The announced retirement in July of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Yukiya Amano for unspecified medical reasons, followed shortly by the revelation of his death, triggered a process for selecting his successor. Amano was in his third four-year term, having been initially selected to head the agency in July 2009, then reappointed in 2013, and again in 2017.

During his 10 years as head of the agency, Amano was well-known for his skill in diplomacy, both with world leaders and the general public impacted by the IAEA’s work. His leadership in response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident in Japan led to significant improvement in global nuclear safety. He helped bring into force new additional protocols that enhanced IAEA verification and inspection safeguards and though the IAEA was not itself directly involved, Amano played a personal role in building support and confidence for the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between Iran, the P5, and Germany.

Following an unspecified medical procedure in September 2018, Amano had become noticeably more frail and was unable to carry out his regular duties on several occasions. He passed July 18, but the agency did not inform member states until July 22 at the request of Amano’s family not to disclose his death until his funeral.

Within the week, the agency’s board of governors designated the current assistant director-general and chief coordinator Cornel Feruţă as Acting Director-General until a formal selection of a successor to Amano could be carried out.

The Selection Framework

This process has been largely unchanged since the selection of Hans Blix in 1981. However, the agency has never had to fill a sudden vacancy in its top post as resulted from Amano’s untimely passing.

Immediately following the announcement of Amano’s stepping aside, two nominees immediately became front runners in the public media: Cornel Feruţă, of Romania, who would become Acting Director-General a few days later, and Rafael Grossi, Argentina’s ambassador to the IAEA and president of the 2020 NPT Review Conference.

The day before the close of nominations, two additional nominees were put forward. Lassina Zerbo, head of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Organization, informed his staff that he would be a candidate and had regional support. He confirmed his candidacy in speaking with Al Aribya’s Rima Maktabi. Zerbo would bring significant experience and political acumen to the job, but recently drew Russia’s ire in criticizing its disabling of CTBTO monitors following a weapons test accident in the country.

Slovakia has also reportedly nominated Marta Ziakova, head of its Nuclear Regulatory Authority since 2002. Ziakova chaired the IAEA board of governors in 2014-2015 and was elected as chair as 2018 General Conference.

Similar to most other intergovernmental organizations, the IAEA’s statutes do not detail the selection process of its top executive officer, rather leaving the process to be defined through consensus by its top governance body. In the IAEA, the board of governors, composed of 35 member states elected for two-year terms, typically announces the process at least a year before the end of the incumbent’s term, including a timetable for nominations and steps for narrowing the list of nominees and facilitating consensus among members.

Deadlines serve to diminish the politicization of the process that would otherwise encourage “dark horse” candidacies, those whom governments support but not formally nominate until after strategically voting against announced candidates. Such nominees are usually unknown (as candidates) to the majority of governments but become “compromise” candidates after others are eliminated from consideration.

Unfortunately, but not uncommon in multilateral selections, there are also no pre-defined qualifications required for nominees to the IAEA’s top post, despite the significant and substantive role the Director-General plays in shaping the international agenda on the proliferation and role of nuclear weapons and regulations of nuclear power. In those contests where such qualifications are defined in advance, they are critical in evaluating nominees more dispassionately and further reducing the politicization the selection.

Following the close of nominations, the IAEA board chair holds informal consultations with members. The aim of these consultations, in conjunction with periodical nonbinding straw polls by the board, is to facilitate consensus on a candidate and avoid formal balloting. If a consensus is unreachable, the board hosts several rounds of secret ballots, with the lowest vote-getter in each round eliminated as a candidate. This selection stage concludes when one of the remaining nominees secures two-thirds support from the board.

Initial Reactions and Agreement on a Timetable

The United States initially suggested that members of the board should not preclude the possibility of a speedy selection of a board-appointed candidate to be approved at the September 2019 General Conference. Russia balked at the suggestion, its ambassador to the IAEA noting in a July 27 tweet thread that while the selection must be “accelerated” and “reasonably fast,” it would be “impossible to arrange credible election of a new Director-General by the time of #IAEA General Conference in mid-September, as US publicly suggested.” Mikhail Ulyanov noted that the process must “provide time for proper nomination and consideration of candidates. Otervise (sic) the result wouldn’t be credible.”

The board finally agreed Aug. 1 that nominations would be accepted until Sept. 5, 2019. The body will next meet in Vienna between Sept. 9-13 and is likely to engage in a combination of expedited informal consultations, led by board chair Ambassador Leena Alhadid of Jordan, and the first of several straw polls to determine the levels of support for each of the nominees.

The Frontrunners

Given their current roles, Feruţă, Grossi, and Zerbo are each in optimal positions to engage member states on their qualifications and plans as the selection process unfolds.

From 2007 to 2012, Cornel Feruţă was Romania’s ambassador to the IAEA and other international organizations in Vienna. He served a member of the Board of Governors from 2008 to 2010 and presided over the 2011 General Conference. He chaired the 2012 NPT Preparatory Committee. Feruţă joined the agency’s secretariat in 2013 as assistant director-general and chief policy coordinator, a role that was effectively Amano’s chief of staff.

Likewise, Rafael Grossi currently serves as Argentina’s ambassador to the IAEA and other organizations in Vienna and was the Deputy Director-General of the agency from 2010 to 2013. He had been nominated for the post of Director General in 2015 and secured support for his candidacy from Brazil, Colombia, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Cuba and Venezuela in 2015. However, as the year-long process wound down, the government of Argentina withdrew his nomination as it focused on other multilateral contests, intending to put Grossi forward at the end of Amano’s third term in 2021.

In May 2019, Grossi was appointed to chair the 50^th-anniversary review conference of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, a role which would afford him great opportunity to also discuss his proposals as a candidate to lead the IAEA. Grossi has not commented on whether he will step aside from this appointment as a candidate for Director-General or how preparations for the review conference will be impacted during his campaign. The consultations that he would be holding with members on the “potentially contentious” conference could present a potential conflict of obligations as have been noted in other multilateral contests.

Grossi’s formal nomination for the post was announced Aug. 2 during a news conference by the Argentine foreign ministry, accompanied shortly thereafter by an official video promoting his candidacy. The candidate subsequently released a letter outlining his priorities for the agency and has engaged actively as a candidate for the post. He has since received endorsements from foreign policy officials in Cuba and Paraguay.

In contrast, Feruţă has been less public about his interest in the post and no public announcement has been made to confirm that he is, in fact, a candidate for the post. According to Andreas Persbo, executive director of the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre in London, the Romanian foreign ministry circulated an official note verbal to IAEA member states Aug. 14 formally nominating Feruţă for the post, but neither Feruţă nor the Romania foreign ministry has confirmed this.

Argentina has asked for Russia’s endorsement of Grossi’s candidacy, but apart from a politely diplomatic tweet that “Rafael Grossi is a good colleague and professional,” none of the members on the agency’s board of governors have revealed their preference. Grossi plans to visit Moscow in the coming weeks to hold previously scheduled talks, during which his candidacy will no doubt be discussed. How closely those discussions go may well reflect how a Grossi director-generalship will engage the larger nuclear powers.

As the Executive Secretary of the CTBTO since 2013, Zerbo has demonstrated core experience in leading a prominent intergovernmental organization at the heart of the international nuclear regime. Though the treaty itself has yet to officially enter into force, the agency has played a significant role in advancing and solidifying international consensus over the norms which it advocates, in large part due to Zerbo’s proven diplomatic leadership and friendly public persona.

The selection of the next Director-General will hinge significantly on concerns related to the fallout from the potential collapse of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal and inspections that may arise from bilateral negotiations for denuclearization between the United States and North Korea. Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammed Javad Zarif, described Amano as “a stalwart support” of the nuclear deal, and tweeted “we expect his successor to follow the same path.”

Feruţă is a strong backer of the JCPOA, having been heavily involved in the negotiations that lead to the deal in 2015. Zerbo discussed Iran’s possible ratification of the CTBT as a follow-on to further implementation of the JCPOA, but the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal in 2018 and Iran’s recent breaches would need to be reversed before that again becomes a realistic possibility. Grossi as well favors restoration of the nuclear deal and offered a cautionary note that Iran should aim for the highest levels of transparency if it continues further enrichment breaches of the deal and later suggesting that the government should consider adopting Argentina’s model when it comes to nuclear power.

Closing the Deal

Despite the usual process providing for approval of the board’s appointee by the General Conference at its meeting immediately following the board’s meeting, the timetable calls for the board to make its final decision in October. Then the process would move to the General Conference for approval of the board’s appointee. “My understanding is that a special very short General Conference will be convened [in October] just to bless the appointment made by the Board,” noted Ambassador Ulyanov in an Aug. 1 tweet.       

However, should a consensus elude the board, members will then engage in a round of “selection” polls, through which the lowest vote-getter in each round will be eliminated. When at least one nominee received 2/3 vote of the board, the board moves to an “appointment” stage. If agreed to by the board, the candidate that received 2/3 support in the “selection” stage is appointed by acclamation; otherwise, the board votes by secret ballot and the candidate is appointed if they receive 2/3 support in this final vote, pending approval by the General Conference.

With several highly experienced and qualified candidates already known, and perhaps others to come in before the deadline Thursday, it would not be surprising if the board will need to conduct a number of ballots before identifying its appointee for approval by the General Conference next month.

“If by the end of October nobody is appointed,” further noted Ulyanov, “then the whole cycle will be repeated again starting with another nomination of candidates with a view to finalizing the process by Christmas.” In 2008, Amano failed to initially secure the necessary support after a series of votes, leading the board to reopen nominations.

Consistent with the recent trend in multilateral leadership selection, the aim is to have the new director-general-designate assume office Jan. 1 of the new year. The officeholder would hold the post through the end of 2023.

The third UN Security Council straw poll on 29 August shifted the informal ranking of most of the current Secretary-General candidates and prompted some curious speculations.

Five candidates lost “encouraging” votes from the previous round, while another candidate gained “encouraging” support that pushed his ranking much higher. This suggested a “coordinated approach” among some Council members in preparation for a qualitative new phase of the selection process.

The remaining four candidates preserved their general level of encouragement, improving the ranking of one as others on the slate fell below her. Within this core of four “stable” candidates, two have receive consistent levels of support and thus may have reached their highest possible level of encouragement, whereas the other two could still move up or down on the ranking list due to possible redistribution between their “discouraging” and “no opinion” votes.

These four are Antonio Guterres (Portugal), Irina Bokova (Bulgaria), Srgjan Kerim (Macedonia) and Helen Clark (New Zealand). Kerim and Clark preserved their “middle-to-low” positions on the provisional ranking list, coming in sixth & seventh place, respectively. Guterres and Bokova maintained their “high-ranking” positions (first & third, respectively). Bokova returned to third place by transforming two discouragements into “no opinion” votes, bringing her back with striking distance of nine “encouraging” votes (as she achieved in the first straw poll) required to be the Council’s nominee.

Miroslav Lajčák (Slovakia) improved his ranking dramatically, from 11th to second place, after gaining seven new “encouraging” votes by managing to transform four “discouraging” and three “no opinion” votes into “encouraging” votes. This surprise development raised speculation as to why this happened, particularly after a previously “high scoring” fellow East European, Danilo Türk (Slovenia), dropped from fourth to eighth place.

Such an unexpected shift is likely to encourage the remaining “low-ranking” candidates—Christiana Figueres (Costa Rica), Natalia Gherman (Moldova) and Helen Clark (New Zealand)—to hold their breath before deciding to withdraw from the race as previously expected. They might also count on some “voting miracles” during the next two straw polls on 9 and 26 September before further, color-coded ballots scheduled for October will start differentiating the critical votes (with a veto right!) of the group of five permanent Council members (P5) from those of the ten non-permanent members. This will mark a qualitatively new phase in the selection process where the usual “horse trading” between P5 preferences will probably prompt more decisively the “low‑performing” candidates to withdraw from the race.

Only Lajčák and Bokova managed to move up during the third SC straw poll. Both of them have the potential to go even higher if they can find a way to transform their “no opinion” votes to the “encouraging” column. These two candidates joining the higher ranking contenders poses a challenge to Antonio Guterres, who is neither East European nor a female – two important selection criteria in the 2016 race strongly supported by Russia and China, both with veto rights. Close behind is yet another Eastern European, Vuk Jeremić (Serbia) in fourth place and Susana Malcorra (Argentine) in fifth.

If the call for the next Secretary-General to be female gains momentum, Bokova’s consistent lead among female candidates would push her to being the eventual nominee. The flexing of “veto muscle” by the P5, notably Russia, China and France, at the straw polls in October might also place Irina Bokova even better within the Eastern European group, leaving behind her male challenges.

However, if the Council continues to lean toward a male nominee, Guterres could still lose out to Lajčák if the “fair regional rotation” criteria gives priority to selection of an Eastern European. In the absence of “inside” information, it remains a matter of speculation as to how and why Lajčák, with much less UN experience, replaced Turk as the male favorite within the Eastern European regional group. One could wonder if the actual reason is that Lajčák, in his capacity as foreign minister of Slovakia being the rotating 6-month president of the European Union, might turn out to be in a position to foster important policy developments advocated by several Council members.

Overall, are these shifts in the rankings tactical and therefore merely temporary as Council members move closer to firm preferences, or might we see yet another significant repositioning on the provisional ranking list? The expected exercise of the veto by one or more P5 members might dramatically change the overall picture in October and start a different type of diplomatic game with strong geopolitical flavor.

The real competition for the next UN Secretary-General position is about to heat up.

From 12-14 April, member states and a select group of civil society organizations will have the first opportunity in the United Nation’s history to question nominees for the post of UN Secretary General prior to their consideration by the UN Security Council.

More significant however than this remarkable shift is an invitation from the United Nations itself to open the floor for questions from everyday citizens — like you.

The UN’s Non-Governmental Liaison Service (UN-NGLS) has created a new website for citizens to submit questions to the candidates, and see questions posed by others. Due to the response to this invitation, the period for submitting questions has been extended until 27 March.

There are three easy ways to submit your question.

• Fill out the official online form
• Tweet using #UNSGcandidates (these can be text or video)
• Post a photo or video question by Instagram
• Email askSGcandidates@unngls.org

Once the deadline passes, an NGO selection committee will draw up a shortlist from the questions received. These will be put to the candidates by the President of the General Assembly during the informal dialogues which takes place in April.

Not sure what to ask?

See the list of questions already submitted to the current list of candidates.

You can also browse this list of possible questions for inspiration. The portions in bold are the proper lengths for Twitter posts.

1. Previous Secretaries General have each utilized their authority differently. Do you see the Secretary General primarily as an administrator, a head diplomat or a chief executive? If you believe there are elements of all three in any good Secretary General, how would you prioritize the respective duties (administrative, diplomatic, and managerial)?
2. As a candidate, you have experienced first-hand a selection process that is more transparent than ever. From that vantage point, what drawbacks do you see to a more open process? What impact on the Security Council’s deliberation do you anticipate the Assembly’s early engagement with you will have?
3. As Secretary General, how will you building rapport not only with the governments of the world but also with “We the Peoples of the United Nations,” the citizens of the world?
4. Would you agree to serve a single 7-year term, as supported by several governments, to avoid politicization around your re-nomination? How would a single term help or hinder you as Secretary General?
5. The President of the General Assembly noted that any restrictions on nominees currently holding a post in the UN system or campaign financing would have to be defined by the United Nations. What campaign finance rules should be put in place for this year’s and future selections of the Secretary General? What assurances will you give that you will not use your current office or position to further your campaigns for Secretary General of the United Nations?
6. How would you distinguish between the roles of the Secretary General and the Deputy Secretary General? What qualifications would you look for in a candidate for DSG? Do you already have anyone in mind for the post?
7. How would you go about appointing the most qualified individuals to your senior management group, including the posts of Under-Secretaries-General for Political Affairs, Peacekeeping Operations, and Humanitarian Affairs? What consideration, if any, will you give to the expectations of major powers to hold these and other top posts?
8. Do you believe the permanent members of the Security Council should agree to an informal restraint on use of the veto on resolutions to prevent or end mass atrocities? In what kind of situations should a single Council member be able to prevent action by an otherwise united Council?
9. A cause of demoralization of United Nations staff is the perception of nepotism in the management and personnel policies of the organization. How would you, as Secretary General, address staff concerns and build trust between the management and the staff at large?
10. Many countries in the developing world oppose management reform because they fear it will reduce their power over the UN budget in the General Assembly. How would you institute necessary management reforms while reassuring member states of a fair say in the decisions?
11. A “responsibility to protect” was affirmed by governments at the 2005 World Summit. Since that time, it has met with mixed support. Would you support intervention by UN peacekeepers in humanitarian crisis, such as Syria, even if the government opposed it?
12. What could the UN do to effectively manage bilateral and regional trade agreements while supporting each country’s need to approach liberalization strategically and with caution?
13. As Secretary General, how would you address the North Korean nuclear posturing, and what advantages do you possess that would allow you to address the situations more effectively than the other candidates?
14. What would you do to assist or pressure governments, both developed and developing, to confront the crisis of climate change given the agreement reached in Paris last year? What more do you believe should be the highest priority to address this threat?
15. How will you ensure that space for civil society organizations within the UN system is strengthened, and how would you improve relations between the United Nations and NGOs?
16. What steps will you take to strengthen the role of a free press and independent media in covering the United Nations and officials?
17. Given their growing influence in almost every part of the regions, as Secretary General, how could you engage armed non-state actors in state-centric environs at the United Nations?
18. Your term of office will encompass the 75^th anniversary of the United Nations in 2020. What efforts or discussions should take place leading up to that event to update and strengthen global governance and institutions? What emerging norms or institutions do you see as vital to enable good global governance?
19. Would you support creating a consultative UN parliamentary assembly through which legislators could formally engage on UN programs and ensure more accountable and legitimate UN decision-making?
20. In the last decade, a number of wealthy individuals have donated billions to help address AIDS, poverty and similarly perplexing global problems. What role do global philanthropists play compared to states and NGOs in the prioritization and resolution of global problems?

More information on this opportunity can be found on the UN-NGLS website.

The publicity around the UNSG contest this year is unprecedented. When I launched UNSG.org in 2006 to cover the race that year, the site was the only authoritative source of information on the race, including copies of the nomination letters and leaked results of straw poll votes in the Council. Today, the 1 for 7 Billion coalition maintains a robust site with similar details, and the United Nations itself has an official page with candidate bios and details. It is far different world from 2006.

So where does everything stand this year?

There are currently seven official candidates seeking the post of UN Secretary General. The contest officially opened on December 15, with the release of a joint letter from the President of the UN General Assembly (PGA), Mr. Mogens Lykketoft, and then-President of the Security Council, U.S. Ambassador Samantha Power.

The slate reflects a strong consensus for the next UN Secretary General to be an East European national, the only regional group yet to hold the post. Six of the seven nominations that have been received are from that regional groups. (The exception being António Guterres of Portugal.)  However, governments have largely failed to respond to the strong call from civil society groups to choose a woman as the next Secretary General.  Three female nominees are competing against four men for the post.

Ms. Irina Bokova Bulgaria UNESCO Director-General	Ms. Natalia Gherman Moldova Former Foreign Minister	Mr. António Guterres Portugal Former UN High Commissioner for Refugees
Dr. Srgjan Kerim FYR of Macedonia Former President of the UN General Assembly	Dr. Igor Lukšić Montenegro Current Foreign Minister	Prof. Dr. sc. Vesna Pusić Croatia Former Foreign Minister
Dr. Danilo Türk Slovenia Former President

For those catching up, the General Assembly set the parameters for a reformed nomination process in September 2015 with adoption of Resolution 69/1007. The resolution called for

• A jointly issued letter from the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council to start the process;
• The name of nominees and their curricula vitae to be circulated to all Member States on an ongoing basis;
• Member states to take into consideration gender and geographic balance, with a specific invitation for Member States to present female candidates;
• Nominees to embody defined criteria, including a firm commitment to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, proven leadership and managerial abilities, extensive experience in international relations and strong diplomatic, communication and multilingual skills;
• Informal dialogues between candidates and other member states before the Council finalizes its nomination.

The December joint letter echoed all of these, strongly pushing the process forward. Within a month, three candidates were officially nomination – Kerim, Pusić, and Lukšić. In February, President Lykketoft  briefed the press on where the process stood since the joint letter’s release in December. All member states had received copies of then six official candidates’ letters of nomination and curricula vitae.

Lykketoft announced that the informal dialogues between candidates and member states would take place from Tuesday, 12^th April through Thursday,  14^th April. The meetings would be structured as such:

• Each candidate will be allotted a 2-hour window to engage with member states, present their candidatures and answer questions from members states. The meetings will be open and webcast on the UNPGA’s website.
• Each candidate will be asked to prepare a written statement of up to 2,000 words, which will be shared online and circulated to all member states in advance
• Each candidate will be provided 10 minutes for an opening statement before taking questions from member states
• If time permits, members of civil society will allowed to ask questions at the end of the 2-hour window in each meeting
• Media and other civil society groups will be able to engage candidates after the meeting at a media stakeout to follow.

The PGA urged all governments who planned to offer a nominee do so soon so they could participate in the informal dialogue with members in April. However, he noted that there was no deadline set for nominations and that another round of meetings might have to be scheduled before the Council was expected to begin its considerations in late July.

The process at this phase is remarkably open and similar to that carried out by the Food and Agricultural Organization in the selection of its Director General, including the use of an official circulated letter opening the race and publicly accessible interviews between member states and candidates. The Council, which has yet to announced its process or timeline for vetting the candidates, is likely to be less transparent.

What impact might these dialogues have on the Council’s consideration? Might the Council to put forward a nominee that has not participated in the informal dialogues with the Assembly or is not the apparent favorite of a majority of member states?

President Lykketoft felt that the these dialogues were an opportunity to inform the Council of members’ preferences, but reiterated that the responsibility for nominating a candidate remained with the Council. On whether the permanent Council members might refrain from vetoing a popular candidate, he offered that use of the veto on a procedural motion (such as nominating a candidate for Secretary General) was questionable, but that the practice has been to allow it to ensure unanimity among the P5. More to his office’s role, he felt only that this is an opportunity for the Assembly to have more influence over the selection than they have had before. He underscored this by noting that

“…the membership for the first time in UN history is included totally in the discussion about the next Secretary General… If this new process we are now embarking on, if out of that comes a very eminent candidate, supported by a majority of the members, it will actually give the general members, the majority of the 193, an increased de facto power in selecting the Secretary General.”

Prior to the April discussions,the Assembly will be holding a debate on the selection on 22 March. During this time, it is expected that members will elaborate on the Assembly’s role in the selection process and may call on the Council and fellow governments to implement other reforms. One receiving much attention this month (especially on Twitter) has been for the next Secretary General to serve a single extended term, with 7 years being the most commonly suggested length. Neither the Charter nor subsequent resolutions ever defined the length of term, but most Secreataries-Generals have served a once-renewable 5-year term.

Another reform which members may urge this month will be for the Council to present two nominees for the Assembly’s consideration. This will be unprecedented and will dramatically increase the Assembly’s role in the selection. The Council has never nominated more than one candidate, and the Assembly has never failed to appoint him by acclamation.

The Assembly may reject the Council’s nomination, should it call for multiple candidates and the Council not respond or should the Council put forward a single nominee whom the Assembly finds objectionable. In commenting on this, the PGA affirmed that it was the perogative of the Council to offer one or multiple nominees, but believes that the Assembly would not reject a single nominee, being aware of the appropriateness for the Assembly to provide the incoming Secretary General the strongest support.

We’ll learn more on 22 March when the Assembly discusses further its expectations and preferences as the process continues to unfold. Follow Global Memo on Facebook or Twitter for more regular updates.

Later this year, the international community will select the next United Nations Secretary-General. More accurately, per Article 97 of the UN Charter: “The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.”

The past being prologue, the most powerful countries, notably the Security Council’s five veto-wielding permanent members China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, will exert major influence over the decision. Historically, the General Assembly has accepted by acclamation the Council’s single recommendation. The reappointment of Trygve Lie in 1950 by a majority vote of the General Assembly without a recommendation by the Security Council remains the exception to the rule.

Nonetheless, for at least three reasons, some much needed reforms are underway in the selection process: first, the General Assembly has asserted a larger role well in advance of the Security Council’s consideration this year; second, civil society is better organized, notably through the 1 for 7 Billion Campaign; and lastly, an effective UN Secretary-General is increasingly viewed more than ever as critical to good global governance.

On September 11, 2015, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted Resolution 69/321, which is of seminal importance as for the first time:

• It sets out basic selection criteria to ensure “the appointment of the best possible candidate for the position of Secretary-General.”
• It called for the selection process to be initiated by a joint letter from the President of the General Assembly and President of the Security Council.
• It urged that the full UN membership receives the list of candidates under consideration and be given an opportunity to engage and question them prior to the Council’s final deliberation.

On December 15, 2015, General Assembly President Mogens Lykketoft and U.S. Ambassador Samantha Power, holding the Council presidency, issued a letter marking the start of the selection process and reconfirming Resolution 69/321’s guidance. And this past week near New York, the General Assembly President convened a high-level retreat, with current and former senior government officials, as well as scholars and civil society representatives, to feed further ideas into making the selection process more transparent and inclusive.

It is difficult to imagine such rapid progress without the targeted pressure of civil society groups—termed the “Third UN” by global governance scholars Thomas Weiss, Tatiana Carayanis, and Richard Jolly—beginning with those participating in the 1 for 7 Billion Campaign. Initiated in 2014, the campaign now boasts the participation of 750 organizations with a combined reach of more than 170 million worldwide, including Amnesty International, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (New York), Parliamentarians for Global Action, and the World Federalist Movement. In addition to many of the reforms called for in Resolution 69/321, the campaign calls for other innovations, such as letting parliaments and civil society organizations (in addition to Member States) propose candidates for Secretary-General; recommending that nominees outline their policy priorities and commitment to select senior UN officials on the basis of merit, irrespective of their country of origin; and encouraging the Security Council to present more than one candidate for the General Assembly to consider.

Another significant factor putting wind into the sails of reform is the growing global interest in UN governance after world leaders, gathered by the United Nations in 2015, reached consensus on the monumental 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Paris Agreement on climate change. To deliver on their historic commitments, attention now turns to the effectiveness of the United Nations in marshalling the resources, ideas, networks, and talents of diverse transnational actors, from states, regional organizations, and municipalities to business and civil society groups. Leadership at the top of the world body is also needed urgently to cope with concurrent global crises, from growing mass violence in fragile states and alarming refugee flows to fears of devastating cross-border economic shocks and cyber-attacks. To better deal with each of these global policy challenges, the next Secretary-General will need to continue to work in close partnership with states, especially the most powerful states.

The incremental, yet important reforms put in play through Resolution 69/321, including its invitation to Member States to present women as candidates for Secretary-General, may lead to a more transparent and inclusive process and a better outcome. Many exciting potential nominees, especially female candidates such as UNESCO’s Irina Bokova, UNDP’s Helen Clark, and the Secretary-General’s former Special Adviser on Post-2015 Development Planning Amina Mohammed, are highly regarded—more details on other prospective female candidates can be found through the Campaign to Elect a Woman UN Secretary-General.

But the progress achieved in recent months only marks the beginning of what should be a critical process of renewal and transformation in the UN Secretariat. For instance, the high-level Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance, supported by The Hague Institute for Global Justice and the Stimson Center, recommends: “consideration of a single, seven-year term for the Secretary-General. This would enable the Secretary-General to focus more on meeting performance, rather than political, goals during the term.” The General Assembly may take up this idea in the next session of its Working Group on Revitalization.

The Commission further calls for empowering the Secretary-General with more discretion to manage the Secretariat (including in hiring and firing staff). It also supports a second Deputy Secretary-General to forge greater UN system-wide coherence in the areas of economic, social, and environmental policy and programming—freeing up the other Deputy to better support the Secretary-General on critical matters of peace and security. Other ambitious UN and broader global governance reforms are presented in the Commission’s report Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance.

Yet a far-reaching program of urgently needed global reforms is unlikely to take root without new coalitions of civil society groups and like-minded UN Member States. The momentum behind UN Secretary-General selection reform offers hope that the international community will appoint a courageous and visionary leader, with the necessary diplomatic skills,  broad networks, and political clout with the most powerful states, to help make this happen.

This was originally posted on The Hague Institute’s website on 14 January 2016. Crossposted with permission of the author. 

The long-awaiting joint letter on the selection of the next United Nations Secretary General was released today, officially kicking off the search. Mogen Lykketoft, President of the General Assembly, announced the letter’s release at a press conference at the UN this afternoon.

Described by one journalist at the press conference as “very mild… not very revolutionary,” the text reflects the important but modest improvements that were urged by the General Assembly in Resolution 69/321. There is no mention of a deadline for nominations, a single term or multiple nominees, as some have urged. But the joint letter itself represents an critical reform. As noted by the 1 for 7 Billion coalition, its release

“…marks the first time in UN history that the selection process has a clear and public start date, and the first time that detailed criteria have been suggested for candidates to fulfill.” 

It’s release officially opens the selection process and call for nominations. Though a number of individuals are known to be interested in running, Mr. Lykketoft noted only two nominees anticipated the process and submitted formal letters of nominations — Dr.  Vesna Pusić of Croatia, and Dr. Srgjan Kerim of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

The expected frontrunner Dr. Irina Bokova has not been endorsed by the Bulgarian government, which faces a choice between Bokovo and fellow Bulgarian Kristalina Georgieva. According to Ambassador Andrej Logar of Slovenia, we can also now expect Danielo Türk to formally announce with the release of the joint letter, among others.

(Transcript below, or open PDF in separate window here.)

http://globalmemo.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/15-Dec-2015_Appointment-of-Secretary-General-15-December-2015.pdf

15 December 2015

Excellency,

In line with General Assembly resolution 69/321, this joint letter serves to begin soliciting
candidates and to set in motion the process of selecting and appointing the next United Nations Secretary-General, in accordance with the provisions of Article 97 of the Charter of the United Nations and guided by the principles of transparency and inclusivity.

The position of Secretary-General is one of great importance that requires the highest standards of eff!ciency, competence and integrity, and a firm commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. We invite candidates to be presented with proven leadership and managerial abilities, extensive experience in international relations, and strong diplomatic, communication and multilingual skills.

Convinced of the need to guarantee equal opportunities for women and men in gaining access to senior deciSIon-making positions, Member States are encouraged to consider presenting women, as well as men, as candidates for the position of Secretary-General. We note the regional diversity in the selection of previous Secretaries-General.

Noting that some candidates have already emerged, we invite Member States presenting
candidates to do so in a letter to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council. The Presidents of the General Assembly and of the Security Council will
jointly circulate to all Member States, on an ongoing basis, the names of individuals that have
been submitted for consideration.

The President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council will offer
candidates opportunities for informal dialogues or meetings with the members of their respective bodies, while noting that any such interaction will be without prejudice to those who do not participate. These can take place before the Council begins its selection by the end of July 2016 and may continue throughout the process of selection.

Early presentation of candidates will help the Council’s deliberations; nonetheless, this should
not preclude others from making themselves known throughout the process, as appropriate. The Council plans to make its recommendation to the General Assembly in a timely manner so that the appointment by the General Assembly allows the newly appointed Secretary-General sufficient time to prepare for the job.

Please accept, Excellencies, the assurances of our highest consideration.

H.E. Mr. Mogens Lykketoft
President of the General Assembly

H.E. Ms. Samantha Power
President of the Security Council

This week, the UN Security Council took up discussion on a joint letter that would kick off the search for the next UN Secretary General. A draft text (see below) was circulated by the United Kingdom, which currently holds the presidency of the Council. If the text receives approval this month, it would be released to all UN member states from General Assembly President Mogens Lykketoft and UK permanent representative Matthew Rycroft.

A source present during the Council’s discussion confirmed that Russia continued to try to derail release of a joint note. During the debate, Ambassador Vitaly Churkin objected to the content of a text, when it might be released, and whether reforms to the selection process were even needed.

The draft text circulated by the United Kingdom encourages the nomination of female candidates for the post, to which Russia has objected publicly and privately before. (At one closed meeting earlier this year, the permanent representative from Chile reportedly invoked “Mother Russia” in responding to Churkin’s derogatory comments about “women empowerment” by the UN.)

The text leaves out any mention of geographic rotation, an important aspect to the Eastern European group and, within recent months, also to Russia. Including a specific reference to it being Eastern Europe’s “turn” at the post or even codifying regional rotation in the letter would be unprecedented, and would undermine the search for the most qualified candidates regardless of national origin. Churkin “regretted the fact” that the text did not reference rotation, and speculated that others in the region might push Russia to veto any non-Eastern European candidate.

The momentum for a more transparent process however makes a joint letter a virtual certainty, though when it should be released is less clear. Russia confirmed earlier this month what Global Memo reported a few weeks before, that it was opposed to this Council starting the process until January 2016.

“We cannot do it without Ukraine and Uruguay and other new members. Really it’s impolite because the new members are going to be the ones … doing the whole process, so how can we announce the process without them,” Churkin told Reuters.

Advocates of an expeditious commencement of the process, including incoming member Egypt, however have noted that those states have participated in Council discussions since being elected and are quite familiar with how the process would likley unfold. Missions of other incoming members, such as Senegal, are working on the basis of what information they are able to obtain while awaiting specific instructions from their foreign ministries.

Overall, Russia’s position appears to be simply one of delay and obstruction. The government considers the P5-dominated ad hoc selection process to have worked fine so far and any reforms will simply mess it up. China reaffirmed its support for the Russian position during the discussion, while other Council members supported adoption of the British text with differing degrees of enthusiasm.

The text itself will please some advocates of reform and disappoint others. As noted, it recognizes that “the strongest field of candidates will be one that includes good representation by women” and “invite[s] the presentation of women candidates for the position.” It echoes General Assembly resolution 69/321 in noting specific criteria for candidates including

“proven executive level management and leadership skills,…integrity, independence, moral courage and impartiality,… [e]xtensive experience in international relations and sophisticated diplomatic communication skills”

and other qualifications. “She or he should show moral and intellectual as well as political and public affairs leadership.”

The text notes that 69/321 called for informal dialogues between candidates and the General Assembly, but here is where it is important to read the language very carefully.

“That resolution also provides for informal dialogues or meetings of the General Assembly with candidates, while noting that any such interaction will be without prejudice to those who do not participate. It would be beneficial as well for there to be interaction of individuals under consideration with Security Council members.”

Notice anything, keen readers? While mentioning that the General Assembly resolution encourages such meetings with non-Council members, the UK text subtly fails to endorse such, here or elsewhere in the letter. It only speaks positively of “interaction of individuals under consideration with Security Council members,” (emphasis added).

It offers no concrete timeline, suggesting merely that “[t]he Council plans to begin the selection process during the Summer of 2016” and that it should conclude sometime in September. In another blow to transparency and accountability, it refutes a deadline for nominations to be received.

“An initial idea – by the Spring of 2016 – of those putting themselves forward will help the Council’s deliberations; nonetheless, this should not preclude others making themselves known throughout the process, as appropriate.”

For dialogues with candidates to matter, non-Council members must have sufficient time and opportunities to engage them. Without a deadline, a “dark horse” candidate could be held back until too late for meaningful engagement with the General Assembly. Should the United Kingdom or the United States for example prefer candidates willing to promise top posts in the Secretary General’s cabinet, it would be useful — for them — to minimize the chance of candidates being asked about that by non-permanent members.

The United Kingdom has been a vocal proponent for a better process, proposing three guiding principles for the selection. These include gender equality, a clear deadline for candidates to declare themselves and a clear date for the selection to take place, and opportunities for candidates “to present their priorities to the whole of the UN, and to the world at large.”

This draft text notably fails to live up to these ideals. By even the most generous interpretation, it can only be seen as echoing the call for gender equality. The ability of candidates to come forward throughout the process negates the call for a clear deadline or selection date, and the disregard given 69/321’s call for informal dialogues between candidates and non-Council members is a slap in the face of the General Assembly.

While the draft letter fails in pushing these substantive and important reforms, its very existence is a major leap forward. But it is now up to other UN member states and advocates of the UK’s own principles, such as the 1 for 7 Billion coalition, to urge courage in bringing forth stronger language in a new draft text.

(Open the draft text in a separate tab or window here.)

http://globalmemo.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Draft-Joint-Letter-2.pdf

(Full screen view of the sample text below can be found here.) 

One of the major reforms being pushed in opening up the selection of the next UN Secretary General is a joint letter from the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council on how the process would unfold. In the 1996 andd 2006 elections, the Council was more transparent in sharing updates as it considered potential nominees, but in neither year did the process include a formal engagement between the top officers informing other member states on the process. Such a reform was strongly encouraged this year by civil society groups such as 1for7billion and several UN members. It was one of several reforms which survived debate and was included in a resolution adopted by the Geneal Assembly last month.

This week, the Security Council held discussions on the body’s “working methods,” including how it would go about nominating the next Secretary General.  There was continued support for the nomination of qualified female candidates and providing sufficient time for non-Security Council members to hear candidates’ visions for the organization. Inner City Press noted that UNGA President Mogens Lykketoft says that he has been discussing the release of a joint letter with the Council president.

The question is when should such a letter be distributed, officially opening the contest? And what should such a letter say?

Below is a draft of such a letter as it might emerge.

A key assumption being made in this imagined text is that the letter would be circulated next month, during the United Kingdom’s Council’s president. The UK has been a vocal proponent of a more transparent process, advocating three principles to which it was committed as part of next year’s selection — equality in gender consideration, predictability in the timeline, and transparency through involvement of all UN member states as well as civil society.

It is quite likely that if a joint letter is to be released, it would occur in November.

However, rumors are that Russia is encouraging a postponement of the letter’s release until early next year. The same suggestion was raised in a discussion by Global Memo with an official with the Slovene mission. Former Slovene President Danielo Turk is a rumored candidate for the post, and an official with the mission has confirmed that he won’t officially announce until the process is defined in a joint letter or otherwise. The same official has raised the suggestion that the newly elected members of the Council — Egypt, Japan, Senegal, Ukraine, and Uruguay — might prefer that any joint letter from the President of the Council detailing an election in which they will take part be held until they assume their seats in January. During the October 20th working methods session of the Securty Council, however, Eygpt urged the “expeditious commencement” of the process and release of the joint letter (video, 1:22:50 mark). A top NGO official working on reform to the process however has suggested a postponement to next year would kill the momentum for a joint letter and other transparency reforms.

This draft text posits how PGA Lykketoft and UK Ambassador Matthew Rycroft would describe the interest in a transparent process during the past year and what procedures might have been agreed to during this week’s “working methods” session in the Council. They invite UN members to put forward candidates meeting certain criteria and to do so by a set deadline. Should such aspects be adopted as part of the process, the selection will be far more open, transparent and inclusive than it has been in the organization’s 70-year history. It reflects a more conservative approach in echoing the Assembly resolution while leaving out the more far-reaching proposals advocates have put forward.

Share your thoughts on this sample text in the comments below or with us on Twitter.

http://globalmemo.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Sample-Joint-letter-on-UNSG-selection.pdf

On Friday, the UN General Assembly adopted new recommendations that fell far short of the more ambitious reforms put forward by governments this year on the selection of the organization’s top post.

As discussed previously, a large part of the rules surrounding selection of the UN Secretary General stems from a UN General Assembly resolution adopted in 1946. The resolution defined the term of office (5 year, renewable), provided for a single nominee from the Security Council, and required a simple majority vote in the Assembly for appointment.

None of this changed on Friday.

The Assembly adopted its lengthy and perennial Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Revitalization of the Work of the General Assembly, including provisions on how it intends to jointly select the Secretary General with the Security Council. Despite efforts by Costa Rica, India, members of the Non Aligned Movement, the ACT Group of States, and others, the Assembly failed to include a call for multiple nominees for consideration by the Council or a single 7- or 8-year non-renewable term for the next office holder.

These two reforms would have had the greatest impact in shifting influence both in the selection and in the office of Secretary General itself. Neither made it into the resolution text. 

Though the Assembly can reject the Council’s single nominee, it has never done so and is unlikely to take such political action by the necessary majority. The office will continue to be more “secretary” than “general” as the incumbent will seek re-nomination by the Council five years hence. Any candidate that pledges to serve even a single 5-year term will no doubt be vetoed by one or more permanent members unwilling to accept such independence.

The resolution did call for improvements on the front end of the process. These included providing
for a joint letter from the Presidents of the Council and the Assembly to formally invite nominations, and calling for criteria to be met by candidates, including “proven leadership and managerial abilities, extensive experience in international relations, and strong diplomatic, communication and multilingual skills.”

If implemented in ways envisioned by the 1 for 7 Billion campaign and others, these may lead to a more qualified slate initially. However, as important as these improvements are, the resolution’s recommendations otherwise suggest the outcome will not be improved in meaningful ways this time.

The decision to encourage candidates to engage with non-Council members in “informal dialogues” is hollow at best. Such is more likely to emerge through the perogative of the candidates and their governments than from the resolution, and will have no impact on the outcome in any case given the continued weak role to be played by the Assembly.

There is no call for a formal process by the Council is keep the Assembly informed of its considerations during its process. Straw poll results emerged only through leaks during the 2006 race, but reform advocates were unsuccessful in urging a more codified process this year.

Gender equality as a goal may be the one endorsement where a notable impact on the process could occur, in that it is likely to directly influence which nominees are put forward by governments. Initially introduced in the 1990s, this goal was almost universally supported by member states in discussions this year. However, there is no obligation on the part of governments or the Council to put forward a female nominee any more than they are required to put forward a nominee from the Eastern Europe group. The Council will be harshly and rightfully criticized by advocates should the single nominee be a male and/or from another region, but no one expects the Assembly to reject such a nominee or demand another.

Given these endorsements however, the question now turns to how the Council will internally consider candidates and move toward a nomination. Perhaps inadvertently, the resolution will push back the formal process until at least November by calling for a joint letter from the Presidents of the Council and the Assembly. Ambassador Román Oyarzun noted in July that discussions on the working methods of the Council—an allusion to how the nominations would be vetted by the Council–would take place during Spain’s presidency of the Council in October. As such, any joint letter will not appear until mid-November or later. The United Kingdom, which supports a joint letter among proposed reforms, hold the Council presidency in November. 

Should the Council adopt a process that involves a deadline for nomination—heavily pushed by reform advocates but noticeably missing from the Assembly’s recommendations—it would be no earlier than February or March of next year, followed by a series of straw polls leading to the final decision in the summer.

Unlike processes in other multilaterals–referenced in the resolution–the vetting of candidates for the position of Secretary General is not likely to encourage or require those with the least number of straw votes to withdraw. As such, the penultimate if not all straw ballots will be color coded so as to identify with certainty those candidates who will be vetoed in the Council’s official vote. At that point, a mass withdrawal of candidacies will occur by all but the “sole” candidate for the post.

This nominee, having survived the threat of a veto, will be nominated — and for all intents and purposed, appointed — by those states sitting on the Council next year. These include the permanent members China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, plus rotating members Angola, Egypt, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Spain, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

The nominee will received the Council’s approval by acclamation. With the Assembly’s failure to substantively update the 1946 resolution, this person will be the single nominee offered to the Assembly. Once rubberstamped, the new head will likely head the world organization for the traditional two 5-year terms, through 2025.