The data is drawn from a wide variety of sources, including OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS, UN OCHA field offices, the World Bank and the European Commission, and has been streamlined to form seven core datasets. These are:

1. International humanitarian response – what countries in crisis receive from international governments and private contributions

2. Official development assistance – what countries give and receive in the form of OECD-defined ‘aid’ for sectors such as governance and security, education or health

3. Financing mechanisms – what countries give and receive through the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), emergency response funds (ERFs) and common humanitarian funds (CHFs)

4. Funding channels – how humanitarian financing flows through the system, be it through the UN, government agencies or NGOs

5. Needs, crisis, vulnerability – what countries give and receive through the UN consolidated appeals process (CAP) and non-CAP appeals; what we know about need from the EU’s crisis and vulnerability index

6. Capacity – what resources governments have to respond to crises within their own countries; what investments have been made in risk reduction

7. Reference tables – summary tables on various indicators and indices

For the first time Google Spreadsheets have been used for GHA’s datastore, increasing the accessibility for users, who can download the data in a variety of formats, including excel and CSV files.

The data will be updated on a rolling basis, beginning in June, to include the latest data that drives our forthcoming GHA Report 2012.

Do get in touch should you have any comments or feedback on our newly restructured datastore.

At a time when many government donor budgets are feeling the squeeze from the economic crisis, the levels of private voluntary contributions in humanitarian donorship are showing no such signs. Nearly a quarter (24%) of the international humanitarian response for the period 2006 to 2010 came from private voluntary contributions, amounting to at least US$18 billion. Private funding as a share of the total humanitarian response grew from 17% in 2006 to 32% in 2010.

This trend has not escaped aid agencies, which are paying special attention to private donors. Regular fundraising campaigns in the media, through the post or face to face are a familiar feature in most developed countries. Moreover, the economic crisis of the past four years has prompted aid organisations to intensify their collaboration with private donors. For many organisations, private money is the answer to the dilemma of how to keep responding to the growing number of aid challenges when there are limited government resources available.

Major humanitarian crises in the past decade have prompted unprecedented amounts of private donations: the tsunami that caused widespread devastation across the Indian Ocean in December 2004 saw US$3.9 billion raised in private aid; the response to the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti generated at least US$1.2 billion in contributions from the general public; and US$450 million was channelled in response to the 2010 floods in Pakistan. While global private support to large-scale emergencies is relatively easy to gauge, it remains unclear how much private money is out there in any given year.

However, if private support to humanitarian aid is here to stay and the system is becoming increasingly reliant on this source of funding, it is imperative that we are able to gain as clear a picture as possible about its volume, and more importantly, its use. After all, the volume of funding is only one part of the picture. Not every dollar of humanitarian aid can be used in the same way, nor will each dollar have the same impact on the ground. Therefore, it is critical that we are able to start systematically assessing the effectiveness of private funding in responding to humanitarian needs and tackling vulnerability.

You can view, download, or print the report here. If you would like to receive a hard copy of the report please do get in touch: dan.sparks@devinit.org

DAC donors disbursed US$129.4 billion (excluding debt relief) in 2011 (in nominal terms). Compared to the previous year, it represented the first decrease of ODA in more than 15 years, with volumes 2.7% lower (in real terms) than 2010. Unlike global ODA, DAC aid to sub-Saharan Africa increased by 4.0%.

Source:    OECD online database. Accessed April 2012

Although nothing major seems to have changed in terms of importance of donors (with the US still the leading donor, providing almost US$30 billion in 2011, followed by Germany and the UK), the real news is that only 7 countries have increased their ODA in 2011.

Italy had the largest increase both in percentage terms (24.5%) and volumes (US$667.4 million in 2010 prices), while Germany is the only other G7 country to have shown an increase in 2011. Moreover, big decreases from EU countries (notably Spain and Greece) are possibly a consequence of the impact of the recession on aid budgets.

Source:    OECD online database. Accessed April 2012

The negative trend can be seen also when assessing performance against aid targets as a percentage of GNI. In 2005, the 15 countries that were members of the European Union by 2004 agreed provide the equivalent of 0.7% of their GNI as ODA by 2015.  Looking at the 2011 data, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and Denmark have met the target while most donors appear to be off track to meet the target by 2015.

Source:    OECD online database. Accessed April 2012

Humanitarian aid from DAC donors totalled US$9.7 billion in 2011, representing a 2% on 2010. But, contrary to total ODA figures, 13 countries showed an increase compared to the previous year, with the biggest decrease coming from the United States (US$ 224.2 million, a 5% decrease), which remains however the largest donor of humanitarian aid followed by Japan and the UK.

Source:    OECD online database. Accessed April 2012

What do we learn from this new data? Many try to explain the decrease as attributable to high inflation in 2011 (which was indeed higher than 6% for DAC donors); this is partially true, even though when looking at nominal trends growth in 2011 was smaller than growth in 2010. But the most important implication is that this decrease of ODA from DAC donors (even if Country Programmable Aid (CPA) may rise by 6% in 2012, while from 2013 onwards it is expected to stagnate) might represent a further step towards the increasing importance of non-DAC donors and south-south cooperation. Although some of these “new” donors report to the DAC, the picture is still incomplete and it is therefore difficult to accurately compare their levels of development assistance with the ones of traditional donors; and after Busan, this release might represent a further push towards the restructuring of the traditional aid architecture and reporting practices. Finally, this change of course in aid levels, together with the possibility that the World Bank will not be directed for the first time by an American, also underlines that global development is now entering a new and decisive phase.

Aid lore is littered with tales such as that of the Mozambique Government which sought a few million dollars some twenty years ago to invest in flood management, to no avail. A few years later the same donors were responding to the humanitarian needs of flood victims with over a $100 million.

Any thought that was given to DRR in Haiti before the January 2010 earthquake was focused on the ever-present Atlantic hurricane season. As the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) observed earlier this year “the focus of preparedness in Haiti was overwhelmingly on seasonal climatic events. Rare, but catastrophic events were not contemplated. The poorest countries are the least able and willing to invest in risk reduction, including in preparedness. Considering the urgency of everyday needs faced by these countries, the onus for risk reduction and disaster preparedness should be more on the international community”.

I saw myself last week in Haiti that much still needs to be done in terms of embedding disaster risk reduction in the recovery phase but there is certainly a greater awareness of the issues when it comes to reconstruction of health facilities and schools which tumbled into rubble during the earthquake.

These are just some of the reasons why UNISDR extends a wholehearted welcome to the new report from Development Initiatives – Disaster Risk Reduction: Spending Where It Should Count – which takes on the considerable challenge of shedding light on how much donors actually do invest in disaster risk reduction.

I am not too surprised at the outcome but it’s good to have the evidence based on solid investigation of official development assistance (ODA) contributions over a ten-year period (2000-2009). If anything, the report’s authors may have erred on the generous side in calculating that 1% of all development aid to the top 40 humanitarian/emergency aid recipients is for DRR i.e. $3.7 billion out of $363 billion received in total aid by these countries.

As though to add insult to injury, the report also finds that in 2009, 68% of DRR financing came from humanitarian funds, a disturbing signal that we are still all too good at locking the stable door after the horse has bolted.

So what’s happening? Why is DRR still flying under the radar in the 40 neediest nations on the planet? After all, they accounted for 847.5 million of the 2.2 billion people affected worldwide during the decade under scrutiny and almost 600,000 of the 840,000 dead.

The only statistic where these countries fall short on the global scale of things is economic damages, mustering just $74 billion out of a worldwide total of $891 billion.

However, there can be little doubt that to consider the monetary value alone of these damages is to underestimate the impact on poor nations of the loss of key development assets such as roads, bridges, schools and health facilities. Many of these losses are recurring ones because of the lack of strong risk governance in many least developed and most exposed countries.

It is impossible to reflect in these numbers the excruciating setbacks which poor families can suffer as a result of a flood, a storm or an earthquake which destroys the family home. The loss is much more profound than simply the price of the flimsy materials used to construct it. The so-called shack or slum dwelling is often the workplace, a sanctuary for children, and the only defence against the environmental hazards which often dictate where the poor can afford to settle.

We should never forget the human impact which disaster statistics represent as this can play a significant part in convincing donors that disaster risk reduction has a major contribution to make towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals and building the bulwarks against climate change.

There are many anomalies highlighted in this report. The large portion of development aid directed at countries affected in one way or another by the “War on Terror” stands out. So too does the fact that while the top 40 aid recipients regularly account for the highest proportion of deaths due to flooding, flood-related DRR funding in general goes to countries outside this top 40.

However, the stand-out fact is that less one dollar out of every hundred dollars of aid money to the top 40 humanitarian recipient countries is spent on disaster risk reduction. And significant sums of money included under DRR are actual large-scale reconstruction projects such as seismic-resistant housing in Pakistan and Gujarat.

Funding for DRR is not targeted at countries which need it most. This report has performed a valuable service by bringing this uncomfortable truth to the fore. UNISDR as the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction is ready to work with all and sundry to help correct this.

We should always bear in mind that the most significant investment in disaster risk reduction is that made by national and local governments themselves which is why one of the priorities of the Hyogo Framework for Action emphasizes the creation of national budget lines for DRR.

Clear international policy and coherence on DRR spending by aid donors will help in terms of setting the direction but ultimately ODA spending on DRR will have little sustainable impact unless beneficiary countries are convinced of the value of a risk management and risk reduction approach. The funding criteria of ODA donors are particularly important in countries where there is a high degree of state budgetary dependence on ODA.

Although quantifying the total investment needed to reduce risk to an acceptable level is difficult and context-specific, the growing humanitarian caseload indicates that current DRR investment is insufficient. Global dynamics, such as climate change, urbanization and environmental degradation, are increasing society’s disaster risk, and disasters are eliminating wealth faster than it is produced (as reported in the 2011 Global Assessment Report) which shows that greater investment is needed in mainstreaming DRR within sustainable development.

Due to the increasing need for disaster relief, humanitarian donors appear to better recognize the importance of DRR, and attempt to support it as best they can through their limited funds. This approach is inadequate in the long-term. Governments and their development partners should firstly prevent as much risk as is cost efficient, mitigate or transfer what they can of the remaining risk and then, recognizing that there will always be residual risk, prepare for it. Prevention and mitigation are primarily long-term development issues, while preparedness spans both humanitarian and development concerns. Yet in many cases, due to a lack of development investment in DRR, humanitarians are trying to fill gaps across the DRR spectrum. Predictable financing for achieving long-term DRR goals needs to come from development sources.

The report highlights that the negligible part of ODA that is dedicated to DRR is rarely focused on those countries which should be given priority as determined by an assessment of risks and needs. While recognizing that donors tend to have countries and/or regions of interest for a number of reasons, and that operational settings are challenging in some high-risk countries, the humanitarian principals of impartiality and neutrality should guide ODA for DRR: human and societal risk should therefore drive prioritization. Conflict and fragile states add an additional dimension of complexity, but recent efforts to better understand and implement disaster risk management in insecure contexts are showing promise.

Preparedness for response deserves special attention as it provides an opportunity to link humanitarian and development efforts. Yet in the current world of bifurcated aid structures, this potential for linkage is actually a liability, with preparedness often falling between humanitarian and development budget lines. A broader resilience approach, as advocated by a number of leading donors and agencies, aims to reduce vulnerability to all potential shocks, even those that are highly uncertain, while at the same time fostering socioeconomic growth which in turn further increases resilience. However, unless the current systems can find a better way to work together without creating yet another budget line, support for resilience will be challenged.

Comprehensive DRR aid tracking and monitoring is critical to successful implementation, results reporting, and to avoiding overlap of efforts across sectors. A sound framework for tracking DRR financing is not yet in place. As the report indicates, the quality of data reported on disaster-related aid needs considerable improvement. A major bottleneck in quantifying the resources dedicated to DRR within humanitarian or development aid is the lack of standardized definitions for recording such investments. The Hyogo Framework for Action Mid-Term Review in fact calls for increased standard-setting and development of tools and guidelines for DRR-sensitive planning and budgeting.

This lack of standards has meant that DRR has not been identified as a core sector or crosscutting issue in most aid providers’ accounting and reporting systems, and in some cases has resulted in inaccurate reporting using multiple definitions/criteria. There is also a lack of accounting procedure for direct investments in DRR, as well as for quantifying DRR investment components in related sector projects. In order to effectively target mechanisms that address the quality and quantity of ODA and other cooperation flows, a thorough review of aid architecture from a DRR perspective is needed. GFDRR and UNISDR have already begun tackling this challenge through a disaster aid tracking initiative.

Governments are ultimately responsible for the safety and well-being of their citizens. As GHA’s new report highlights, accessible information on domestic spending on DRR is generally limited. Standardization of global DRR finance tracking and budgetary definitions would naturally permeate national budgetary systems. However, we must be cognizant that in low-income countries, where national budgets are limited and resources must be distributed amongst many competing priorities, international support is needed to initiate the path of resilient growth. As a country becomes more resilient, disaster losses decrease, ensuring more domestic resources to invest in further growth and resilience.

Recent disasters such as the Pakistan floods, the Haiti earthquake and the famine in the Horn of Africa have raised substantial debate around the need for more strategic investment in disaster risk reduction within aid programmes; the impact of these disasters could arguably have been lessened and recovery quickened if risk had been reduced before the event, which could have resulted in lower requirements for assistance later on.

This new report examines the levels of donor investment in disaster risk reduction in the top 40 humanitarian recipients over the last 10 years, and compares and contrasts these totals with overall aid figures. Questions are posed about the equity of this funding, and whether it is being appropriately directed to meet needs. All this is in the context of a current model of year on year increase of humanitarian expenditure in the same countries, and a humanitarian system which is increasingly under pressure (aid from governments reached US$12.4 billion in 2010, the highest figure on record, and for the first time in five years the level of needs met fell significantly). The sustainability of this is questionable. The report argues that there is a clear need for a shift in the focus of spending. 

Some headline figures for the top 40 humanitarian recipients, 2000-2009: Only US$3.7 billion out of a total US$363 billion of official development assistance (ODA) went to reduce disaster risk; 1% of all development aid is directed at DRR. Four countries alone (Pakistan, Indonesia, India and Bangladesh) accounted for 75% of all DRR funding. In 2009, 68% of DRR financing came from humanitarian funds.

At a time when humanitarian needs are at an historic high, and donors are under considerable pressure to spend less and prioritise value for money, a reassessment of spending is essential. This report reveals the critical need for a revised financing model which places greater emphasis upon the reduction of risk, based on comprehensive assessments of need and appropriate prioritisation of funding, as well as improvements in the quality of reporting.

You can view, download, or print the report here. If you would like to receive a hard copy of the report, or to speak to the report’s authors, please do get in touch: georgina.brereton@devinit.org

The study used UNOCHA’s Financial Tracking Service (FTS) to examine 6,003 projects that were submitted to the consolidated appeals process (CAP) for 14 countries and four flash appeals in 2010 and 2011, quantifying the amount of funding provided that was targeted specifically to older people and people with disabilities who were living in humanitarian crises.

Key findings:

• US$10.9 billion was contributed by official donors to the CAP and flash appeals in 2010 and 2011
• US$73 million (0.7%) of that was allocated to projects that included at least one activity targeted at older people or people with disabilities
• US$27.6 million (0.3%) went to projects targeted exclusively at older people or people with disabilities
• 145 (2.4%) of the 6,003 projects submitted to the CAP and flash appeals in 2010 and 2011 included at least one activity targeting older people or people with disabilities, 61 of which were funded (1% of all projects submitted).

Findings – older people:

• neither the USA nor the UK provided any CAP or flash funding for projects that included activities targeting older people
• 47 (0.78%) of the 6,003 projects submitted included at least one activity targeting older people, 18 of which were funded (0.3% of those submitted)
• i20 countries there were no projects submitted in any sector that targeted older people, including Chad, Central African Republic and 16 countries in Western Africa
• 22 (46%) of the 47 submitted projects that targeted older people were submitted by just one organisation – HelpAge International.

Findings – people with disabilities:

• 98 (1.6%) projects submitted included at least one activity targeting people with disabilities, 43 of which were funded (0.7% of those submitted)
• in 2010, 37 projects (1.3%) included at least one activity targeting people with disabilities; this figure increased to 61 (1.9%) in 2011
• among the 98 projects submitted, 29 exclusively targeted people with disabilities, of which 18 were submitted by just one NGO – Handicap International.

The study also considered projects that did not have any activities specifically targeting older people or people with disabilities, in order to establish to what extent these groups were integrated into broader humanitarian activities. It found that only 312 of the 6,003 projects analysed (5.2%) mentioned older people and people with disabilities alongside other vulnerable groups, indicating that access to general humanitarian projects designed to support the whole population is at best limited for older people and people with disabilities.

Although the evidence shows a slight increase in the number of projects funded that include at least one activity targeting older people and/or people with disabilities from 2010 to 2011, funding for both groups remains low. When we take into account the fact that the targeted activities typically represented less than 25% of each project’s total activities, we begin to get a clearer picture of the extent to which older people and people with disabilities are currently being overlooked by the humanitarian system.

However, population demographics are changing fast, and the report warns that this situation cannot continue. By 2050:

• the number of people aged over 60 is set to triple to 2 billion
• the number of people aged over 80, who represent the world’s fastest growing population group, is expected to increase fourfold
• more than 80% of older people will live in developing countries, where disasters are more likely to occur and where people have fewer resources to deal with the effects.

Recommendations

Based on the findings of the study and the combined operational experience of HelpAge and Handicap International, the report recommends that:

• humanitarian agencies ensure their needs assessments provide accurate information on all vulnerable groups by collecting data on older people and people with disabilities, and disaggregating the data by age and gender
• examples of good practice in inclusion of vulnerable groups are more widely shared, and are applied to project design and implementation
• cluster lead agencies, UNOCHA and Humanitarian Coordinators provide better leadership to ensure adequate accountability to all beneficiary populations and improved consistency across sectors
• bilateral and multilateral donors encourage and enable appropriate and inclusive humanitarian response by providing flexible, timely funding, which is allocated in proportion to need and on the basis of a thorough needs assessment.

You can read the report, A study of humanitarian financing for older people and people with disabilities, 2010–2011, here.

HelpAge International – www.helpage.org

Handicap International – www.handicap-international.org.uk

Several agencies are, however, continuing to provide assistance to Syrians that have crossed or are crossing the borders into Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. UNHCR, the UN’s refugee agency, said it has registered 6,375 Syrians in Lebanon but said the actual figure there is likely to be higher as not all refugees register with the agency. Turkish officials said nearly 10,000 Syrian refugees are living in tent camps along the country’s border with Syria, and reports put the number of Syrian refugees already in Jordan at 10,000.

What does that mean for funding?

There are essentially three streams of humanitarian funding flows focusing on humanitarian activity in, on and around Syria:

1. Humanitarian activities in-country

- Some agencies have budgeted to support continued operations in and around Syria in 2012 and some donors have pledged support for humanitarian activities (e.g. the United Kingdom has pledged UK£2 million to “three established humanitarian agencies” (DFID, 17 February 2012) but in-country operations are currently restricted due to lack of access.

- The only funding reported to UN OCHA’s Financial Tracking System (FTS) specifically to address the crisis in Syria so far in 2012 is US$645,995 from Germany to the ICRC

- In 2011, UN OCHA FTS reported expenditure of US$11.8 million on humanitarian operations in Syria, from eight main donors. The three largest donors were: the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), US$3.3 million; Australia, US$3.2 million; and Switzerland just over US$3 million. Just over half of this was provided through the ICRC and World Food Programme (WFP).

- The ICRC budget for Syria in 2012 is CHF12 million – nearly three times higher than in 2011 – some of which will focus on assisting civilians in the current crisis and some of which will assist refugee populations (see below and also ICRC overview of operations).

Due to a technical problem, tables cannot currently be displayed. We are aiming to fix this in the next couple of days. Meanwhile, you can access them by clicking straight through to this spreadsheet.

2. Operations to support Syrian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey

- UN OCHA FTS tracked just under US$1 million (US$912,974) for operations specifically relating to Syrian refugees in 2011. This was provided by three donors: Italy (direct bilateral contribution to Lebanese government); Norway (through Norwegian Refugee Council); and Switzerland to UNHCR.

- Some agencies are raising money to provide support to Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries – for example Muslim Aid and Islamic Relief.

- MSF set up a health programme for Syrian refugees in Wadi Khaled, in the north of Lebanon, in November 2011. Funding to support MSF operations such as this are not necessarily tracked within UN OCHA FTS.

[Note: Jordan is home to refugees from Syria, Iraq and Palestine. At the height of the crisis in Iraq, Jordan hosted an estimated 1.5 million Iraqis. The UN estimates that there are now half this number, though actual numbers fluctuate. This raises an interesting point about how many governments are providing support to people in crisis and how these resources are made visible, or not, in reports on international resource flows.

3. Operations in Syria to support refugees from Iraq and Palestine

Syria has the world’s third largest refugee population and is itself home to refugees from both Iraq and Palestine. The Syrian government has taken on the responsibility for providing some of the basic utility requirements – including, for example, in the camps that are home to Palestinian refugees (while UNRWA provides basic environmental health services including sewage and waste disposal and provision of safe drinking water).

- UNHCR’s 2012 budget for Syria stands at US$94.5 million, 20% less than that for 2011 due to the projected reduction in the number of registered Iraqi refugees. However, while the number of refugees is declining, their humanitarian needs are rising as their vulnerability increases. The Syrian Arab Red Crescent is UNHCR’s key operational partner.

- UNRWA provides health, education, and relief and social services to more than 496,000 Palestine refugees living in nine official and three unofficial camps in Syria.

- So far in 2012, UN OCHA FTS has tracked US$2.3 million in support of Iraqi refugees in Syria. This has come from Denmark in support of operations by Danish Red Cross and Danish Refugee Council. In 2011, US$26.2 million was provided for refugees of Palestine and Iraq inside Syria.

Download data from this spreadsheet. Tables will be shown here in the next few days.

Useful resources:

ICRC

ReliefWeb

UN data

BBC factfile

UNHCR

AlertNet

 The list was compiled based on a set of qualitative criteria, which included:

• ·        innovation, understood as creativity in programming
• ·        effectiveness, measured by NGOs’ delivery against objectives
• ·        impact, looking at the NGOs’ outcomes rather than outputs and whether activities are donor-driven or needs-based
• ·        efficiency and value for money, evaluating administrative overheads and coordination in order to avoid duplications
• ·        transparency and accountability, assessing organisations’ levels of reporting and participatory planning
• ·        sustainability, defined as enduring impact and relevance
• ·        strategic and financial management, meaning consistency of funding and the use of a self-evaluation process
• ·        peer review, measured by NGO and donor perception of sector leaders.

 Despite the use of these metrics the ranking does not appear to be based on empirical evidence; “there is no science in the measuring” when it comes to selecting the best 100 NGOs, The Global Journal admits in its methodological note. Furthermore, the spectrum of organisations included in the list is quite wide. For the purpose of its study, The Global Journal defines NGOs as “operational or advocacy focused non-profit organisations organised on a local, national or international level”.  With such a broad definition – ranging from long-established organisations with clearly defined political or developmental agendas, to young information-sharing initiatives springing from universities and technological centres – it is no surprise that the reader is presented with a rather eclectic list of organisations.

 Methodological issues aside, what is particularly appealing about The Global Journal’s Top 100 Best NGOs list, is the high presence of non-Western NGOs. Within the top 10 ranking, there are already two developing country-based organisations: Bangladeshi BRAC in fourth place and Kenya-born Ushahidi in tenth.

 However, it is interesting to note that, from a geographical perspective, over half of the 100 best NGOs are based in only two countries: 37 come from the United States and 14 from the United Kingdom. Emerging countries, such as India and Brazil, contribute just over a tenth of the top non-profit organisations in the ranking while developing countries host 15 of the best NGOs.

As one of the founders and first co-chairs of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative, Canada has a proven commitment to humanitarian action and remains a dedicated humanitarian donor. With the level of humanitarian needs continuing to grow, it is clear that we – both as a donor and as a member of the international humanitarian community – must rise to the challenge of finding ways to best meet those needs.  As the country profiles track disbursements over time, they give us cause to reflect on what role we have played in the humanitarian system, which trends have emerged, and how best to move forward.

An integral component of effective response is working to continually build the evidence base to enable better, more informed policy and programming decisions. Taken as a whole, GHA’s country profiles present not only a comprehensive overview of the state of humanitarian financing, but also, and perhaps more importantly, they provide a window into where funding has fallen short, and where increased efforts are needed. In contributing to this evidence base, the country profiles serve to foster a more robust dialogue on and analysis of humanitarian assistance, through offering insight into some of the ways that different country actors engage in humanitarian action.