The list was compiled based on a set of qualitative criteria, which included:

• ·        innovation, understood as creativity in programming
• ·        effectiveness, measured by NGOs’ delivery against objectives
• ·        impact, looking at the NGOs’ outcomes rather than outputs and whether activities are donor-driven or needs-based
• ·        efficiency and value for money, evaluating administrative overheads and coordination in order to avoid duplications
• ·        transparency and accountability, assessing organisations’ levels of reporting and participatory planning
• ·        sustainability, defined as enduring impact and relevance
• ·        strategic and financial management, meaning consistency of funding and the use of a self-evaluation process
• ·        peer review, measured by NGO and donor perception of sector leaders.

 Despite the use of these metrics the ranking does not appear to be based on empirical evidence; “there is no science in the measuring” when it comes to selecting the best 100 NGOs, The Global Journal admits in its methodological note. Furthermore, the spectrum of organisations included in the list is quite wide. For the purpose of its study, The Global Journal defines NGOs as “operational or advocacy focused non-profit organisations organised on a local, national or international level”.  With such a broad definition – ranging from long-established organisations with clearly defined political or developmental agendas, to young information-sharing initiatives springing from universities and technological centres – it is no surprise that the reader is presented with a rather eclectic list of organisations.

 Methodological issues aside, what is particularly appealing about The Global Journal’s Top 100 Best NGOs list, is the high presence of non-Western NGOs. Within the top 10 ranking, there are already two developing country-based organisations: Bangladeshi BRAC in fourth place and Kenya-born Ushahidi in tenth.

 However, it is interesting to note that, from a geographical perspective, over half of the 100 best NGOs are based in only two countries: 37 come from the United States and 14 from the United Kingdom. Emerging countries, such as India and Brazil, contribute just over a tenth of the top non-profit organisations in the ranking while developing countries host 15 of the best NGOs.

As one of the founders and first co-chairs of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative, Canada has a proven commitment to humanitarian action and remains a dedicated humanitarian donor. With the level of humanitarian needs continuing to grow, it is clear that we – both as a donor and as a member of the international humanitarian community – must rise to the challenge of finding ways to best meet those needs.  As the country profiles track disbursements over time, they give us cause to reflect on what role we have played in the humanitarian system, which trends have emerged, and how best to move forward.

An integral component of effective response is working to continually build the evidence base to enable better, more informed policy and programming decisions. Taken as a whole, GHA’s country profiles present not only a comprehensive overview of the state of humanitarian financing, but also, and perhaps more importantly, they provide a window into where funding has fallen short, and where increased efforts are needed. In contributing to this evidence base, the country profiles serve to foster a more robust dialogue on and analysis of humanitarian assistance, through offering insight into some of the ways that different country actors engage in humanitarian action.

In order to include opinions of humanitarian aid actors and aid recipients, four different surveys are being conducted, targeted at international aid practitioners, national and regional organisations, host government representatives, and recipients of aid. If you or colleagues would like to take part in one of these important surveys, please visit the ALNAP website for more details.

In this context, clarity around humanitarian financing is crucial. If we are to have a chance of ensuring the most effective response possible to such crises, and if humanitarian financing is to be appropriately allocated to bring about the best possible results for crisis-affected people, not to mention an improved financial focus in the area of preparedness, we need comprehensive and accessible information.

The GHA country profiles provide such information, showing us how much humanitarian donors and recipients are giving and receiving, where the money is going, which financing mechanisms and channels of delivery are employed, while situated in the context of other resources, as well as examining how much countries contribute to disaster risk reduction (an area which receives greater attention this time than it did in the last iteration). A country profile for France has also been added.

In addition to the newer data, content has been streamlined, changes have been made to graph presentation and improvements made to functionality and design. The profiles remain accessible and interactive, easily navigable and include downloadable data and graphs. These updates come ten months after the profiles were initially launched, and will be updated again in the spring.

We invite you to share these will colleagues and contacts and would welcome any feedback you may have. You can contact the GHA team at gha@devinit.org

Photo courtesy of Flickr.com/401K

At the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)’s sixth high-level conference on 15 December in New York, donors pledged a record high for 2012, reaffirming their support for the global humanitarian pooled fund.  So far a total of 47 donors have promised US$375 million for 2012, an increase of 4.7% from last year when 59 donors pledged US$358 million.

Paid contributions in 2011 reached an all-time high since the inception of the fund in 2006, with 75 donors having given US$448 million to date, US$90 million more than the total pledged at last year’s high-level conference. All but one of the top ten donors have contributed a larger sum than was originally pledged. This could be partially attributed to exchange rate fluctuations which are applied on the day of the donor transaction; however it is likely that the increased contributions are primarily in response to the on-going crisis in the Horn of Africa. The United Kingdom, for example, contributed an additional £20 million in June, the equivalent of US$32.3million.

With this pattern in mind, we might expect to see a similar increase on this year’s pledges, next year, which would again represent record levels.

Yet continued economic instability and the eurozone debt crisis could cause some major donors to make more modest contributions. Evidence of this can already been seen with Italy pledging 50% less than their 2011 contribution and Greece and Spain yet to pledge.

We will continue to monitor contributions. For more information on the CERF please refer to this detailed profile.

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
CAP requirements at launch (US$ billion)	1.7	4.7	3.9	3.8	7.0	7.1	7.4	7.7
CAP beneficiaries (million)	26	31	27	25	30	48	50	51
US$ per beneficiary	65	152	144	152	233	147	148	152
Number of CAP appeals at launch	17	14	13	10	12	12	14	16

Table 1: Comparative analysis of UN CAP appeals at launch. [Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS and UN OCHA Humanitarian Appeal data]

However, the new Humanitarian Appeal seeks to mobilise US$93 million less than did the mid-year review (MYR) of the 2011 CAP, which represents a 1% decline. Yet, any direct comparison between global CAP requirements at the time of launch – which takes place on the last day of November each year – and at its mid-year review point – which occurs each July – can be misleading. This is due to the fact that new consolidated appeals are added after the annual CAP is issued and flash appeals are launched in response to sudden onset emergencies that could not be foreseen in the annual CAP. Therefore a detailed analysis of individual appeals is essential in order to assess the actual variations taking place.

Table 2: Comparative analysis of 2011 and 2012 UN CAP requirements. All figures are in US$ million. [Source: Development Indicatives based on UN OCHA Humanitarian Appeal data]

Somalia is the country experiencing the single most dramatic escalation of requirements for 2012 with a staggering increase of over 500%, in the course of a single year, up to US$1.5bn, driven by the severe drought crisis in the Horn of Africa. Requirements by beneficiary also soared to US$380 per person, a 93% increase from 2011. Yet, even with recent improvements in the security situation and better humanitarian access, it remains doubtful that such a vast volume of funding can be successfully implemented in one of the most unstable and volatile countries in word.

Figure 1: Somalia consolidated appeals’ total requirements and requirements per beneficiary for 2011 and 2012. [Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA Humanitarian Appeal data]

Requirements for Kenya and Djibouti – the other two CAP countries most severely affected by the Horn of Africa crisis – also feature predominantly in the Humanitarian Appeal for 2012. Kenya’s is the third largest consolidated appeal for 2012 with a 26% increase in needs compared to six months ago and a 45% rise from the 2011 CAP levels. Funding sought for drought-affected Djibouti more than doubled, with requirements per beneficiary also rising by some 18%. 

In its first year, The Republic of South Sudan has taken place in the UN CAP for the second time. The country’s first consolidated appeal was launched at the time of the 2011 CAP MYR last July and represented the separation of humanitarian plans and the associated financial requirements for South Sudan from those of Sudan. In 2012, both Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan see their requirements per beneficiaries grow well beyond 100% when compared the previous year, despite a more moderate increase in net appeal requirements: collectively needs increased from US$1.7bn in 2011 to US$1.8bn for 2012. Looking at each country, the Republic of South Sudan sees the funding sought increase by a quarter while Sudan’s requirements decline marginally by 4%.

Figure 2: Sudan 2011 CAP and consecutive separated South Sudan and Sudan consolidated appeal requirements. [Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA Humanitarian Appeal data]

Many traditional consolidated appeals begin 2012 with declining funding requirements: Afghanistan, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad and the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) all see their funding diminished. In the case of Afghanistan and CAR, this is happening despite an increase in the number of beneficiaries (32% and 18% respectively), while Chad sees those considerably reduced. Such apparent contradiction reinforces the perception that there is little connection between the identification of humanitarian needs and the level of funding requirements in the Humanitarian Appeal.

Figure 3: CAP requirements for Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Chad and occupied Palestinian territory (2011-2012). [Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA Humanitarian Appeal data]

The CAP 2012 document states that “coordinated needs assessments are more systemically practised, and this is likely to be fine-tuning the identification of people in need and of the scope of their needs. Also, information management innovations are likely playing a part in reducing funding requests (…)”. Nevertheless, this is at best a tenuous explanation of the widely varying scenarios presented by the 2012 Humanitarian Appeal: while Afghanistan is experiencing drought and intensified conflict, leading to an increase in the number of vulnerable people, its funding requirements are being slashed by a quarter; on the other hand, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has lost 31% of its beneficiaries and yet funding requirements remain unchanged from those of the previous year.

With regards to the countries included in the 2012 Humanitarian Appeal, they are few highlights, apart from the disappearance of the West Africa regional appeal which has been part of the CAP for the past 11 years. The West Africa appeal used to encompass some 15 countries, many of which experience small-scale but persistent humanitarian crisis and high vulnerability. Traditionally it has been a rather small appeal, with average requirements comprising only 4.4% of the CAP. However, if the level of funding requested has usually been low, so has been the response too: the West Africa appeal received on average just 4.1% of all CAP funding and was the worst funded consolidated appeal in 2011.

Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and Niger frequently participate in the CAP process with individual appeals as these countries face larger-scale emergencies that demand targeted response. Indeed, Niger and Côte d’Ivoire are part of the 2012 Humanitarian Appeal and Liberia is expected to come on board by the beginning of 2012. However, at least another five countries in the region – Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Guinea and Burkina Faso – are currently experiencing cholera outbreaks. Leaving them outside of the CAP is not likely to raise donor awareness of their needs, nor help to provide adequate assistance to affected populations.

In the Philippines, the population of Mindanao continues to face the triple effects of insecurity, natural hazards and poverty. During 2011 heavy rains and severe weather caused repeated flooding in central and southern Mindanao, the last flash floods happening only a few days ago.

Finally, the 2012 UN Humanitarian Appeal suggests that a more strategic identification of objectives exists now than it did previously, with clearer boundaries being set between humanitarian needs and secondary aims. This could account for the marked decline in funding requirements for some humanitarian contexts, as demonstrated below.

• The oPt CAP for 2012 seeks 22% less money than it did in 2011 placing requirements at their lowest level for the last five years. Although the appeal acknowledges that “the humanitarian needs in the oPt have not fundamentally changed”, this CAP opts for a narrower scope than was seen in previous years.
• Nearly two years after the devastating 2010 earthquake, Haiti is in a transitional phase and CAP requirements have gone down by 40% compared to those from the CAP MYR., However, when compared to funding requirements from 12 months ago, this decrease reaches 75%. According to the appeal document this is not a transition appeal but one which focuses on critical humanitarian needs only, leaving reconstruction and development work to other funding mechanisms.
• In Zimbabwe, the humanitarian community has revised funding requirements for 2012 downwards by 45%, as only priority humanitarian needs will be covered under the 2012 CAP, while recovery work will be addressed by other initiatives such as the Zimbabwe UN Development Assistance Framework.

This new, more targeted approach of the UN CAP is a welcome development as it helps to keep the appeal process more firmly grounded in key humanitarian objectives. It should also help to bridge the gap between humanitarian requirements and humanitarian funding. On average, a third of humanitarian needs have gone unmet in the last five years with provisional levels for 2011 being the highest ever, at 41%. However, meeting needs can only be achieved if humanitarian donors maintain current levels of funding despite the squeeze on their budgets and do not reduce the size of their country envelopes in line with decreased appeal requirements. 

Photo courtesy of Flickr.com/brewingluminous

Nepal has undoubtedly experienced its fair share of natural hazards over the last century, some of which recur year on year such as floods and landslides and others which have struck less frequently but have the potential to cause more devastation, as is the case with earthquakes. This makes the country one of the 20 most disaster-prone countries in the world.[1]

The risk of exposure to natural hazards has been exacerbated by the fact that the country has only recently emerged from ten years of intrastate conflict. It is still vulnerable and has a long way to go in terms of development. Lack of government capacity, weak infrastructure (roads, buildings) and over-population in urban areas, makes it difficult to reduce the risk. There is a high need for preparedness approaches and disaster risk reduction (DRR) strategies that take account of the country’s vulnerability.

Despite the risk that Nepal faces, levels of funding to preparedness between 2007 and 2009 have accounted for only 6% of total humanitarian funding. However, actual amounts have increased over the same period and will hopefully continue to do so with the introduction of the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC).  Funding for DRR is more difficult to track as currently there is no code within the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Creditor Reporting System (CRS) to which donors can report their funding.

Figure 1: Funding reported to prevention and preparedness code, 2007-2009 (US$ million). Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD CRS data

The Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC) was launched by the Government of Nepal in May 2009 and is supported by a number of international institutions including the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) along with several United Nations’ (UN) agencies and donors such as the United Kingdom, Australia, and the World Bank among others. Building on the successful risk reduction of other countries such as Bangladesh and Mozambique, the Consortium aims to generate funding for, and improve the coordination of, disaster preparedness and risk reduction in Nepal. It is not however a pooled fund (Nepal does already have one small pooled fund for emergency response). It attempts to build on the National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management (NSDRM) and to help support the Government of Nepal develop a DRR Action Plan. The NRRC is built around the assumption that a coordinated approach between different organisations engaged with DRR issues needs to be adopted, drawing on the experience and strengths of different institutions.

The Nepal Consortium is still in its infancy, yet it has shown that a properly articulated country plan can assist in attracting both interest and funding. It bridges the humanitarian and development divide, bringing together actors from both sides within an overall funding and coordinating umbrella. However, to date, not all donors have bought into the Consortium, with the absence of evidence demonstrating value for money (such as cost benefit analyses and impact assessments) cited as a key factor – a general characteristic of the global debate on preparedness. It is therefore perhaps too early to decide whether the Consortium is a model to be replicated in other countries, or a one off. Only time will tell.

For more information please see a special case study on Nepal that was carried out as part of a wider study on tracking funding for preparedness for the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC).

At the meeting, over 2000 policy makers and practitioners and over 100 government ministers are putting the spotlight on development aid and its role in reducing poverty. To date, 26 organisations, together accounting for around just over half of global aid spending, are now International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) signatories. In addition, 22 developing countries have endorsed IATI, and other organisations and developing countries participate as observers. Given that high level discussions around the next steps needed to improve transparency of information are happening as we speak, it is pleasing to report that there is already some positive news. With the right application, commitments at these forums really can matter.

IATI aims to make information about aid spending easier to access, use and understand, and to help donors and recipients meet their commitments on aid transparency. It has created a common standard for the publication of aid information and has produced an online registry where aid information published by donors can be located.

Development Initiatives (DI), through aidinfo, has a presence at the Busan meeting and is helping to make sure that IATI receives the attention it needs to improve aid transparency on a global scale.

Busan’s legacy in this area will be judged by how well it sets a compelling agenda for the future of transparency at a time when the remit of the Millenium Development Goals  (MDGs) enters the final three years, donor countries undergo financial retrenchment at home bringing pressures on aid budgets (and public support), and emerging / non-DAC donors rightfully take an ever increasing role in negotiations with growing impact (see our recent report on non-dac-donors-and-humanitarian-aid-2">non-DAC donors and humanitarian aid). A lot lies in the balance. Within this turbulent context the impact, value for money, and role of aid in improving lives are to be closely examined alongside progress towards meeting those MDGs.

DI works with many partners to ensure that resources are more effectively directed, and that people are empowered to make evidence-based, data-informed decisions.  We believe greater transparency around what resources are going where, from whom, when and by what means will enable donors to more appropriately plan budgets and allocate resources to make the greatest contribution possible to poverty reduction.

Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) and aidinfo, DI’s dual programmes, contribute to this agenda.  Here at GHA we work to provide better visibility of the resources available to people in humanitarian crises, and aidinfo focuses upon increased transparency and accountability of aid, and helps to drive the IATI agenda.

These few days bring challenges, but the rewards are there for the taking.

For context around the aid history of the meeting’s host country, the Republic of Korea, see GHA’s recent profile.

Photo courtesy of Flickr.com/DVIDSHUB

The pressure on the humanitarian system appears to be growing. Aid from governments reached US$12.4 billion in 2010, the highest figure on record. At the same time UN appeals in 2010 reached their highest ever figure of US$11.2 billion, double what it was in 2006, and for the first time in five years the level of needs met fell significantly[1]. This is occurring alongside continued high prices for basic commodities that on the one hand creates more need and on the other reduces the amount of aid that each humanitarian dollar can buy. There is also considerable pressure on donors to be spending less or justifying each dollar spent, prioritising value for money and pushing for more and more impact with the same expenditure. Whilst it would be overly dramatic to say the humanitarian system is near breaking point, it cannot be denied that it is under substantial strain.

It is not surprising to see preparedness on almost everyone’s agenda in the humanitarian community. A sharper focus on preparedness is seen by many stakeholders as potentially transformative. It could not only connect humanitarian and development actors better and help focus national priorities, but also help reduce those growing costs of humanitarian interventions.

A study recently completed by Development Initiatives for the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) on behalf of the Inter-Agency Steering Committee (IASC) has highlighted both the current inadequate investment in preparedness as well as the many issues needed to be overcome before improvements can be both sustained and sustainable.

Funding to prevention and preparedness code, 2004-2009 (US$m constant 2009 prices). Source: OECD DAC data

Key issues to address are the inadequacy of existing financing mechanisms, lack of prioritisation or analysis of all risks, inability to learn lessons from one context to another and institutional structure issues with both global and country-level leadership.

“Not all the [preparedness] solutions are within our [humanitarians] hands but perhaps we are best placed to ensure overall aid is targeted correctly, because we are otherwise left with the failure of not doing so.”  Government donor representative

Above all donor structures that separate out humanitarian and development aid into two somewhat artificial camps, continue to inform a situation where preparedness is only considered short-term and the responsibility of which is place with ‘humanitarians’ who have neither the policies nor funding to make adequate improvements.

You can see the full report here or contact the authors below.

gha@devinit.org

The main policy recommendations to emerge from a three-year consultation process, and clearly articulated in the report « Analyses et propositions sur l’action humanitaire dans les situations de crise et de post-crise » commissioned by Bernard Kouchner, and written by Alain Boinet (Solidarités International) and Benoit Miribel (Action Contre La Faim (ACF)), centre on adopting and promoting the EU consensus on humanitarian aid and on developing a national humanitarian policy framework.

Money-wise, the emphasis is to be on: post crisis reconstruction and preparedness (specifically, a proposal to spend EUR50 million a year on reconstruction programmes); partnerships with NGOs (target to spend EUR160 million through French NGOs by 2012); public information; bolstering France’s research/academic capacity; and engagement in the UN reform process.

I was asked to talk about: how France is currently situated in comparison with other donors in terms of financial flows (and in relation to development aid) – trends and main partners, comparisons with OECD DAC donors and other government donors; recipient countries; principal partners (NGOs, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, United Nations); trends in types of crises (DRR, post conflict). I was also asked to reflect on the ‘financial crisis’ and its implications. That was a lot to try and get through within 15 minutes … especially since I also wanted to use the time to talk about the value, impact and transparency of resources for people in crises.

The fact that France’s bilateral humanitarian contributions are ‘modest’ (a word that features in the report, p30), is not news. Since 2000, it has spent between US$15 million and US$55 million a year on bilateral humanitarian aid (i.e. specified or ‘earmarked’ funding for specific programmes or projects) with very little channelled through its own national NGOs. At US$344.7 million over the 10-year period 2001-2010 (US$310.7 million 2000-2009), that’s less than Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (US$793 million) and 16 OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) governments (19th, Finland, gave US$751 million), and more than Kuwait, Russian Federation and five other DAC governments (Luxembourg, New Zealand, Austria, Portugal and Greece). It’s interesting for people to be able to place their national expenditure alongside others’ of course, but the headline numbers are too broad, too sweeping to show us the true value of contributions and activities, which might not be comparable: what was the money spent on? where? who for? how long for? through which partners? with what impact?

We should also consider the extent of France’s contributions to humanitarian activities through its funding of the EU budget. The graphs in the slides and Excel clearly show the extent of this funding, together with multilateral ODA contributions to UNHCR, UNRWA and WFP. Some 25%-30% of France’s official development assistance (ODA) is provided in the form of ‘multilateral’ (i.e. totally unspecified) contributions to EU institutions each year. (It provides the second largest contribution after Germany.) And I learned at the conference that the EU spends 23% of its budget through French NGOs! With these multilateral elements taken into account, France is propelled to 9th largest donor over 10 years.

To meet the many demands placed on humanitarian delivery, which is pulled in so many directions, we need to be able to see all the resources available to address the needs – not just those in the ‘emergency response’ envelopes of OECD DAC governments (which happen to be the only ones we can get consistent and comparable data on). To meet the demands effectively, we need to put all resources available on the table so that we can make informed choices based on comparative advantage.

Humanitarian aid financing is but one resource that can be applied to promoting resilience to risk and addressing the consequences of poverty. It can work alongside local private and government resources; other aid and aid-like flows from a variety of government donors; private sector investments and donations; foreign security and peacekeeping investments. In order to harness the potential of all of these contributions, we need to be able to see them; and a precondition for that is transparency. Our generation is ideally placed to make the most of convergence in information, communications and technology to make that happen.

If you read French, you might want to take a look at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs website or this article by Jean-Jacques Louarn and Jérôme Larché at Grotius International.

Meantime, here are some additional slides. I’ve put the data in this Google Doc. The graphs didn’t convert from the Excel version of the file, so I’ve saved that here in our datastore.

Technical annex: