:

Gastos Sa Kampanya, Sukdulan Nga Ba?

(Jan.-Feb. 2013)

Financing Global Climate Action, Rich Countries Should Pay Up

(May-June 2013)

Pork in LGUs

(July-August 2013)

Justice for Kristel, Justice for the Iskolar ng Bayan

2013-03-23T02:59:00.000-07:00

Candle-lighting-protest program at AS Steps, UP Diliman, Luksang Pamantasan (March 15-22, 2013)
Photo album http://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.4951914550561.1073741827.1079790069&type=1&l=7bf66e7e6f

Understanding the Moro People and Philippines Claim on Sabah

2013-03-16T02:54:00.000-07:00

PUBLIC FORUM on Understanding the Moro People and Philippines Claim on Sabah
SR104, The University Hotel, University of the Philippines Diliman, 12 March 2013

Photo album http://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.4934956046609.1073741826.1079790069&type=1&l=9fe5f3a8dd

Youtube playlist http://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLXYznFqU6nCJs3kxyAn9kYyvJ1r9Y1ttu

International Women’s Day - 8 March 2012

2013-03-10T03:02:00.000-07:00

International Women’s Day - 8 March 2012

Thousands of Filipino women from various sectors condemned the continuing violation of women’s rights under the administration of Benigno "Noynoy" Aquino III during this year's International Women’s Day protests in Manila. They called for salary hikes for teachers and government employees, rollback of oil prices, a moratorium on demolitions of urban poor communities, and an end to US military intervention in the country, among many other demands. They held a program at Plaza Miranda and marched to Mendiola (Don Chino Roces) Bridge where they burned an effigy to cap the day-long commemoration last March 8.

Photo album http://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.3068682110927.2142308.1079790069&type=1&l=361b1497d8

Lantern Parade 2011

2012-12-22T03:04:00.000-08:00

UP Lantern Parade, UP Diliman, QC. Dec. 16, 2011.
Photo album http://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.2539658765674.2131279.1079790069&type=1&l=9ad23b28c1

Oblation Run 2011

2012-11-17T03:05:00.000-08:00

Oblation Run, UP Diliman, QC. Dec. 16, 2011.
Photo album http://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.2539554843076.2131272.1079790069&type=1&l=fa79a9012e

Junk RA10175 / Anti-Cybercrime Law / eMartial Law

2012-10-07T01:08:00.000-07:00

photo from http://www.facebook.com/followteddycasino

Read:

Netizens urged to continue posting, tweeting vs cybercrime law
http://bulatlat.com/main/2012/10/05/netizens-urged-to-continue-posting-tweeting-vs-cybercrime-law/

A statement of the 15th Graciano Lopez Jaena Community Journalism Fellows on the Cybercrime Law
http://bulatlat.com/main/2012/10/05/a-statement-of-the-15th-graciano-lopez-jaena-community-journalism-fellows-on-the-cybercrime-law/

Cybercrime law takes effect October 3 amid broad protests
http://bulatlat.com/main/2012/10/02/cybercrime-law-takes-effect-october-3-amid-broad-protests/

Anti-Cybercrime law, an attack against freedom of expression, other civil rights
http://bulatlat.com/main/2012/09/20/anti-cybercrime-law-an-attack-against-freedom-of-expression-other-civil-rights/

Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility (CMFR) on Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012
http://www.cmfr-phil.org/cmfr-on-the-cybercrime-prevention-act-of-2012/

Cybercrime Prevention Act, seryosong banta sa karapatan sa pamamahayag
http://pinoyweekly.org/new/2012/09/cybercrime-prevention-act-seryosong-banta-sa-karapatan-sa-pamamahayag/

Pag-aaklas kontra Cybercrime Law, offline at online
http://pinoyweekly.org/new/2012/10/pag-aaklas-kontra-cybercrime-law-offline-at-online/