Do leadership styles vary greatly based on geography and national context? I had the opportunity to ask this question and observe other cultures as a Marshall Memorial Fellow in the Fall 2014 cohort.

If leadership styles are influenced by the prevailing culture of their location, they must vary by cultural context. As culture is a collection of social customs and expectations, and leadership is by nature a people-managing enterprise, it stands to reason that as the norms of social habits and expectations are different from place to place, so would they affect leadership.  What it means to be, for example, an autocratic leader or a transactional manager will shift from culture to culture. Moreover, you may find many more individuals of one type or another in a context that lends itself to leaders being created in a particular mold.

I observed differences in how leaders related to their organizations and countries in the very way they spoke. Beneath the surface, though, it was conversational commonality that I found to be most indicative of a cultural thread: the European tendency to say “we” where Americans would use “I,” or avoid the plural pronoun altogether. A sample representative quote may be: “Brussels sets trade, legal, defense, agriculture, energy, and monetary policy. We only manage what we can.”

Maybe it is a mechanism to take a deferential posture, to deflect the credit for accomplishments in a humble fashion. “We in this agency provide free health care to thousands of people in need in this region every year.”

Or could it be as simple as a reflection of European collectivism that contrasts so strongly with American individualism? “We are very proud of our gastronomy, and it is important that we protect it.”

Is this merely a manner of speaking, or something deeper? Perhaps both. The appointments our MMF delegation had were with leaders in various areas, and even among those with the loftiest positions I observed a lack of personal vigor and outward optimism compared to what you would expect from a similar;y positioned American. The leadership styles on display in Europe tended toward the humble servant type. Rather than employing charisma or flair, our counterparts seemed to rely on their technocratic skills and ability to lead democratically.

If a place is defined by its people as well as its landscape, conversational clues might be an excellent window into the soul of the community and its leaders. Indeed, the influences of cultural characteristics embedded in language can be found in not only the workplace but throughout the power structures of the places we visited. I look forward to taking this awareness along with me on my own leadership journey.

Tom Habitz, an Urban Planning Specialist at Henry Ford Health Systems in Detroit, is a Fall 2014 American Marshall Memorial Fellow.

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One of the first things that struck me when I arrived in Brussels, Belgium as a 2014 American Marshall Memorial Fellow was how simple the immigration and border protection process was. Of course I have an American passport, but still, the officer simply asked me how long I would be around and welcomed me kindly to Belgium.  No stress, no pomp. In fact, waiting in the line to reach the border agent took longer than our transaction. As I walked through to the arrivals hall, I immediately observed the Dutch and French signage, not boldly declaring that this was a multilingual nation, but doing it in a way that seemed natural, accepting and proud. This theme carried through much of the rest of my sojourn in this international city.

Indeed, Belgium’s natural and accepting society is apparent in its strong emphasis on social justice, stable value structures and social welfare. Whether it was our speaker from the Open VLD party, an informal conversation with a Belgian physician, or other conversations on Belgium, it became evident that the predominant Belgian value system was predicated on a belief that the “rising tide floats the whole boat”. A core belief in making health care a right and not a privilege, providing social services and resources, emphasizing primary care as the portal of entry into the healthcare system, and prioritizing education as an essential ingredient to well being was fascinating.

In my individual meeting with a Federal Minister, we talked about the national efforts on poverty and social integration, and he told me that “poverty is not just about resources, it’s also about education, opportunity and knowledge.” He also said that their work was not to give people money but to “give them dignity”. Though the system was not perfect and there were still people on the fringes, overall, there was a definite and distinct Belgian rubric amidst major international institutions like NATO and the European Union. Hence, the core of the Belgian ideal is strong, and Belgium has strong and powerful influence over the tone of the rest of the EU.

Belgians, who straddle many cultures and the international affairs sector, must speak many languages. On any given day, I would hear English, French, Dutch, German, Spanish, Swahili and more. Such a multilingual nation is very appealing. The fact that someone serving you coffee could converse in multiple languages was exciting! The fact that the 24 official languages of the EU are used in every meeting and with materials is impressive. The Belgian physician I met with spoke 6 different languages and said that she can take care of pretty much any patient that walks into her door.  What a comfort to the patients she provides care for! The three regions of Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels are primarily divided among language lines, but still, multiple languages are still woven into the national fabric. While language itself is not “Belgian,” the acceptance and inclusion of multiple languages and the ability for people to speak their native languages without reproach distinguishes the nation.

This is perhaps the reason why the spirit of multi-nationalism and multiculturalism characterizes Belgium. People travel from all over the world to bring their expertise or develop their expertise in Belgium. A somewhat transient culture, it is common for people to come to Belgium for short periods of time to work and then move on to another assignment. Hence, the multiple cultural influences seem to be new and fresh, and a major attraction to the country. In the area of Matonge, where many African immigrants reside and work, the potpourri of various African foods and cuisine, musical sounds, languages, shops, styles and beliefs is a wonderful experience.

Yet Belgians also face challenges when assimilating this diversity. Strong nationalist sentiments and harsh sentiments towards ethnic minorities emerged pervade some corners of society. In return for some of the structural and interpersonal discrimination around race, ethnicity, religion, status and national origin, Belgium is met with retaliation or apathy that often results from polarizing rhetoric and actions. This, then, spurs disenfranchisement and the cycle repeats itself. These challenges were noted in each of the 5 countries I visited during my fellowship, so it is a common struggle for all, and Belgium is well suited to lead the dialogue shift given its rich diversity.   Belgium’s diversity gives it a competitive advantage. Belgian leaders should do more to embrace, and not marginalize, their diverse citizens. Changing the conversation from what immigrants add to the country’s tapestry instead of what they take away, and focusing on extending social benefits to newer society members will increase their likelihood of contributing positively to the larger state. If this ethos can prevail in Belgium, given its strategic and political positioning in the EU, it could truly serve as the springboard for a larger conversation on diversity and inclusion throughout Europe.

Jacqueline Nwando Olayiwola, an Assistant Professor of Medicine at the University of California, San Francisco, is a Fall 2014 American Marshall Memorial Fellow.

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WASHINGTON—Fresh off a narrow victory in a contentious election, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff has signaled an interest in restoring momentum in Brazil’s ties with the United States as well as a renewed focus on the European Union. Brazil’s growth is collapsing due to continuing infrastructure, regulatory, and fiscal problems, as well as tightening external credit and low global commodity prices. The cumulative impact of these factors is encouraging tighter fiscal and monetary policies at home, and a trade agenda that focuses on a Mercosur-EU free trade agreement with Brussels and trade facilitation and regulatory convergence with Washington.

These initiatives are being pursued in the context of negotiations over a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the United States and EU, a mega-trade deal that Brazil worries will leave it outside global value chains. Given its similar fears regarding the Trans-Pacific Partnership, stagnant domestic economic growth, and a devalued currency, Brazil has turned its attention to exports — and to its northern Atlantic partners in particular.

Brazil-U.S. relations faltered amid Rousseff’s reaction to revelations of U.S. National Security Agency data mining in Brazil and related issues. Rousseff postponed a planned October 2013 state visit to Washington and put on hold multiple policy dialogues with the United States. Recent announcements — including a rescheduled visit to Washington in September and the appointment of former Foreign Minister Luis Alberto Figueiredo as ambassador to the United States — suggest Brazil wants to rebuild bilateral bridges and put ties back on a more productive footing.

Last week’s visit to Washington by Armando Monteiro, Brazil’s minister of development, industry, and trade, was a positive signal for the commercial relationship. Monteiro used his first international trip to focus on a pragmatic agenda of trade facilitation and regulatory convergence with the United States. One measure that Monteiro proposed was to link U.S. and Brazilian online foreign trade portals, websites that centralize information on procedures for businesses seeking to import and export. Regulatory convergence in areas such as ceramics, tiles, machines and equipment, and textiles are among Brazil’s other proposals. In the longer term, deeper cooperation with the United States on innovation and investment are priorities.

Brazil’s near-term trade agenda with the United States is intended to deliver quick, tangible results. It also dovetails with the Trade Facilitation Agreement reached by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Bali in 2013, which formally entered the WTO rulebook in November last year, and which was championed by the WTO’s Director General Roberto Azevêdo, a Brazilian. Eliminating non-tariff barriers to trade via the Bali agreement is estimated to add up to $1 trillion to the global economy through more efficient customs procedures, reduced red tape, and improved border infrastructure, thereby speeding delivery of goods and improving access to markets.

In addition to closer ties with the United States, Brazil wants to strengthen commercial and political linkages with the European Union. The priority with Europe is to finalize a stalled trade pact between the EU and Mercosur (a bloc comprised of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela). One of the main difficulties in advancing an EU-Mercosur deal has been Argentina’s isolationist position on international trade. Throughout 2014, Mercosur countries hotly debated ways to move forward together.

Last week, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier met with Rousseff in Brasília to discuss bilateral ties, trade, and Merkel’s state visit to Brazil in August this year. They signed a “working holiday” agreement that will allow Germans and Brazilians aged 18 to 30 to work and study for up to a year in the other country. Steinmeier also stressed Germany’s interest in deepening trade ties with Brazil and reaffirmed Germany’s commitment to accelerating the EU-Mercosur trade negotiations, while Brazilian Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira confirmed that Mercosur’s proposal is ready and awaits the EU proposal.

Disagreements within Rousseff’s Workers’ Party (PT) about opening the Brazilian economy could always derail Brazil’s Atlantic trade agenda. Moreover, a massive money-laundering scandal surrounding the state-run oil company Petrobras, which implicates many PT members, seems to be rapidly depleting Rousseff’s political capital. As this impinges on her ability to manage her diverse coalition in Congress, it is unclear if she will be able to sustain legislative support for her second-term goals.

Nevertheless, Brazil has set a proactive Atlantic agenda centered on trade facilitation, regulatory convergence, and an EU-Mercosur trade pact. As Brazil continues to explore and define its role on the international stage, exercising the soft power of agenda-setting appears to be emerging as one of its primary tools. Brazil is, of course, seeking domestic gains from these moves. But in helping to frame and advance the trade agenda both globally and in the Atlantic, Brazil is stepping forward in a leadership role.

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WASHINGTON—The United States has long had a strong interest in Europe’s energy security as an essential component of our security alliance. Washington worked closely with Europe in the creation of the International Energy Agency in 1974 to coordinate a collective response to oil supply disruptions. They partnered in promoting oil and gas flows from the Caspian through non-Russian routes to Europe, and have collaborated on energy security and climate in the G7 and G20. They also established the U.S-EU Energy Council that fosters cooperation on energy policies and research on clean energy technologies. While Europe has made great progress in enhancing its energy security, the conflict in Ukraine has highlighted remaining vulnerabilities, with U.S. Vice President Joe Biden calling out “Russia’s track record in using the supply of energy as a foreign policy weapon” in November.

It is natural that Washington should support the goals of the Energy Union, one of the top priorities of the European Commission under the leadership of Vice President Maroš Šefčovič. The Energy Union is meant to achieve a more competitive, secure, and sustainable European energy policy, reforming how Europe produces, transports and consumes energy. It will help complete Europe’s internal market, reduce import dependence, boost energy efficiency, and increase its use of renewables.

Šefčovič intends to deliver a framework strategy for the Energy Union on February 25 with completion of the EU’s internal energy market as its backbone, and a strong governance system to ensure its implementation. While non-members of the EU are not involved directly in shaping the content of the Energy Union, a formal contribution by Washington to the debate would likely include:

• A strong call to expeditiously complete the internal energy market outlined in the EU’s Lisbon Treaty. Šefčovič rightly views the EU as too fragmented into national silos, meaning that some parts of the continent remain insufficiently integrated into the energy system.
• Urging prioritization of a handful of energy infrastructure projects that would make a real difference, such as a Croatian liquefied natural gas terminal, the Greece-Bulgaria gas interconnector, and electricity interconnectors in the Baltics — rather than the 30-odd priorities currently on the table — and ensure they are funded.
• Advising the Europeans to speed up the finalization of simple, harmonized rules for gas and electricity trading in Europe and ensure they are implemented.
• Reminding EU member states of the value of a truly integrated European energy market. It would benefit all Europeans by increasing competition, which puts downward pressure on prices and increases energy security by diversifying sources, delivery routes, and types of energy.
• Recommending more transparency in opaque import contracts, especially of natural gas from Russia, and to end once and for all Gazprom’s discriminatory pricing and market abuse. When Gazprom becomes an ordinary supplier, with its prices determined by market conditions and without political surcharges, Europe will have made a huge leap forward in energy security.

While Washington might be reluctant to weigh in directly regarding how the EU organizes itself to address these issues, it would likely encourage Europeans to strengthen their work on common policies. As Biden noted last November, the EU’s energy stress tests last year “underscored the importance of coordination.” Stronger regional cooperation arrangements would mitigate energy security risks and more evenly distribute the costs of decarbonization of the energy sector.

In that vein, Washington would applaud the decision to create a working group on energy security in Central and Southeast Europe following Russia’s announcement that it was cancelling its South Stream pipeline project. This working group is to develop an action plan for advancing cooperation, integrating gas markets and enhancing physical interconnections in Central and Southeast Europe (where linkages are the weakest in the EU), and how to finance the work. If this plan provides clarity on infrastructure priorities and identifies funding, it could become a model for other regions, and perhaps for Europe as a whole. As for the much-touted common purchasing of gas to enhance the negotiating power of EU members, its objectives could be met largely by greater contract transparency, effective enforcement of EU rules (including an end to prohibitions on re-export of gas), and continued movement toward hub pricing.

Above all, Washington would be pledging its continued support as Europe’s closest partner in addressing our common energy challenges. A more resilient European energy market is a core security objective for the transatlantic community.

The views expressed in this GMF publication are the author’s views alone and are not those of GMF, the Department of State, or the U.S. Government.

Douglas Hengel is a senior resident fellow with The German Marshall Fund of the United States based in Washington, DC.

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MUNICH—The 51^st Munich Security Conference began amidst the backdrop of crisis in Ukraine and concluded with little room for optimism. In fact, the proceedings left many with the impression that they had been transported back to the bygone Cold War era.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel urged caution and diplomacy in dealing with Russia, using her own personal experiences of having grown up in East Berlin. U.S. senators demanded to know why Germany was not willing to equip Ukraine militarily. U.S. Vice President Biden was anything but his usual jovial self. Booming from the podium, he declared that the United States would not be resetting its relations with Russia, but rather reasserting itself. He implored his predominately European audience to raise defense spending levels above 2 percent and not take NATO for granted. Ukrainian President Petro Poroschenko thanked the international community for its support, but urged greater action, dramatically shaking the passports of Russian soldiers who he claimed had “lost their way” into Ukraine. And Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s defense was literally met with boos and laughter in the hall, which further indicated his country’s isolation.

The apparent renewal of a Cold War-like security atmosphere did mean an absence of detailed conversations on the major trade and investment negotiations underway: the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The lack of focus on Asia — home to four of the world’s largest economies (not counting the single European market) — was also noticeable, although this year’s sub-main stage discussion was on “Asia as a Pow(d)er Keg?” and involved senior official participants from China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and the United States, as well as former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd as moderator. There was also relative optimism about the Middle East, whether about the eventual defeat of the so-called Islamic State (now being called “Daesh”) or the ongoing Iran nuclear negotiations.

Europe’s absence in Asia outside the conversations on economics is unfortunate given that the future international system will be defined by Asia’s evolution and the transatlantic response. For the Munich Security Conference to continue to be the premier international security conference, Asia will have to be better discussed and represented in the future, particularly given the emergence of new Asian security forums being proposed in China and the existing Shangri-La Dialogues in Singapore. While reiterating that the United States was a Pacific power, U.S. leaders at Munich — including Secretary of State John Kerry and Vice President Biden — were at pains to reaffirm their commitment to Europe, declaring it a cornerstone of U.S. engagement in the world.

The relative absence of Asia and optimism about the Middle East were in contrast to the deep pessimism about the crisis with Russia over Ukraine. The sharp disagreement between Lavrov and Biden was perhaps to have been expected, but it was surprisingly exacerbated by differing lessons drawn from history by Merkel and U.S. Senator John McCain. The issue of militarily equipping Ukraine was the main dividing line between the two and continued to be discussed as Merkel visited the White House in advance of her next meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Minsk. These divides within the transatlantic alliance will only be further amplified as Putin continues to meet with Merkel and French President François Hollande and other European leaders — most importantly, from Britain — choose to remain on the sidelines, not to mention Europe’s own internal divisions being exasperated by Greece at the moment.

Even as Kerry declared his optimism about the global responses to Ukraine and the Islamic State group, describing them as defining moments for the transatlantic community — and Biden further reinforced the point by saying that we had a once-in a generation opportunity to live up to the transatlantic ideals of our forefathers after World War II — the cold winds blowing throughout the conference halls indicated something very different. After all, “enduring orders” and “defining moments” have often been accompanied by major wars.

Joshua W. Walker is a transatlantic fellow with the Asia Program of The German Marshall Fund in the United States.

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BERLIN—Right-wing nationalism is rising in Germany. Recent polls suggest that the new Alternative for Germany (AfD) party can tap a potential voting block as large as 30 percent of the German electorate. The AfD’s party platform largely follows the formula of classic European right-wing populists, positioning itself as for the nation and against the existing political establishment. Originally founded as an anti-euro (although not necessarily anti-Europe) party, the AfD now attacks establishment German politicians for all sorts of undesirable social changes over the last few decades. It also blames migrants and the influence of the European Union for hampering the bright outlook of the German nation.

But the AfD has also been riven by internal party disputes between the informal party leader Bernd Lucke and a national-conservative faction. On most political issues, the wing of the party that supports Lucke wants to adopt some positions that were held by the mainstream Christian Democrats only ten years ago. For example, Lucke has called for the party to commit to transatlantic and European cooperation, is skeptical about Vladimir Putin’s Russia, and proposes a strict stance on immigration policies.

At the same time, a more far-right national-conservative faction led by Konrad Adam, Alexander Gauland, and Frauke Petry wants to position the AfD as a German version of France’s Front National (FN). In their view, the AfD should mainly focus on issues relating to German identity, on which the positions of the Christian Democrats is far too liberal. As such, they fully reject transatlantic cooperation, have strong sympathies for the Russian stance on Ukraine, and propose selective migration based on their religion. Remarkably, the internal disputes have so far had almost no impact on the AfD’s public standing; polling for AfD has remained steady at 6 to 8 percent since mid-2013.

A party convention in Bremen on January 31 resolved nearly all of the intra-party conflicts in Lucke’s favor, and he is likely to become the sole party leader in November. As Lucke has frequently pointed out, with two important federal state elections on the horizon, it is important for the party to paper over its internal disputes. It was not necessarily a sense of consensus on the issues, but rather a commitment to this pledge for unity, that led a substantial share of AfD members to ultimately support Lucke.

However, several party members expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that nearly all dissenting proposals were voted down. They were even more taken aback by Lucke’s assertion that he would step down from his leadership position if his proposals were not accepted. Their dismay at such authoritarian tactics was somewhat mitigated by anxiety over the AfD’s negative image in the German media.

Lucke’s triumph at the party convention could ultimately turn out to be a pyrrhic victory. The limited debate on issues means that Lucke’s party rivals may gain momentum in the coming months. Disenchanted with the convention’s results, some members will continue to criticize Lucke for his authoritarian style of leadership. They will also accuse him of being too soft on immigration, the EU, and the United States, and for being too critical of Putin’s Russia. Even at the Bremen convention, some supporters of Adam, Gauland, and Petry openly criticized Lucke’s leadership and programmatic priorities, to sustained applause, although they stopped short of resisting his proposals.

The struggle for primacy in the AfD is therefore by no means over, and whoever emerges victorious will define the party’s agenda in the years to come. The upcoming AfD party conventions in April and November will show which platform will prevail: the largely pro-U.S., anti-euro conservatives around Lucke, or the pro-Putin, anti-Europe national-conservatives around Adam, Gauland, and Petry.

Timo Lochocki is a transatlantic fellow with The German Marshall Fund of the United States.

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WASHINGTON—“Germany is collapsing.” This was the headline of a recent provocative article in German news magazine Der Spiegel that criticized the sorry state of Germany’s infrastructure. And indeed, even as the U.S. economy appears to be growing strongly for the first time in seven years, and as Germany’s economy limps along, political leaders in both countries have resigned themselves to reducing infrastructure investment and delaying mounting maintenance costs.

This trend has continued despite a growing consensus in both countries on the need for increased infrastructure investment. In Germany, both states and the business community pressed Chancellor Angel Merkel to increase infrastructure spending as that country’s economy began to slow in 2014. Her government has hinted that additional investment might be on the horizon. Nonetheless, the Merkel government still gives priority to balancing the national budget over increasing infrastructure investment.

In the United States, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and state governors have frequently called on the federal government to pass a new infrastructure spending bill. U.S. President Barack Obama even commented to a group of businesses leaders that the country’s infrastructure was “embarrassing,” although he carefully noted the difficulty of securing additional funding. He echoed this message again during last month’s State of the Union address, proclaiming the need for “modern ports, stronger bridges, faster trains, and the fastest internet,” and proposing a bipartisan infrastructure plan that “could make [the United States] stronger for decades to come.” Yet Obama has also remained cautious about increasing income from sources such as the federal gas tax and has failed to secure other financial resources from an equally hesitant Congress.

As Obama correctly pointed out in his State of the Union speech, infrastructure investment can boost productivity and lower costs for businesses and their economic outputs. Poor roads, overburdened rail systems, and aging bridges dampen future growth prospects and add significant costs to businesses and residents. In both Germany and the United States, 30 years of underinvestment is slowly eating away at once-formidable infrastructure networks. A recent International Monetary Fund report singled out the United States and Germany as laggards in their infrastructure investment, despite the long-term economic gains from public investment and today’s historically low borrowing costs.

Federal infrastructure spending in both countries has sunk to record lows, from well over 3 percent of GDP in the early 1970s to under 2 percent in the United States and Germany. The American Society of Civil Engineers frequently releases figures of the annual infrastructure funding gap, which stands at well over $100 billion a year in the United States for the maintenance of existing major roads alone. As a consequence, 32 percent of roads in the United States are in either poor or mediocre condition. In Germany, 40 percent of all bridges are said to be in a “critical” state.

But it will take more than money to fix this problem. The crisis instead demands more flexible solutions and visionary leadership. It requires creative thinking about where and how we choose to make our investments for public benefit, and how we could potentially retrofit existing infrastructure to meet multiple societal goals. Examples could include small-scale neighborhood-level projects that involve citizens, rather than the large-scale projects that might impress initially, but are vulnerable to cost overruns and long delays (about which Germany knows plenty).

In addition to the brick and mortar investments that the United States and Germany need to make, both countries should also look to infrastructure investment as a tool for meeting long-term social or economic goals. This will require looking forward and building the systems that will be resilient and relevant in 10 or 50 years, meeting the environmental or demographic challenges that we know are quickly approaching. In this more expansive view, infrastructure investment means investing in energy efficiency, renewable energy systems, less-crowded schools, transportation systems that meet the needs of an aging population, world-class parks, and high-speed Internet access.

Infrastructure investment is an imperative for both the United States and Europe. Just as importantly, this investment must be tied to a larger consciousness and vision of the kind of societies that both Germany and the United States want to become. Only then will the infrastructure being created now deliver tangible prosperity in the future. And perhaps, this vision will motivate reluctant politicians to make the serious financial commitments that are sorely needed.

Bartek Starodaj is a program coordinator for the Urban and Regional Policy Program of the German Marshall Fund in Washington, DC.

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BRUSSELS—The dramatic terrorist attacks in France, and counter-terrorism operations in Belgium and elsewhere, have cast a spotlight on Europe as a focal point of terrorism. This is not a new phenomenon. Over the last decades, several key shifts in the nature of terrorism have emanated from Europe, even as the bulk of global terrorism occurs elsewhere. This fact is worth keeping in mind as policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic seek to counter the latest evolution of the terrorist threat — frequent, loosely organized acts by individuals or small cells, against a backdrop of religious extremism. Conditions in the Middle East and North Africa are part of the equation, alongside rage at perceived Western misdeeds, and a culture of violence among some poorly integrated immigrant youth. But Europe is the place where this new wave of modern terrorism is likely to be played out, where U.S. interests are most closely engaged, and where transatlantic counter-terrorism strategy will be tested.

The first wave of modern terrorism featured well-established groups, political ideologies, and limited lethality, with Europe as the leading theater. From the 1960s to the 1980s (and in some places, well into the 1990s and beyond), Europe was plagued by spates of ideologically motivated terrorism, principally of the extreme left. Small groups such as the Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany, Action Directe in France, The Red Brigades in Italy, and November 17^th in Greece targeted governments and individuals, and threatened the stability of societies across the continent. This was also the hey-day of terrorism as a tactic of national liberation movements, with the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine responsible for shootings, bombings, and hijackings. Their origins were Middle Eastern, but Europe was a principle theater for this type of terrorism, from the Munich Olympics to attacks on airports in Rome and elsewhere. And, of course, Europe had its own very durable terrorism of this kind in the form of the Irish Republican Army, Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA), and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). For decades, Europe was also the focus of terrorist attacks aimed specifically at U.S. targets, whatever the motive.

September 11^th — and the series of increasingly large-scale terrorist attacks seen in the years leading up to 2001 — exemplified the second wave of modern terrorism. The hallmarks of this new form of terrorism included much higher lethality, religious motivation, networked organization, and the prominence of private sponsors. The roots of this new terrorism — potentially super terrorism using weapons of mass destruction — were in the Middle East, including the so-called Arab Afghans among the fighters operating in Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion. But, once again, the operational dimension was deeply rooted in Europe. Fourteen years on, few recall that the 9/11 conspirators met and planned their attacks in Hamburg. They shared a common experience of alienation and radicalization abroad, mostly in Europe.

The latest, and third, phase of terrorism — an amalgam of Islamic extremism, cultural alienation, and nihilistic violence — will have its center of gravity in Europe. Poorly integrated Muslim communities and proximity to irregular conflicts in North Africa and the Levant are key elements in this equation. The “foreign fighter” problem is not new. Mediterranean countries, in particular, worried about the security implications of fighters returning from earlier wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. But the scale of the circulation linked to ongoing conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Libya, and the networked nature of the challenge, are of a different order. The prospect of open-ended chaos on Europe’s southern periphery is likely to make this a standing challenge for European partners, and for EU and NATO strategy, over the next decade.

Finally, it is by no means clear that Islamic extremism is the only reservoir of terrorism in an economically and politically troubled Europe. Southern Europe, in particular, is exposed to the potential for terrorism at the fringes of populist movements of the right and left, fueled by xenophobic, anti-austerity, or nationalist anger.

The United States will have a direct stake in the struggle against this third wave of terrorism in Europe, and not just because it can lead to new attacks on U.S. territory or its forces and citizens abroad. The United States’ NATO strategy and commitments are likely to be tested by the terrorist challenge in and around Europe, just as security challenges of a different sort unfold to Europe’s east. Amid the focus on rolling back the so-called Islamic State and striking at terrorist sanctuaries in Yemen, Libya, the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere, policymakers must put counter-terrorism cooperation with — and in — Europe at the top of the agenda.

Dr. Ian O. Lesser is executive director of the Transatlantic Center, GMF’s Brussels office, and GMF’s senior director for foreign and security policy.

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WARSAW—The latest escalation of fighting in Eastern Ukraine clearly shows that current Western policy toward Russia is not working. The rocket attack last weekend in the city of Mariupol, which killed 30 civilians and injured almost 100, is a heinous crime. It is also a flagrant violation of the Minsk Protocol, the agreement brokered last September between Ukraine and Russia, as Mariupol lies 25 kilometers beyond the agreed ceasefire line.

What is clear is that negotiations under the Normandy format — involving the foreign ministers of Germany, France, Russia, and Ukraine — is spent, and needs to be adjusted. The escalation in the Donbass region came in the immediate aftermath of a Normandy meeting last Thursday in Berlin; the diplomatic agreement was upended by facts on the ground before the ink had a chance to dry. One power that is clearly missing is the United States. It is time for Washington to engage directly in the negotiations over the conflict in Ukraine. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry acknowledged as much in his recent phone call with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

The format should also be supplemented by representatives of European institutions. Given its importance and the geopolitical dimension, the negotiations with Russia over peace in Ukraine will require the attention of the European Council and close cooperation with High Representative Federica Mogherini and Council President Donald Tusk.

It is also time to rethink military aid to Ukraine. The escalation in Eastern Ukraine shows that, unassisted, the Ukrainian military will continue to be under enormous pressure from separatist forces that are regularly resupplied, and even directly supported, by the Russian military. Many skeptics worry that arming Ukraine will lead to further escalation. Yet, the opposite is true. Faced with a weaker opponent, the separatists and their masters in Moscow have an incentive to push further and escalate while there is a window of opportunity on the ground. Military aid to Ukraine could change this calculus. Western military aid to Ukraine should be mainly defensive in nature and carefully calibrated in order to raise the price in blood and treasure of the Russian-backed separatists and deter further attacks in Eastern and Southern Ukraine.

Reconnaissance is one of the key areas where Ukraine could use help, allowing it to avoid surprise attacks by the separatists. It is also an area where Russia provides substantial assistance to the separatists. Sharing actionable intelligence with the Ukrainian army would also give separatists a pause, providing some degree of deterrence. The initial hesitation in Europe and the United States against arming Ukraine made sense in September when there was hope of freezing the conflict with the Minsk Protocol. But this approach is clearly not working, and the Russian-backed separatists walked right through the agreed limits, both in Donetsk and in Mariupol. Waiting for a major Russian offensive before considering military aid would be too late.

Expanding the Normandy format and arming Ukraine are vital for deescalating the fighting in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. But these steps alone will not solve the strategic problem with Russia. The conflict in Ukraine is not a passing crisis, but rather a new, long-term change of Russia’s behavior in its neighborhood. By annexing Crimea and invading Eastern Ukraine, Russia has rejected the Helsinki principles that were signed 40 years ago by the Soviet Union, and that lie at the core of the European security order. Russia openly aims to reestablish its sphere of influence, and is willing to violate principles of territorial integrity and the sovereign ability of countries to choose alliances.

To counter this long-term challenge, the West needs to recognize Russia for what it is: a strategic competitor in the European Union’s neighborhood and a spoiler on the global stage. This recognition should be a beginning of a long-term strategy toward Russia. And this strategy can be effective only if it is devised and implemented by Europe in conjunction with the United States.

Michal Baranowski is the director of the Warsaw office of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

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BRUSSELS—The landslide victory of SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left) in Greece’s national elections was predictable, and is likely to have important consequences at the national, European, and potentially transatlantic levels. The way this development is treated by European leaders will be influential on the future of the European Union, and the United States will be an important stakeholder in this process.

Having visited Greece in the days before the election, it was clear that the party’s charismatic leader, Alexis Tsipras, would lead the movement to an impressive victory. Their success owes a great deal to the collapse of confidence in Greece’s traditional mainstream parties: the center-right New Democracy and the center-left PASOK. Early results suggest that SYRIZA garnered some 36.2 percent of the vote, followed by New Democracy at 28 percent, and the far right, neo-fascist Golden Dawn with 6.3 percent. KKE, Greece’s unreconstructed communist party received roughly 5.5 percent.

Clearly, the Greek center has been pushed to the margins. The result left SYRIZA close to, but not quite in a position to form a government on its own, and Tsipras has apparently opted for a coalition with ANEL (the Independent Greeks Party), a minor anti-austerity partner of the center-right. The imperative is to avoid an unstable coalition or the need for new elections, both of which could spell trouble for politics and markets.

How radical will SYRIZA turn out to be? Much will depend on internal dynamics within a party that is really more of a movement, composed of everything from moderate populists to the radical left. Tsipras will certainly need to deliver on his principle goal of scrapping the current financial deal with the country’s creditors, restructuring the Greek debt, and rolling back the severe austerity measures of recent years. By all accounts, the SYRIZA leadership has been making some efforts to put forward a more moderate face, especially beyond Greece. Once in power, this pragmatism will be tested.

Assuming that SYRIZA can form a government, EU leaders will face a near term challenge, as much political and geopolitical as economic. The current debt and reform deal with Greece is widely seen as unsustainable. The troika of the International Monetary Fund, European Commission, and European Central Bank — and above all Germany — will need to decide very quickly whether Europe is willing to subsidize a softer path for Greece in the interest of stability within the eurozone and the viability of the European project, or whether Greece needs to be held to account, even at the risk of default, and exit from the euro, or both. In this atmosphere of brinksmanship, it is likely, but not certain, that EU leaders will opt for compromise. Certainly, Tsipras will be betting on this outcome.

The SYRIZA victory could also have wider implications for Europe. Like-minded anti-austerity parties of the left, such as Podemos in Spain, will be buoyed by the result. A broader set of victories of this kind will place in stark relief the tension between austerity and stimulus, and the critical question of whether the EU will continue to evolve as a transfer union, even — perhaps especially — under conditions of slow or no growth within the Union.

Greece’s transatlantic partners, including Washington, will also have important stakes in the outcome. These stakes go well beyond the issue of financial stability. Little has been said about the foreign policy implications of a SYRIZA win. Foreign and security policy issues have not figured prominently in the election discourse, and much that can be said is in the realm of speculation. Initial impressions suggest that Tsipras and his advisors are not inclined to take a nationalist line on relations with Turkey or Balkan neighbors, and their external priorities will probably resemble those of the center-left in Italy and elsewhere — non-confrontational on Russia, activist on climate diplomacy, human rights and human security, etc.

The SYRIZA line on austerity versus stimulus is more in line with Washington (and Paris) than Berlin, and the party has been supportive of the most recent counter-terrorism measures in Greece and elsewhere. In short, you see a mixed picture from a transatlantic perspective, but not far out of the European mainstream. SYRIZA is not automatically Atlanticist, but they also do not bring the nationalist baggage that has hampered U.S.-Greek relations in the past.

With critical and durable security challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean, the evolution of Greece’s foreign policy under a SYRIZA-led government will matter in geopolitical terms. Early engagement from Washington could pay significant dividends in shaping relations at a moment of great flux.

Ian Lesser is executive director of the German Marshall Fund of the United States’ Transatlantic Center in Brussels, and Senior Director for Foreign and Security Policy at GMF.

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