Gateway To The Americas Political Desk

First Latin American Pope, Argentine Cardinal Jorge Bergoglio, To Energize World's Most Catholic Continent

2013-03-17T17:23:00.000-04:00

This great piece written by Katherine Corcoran of the Associated Press gives us a great overview on the Catholic Church and Latin America, where religion is deeply entrenched in the national culture and psyche. Thank you for sharing!

MEXICO CITY — The famous words uttered to announce that a leader of the Catholic Church has been chosen now have special resonance for Latin America, which had felt neglected by the Vatican and has finally produced the New World's first pope.

"`'Habemus Papam.' `WE have a pope,'" said Tom Quigley, former policy adviser on Latin American and Caribbean affairs at the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops. "This will instill a sense of pride and happiness and will have a very positive effect."

The selection of former Argentine Cardinal Jorge Bergoglio as pope is already energizing the world's most Catholic continent, which has been rapidly losing its faithful.

Many hope Pope Francis will bring a familiar cultural warmth, while pushing the church to address a divisive gap between rich and poor in the region. He is also seen as someone who could bridge Latin America's left-right political split as a conservative devoted to fighting poverty and not afraid to speak out against the hierarchy.

But first, the papacy of Francis is being seen as an overdue acknowledgement of the home of 40 percent of the world's 1.2 billion Catholics that felt distant from former Pope Benedict XVI.

"It's a recognition of the millions of Spanish-speaking faithful who belong to the church," said Salvadoran President Mario Funes.

Almost everything about Pope Francis suggests a shift from Benedict, his reserved academic predecessor, who put his focus on saving Europe and was criticized for waiting seven years before visiting Spanish-speaking Latin America on a trip last year to Mexico and Cuba.

The new pope picked a name that has never been used, an apparent reference to a humble friar who dedicated his life to helping the poor. He comes from an order, the Jesuits, that had never produced a pope. He considers social outreach, rather than doctrinal battles, to be the essential business of the church.

"For me it's a sign from God, who is inviting us to commit ourselves to a continental mission," said Bishop Eugenio Lira, secretary-general of the Mexican Conference of Bishops. "He will imprint his Latin American personality ... He knows the joys, the pains, the problems and the opportunities of the people of Latin America and the Caribbean and that will create a very close relationship."

Latin America, with roughly 600 million people, is home to some of the world's poorest and most violent countries, with organized crime and drug trafficking causing a spike in killings through the region in recent years. It remains one of the most unequal regions in the world, according to the World Bank, though the gap has been closing in recent years and more people have move into the middle class.

Francis was unafraid to challenge the Argentine government for being too liberal or to label fellow church members as hypocrites for forgetting that Jesus Christ bathed lepers and ate with prostitutes.

"His discourse is very close to the social doctrine of the church," said Elio Masferrer, a religion expert at Mexico's National Institute of Anthropology and History. "That includes the criticism that in this time there are sectors of the clergy who behave like aristocrats, like princes of the church."

But one of his main challenges will be to woo back the followers the church has lost to Protestant evangelicals or just to secularism, with some of the biggest drain occurring in the poorest communities.

Perhaps nowhere in Latin America has the church been losing ground faster than in Brazil.

The nation still has more Catholics than any other – 124 million people self-identified as following the faith in the 2010 Census, 65 percent of the population. However, just a decade earlier 74 percent of Brazilians were Catholic, and in 1970 that figure was 92 percent.

The Pentecostal churches expanded rapidly in poor areas in Brazil, offering the downtrodden real-life guidance on employment and education, while the Catholic church was perceived to have largely abandoned poor urban areas in cities like Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo.

In the slums of those two cities, one would be hard pressed to locate a Catholic house of worship, whereas raucous Pentecostal churches holding daily services are numerous.

Yet in recent years, even the Pentecostals are losing steam in Brazil.

"The biggest challenge facing the church in Latin America isn't the growth of the Pentecostals, but the abandonment of a considerable amount of Catholics and others to agnosticism," said Fernando Altemeyer, a theologian at the Catholic University of Sao Paulo.

The church under Francis also must recover from the financial and sexual abuse scandals that marked Benedict's eight-year papacy before he resigned last month.

"The question is whether the new Pope will achieve transparency when managing the church, whether he manages to re-legitimize the moral and financial questions, I think this is key, not only for Latin America but more generally," said Franklin Ramirez of the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences in Ecuador.

As a cardinal, Pope Francis never held a top post inside the Vatican administration, or curia. This outsider status could pose obstacles in attempts to reform the Vatican, which has been hit with embarrassing disclosures from leaked documents alleging financial cover-ups and internal feuds.

His biographer, Sergio Rubin, told the AP that the new pope reacted strongly to the pedophilia scandal, which hit Argentina among other Latin American countries, saying the church has to make sure that its next priests aren't so susceptible. Only 40 percent of those who enter seminary make it as priests.

"He imposed a system of very strict controls," Rubin said.

The region that celebrated its native son on Wednesday believes he is up to the task.

Jesuits have the gift of spreading the word of God in the most inhospitable of places, said Maurizzio Pavia, an Argentine tourism official who promotes religious and cultural events in Puerto Rico.

"I think his emphasis will be on helping people recover the confidence they had in the church as an institution and as the evangelical messenger," Pavia said.

_________

Associated Press writers Michael Warren in Argentina, Gonzalo Solano in Ecuador, Bradley Brooks and Marco Sibaja in Brazil, Marcos Aleman in El Salvador, Danica Coto in Puerto Rico, and Olga R. Rodriguez and Adriana Gomez Licon in Mexico contributed to this report.

Hugo Chavez Passed Away

2013-03-07T08:42:00.000-05:00

One of Latin America's most controversial political leaders has finally been put to rest after prolonged health battles. Now that his seat is open in government, some experts assume that Vice President Madero will continue the Bolivarian Revolution, while others speculate that Caracas will now be open for business.

By Tracy Connor, Staff Writer, NBC News (click here for original article)

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, the charismatic leftist who dominated his country with sweeping political change and flamboyant speeches, died Tuesday at age 58, after a long battle with cancer that was shrouded in mystery and prevented him from being inaugurated for a fourth term.

Adored or reviled for his self-styled populist revolution, Chavez held sway over Venezuela through a cult of personality, government reforms that championed the downtrodden, and an endless stream of rhetoric denouncing capitalism, imperialism and the United States.

The "Chavistas" praised El Comandante for reducing extreme poverty and expanding access to health care and education. Critics blamed him for high inflation, food shortages, escalating crime and mismanagement of the country’s oil industry.

Human rights groups lambasted him for politicizing the judicial branch, and undermining the democratic system of checks and balances.

To many he was a charming populist who sang and danced on his weekly television show and gave the impoverished a voice; others saw him as an autocrat who plastered his portrait all over the country and failed to deliver on the promises of what he called the "Bolivarian revolution."

"He will be remembered as someone who generated over 14 years an international presence and impact way beyond his country's size or wealth and beyond his own talent and personal charisma," said Jorge Castenada, the former Mexico foreign minister and NBC's Latin American policy analyst.

"And I think he'll be remembered for having tried to make a life of poor people in Venezuela better but in the end of the day, having made it worse. When the consequences of his economic policies become apparent, it will end up that he spent an enormous amount of money to make people a little better off for a short period of time."

The last two years of his presidency were overshadowed by his health struggles. After declaring himself free of an unspecified cancer, he fended off a tough challenge to win re-election in 2012 — even giving an epic nine-hour speech during the campaign.

He soon relapsed and was rushed to Cuba for surgery. He was deemed too sick to be sworn into office in early January, and was still gravely ill when he made a surprise return to Venezuela in mid-February, heralded on a Twitter account with 4 million followers.

His deputies insisted he was still in control, signing documents and holding meetings in a Caracas hospital room even if a tube in his throat had silenced his well-known voice. But by this week, the end seemed imminent with reports of a new respiratory infection.

In an address to the nation Tuesday afternoon, Vice President Nicholas Maduro said Chavez was facing his "most difficult hours" and claimed the cancer was an "attack" by his enemies. A few hours later, he announced Chavez's death at 4:25 p.m.

"Honor and glory to Hugo Chavez," an emotional Maduro said in Spanish on Venezuelan television, calling for public memorials at every town square in the country but warning against violence or hatred.

Born July 28, 1954, to schoolteachers in a small Venezuelan village, Chavez was raised by his grandmother and entered the military academy in Caracas at age 17. Six years later, inspired by the life of 19th century South American revolutionary Simon Bolivar, he formed a secret movement within the army.

Rising through the military to the rank of captain, he led a bloody coup attempt in 1992 that failed and landed him in prison. Pardoned two years later, the ex-paratrooper re-launched his revolt against the ruling class and announced his candidacy for president in 1998.

"The resurrection of Venezuela has begun, and nothing and no one can stop it,'' he bellowed to a roaring crowd after a landslide victory made him the youngest president in the history of Venezuela.

As president, Chavez created a new constitution and had the name of the country changed to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. He took greater control of the state-run oil company, expanded the country’s armed forces, and instituted government programs to create jobs, housing and services for the poor.

A 2009 report by the progressive think tank Center for Economic and Policy Research found poverty was cut in half during the first decade of Chavez’s rule; child mortality fell by a third; malnutrition deaths were down by 50 percent; and college enrollment almost doubled.

At the same time, one non-government report estimated Venezuela’s murder rate quadrupled while Chavez was in power. In 2012, inflation hit 18%. Accusations of corruption and nepotism dogged his administration.

Problems aside, he enjoyed tremendous loyalty from his supporters. A 2002 coup during an economic crisis kept him out of power for just two days — and he claimed the United States had orchestrated it.

Chavez’s relations with the U.S. — referred to derisively as the "empire" in his epic speeches — were icy. He called President George W. Bush "the devil" and "the king of vacations." In 2010, he demanded Secretary of State Hillary Clinton resign "along with those other delinquents working in the State Department."

He often lavished praise on Libya’s Moammar Gadhafi and Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, but his staunchest ally was Cuba. He kept the island nation flush with oil in exchange for its well-trained doctors and teachers, and he was visiting Havana when he fell ill in June 2011.

In an address to the nation a few weeks later, he admitted neglecting his health and said it was Fidel Castro who got him to admit he wasn’t feeling well, leading to the discovery of a tumor in his pelvis and emergency surgery.

In the following months, the twice-divorced Catholic shuttled between Cuba and Caracas for treatment even as he sought a fourth term, made possible because he had pushed through the abolition of term limits in the constitution he had rewritten.

Days before the election he would win with 54 percent of the vote to his opponent’s 45 percent, he spoke to a rally of supporters in Caracas, displaying the trademark swagger that had made him one of Latin America’s most captivating, if polarizing, leaders.

"Since I haven’t failed you in these 14 years," he said, according to the Associated Press. "I promise I won’t fail you in the next presidential term.

"Because Chavez doesn’t lie. Because Chavez doesn’t sell out. Because Chavez is the people. Because Chavez is truth. Because all of you are Chavez. We all are."

Who Votes For Rafael Correa?

2013-02-10T08:46:00.000-05:00

I am pleased to share with you this month an article from a dear friend and fellow political scientist, Paolo Moncagatta, breaking down Rafael Correa's unique success in Ecuador's politics. He has been among the few national leaders to live through a presidential term in recent history and managed to be successfully re-elected. Enjoy the read and thanks for the contribution Paolo.

¿Quién vota por Rafael Correa?

Hace un tiempo publiqué en este mismo espacio un análisis sobre el perfil socio-demográfico del votante de Hugo Chávez. Esta vez, con motivo de las próximas elecciones presidenciales, hago un ejercicio similar para el Ecuador. Me pregunto: ¿tiene el votante de Rafael Correa un perfil socio-demográfico determinado? Más en específico: ¿hay alguna relación entre el nivel de educación de un ciudadano ecuatoriano y la probabilidad de votar por Correa? ¿Influye de alguna manera el nivel de riqueza?

Es imposible contestar estas preguntas con exactitud, pero utilizando datos de encuesta se pueden obtener aproximaciones válidas. Con este fin, utilizo datos del “Barómetro de las Américas” del 2012, desarrollado por el Latin American Public Opinion Project de la Universidad de Vanderbilt en los Estados Unidos[i]. Dichos “barómetros” son encuestas representativas a nivel nacional; en el Ecuador, la encuesta fue llevada a cabo en Febrero del 2012, y contó con un número total de mil quinientos entrevistados.

En la primera parte de este artículo hago una revisión de tres actitudes ciudadanas hacia Rafael Correa: (i) confianza en él, (ii) evaluación de su gestión como presidente e (iii) intención de voto por él o su partido[ii]. Evalúo estos tres aspectos para ecuatorianos y ecuatorianas de: i) distintos niveles de educación y (ii) distintos niveles de riqueza, con el objetivo de distinguir, a grandes rasgos, las actitudes hacia Rafael Correa de los ciudadanos pertenecientes a los distintos estratos sociales en el Ecuador.

En la segunda parte, realizo un breve análisis comparado entre el Ecuador y tres países que han sido comúnmente relacionados con la llamada “nueva izquierda” latinoamericana: Argentina, Bolivia, y Venezuela. Con el objetivo de compararlos con el Ecuador, examino si en estos países existen relaciones entre nivel de educación y de riqueza, por un lado, e intención de voto por el actual presidente o su candidato, por otro.

Antes de entrar en materia, debo aclarar que el análisis realizado aquí no es –ni pretende ser- un estudio ideológico sobre Rafael Correa, su movimiento Alianza País, o los ciudadanos que votan por él. Lo único que este artículo pretende es, como he dicho antes, investigar si el ciudadano que vota por Correa tiene una tendencia a pertenecer a un determinado perfil socio-demográfico. El análisis de cualquier relación que pueda existir entre las distintas variables analizadas aquí y cualquier postura ideológica está fuera del ámbito del tema de este artículo.

Además, cabe aclarar que este artículo no es de ninguna manera una invitación a votar –o a dejar de hacerlo– por el candidato Correa. Si el análisis en cuestión está hecho sólo para dicho candidato, es por dos razones simples pero que obligan a que sea así: primero, que los datos con los que cuento hacen referencia solamente a él, y segundo, que Correa es el candidato que parte como claro favorito en el proceso electoral del 2013. Aparte de ser el actual presidente del país (y esto, de acuerdo a mucha literatura de ciencia política, ya le da cierta ventaja sobre sus contendientes), desde que ganó su primera elección en el 2006, Correa y su movimiento han ganado todas las elecciones que se les han puesto al frente, algunas con márgenes elevados (como la de la consulta popular para la creación de la Asamblea Constituyente en el 2007, en la que obtuvieron más del 80% de los votos válidos). De cara a las próximas elecciones, todas las encuestas lo sitúan como favorito, dándole intenciones de voto de entre el 40% y el 65%. Sin lugar a dudas, Rafael Correa parte como el oponente a vencer para el resto de candidatos.

Habiendo aclarado estos importantes puntos, voy directo al grano.

1) Niveles de educación.-

Para el análisis de actitudes hacia Correa por niveles de educación, he dividido la muestra en tres grupos por sus distintos niveles de educación: el primero, que cuenta con un 26,8% de la muestra, incluye a aquellos ciudadanos que como máximo acabaron la escuela primaria (“educación primaria”), el segundo, que cuenta con un 46,8%, a aquellos que hicieron algún año de secundaria, incluso llegando a terminarla (“educación secundaria”), y el tercero, que cuenta con un 26,4%, a aquellos que terminaron la secundaria y completaron al menos un año de educación superior (“educación superior”).

En las tres actitudes revisadas se distinguen niveles altos de aprobación a Rafael Correa. Los niveles más bajos se encuentran en la medición de los porcentajes de ciudadanos que expresan tener “confianza alta” en él, y aún en este caso los niveles superan el 40% en los tres niveles de educación. Porcentajes muy altos (entre el 63% y el 64,5%) se encuentran en cuanto a las evaluaciones positivas de su gestión como presidente. Finalmente, en cuanto a los porcentajes de ciudadanos que expresan que votarían por él o su partido si la elección fuese realizada en la semana que se llevó a cabo la encuesta, los números rondan el 50% para los tres niveles de educación.

Lo más interesante de este gráfico, aparte de los elevados niveles de aprobación encontrados en las tres actitudes bajo análisis, es que casi no se aprecian diferencias en cuanto a las actitudes hacia Correa entre los distintos niveles de educación. En el único aspecto donde se encuentra una diferencia entre quienes pertenecen al grupo de “educación primaria” y los otros dos grupos es en los niveles de “confianza alta” en Correa, y aún aquí las diferencias son muy pequeñas (48,5% en “educación primaria” vs. 41,8% en “educación secundaria” y 42% de “educación superior). En cuanto a los porcentajes de ciudadanos que evalúan positivamente su gestión como presidente, las diferencias son mínimas, de menos de 1,5%. Y también diferencias insignificantes se encuentran en los porcentajes que expresan intención de voto por Correa en los tres grupos (es interesante que en este caso el porcentaje más alto se encuentre en la categoría de ciudadanos con “educación superior” – un resultado que podría sorprender a algunos).

2) Niveles de riqueza.-

Para realizar el análisis por niveles de riqueza, he dividido la muestra en cinco grupos (quintiles) de riqueza, mediante el uso de un ‘índice de riqueza relativa’ construido en base a indicadores sobre posesión de bienes del hogar. El índice que he construido para este análisis es una variación del desarrollado por el equipo del Latin American Public Opinion Project (Córdova, 2008) para sus reportes regionales y nacionales de los recientes años. Para la construcción de dicho ‘índice de riqueza relativa’ he utilizado una serie de preguntas incluidas en los “Barómetros de las Américas” del 2012 sobre posesión de los siguientes once bienes del hogar : 1) televisor, 2) refrigeradora, 3) teléfono celular, 4) vehículo(s) (¿cuántos?), 5) lavadora de ropa, 6) microondas, 7) motocicleta, 8) agua potable dentro de la casa, 9) cuarto de baño dentro de la casa, 10) computadora, y 11) televisor de pantalla plana[iii]. El resultado son cinco grupos, prácticamente del mismo tamaño, en orden ascendiente de riqueza (el grupo “1” es el más pobre, seguido del grupo 2, y así sucesivamente, hasta llegar al grupo “5” que es el más rico).

El gráfico de arriba ilustra la relación entre los cinco niveles de riqueza construidos mediante el método descrito anteriormente y las tres actitudes hacia Rafael Correa bajo análisis. Para cada actitud, la barra del extremo izquierdo representa al primer quintil, el más pobre, y las barras sucesivas representan los quintiles con creciente nivel relativo de riqueza (la segunda barra representa al segundo quintil, la tercera al tercer quintil, etc…).

Al igual que en el gráfico por niveles de educación, se distinguen altos niveles de aprobación a Correa en las tres actitudes analizadas para los cinco quintiles de riqueza. El porcentaje más bajo se encuentra en la cantidad de ciudadanos del quintil más rico que tienen “confianza alta” en Correa, con el 37,6%. Los porcentajes de ciudadanos que evalúan positivamente su gestión como presidente rondan el 60% en los cinco grupos, y la intención de voto por él o su partido se encuentra entre el 45% y el 50%. Y al igual que con los niveles de educación, no se aprecian diferencias significativas en las actitudes hacia Correa entre los distintos niveles de riqueza. Si bien a primera vista podría parecer que, por ejemplo, el quintil más rico tiene menor cantidad de ciudadanos que expresa tener “confianza alta” en él que el resto de quintiles, o que el quintil más pobre tiene un porcentaje menor de gente que expresa intención de votar por él o su partido, las diferencias son mínimas y estadísticamente no significativas (el hecho de que los intervalos de confianza de cada barra se solapen nos permite establecer esto).

En resumen, Rafael Correa demuestra altos niveles de aprobación en los tres aspectos examinados, y prácticamente ninguna diferencia en dichos niveles entre los distintos niveles de educación o de riqueza. Parecería no haber ninguna relación entre nivel de educación y nivel de riqueza, por un lado, y la probabilidad de votar por el candidato Correa.

3) Un breve vistazo comparado.-

Nunca antes tantos países de Latinoamérica y el Caribe han estado gobernados por partidos o coaliciones de izquierda o centro-izquierda. Tanto la opinión pública como la literatura académica han coincidido en agrupar a determinados gobiernos que comparten ciertas características ideológicas y programáticas bajo membretes como la “nueva izquierda” latinoamericana, la “izquierda populista”, o el “socialismo del siglo XXI”, entre otros nombres. Entre estos gobiernos generalmente se han incluido al de Hugo Chávez en Venezuela, el de Evo Morales en Bolivia, el de Cristina Fernández de Kirchner en Argentina y el de Rafael Correa en Ecuador.

En esta sección hago un breve análisis comparado de la intención de voto por el actual presidente (o su partido) de los ciudadanos de los cuatro países antes mencionados en relación a niveles de educación y niveles de riqueza.

A primera vista, el gráfico sugiere la presencia de relaciones entre nivel de educación e intención de voto por el candidato o partido del actual presidente en Argentina, Bolivia y Venezuela. En estos tres países la tendencia apunta a ser la misma: a mayor grado de educación, menor probabilidad de expresar intención de voto por el presidente o su partido. En Ecuador, como ya observamos anteriormente, parece no existir relación alguna entre ambas variables: las probabilidades de expresar intención de voto por el candidato del presidente de los tres niveles de educación son prácticamente las mismas, de aproximadamente el 50% en los tres grupos.

En Bolivia se distingue una clara relación negativa entre nivel de educación e intención de voto por el candidato del presidente: mientras más educados, menos tienden los bolivianos a expresar intención de voto por el candidato o partido de Evo Morales. En Argentina y Venezuela se ven situaciones similares, aunque menos marcadas que el caso boliviano: la tendencia parece indicar que a mayor grado de educación, menor probabilidad de expresar intención de voto por los candidatos de Fernández de Kirchner y Chávez, respectivamente.

Al igual que en el análisis por niveles de educación, a primera vista el gráfico sugiere relaciones negativas entre nivel de riqueza e intención de voto por el candidato del actual presidente en Argentina, Bolivia y Venezuela. Y al igual que con los niveles de educación, como vimos antes, en el Ecuador parecería que definitivamente no existe una relación entre cuan rico se es y la probabilidad de expresar intención de voto por Rafael Correa.

Argentina, Bolivia y Venezuela, aunque con diferencias en sus patrones particulares, presentan la misma tendencia: a mayor grado de riqueza, menor probabilidad de expresar intención de voto por el candidato del presidente. Argentina presenta el patrón más regular –más lineal si se quiere- con la probabilidad más alta en el primer quintil (61,9%) y probabilidades decrecientes en los quintiles adyacentes. Bolivia presenta un primer quintil, el más pobre, que con diferencia significativa sobre los otros exhibe mayor intención de voto por el candidato del gobierno (36%), y un último quintil, el más rico, que con diferencia significativa presenta la menor intención de voto (17,6%). Los tres quintiles intermedios en Bolivia demuestran proporciones idénticas entre sí, del 25%, que se encuentran entre los extremos del primero y el quinto quintil. En Venezuela, aun conservando la relación negativa entre las dos variables en juego, parecería haber dos grupos: el primero conformado por los tres primeros quintiles, con proporciones cercanas al 60%, y el segundo conformado por los últimos dos, con proporciones casi iguales de alrededor del 47%.

En resumen: en Ecuador parece no existir ninguna relación entre nivel de riqueza e intención de voto por el candidato o partido del actual presidente. En Bolivia se distinguen tres “clases” bien marcadas: una clase “baja”, compuesta por el quintil más pobre, que demuestra con diferencia la mayor tendencia a expresar intención de voto por Morales, una clase “media”, compuesta por los quintiles 2-4, que demuestra una tendencia intermedia, y una clase “alta”, el quintil más rico, que con diferencia demuestra la probabilidad más baja de expresar intención de voto por Morales. En Argentina y Venezuela se distinguen diferencias claras entre una clase “alta” conformada por los quintiles más ricos y una clase “baja” conformada por los quintiles más pobres, pero las relaciones no son tan marcadas como en el caso boliviano.

4) Conclusiones.-

Rafael Correa, después de más de seis años en la presidencia, logra mantener niveles altísimos de aprobación ciudadana. Los porcentajes de ecuatorianos y ecuatorianas que tienen confianza alta en él, evalúan positivamente su gestión como presidente, y expresan intención de votar por él o su partido en una próxima elección son de magnitudes impresionantes. Si nos dejamos guiar por estos números, sin duda es el claro favorito para la elección venidera.

Ni el nivel de educación ni el de riqueza demuestran tener relación con la intención de voto por Correa.Rafael Correa parece recibir altas votaciones tanto de los sectores más educados como de los menos educados, de los más ricos como de los más pobres. El apoyo a Rafael Correa atraviesa todos los estratos socio-demográficos de la sociedad ecuatoriana de manera horizontal.

Interesante es que en ninguno de los otros países que comúnmente se relacionan con el gobierno del Ecuador (Argentina, Bolivia y Venezuela) se vea lo mismo. En estos países sí se distinguen relaciones entre niveles de educación y de riqueza e intención de voto por el actual presidente: en algunos las relaciones son más claras que en otros, pero en todos ellos parecen existir al fin y al cabo.

Y habiendo dicho esto, me despido cordialmente.

APÉNDICE

ENCUESTA

The AmericasBarometer (“Barómetro de las Américas”) 2012 del Latin American Public Opinion Project(LAPOP), www.LapopSurveys.org.

La encuesta se llevó a cabo en Febrero de 2012, como parte de la ola del AmericasBarometer del 2012. Para la muestra, el proyecto utilizó un diseño probabilístico de adultos en edad de votar a nivel nacional, con un N total de 1.500 personas en Ecuador. Involucró entrevistas cara a cara realizadas en español. El estudio utilizó un diseño muestral complejo, teniendo en cuenta la estratificación y la agrupación. Para mayor información sobre la encuesta, el trabajo de campo, el cuestionario o la muestra, consultar la página web: www.AmericasBarometer.org.

PREGUNTAS UTILIZADAS

Confianza en el presidente: ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el presidente? (1= NADA -> 7 = MUCHO).

“confianza alta” = suma de los scores 6 y 7.

Evaluación del gobierno de Correa: Hablando en general acerca del gobierno actual, ¿diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente Rafael Correa es...? (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo).

“evaluación positiva” = suma de las categorías (1) Muy bueno y (2) Bueno.

Intención de voto: ¿Si esta semana fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, qué haría usted? (1) No votaría (2) Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente (3) Votaría por algún candidato o partido diferente del actual gobierno (4) Iría a votar pero dejaría la boleta en blanco o la anularía.

“votaría por Correa” = la categoría (2) Votaría por el candidato o partido del actual presidente.

Nivel de educación: ¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó?

	1°	2°	3°	4°	5°	6°
Ninguno	0
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6
Secundaria (Básico)	7	8	9
Secundaria (Diversificado)	10	11	12
Superior no universitaria (Técnica)	13	14	15
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18

“educación primaria”: suma de los scores 0 – 6.
“educación secundaria”: suma de los scores 7 – 12.
“educación superior”: suma de los scores 13-18.

Notas:

[i] Fuente: The AmericasBarometer 2012 del Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP),www.LapopSurveys.org. Agradezco al Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) y sus principales auspiciantes (United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD), Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID), y la Universidad Vanderbilt) por permitir el acceso a los datos de la encuesta.

[ii] Para los detalles de la muestra, preguntas utilizadas, construcción de categorías, y otros detalles técnicos, referirse al apéndice o escribir a paolo.moncagatta@upf.edu

[iii] La construcción del ‘indice de riqueza relativa’ se basa en la aplicación del Análisis de Componentes Principales (ACP), popularizado por Filmer y Pritchett (2001) en su estimación de niveles de riqueza a partir de bienes del hogar en lugar de datos de ingreso o consumo. Al aplicar el ACP a los datos de estos once indicadores, cada bien del hogar recibe una ponderación distinta (Vyas y Kumaranayake, 2006). Mediante este método se asegura que se otorga más peso a los bienes de lujo como los vehículos, computadores o televisores de pantalla plana, mientras que a los bienes más ‘comunes’ en los hogares, como el agua potable dentro de la casa, televisores, o refrigeradoras, se les otorga un peso inferior. El resultado final del Análisis de Componentes Principales es un índice único de riqueza relativa que asigna a cada caso un valor específico, llamado puntaje (score) de riqueza, que representa el status de riqueza de ese caso en específico en relación a todos los otros casos de la muestra (Henry, Sharma, Lapenu, y Zeller, 2003). Así, comparaciones entre niveles relativos de riqueza pueden ser hechas basándose en este índice. Además, para tener en cuenta las diferencias de peso de cada uno de los bienes entre los ámbitos urbano y rural (la posesión de una lavadora de ropa, por ejemplo, no tiene el mismo peso en el campo que en la ciudad), calculé los puntajes del primer componente principal por separado para los estratos urbanos y rurales, para posteriormente construir el ‘índice de riqueza relativa’ agregado.

BIBLIOGRAFÍA

Córdova, Abby. 2008. “Nota Metodológica: Midiendo Riqueza Relativa Utilizando Indicadores Sobre Bienes Del Hogar”, Perspectivas Desde El Barómetro De Las Américas, Vol. 6. En <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights2009.php> (Consultado el 15 de Noviembre de 2012)

Filmer, Deon, y Pritchett, Lant H. 2001. “Estimating Wealth Effects Without Expenditure Data—Or Tears: An Application To Educational Enrollments In States Of India”, Demography, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 115–132.

Vyas, Seema, y Kumaranayake, Lilani. 2006. “Constructing Socio-economic Status Indices: How to Use Principal Components Analysis”, Health Policy and Planning, Vol. 21, No. 6, pp. 459–468.

Henry, Carla, Manohar Sharma, Cecile Lapenu, y Manfred Zeller. 2003. Microfinance Poverty Assessment Tool, Technical Tools Series No. 5, Washington D.C, World Bank.

Latin America is enjoying the good times - at last

2013-01-22T09:29:00.000-05:00

Latin America is a region that has observed much volatility and in a time of economic uncertainty, many countries have looked to assert themselves among the new world order. Traditional global leaders that Latin America depended upon to take their products to market are finding their coffers depleted and many regional leaders have been able to adapt and show increasing growth as a partner. As a matter of fact, it is the region where sustained economic growth has been the highest as of late.

Latin America is enjoying the good times - at last

By Gideon Long

BBC News, Santiago

There was a time when European economists looked at Latin America with horror. Weighed down by debt, plagued by hyperinflation, and ravaged by unemployment, the region was a financial disaster zone.

Those days are long gone.

As the leaders of Latin America and the European Union (EU) prepare for their seventh biennial summit in the Chilean capital Santiago this weekend, the region is enjoying unprecedented stability and prosperity.

The EU-Latin American relationship has been somewhat turned on its head. These days, it is the Europeans who are grappling with austerity measures, joblessness and an intractable debt crisis.

"The European Union is going through a very difficult time in terms of its economic crisis, stagnation, unemployment and fiscal deficits," Chilean President Sebastián Piñera told reporters in Santiago ahead of the summit.

"Latin America is going through a very positive period, both compared to the rest of the world and to its own history. The 19th and 20th centuries did not belong to us. We hope the 21st will."

The economies of Latin America and the Caribbean grew by 3.1% last year, comfortably outstripping global growth of 2.2%. In Panama, the economy grew by 10.5%, in Peru 6.2%, and in Chile 5.5%. Compare that to the eurozone, where the economy contracted by 0.5%.

In each of the past eight years, Latin American economic growth has outstripped that of Europe, and will do so again in 2013. The United Nations' Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) predicts the region's economy will expand by 4% this year, while the eurozone will grow by just 0.3%.

Homeward bound

While Spain, Greece and Portugal deal with double-digit unemployment, the jobless rate in Latin America fell to 6.4% in 2012. Many Latin Americans who migrated to Europe in search of work in the past are now returning home.

At 5.8%, inflation in Latin America was higher last year than many would have liked, and in Argentina and Venezuela - still economically volatile nations - it was closer to 20%.

But inflation is still lower than in 2011. In Chile, regarded by many as the region's best-managed economy, it was just 1.5% last year.

Years of growth have spawned a thriving middle class. The World Bank estimates that between 2003 and 2009, the percentage of Latin Americans living in poverty fell from 44% to 30% while the number of middle class Latin Americans rose from 103 million to 152 million.

That expanding middle class has more disposable income than ever before. Robust domestic demand has been key to helping Latin America weather the global economic turbulence of recent years.

Sensible governance and wise central banking have also played a role. Some Latin American nations have used counter-cyclical policies to cushion the effects of external shocks. In 2009, many used fiscal stimulus packages to keep their economies on the rails.

The region's public sector debt is below 35% of gross domestic product (GDP). In several countries in Europe - Italy, Belgium and Greece among them - it is over 100%.

"There is no longer that fear that Latin American governments are going to over-spend," said Alicia Bárcena, a Mexican economist and executive secretary of ECLAC. "Macroeconomic prudence has become mainstream in Latin America. Almost everybody understands that low inflation, good fiscal accounts and healthy international reserves are essential."

Huge inequalities

There are still problems, of course. Latin America remains the most economically unequal region in the world. In Brazil, for example, the income gap between rich and poor is vast. Governments have made some progress in addressing this problem over the past decade, but not enough.

Brazil and Argentina, the first and third biggest economies in the region, underperformed in 2012, with growth rates of 1.2% and 2.2% respectively. The region needs them to rebound in 2013.

The tax take in Latin America is still low and tax systems are often regressive compared to those in Europe. That leaves Latin American governments with little spare cash to spend on social policies.

And the economies of Latin America need to diversify more. Whether it be copper in Chile, oil in Venezuela, soybeans in Paraguay or tourism in the Caribbean, too many countries are overly reliant on a single commodity or industry.

This weekend's summit, which brings together around 40 heads of state from 60 nations, offers a chance to address some of these issues, and also to see how Europe can learn from Latin America's traumatic debt crisis of the 1980s.

For Francois Bourguignon, director of the Paris School of Economics, there are similarities between Latin America then and Europe now.

"We know that Greece will never repay its debt, and we've started restructuring it… I believe we will have to do the same with Spain, and probably Italy, and maybe Ireland and Portugal," he said.

"So I think there are some lessons to learn from Latin America on the best way to restructure your debt without completely frightening off your investors."

Landmark year

Despite its current woes, the EU remains the world's biggest economic bloc, accounting for around a quarter of global GDP.

It is the biggest investor in Latin America, accounting for 43% of all foreign direct investment in the region. The EU invests more here than in China, India and Russia combined.

This year promises to be a landmark year for EU-Latin American trade relations. Colombia, Peru and Central America are all ratifying Free Trade Agreements with the EU and are likely to complete the process before the end of 2013.

The Europeans arriving in Santiago this week are in for a pleasant surprise. Not only will they swap the cold and snow of the European winter for the heat of a Chilean summer. They will also find themselves in a country and region that is thriving as perhaps never before.

That might help them take their minds off the economic plight of their own continent and focus on a brighter future.

"In EU-Latin American relations, the best is yet to come," Mr Piñera said.

Brazil nightclub fire: security guards 'stopped people from leaving'

2013-01-01T08:59:00.000-05:00

One of the most newsworthy pieces this month comes to us from Brazil. Certainly, there have been more interesting political developments, however, this development has its own importance as it applies to daily life. Time and time again, there have been horrific loses of life due to fires in nightclubs and other locations where access is restricted and fire | emergency exits are locked to avoid people skipping out on their bill. This is a security concern to keep in mind when you travel to Latin America and other places around the globe.

Brazil nightclub fire: security guards 'stopped people from leaving'

By Donna Bowater, Rio de Janeiro (click here for original article)

Security guards reportedly tried to stop people leaving from the Brazilian nightclub where a fire ripped through the building, killing more 233 people.

The victims, believed to be mainly students from a nearby university, died from smoke inhalation and were crushed as panicked men and women tried to flee the building in the early hours of Sunday morning. There were claims security guards had tried to stop people leaving as they underestimated the severity of the fire.

The band performing at the venue had lit a flare, police said, which set the soundproofing foam on the ceiling alight, spreading in seconds.

Witnesses said there was a stampede of people trying to reach one exit of the Kiss nightclub in Santa Maria, a university city in the southern Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul. Many of those who survived had been in the VIP section closest to the door.

Major Gerson da Rosa Ferreira, who was leading rescue efforts for the military police, said there were up to 500 people inside the club when the fire broke out at about 230am local time.

Santa Maria fire chief Guido de Melo said there had been widespread panic after the fire broke out. "The main cause of death was asphyxiation," he said.

According to local reports, the event at the venue with a capacity for 2,000 people was a £5 per person festival for students at the Federal University of Santa Maria.

Matheus Bortolotto, a dentist who survived the fire, said some of the victims had been trapped by crowd control barriers.

"The club's barriers used to organise queues locked people in," he told Correio do Povo. "One girl died in my arms, I felt her heart stop beating. It was like a movie scene.

"The ambulances could not cope with the number of casualties. We could not manage to use the emergency exits. Those at the bottom of the club had no chance."

He said the flare had been set off by the band, Gurizada Fandangueira, during the first song but the crowd only reacted when they saw black smoke coming from the stage.

Michele Pereira, another survivor: "The band that was onstage began to use flares and, suddenly, they stopped the show and pointed them upward. At that point the ceiling caught fire. It was really weak but in a matter of seconds it spread."

Murilo de Toledo Tiecher, a medical student, claimed security guards did not realise the gravity of the fire and initially tried to stop people leaving.

"People were screaming 'there's a fire' but the security guards didn't budge and tried to keep the door shut," he told Zero Hora newspaper.

"Five or six people knocked over one security guard and knocked down the door. It was the only exit.

"The first people to get out tried to pull out whoever was still inside. Hands and arms appeared from the curtain of smoke.

"I pulled out a girl by the hair. It was chaos."

Luana Santos Silva, 23, told GloboNews that she was near the exit when the fire started. "We looked at the ceiling at the front of the stage and saw a fire was starting," she said. "My sister grabbed me and dragged me across the floor. It was a small emergency door for so many people."

Her sister Aline, 29, added: "The smoke spread very fast, it did not give people time to escape.

"People started to get sick and soon people were leaving covered in soot."

Some of the bodies of the victims were taken to a nearby municipal sports centre where families gathered to identify the dead. Authorities are reportedly struggling to identify some of the female victims, who became separated from their handbags in the club.

Brazilian press on Sunday night reported that most of the victims were aged between 16 and 20, despite the event being for over 18s, as many teenagers are thought to have attended with fake ID cards.

At least six hospitals received the injured while health workers appealed for blood donations and medical supplies. The city, which is 180 miles from the state capital Porto Alegre, has a population of around 250,000.

News of the death toll prompted President Dilma Rousseff to cut short her visit to Chile to return to Brazil.

She was taking part in a summit between the 27-member European Union and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, known as CELAC.

In a tearful interview in Santiago, she said: "It's a tragedy for all of us, and I cannot continue here at the summit, because my priority is the Brazilian people."

The governor of Rio Grande do Sul, Tarso Genro described the fire as a "brutal tragedy". A 30-day period of mourning was announced by the state.

"This university town has never experienced anything like this," the vice mayor Jose Haidar Farret said.

"Just yesterday we watched the selection of the carnival queen and today, in the same sports centre, we are collecting bodies."

The fire in Santa Maria was thought to be the worst of its kind since Christmas Day, 2000, when a welding accident reportedly set off a fire at a club in Luoyang, China, killing 309.

In December 2004, a fire killed 194 people at an overcrowded nightclub in Buenos Aires, Argentina, after a flare ignited ceiling foam.

Argentina protests against Britain's Antarctica decision

2012-12-01T09:11:00.000-05:00

Antarctica is an immense block of ice making up its own continent in the Southern Hemisphere. Many countries stake certain claims to territory on this iceberg, placing research teams all across the land. It is said that this region in our planet is rich in fuels and deposits but there is much speculation regarding approved exploitation. This month's article presents yet another face-off between Argentina and the United Kingdom, having a long standing political and economic rivalry since the 1800s.

Argentina protests against Britain's Antarctica decision

By Cosima Glaister

Argentina has formally protested against Britain's decision to name a vast swathe of Antarctica as Queen Elizabeth Land and summoned the British ambassador in Buenos Aires to explain the decision.

The foreign ministry handed a formal protest note to British Ambassador John Freeman in Buenos Aires.

The note rejects London's claim since 1908 to a chunk of Antarctic known as the British Antarctic Territory, and it criticises what Argentina calls Britain's "imperialistic ambitions going back to ancient practices."

Separately David Cameron urged Falkland Islanders to use a forthcoming referendum to send a "definitive" message to the international community about their wishes for the future of their homeland.

In a Christmas message to the Islanders, the Prime Minister reinforced his commitment to their rights, saying "there is no justification for any country to try and deny you the right to democracy and self-determination".

Argentina has made increasingly aggressive claims to the islands, which Buenos Aires refers to as Las Malvinas.

In March, Falklanders will vote on whether they wish to maintain their status as a UK overseas territory.

Mr Cameron yesterday made clear he hoped they would vote emphatically to retain their links to Britain. He also attacked Argentine President Cristina Kirchner's government for its behaviour.

"I value deeply the UK's relationship with the Falklands and hope it will long continue. But it is not my decision, nor is it Argentina's, it is yours and yours alone," the Prime Minister said.

"This referendum is true democracy in action, an opportunity to show the international community what you want for your future and to show it definitively. I hope all of you seize it."

He added: "President Kirchner's government appears determined to argue that you should have no say in how you are governed. They continue to misrepresent the history of your islands and the current realities of life there.

"It is a pity that Argentina persists in behaving this way. The UK would like to have a more positive relationship with the government of Argentina.

"But the British Government will not stand by and allow your human rights to be ignored. There is no justification for any country to try and deny you the right to democracy and self-determination, nor to make attempts to isolate you, block your trade and undermine your legitimate fisheries, hydrocarbons and tourism industries."

The message comes as the Queen appoints Colin Roberts as the new Governor for the Falklands. Former governor Sir Rex Hunt, who was expelled by the Argentines during the 1892 invasion, died last month. He was hailed by Mr Cameron in Friday's message as "a brave and dedicated public servant".

British relations with Argentina have been increasingly strained in recent months, after intimidation by Argentine nationalists caused the cancellation of several visits by cruise ships to the islands.

Operators such as P&O have said that, whilst ships would continue with visits to Stanley in the Falkland Islands, they would no longer call into Puerto Madryn, Ushuaia and Buenos Aires.

The cancellations came after protesters ransacked the Buenos Aires offices of a travel agency offering cruises last November. A spokesperson for P&O said: "As a British cruise company we cannot allow ourselves to be the subject of any political dispute or put our customers and crew into any situation where their enjoyment may be compromised."

Eurozone unemployment hits new record of 11.6 per cent as economy slips toward recession

2012-11-01T12:00:00.000-04:00

A brief view into Europe's continuing economic troubles. Original article published on ipolitics.ca

Unemployment in the 17-country eurozone hit a record high of 11.6 per cent in September, official figures showed Wednesday, a sign the economy is deteriorating as governments struggle to get a grip on their three-year debt crisis.

The rate reported by Eurostat, the EU’s statistics office, was up from an upwardly-revised 11.5 per cent in August. In total, 18.49 million people were out of work in the eurozone in September, up 146,000 on the previous month, the biggest increase in three months.

While the eurozone’s unemployment rate has been rising steadily for the past year as the economy struggled with a financial crisis and government spending cuts, the United States has seen its equivalent rate fall to 7.8 per cent. The latest U.S. figures are due this Friday.

With the eurozone economy fading, most economists think unemployment will keep increasing over the coming months. Five countries in the eurozone are already in recession – Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Cyprus – and others are expected to join them soon.

The region as a whole is expected to be confirmed to be in recession when the first estimate of eurozone economic activity in the third quarter is published mid-November – a recession is officially confirmed after two consecutive quarters of negative growth.

“With surveys suggesting that firms are becoming more reluctant to hire, the eurozone unemployment rate looks set to rise further, placing more pressure on struggling households,” said Ben May, European economist at Capital Economics.

Recession and unemployment make it more difficult for the eurozone to deal with its debt problem – governments need to pay more benefits to the jobless and receive fewer tax revenues. That could push countries to take even more austerity measures, which in turn weighs on economic activity.

Once again, Spain held the ignominious position of having the highest unemployment rate in the eurozone, at 25.8 per cent. Greece may yet surpass that – its unemployment rate mushroomed to 25.1 per cent in July, the latest available figure, and is due to increase in the face of what many economists are calling an economic depression. The country is forecast to enter its sixth year of recession next year.

Both countries, which are at the heart of Europe’s three-year debt crisis, have youth unemployment above 50 per cent. That risks creating a lost generation of workers and is straining the countries’ social fabric. Extremist political groups in Greece and regional separatist parties in Spain have grown in popularity as the economy worsened.

Concern over the social impact of unemployment has also weakened governments and hobbled political decision-making.

In Greece, the three parties in the coalition government have tried for months to agree on an austerity package that is necessary for the release of bailout loans to prevent the country’s bankruptcy.

The lowest unemployment rate in the eurozone was Austria’s 4.4 per cent. Germany, Europe’s biggest economy, has a jobless rate of only 5.4 per cent.

Separately, Eurostat reported that inflation in the eurozone fell modestly to 2.5 per cent in the year to October, from the previous month’s 2.6 per cent. Inflation is still above the European Central Bank’s target of keeping price rises just below 2 per cent.

“High and rising unemployment, and relatively sticky inflation, does not bode well for consumer spending across the eurozone, especially as consumers in many countries are also facing muted wage growth and tighter fiscal policy,” said Howard Archer, chief European economist at IHS Global Insight.

Above-target inflation has not prevented the ECB cutting its key interest rate to a record low of 0.75 per cent, but few economists think financially-strained consumers will get any more help from the bank at next week’s monthly policy meeting.

By Pan Pylas | Oct 31, 2012

Photo credit: Global Post

What Happened To Europe?

2012-08-01T12:00:00.000-04:00

European business has often played a strong role in the private sector throughout many economies in the Americas. As the world watches from the sidelines, we are looking to define the situation and uncover why all of this is happening. This excellent extract from Amartya Sen can help see the bigger picture and for the full article, click here.

ABOUT FIFTY YEARS AGO, in 1961, Jean-Paul Sartre complained about the state of Europe. “Europe is springing leaks everywhere,” he wrote. He went on to remark that “it simply is that in the past we made history and now history is being made of us.” Sartre was undoubtedly too pessimistic. Many major achievements of great significance have occurred in the last half a century in Europe, since Sartre’s lament, including the emergence of the European Union, the reunification of Germany, the extension of democracy to Eastern Europe, the consolidation and improvement of national health services and of the welfare state, and the legalization and enforcement of some human rights. All this went with a rapidly expanding European economy, which comprehensively re-built and massively expanded its industrial base and infrastructure, which had been devastated during World War II.

There is indeed a long-run historical contrast to which Sartre could have pointed. For centuries preceding World War II, a lot of world history was actually made in Europe. And this generated much admiration, mixed with some fear, around the world. But the situation changed rapidly in the second half of the twentieth century. When I first arrived in Cambridge as a student from India in the early 1950s, I remember asking whether there were any lectures given on the economic history of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. I was told that there were indeed such lectures—and that they were given for a paper called “Expansion of Europe.” That view of the non-European world would seem a little archaic now, not merely because the grand European empires have ended, but also because the balance of political prominence and economic strength has radically changed in the world. Europe is no longer larger than life.

There is, of course, nothing particularly remarkable—or lamentable—in the changing role of the different regions of the world. This has happened again and again. What is really striking is not the historical re-balancing of the different parts of the world, but the mess that Europe has managed to get into in the last decade or so, particularly over the last couple of years. There is a lot of discussion right now—appropriately enough—about how Europe is going to liberate itself from its financial disarray, economic misery, and political chaos. “What to do now” is certainly an important issue today, but “what not to do” is no less important in looking at Europe’s immediate past. This is so not just because past mistakes are relevant in deciding on what to do in Europe (even though what has been done cannot be readily undone—there is no automatic translation from past follies into present rectifications), but also because the negative lessons are essential if we are to avoid similar adversities in the rest of the world.

SO WHAT HAS GONE WRONG in Europe in recent years? I shall divide my analysis into three broad subjects: the challenge of European unity; the requirements of democracy; and the demands of sound economic policy. These are all related to each other, analytically as well as empirically.

The unification of Europe is an old dream. It is not quite as ancient as it is sometimes suggested—the dream is not of classical antiquity. Alexander and other ancient Greeks were less interested in chatting with Goths, Vikings, Angles, and Saxons than they were in conversing with ancient Iranians, Bactrians, and Indians, and Julius Caesar and Mark Antony identified more readily with ancient Egyptians than with Europeans located to the north of Rome. But Europe went through successive waves of cultural and political integration, greatly helped by the powerful spread of Christianity; and by 1464 King George of Poděbrady in Bohemia was talking about pan-European unity. He was followed by many others in the centuries to come, and by the eighteenth century, even George Washington wrote to the Marquis de La Fayette that “one day, on the model of the United States of America, a United States of Europe will come into being.”

But it was the terrible sequence of the two World Wars in the twentieth century, with its floods of European blood, which firmly established the urgent need for political unity in Europe. As Auden wrote in early 1939, on the eve of World War II:

In the nightmare of the dark

All the dogs of Europe bark,

And the living nations wait,

Each sequestered in its hate.

The events that followed only confirmed the poet’s worst expectations. The terrible fear of a repeat of what European countries had seen in the World Wars continued to haunt a great many Europeans. It is important in this context to appreciate that the movement for European unification began as a crusade for political unity, rather than for financial unification and a common currency.

This article is the intellectual property of Amartya Sen. For the full article, visit The New Republic

The Lead Up To Mexico's Elections 2012

2012-07-01T12:00:00.000-04:00

Elections 2006: By A Nose

In many ways, Vicente Fox was a disappointment to Mexican voters. During the electoral campaign he had portrayed himself as a successful business leader poised to bring modern business practices into his administration. It is a common problem, where CEOs are seen as more decisive than politicians, and able to get things done. The problem is that CEOs are used to the boardroom, where new initiatives are discussed, the CEO decides on a plan of action, and his staff gets with the program or they are out the door. Unfortunately for Fox, the straightforward approach doesn’t work in politics where the leader has to contend with an unruly congress, interest groups, and competing forces within his own party. Fox did not prove able to manage effectively this new environment. Furthermore, Fox consciously tried to make a break with past dictatorial political practices, not wishing to govern by decree or fiat. Ironically, he was seen as a weak leader, and Mexican presidents are expected to get things done, not blame failure on a recalcitrant congress. In short, the PAN suffered at the polls during Fox’s final years in office.

In 2006, the PAN’s presidential candidate, Felipe Calderón, began the electoral campaign well behind the PRD’s charismatic Andres Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). In March it appeared that AMLO would win comfortably, but in April Calderón slowly began to build and consolidate his support, eroding AMLO’s lead. An IFE official remarked to the authors at this time that his organization was concerned that, among the many possible outcomes of the elections, AMLO could lose by a very small margin. Under this then-theoretical scenario, he was certain AMLO would challenge the results in a forceful manner, throwing the credibility of IFE into question – the official believed that, should any other candidate lose by a close margin, the result would be accepted. This official’s concern was prophetic.

AMLO had made a strong reputation for himself as Head of Government (Mayor) of Mexico City. He was seen as an honest and capable administrator, willing to challenge the federal government on social issues. He used this platform to launch his candidacy and his chances appeared solid (other PRD leaders had followed this route without success in the past, but AMLO had energy, perseverance, a flair for public speaking which touched the pulse of the poor, and charisma). He steamrollered the PRD’s leadership convention, as the only candidate with a chance to topple either of the two leading parties. Traditionally, support for the PRD had hovered around the 17% level, but AMLO had potential to raise this significantly. AMLO’s confrontational and dictatorial tactics at the convention lost him the support of the party hierarchy, but he thought he could win the presidency on the strength of his personal appeal. He also ignored potential allies from the left.

The June 2006 vote gave the PAN’s Calderón a win by less than one percent of the votes cast. As expected by our IFE official, AMLO screamed foul, and challenged the results. The PRD sought a recount of votes in 54% of the polls (basically all those where the PRD had lost and if a recount went against them, it would not matter). A recount was ordered in about 9.0% of voting stations, and the result was even closer. Although the margin had narrowed, the Electoral Court ruled that there was insufficient cause to annul the elections. The Supreme Court ratified this decision and Calderón was declared president by a margin of 0.54% of the popular vote (240,000 votes). AMLO, however, refused to accept the ruling. He proclaimed himself “legitimate president” and was inaugurated, along with a parallel government, in front of a crowd of several hundred thousand. His supporters declared “peaceful civil resistance” which included marching in the streets, blockading banks and government offices, and holding large public rallies that disturbed the day-to-day life of major cities. His followers in congress disrupted sessions and tried to block the inauguration of President Calderón. As late as 2008, AMLO supporters occupied Congress to block discussion on possible energy reforms.

Although AMLO’s protest movement slowly lost support, much damage had been done. In one poll in December 2006, 42% of those polled believed that Calderón’s victory had been achieved through fraud, and 46% that it was legitimate. Nonetheless, 74% of responses rejected civil resistance/disobedience, and 56% disapproved of AMLO taking the title of “legitimate president”. While divided over the legitimacy of the Calderón administration, Mexican’s were clearly uncomfortable with AMLO’s confrontational ways. His polarizing rhetoric also lost its impact over time. He was largely seen as a spent force and a polarizing figure in politics, out of tune with Mexico’s new politics, and Calderón was quickly adopted as Mexico’s “legitimate President”.

Elections 2012: He’s Back!

AMLO is, once again, the PRD’s candidate for president. After a lacklustre performance in early days – when PRD support appeared to be stuck in the 16-17% range – AMLO’s campaign gained some momentum. While the PRI maintained a comfortable lead, the PAN’s campaign stagnated, and some of its support appears to have drifted to the PRD.

Feb 2012 March 2012 June 2012

Enriqu Peña Nieto (PRI)	36%	42%	35-40%
Andrés Manuel López Obrador (PRD)	17%	17%	20-26%
Josefina Vásquez Mota (PAN)	29%	24%	20%

Although he has moderated his discourse, as in 2006 AMLO lacks the support of the PRD’s leadership. Furthermore, the PRD machine in northern Mexico is weak, and AMLO has little presence there. The PAN was neither able to kick start its campaign in time to catch up to AMLO or overcome the negative aspects of Calderón’s presidency. The PRI retains the largest grassroots organization/presence of any party in Mexico and will get its voters to the polls. The polls, including exit polls suggest a return to power of the PRI by a comfortable margin – not another squeaker as in 2006. Should AMLO cry foul and take to the streets again, he is unlikely to receive the groundswell of support that he did in 2006.

Is a return to the PRI necessarily bad? We believe Mexico has undergone a fundamental political change since 1994, and a return to the old pseudo-democratic approach and dirty tricks would be a severe mistake for the PRI. Turning back the clock would be most difficult, if not impossible, and the PRI will have to operate under the new political rules. The PRI has, historically, been strongly anti-American, and used the USA as scapegoat for its own policy failures domestically. Whipping up xenophobia and anti-American feeling will no longer be easy, given the transparency of the internet age, nor will blaming the woes of Mexico on the USA.

There are questions, inter alia, about whether the PRI will continue the war on drugs initiated by Calderón, or whether it will gradually open Mexico’s energy sector to foreign investment. On the former, we suspect a return to a “live and let live” approach, which would give the cartels more room for manoeuvre, and the PRI more political energy for other priorities. On the latter, Mexico’s oil production is declining and its future lies in deep offshore fields. Foreign technology is required and if Mexico is to maintain its status as an oil exporter, the state oil corporation (PEMEX) has to be opened to the private sector – domestic or foreign. The PRI faces major policy challenges.

Mexico: Voting for Change

2012-06-01T12:00:00.000-04:00

On Sunday 1 July, 2012, Mexican citizens will go to the polls to elect a president, a national congress, and, in some jurisdictions, state, local officials. This event will determine the nature and direction of Mexican politics for the next six years, but first, a bit of background might prove helpful.

Mexico’s Electoral System:

Mexico’s president is chosen through direct election and serves a 6-year period. There is no provision for re-election. The Congress of the Union is divided into two chambers: the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. The senate consists of 128 members of which three per state (31 states and a federal district) are selected through a first-past-the-post system (two seats to the winning party and one to the next largest party). Thirty-two seats are distributed on a proportional basis from national lists. The chamber of deputies is composed of 500 seats, of which 300 are allotted on a first-past-the post basis in individual constituencies with members serving for 3 years. These seats are distributed among the states and federal district according to population. The remaining 200 seats are allocated on a proportional basis with incumbents serving for 3 years in multi-member constituencies. The Chamber will be renewed through a mid-term election in 2015. In some states, federal elections coincide with gubernatorial, state assembly and/or municipal elections.

Elections are administered by the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). The IFE was constituted in 1990 as an independent body to ensure free and fair elections. While there was some question as to the fairness of the 1994 elections, the Institute subsequently built a strong level of credibility as an impartial, independent and professional body. Since 1993, IFE has accredited both domestic and foreign observers (in 1994, IFE approved 943 applications from foreign observers, and 398 for the 1997 mid-term elections).

The 2000 elections:

After the polls closed in 1994, the early count suggested that the ruling Party of the Institutional Revolution (PRI) was trailing. Then came a pause in the issuance of results, after which the PRI recovered and President Ernesto Zedillo was declared victorious with 48.7% of the vote, against the National Action Party (PAN) with 26% and the Democratic Revolution Party (PRD) with 16.6%. Many believed that the pause during the counting phase was when the PRI machine seriously manipulated results in its favour, and there were fears in certain quarters that the same would happen in 2000.

Nonetheless, in 2000 the domination of the PRI was broken, after 71 years in office. The PAN’s charismatic Vicente Fox won 42.5% of the vote, the PRI’s Francisco Labastida, 36.1% and the PRD’s Cuauhtémoc Cardenas, 16.6%. This was after public opinion polls leading up to the election suggested that the PAN and PRI were running neck-to-neck. Exit polls, however, had projected a result of 43% for Fox against 34% for Labastida, which turned out to be an accurate snapshot. While there may have been incidents of electoral manipulation, they were not considered widespread enough to have affected the final result. Also helpful, both the outgoing president and the PRI candidate conceded defeat shortly after the polls closed, and while counting was still incomplete. President Zedillo publicly offered his full support to ease the new administration’s transition, and there is little to suggest that he did otherwise. Mexico owes a debt of gratitude to Zedillo. Mexico’s media also played a pivotal role through its extensive coverage of the lengthy campaign, its in-depth daylong coverage of the voting process and its speedy announcement of exit polls and quick count results.

Notwithstanding Fox’s convincing victory, the PRI remained the party with the most seats in Congress. Some pundits suggested that this was the result of strategic voting – Mexicans wanted change, but not drastic change, and wanted some form of control over the new president. We believe it was a case of split voting, with three credible parties with national reach dividing the vote. The PRI’s strong showing was also partly due to its historic dominance over the rural vote, particularly in the poor south and southwest. The PRI had long been charged with pressuring and buying the rural vote and doling out governmental assistance (seeds, tools, fertilizer) as if it came from the PRI, while suggesting that a change of party could jeopardize these benefits. There was some evidence that local political bosses still dominated the countryside and closely controlled the polls. Access to other political opinions and civic education in general, was also weak in the countryside. In their post-electoral reports, several Canadian NGOs noted the persistence of undemocratic or illegal practices that were common before the most recent electoral reforms. While the exodus of the country poor to the cities has been huge – and there is evidence that the PRI stranglehold over their vote is lessened in urban context – the remaining “campesinos” constituted a significant voting bloc for the PRI in 2000. This was particularly true in the state of Guerrero.

Electoral observation and the rural vote:

The authors enjoyed the unique pleasure of observing the 2000 elections as part of the Canadian Embassy, Mexico City team. Accredited as observers through the Mexican NGO Alianza Cívica, we were assigned to the interior of the state of Guerrero in southwest Mexico. This is a particularly troubled area, which has been home to various violent groups, including the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR) that was still active in the state in 2000. Guerrero is one of the poorest states in Mexico, with a high illiteracy rate (21%), and some 400,000 marginalized indigenous people out of a total population of 3,000,000. The tourism boom in Acapulco and along the Pacific coast has not had much of an effect in the interior, where the majority are subsistence farmers.

We observed the opening of the polls in one of the poorer districts of the state capital Chilpancingo de los Bravos (population: 167,000). The common complaint there (and elsewhere) was the slowness in opening the polls. While most polling officials arrived by the 08:00 starting time, voting did not begin until 09:00, mostly because those appointed to run the polls were unfamiliar with procedures. While we watched from the street, several cars drove by. The occupants noted that we were observers and shouted at us to go into the interior where irregularities were being committed. Over the course of voting day, we visited 10 polls, beginning and ending in Chilpancingo (4 urban polls in Chilpancingo, one each in the small towns of Tixtla de Guerrero and Chilapa de Alvarez, one village poll in Acatlan, and 3 rural polls).

The urban polls were well organized, particularly in middle-class districts where people were used to working in offices, filing or processing papers. Most had scrutineers from the three major parties and were held outside in bandstands, under awnings or verandas - in general under public purview. Debate was lively and electoral material was evident for all major parties and candidates. The press was evident in Chipancingo, as were observers from several Mexican NGOs. In one case, however, a film crew from a major Mexican channel arrived after the scheduled time for closing the polls, but given that there was still a long line-up, they stayed open beyond the 17:00 deadline in order to accommodate those in line. The TV crew herded a number of women together and invaded the voting station (a bandstand) getting the women to chant “We wish to Vote”, even though we had seen several of these women vote already. The TV crew continued filming in the middle of the bandstand while citizens continued to vote. We believe this violated the principle of secret ballot. The TV crew eventually left and the poll continued to receive voters until 19:30 when they ran out of ballots.

The ambiance at the rural voting stations was quite different. We were struck by the lack of people on the roads, no line-ups at polling stations, and in several cases we saw no voters in over a half an hour of observation at a specific poll. In one case, a rural polling station was on the veranda of a government dispensary for agricultural tools, food, and seed, which may have given voters the message that if you don’t vote for the PRI, these “gifts” will no longer be available to you. Another rural poll was headquartered in a school, with PRI party markings on the outside wall. The proper number of electoral officials and scrutineers was assembled, but no one would answer our questions except for a man, better dressed than the others, wearing dark glasses and sitting facing the polling table. When we asked who fulfilled a particular function at the polling station, he would point to someone and say “he or she does”, after which the person would nod and smile nervously. Any question we asked was answered with a nervous shrug from the table. Every now and again the man in sunglasses would make a statement such as “In Mexico all citizens enjoy full democratic freedoms”. The rest would nod. During a 45-minute period only one person came in to vote. She was an older woman, very poorly dressed. Proper procedures were followed in identifying her, giving her ballots and sending her behind a screen to mark her choices. She came out, showed the ballots to the man in dark glasses, asked him whether she had done her task correctly, after which he smiled, nodded and told her to deposit her ballots in the urn (which was not sealed with tape as per regulations). The results from this polling station were very favourable to the PRI.

One strange event occurred in the main square in Acatlan where there were several polling stations in the open air. During the half hour we were there, no one came to vote, but a school bus stopped, and a brass/guitar band of about 30 men dressed a black with red neckerchiefs got off, formed a line and walked/marched through the plaza playing country music. They snaked through the square between the polling stations for a few minutes before getting back on the bus. The women working at the polling station completely ignored them and continued with their knitting!

We returned to Chilpancingo to observe the closing on one poll and the counting process. The open air station was on a pedestrian street with a large crowd huddled around. The chairwoman of the poll held up each individual ballot, showed it to the crowd and announced the winner for each ballot. The results were tabulated and posted on a nearby wall at about 20:30. We were most impressed by the dedication and pride of these workers, but doubt the same level of transparency existed in several of the rural areas we visited.

In 2000, the PRI maintained its hold over the state of Guerrero, despite the Fox phenomenon that swept much of Mexico. This was largely due to the PRI’s dominance over the countryside. In the 2006 elections, much of that support was swept aside, when enthusiasm for the charismatic candidate for the PRD, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador soared.

Presidential Vote: Results from Guerrero

1994	2000	2006
PRI: 358,000	PRI: 402,000	PRI: 263,000
PRD: 266,000	PRD: 332,000	PRD: 510,000
PAN: 74,000	PAN: 175,000	PAN: 160,000

Photo credits:
Mexican candidates 2012, Hemisferio Zero
Vicente Fox, Efemérides Mexicanas
Polling station, Hispanically Speaking News

Last Tango In Malvinas

2012-05-01T12:00:00.000-04:00

The elegant Buenos Aires, the once enchanting South American capital that captivated the world through tangos and Eva Peron has lost some of its splendour. The Europeans of America are losing their bragging rights in regards to their continental neighbours’ status quo as their elected officials play Russian roulette in domestic and external policy. Standard of living has taken a major tumble and their belle époque is a distant dream. Cristina is dragging the once large and exemplary middle-class, much like her recent predecessor the late Mr. Kirchner himself, into an exclusive endangered species list. Those who are able, opt to cash in on their European ancestry and set up shop in the old country. Those who cannot afford this self-exile are packing up their personal effects, selling the house and moving their wife and kids to live with los viejos. Foreign investment, businesses and trade partnerships are closing up shop, bolting the door and placing a ‘condemned’ sign on their buildings, not looking back on what hindsight indicated as a miscalculated piece of decision-making to ever have come to Argentina.

The government’s official line to its people and beyond is that everything is business as usual. As of September 2011, the Argentine government’s figures pegged inflation at approximately 9.8% whereas the unofficial figure gathered by independent consultant firms painted a more realistic picture of 24%. Of course, the latter figure was considered blasphemous and dissident by the government. Several foreign actors in the Argentine economy do require slightly more convincing, especially as Spain’s shares in YPF are being yanked away into Patagonian hands. It’s not as if the people in the Iberian Peninsula have not had their fair share of crises, with an official unemployment rate that makes Madagascar look like a safer bet. The Peronist government appeals to its electorate masking inward-looking protectionist policies as a patriotic imperative. Just as you will hear crowds chant at a football match, “el que no salta es un inglés.” There is no worse crime than to be a traitor to the albiceleste. This fervour has effectively blinded the people to reality and is spooking the entire private sector. Both elected officials in government and the opposition share the feeling of a growing populism manipulating the population, fueling a sort of homegrown variation of chavismo.

General Galtieri speaking to a crowd from the Casa Rosada

Tips to Avoiding Reality

A similarly bleak state of economic and political affairs existed in the early 1980s. It is almost as if the highly political consciousness of the rio platense is inclined to repeat a 10 year economic rollercoaster cycle, each time with a bigger drop. To better understand the current picture, we just have to click and drag Cristina Fernandez and her cabinet into a different folder and copy-paste General Galtieri and the military junta into our existing one. There is a very eerie resemblance. The military was in absolute control of the country’s institutions and organizations, simultaneously resorting to drastic human rights violations to assert its control. The streets of these populous urban centres imitated the setting of a dystopia or post-apocalyptic movie. Citizens’ movements were restricted by curfews and random home invasions by the secret police were commonplace. It was rather easy to be dubbed as a ‘subversivo’ in those days, as much as it is nowadays to be considered unpatriotic by not giving unconditional support to Argentina in the eyes of the democratically elected regime. Physical repression has simply been replaced with the lack of purchasing power and the right to respectable living standards.

The high-ranking military officials were true masters of strategy. On one occasion, they managed to win a bid to host the 1978 FIFA World Cup. The Argentines were too busy cheering for Mario Kempes and the white and sky blues as they took on the big names in international football. Sport was the opium of the masses. Meanwhile, many of their compatriots were being dragged out of their homes or snatched off the sidewalk into the Naval Engineers’ School for ‘questioning’, never to be seen again. However, the tournament was not long enough of a distraction, lasting only one month. A major crisis that placed blame for the country’s woes in an outsider was crucial. A clear-cut, tangible achieved end goal visible to all. What better scapegoat to distract their people than the English? Those foreign pirates stole the Falkland Islands from their rightful owners during a time of peace and good bilateral relations in 1833. This was a true act of unwarranted aggression. A woman was in charge at Downing Street and the houses of parliament, so it would be a piece of cake to retake what was rightfully Argentina’s. Galtieri could already imagine all the monuments that were going to be erected in his honour. No woman would stand up to a man in uniform. The result of such a miscalculated military decision turned out to be Argentina’s own Vietnam and a massive political triumph for Thatcher. The military was unable to hide such a major embarrassment, forcing them to step down and facilitate a transition to democracy.

To mark the 30^th Anniversary of this terrible loss of life, the voice of Cristina has resonated across the Pampas to Cartagena and beyond, regurgitating the rhetoric of her military predecessor of “fuera piratas!” A barking dog doesn’t bite, but neither does a toothless one. Her government has gone above and beyond to give the Union Jack enough of a headache in the region, not allowing boats baring the Falklands flag or British vessels to dock in their ports. Furthermore, some of their neighbours have followed suit in solidarity. The President has pushed for consensus supporting their Malvinas claim, with some jumping on the bandwagon but other leaders prefer to side with Washington’s desire to maintain amicable relations with the Brits. Ms. Fernandez was vocal in expressing her disappointment with Obama who failed to support a partner in the Americas. This contributed to her premature departure from the OAS Summit in Cartagena, Colombia, somewhat before her original scheduled departure. She cannot respond with force to the British occupation as the Argentine military is not what it used to be back in its heyday. Their budget has decreased exponentially since the end of the dictatorship to avoid the past from repeating itself. Any funding directed to this sector is strictly to pay salaries rather than acquiring armaments and modernizing ageing equipment. A full-scale war is out of the question.

March against austerity measures

What Is Next?

The Argentine people have a strong emotional attachment to their Malvinas. Nearly two centuries have passed since being robbed of their beloved island and this feeling has not subsided. It seems to gain further momentum as time passes. The locals that call their South Atlantic homeland, the Falklands, do not speak Castilian yet on the mainland, this does not matter. It is still Argentina’s territory, only 500 km away from their coast and the only piece of land in South America that remains a colony. President Cristina Fernandez found the perfect panic button to push in her time of desperation. That magic button sends all the real troubles to a trash folder on the national mental computer system.

Cristina will continue her populist agenda, encouraging further protectionism, claiming this to be in the best interests of her country and the economy performance. This will lead to increased isolation and an increasing rapprochement with the regional bad boy club headed by Hugo Chavez. Just this year, we witnessed Argentina’s preferred trading partnership with the United States disappear into thin air due to the stubborn porteño politics. If the goal is to become the South American country with the most trading barriers and highest tariffs, she will be successful during her second term she has barely just kicked off. Unfortunately for Argentina, it can hardly become a self-sufficient economy due to the limited availability of natural resources.

Eventually, whether this applies to Fernandez’s government or her successor, they will be hit with a harsh reality: the voices of their people. As they cried lamenting Evita’s loss, they also have demonstrated that they stand up when they have had enough. Some of us may remember the famous cacerolazo – the traditional beating of cooking pots and pans – popular disturbances amplifying the angry choir of the dissatisfied back in December 2001. These riots breaking out throughout the country marked the culmination of a prolonged financial crisis starting in 1999: an Argentine peso bound to the US dollar, large amounts borrowed by Carlos Menem and a rampant increase in debt due to the rapidly shrinking tax revenue received by the government. Argentina was in the red, owing $130 billion US – a third of all moneys owed by the entire developing world. The mobs chewed up leader after leader – one of them having to flee the Casa Rosada by helicopter – from the Plaza de Mayo until they were truly convinced someone would continue to govern looking after their interest.

The problem is that governments have traditionally opted for populist measures rather than making the fundamental reforms necessary to build the economy in a sustainable fashion. Alas, such measures, while crucial to Argentina’s future, are unpopular with the voting public and few leaders in this or the past century have been willing to take the plunge. There are many within the electoral base that have also grown tired of politicians’s ineptitude and attempt to seek alternate means for financial survival and well-being, especially following their last catastrophic meltdown. Argentina remains a country with incredible potential as an important player in the global economy and needs to tap in to its well-educated population and vast resources before all those who can contribute decide to follow those who have already abandoned their birthplace.

Photo credits
Image 1 - Prensa Libre
Image 2 - Veja.br
Image 3 - Press TV

Cuba: When Marx Meets Celia Cruz

2012-04-01T12:00:00.000-04:00

Between the pristine windswept beaches surrounding this tropical paradise, it is evident the golden age has slid into oblivion. What was once the new kid on the Soviet bloc, protected by its powerful Russian big brother, is orphaned into a world with few friendships. The never-ending revolutionary rhetoric spearheaded by the bearded, eloquent, Cohiba-smoking Father of the people has lost its momentum. It has been sidelined like a long-time cigarette-smoking track star. The cancerous lungs are shot. The political elite remains but the socialist propaganda machine has faded much like roadway signs that once enamoured the islanders. Yes, there are co-called allies to the cause, such as Venezuela’s self-dubbed new Castro, but this South American puppy love does not compare to the intense love affair with the USSR. The name is Russia now and she kicked her Latin lover to the curb, leaving him only with the sickle and hammer as a memento. Love does not pay the bills in the capitalist system. Uncle Sam has tumbled into a state of amnesia, forgetting the existence of the Helms-Burton law due to his ailment. More pressing matters dominate his agenda in DC and, occasionally, minimal humanitarian aid is allowed to slip past the Keys toward the banana shaped island it once exploited.

Cuba has had to assert itself and find a new place in the global community while its bureaucracy struggles to maintain any sort of legitimacy. There appears to be a certain shyness to rejoin the rest of the international club, turning down oblique offers to return to the OAS. It is difficult to imagine that the present state of the island was what Fidel and his Barbudos risked their lives to achieve. Would Che Guevara continue to support the Revolution, were he still among us? The Cuban compañeros are cut off from the outside, totally disconnected from easy Internet access, inexpensive cell phone services and virtually any other means of communication the rest of the planet takes for granted. The young are still encouraged to attend school and go to university where all the bills are taken care of by the state. The problem is that they face prospects similar to the rest of the world’s youth upon completion. The employment market is extremely competitive, and no matter what, they must struggle to put food on the table. People are starving for change. You must be in the top echelons of the political hierarchy, or the next step down, the tourism industry or biomedicine field in order to enjoy a decent standard of living. I am certain the fathers of the revolution never dreamed of welcoming with open arms, legions of international tourists coming to sample their rum, smoke their fine cigars and throw out left over food others are not aloud to eat or have never had a chance to try.

What is most outstanding is the resiliency of the Cubans who carry on regardless of their government’s inability to provide. The worker’s tropical paradise – if it ever existed – left like a thief in the night leaving no trace behind. It packed its bags and moved to Miami, favouring Elvis rather than the Russian Red Army choir. The following three subsections are based on three special people from different backgrounds I met while exploring Cuba. Consider it a type of spotlight of a behind the scenes in the ongoing Revolution. To protect the identity of these contributors – it continues to be a totalitarian state, so I do not wish to see these kind souls disappear off the map into another dimension – the names used are fictional. You will notice that each of these individuals earn a living in very different ways, breaking away from the classical sense of equality established in communist states. It’s the law of the jungle out there and, on average, people earn about 20 CUCs (about $20 US Dollars) a month. Whatever I can say about each of these great individuals will only scratch the surface. They are the voices of Cuba.

A classic Cuban taxi

José – The Old Guard

José spends his day driving tourists in his classic yank tank. These antique American gas-guzzlers are a true national treasure and it is illegal for anyone to export these. He is not an ordinary cab driver. He holds a PhD from a prestigious university but resigned from his stable teaching job during the Special Period, opting for a private tour gig - when the iron curtain fell, Cuba descended into the Stone Age, leaving people without power, food, transportation, building material, etc. He now drives foreigners anywhere they want to go and is licensed to do so by the government. The bureaucracy takes its own generous cut of the profits so, as for any service in the country, tips go a long way. He does in fact make a decent living in comparison to most of his compatriots. Some of the cheaper day trips he can take you on start at 130 CUCs. You will soon realize the price is more than appropriate for a quasi-private and personalized tour. He is knowledgeable about his country and enjoys taking time to explain everything properly to his clients.

You will get a chance to see behind a somewhat tough exterior and realize he is a proud and dedicated professional. He provides for his family: a loving wife who, unlike many of her female peers, has the luxury of being a homemaker, a daughter who works in fashion and their adorable first grandchild. He is extremely disciplined and regardless of his workload, sets some time aside to workout at a private gym, which he can easily afford. He eats three healthy meals a day. He enjoys drinking responsibly and is always concerned about being in shape and smoke-free. On our day together he mentioned: “The only thing Cubans care about is food on the table and health for their families.” It was a privilege to travel with him an entire day. We began talking about the outside world and, for a person who had little contact outside Cuba, he knew his stuff about the state of world affairs. After he shared some opinions as we travelled along the open road, I carefully gauged, through carefully-posed questions, his overall state of well-being on the island, to which he replied: “Nothing is going to get me to leave my country. This place is not only my home, it’s in my blood.” He said this with the utmost conviction.

After spending the entire day with this fine Cuban gentleman, I admired him for his accomplishments. Nothing was handed out to him. He lives in a tough place and has achieved a quality of life many of his countrymen dream of. As men, we all hope to be the primary breadwinner, something that is genetically coded in all males, and provide the best possible life for our family. It was evident that his journey out of the special period has been fruitful. Should he have continued working as a professor, he may not have been able to live the Cuban dream: provide food for the table and have a healthy family. Due to his magnificent tourist service and the pleasure of his company, I gave him a tip as appreciation that he gratefully accepted. I reached in to my shoulder bag, giving him a few beauty accessories for his wife and daughter and a Canadian maple leaf pin, which he received with great enthusiasm. He had a tear in his eye as a consequence of this gesture in friendship, which led him to reciprocate with a farewell hug. He wished me all the best and added he would be happy to take me anywhere else in the future as it had been a pleasure to meet an open-minded and friendly foreigner.

The women of the Cuban Revolution

Maria – The Forgotten Revolutionary

Maria is an honest, hard-working woman. Her husband left her years ago to fend for herself and her young child who is still in elementary school. She knows she will never be in line for a promotion anytime soon as she works under a temporary contract. Her employer may choose at anytime not to renew her contract. She cleans after tourists who come to her place of work - a hotel that caters to everything the Revolution taught her to reject - to get drunk partying, make a mess, and complain about every single aspect of the resort. I can only imagine what she has to tolerate on a daily basis without the right to complain. She does her job with minimal fuss, putting up with the whims of the administration fat cats who earn something she envisions as a fortune. She swallows her pride. Her 6 days a week – with no vacation – start with an hour-long bus ride, subject to multiple break downs, and she gets dropped off with the rest of the staff at a rear entrance where guests do not see her arrive. Before coming in, every millimetre of her purse is searched for possible contraband at a routine checkpoint. Anything not work related is confiscated and she is guaranteed she will never see it again. At the end of the day, a similar routine is conducted on her way out and, if she takes anything from the establishment including any possible gift, she will be dismissed.

Since she is part of the staff, she is not permitted to enjoy any of the food served in the all-you-can-eat buffets. However, she is required to be there to clean up after the tourists where she can easily see what is on the menu. With her salary, she can barely afford groceries for herself, let alone her child. She knows the meaning of rationing. She defines it daily. She will overhear many of the international guests criticizing the quality of the food yet she can only dream about what each dish tastes like. Imagination is everything to her. The doors of the dinning room shut, notifying the tourists that the restaurant is closed until the next meal. She continues to work inside with other members of the cleaning staff, packing the leftovers to toss away in the dumpster. They are all following orders from the hotel establishment. These executives prefer that the food go to waste in a rotting pile of garbage instead of allowing the Cuban workers to take leftovers home to feed their needy families. If any of them is naughty enough to attempt to smuggle some out and gets caught, they are let go without pay and the police called to take them to prison, charged with theft. She explained her feelings in regards to this matter as such: “To let the Cuban workers starve by throwing out perfectly good food, is counter-revolutionary.”

She keeps her mouth shut, as she knows it would be impossible for her to find a job once she is fired. The Cuban state is the one who pays her, not the hotel. If she is at odds with her own government, her and her son will starve. She becomes unemployable. She owes it to her family, she says. She sees her child grow up with no chance to be spoiled and the child in turn is significantly aware of her mother’s efforts. If her mother says no, the child looks down in acknowledgement. Maria knows that the child’s innocence has been robbed, but she wants to be a good example to her kid. She knows that some days there will be food on the table and on others they have to make do. She cannot regularly afford basic cooking ingredients although she loves to cook. She remembers there was a time when there was sufficient food, a time when it was legal for Cubans to eat beef, and now, she is forced to use her imagination to create substitutes. She dreams of having her own restaurant. However she is will never generate enough savings to purchase a permit from the state. Her revolution ended a long time ago.

Elián González, proud supporter of the regime

Omar – The New Generation

Omar represents the younger Cuban generation – those who have never witnessed the glory days. He knows what it’s like to grow up with nothing. He makes a living as part of the entertainment staff in a resort hotel, responsible for organizing shows and activities to ensure visitors are happy. His workdays run usually up to 14 hours a day or more. Like Maria, he is at the grind 6 days a week and has no right to vacation. He is expected to have a permanent smile on his face throughout his entire shift and run the same routine chores every single day under the blazing sun. Same dance routine, same sports games, same kids’ shows, etc. If the sand is hot enough to melt his feet, he must still stand in it with a smile and proceed with the established agenda. His employers consider him and his peers to be the face of the hotel, hoping their involvement guarantees return visitors every season. It is a competitive market out there for hotels and their employees. It is the most valuable component of the national economy, far surpassing what sugar used to rack in. However, his salary is barely sufficient for him to survive.

He is a normal young adult. He yearns to see the world but he is not allowed to travel. His only way to get out is to follow the balseros or get married to a foreigner. Both options are highly unlikely. The danger of floating towards Florida has brought a high death toll and as far as getting married goes, he needs to get that special someone in 7 days or less – the average stay of a tourist in most resorts on the island. His understanding of other countries comes through the Latin American Film Festival in Havana – an event he never misses - controlled news broadcasts he barely has time to watch, and stories from guests he manages to befriend. Given the chance, he will tell you that he wants to leave. “Every young person wants more. We all want to leave.” There is nothing this land has to offer his generation anymore. He has no future or any intention of working for the Communist Party of Cuba. He avoids talking politics with his neighbourhood committee. When I asked him how he sees the political future of his country now that Fidel has stepped down he says: “That old man is still alive. His brother is from the same stalk so who knows how long he will live. We are stuck with these guys for the long haul.” I asked him if he foresees any opposition grassroots movement or mass protests like the Arab Spring to which he responds: “No one is willing to put their foot down. Maybe no one else steps forward and no one is willing to go on with a foot chopped off.” Treason is not tolerated.

Many would say that it sounds like a dream to work on the beach. Usually these people have only sat to sunbathe or swim in the ocean at their own leisure. However, all eyes are on him and his mates. There are cameras installed in various checkpoints throughout the hotel, both to ensure that neither tourists nor staff members get out of hand, although foreigners have slightly more leeway. The administration does not want guests polluting the minds of the worker. Should any of the visitors complain about his or his fellow staff member’s behaviour, they can be terminated on the spot. No questions asked. They have no chance to defend themselves. All employees in each hotel perform their duties in individual groups and look after each other as such. In a way, each and every group resents the entertainment staff because they have more of a chance for rapport-building with tourists, therefore, they are able to obtain more benefits through tips, gifts and even drinks or food as long as these are consumed on hotel property. They better not get caught on candid camera. Aside from an already heavy workload, he must watch his back constantly.

When In Cuba

Cuban people are some of the more hospitable I have ever met in my travels. Regardless of the weight on their backs, they carry themselves with pride and dignity, and maintain a jovial attitude. They leverage their energy from humour. When travelling there, it will be impossible to overlook this and, ultimately, to admire their spirit. You may even be found guilty of occasional salsa dancing. Keep in mind, especially in Havana, that strangers come up to you asking for things ranging from the favourite baseball cap you are currently wearing, to dirty clothes packed away in your suitcase. Even a small donation can go a long way. What may seem to you like nothing could make a big difference to people in desperate need. Pretty much any goods you take for granted in your daily life are unavailable or unaffordable there. When I left Canada, my suitcase was about 19 kg and upon my return, I was down to 14 kg. You soon realize that your material possessions are much less important than you initially thought and, although most of the world’s population is being squeezed, Canadians have a much more enjoyable and comfortable existence on this planet. After all, you were able to afford this trip.

When you board a plane leaving your country of origin, you immediately become an Ambassador. Remember this. This is the case whether you are going on vacation, foreign assignment or posting. The good or poor behaviour you decide to exhibit – even if this is your natural pattern - will reflect on your national flag. If you are expecting others to understand you, to behave like you and for things to be like back home, save your money. Stay home. Otherwise, dedicate some time to read a comprehensive book or watch a documentary about where you are going in order to have an idea about the people, culture and events that have shaped their lives. If you cannot do this, at least tune that mind, that powerful motor for building your own prejudices, and accept that things will be different. You may be surprised. When we travel, it should be for the cultural experience, even if all you are planning on doing is sunbathing and surfing the waves. You have to be aware of rules and values, or else not only will you give your compatriots a terrible reputation, but you could also offend the local population that is your host. You could also end up in jail if you are too careless. Don’t be an unwelcome guest. If you open yourself up to these experiences, you will benefit greatly from these unique opportunities, make new friends and add much cultural value to your own existence.

The political panorama of this island is changing extremely slowly. Most foresee Raul Castro hanging on as long as he possibly can, like his brother. His party knows any wide-scale reforms could cause the country to descend into chaos. However, during this new phase of the Castro reign, the regime has adopted a more progressive stance, gradually liberalizing the running of the economy. Many believe that Raul is adopting the Vietnamese or Chinese approach to building a “new communism” which allows a freer market economy, but few political freedoms – if that can still be defined as communism. There are more incentives and government initiatives than in the past. Foreigners are even allowed to purchase land and enter joint ventures, as long as the Cuban government can have a hand in one of the pockets. Small changes can continue to be expected but the odds are, we will not see a Cuban Spring or something similar to the Soviet transition to a questionable democratic federalism. The Bolivarian oil tycoon has not shown any sign of a cooling his ardour to maintain a special relationship with Cuba, which will continue to guarantee a steady supply of petroleum to the island and well trained Cuban doctors for Venezuela.

At least, Cubans are still able to bank on a good education system and free healthcare, something most Latin Americans struggle to access. The government’s approach to allow gradual economic opening, but restricted political freedoms, is also likely to be supported by the majority of Cubans. They don’t wish to see living conditions deteriorate any further – and widespread civil unrest or disobedience could have this effect - but have few alternative, viable political options available to them, and a strong state security apparatus to contend with, should they protest.

Photo credits:

Large Cuban Flag - National Geographic Travel Photos

Cuban Old Taxi Car - policymic

Women of the Cuban Revolution - The Spread of Dreams

Elian Gonzalez - The Guardian.uk

Cuban Propaganda: Government Dirt

Latin America: Politics, Politics…Its all about Politics

2012-03-01T12:00:00.000-05:00

Serious challenges

Latin American governments and societies face many serious problems and challenges. Not the least of these are deep social and economic disparities, coupled with social exclusion, persistent grinding poverty and fragile safety nets. The region has experimented with various economic models - the import substitution model and in some cases variants of the command-control economy. These have proved largely a failure, and almost by default, the free market model has been generally adopted. While this model has brought greater sustained economic growth and stability, it has been less successful in addressing problems of social and economic exclusion. The potential for serious social unrest remains strong in many countries, and the tools available to confront the challenge are limited. The burden lies not just with the private sector to generate more jobs, but also with governments.

President Raul Alfonsin, symbol of Argentina's transition to democracy

The transition to democracy has not always been positive

On the whole, the transition from dictatorship to democracy in Latin America – while still evolving – has been positive. No longer does the military oppress or torture its own citizens, nor do leaders rule with an iron fist. The days when power resided in an all-powerful executive with the legislature used as a rubber stamp are likely gone. These changes, however, have brought unforeseen consequences.

Power has shifted from the executive to the legislative branch, and judiciaries have become less of a partisan political instrument. Presidents have ceded power, but there remains the impression that they are responsible for resolving the country’s ills, and they are blamed if little or nothing is done. Presidents are now reluctant to rule by fiat or executive order, even though constitutions may allow for this. As a result, the approval ratings of leaders – usually high immediately after an election - plummet rapidly.[1] Public expectations from their presidents remain high, but many – particularly the older generations – often look back fondly to “the good old days” when the dictator made the trains run on time and clamped down on crime. Democracy often appears vacillating and chaotic.

The other side of the coin is the legislature. Again, public opinion polls[2] award congresses and political parties low approval levels. People find their politicians neither effective nor relevant, although legislative branches have amassed considerably more authority and power over the past 10 to 15 years. While presidents have not responded to the demands and aspirations of the people, neither have congresses. To be fair, considerable political energy is expended as the executive and legislative branches continue to feel each other out as they attempt to reach a political power-sharing balance between themselves.

Multi party politics at work

The multi-party system doesn’t help

The vast majority of Latin American countries have chosen the US model of governance – along with some European influences, particularly from France. While the US model clearly has major problems: imagine the USA with three of four major political parties, none of which are willing to work with the others, each winning 25% to 35% of the popular vote… Most Latin American countries field an even larger number of political parties, many of which are populist and/or personality-based. Only in rare instances do parties adhere to ideology-based platforms. As a further complication, in many cases it is the elite that stocks congress and uses the legislature to further its own ends. The poor remain under-represented and often resentful.

The problem would be less acute if, more often than not, the president’s party won a majority in Congress, but this is rarely the case. The general rule of thumb is that the percentage of the popular vote won by presidential hopefuls is reflected in the composition of the new congress – i.e.: if a presidential candidate wins 30% of the popular vote he will likely gain around 30% of the seats in congress. Since presidents rarely win more than 50% of the popular vote, the minority congress is a systemic problem that administrations find difficult to deal with. In countries where there are run-off elections, the composition of congress is determined on the first ballot, which, again, greatly reduces the chances for any single party to win a majority.

In some cases, such as that of Peru, deputies are chosen from a list – if the party wins 25% of the popular vote, the first 25% of congressional candidates are appointed to office. They represent no specific constituency and it is difficult for a citizen to identify with a particular member of congress, unless one happens to be from his hometown. Members often don’t feel beholden to the voter, and pursue their personal agenda rather than that of the party or its people.

National interests come second due to the political gridlock

Parliamentary gridlock

In Latin American political systems, compromise or coalition is difficult to achieve. Personal or party objectives take precedence over vital national interests.[3] Experience in coalition building remains low and is employed largely on an ad hoc basis when interests coincide on specific issues.[4] The concept of coalition implies power sharing, to the point of including potential rivals in cabinet, a difficult pill for most politicians to swallow.

In essence, a sort of power vacuum has emerged, where neither the executive nor legislature appear able or willing to address effectively the problems facing the nation. Others are taking up the “slack”. The private sector has created jobs – but not enough and not as well paid as they could be. Non-profit and non-governmental organizations have attempted to fill gaps in education and health where the government has not been present, and community groups have tried to help themselves when appeals to government for assistance have failed. This trend has distanced the populace, particularly the poor, from its government, which in any case is often poorly represented or non-existent in rural areas.

If citizens see what they consider as legitimate demands being ignored by their leaders, they may well seek more radical options. The emergence of populist, nationalist leaders has been one consequence – although the “system” has a tendency to de-radicalize such leaders, to the subsequent disappointment/frustration of voters. We have seen this in Peru where twice in recent history[5] voters elected indigenous presidents, but found them wanting. Unless governments become more relevant to the population at large, the option of violence to counter inaction cannot be excluded.

[1] One major exception is Colombia where the current president and his predecessor (Santos and Uribe) enjoy(ed) extremely high approval ratings.

[2] We find the annual regional public opinion polls conducted by the Chilean think tank Latinobarometro to be particularly good in judging regional and individual country attitudes towards democracy, and how they have evolved over time.

[3] While politicians in “developed” countries are little different, and re-election plays a major role in planning party platforms and positions, it can be argued that in the “north” politicians may take public opinion into account to a greater extent than their Latin American counterparts. It may also be true that the issues facing northern governments are rarely as acute as those facing developing countries – although the response of the EU and the USA to the current financial crisis suggests otherwise. Also, the resources to meet public demands are greater in developed countries.

[4] At the federal level, Canadian politicians appear not to understand the concept of “coalition”, or they see it as an anathema to their political credo.

[5] Alejandro Toledo and Ollanta Humala

Photo credits:
President Raul Alfonsin by Sydney Morning Herald
Multi party system at work by Carnegie Endowment
Shanties by The Daily Mail

No Country For Young Men

2012-02-01T12:00:00.000-05:00

Over the past few years, I have received several e-mails from recent graduates looking for work in my firm and I have had the pleasure of coaching some toward employment in the policy analysis/development fields. Nevertheless, unemployment seems to be hitting many of our countries hard and the worst thing we can do is turn our back on those in need. We can all learn if we put ourselves in their shoes.

Little do we know about the game we enter when beginning our career as students. Children are often asked since they first set foot in their school: “What do you want to be when you grow up?” Each and everyone has their own dream. The sky is the limit. As they grow older, their dreams begin to take on new meanings but everyone still searches to become what they visualize deep in the complexity of their fresh, untouched mind. Usually at this point, they are sitting before their guidance counsellor or faced with the dilemma of getting the grades to make them eligible for a suitable university. Many of our planet’s young are expected to take this step to guarantee a solid future in which they will become self-sufficient. If you apply yourself, anything is possible. Each generation hopes that the next will enjoy a better life. Post-secondary institutions systematically ship off their glamorous portfolios and brochures, hoping to secure more funding than the year before, therefore granting them more status, bestowing a treasured diploma in return to seal the deal.

Another game played simultaneously, or as a consequence of the ballad of education, is the ever feared concept of “unemployment.” None of these kids are sent to school expecting this label to be slapped onto their future. It’s as feared as a criminal record. You are usually threatened that you will become part of a jobless market if you do not apply yourself in school. Strike that. Apparently things have changed these days in schools where children rule and dictate their own terms in defining their curriculum. A fresh unchallenged pool will soon follow those who are currently struggling. These kids, if they don’t want homework, that’s quite alright. However, the graduated generations facing worse than bleak – this would be a compliment for the current global situation faced by many of our young disillusioned – prospects, are finding many doors slammed shut by an ageing population unwilling to relinquish their place and pave the way to the future. Many corporations search for applicants with working experience applicable to their own offices – a clone of who has already bid farewell to the now empty desk - something that precludes those who are in the playing field. There is just no way around this for the new grads (or literally anyone else for that matter) and only the recruiting manager knows who the lucky winner will be after weeks or months of rocking in the chair.

Since 2008-2009, this trend has increased substantially due to the world economy tumbling into an endless disarray of red arrows pointing downward. Hiring freezes, budget cuts, even volunteer opportunities have reached record lows. I recall the catalyst driving us to the red – at least part of it - originated from some hot-shot economists belting out awkward PR-number faux pas – after all, what is money but imaginary numbers backed by words and promises - and suddenly big banks and corporations realized people cannot pay back what they owe. Living beyond your means (i.e. mortgages, loans, credits) is now wrong even though these same institutions still continuously expel volumes of junk mail - including pre-approved credit cards and ideas on reverse mortgages – enticing naïve consumers to borrow what they can’t pay back. Living beyond your means has been an increasingly accepted lifestyle around the world - a major trigger for the United States’ plunge into the dark ages and the Europeans becoming ever so disunited. If it is bad now, why was it good then? Meanwhile, it seems the world’s tycoons, CEOs and other business “elites” are richer than ever, accusing disorganized, leaderless grassroots movements standing in quasi-oblivion of being “communists” or “socialists.”

Occupy Wall St movement

In Canada as in many so-called advanced economies around the globe (UK, US, Spain, only to name a few) the young have surrendered their emancipation, handing over the keys to their freedom to their landlords and returning home to the worried arms of their parents. Others have opted to return to school to pursue higher degrees hoping that a market that betrayed them would give them renewed hope and not a uniform bearing a golden arch. Many successful baby boomers barely completed high school and new applicants for positions in the same companies or public sector are being asked to have a Master’s Degree, PhD, an MBA, you name it. It is the age of certification. You no longer possess the authority to change a light bulb in your home because the city will fine you since you do not have a license. Have we become obsessed with official papers and diplomas? Have we forgotten the human capacity to adapt and learn on the job? Are we afraid to hire newbies because we fear we could get sued or lose face because of them?

In countries where we have ageing populations (most of the developed world), it seems that those who should retire are hanging on, perhaps because they fear a world of peace and rest. They are so used to the a of getting things done that they cannot bear the thought of no longer calling the shots from a desk. On the other hand, some of them did not contribute to a retirement plan - a basic rule in home economics they revolutionized. Regardless, it is time to make a concrete investment in a newer generation that will contribute to the tax base and the shrinking pension pool. In order to combat the post-traumatic stress of soon-to-be retirees, there should be an across-the-board (both public and private sector) programme harnessing the wealth of knowledge of the departing workforce to coach the new on a kind of volunteer status. After all, many hang on as external consultants already. Let’s call this a study-to-work programme. This would be a true service to society and the labour market, as the young have the energy, creativity and ability to learn that comes with their fresh innovative minds. This will add value instead of asking new graduates to return to school as their skills are not needed in the market. If you recall, many students have loans to pay back and this is also a drain on the economy if not accomplished. Should they spend time seeing their skills atrophy by attrition while others take their sweet time in calling it quits?

People who have enjoyed long careers in the public service, private sector or elsewhere take their tenure for granted. They often imagine that those who do not have a job are not trying hard enough, are uninterested, or even lazy. As we are employed, have a salary, are able to make our car payments, we assumed everyone shares our comfortable and protective bubble. I have served as a professional reference, character reference for former colleagues or even just a friend to share my five cents with recent grads, but I have also been in the past on the side of unemployment. Did you know many companies these days will not even give you a reference? How do you prove you can do your job if no one will support you? I know it can be hard to be on the wrong side of the market and it is perhaps the toughest job out there as you have no coworkers who will recommend you, and you are not paid for your efforts. To actually get a job requires much more patience, persistence, networking and being ready to hear things you do not want to. To those troopers out there, do not lose hope. If 5 people are competing for one opening and only one candidate is hired, where do the other four go when there is just no job creation? How are companies still bringing in record profits while more people line up at the soup kitchens of the world?

Youth-peer educators

There must be a strong commitment to today’s and tomorrow’s generations. Schools and universities should start leveraging the skills of the young, teaching them what is needed to carry society forward and what career tracks are in demand for tomorrow’s markets. Someone cannot be allowed to study photo developing when the market is moving towards digital cameras and pictures you can print at home. Internships, co-op programmes and government incentives are not taking us far enough to prepare future leaders to enter the workforce. Many times these are under funded and inefficient. Those who like numbers, we can see that relatively everywhere. We should not have to retrain people straight out of school but get them while they are young, before committing four years to a BA and a life of pointless debt. This will strengthen countries and provide a proper recruitment pool in the long term. We have to tell kids, what would like to be when you grow up out of a certain pool of jobs because it is obvious, “if you apply yourself” does not cut anymore in most fields. Too many fall through the cracks in recruitment campaigns, having more than just consequences for capital generation, but on people’s self-worth. Although economics makes sense in numbers, nobody wants to be in the shoes of the one who is unemployed, and youth unemployment is far above the statistical average in most developed countries, not to mention the developing world.

For further reading, check out No es país para jóvenes by Pablo Simón Cosano regarding Spain's struggle for tomorrow's generation.

Photo credits:
Unemployment: Money Matters
Occupy Wall St: International Business Times
Youth Peer Educators: UNFPA - Eastern Europe and Central Asia

The Inter-American Democratic Charter: Rush to Judgement

2012-01-01T12:00:00.000-05:00

Secretary General of the OAS, José Miguel Insulza

Democratic Clause and Charter

The Organization of American States (OAS) has been better at reinforcing success than in punishing offenders. The building of democratic practices and institutions generally proceeded smoothly during the 1990s, and states were rewarded by the OAS. Where democracy was threatened, however, the OAS foundered. In an attempt to both reinforce democratic practices and to introduce a measure of censure to those who backtracked, the April 2001 Summit of the Americas in Quebec City adopted a democratic clause that excluded offenders from participating in the Summit of the Americas process. The OAS quickly followed by the passing of the Inter-American Democratic Charter at its General Assembly in Lima Peru on September 11, 2001.

States agreed that where the government of a member state considered “that its democratic political institutional process or its legitimate exercise of power is at risk, it may request assistance…for the strengthening and preservation of its democratic system.” The ultimate sanction was, “…an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order or an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that severely impairs the democratic order in a member state, constitutes, while it persists, an insurmountable obstacle to the government’s participation in sessions of the General Assembly, the Meeting of Consultation, the Councils of the Organization, the specialized conferences, the commissions, working groups, and other bodies of the Organization.” Less drastic measures included sending fact finding missions, providing good offices and other support.

OAS permanent council meeting

Does the Clause/Charter Work?

While the USA, Canada and the Commonwealth Caribbean have supported OAS intervention where democracy is threatened, the Latin American tradition and mantra has been to eschew outside interference in the domestic affairs of a member state. Since the OAS acts through consensus, after much negotiation, a democratic charter was adopted, but with the stipulation that member governments must invite the OAS to intervene in a crisis. Can the hemisphere be considered better protected now, since a government that feels under threat from non-democratic forces can appeal to the OAS? In fact, member states have long been able to appeal to the OAS for support in such cases.

A serious loophole emerges when democratically elected leaders begin to take undemocratic action. Since OAS intervention can only be at the behest of the member government, it is unlikely that a leader intent on manipulating the system to ensure his position in power will seek OAS intervention, unless his actions have brought the wrath of the people upon his head. In fact, a former head of the OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy essentially stated to me that if a democratically elected leader acts in a dictatorial way, the electorate will have to put up with the situation until they can vote him out of office. If the subsequent election is faulty, then the OAS can intervene. This appears to me to be inadequate. There does not appear to be a mechanism whereby the people of a member state can appeal directly to the OAS to intervene when they believe they are being oppressed, albeit by a democratically elected government. The OAS record in such cases is mixed, and a large bloc within the OAS has resisted efforts to extend the powers of the organization to monitor individual country cases and intervene where necessary.

Peru 2000: A precedent

After the fraudulent re-election of Alberto Fujimori, in May 2000, bolstered by discussions at the Windsor Ontario General Assembly in June, the OAS developed a high-level dialogue/round table process, bringing together Peruvian opposition parties and civil society. This initiative filled an institutional vacuum and was instrumental in the transitional period leading up to free and fair elections in 2001. Fujimori ceded power, however, due to an untenable domestic situation rather than through international pressures. Nonetheless, the OAS can be applauded for its efforts to ensure a smooth transition from Fujimori. The Peruvian crisis clearly afforded a stimulus for adopting a democratic clause/charter.

Anti-government rally in Ecuador

Ecuador 2005: Not Unconstitutional

In April 2005, President Lucio Gutiérrez was in deep trouble. The presidential palace was under siege by mobs opposed to unpopular measures proposed by Gutiérrez. A hostile congress ruled that he had abandoned his office, and appointed Vice-President Alfredo Palacio as his successor. Gutiérrez appealed to the military for protection, but the latter informed him that they would not protect him. He fled to Brazil while seeking OAS intervention. While the OAS was quick to label this a coup d’etat, the process was constitutional, in that Congress has the power to dismiss a president on these somewhat spurious grounds. In Ecuador’s turbulent politics, presidents have little room for manoeuvre and elites will turn on them if they attempt to reform the system. The subsequent OAS observer mission was neither welcomed, nor its report essentially condemning the coup considered valid. Nonetheless, Palacios, however, was later recognized as president of Ecuador.

Honduras 2009: A Coup, or Not?

In June 2009, President Manuel Zelaya attempted to conduct a referendum to ascertain whether Honduran citizens would consider a major re-write of the Constitution. Honduras’ Congress, Supreme Court and Attorney General ruled that such a referendum would not be legal. The Honduran Army’s Judge Advocate General agreed. Zelaya persisted in his intent, and the Armed Forces Commander refused to distribute the ballot boxes – under the constitution the military must provide logistical support to any election. Zelaya fired his commander and declared that he and his followers would take charge of the ballots. The Supreme Court ordered Zelaya’s detention, and Congress appointed Roberto Micheletti (President of Congress and next in the order of succession) as interim president. The Armed Forces were ordered to arrest Zelaya, which they did. Up to this point, the constitutional process for replacing a president was adhered to, but the military (possibly on its own initiative) decided to send Zelaya into exile, which is against the constitution.

International condemnation was immediate. Honduras was suspended from the OAS, and both the OAS and UN condemned the “military coup” and demanded the restoration of Zelaya. The Secretary General of the OAS travelled to Honduras to negotiate Zelaya’s return. No government recognized Micheletti as interim president, and his promise to hold national elections in November was greeted with scepticism. Elections were held on schedule, with Porfirio Lobo assuming power in January 2009. Nonetheless, questions about the legitimacy of his mandate remained until after Lobo allowed Zelaya to return from exile. This is clearly a case where a democratically elected president was likely attempting to manipulate the political process to perpetuate him/herself in power, but the OAS membership tried to protect him.

President Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua

Nicaragua: Systemic Abuse

Nicaragua’s national and municipal elections have long been considered irregular. The 2006 national elections were widely considered to be fraudulent, as were the 2008 municipal elections. The 2011 national elections were clearly deficient, and the congressional ruling that President Daniel Ortega could run for a third consecutive term appeared dubious. The OAS response to what has been a steady erosion of democratic institutions and practices in that country has neither been swift nor substantive.

Venezuela: More Systemic Abuse

After the attempted coup d’etat against President Hugo Chávez in April 2002, the OAS convoked a summit, but Chávez had already returned to power before leaders could meet. Subsequently, Chávez has placed limits on OAS electoral observer missions, disputed their findings and, in general, taken an antagonistic stance in that organization. Nonetheless, the response of the OAS has been mild in the light of a steady undermining of any opposition to Chávez and his regime.

President Barack Obama speaking to a crowd in Santiago, Chile

Conclusion

While the Inter-American Charter has clarified some of the ground rules under which governments in the Americas can operate, it is not effective where a government refuses or declines to invite OAS intervention – and this remains one of the key challenge to democracy in the region. As a tool to effect positive change where democracy is threatened, the charter remains toothless. The current situation is akin to demanding that the police seek the permission of a criminal to investigate his/her possible misdeeds. In cases where the OAS has intervened (In Ecuador, but especially in Honduras) the result has been a ham-fisted, knee-jerk, rush to judgement – I think unusual for the OAS, and perhaps an indicator of how split the OAS on ideological lines.

There is little stomach in the Americas for further strengthening the Democratic Charter, but the OAS needs to be more assertive where democratic practices are systematically being undermined. Electoral observation may be one starting point. Where the OAS – invited to observe or not - finds instances of blatant and deep fraud which clearly affect the outcome of elections it should be able to invoke sanctions, to the point of suspending a member state, as was done in the case of Honduras. In the case of Honduras, economic sanctions were also discussed – there should be more of this type of discussion, and the consideration of other punitive action, including the termination of development assistance funding.

Photo credits:
Secretary Insulza: Noticias Caracas
OAS Permanent Council Meeting: OAS.org
Ecuador demonstration: Flag Identifier
President Daniel Ortega: Inquisitor
President Obama: HS News Network

A Bloody Summer: The Japanese Embassy Hostage Crisis

2011-12-17T12:00:00.000-05:00

Today marks the 15th anniversary of the Japanese Embassy attacks in Lima, Peru on December 17, 1996. To remember the event, we are proud to present the following account from David Bickford's experiences as Political Counselor at the Embassy of Canada during the longest hostage crisis in human history. It was an event that changed the Peruvian government and the life of Canadians in the country. Enjoy the article:

The Ambassador of Japan and his wife welcoming the Ambassadors of Indian and Israel

A Bloody Summer

By December 1996, many of us believed that terrorist activity in Lima was on the wane. Attacks on police stations, bombings and car bombs were less frequent, and crime with violence appeared to be a more potent threat to our families’ security. Thus, terrorism was not at the front of my mind when I received a call in the evening of December 17 to inform me that Ambassador and Mrs Vincent were in some way victims of a terrorist occupation of the Japanese residence. Thus began the longest cocktail party in human history, or what one Peruvian newspaper later described as “The Bloody Summer.”

Not really knowing what was happening, as the number 2 at the Embassy, I called colleagues from the staff, and we sped to the Embassy to open up the office and a channel with Ottawa as well as to try to gather information on what had occurred at the Japanese residence. It soon became clear that Tony and Lucie Vincent were being held captive by an MRTA terrorist cell along with well over 600 other Peruvian and foreign dignitaries. At about midnight all of the women and some of the older guests were released, leaving perhaps 350 inside. At about 2:00 in the morning, I received a telephone call from a calm and collected Tony Vincent, to debrief me on what was happening in the residence. He had borrowed someone’s cell phone and we talked with the sound of snoring in the background. Tony informed me that, beyond himself, there were three other Canadians among the hostages. With four Canadian lives at risk, this became essentially a consular crisis for the Embassy – everything else was subordinated to the task of ensuring that these Canadians emerged unscathed. None of us slept that night.

The next afternoon Tony was released as part of a commission to present the terrorists’ demands to President Fujimori. I was near the front of the Japanese residence at that time, and it was a huge relief to see him emerge, tired and dishevelled but unharmed. For the next 24 hours, Tony made repeated attempts to meet with Fujimori, but his efforts had been rebuffed. At this point, Fujimori clearly wanted to devise and put a strategy in place before receiving any communiqué from the terrorists.

Canadian Ambassador Anthony Vincent released

That evening Tony told me that he would be going back into the Japanese residence to inform the terrorists that he had not been successful in his task, but that he would continue his efforts. While the two of us got along well, this time we argued. I told him not to go back in – who knows whether he would be allowed to leave again. He persisted, and I told him to send in a written status report with the Red Cross. He refused, and I asked him why he was so insistent about going back in. “Because I gave my word” he replied[1]. Again, I argued that we were dealing with unpredictable terrorists, and one didn’t have to keep his word to such people. He again insisted, and while I didn’t agree with what he was doing, I appreciated his courage and desire to help ensure the safety of many of his colleagues and friends. I watched him go into the residence with a mixture of emotions: fear and apprehension that he wouldn’t be coming out alive; and pride that the Canadian foreign service had produced someone like him. I don’t think I took a full breath until he emerged some 30 minutes later.

Over the next few days, Tony was able to deliver the MRTA’s terms to the government’s “interlocutor” for negotiations with the terrorists, and all the other Canadian hostages had been released. With terms delivered and all Canadians now safe, I heaved a sigh of relief and thought that our direct involvement in the crisis was over. Little did I know…

What is a Guarantor?

The Embassy continued to monitor the hostage crisis, which took up an enormous amount of Peruvian political attention and energy, but there was no evidence that negotiations had even begun. Then, in early January, Ambassador Vincent was asked to serve in a personal capacity as one of a Group of Guarantors. With Ottawa’s consent and support, he accepted the role. As the acting foreign minister explained to us, the group was to include Japan (representing Asia), the Vatican (representing Europe), Canada (representing the Americas), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (providing food, water and amenities to the hostages on a daily basis). The Japanese representative opted to be an observer given the large number of Japanese hostages, and the ICRC representative decided to continue to devote his efforts entirely to the care and feeding of the hostages. The Guarantors effectively were limited to Tony Vincent and the Archbishop of Ayacucho, Monsignor Juan Luis Cipriani (representing the Vatican), although the Japanese representative, Terusuke Terada (Japanese ambassador in Mexico) provided much wise counsel.

The mandate of the Group of Guarantors, as initially stipulated by the Peruvian government, was to be present when the terrorists laid down their arms, released the hostages and left the residence for a safe haven. They were not to be present during negotiations. The Guarantors argued successfully, that they could guarantee the implementation of an agreement if they had not been party to the negotiations. The Peruvian government reluctantly agreed with this point of view, and the guarantors discovered at their first meeting between the government and terrorists that negotiations had not yet started, and that the terrorists were becoming nervous about the unwillingness of the government to discuss their demands.

In order to kick-start negotiations, the Guarantors began to introduce ideas and to stimulate discussion in order to clarify positions and build at least a small measure of confidence. The Guarantor’s role moved from passive observer to facilitator, and eventually to mediator. As part of that process, I got to lead a sub-group to visit the MRTA leadership incarcerated in high-altitude, maximum-security prisons – scary, but that is another story.

Left to Right: Tony Vincent, Monsignor Cipriani, Domingo Palermo, Michel Minnig and Terusuke Terada

To digress slightly, at some point in their career, diplomats receive training in “negotiating skills”. I had completed such a course several years before, and dug out the course material and my notes to see whether there was any inspiration there. It was a depressing exercise since, in this instance, none of the criteria for a successful negotiation were present: There was, inter alia, no willingness on either side to negotiate, no flexibility in positions, no mutual confidence, and on the terrorist side no clear understanding of what they really wanted. At times, they demanded the release of all their comrades from jail, at others better health, food and visits privileges, at others just the release of their key leaders. The Guarantors attempted, unsuccessfully, to convince the terrorists that the release of their leadership was a non-starter, and they should lower their expectations.

I had talked with hostage rescue experts from a number of countries, including our own, and the consensus was that an armed assault on the Japanese residence would be extremely costly in human lives, since the building was large, with many rooms and hostages and captors were spread throughout the building. A major factor was that the MRTA regularly practiced their routine for responding to such an attack – which essentially meant killing as many of the hostages as possible before being overwhelmed. The view was that if the takeover could be accomplished in under 3 minutes, 50% of the hostages would become casualties, 50% of the remaining hostages would die within the next 3 minutes, and so on. If the operation lasted more than 12 minutes, it was likely that all the hostages would be dead or wounded.

The Guarantors believed that the only conceivable favourable outcome was a negotiated exit strategy. All efforts were made to ensure such a conclusion, but as the months passed, very little progress was made. Meetings between the government and the terrorists were few and pro forma, accomplished little. In consequence, the Guarantors spent more of their time in the Japanese residence attempting to make the terrorists listen to reason and urging the hostages to keep calm and not provoke their captors. In this, the Guarantors were more successful. Moral remained relatively high among the hostages, there were few instances of confrontation between the hostages and terrorists, and a form a reverse Stockholm syndrome emerged - several of the young (15 to 16 years of age) and impressionable terrorists were awed by being the presence of ministers, generals and ambassadors and saw them as role models.

In the meantime, the Peruvian army was digging tunnels under the residence…

Terrorism for Dummies

During the off-and-on discussions between the terrorists and the Peruvian government, several times the MRTA expressed concern about the plight of their imprisoned comrades – shortly after the taking of the Japanese residence, all visiting rights to terrorists in jail were suspended by the government and any other of the limited privileges that the prisoners enjoyed in these stark institutions was curtailed. The Guarantors decided to form a sub-committee (I was chosen as the victim to lead the group) to visit the various prisons where MRTA members were being held. We were a small group consisting of myself, a Japanese diplomat, a Spanish nun, a Japanese doctor, a Peruvian doctor and another Canadian diplomat. We were to visit six prisons, and report back to the Guarantors on conditions within the prisons, including respect for human rights, as well as the health and well being of prisoners.

We started out well – sort of - in a minibus rented by the Japanese Embassy from “Mickey Mouse Tours”, which even had a picture of the smiling mouse on the side. The visit to one of the most notorious prisons in Lima, called Lurigancho, was extremely interesting. This was the prison in the late 1980s where there was an internal revolt and the army went in and killed hundreds of prisoners, mostly terrorists. There were four major wings, two of which contained hardened criminals and where the guards never went, and the others where convicted terrorists were held. We had ready access to prisoners, sampled their food, and were rather surprised that prisoner morale remained high given a very Spartan regime. We emerged from the prison to be surrounded by the media (mainly Japanese) who hounded us worse than the prisoners inside. The intrepid Mickey Mouse bus was unable to outrun the swarm of press vehicles and motorcycles and we arrived back in the Embassy to write our report with the press milling and shouting outside.

We visited several medium security facilities, but the highlight (literally) was a high-altitude prison at 4,200 metres near Puno in southern Peru: Yanamayo. We arrived from Lima - almost deaf - on a Peruvian National Police Antonov 22 (Soviet 1960s equivalent of a C-130 Hercules). The prison we were visiting held most of the MRTA leadership. We wanted both to look at their welfare, and also try to convince them to instruct their colleagues in the Japanese residence to be more flexible in negotiations. One of the problems we had experienced was that the leaders in Yanamayo had given the terrorists in the Japanese residence their instructions, through intermediaries, prior to the assault. Although prisoners were, theoretically, held incommunicado in the high-altitude prisons, they were in contact with the outside world – we presumed through bribing guards to convey messages.

MRTA guerrillas in the Japanese Embassy

The first impressions of Yanamayo were forbidding. On a windswept hillside, the prison was a huge 4-floor cement block with no windows, with a few outbuildings. The complex was surrounded by two chain-link fences topped by razor wire, with armed soldiers every fifty metres between the two fences facing outward - presumably to deter any assault from outside. Signs indicated that outside the wire there were land mines. From inside we could hear shouting, slogans and chanting of patriotic mantras. The guards didn’t want us to go in, fearing a riot, but we insisted. With some trepidation we entered a cellblock. There were cells on all four sides, with bars across the front of the cells. Once they saw us, the MRTA immediately started shouting, banging on the bars – strangely the Shining Path prisoners were calm, and talked to us in a relaxed way. The MRTA appeared half crazed, including one whose photo I recognized as being a Chilean. I was extremely glad that there were stout bars between them and us. What I remember most though was the cold. It was intense and pierced to the bone. I shook hands with some of the prisoners whose hands were blue and appeared to have little feeling in them. They were four to a cell (about 3 by 3 metres), sleeping on concrete shelves with thin foam mattresses. They were allowed out to exercise for 30 minutes a day – but this “privilege” had been cancelled, along with visits and parcels from home. I found it hard to believe that they could maintain their militancy year-after-year under such conditions, but they had.

Later we met in a small conference room with the leadership, who were calm, relaxed, but argumentative and not forthcoming. We got nowhere convincing them to introduce some flexibility in their negotiating position – after all, for them the whole purpose of taking high-level hostages was to gain their own release from jail. Nothing else mattered. We later visited the hospital, where I sat down on a bed with a Shining Path guerrilla paralysed from the waist down. He admitted that he had injured himself while preparing a bomb. He told me he had received little rehabilitation at the prison, but felt he was treated better than a poor Peruvian with no access to medical assistance. I found the Shining Path much more reasonable than the MRTA. We also visited the kitchen where we tried Alpaca stew (mostly leg bones, but nonetheless hearty and tasty). We went back to Lima late in the day with splitting headaches from the change in altitude (Lima is just a few metres above sea level).

Our final report served to reassure the terrorists in the Japanese residence that their colleagues were not being mistreated, and may have helped to build a better rapport between the terrorists and the Guarantors. On a personal level, we in the sub-group became good friends, and I grew to appreciate particularly the work ethic, professionalism, and good humour of my colleague from the Japanese diplomatic service, Kenji Hirata. While these visits were something of a sideline to the main negotiations, I learned that the MRTA leadership, even after years in jail and with little prospect of ever being released, remained militant, dedicated to their cause and with spirits unbroken – a daunting enemy.

The Assault – Surprise, surprise…

On one of his moral-raising visits to the Japanese residence, Tony was called into the dining room by the leader of the terrorists, Nestor Cerpa, and asked to put his ear to the floor. After a few minutes, scraping was heard underneath, and Cerpa said, “They are digging tunnels, aren’t they”. Tony would not reply. Later, in the Embassy we discussed this and saw it as a bad omen.

With hindsight, it is now clear that Fujimori was pursuing a two-track approach: If the terrorists gave up, all well and good. If they didn’t, he was prepared to send in the army – even though his younger brother was a hostage. For him, the role of the Guarantors was to keep the situation in the residence calm for long enough to build his tunnels. In the meantime, the presence of the Guarantors had given the MRTA a false sense of security. They felt protected, and relaxed their vigilance. Dangerous for them, they slipped into a routine and the Peruvian authorities ultimately took advantage.

Assault on the Japanese Residence in Lima, Peru

On April 22, 1997, Tony came back from a visit to the Japanese residence at about 13:30. He said that the police around the perimeter of the residence were edgy, tense and aggressive with him. We filed this thought away, but at 15:20 the assault began. Tony, and eventually Cipriani, Terada and one of his officers, clustered around the television in my office at the Embassy and we watched the attack unfold with horror. The final shots were fired some 20 minutes later, but the armed forces assault force did not declare victory until almost 16:00. We felt failure bitterly, believing that four months of work had all been for nothing. We were sure that the bulk of the hostages must have been killed, since the assault took so long. As reports filtered in, however, it emerged that most of the hostages had survived, to us a miracle. In the end, of the 72 hostages, only one died, although four others were wounded. In the operation, two commandos were killed and 10 badly wounded. All 14 terrorists died.

How had they accomplished this when experts from around the world said it couldn’t be done without massive losses among the hostages? In secret, the Peruvian army had build a full-size replica of the Japanese residence on a local army base, where 150 officers from the special forces had been practicing and refining assaults for weeks. In addition, the authorities were able to communicate clandestinely with some of the hostages, and on “D Day” told them to prepare for an assault at 15:20 by getting themselves up stairs without raising the suspicions of the terrorists, and behind some protection. The MRTA had gotten into the habit of gathering in the main dining room shortly after 15:00 to play table football. The commandos simply blew up the dining room at 13:20 from a tunnel below, killing or disabling probably half of the terrorists. Commandos simultaneously attacked the front door, emerged from tunnels to blast holes in the outer walls, or landed on the roof by helicopter. Also, when it came to the crunch, several of the young terrorists could not bring themselves to kill men that they had come to know and often admire. Fujimori played the assault as a major victory over terror, and his popularity soared in the immediate aftermath.

The Aftermath

The last official act of the Group of Guarantors was a press conference the day after the release of the hostages. The Guarantors lamented the fact that a peaceful solution had not been reached. They expressed satisfaction that the vast majority of the hostages had survived, but regretted the loss of life, both the hostage killed, the military officers slain, and the 14 MRTA members. As Cipriani expressed it: “Throughout the hostage crisis, I felt like the father of a great family of 86: the 72 hostages and 14 members of the MRTA…My tears are those of a father of a family of 86 persons, of which 17 have been killed in one blow.” Privately, Cipriani later told me how sorry he was that he couldn’t have saved the lives of the teenaged terrorists. It took us all quite some time for the shock of the assault to wear off and to realize that the Group of Guarantors was no more. It was hard to believe that now it really was over.

The question of whether the death of all the 14 terrorists was justified continued to be controversial mainly outside Peru. Some suggested that a number of terrorists had raised their hands in surrender, but been shot down, that others had been in hiding after the hostages were freed but were shot when discovered, and several had pleaded for mercy, but to no avail. Several Western European counter-terrorism officers had told me earlier that in such operations, the first priority is to secure the safety of the hostages. Should someone attempt to surrender, you shoot and move on. If you stop to secure a prisoner, you have been diverted from your main task. Also that person may well be faking, and fire at you when you let your guard down. That appears to be the line taken by the Peruvian special forces assault group. Their own losses of two killed and ten badly wounded suggest that the battle was not completely one-sided.

Heavily guarded Canadian Embassy in Lima, Peru

After the rescue operation, the media suggested that Ambassador Vincent, since he was the last member of the Group of Guarantors to enter the Japanese residence – and only two hours before the assault – must have passed the word that the attack would take place that day. Nothing could be further from the truth. We were given no indication by the government that such an attack was to take place. Later Fujimori told the press that the attack would have proceeded as planned even if one of the Guarantors had been inside at the time – truthful but not very diplomatic. Tony was extremely lucky he hadn’t stayed longer, or arrived a bit later.

Nonetheless, the MRTA leadership blamed the Group of Guarantors for the failure of this operation. Apparently, a key part of their strategy had been to execute a hostage every few weeks should talks not proceed, in order to impress upon the Peruvian government the seriousness of their intent and demands. The presence of the Guarantors, particularly Cipriani, made the terrorists in the Japanese residence reluctant to carry this out, and their leaders blamed the Guarantors for interfering. As a result, the Canadian Embassy and its staff remained under a terrorist threat (kidnapping of a senior staff member or a car bomb at the Embassy) for several years after the hostage crisis, until the remnants of the MRTA were either hunted down and killed or imprisoned. My family and I travelled with Peruvian police bodyguards for the next two years, our home had 24 hour armed guards who enjoyed playing basketball with my two sons at shift change time, and the Embassy resembled a bunker with a private guard service within the perimeter of the property, barricades, cement barriers, and high grills/walls with barbed wires surrounding the grounds, and armed SWAT team from the national police (including a bomb squad truck) in the street in front of the building. Not a very welcoming impression for visitors.

Most Peruvians were elated by the result of the rescue operation, and gave the group of Guarantors at least some of the credit – Fujimori never did. For the rest of his time in Peru, Tony was often approached in public places by Peruvians who were anxious to shake his hand and to thank him for his efforts. A year or so later, Francisco Tudela, who had been Peruvian Foreign Minister at the time of the hostage crisis and considered by the MRTA as their prime hostage, told me that, undoubtedly, the Group of Guarantors had saved many lives, including his own. From that point of view, I think we done good, and that it was a good time to be a Canadian in Peru, eh!

[1] For more on this, see David Goldfield’s book “The Ambassador’s Word”
Photo credits:
"Base Tokio: El Verano Sangriento" by El Comercio (Peru)
Other pictures from Picasa Web Album, Gateway To The Americas by William Bickford

Honduran journalists face 'growing threat'

2011-12-07T12:00:00.000-05:00

An interesting original BBC article shedding some light into the growing insecurity in Central America and gang violence. To visit the original article click here.

Journalists in Honduras are facing growing danger, the country's human rights commissioner has warned.

Ramon Custodio was speaking to the Spanish news agency, Efe, a day after a radio host was shot dead.

Luz Marina Paz was the 17th media worker to be killed in Honduras over the past couple of years, rights groups say.

Honduras has the highest murder rate in the world: 82 killings per 100,000 people, according to the UN.

Ms Paz and her driver were shot dead as they travelled through the capital, Tegucigalpa.

The journalist, who had a morning news programme, was reported to have received death threats for refusing to pay extortion money.

Hours earlier, gunmen had shot at the offices of La Tribuna newspaper, injuring a security guard.

"We are in more danger than ever, because we don't know where the attacks against journalists and media organisations are coming from," La Tribuna's editor, Adan Elvir, told Efe.

His comments were echoed by Human Rights Commissioner Ramon Custodio.

"The danger we all in Honduras are experiencing is intensifying in an important part of society, namely the media, which are suffering threats, attacks and murders," Mr Custodio said.

Police upheaval

Honduran President Manuel Zelaya

According to rights groups, some 17 journalists have been killed in Honduras since 2009 when the military helped to overthrow the then president Manuel Zelaya.Current President Porfirio Lobo, who was elected in November 2009, expressed deep regret at the news of Ms Paz's murder.

"There is no doubt that we are facing an escalation (in violence) and we have to identify clearly where it is coming from," Mr Lobo said.

"Given the difficult moments the national police is experiencing, there are some who are taking advantage of the latest upheaval."

Last month, dozens of police officers were sacked in a crackdown on corruption and organised crime.

The alleged involvement of officers in the high-profile murders of two students in November also increased calls for police reform.

The Honduran government has begun deploying troops to help combat criminal gangs and drug traffickers.

Photo references:

Media: rctv-threat-weil.gif

Manuel Zelaya: topics.nytimes.com

Spanish Elections 2011: Changing Of The Guard?

2011-11-17T14:00:00.000-05:00

Spain has often been viewed as an ideal country to start a new life by many Latin Americans and North Africans. People usually felt they would have a second chance at building a family in an environment of prosperity and jobs, unlike their home country. Prospects for the future seem bleak at best as the economic crisis brings record levels of unemployment, especially among the youth population. The following article is brought to you by Pablo Simon Cosano, a young academic at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, in Barcelona, Spain and a veteran blogger. We are appreciative of his contribution.

In the 2008 elections, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), led by presidential candidate Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero claimed victory with 43.9% of the popular vote, increasing parliamentary majority. Even though the People’s Party (PP), the centre-right opposition made some headway narrowing the gap, the PSOE still managed to take 4 points from them. Zapatero enjoyed the full support and confidence of his party to begin a new mandate, while the PP struggled with internal bickering, threatening the position of their leader, Mariano Rajoy. Following three years of conflict, the stage is now set for a completely different play. The government has pushed for early elections on November 20, Zapatero is not running for re-election and Mariano Rajoy is not only the undisputed leader of his party but, polls show a near sweep toward an absolute majority come next elections. What has actually happened to cause the most dramatic and unparalleled political turnaround in Spain since the transition to democracy?

During the 2008 elections, the world’s economy was entering a period of recession causing a dramatic domino-effect, sending the Lehman Brothers into the annals of history and the US economy into a vacuum. All of this had little effect on Spain at the time and the country barely registered a minimal tremor. Even though the PP tried to highlight this concern, the aftershock of the crisis had not yet shown its face on the Iberian Peninsula and the issues pertaining to the previous presidential mandate primarily regarding terrorism and territorial quarrels were the main topics. During Zapatero’s second term, the government’s reaction to the crisis was to deny its very existence. Nevertheless, the Spanish economy teetered on weak foundations; high private sector debt (both enterprises and families) and a speculative real estate bubble were the principal factors fueling the engine of Spanish growth. In 2009, there was a sudden dramatic slow-down bursting that imaginary protective bubble as a direct consequence of growing international credit limitations. Spain, with a labour market dependant on growth, adjusted through wide-scale downsizing. In less than one year, the unemployment rate catapulted from 8% to 14%. The economic surplus the government had accumulated during its previous mandate now dipped into the red as a sharp decline took the reins of economic activity.

Left: Zapatero, Right: Rajoy

When faced with these circumstances, President Zapatero publicly acknowledged his misjudgement of the crisis and its effects, committing himself to safeguard workers’ rights and entitlements. His government led efforts to undertake expansive (Keynesian) policies stimulating demand through his well-known Plan E. As a result of this measure, the government transferred resources to municipalities to provide stimulus strengthening public sectors and creating new jobs. Although these measures had been widely criticized, the fact is that it truly made a difference combined with other measures such as subsidizing the purchase of brand new vehicles. Altogether, including the rise in public deficit, the drop in unemployment was somewhat neutralized. In terms of the financial sector, government funds provided liquidity, hoping to trigger credit availability. Zapatero further pushed his legislative agenda on other fronts, such as amending the laws concerning abortion, birth control pills, both of these met with adamant opposition from extremists. The PSOE lost the Galician regional government and the European elections but won in the Basque Country due to an unspoken agreement between the PSOE and PP to dethrone the PNV, a moderate nationalist party, from the seat of regional government. The government was exhibiting some weakness and polls began to favour the PP by a margin of 3 points.

Nevertheless, there is a clear breaking point, showing a shift in the status quo of the legislature: May 2010. Greece is nearing the brink and there is increasing pressure from investors regarding European countries’ sovereign debts. The risk premium shot up and Spain is getting closer to IMF and EU intervention, just as has already occurred in Greece and Ireland and Portugal may follow suit. At this point, whether he wanted to or not, Zapatero shifts gear, this time announcing cutbacks on public servant wages and contributions to retirees’ pensions, freezing public investments, all approved in very tight votes in the legislature. Now the risk has been pushed away (only momentarily) from Spain but something is now damaged beyond repair. On one hand, the traditional support base for the PSOE has turned its backs on the party and there is a void opening up 10 points for grabs. On the other, Zapatero decides to undergo a political make-over and declares he will lead a process of reforms and any other measure necessary to get Spain out of the crisis: “at any cost.” The path of austerity begins at this moment. From then to the following summer, his government rushes to implement each and every reform. One of the laws increases the retirement age, another, impacts the labour market resulting in a (not entirely successful) general strike. Last but not least, Cajas de Ahorro, small autonomous public banks, are obliged to merge and readapt.

The PSOE suffered a critical blow to their support and the trend favours the PP, which has built a lead averaging almost 15 points in all polls. The CiU was able to regain the Catalan government in 2010 after a controversial sentence handed down by the Constitutional Tribunal, cutting back Catalonia’s capabilities of self-governance. This was just a sign of the things to come. Following several months of speculation, Zapatero decided not to run for re-election and announced this prior to the municipal and autonomous community elections on May 22. This in turn allowed the PP to power its way throughout the territories, winning in every region in Spain, marking an unprecedented victory. The voters had decided to punish the PSOE for its actions. Furthermore, this also coincided with the birth of the indignados or “15-m” as an assembly-based movement, plural and diverse, taking to the streets to reclaim their rights, seeking a change in the economic system and revamping the political system. They are protesting specifically against politicians’ privileges, corruption and the excessive power of banks and markets. While this social explosion spread to the rest of the world, the PSOE decided to regroup and name their Vice-President Rubalcaba as their presidential candidate. Shortly after this, Zapatero announced that he would be calling early elections to be held on November 20, 2011.

The indignados taking to the streets

During the summer of 2011, there is no sign of a truce as the Spanish prime risk skyrocketed once again, this time due to overwhelming concern tied to the growing lack of confidence in the Euro zone, Greece and Italy. Zapatero proposed extreme constitutional reforms with the PP at his side, without engaging the population through a referendum and renewed military agreements with the USA, causing a further rift with the left-wing of his PSOE. The new socialist candidate now has his hands full trying to distance himself from the outgoing president and his government, Zapatero has disappeared during the campaign, and Mariano Rajoy’s lead seems to grow and consolidate. Today, Spain’s unemployment rate sits near 22%, the same rate as Madagascar. In such a bleak world, it seems that the only good news has come from ETA, the armed separatist Basque wing, when it declared a ceasefire. This will be a key item in the next president’s agenda.

This background sheds some light on the situation that most Spaniards experience today. The country finds itself in a weak economic situation with a clear alternation in power in sight. This electoral campaign sets the stage for Rubalcaba to deny everything while promising everything that he will not do, as Rajoy promises he will not do a single thing that everyone thinks he will do (cut public spending and social services). The track is set for the People’s Party’s victory lap in perhaps the easiest electoral contest due to major political miscalculations by the outgoing government and the unforgiving wrath of this global economic crisis. The indignados sitting in their plazas demand an overhaul of the system. The smaller parties aspire to significant gains in representation although some know that this will be overshadowed by a People’s Party crushing victory. The Spanish people will make their way to the polling stations on November 20 - the day that marks the passing of General Francisco Franco – feeling pessimistic about their reality and convinced that things will not get much better. There is no light to be seen at the end of this tunnel.

For other articles written by Pablo Simon Cosano, please visit his blog at La Kancilleria. We thank him again for his contribution and putting his country's situation in perspective for us.

Image references:
Spanish flag: dsc00979.jpg by World Elections
Zapatero and Rajoy: zapatero-rajoy.jpg by Politics in Spain
Indignados: revolucion_de_los_indignados.jpeg by Better Nation

Nicaragua: The Tired Revolution

2011-11-01T12:00:00.000-04:00

Sandino Vive

In July 1979, the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza was overthrown through violent civil strife. The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) had played a major role in defeating oppression. A five-person Junta of National Reconstruction was established, which the FSLN came to dominate. The FSLN offered land reform and the redistribution of wealth along with poverty alleviation and literacy programs. In 1985, the FSLN won the national elections, its leader Daniel Ortega Saavedra, with 67% of the popular vote and a solid majority in congress.

Ortega’s move to the left, supported by the USSR and Cuba, alienated many voters from the centre and right, while polarized his potential international support. With its drift towards socialism, the establishment of a state/party-controlled neighbourhood control system, a blurring of lines between the party and state, and virulent anti-Americanism, Nicaragua appeared well on the way towards joining the Soviet camp.

The Decline of Ideology

The FSLN lost the next three national elections but remained a powerful force in opposition. While the party espoused a more moderate platform, it nurtured its militant grass-roots organization. As long as the opposition could remain largely united around one presidential candidate, the FSLN, with base support of between 35% and 40% was unlikely to regain the presidency. In the 2006 elections however, Ortega and the FSLN again won power, partly due to a “Pact” with the Constitutional Liberal Party to share power between the two leaders and parties. These elections were considered flawed, with fraud and intimidation of the opposition fairly widespread. Ortega received 38% of the vote and a minority position for the FSLN in Congress.

Since then, many of the FSLN’s long-term supporters and ideologues have left the party, disgusted by high levels of corruption within the party elite, Ortega’s intolerance towards criticism, and the erosion of political principles and ideals. Many bemoaned what they saw as the betrayal of the Sandinista revolution, and while a “purist” Sandinista party has been established, it has yet to make a political impact. Ortega has proven a better revolutionary than a leader in peacetime, interested largely in amassing power and personal gain. Intimidation of political rivals proceeded apace, and the judicial and electoral authorities, under the thumb of the FSLN, were used to restrict the ability of the opposition the field candidates, run effective campaigns or monitor the voting and counting processes. Gangs of thugs have been used for many years to forcibly break up opposition rallies while the police have largely stood by as passive observers. This pattern continued in 2008 during the municipal elections, which were considered by most international observers to be fraudulent. Several donors reduced or suspended development assistance programs as a result. While the opposition complained and marched in protest in the streets, it was not able to sustain such campaigns indefinitely, while the FSLN machine has been able to draw upon the resources of the state and foreign friends to maintain its national network.

Nicaragua’s previous constitutions prohibited consecutive election to the presidency. In October 2009, the FSLN-dominated Supreme Court approved consecutive re-election, setting the stage for Ortega to run for president in 2011. Notwithstanding, polls suggested that Ortega’s approval rating remained at about 45% in October, and that an FSLN win in 2011 was more than likely. Despite its critics, the FSLN has been able to draw upon extensive Venezuelan funding (possibly up to US$ 500 million/year) for social programs, which has more than offset the reduction in aid flows from OECD members. While accountability of these funds is murky, and much may be finding its way into private bank accounts, this sum represents 7% to 8% of Nicaragua’s GDP and its selective application, particularly in poor rural areas, has helped to retain the loyalty of the FSLN’s base and expand the number of adherents. Some figures suggest poverty has been reduced nationally from 65.5% in 2005 to 57% in 2011. Even if this is a somewhat inflated figure, it is a major accomplishment.

2011 National Elections: More of the Same

Every indication is that the FSLN drew on its extensive box of dirty tricks to ensure a favourable electoral result. With high popularity ratings, however, why manipulate the electoral process in such a blatant way? Ortega, with a 45% approval level, would more than likely win the presidency fairly. Ortega, nonetheless, may well have felt the need for an insurance policy. As one of the FSLN’s last remaining founders, Tomas Borge, suggested recently, the party should never give up power, even if voted out.

On a deeper level, should Ortega wish to transform Nicaragua fundamentally through the application of Venezuelan-inspired 21^st Century Socialism, he would require a controllable majority in Congress. Others suggest he may wish to change the constitution to permit unlimited consecutive re-election, thus setting himself up as president for life. To do either of these things he would need to control well over 50% of congressional seats.

The formal results of the November 2011 elections suggest that Ortega has achieved his goals. With 64% of the vote, he can claim personal legitimacy and a mandate for change. The FSLN has also achieved a comfortable majority in Congress. While the opposition has protested and demonstrated in the streets, it is unlikely that such action can be sustained over more than a few months. With control over the political apparatus, the armed forces, police, judiciary and electoral branches, Ortega has the power to implement sweeping political change, and five years to do it.

It remains to be seen, however, whether any changes that Ortega may make will be superficial or deep. Ortega, himself, appears less of an ideologue and more of an authoritarian figure cloaked in socialist rhetoric. We would suggest that the process of consolidating total power over Nicaraguan political space, economy and institutions will continue. We would not rule out a move to enshrine indefinite consecutive election to the presidency. Further restrictions on freedom of expression or assembly are quite likely, particularly when elections approach – Ortega will not forget 1990, when the opposition – both left and right – rallied behind Violeta Chamorro and ousted him from power. He will not let this happen again. We predict a tough five years ahead for Nicaragua and its people.

If Ortega wishes to continue to receive Venezuelan largesse for his social programs – and perhaps personal enrichment – he will at least have to continue to mouth the language of 21^st Century Socialism. We expect Ortega to continue to support Venezuela’s contentious positions in international fora, especially the OAS. Strong doses of anti-American and pro-Iranian rhetoric can be expected in lock step with other members of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA). Any implementation of 21^st Century Socialism (which appears to be little more than 20^th Century Communism) by Ortega is likely to be reluctant, slow and piecemeal, but he will mouth the jargon. Ortega’s attempts to introduce socialism/communism in the 1980s met with failure. Even with Venezuelan money, a fundamental restructuring of the Nicaraguan economy and society on such ideological lines is also likely to be meet fierce opposition and eventually failure. While communism may have been seen as a viable option to capitalism in some circles in the 1980s, its failures as a system are by now well documented, and there is little to suggest that Nicaragua could make a success of it where all others have failed.

Security in a Post-Chavez Venezuela

2011-10-01T18:27:00.000-04:00

The announcement that Venezuela’s president is suffering from cancer raises the question of what lies ahead for the country, which under Chavez's leadership has been increasingly beset by organized crime.

President Hugo Chavez's sudden return to his country after several weeks in Cuba has raised the spirits of his supporters. But with the news that the leader is seriously ill, even his most devoted fans are looking forwards to what could happen with Chavez off the political scene, which suddenly seems a real possibility.

Crime under Chavez has grown exponentially, with Venezuela now the principal transit nation for Colombian cocaine heading for Europe. The official murder rate stands at 47 per 100,000 people, making Venezuela one of the most dangerous places in the world, well above its war-wracked neighbor Colombia. Kidnapping has soared, with some estimating that abductions rose 60 percent in 2010, up to a total of 1,179 last year.

These high rates of violence are linked to the growth of organized crime, which is firmly rooted in the country's institutions.

A dramatic illustration of the level of this penetration of organized crime was given by the recent disturbances in the Rodeo II prison, close to Caracas. Heavily armed prisoners have been holding off the security forces since June 18, under the command of criminal bosses who reportedly control everything that goes on inside the prison. Two of the institution's governors have been arrested on suspicion of allowing the trafficking of arms into the institution.

The police fare little better than the penal system. In 2009, the government itself said that the police were behind some 20 percent of all crime in Venezuela, including murder and kidnapping.

The military has long faced charges that many of its elements are connected to organized criminal groups, and even run drug trafficking operations themselves. Drug trafficker Walid Makled, recently extradited to Venezuela by Colombia, claims to have paid off members of the Venezuelan Congress, high ranking military commanders, and to have given money to Chavez’s party. He even claimed that government forces had guarded drug facilities for him.

The chance of any major changes in the near future are small. No figure from the Chavez-dominated ruling PSUV party stands out as having the backing, or independence, to take over from the charismatic leader. Vice President Elias Jaua did not take over in his absence, as the constitution sets out. Chavez has not groomed anyone for the succession, though one possible contender could be his brother Adan Chavez, who governs the state of Barinas. Rule by this second Chavez is unlikely to herald a move towards strengthening the rule of law; in the midst of concerns about the president’s health, Adan told supporters that they should not rule out armed struggle as a means to retain power. Meanwhile the rather weak opposition has not produced any single candidate who stands out as a powerful successor. A report by the Associated Press says that the opposition is only held together by animosity towards Chavez, and that his removal could cause its fragile coalition to fragment, as its different elements could be encouraged to strike out on their own.

It’s unclear how much even the most reform-minded successor could change things. The rot in Venezuela's institutions goes deep, and much corruption and abuse existed before Chavez even came to power. As for the economy, and the poverty rates that also contribute to the power of organized criminal groups, there are deeper structural issues that will prevent any swift turnaround. As a recent Reuters report pointed out, the predominance of oil in Venezuela encourages state control of the economy, and means that governments with poor economic policies can be propped up by high oil prices.

However, it is clear that there are many Venezuelans who want change. A poll by Datanalisis, carried out in May 2011, found that Chavez’s popularity had fallen to 47 percent, down from 71 percent in 2006. The head of the polling firm said that this drop was due to the president’s “inability to resolve the everyday problems of Venezuelans,” such as inflation, unemployment, and insecurity. The last of these may turn out to be a crucial factor in draining support away from the Bolivarian revolution, whether or not the president makes a full recovery from his illness.

Post written by Hanna Stone originally posted on Insight Crime. To read original post click here.

Peru: More of the Same?

2011-09-01T09:00:00.000-04:00

Earlier this year, Peruvians elected Ollanta Humalá Tasso as their President. Humalá is a former army officer who led a short-lived revolt against then-President Alberto Fujimori in 2000. While unsuccessful, his actions may have contributed to Fujimori’s downfall.

Radical Nationalism?

Humala ran for president in 2006 on a socialist, nationalist platform. His campaign was branded as ethno-nationalist, largely because his father and several other relatives espoused an extremist pro-indigenous, ethno-nationalist line. While he disavowed the extreme position, traditional elites considered him a threat to the established order. He achieved a plurality on the first round of balloting, but failed to win 50% of the vote. The right and centre rallied behind Alan García, as the “least bad” option, and Humalá was narrowly defeated on the second ballot. Strong backing by Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, including character assassination of Alan García, may well have helped turn Peruvian voters against Humalá. There were also fears that Humalá would bring Peru into Hugo Chavez’s leftist, anti-American, anti-capitalist Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA).While Humalá dropped off the political radar for several years, the ‘ethno-nationalist” label has stuck with him

In 2011, he again ran for president, this time on a moderate socialist platform aimed at increasing the state’s role in the economy and in the distribution of wealth. He suggested, early on in the campaign, that he liked the Brazilian model for social programs, and that he intended to retain Peru’s existing economic and trade policies. In the 2011 elections, the centre cancelled itself out by fielding three candidates, and no majority was achieved on the first round. The second round saw Keiko Fujimori (seen as the reactionary right), pitted against Humala (seen as the radical left). Humala won a narrow victory with 51.5% of the popular vote. Thankfully Chávez did not provide any “help” during these elections, and Humalá was able to distance himself somewhat from his radical relatives. After the elections, Humala moved quickly to assure elites and investors that there would be no major policy swings. His cabinet is considered moderate left and centrist and he has put together a liberal economic team. It is likely that he will stick with the current economic model, with a modest increase in social spending. If the Brazilian model remains his option of choice, Peru will seek closer ties with the moderate left in South America, including Brazil, Chile and possibly Colombia.

Poor Presidential Performances

Since Alberto Fujimori (Japanese-Peruvian: 1990-2000), Peruvians have elected a Quechua (Alejandro Toledo: 2001-2006), returned to the traditional elite (Alan García: 2006-2011), and once again chosen an indigenous president (Ollanta Humala: 2011-2016). While Fujimori retained considerable popularity until 2000, his successors enjoyed little public support, with Toledo finishing with a less than 10% approval rating, and García with less than 20%. Under the regimes of all of the last three presidents, economic growth was strong – over the past 5 years, GNP growth has averaged 7.2%/annum and poverty levels have dropped from 45% to 31%. Notwithstanding these achievements, Presidents – whether from traditional elites, the indigenous or Sino-Peruvian communities - have not been able to cement a strong public following, and the populace at large remains disillusioned with its politicians.

In terms of policy, García was criticized – perhaps unfairly - for emphasizing infrastructure projects and neglecting social programs. If Humalá retains the policy direction of his predecessors, he is likely to experience the same precipitous decline in popularity. Expectations on the part of the poor and marginalized are likely too high and will be disappointed. The belief that “trickle down” does not work is likely to be heightened. Humala has promised to raise the minimum wage substantially, but with almost 70% of the work force in the informal economy, such a measure is likely to have little impact on the welfare of ordinary citizens or on his popularity.

Is Peru Governable?

Humala must increase his tax base and improve delivery mechanisms if he really wishes to address issues of poverty and social exclusion. He has suggested that taxes will be raised on new mining concessions and that he will allow the export of natural gas, both of which may increase government revenues but are unlikely to be of sufficient magnitude to make a significant impact on poverty. Furthermore, traditional elites, which remain powerful in congress, are unlikely to support the diversion of scarce government revenues to social programs, and their somewhat shaky support for Humalá will further fall off should he insist on greater social spending. In any event, they will not support initiatives that could strengthen Humala’s position with the poor. Peruvian politics leave little room for manoeuvre for presidents – the elites will turn on them if they attempt to reform the system.

Past efforts to decentralize governmental responsibilities and services to the departments largely faltered, leaving confusion. In addition, Peru lacks a professional civil service at the central and local levels with the skills, experience, and tools necessary to implement development projects in the interior, or to supervise implementation by the private sector. In many parts of rural Peru, the state remains largely absent. Without better human infrastructure, sustainable development in the interior is doubtful.

As in the past, development will be effected largely by “trickle down”, supplemented largely by ad hoc efforts of non-governmental and private groups. We thus expect continuing low-level social unrest, disillusionment with government, and perhaps a less attractive investment climate in the countryside as more emphasis is placed on taxes, environmental and social impact issues.

Nonetheless, we expect Peru to maintain healthy GDP growth, primarily due to a largely unfettered private sector and a robust mining/energy sector, as long as mineral and petroleum/natural gas prices remain strong. There will be slow but steady progress on poverty alleviation over the next 5 years, but Humala – unless he adopts a Fujimori-like policy of regular, well-publicized visits into the interior where his is able to offer tangible help and assure the poor that he has their interests at heart – is likely not to retain strong public support, and a second term is clearly in doubt.

Analysis - Policy-making Gets Harder In Wake Of Global Credit

2011-08-01T12:00:00.012-04:00

(Peter Apps, Reuters) - Greece's latest austerity steps have squeaked through parliament, avoiding an imminent default. Politicians in Washington may manage a similar last-minute trick later this year to raise the U.S. sovereign debt ceiling, allowing the United States to continue borrowing.

But almost wherever you look in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, widening domestic and international faultlines -- including those between political elites and the people they rule -- are making economic policy-making a more anguished process.

For now, despite periodic scares such as this week's votes in the Greek parliament, outright paralysis has been avoided. But in the euro zone at least, some believe it is only a matter of time before short-term solutions assembled by governments fail, ushering in a potentially chaotic sovereign default.

"We believe that Greece is a tragedy in four rather than two acts," said Stuart Thomson, chief economist at Ignis Asset Management, reflecting wider market worries.

"We don't believe that it will default in the near term, but over the medium term it is a virtual certainty...it is increasingly difficult to kick the can down the road because the can is becoming heavier."

Having nationalised a large part of the Western world's banking debt during the global credit crisis, governments are now struggling to solve sovereign debt crises -- potentially dragging on rising economies such as China which now own much of that debt and face their own worries over growth and inflation.

Both within countries and globally, that means a clash of powerful competing interests. Demographic trends in many countries may be starting to make these clashes fiercer; not only Europe but also China face heavy pressure on welfare and pensions systems in coming years from ageing populations.

So far governments have managed to take emergency steps to contain the crises, and make limited fiscal and economic reforms, despite protests from large sections of their populations. But almost everywhere, strains are showing.

"Once debt economics takes over, politics becomes a stalemate at best...and there is little anyone can do to take initiatives," says Vanessa Rossi, senior economics fellow at London think tank Chatham House.

"You can get a moribund political system unable to move forward -- see Italy for many years. These problems highlight why it's critical to address an escalating debt problem early and sufficiently to see progress before fatigue sets in."

GROWING FAULTLINES

In many countries, the global crisis has worsened divisions papered over during decades of boom. Disagreements between Athens and Berlin over fiscal discipline could be finessed when Greece joined the euro zone in a relatively healthy economic and market environment in 2001, but no longer.

As states that have seen rising living standards for generations try to reform, governments face pushback from unions, electorates and companies all keen to protect their interests.

Some believe Europe's tipping point will come when Greek politicians find themselves unable to keep pushing through reforms in the face of rising popular anger. But others say richer countries such as the United States and Germany, which are under less obvious and immediate economic pressure, may be the first to find policy-making on critical issues impossible.

In countries such as Greece, Ireland and Spain, despite howls of protest policymakers may be able to win the argument that financial markets and more powerful countries leave them no choice. That argument is less likely to wash in larger countries.

"I would mostly concentrate on the countries with the room to manoeuvre," said Marko Papic, analyst at U.S.-based political risk consultancy Stratfor. "These are the countries where people have the luxury to be populist."

That could include the United States, he said, where right- wing Republican lawmakers with links to the Tea Party were "playing with fire" by threatening to block attempts to lift the U.S. debt ceiling -- even though the failure to do so could trigger a technical default.

DECLINE OF THE NATION STATE?

"From Cairo to Athens, the word on the street is an anti-establishment refrain," says Citi chief political analyst Tina Fordham. "We will see an acceleration of the existing trend of political polarisation."

That could include heightened anti-immigrant feeling, euroscepticism, protectionism, ever-deeper divisions between deficit hawks and doves, and support for fringe political parties that could help to shape debates even if they never take power.

"There is a big story here," said Alastair Newton, a former senior British official who is now chief political analyst for Japanese bank Nomura.

"With the end of the Cold War, the consequent rapid surge in globalisation and the more or less simultaneous rise of the Internet have created a much more active civil society disrespectful of the political classes. Even in China."

Traditional government systems find themselves competing for influence with largely unregulated financial markets, multinational firms and other forces such as Cairo's street demonstrators and cross-border computer hackers. In some cases, governments are struggling.

"The nation state is leaking power, and it has been for some time," says Jeremy Greenstock, Britain's former ambassador to the United Nations. "That's a problem, because it is the basic unit of which our international system is made up, and other institutions -- the EU, UN, everything else -- draw their legitimacy from nation states."

There have been some unprecedented and partially successful efforts in the past few years to strengthen international economic cooperation. These include giving the International Monetary Fund a bigger role in monitoring global economic imbalances, and the euro zone's creation of a massive rescue fund to bail out Greece and other indebted countries.

But Greenstock thinks the weaker nation states mean the world will find it hard to meet challenges from climate change to financial crises to cyber security -- and it may take another, as yet unforeseen global shock or conflict to change that.

"If it was to continue indefinitely, you would have collapse and chaos," he said. "But it won't. The pendulum will swing back. But I worry we will need a scare to make that happen."

"A special thanks to Peter Apps, Political Correspondent for Thomson Reuters for collaborating this piece for our monthly publication. Please visit his blog Peter Apps | Reuters to read other of his fine publications."

Branchless Banking: Tapping In To The Mass Market

2011-08-01T12:00:00.006-04:00

Branchless banking offers considerable potential for the financial industry, especially among the unbanked or underbanked. Most of the world's population is considered to be underbanked. In developing countries, banks often cater to the affluent, however, there is much to gain by targeting the low-income population. Brazil and Kenya serve as good models with positive results in reaching the poorer segment of the population. A major advantage in this market is high mobile phone penetration, far exceeding internet access. The developing world accounts for 59% of global mobile users according to the Washington Post in 2010. Branchless banking can be promoted as an affordable option beyond medium-term saving and paying bills, outweighing costs incurred through informal options. Promoting a profitable return on investment produces confidence in the system and will attract more customers. Successful implementation can contribute to developing a banking culture among those who have never banked before. Affordability can encourage access to new opportunities, such as schooling, creating a new client base from future generations or enjoying stronger financial standing. The challenge is to develop new and innovative products which meet the particular needs of potential client groups.

Branchless banking is gaining credence as a profitable option for increasing the financial inclusion of the low-income mass market in emerging economies. Brazilian and Kenyan banks decade-long projects through mobile providers show continued growth among low-income and unbanked customers. This initiative observed a major spike in banking and mobile partnerships between 2009 and 2010, by granting customers quick and immediate access to their accounts through their mobile network and promoting sustained loyalty. The CGAP 2007 report indicates that 75 percent of Brazilians use branchless banking agents, compared to 43 percent who have a bank account. There is great potential to reach a large number of low-income and unbanked customers through affordable services, in comparison to traditional banking. Nokia and Paypal came together to forward a mobile payment platform for all users regardless of their bank.

One of the major benefits observed is its cost-effective performance in contrast to traditional banking. Costs for maintaining infrastructure, security staff and teller personnel are reduced. Low-income and unbanked clientele utilizing this mobile system have benefited from low transaction fees which are proportionate to the amounts they handle, as opposed to a standard fee at a branch. Their activities include bill payments, purchasing airtime or withdrawing government benefits. Branchless customers pay higher fees when deposits are of substantial value, which is not an obstacle for the mass market. Usage of branchless banking has increased the role of banking institutions, growing as fast as MFIs in some instances. Through mobile wallets, the need to visit a branch for basic banking is no longer necessary, saving low income customers a pricey trip just to get to a branch. In some countries there is room to decrease branchless fees as competition increases in the market.

Branchless banking has been successful in active environments studied by CGAP, yet there are challenges to increasing its penetration in existing and future markets. The branchless banking system must develop products based on specific economic and social needs in order to attract the low-income unbanked. Some banks extend a variety of products such as short and medium term investments and pensions. They need to foster relationships with the public sector and market research companies to design further innovative initiatives, probing their consumers and observing their trends to continue leveraging the untapped potential of this mass market. Research suggests that many low-income individuals have easier access to informal options, a costly process with high risks of losing money on transactions. A significant proportion of this target population wishes to earn interest on their savings. In Kenya, 75 percent of clients say they store funds in their M-PESA wallet, and 21 percent say this is their most important resource for savings. An additional 90 percent of users indicate that this is one of the most important benefits. A safe rate of return on investment is a common concern among many of the unbanked and underbanked population. Branchless banking must address these concerns and maintain strong partnerships with mobile providers in order to expand its reach.

Chile: Game Over for Concertación?

2011-07-01T12:00:00.000-04:00

The Birth of Concertación

Chilean politics have been dominated by “Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia” since the late 1980s. This political alliance, originally composed of 17 political parties from the centre and legitimate left – referred to as “Concertación”, came together in 1988 with the objective of manoeuvring the Pinochet dictatorship into holding free and fair elections. It skilfully reduced Pinochet’s political space and forced elections in 1989. Its candidate, Patricio Aylwin Azocar, won handily with 55% of the popular vote, and Concertación dominated Chilean politics for the next 20 years. Based on the raison d’être that Pinochet could never be allowed to return to politics, Concertación was able to bridge – perhaps only temporarily – the traditional three-way split in Chilean politics (well-defined and entrenched one/third right, one/third centre, and one/third leftist) that had led to political instability. It became Chile’s bulwark against the possible return to military dicatorship.

Erosion of a Coalition

Over the next few years the far left splinter parties left the alliance and by the early1990s the 17 original parties were reduced to four, with the centrist Christian Democrats and leftist Socialist Party dominating the coalition. The defection of the far left is attributed to what was seen as a betrayal of leftist ideals and principles by what militants believed had become a centrist government. Never particularly willing to cooperate even with the Socialist Party, the far left went its own way, taking much of the militant left with it. Although marginal to Concertación’s electoral strength, the psychological effect of these defections was significant.

The Remaining Four:

Christian Democratic Party (PDC)

Socialist Party (PS)

Party for Democracy (PPD)

Social Democratic Radical Party (PRSD)

Concertación was able to play the Pinochet card effectively for a number of years (i.e: the democratic centre and left must remain united so that Pinochet can never return to power). Several unsuccessful attempts were made in the early 2000s to bring him to justice for human rights abuses. He was stripped of his parliamentary immunities in 2004, however, and charges laid in 2006. He died before proceedings could begin, and with his death this key rationale for maintaining Concertación fell by the wayside.

In addition, the continuing strains of trying to maintain the cohesion of well-defined political parties of the centre and left, with clear, distinct and inflexible ideologies against the need for a platform that could appeal to a wide political spectrum, became exceedingly difficult. What did help was the fact that the coalition could continue to win elections, although the margins of victory were often thin.

President/Party	Years in Office	Popular Support
Patricio Aylwin Azocar/PDC	1990-1994	55%	Considered transitional President
Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle/PDC	1994-2000	58%
Ricardo Lagos Escobar/PS	2000-2006	51%	Runoff election
Michelle Bachelet Jena/PS	2006-2010	54%
Sabastien Piñera Echeñique/Alliance for Chile	2010	51.6%	Runoff election

A Battered Coalition

The 2009 elections saw the rightist coalition “Alliance for Chile” win a narrow victory in a runoff election. The new president, Sabastien Piñera, hailed from “Renovación Nacional” a moderate right wing party. His narrow win suggested that Chileans from the centre no longer hold the fear that the election of a rightist regime could lead to a return to military rule. In fact, during the Bachelet presidency, Piñera often pushed for enhanced social programs where the socialist president resisted. Concertación was also criticized in 2009 for choosing Eduardo Frei as its presidential candidate. The full coalition did not rally behind him, he was considered too conservative by the left, and he led a lacklustre campaign. Some analysts suggested that Concertación had lost touch with its base.

There appears to have been an informal agreement that the PDC and PS would alternate presidential candidacies. After the Lagos presidency, it was expected that the gifted and charismatic Solidad Alvear of the PDC would be anointed at the coalition’s primary, thus ensuring the alternation of power between the two parties. The PS may well have used Bachelet’s sudden surge in popularity to scupper Alvear’s candidacy. Two PS presidents in a row could well have reduced the ardour of PDC supporters for the coalition. In any event, the primary process appears to have created more friction than harmony.

The End of a Coalition?

Some have suggested that a new generation of leaders in needed to revitalize Concertación. This new wave of leaders does not appear to be emerging. In order to retain their base support, it is more likely that parties will accentuate their differences, since the moderate right has eroded the right-wing in the PDC and the Community Party to left wing of the PS. We would suggest that unless Concertación can win back the presidency in 2017, it will likely be relegated to the dust bin of history. Since Piñera has been managing well, remains popular, and the fear of the right has diminished, this will be a tall order. On the other hand should the coalition disband, neither the PDC nor the PS stand much chance of beating the combined right.

There is some suggestion that Michelle Bachelet might be willing to try for another term as president. Although she represents an older generation and is not seen as a “team player” with the PDC, she retains high approval ratings. Currently she appears to be the best gambit for extending the life of Concertación, and pragmatic politicians within the coalition will likely jump on the bandwagon. Nonetheless, this is likely just delaying the inevitable, and Chile will eventually fall back into a political system that reflects the pre-1976 one/third right, one/third centre, one/third left political orientation of the electorate. This means a return to three main parties/coalitions in competition for power, with the incumbent instabilities inherent in such a system.

The difference from the early 1970s, however, is that political platforms and positions are likely to be somewhat less rigid, and attempts by parties to reach a wider potential political base will mitigate against extremism. In addition, the right has become more comfortable with Concertación. In 1989, with Concertación’s first electoral victory, many in the right believed that although Aylwin was a well-meaning and moderate politician, the “communists” (i.e: anyone left of centre) would quickly dominate, undermine and manipulate his administration, and the economic reforms instituted by Pinochet would be eroded or eliminated. Should that have happened, there is the distinct possibility that the military would have intervened in politics again. Aylwin and his successors took great pains, however, to maintain the economic model – as Aylwin’s pragmatic finance minister Alejandro Foxley stated to the author: “We will keep to this economic model because it works”. Even under socialist presidents, the economic model has not been eroded, although there has been more emphasis on social programs and justice. We thus expect the relationship between the major political parties to be much more cooperative, and much less suspicious than it was before the Pinochet period.

Mexico: Winning the War on Drugs?

2011-06-01T12:00:00.015-04:00

Declaration of War

In December 2006, newly inaugurated president Felipe Calderón launched a major campaign to curb the power of Mexico’s drug cartels. In particular, he deployed the Mexican armed forces to the north and reinforced the federal police presence along the Mexico-USA border. After five years of sustained effort the record in mixed: Despite some success in arresting cartel members and disrupting their activities, Mexican and US efforts ultimately have failed to defeat the cartels or stem the flow of drugs into the USA.

Public Support in Wavering

The Mexican public is tired of violence with little perceived result. It has focussed on the death toll, now at over 37,000 drug-related killings since Calderón assumed power. The vast majority of these deaths are the result of inter-cartel and intra-cartel violence and struggles for power. Only a small percentage of the casualties are police, military, local government officials or innocent bystanders. In fact drug-related killings constitute less than half of Mexico’s homicides (Mexico’s homicide rate remains low by Latin American standards: approximately 10 per 100,000 inhabitants vs over 85 per 100,000 in Venezuela). Recent polls indicate that Mexicans see street crime/public insecurity as the major issue confronting the country, and 80% believe that the situation worsened over the preceding 12 months. Since common crime has not increased measurably, those citizens polled appear to link rising drug deaths with the overall very serious problem of public insecurity rather than treating them as separate issues.

In 2006, the public largely supported Calderón’s offensive against the cartels, partly due to an increase in domestic drug use (some value the Mexican market for illicit drugs at well over US$1.6 billion). By November 2010, more than 50% of those polled stated that they believed the war on drugs had failed. It is not clear, however, whether the public favours any alternative strategy.

Public Institutions Not Up To The Challenge

Calderón may have jumped the gun in 2006. The police, judiciary and prisons were not equipped to undertake this battle. Although new resources have been applied in these fields, reform has been painfully slow and institutions will not be up to the task for many years – certainly not before Caderón leaves office in 2012. Ideally, he should have reformed and strengthened public institutions before embarking on this effort, but he likely did not feel he had the luxury of time.

Mexico’s armed forces have played a key role in Calderón’s campaign, but the working relationship between the police and military has been poor. Military leaders also fear that their personnel will be tainted by drug money should they be involved in the campaign for extended periods. There is broad public support for the use of force to combat the cartels, and while public confidence in the military remains high, the same cannot be said for the police, judiciary, elected officials and political parties – also key players in the anti-drug program, and where corruption is rife.

Calderón has increasingly made the point that Mexico will not defeat the cartels until the USA does something major to decease its consumption rates. We agree that while there is demand there will be supply. Mexico also complains that the flow of illicit firearms from the USA exacerbates their problem – and indeed that police are often outgunned by the cartels. We see little evidence, however, that the USA is prepared to take major steps to address either of these key issues.

Will Government Stay the Course?

We believe Calderón will actively pursue the struggle against the cartels to the end of his term in office. While some progress will be made over the next year towards curbing the cartels, he will not be able to point to any turning point or major victory. In addition, his approval rating has been slowly declining - from 63% when he took office to 49% in March 2011. His National Action Party (PAN) has fallen behind its leading opposition, the Party of the Institutional Revolution (PRI), in the polls, and we are now approaching the lame duck period leading up to the 1 July 2012 federal elections. Calderón has little political space to do more, and the unclear results of his program thus far will be unhelpful to his party’s prospects in the 2012 election..

Should Calderón’s PAN retain power, in all likelihood the current anti-cartel campaign will be sustained. At this point, however, it appears unlikely that the PAN will win the presidency in 2011 – although that could change should the PAN field a strong and charismatic presidential candidate. More likely, the PRI will regain the presidency. If that should happen – and especially should the party old guard emerge the victor - a new government may give lip service to an anti-cartel program, but is likely to decrease such efforts in the expectation that the cartels would limit their violence to their own kind. We would expect a return to the live-and-let-live approach of PRI governments prior to 2000. While the USA will not be pleased with a dilution of Mexico’s anti-drug effort, the PRI has used vitriolic anti-American rhetoric to its domestic political advantage in the past, and is likely to attempt to do so again. Also, if the PRI can separate drug violence from normal street crime in the public perception, public pressures – already weakening – to tackle the cartels may further decrease.

Drifting Towards a Narco-State?

In Latin American terms, Mexico has strong public institutions, major budgetary resources, solid infrastructure, a reasonably professional military, a strong and active media, sophisticated political class, and no active insurgencies. There is little or no evidence that the cartels have effectively infiltrated the upper levels of government, and in those cases where there has been evidence of such wrongdoing, action has been taken.

The cartels, like taxmen, are likely to be with us always, and some parts of Mexico’s interior and its frontier with the USA will remain lawless, regardless of which party gains power in 2012. Mexico is most unlikely to decline to the point that the viability of the state is at risk, or that the legitimacy of the central government is threatened. We don’t expect that the cartels will increase their power and reach, but will remain a powerful force in the Mexican security equation.