UNIFORMS: Towards The Practical Part One 1775-1915
UNIFORMS: Towards the Practical Part 2 1914-1975
UNIFORMS: Towards the Practical Part 3. 1917-2017 Camouflage, Conflict, and Chaos

“…General requirements for military textiles:  Future soldier requirements:  Dealing with complexity; Non-woven fabrics for military applications; Mechanical failure criteria for textiles and textile damage resistance; The sensory properties and comfort of military fabrics and clothing; Testing and analyzing comfort properties of textile materials for military; Sweat management for military applications; Cold weather clothing; Designing military uniform with high-tech materials..  …Protection:  High-performance ballistic fibers; Ballistics testing of textile materials; Ballistics testing of textile materials; Chemical and biological protection; Self-decontaminating materials for chemical biological protective clothing; Camouflage fabrics for military protective clothing.  New developments in coatings and fibers for military applications; Military fabrics for flame protection…” 

Research and development plan on taking uniforms into the future.  Textile research alone opens countless possibilities, (not all of them good…)  The above paragraph is from the book “Military Textiles.” (See Suggested Reading at bottom of article…)

Russian “Star Wars” outfit…Youtube via Ruptly.

If the average civilian gives any thought to future uniform development, they perhaps imagine something on the order of the Russian “Star Wars” photo above.  Depending on what is involved, the image can range from “Borg” to “Imperial Storm Trooper” to Robert Heinlein’s “Starship Troopers.” (The book…not the travesty of a film…) (See Suggested Reading at bottom of article.)

Uniforms and equipment are traditionally separate subjects…but in the last century the dividing line is sometimes blurred.  For example, a helmet qualifies in both categories… though it is progressing from a “tin pot” to not only ballistic protection but environmental control, communications center… and computer display mode.

Some of the developments are so advanced and complex that the soldier inside is no longer visible.  The fly in the ointment would seem to be that even if battery/motor durability/reliability issues solved… how much does this fearsome “Death Machine” cost?  Then the real question… How much does one RPG-7 in the hands of an ignorant (but fanatic) peasant cost?  Aye, there’s the rub.

Story of a university agricultural department that invented a perfect cattle feed.  Pellets that were completely nutritious, relatively inexpensive.  They handed out sample loads to a dozen farmers.  Results soon came back.  The cattle would barely touch… then ignored.  One farmer though… his cattle went through the whole allotment.  When they asked him why his cattle seemed so eager, he replied:  “I put molasses on it.  Cattle will eat anything with molasses on it…”  All of the team’s calculations had ignored taste.  Military R&D teams can miss the obvious as well.

Research and Development teams can be a soldier’s worst nightmare.  Like the agriculture department, they may not have “consulted the cattle…”  Scientists and generals may not have spent days in the mud or snow themselves…and what looks good on paper (or computer programs) may come up short of being the desired improvement.

Korean War shoepacs…public domain.

The “shoepac” was a boot that R&D developed for soldiers in cold weather environments in the last years of WWII.  Consisted of leather uppers and rubber lowers with thick woolen inserts and a couple of pairs of thick socks.  Some reports unfavorable as not all cold weather environments the same.  In the winter of 1950-51 in Korea, they proved to be a disaster.

Marines and soldiers in North Korea in late 1950 had Arctic weather come straight down from Siberia into the North Korean high country.  While at the same latitude as Venice… winter weather savage… -25 to -40 degrees F.

Boots that might have been fine for duck hunters in late Fall in Vermont, proved inadequate for what the infantry faced at the “Frozen Chosin…”

R&D had contemplated such a situation and simply ordered that socks and inserts be “frequently” changed to prevent sweat from freezing and causing frostbite.  Like “twenty years in solitary” it was easy to say, but hard to do.

Men had to keep up with marching columns… wet liners or not.  In a fixed location, such as the base at Hagaru-ri, warming tents set up where men could be rotated off the line for short periods… get some hot coffee (that wouldn’t freeze in canteen cups in the open in precious little time) and above all… change socks and liners… (wringing out the wet ones, warming them close to warming tent stoves… then placing them inside clothing to finish drying out…)  Otherwise, the men had to go through the agony of attempting to change out in the open… in the savage cold.

Too many of the lads marched non-stop (when not fighting) towards the South… then directly into a hole in the snow at night.  Frostbite often caused more casualties than the masses of Red Chinese.   The infantry had been shortchanged by a Research and Development program that mandated a seriously impractical maintenance procedure…designed by men who never experienced what the soldiers and Marines did.

“Marine Berets” USMC image.

Speaking of Marines… While the Marines deserve kudos for developing an excellent camo pattern for a very reasonable price…that doesn’t mean that their R&D is always on the tracks.  See photo above where the Corps actually considered issuing British style berets to all Marines.  Fortunately, somebody put a stake in the program’s heart.  More unfortunate examples…such as two-piece camo uniforms in WWII that were too heavy for hot weather fighting… didn’t “breathe” and had a camo patterns that essentially didn’t work… Also, the Reising submachine gun… fine for domestic police use, but hopeless in a battlefield environment.  The Army had the good sense to reject the weapon… the Marines discovered the many problems on Guadalcanal.

There is always hope.  Marines not only testing new jungle boots, but also boot drying towels.  (See image below…)

Boot drying towel with test boots. USMC image.

Below are five links to articles (in the past 12 months) re the Army and Marine Corps work on hot weather uniforms and jungle boots.

http://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/08/10/army-to-begin-testing-new-jungle-uniform-next-year.html

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https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/pay-benefits/military-benefits/2016/08/29/marines-sound-off-on-the-corps-new-jungle-uniform-wear-test/

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https://www.army.mil/article/183541/new_army_jungle_wear_gives_trench_foot_the_boot

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http://asc.army.mil/web/news-alt-amj17-the-jungle-boot/

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https://kitup.military.com/2017/10/army-testing-improved-hot-weather-army-combat-uniform.html?comp=7000029711048&rank=0

While combat troops’ input important… it needs to be screened.  Sometimes troops can be as conservative as their generals.  Many Marines did not want to switch from 1903 Springfields to M-1 Garands… though tactical realities in the Pacific war absolutely required it.  (And contrary to old yarns, Marines on Midway…prior to the battle… were issued with Garands, while many soldiers landed in North Africa months later still carrying bolt action Springfields… as had the 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal in August of 1942…)

Many (most of whom were not in Vietnam) see no reason to replace the Vietnam era jungle boot.  While a definite improvement over regular boots… and a favorite of a few… it has its limitations and seriously needs replacement.  For comments on the subject of that and boots in general, see link.

A more reasoned discussion may be had re jungle uniforms.  Some might think that the jungle uniform as massively issued in Vietnam had it all.  Relatively cheap, lightweight, comfortable.  When it got soaked… it didn’t take long out of the rain for it to dry (especially in the sun…)  Rip stop helped, but when uniform ratty and torn…could be replaced at little cost.   But this too had its limitations.

Whoever designed it included fabric “ties” at the bottom of the trousers for “blousing” over the boots to help keep out bugs.  Almost everybody who was issued this item… immediately cut out the ties and replaced with boot blousing bands and the like…with no adverse comment from the brass.

And times and places in Vietnam this uniform was very much too lightweight.  Classic example… Khe Sanh in the higher country during the monsoon (later 1967, early 1968…)  Marines were not only issued with M-65 field jackets to wear (especially at night), but also some were issued wool cold weather shirts to be worn under jungle fatigues.

Much current discussion re new jungle uniforms includes large amounts of nylon or other synthetic fibers.  Lot of controversy… This adds to durability and to water “resistance”, but once truly soaked one would expect increased time for drying.  Various other “additions” such as “chemical warfare resistant fibers…”  Well, beyond my ken, but does that require “non-breathing” fibers and more weight and more water retention?  I don’t know.

I do know that weight, cost, and tactical good sense should mandate the prohibition of Velcro on any uniform designed for combat use.   Velcro is evil.  If brush rubs against it, it may well strip off… making an unmistakable sound…  (And have you ever accidentally rubbed an injury scab on it?) As for the idea of ammo pouches with Velcro fasteners…  Soldier dives into brush… catching breath… hears enemy getting close… realizes that he only has a couple of rounds left in his magazine as he hears voices of enemy soldiers coming closer…

“Velcro is evil…”

Velcro “mounting points” requires extra reinforcement… which adds to weight… and is another place where water takes longer to shed.  Also adds to cost… Jungle uniforms, no matter how well constructed…need to be replaced with some frequency.  Rather than Velcro, maybe a “template” where dark dye can be used for division patch… and others for name and U.S. Army/U.S. Marines… Only other important item, rank insignia…subdued metal/plastic would fill the bill.  Mass of other patches, bells, and whistles can be retained for non-tactical uniforms.

One issue that comes up from time to time is private purchase by the soldiers themselves.  Obviously, any items contemplated need approval at some level… and then “checked off” by maybe the Company First Sergeant.

Items need to meet all requirements including durability.  During WWII “Merrill’s Marauders” were issued a type of jungle boot that was extremely comfortable, but worn away from the swamps…on dry and rocky ground… the boots would soon fall apart.  Members of the unit tied the jungle boots to the back of their packs and only used them where appropriate.

In Rhodesia, some units, (including mine) permitted private purchase items.  All had to be approved by the immediate command structure… (who also steered the lads towards the best sources re quality and price…) The force that I was in actually had (with minor exceptions) no “high top” combat boots.  A few “man-mountain” types had “flap uppers” sewn onto the heavy issue low-cut boots… but most considered that way too heavy for the Rhodesian bush.

I wound up with what were called “desert boots…”  High-top double buckle combat boots.  Most comfortable that I ever wore.  The only problem was that they would only last a few months at best.  But as you (or one of your mates) were at most an hour’s drive from a city large enough to have a civilian supplier… replacements could be purchased about one month before estimated wear-out date.

Somehow an attempt must be made to make combat uniforms “garet (garrison) trooper” proof.  The BDUs of the 1980s all had instructions saying “Do Not Starch”, but even Fleet Marine Force and Army readiness troops often had crisply starched combat uniforms Stateside.  Even a boot with leather turned rough side out… somebody up the chain of command may yet think of a way to “spit-shine” them.

Below are images of “future military” changes at R&D…

Land Warrior…Army Times

Iron Man

Indian Army future gear…Indian Army

In closing, perhaps some thought should be given to “less conventional” potential recruits.  A number of constituencies might find the hot weather uniform below to their liking… including of course, many who were denied enlistment because of visible tattoos…  The “presentation” of the uniform seems to make full allowance for them.

Spanish Legionnaire…Spanish Army

-Yankee Papa-

-SUGGESTED READING-

The post UNIFORMS: Towards the Practical Part 4. The Future. Where Nothing Can Go Wrong… Go Wrong… by Yankee Papa appeared first on Grunts and Co.

I adopted “Sabot” as a gift to my wife a month after our wedding on Valentine’s Day almost 15 years ago.  The staff at Ft. Benning’s pound (I know, BIG spender Will!) steered me to their favorite and oldest boarder, “Bear”.  Bear had been surrendered by their family upon receiving orders to their next post.  A too tragic fact that too many military families give into.  (Moral – Don’t adopt a dog unless you are going to keep and provide for him for life.)  The staff told me “Bear” was a HUGE lover and their favorite. Sadly, he was also there the longest and might not be with them much longer.

I was looking for a companion dog for the two of us.  Through his kennel’s fence I saw a long haired black dog, a chow/border collie mix approximately three years old based on his youthful appearance and teeth.  Bear was skittish alternating between staying behind his dog house and coming to sniff at the fence.  I entered the kennel and gently approached Bear who cowered and nervously urinated on the floor.  I sat in the kennel and spoke gently to him about his misfortune and if he would like to try a new family.  I already had a soft spot for Bear.  Besides his sad story, he resembled my previous dog Mishka, a black Chow.  It was also obvious that someone had disciplined him harshly.  I made a decision that would change and bless all of our lives.

Denise my wife has a huge soft spot for animals which is a likely reason for why we have so many.  Her and Bear bonded immediately, and she would refer to him after as “My Valentine” when he was at his most loveable which was often.  I changed his name to Sabot in recognition of his blinding speed and an effort to create some distance with his troubled past.   Sabot took to CONSTANTLY following Denise around the house which I found reassuring.  The following day we adopted Bradley, a puppy from the same pound and the younger sibling Sabot bonded with as an older brother would a younger one.

Early on we learned of Sabot’s love to corral.  It left us little doubt to his border collie lineage.  Sabot corralled everything.  He dominated Bradley who would grow to almost twice Sabot’s size especially when it came to agility, speed and running around the yard.  Sabot had monstrous amounts of energy to dedicate to corralling Bradley and the 2-3 cats in the house to their chagrin.  We often had a difficult time playing with the cats because of Sabot’s desire to control the “red dot” and how much fun the cats were having.  Sabot was a bit of a control nut and ham.  He always found a way to get into the center of any activity and answered to any dog, cat or persons name called.

Sabot finally met his match when we homed Sugar.  Unfortunately, my mother in laws management decided they didn’t want the Chihuahua puppy distracting everyone at work by her visits to each office on the floor.  We all felt it was unfair to keep Sugar in a home by herself for 8-12 hours so she moved in with us.  Sugar must be part Greyhound and left Sabot in the dust with her agility and speed easily defeating his feeble attempts to corral her.  They became fast friends with Sabot’s daily attention.

Sabot’s extremely kind and gentle demeanor was a constant salve on the injuries caused by the daily grind.  His constant smile and desire to be petted always left one feeling “it’s going to be alright”.  The only issue being there was no such thing as too much petting.  Stopping the slow stroking of Sabot’s abundant fur only invited a furry paw with wisps of hair protruding on your arm, hand, leg or face reminding one that petting hasn’t ended.  Sabot always enforced a large petting tax.  His love for affection wasn’t limited to us.  After occasional protective barking, Sabot always approached strangers with the required petting tax.  His huge heart and loving aura would have made him a perfect therapy dog.  I regret not sharing him that way, but he did become the director of “Pawblicity” for all our public relations outreach.

As time inflicted its slow toll we watched Sabot slow down and Sabot watched the world.  He would always create a favorite perch to watch the world pass by.  Early on, his favorite perch was a shared front windowsill or shady spot in the backyard.  On the road he loved to sit in the driver’s seat of the RV when we weren’t in it.  He caused many a chuckle to the passerby as they did a doubletake at the black dog driving the RV.  His all time favorite spot was a corner of the enclosed pool area where he could watch out at Florida’s wildlife.  Besides barking when we fed the ducks, he’d lie in wait until the ducks came close then pounce the fence scaring the ducks away.  His chest was puffed high at the threat he had dispatched.

While still the Alpha, Sabot didn’t dominate Bradley as much.  And after we lost Bradley, the candle light in our home seemed a little dimmer.  I started watching Sabot with an apprehensive eye.  He was at least three years older to Bradley’s 12 when Bradley crossed the rainbow bridge making him 14 or 15 years old.   Our walks were getting shorter, but Sabot had another great gift to give us.

We brought a little puppy into the house a couple of months after Bradley’s passing.  Gabriel was a handful.  Sabot was rejuvenated overnight and for almost four years Gabriel became Sabot’s mission.  Sabot taught Gabriel how to follow, how to play, how and when to bark, when to listen and when to obey.  I think that mission gave him more years because he knew we needed his example.  He did it all much better than we ever could and in the back of my mind I feared it would be the last gift.  I should have known though, Sabot would always have one more surprise.

Late last year Sabot started having trouble getting up.  At first it was very slow.  Then he needed a surface that gave him friction and we had to be sure to keep his fur trimmed around his paws so he didn’t slide.  After 13 years of truly unconditional love and loyalty now was our chance to give to him.   Eventually he couldn’t walk without assistance and for several months we’ve assisted him outside with a sling to carry his rear weight.  He still had a strong appetite, was very alert to everything going around about him and interacting with the family as best he could.  He loved to watch the goings on in the house, participate in living room bark fests and let the cats know when they were getting too unruly.  We constantly assessed his quality of life and looked-for pain.   During the worst patches we asked each other if it was time for that trip to the vet but Sabot returned to his always smiling self.

The last two weeks Sabot wasn’t sleeping well through the night and was having trouble sitting up.  We started asking ourselves if it was “that time” as we prepared for a long eight-hour road trip to winterize a home in another state. We bundled Sabot into the SUV ensuring he had a comfortable spot and in the back of my mind I wondered if we would return with him.  Sabot snored loudly as we drove to the home he grew up in a sure sign he was getting some much-needed rest.  After arriving, he rested in his spot, slept in our bedroom and spent a day in the sun but wasn’t drinking or eating as usual. During a nap Friday evening, Sabot peacefully passed away in the home we shared for much of his life and where Bradley passed. Denise called me in the midst of heavy Atlanta traffic to tearfully give me the news.  I sobbed on the way home alternating between grieving for his loss and thanking God for the merciful way he took him home.

When I got home I petted Sabot, told him what an awesome friend he was and that I would miss him but looked forward to seeing him again.  Denise and I hugged and cried on each other.  We shared stories of our moments with Sabot and remembered some of the great gifts he gave us.  We learned after losing Bradley that separately writing down our friend’s unique “isms” and then putting the lists together helps with the grief and preserves the memory.  As I write this I remember his last gift being the opportunity to care and show love to someone who couldn’t take care of themselves.

We’ll never be the same without Sabot but that’s a good thing.  While he leaves a huge chasm in our hearts he has made us better people showing how to love, serve and be a subtle leader while having fun the whole time.

My list is nowhere near complete but here’s the start of my “Sabotisms”:

Digging deep holes in the back yard and having a face covered in dirt resembling a miner minus the mining helmet.

Getting excited about a stuffed animal and playing keep away until finding a quiet spot to lick that stuffed animal completely “clean”.

Laying in the back yard shade in a shallow hole he scooped out to stay cool.

The one time I wondered aloud if I had finished a slice of pepperoni pizza I had set on the coffee table and seeing crumbs on Sabot’s inquisitive face.

There are many more to come…

“See you later Sabot.  Don’t miss me too much.  Enjoy your renewed vitality corralling Bradley, Floyd and Mr. Socks, watching/barking at ducks and greeting every person that comes across the Rainbow Bridge.  Denise and I will be along, and we’ll catch up.”

The post Sabot, Our Oldest Four-Legged Friend & What he Taught Me appeared first on Grunts and Co.

The General sat at his desk and fumed.  Thirty-five years in the Army and he was used to getting his way.  But this damned “Second Land Army”, as he always insisted on calling it (except in public) was being more arrogant than usual. 

He never saw any reason for it existing in the first place.  Given his way he would gladly see it disbanded with its manpower and funding handed over to the Army.  But he had to admit, they had come up with an excellent camouflage pattern.   He wanted the Army to have it.  But the arrogant bastards not only refused to share it… but had taken out a patent in an attempt to prevent the Army from having use of it! 

He had thought to simply ignore that patent… this wasn’t the civilian business world and one military branch had no business using a civilian “technicality” to prevent a far larger service from having access to something that might well be useful in the field.   

But in reading through the patent, he found that one of the names listed as patent holder was Heinrich Himmler.  The Army would have to develop its own camouflage pattern.  (From 1937 events…)

WWII German SS Camo Pattern Helmet Cover

World War One

In 1917 the Marine Corps offered to send two regiments of infantry to France aboard the first transports.  While Pershing would welcome any trained and disciplined infantry that he could get, Stateside Army brass told the Marines that all transport would be tied up by the Army for many months to come.  The Secretary of the Navy got around that by having the Navy rustle up its own transport and the Marines were among the first units landed.

The Corps had agreed to some changes in its regimental organization to match the Army’s structure. A pre-war Marine regiment was rarely formed and had component companies of only 100 men.  It was barely equal to a WW1 Army battalion.  So the companies were pumped up to 250 men and the battalions to a thousand.

The two regiments, (5th and 6th Marines) would be combined with two Army regiments (9th and 23rd Infantry) and form the 2nd Army Division.  Each service unit would constitute a brigade within the division.  With each brigade later getting a machine gun battalion, and an artillery formation… each individual brigade was almost as strong as a French or British division by that point in the war. The Commanding General of the division was from the Army.

The Army’s brigade contained many regular soldiers and was a good fit with the Marines.  Together they would prove to be arguably the best division of the Allied Expeditionary Force…

But all was not roses.  Many of the enlisted Marines might not have known that they were almost kept out of the war by being restricted from shipping.  But they all knew that their superb Lewis machine guns had been confiscated from them as soon as they landed in France.  For months they would have criminally inferior French castoffs.

They chalked that up against the Army…If not Pershing himself, then his staff.  Actually it was Ordnance that was responsible.  That organization would spend WW1 being slack, pig-headed, and rabidly insubordinate to Congress.  The Army also suffered at their hands…the Army brigade getting stuck with garbage as well.

Ordnance forbade the brand new Browning Automatic Rifles from being sent to France (because the enemy might capture one and copy it…)  Somehow the 79th Infantry Division went into combat with some in September 1918, but Ordnance immediately moved heaven and earth to confiscate them.  See my previous story.

The Marines were wrong about Pershing.  In many ways he was one of their best friends in France.  His staff…not so much. Pershing himself could hardly be expected to routinely involve himself in most matters involving only two regiments in what would become a massive force.

Marine NCO 1918 (Naval Institute Press)

The Marines were told that they would have to surrender their uniforms and wear the Army’s “mustard-khaki…”  The claim was that it would clutter up the resupply channels to have to provide for a different uniform requirement.  The Navy gallantly offered to include replacement uniforms for the Marines…space available on warships that would dock in France.

The staff changed its tune and said that everybody would shoot at Marines because they would “look like Germans due to the greenish hue of their uniforms.” The Marines weren’t buying that since it wasn’t listed as a problem initially.  The staff stood firm.  They didn’t try to confiscate as originally envisioned…rather just waited for the trenches to rot the uniforms off the Marines’ backs. (As indeed happened over the months…meanwhile pretty much nobody shot at the Marines but the Germans.)

When the uniforms fell apart, the Marines cut their USMC buttons off the rags and sewed them on the Army replacement uniforms.  The staff said that it was against regulations but the Brigade did it anyway.  Until after Belleau Wood, enlisted Marines did not wear the Marine Corps Eagle, Globe and Anchor on the collars of their tunics… only officers. (Secretary of the Navy authorized for gallantry in that battle.)

As soon as the Marines hit France, the Army brass ordered U.S. Army type branch insignia (with Marine Corps emblems) to be manufactured, but those did not arrive until very late in the war, by which time the Marines were wearing the post-Belleau Wood authorized EGA’s on their collars. (See Army collar devices image below.)

Army issue Marine Corps collar insignia

A more severe blow to the Marine Brigade was the loss of their Commanding Officer.  This time Pershing was responsible. He had Brigadier General Doyen sent back to the States and replaced him with an Army general… a personal favorite…his Chief of Staff who had gone from major to brigadier general in less than a year.

Though their officers kept them in line, the common Marines in the Brigade felt as motherless as hobos in a rail-yard.  Two regiments of Marines.  Famed historian S.L.A. Marshall described them as “…a tiny raft of sea-soldiers tossed about in a gigantic ocean of Army…”  They felt as if they were going under.

But all was not as it seemed.  Pershing was indeed responsible this time, but he was doing what he felt to be right.  Pershing found that the Army was shipping high ranking officers to head up commands based on their seniority.  Far too many were way too old for a field command.  The oldest…his first duty upon reporting to his first post -in 1876- was to tell Mrs. Custer that her husband was dead.

Pershing demanded from the President…and got…authority to weed out the aged, ill, and infirm.  General Doyen had been a fine Marine officer… but he was too old and infirm… Headquarters Marine Corps should never have assigned him… (Throughout the war the Marines would too often blame Pershing, when it was his staff… and the Army would too often blame the 4th Marine Brigade, when the offender was Headquarters Marine Corps…)

Marine Colonel Buck Neville, commanding the 5th Marines was next in line…and had been far senior to Pershing’s choice at the beginning of the war. He should…in the normal course of events…have been given the command.  But events were not normal.  Pershing knew that the 2nd Division would probably be the first in action and he had to be sure that it would meet the test…and he knew almost nothing of Neville.

Army Brigadier General James Harbord was nothing like Ned Almond (picked out of place by MacArthur whose favorite he was in 1950 to head 10th Corps).  Harbord was tough, smart, and perceptive.  He never told Pershing what he thought that he wanted to hear… He would give him the truth, with the bark on.

Pershing shook Harbord’s hand and firmly told him… “I’m giving you the finest infantry in France…I expect you to command accordingly.”

Neville was too good an officer to sulk. He determined to give his full support to the incoming general…but he also wanted to see where the new commander stood. He shook his hand…then handed him two Marine Corps emblems to put on his Army uniform.(1)  This could be viewed as both a welcome and as a challenge… and indeed it was both.

Harbord wore the EGA’s during the time that he commanded the Brigade.  He demanded the best, but the Marines responded not only to his superb leadership… but also as only men who are treated right by someone that they initially assumed to be an enemy can.  He never let any staffer raise the issue of Marine buttons on Army uniforms or other such drek.  He was their “Godfather…”

Harbord went on to briefly command the division…but Pershing needed him to untie the logistic nightmare that faced the AEF. (2) After some temporary commanders, Pershing placed the U.S. Army’s 2nd Division under the command of General John Lejeune, USMC in August of 1918…who would command until after the 2nd Division was relieved the following year from occupation duty in Germany.

Being attached to the Army in France had innumerable benefits for the Marine Corps that would pay major dividends in WW2.  In addition to combat experience among many officers who would wear stars in the later war… many Marine officers had command experience not only with the Marines, but a fair number attached to staffs of Army divisions (though they had to wear spurs on such duty…)  Heavy artillery use…and on a large scale.

The public image of the Corps had been massively enhanced (fairly and unfairly…the last not the doing of the Brigade, but of HQMC…)  But some “identity issue” memories remained…again more with HQMC than with the Brigade.(3)

To this day the 5th and 6th Marine regiments proudly remember their being part of the U.S. Army’s 2nd Division.  (See image below…)

Institutional Memory

WORLD WAR 2 and Korea

Prior to the U.S. involvement in WW2, the Army decided to look into the possibility of camouflage uniforms…and handed the project off to the Corps of Engineers.(?)  Outside input was also requested.

American horticulturist Norvell Gillespie, the garden editor of magazines such as Sunset and Better Homes and Gardens, designed the jungle camouflage print used by the U.S. military in World War 2.

Essentially the material as used by the Army and the Marine Corps was the same, though differences in cut, pockets, etc. for each service.  Early on a camouflage “overall” was made available.  The Marines pretty much passed… The Army tried some in New Guniea and elsewhere.  Sadly, in tropic locations dysentery fairly common and the overalls did not have a “trap door” and soon were discarded.

Two-piece camouflage uniforms did make it into the European theater.  At least major parts of two divisions… the 2nd Infantry Division and the 2nd Armor were sent into France in 1944 wearing camouflage.  (See images below…)

Normandy 9th Infantry Division (U.S. Army)

9th Armored Division, Normandy (U.S. Army)

No evidence that camouflage helmet covers of the same material were ever issued to American troops in the European Theater.  Either they were not sent or the brass decided not to issue them.  Photos do exist of American soldiers in the ETO wearing camouflage covers on their helmets, but they seem to have all been constructed from material cut from camouflage parachutes. (See images.)

First Lt. George Kerchner, Ranger commander at Pointe de Hoc (U.S. Army)

Helmet cover made from camo parachute material

The Army had some of the same issues with the camouflage uniforms that the Marines had the year before in the Pacific. There was also a concern as to “friendly fire…”  The soldiers landing in France had tangled with Waffen SS who wore camo uniforms, (and increasingly, German Army regular forces wearing their own pattern helmet covers, smocks, and ponchos.)

The camo uniforms in the ETO were withdrawn.  Some would wind up as post-war surplus (being used by hunters…the pattern eventually being called “duck hunter”) or sent to French troops in Indochina.

The Marines in the Pacific started getting the two-piece uniforms in 1943. Marines wore them on Bogainville but the most complete issue was to the 2nd Marine Division in New Zealand, preparing for the invasion of Tarawa.  Uniforms, helmet covers, E-Tool covers, shelter half… ponchos.  (First issue camo helmet covers as used on Tarawa did not have the “slits” for inserting brush that later models did.)

Marine at Tarawa (USMC)

Tarawa proved the uniforms to be a failure.  Did a great job of being reversible, but the fabric was far too heavy and did not “breathe” properly.  Tarawa was 60 miles off the Equator… If the fabric became wet it stayed wet for a very long time.  The sleeves were “tubular” and not designed to be rolled up.

The camouflage pattern itself proved to be a failure…at least for an entire uniform.  The brownish “beach” side wasn’t too bad, though it had one major fault…(see below) but the mostly green side was a great design…for somebody hiding in the bushes…if they moved, it made them much more noticeable than if they were wearing a simple green fabric.

Both the brown and the green side shared another problem.  The pattern was too small.  For bird watching or hunting in place, not bad if blending in with matching vegetation. But, without getting technical… very close up, small patterns work… farther out they just look like a blob.

While some camo shirts worn by some 2nd Marine Division lads on Saipan, the Corps was through with the uniforms in that pattern for any mass issue.  The helmet covers and shelter half retained until the early 1960s…the ponchos issued until no longer serviceable…mostly by the early 1950s.

Other than the Alamo Scouts in MacArthur’s command, most soldiers in the Pacific either were never issued camo uniforms and helmet covers… or stopped wearing them well before the end of the war.

But HQMC noticed something about the camo helmet covers. Civilians watching newsreels soon came to identify camouflage helmet covers with Marines.  Too many times earlier in the war, Marines with bare “steel pots” had been identified as “soldiers” in newsreels.  HQMC made a mental note.

Immediately after the surrender of Japan and the occupation by American troops, MacArthur’s staff ordered a giant parade (one of countless film opportunities for General MacArthur.)  Appended to the order for the various commands was a note that the Marines were not to wear their camouflage helmet covers.

Many Marines (and HQMC) felt that this was a slight… that they were to be denied recognition in the newsreel that would be made.  Some blamed MacArthur.  No way of knowing what was the thought behind the order.  Maybe some anal staffer simply wanted all helmets to look alike.

Doubtful that MacArthur involved at all.  While he loathed Marines at the start of WW2, he deeply respected them by the end, and early in the Korean War threatened to resign if the Pentagon did not send him the First Marine Division to launch his invasion of Inchon.

Korean War

Before the Korean War the Army decided to see about coming up with a new pattern of camouflage for helmet covers.  A design was approved, but a contract was not issued.

When the Korean War broke out the Marines rushed one regiment, some supporting arms (total labeled 1st Marine Brigade) and some air support.  Somewhere over the years, the Marines in this regiment had not kept camouflage helmet covers as routine inventory.  Most of the Marines in the “Fire Brigade” in the Pusan area had bare helmets.  Newsreels again often referring to them as “soldiers…”  And again, HQMC took note.

When the Brigade joined up with fresh units to become the 1st Marine Division, the Corps saw to it that camo helmet covers were available and worn by all.  Never again would a Marine unit deploy without them.  I have seen photos of some Marines in Korea in the last 18 months of the war wearing WW2 pattern camo shirts… They were part of a local “recon” team.  Interestingly they wore the shirts over their body armor.

The Army requested that a production run be made on “their” helmet cover design…(having by this point left the previous design to the Marines.)  A production run was made and space on an old freighter hauling other supplies was found.  Unfortunately the ship sank in the North Pacific.  The Army got another run…but only in the last weeks of the war.  (See image of probable pattern below)

Army developed camouflage helmet cover (Author paid image licensed by Canstock.)

Whatever the Army brass was doing, company grade officers in the field decided to take matters into their own hands.  Fabric helmet covers had been used as far back as WWI by the Germans…mostly improvised…and the U.S. Army was going to do the same in Korea.

Aside from any camouflage patterns, fabric covers “softened” the silhouette a bit at distance… eliminated any glare from bare metal, and mostly eliminated any metal sound if helmet hit branches, etc.  So by 1951 various materials being used…sandbags, combat fatigue cloth, etc.  (See image below.)

Joe Clemons, C.O. King Company, Pork Chop Hill, 1953 (U.S. Army)

Post Korea – Pre Vietnam – Vietnam

The Army and the Marine Corps returned from Korea with a renewed interest in camouflage uniforms.  The Marine Corps still had stocks of WWII two-piece camo. Some experimenting in the field… but the problems remained.  Eventually remaining stocks issued to Recon.

Marines exiting chopper 1960… (USMC)

The Army in Germany in the 1950s had access to Wehrmacht WW2 camo stocks. Various experiments carried out.  Some of the troops flown into Lebanon in 1958 were wearing various types of camo from the experiments.

American soldiers experimenting with German camo (U.S. Army)

Meanwhile, the Marine Corps had introduced a new, Marine Corps specific, utility (combat fatigues) uniform.  A definite improvement over the many variations of combat fatigues used in Korea.  The uniform was handsome yet simple.  Flaps covered and protected all buttons (except the very top which was normally not closed.)  The material was durable and (pending any adoption of camouflage) seemed to meet their needs for coming decades.

U.S. Marine 1st Lt. wearing pre-common service issue utilities (USMC)

One potential problem.  The uniform “blouse” was too heavy of a fabric for sustained use in the tropics.  This was made worse by a very large inside pocket on the wearer’s left side.  A “map pouch” that doubled the thickness of the material.

There *was* consideration of a “new” camouflage uniform.  This would be in a “broad-leaf” pattern using larger pattern to avoid the problem with “duck hunter…”  The pattern actually was a 1948 design that got shelved.

Summer Leaf pattern test

The Corps considered it…and some test uniforms (including field jackets) were produced.  Absolutely gorgeous… but “gorgeous” is not a field requirement. Reversible…would look splendid in New England forests.

But too many problems.  Reversible pattern increased weight of fabric.  The uniforms were cut exactly like the new Marine Corps utilities… right down to the map pocket.  While some were produced in Asia for Americans in Vietnam in the early 1960s… the uniforms themselves were “no-go…”  However, a variation of the pattern would make its way onto helmet covers and shelter half prior to the Vietnam war and would be the pattern for decades.

Robert McNamara and the bean counters arrived.  Tradition and pride meant nothing.  The same people who would send individual replacements to Vietnam like so many spare parts… had no patience with “individual service expression…” The services had “standardization” rammed down their throats.  Same boots for everybody…same combat fatigues.  They *graciously* allowed the services to keep their own fatigue caps, belts, and buckles.

Jointly procured combat fatigue shirt

The Army didn’t like it much and the Marine Corps even less.  Their elegant utilities could no longer be produced.  So too with their classic camo helmet covers and shelter half.  Wasn’t the Army’s fault, but the Corps, in the field… was going to look a lot like “more Army…” To make it worse…the damn uniforms were no good for the tropics.

In Vietnam both services would wear the well-designed jungle fatigues.  (See Part II of this series.)  But both services also experimented with camouflage uniforms. Mostly recon teams…locally produced tiger stripe uniforms… then American camo version of the jungle fatigues.

Recon team RVN… (U.S. Army)

U.S.M.C. Vietnam era jungle uniform in Army developed ERDL camo pattern

The Marine Corps really into this latest pattern and design.  Eyes on adopting it as their standard issue when they returned from Vietnam.  But that was not to be.

Rhodesia

Meanwhile in Southern Africa in the mid 1960s the Rhodesian government was looking for a camo pattern to be issued to all services in its slowly escalating bush war.  Some of their senior officers had served in the Long Range Desert Group in North Africa, and the SAS there and in Malaya.  One pattern was quickly agreed upon.

Rhodesian Security Forces camouflage pattern

Close up you could see both small patterns and large…the smaller to help a soldier who might be concealed in the bush… At a distance only the larger patterns visible.  (See photo below… Yankee Papa image 1976)

Rhodesia, field briefing (Image by Yankee Papa)

The Rhodesians had the advantage that their uniform only had to be appropriate to one area of operations.  A field jacket in the pattern was issued since in the High Veldt in winter, frost could frequently be encountered in the morning.  The only real flaw was the buttons… too small, too weak, and sewn on with cotton thread.  The lads replaced with larger, tougher buttons in the same color with nylon thread.

Post-Vietnam

The Marine Corps hopes for adopting the Vietnam jungle uniform as the template for their future utility uniform crashed on the rocks of standardization. It is said that “…an elephant is a mouse designed by a committee…”  The “Woodland pattern BDU” wasn’t that bad… but it was a “compromise…”

The Corps wanted to keep the upper slash pockets (goes back to old paratrooper design to allow easier access when wearing web gear…)  That was rejected… straight pockets would be the standard. The size of the pattern would be adjusted, colors flattened.  It was what it was and both services would have to live with it for the next two decades.

Rather than rip-stop cotton, it would be a 50-50 nylon/cotton.  Both the pattern and the weight geared to Northern Europe.  Overheating of troops led to the Army and the Marine Corps issuing their own lightweight rip-stop blends. In spite of being specifically designed *not* to be starched… commanders could not restrain themselves and in many commands starching became mandatory.

Marine BDU images 1980s (USMC)

Gulf Wars

In Gulf War One the Army and the Marine Corps were issued a desert specific uniform in what the troops called a “chocolate chip” pattern.  It was handsome enough looking, but the issue of the “small pattern” was raised again.

At the start of Gulf War two the standard desert uniform was essentially tan with very large markings scattered upon it.  Neither service particularly fond of it.

MARPAT

The Marine Corps decided to “go rogue” (so to speak) and design its own battle dress utilities.  While this was not done in secret, it was well below many radars.  The Corps wanted regular and desert patterns.  They commissioned scientific research and managed to achieve what they were looking for at a remarkably low cost…(in view of what would follow… amazingly low…)

Marine MARPAT BDUs (USMC)

The Corps knew that it had a world beater.  It also had a camo pattern all its own.  It expected other services to attempt to “co-opt” the pattern. Not just service identity… but imagined images of National Guardsmen in wrinkled BDUs that hung like pajamas walking around shopping centers in the new pattern. (Marine Reservists essentially not allowed to be in public…other than driving to drill…in camos while not on official tasks.)

A patent was obtained.  The “MARPAT” was no longer under the radar. The Army (with some justification) wanted to know why, if MARPAT was the best available, they couldn’t have it too.  Certainly, if the Corps had a new (and best) anti-tank rocket, the best out there, they couldn’t put a patent on it to keep the Army from having the rockets as well.

What happened next is a puzzlement.  One would have expected the Secretary of the Army to go to the Secretary of Defense…and a “stand and deliver” order be given to the Marine Corps.  But it didn’t happen that way.

It might have been that while the Army had a burr under its saddle… They made the complaint…but saw this as a golden opportunity to design their own all-Army uniform… and come up with a better product than the Marines had.

UCP – ACU

The Army brass, somehow… in spite of spending vastly more money than the Corps had came up with a camouflage pattern that was an embarrassing failure.  How did it happen?  Were combat troops not consulted?… Didn’t *anybody* with veto power take a good long look at it?  The pattern and color scheme might have been a winner…at the battle of Stalingrad.

Back to the drawing board (U.S. Army)

The Army took more care to come up with a decent replacement pattern… The replacement candidates certainly better thought out.

Meanwhile, the Marine Corps has stopped issuing the desert pattern MARPAT as a Summer Stateside uniform.  It is restricted to Marines assigned to overseas desert environments.  The “Winter” combat uniform is now to be worn all year round in the United States.  In warmer months the sleeves authorized to be rolled up.

As a final note.  The Woodland BDU’s are not missed…if for no other reason than the fact that the color/pattern in use by a number of armies that we may have to fight… including some Red Chinese formations.

-Yankee Papa-

COMING IN PART IV…THE FUTURE – NOTHING CAN GO WRONG…GO WRONG

NOTES

(1) Marine officers not in France…especially those at HQMC made some disparaging remarks about Harbord being given the Marine collar EGA’s.  Mutterings of “buttering up the new boss” were heard.  The Marines at the “sharp end” with the 4th Marine Brigade knew better…as did Harbord.

 

(2) After the war, President Wilson sent Harbord on a fact-finding mission to the Mideast.  He supported the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine.  Harbord reported on massacres of Armenians by Turks, collected information about them and was an eyewitness to at least one.  He retired from the Army in 1922 and became the head of RCA until 1947.

 

(3) The gripes between the Army and the Marine Corps…especially re WW1 are nearly endless…and all too often misdirected or in error.  I have gladly ignored almost all of them except those directly pertaining to this article.  Otherwise, to paraphrase Gandalf in Lord of the Rings: “If all the grievances standing between the Army and the Marines are to be brought up here… then we may as well abandon this article…”

(Xtra) Complex guide to camo

SUGGESTED READING

The post UNIFORMS: Towards the Practical Part 3. 1917-2017 Camouflage, Conflict, and Chaos by Yankee Papa appeared first on Grunts and Co.

The driving force behind this initiative is a perceived overmatch the enemy has over the average Grunt.  The problem is the shortfall relies on an apples and oranges comparison.  Anecdotal reports from the field are that snipers equipped with Enfields and Dragunov sniper rifles as well as medium machine guns like the PKM and the PKP are outranging the Grunt’s ability to shoot back.  Yes, they do and to someone who doesn’t understand how we arm units (not individuals) or who has never been in a firefight, it would seem to make sense.  Contrary to what may at first look seem reasonable, it isn’t how we fight or counter a threat.

We have our own sniper systems, fielded all the way down to squad level as well as our own medium machine guns to counter those enemy systems. Admittedly we do need a new machinegun to match the PKP’s 1500m range but that doesn’t make the case for a new individual rifle. Equipping every grunt with the ability to fight a sniper or crew served machine gun is as logical as equipping every infantryman with an anti-tank weapon because he might have to fight a tank.  We don’t fight that way and that type of thinking weighs down our already overburdened Soldiers and Marines.

Slide 10 “A Path to Overmatch Next Generation Individual Weapon System” By Jim Schatz

Here’s another thought, let’s assume despite no actual scientific research (another logic error) that the enemy is effectively engaging us at beyond 300 meters on a consistent and operationally significant basis. For arguments sake let’s say the case is actually better supported than just the anecdotal situations that are the basis of this perceived overmatch.  Wouldn’t it behoove us to teach our troops to shoot at greater ranges NOW even before evaluating a new interim rifle on the way to determining an unknown new round?  Developing a training program is exponentially simpler than fielding a new weapon system and could squeeze out a couple of hundred yards of effectiveness from existing systems.  Heck, it would be a down payment on the required longer-range training program the future desired weapon system would demand.

Our military does a generally poor job of training longer range engagements.  Heck, we don’t train to the max effective range of our current assault weapons.  A little over 20% of the Army’s individual qualification course is dedicated to shooting at 300 meters (THREE engagements with a 10 second engagement window per).  The Marines devote TEN rounds to shooting at a six-foot by six-foot barn door at 500 meters with a full minute to fire each round at that range.  Realistic?  Adequate?  I think not.

Unfortunately, it’s not sexy to improve training instead of getting new kit.  The military doesn’t have a “Training Corps” but they do have an “Acquisition Corps”.  There’s a profundity there.  Also, vendors don’t make much money from training versus selling a product outright.  Our military still conducts most of their training in house with uniformed staff.  Those troops aren’t siphoning off campaign contributions from a new training initiative.   Major weapons sources habitually grease the political skids with cash, another factor that pushes for material solutions to potential training problems.

What about the efficacy and efficiency of switching to a 7.62 rifle just to be able to have a system that can be upgraded to another caliber in a decade?  Ignoring the default bottomless pit of money approach, why limit ourselves before this new super caliber is selected?  What if there is a better super caliber specific rifle available in the future when this super round is selected versus the interim rifle being proposed today?  Do we just start again from scratch from a new bottomless pit of money?  Hey, I’m all for giving troops the best tools AND TRAINING to address the threat but maybe we should confirm what the actual threat is, create the training and then select the caliber instead of a step backward to maybe take a step forward?

There exists a train of thought that adopting 7.62 distances us from 5.56 putting us on the right path to getting to a supposed better and larger round.  Ignoring that this better round hasn’t been identified yet, this approach ignores the proverbial 800-pound gorilla.  That supposed better round is always a bigger round.  Why did we leave 7.62?  Well it wasn’t just because of McNamara’s overarching influence on the Department of Defense in the 60’s.  7.62mm ammunition and rifles have downsides to being generally issued.

Most of the negative challenges resulting from the selection of a 7.62 battle rifle derive from weight.  A slightly heavier rifle is required to fire the round but the real debilitating factor is the weight of the ammunition.  7.62 is almost twice the weight of 5.56 ammo.  This is not a small matter especially considering how overburdened the Soldier and Marine is today.  The choice then becomes to either add to the combatant’s load or do with less.  More weight will slow the troop down further as well as cause him to tire more quickly.  This is a cumulative phenomenon.  Carrying a heavier load for a day is unpleasant. Carrying it for weeks on end is soul crushing.

Lightening the load by carrying less ammo has even worse second order effects.  We rely on fire and maneuver to close with to kill, capture or destroy the enemy.  The ability to suppress the enemy is critical to being able to maneuver to a position of advantage against him. Suppression requires ammo.  Less ammo means less suppression which means less maneuver.  That can result in mission failure as well as more casualties.  Less ammo also means more frequent resupply.  Solutions to ease supply constraints often require minimizing the distance between the source of supply and the user which makes for slow progress. Another solution is stockpiling supplies on the warfighter, a return to the weight problem.

Weight is a major issue often ignored by fans for fielding an intermediate rifle.  A recent counter to the weight conundrum is a belief that polymer or telescoped casing will fix the issue.  We’ve been chasing this solution for decades.  We should not field an intermediate rifle and pin our hopes on a technology breakthrough.  It first needs to be proven. The promise of a lighter round does little to address the increased weight on one’s back especially since adoption of a 7.62 interim rifle would but that weight on a warfighter’s back for at least five years assuming no setbacks with selecting a new round and the weapon to fire it.  Fat chance.

Compared to weight a relatively small but hardly if ever mentioned disadvantage to fielding a 7.62 battle rifle is the additional training that will be required to handle the increased recoil.  It’s also worth considering the role of women in the Infantry.  The growth of women serving was a small part of the reason we moved to a 9mm pistol round in the 80’s.  Women’s increased integration is an important criterion cited by law enforcement organizations when adopting a new pistol and was undoubtedly at play as part of the Army’s demand for modularity in the newly adopted Sig 320 pistol.   This isn’t the biggest issue but it is one.

There are many reasons we should not take the interim rifle course.  The overmatch argument is a flawed apples to oranges comparison. The inevitable and at one time correct comments that 5.56 isn’t effective rely on old experiences and not the Army’s latest and highly effective round, the M855A1.  Giving front line troops a bullet launcher with more range while not giving him the training necessary to employ that weapon creates capability on paper alone.  Considering that we don’t train to our current weapons’ max ranges today and haven’t for decades should give one pause.

Switching to an interim rifle because it will handle a bigger round than the current platform is capable of seems to be the opposite approach if we haven’t even identified the new round.  That study isn’t going to happen until the next decade.  Most importantly though, the weight considerations of 7.62 should be a HUGE red flag for those thinking about fielding a 7.62 battle rifle and a STOP sign for those that will have to actually carry it.  How can we invest in an interim rifle to host that unspecified round if we don’t even know what the round will be?  What if that new round comes with an ideal platform? Do we start over yet again?

Having listed many reasons as to why the interim rifle shouldn’t be the path what is?  Immediately improve longer range marksmanship training so we can get the most out of the rifles we have.  Keep the M4 and do the ammo study now.  Not because of a fictitious overmatch issue but to see what demonstrable advantages a different round may have and identify the requirements for a rifle to shoot it should a new round substantially increase lethality, accuracy or range at no additional weight to the soldier.  That means perfecting polymer or telescoped cases to generate a 40% weight savings.

I suspect this article will cause a stir and be deeply dissatisfying to “gun guys’ like myself.  It is a very different take on the “Interim Rifle”.  Every article out there seems to focus in a glowing manner on the different potential candidates for an interim rifle.  A few will even list a disadvantage or two reference the effort but even then, it’s a cursory nod.  It seems that with the potential of a relaxed defense budget the Army feels it has money burning a hole in its pocket.  It can be predicted with a high degree of certainty that spending for spending’s sake is hardly ever wise.

The post MISTAKE: Ditching the M4 for a 7.62 Interim Rifle appeared first on Grunts and Co.

 …For years the French High Command had stressed the attack… always the attack. Whatever the casualties, the “elan” of the French soldier would always sweep the enemy away it was firmly believed.  “Elan” is always a fine thing…but it is never a substitute for good tactics.  At the end of the day the bullets don’t care how brave you are.

 …The French launched frontal assaults all along the line of contact.  Fourteen separate actions lumped into one battle known as “The Battle of the Frontiers…” The ghastly lessons of the American Civil War had been largely ignored by European generals who dismissed the American armies as “armed mobs chasing each other around the countryside…”  The French, at least, were getting a crash course this August day.

…Bayonets against machine guns in frontal assaults just left ever increasing piles of bodies.  The French troops and their regimental officers displayed all the “elan” in the world… Attack after attack, moving over the bodies of their fallen comrades…all to no avail. 

 …Larger numbers of French soldiers would die in other battles during that war… but not in a single day.  The Battle of the Frontiers took the lives of 27,000 of France’s finest young men in one day… 7000 more killed than the British lost the first day at the Somme.

 …Most of the world… even most of France, has forgotten; the next four years blurring the image. The French government censored all casualty reports and it was years before historians could learn the casualty figures and match them to the specific action.

 …The local villagers have kept the memory alive…but mostly because on that day German troops in a number of villages in the same area were ordered to kill civilians… males in some villages… everybody in others… as “reprisals” for suspected “franc-tireur” (partisan) actions that never occurred. 

 …The grim logic of 20th Century warfare had arrived, with a vengeance. Close order frontal assaults against steady troops with modern firepower would become little more than massed death swarms.  And then there was the problem of facing an enemy behind cover whose uniforms blended in with the terrain, while your troops in the open wore bright blue coats and blazing red trousers with matching kepis. 

While this article deals mostly with the American military experience regarding combat uniforms…reference must be made to European forces in WWI.  You can read Part 1 here.

By 1914 most European armies had “drab” or “earth toned” uniforms available for their troops…most often in shades of khaki or green.  But for the glory minded French generals such uniforms were suitable only for small dirty colonial wars on the far frontiers of Asia or Africa.  For a European war (uniforms last updated in 1870) Napoleonic splendor was required.

It might seem that by 1912 any cheeseburger could figure out that Napoleonic splendor was at a disadvantage when facing modern bolt action rifles, smokeless powder and machine guns.  But when a reformer in the French Assembly suggested “toning down” the combat uniform (as the English and Germans already had)…at a minimum replacing the blazing red trousers… the French Minister of war sprang to his feet and shouted him down: “Jamais! Le pantalon rouge c’est la France!” (“Never! The red trouser *is* France!”) And that of course, trumped all logic.

Revell.com

By early 1915, after catastrophic losses, the French Army decided that “Le pantalon rouge” was a luxury that it could no longer afford.  But rather than go with an earth tone, they produced field uniforms that from head to foot were in a color that they referred to as “horizon blue…”  (Think “powder blue…”) Somewhat of an improvement, but not only failed to blend into many backgrounds, but the color was profoundly “un-martial…”

Improved French uniform

Green tone French uniforms followed and were better designed for the rigors of the Western Front.  The New Model French “Greatcoat” was far more serviceable than the old dark blue one.  While “elan” tactics would persist for a time, at least the soldiers were no longer “blazing targets…”

The British wore a type of “khaki” uniform.  “Khaki” can run from an almost white sand color to a brown or near green tone.  The Germans wore “Feldgrau” or “field gray” uniform.  Shades could vary, but quite often the uniforms started out as more of a green color and fade into what would be called gray… though some units actually started with all gray uniforms.

The American Expeditionary Force pretty much followed the British model. Field grade and higher ranking American officers often had their uniforms tailored in London.  Shades of “khaki” might range from a tan to possibly a “mustard green…”

Many American officers wore “riding boots” and the fashion was to attach spurs… even if they never sat a horse… (To achieve the European image of gentlemen officers…)  Marine Corps officers shunned the spurs (except when attached to Army staffs where they were required to wear them… A ceremony of sorts held on the transports heading home… as the Marine officers forced to wear spurs, tossed them into the ocean…)

American Army 1917-18. US Army

American “campaign hats” (think D.I. type headgear) soon put aside and replaced by flat folding overseas caps… or British model helmets.

In 1914 the armies entered combat without proper helmets. Modern artillery with greatly increased fragmentation inflicted head wounds on a scale not seen before.

Except for German cavalry… the German “pikelhaube” helmets with the “spike” on top were not made of metal… but of boiled leather (designed to deflect sword strokes.)  Would not stop shell fragments (referred to generically as “shrapnel”, though that was only one type of fragment…)

The French came up with a serviceable helmet, the Germans with the iconic “coal scuttle helmet.  The British, (and the Americans in that war) eventually went into battle with a type of helmet very close in appearance to that worn by English armies during the 100 Years War.  Helmets reduced serious head wounds (compared to troops without them) by up to 70%…

While “leggings” of a sort had been worn by American, British and French troops elsewhere… enlisted men soon came to be equipped with “puttees” (the name comes from India, though various tribal peoples ranging from Central Asia to the Apaches have at times worn them.)

WWI puttees…

******

Puttees were pre-measured lengths of a very thin blanket-like cloth wound round the leg.  Protected the lower trouser legs from being torn in the field.  Cheaper than dirt.  (I was forced to use them in a special training unit for a time… but that is a story for another day…)

It takes a fair amount of practice to apply them correctly.  If not done perfectly, they will start to unravel… (usually at the worst possible time…) Even more so than “gaiters” or leggings, they are time consuming to apply and remove.  For infantry this meant fewer opportunities to clean feet and change socks.  Some reports of issues involving varicose veins and other circulation issues.

While the red trousers and “horizon blue” uniforms had vanished, total war (on the Western Front at least) had not produced truly practical, or comfortable uniforms. “Combat” uniforms would have been more at home on a parade ground.

One might think that top buttons buttoned on jackets would only be mandated during a gas attack… but armies went into attacks with troops so encumbered. Worse, some coats had tops that were more like “stocks” to keep the chin up… just one step removed from the old leather stocks of the early 19th Century. And some uniform jackets (such as many issued to Americans) were so “form fitted” as to make them look a size or two too small.  Function and comfort still not a top priority.

Between the two World Wars American troops did their active campaigning mostly in “…sunny tropic scenes…” from Haiti to Nicaragua. Khaki uniforms sufficed.  The two Marine regiments that deployed to North China at various times wore modified WWI uniform… (looser fitting, open collar… often with tie when not under fire.)

The American military was “resistant” to the idea of a fully functional combat uniform.  It was grudgingly admitted that some work details (cleaning out garbage pits, etc.) needed something more functional and the 1937 indigo denim work outfit was issued to those requiring it.  Usually a jacket and trousers with floppy “clam-digger’s” hat, the only thing military about it was the uniform belt.  (A few commanders insisted upon the wool shirt being worn with it…sometimes even with necktie!)

After Pearl Harbor a few commands (especially Stateside) had troops turn out in denims with helmet, cartridge belt, and leggings.  But soon they were again relegated to cleaning garbage pits… stockades… and as issue to enemy prisoners of war.

U.S. Army ETO combat uniforms. brainparking.com

In the European Theater of War (to include North Africa), the American Army’s idea of a combat uniform was wool trousers (referred to as “O.D., but like “khaki” that came in various shades…), wool shirt (to be worn open, though a few commanders insisted upon ties for a time), a short, lightweight “field jacket” and leggings.

Later the wool trousers would be replaced with green “herringbone” twill (HBT) “fatigue” trousers.  All HBT uniforms were issued, but some Stateside commands initially used only in place of the indigo denims.  Somehow the idea was that the HBT would be worn over the wool uniform (some units with a necktie!) but rapidly the practical fatigues were worn on their own.

The 1943 issue of this uniform in the ETO (along with vastly more efficient longer, warmer, and more wind resistant dark green cotton sateen field jacket) was bitterly resisted by some American commanders in the field.  But the supply system, combined with replacements arriving in the newer uniforms saw to it that by late 1944 the change was largely complete in most units.

Airborne units had their own distinctive uniform… baggy fatigue trousers, jump boots and jacket with upper “slash pockets”, lower cargo pockets, fabric belt and snap closures.  Colors ranged from early desert tans to various shades of olive and green.

U.S. Army, Pacific Theater combat fatigues. US Army

In the losing battles of 1942 in places like the Philippines and Wake Island, the Army and Marines fought in what they had…khaki shirts and trousers.  But by August of 1942 the Army and Marines entered combat wearing the green dungarees. Neither service experienced any serious opposition within their commands in the Pacific to these fully functional uniforms.  (I’ll cover camouflage uniforms in part 3.)

In both Theaters shoes were replaced with low-cut boots (in the Marine Corps these were called “boondockers…”) Leggings were issued, but once in combat (especially in the Pacific) many men simply did not wear theirs at the “sharp end…” Being able to remove boots during brief stops was facilitated by this… and, especially in the Pacific, not just the trouser legs… but the entire fatigue uniform would be in shreds soon enough.

WW2 buckle flap combat boots

The Army was not going to issue “jump boots” to all its infantry, but by 1944 started issuing low-cut boots with buckle flaps sewn on.  A practical combat boot was now being issued to soldiers in the field.

…The years between WWII and Korea saw some minor R&D, but the war was essentially fought with the same weapons… and the same uniforms.  The South Korean Army wore U.S. fatigues in combat as did all U.N. contingents except most of the British Commonwealth Brigade.

U.S. Army combat fatigues, Korean War (Canadian officers pictured…)

The Pentagon had cleverly decided that there would be no more ground wars, so after WW2 vast stocks of fatigue uniforms had been sold to the surplus market. But then pesky Korea came along, demanded entire divisions… and an increase in the Army at home and abroad.  For a time there was a shortage of combat fatigues. North Korean and Chinese POWs were often issued U.S. officers’ khaki shirts and trousers in lieu of fatigues.

Army warehouses around the country were searched and fatigues were found… many different designs… including one pattern with trousers that had a giant pocket centered on the rump.  Pockets ran from small to gigantic… buttons of all kinds. In short, there was little “uniform” about the uniforms.

By the end of the Korean War both the Army and the Marine Corps decided to sort everything out.  Each had fatigues designed to meet its own preference (and boots as well).  The days of combat fatigues that had all the tailoring of potato sacks was now a thing of the past.

Combat uniforms would be (in theory) better fitting and look sharp when starched (garrison only… not at the sharp end…) Flat buttons would later be replaced with far thicker ones that would not easily snap or crush.  Depending on unit, trousers would either be tucked into boots…or “blousing bands” used. Presented a neat appearance and went some way to keeping bugs out.

Pre Vietnam U.S. Army Airborne. US Army

The new Army fatigues were better designed and fit better (some individuals and units “fine tuned” tailoring them as well…).  Looked sharp.  Maybe too sharp for combat use.  White name tape, gold on black “U.S. ARMY” tape… colored division patches, jump wings, and full size gold sleeve rank for the enlisted and silver or gold insignia for the officers.

Pre Vietnam U.S. Marine recruits. Leatherneck Magazine

The Marine Corps went with an elegant “minimalist” design.  All of the buttons on the shirt were covered, producing a smooth appearance.  Little else was added, small black metal enlisted pin-on collar rank insignia. Officer collar rank insignia same as Army, but only 1/2 the size. Iron on Marine Corps Eagle, Globe and Anchor and USMC on left breast pocket.

For some odd reason the Third Marine Division in Okinawa bucked the trend and had white name tapes over the right shirt pocket. Heavy duty and durable, the shirt’s suitability for tropical deployment was further reduced by a very large map pocket inside the left breast.

Prior to and during WW2 the military dabbled in research on tropical combat uniforms.  Some ideas would come to fruition decades later… others (such as very high top jungle boots with about 25 buttons) died unlamented.

The Army had been experimenting with jungle uniforms for its advisors in Vietnam, but suddenly in March of 1965, thousands of American troops started to arrive…wearing their Stateside combat uniforms.  Those needed replaced… as did the all leather boots (which would soon rot…)

Jungle boots…soon with metal “punji stick” plate eventually issued to all troops (though early on many soldiers got their first pair of genuine U.S. manufactured items…on the black market…Then the senior officers got them as issue… then the battalion clerks, and so on until somehow they made it out into the grass…)

U.S. Army officers…jungle fatigues…Vietnam War. US Army

Early Vietnam jungle fatigues had shoulder epaulets and buttons that showed. The later version hid the buttons and lost the epaulets. Larger slash and cargo pockets than WW2 Airborne combat uniform (idea is to have better access while wearing webbing of any type).  Metallic snap buttons replaced by late model thick buttons.

Ripstop fabric. Lightweight, cool, dry in little time… Trousers had fabric blousing ties built in at the bottom…that everybody ripped out…used separate blousing devices.  As issued, the darker green was fairly effective… after repeated washings the color faded to a light sage, more appropriate to a drier woodland.

The Army started off on their jungle fatigues with full size gold colored shoulder stripes for the enlisted… sewn on.  WWII and Korea seemingly taught some people nothing. Army eventually replaced with “subdued” full-sized sewn on shoulder rank.

In the end, it was decided that the Marine Corps subdued collar rank insignia a better idea.  Among other things, not only smaller and harder to make out at a distance, but uniforms rotted and ripped so fast that sewing insignia on new issue jackets something of a waste of time.

The Army went with subdued officer collar insignia, but the Marine Corps did not.  God only knows why.  As it was, 2nd Lieutenants were dropping like rock stars…the enemy didn’t need any help. Smart platoon commanders removed their bars before going out in the grass… and carried rifles rather than .45s…

American infantry at last had a truly practical combat uniform (for that AO…) It was lightweight, comfortable, did not remain soggy… It was durable enough…and easily replaced. It was a winner… so of course not only would the material and color have to change… but even much of its basic design.

The American military returned from Vietnam, and a gradually escalating war between the services would develop:  The “Camo Wars…”

(…Coming in Part III, CAMOUFLAGE, CONFLICT, and CHAOS…)

-Yankee Papa-

SUGGESTED READING

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Since the advent of large capacity magazines, soldiers have searched for ways to keep track of how many rounds remained in that magazine.  Besides obviously trying to count the number of rounds fired, early approaches included loading the last five to ten rounds with tracer to warn the service member of a soon to be empty magazine.   Hardware solutions have included holes in magazines, clear windows and even clear magazines.

Real technology to count the rounds in a magazine seemed to only exist in movies like the 1986 movie Aliens with the M41A Pulse Rifle.  That movie actually inspired military acquisition as they developed the Objective Individual Combat Weapon (OICW).

Our military has been pursuing round count capability for decades.  As a project officer at the Infantry’s Battle Lab at Ft. Benning, the first I heard of the Army’s desire to have a round counter on its rifles was in the doomed land warrior program.  It was bantered about even more as a capability for the later objective force and future force warrior programs.  Neither program had a specific weapon identified but the capability was something that was desirable.  Using round count, the ability to forecast equipment failure was definitely part of the vehicles that made up the Future Combat System program and something round counters up to that time did not offer.

One of the last indicators of military interest in incorporating shot counter capability is a briefing that is almost a decade old.  Over the last decade and a half the military has been largely focused on the current fight and not really pursued shot counter capability but industry has tried to advance it.

Most previous efforts have been directed at the previously described capability of providing the user information on how many rounds they have fired.   CAA produced the CDMAG AR magazine that shows the round count in the base.  Magpul installed a window in their later generation magazines.  RADETEC developed a device that sat on the right side of the pistol and counted the number of rounds fired from a pistol.  (That worked ok for a left handed shooter but a right handed shooter would need to tilt the gun to see the readout).  None of these approaches addressed maintenance issues.

Secubit has taken a radically different tack on the capability with WeaponLogic.  WeaponLogic’s round counter approach is not to provide the user information on how many rounds they have fired but to provide a tool for firearms maintainers to determine the usage seen by a particular firearm as a predictive tool to improve reliability.  Hidden in the pistol grip of a firearm sits a black box counting rounds dry fired, fired, the rate of fire and even the use of higher pressure producing ammo.

WeaponLogic’s counter that fits in an AR-15/M-4 pistol grip. Secubit Photo.

The counter is installed at the armorer level.  It fits in a variety of existing grips with more being added.  Battery life is reported at a whopping 15+ years. Each counter can capture up to a million rounds of data.

Periodically, the information can be collected in a handy handheld device called a Data Collection Device (DCD) and then downloaded to a maintainer’s computer allowing armorers to keep a much more accurate count of rounds fired by the weapons under his charge.  Previously keeping track of a weapons usage rested on super diligent users keeping track of the rounds they fired.  That’s something really only snipers typically do.  More often than not, most units relied on unit armorers to keep track of how many rounds were fired.  Often that was done by taking the ammo allocated to his unit during a training event and dividing it by the number of weapons that fired that round in his arms room.  That technique is highly inaccurate at best and in the fluidity of combat, useless.

WeaponLogic’s DCD handheld reader. Secubit Photo

The ability to have exact shot counts and software to maintain an arms room inventory isn’t minor.  Imagine being able to replace parts before they actually fail based on their expected life versus a reported failure or worse, a casualty.  Further, used across a service, the reams of data could actually help in improving a fielded weapon or acquiring a new one before enough anecdotal evidence surfaces to cause a service to conduct a test.  A SOCOM briefing (slides 42-55) prepared by NAVSEA Warfare Center from 2006 describes the potential issues that could be addressed by such a shot counter maintenance capability.

WeaponLogic has taken the approach even a bit farther with software that allows armorers to track individual weapons’ round count, when last serviced/specific parts replaced, set mean life between failure settings by part and input specific weapon issues.  The system even promises the potential to provide feedback on ammunition performance by lot.

Main software screenshot. Secubit photo

Secubit promotes WeaponLogic as a solution to last month‘s NAVSOC RFI requesting a combat evaluation.  Secubit can reconfigure Weaponlonlogic’s counter to other weapons besides the AR-15.  As a former rifle company commander with an arms room containing in excess of 250 small arms the ability to capture weapons firing data would be especially beneficial for automatic weapons. They are often a unit’s greatest source of firepower and suppression.  When they break in the heat of combat the impact on a unit is much greater than the failure of an individual’s rifle.  That’s not to say that I wouldn’t love an increased ability to better manage my weapons’ maintenance status.

During a discussion with Robb Meng Secubit USA’s Weapons Technology director, he shared the system has a timestamp capability.  It would be interesting if police departments take an interest in WeaponLogic.  Besides the enhanced maintenance situational awareness WeaponLogic provides, incorporating a timestamp function may even have evidentiary utility in documenting incidents where police use their firearms linking a timestamp to each shot.

SpotterUp will be checking out Secubit’s shot counter and software at Shot Show next week.  They’ll be at the ADS booth #20415 if you happen to be attending the event and want to see the latest evolution of the shot counter and what it can potentially do for weapons reliability.

(This story originally ran in SpotterUp.com where I’mnow erving as assistant editor.  My apologies for not posting here more often but I’ve just been consumed with my new responsibilities, teaching personal security classes and jumping for joy over the latest developments in the new adminsitration.  There’s much to write about and I’ll endeavor to do better.)

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As I mentioned, the TAC Ultra FS had me thinking Robocop.  Likely because the full slide rail makes the gun look heftier and meaner than it is.  That all but disappeared once I handled the gun.  Its solid steel construction communicates substance but then most 1911’s do.  The attractive and aggressively checkered grips insure the gun stays put when you fire it and handsomely complements what I think is a slightly futuristic look.  The gun has a TON of features including a skeletonized trigger, adjustable rear sight, fiber optic front sight, full beavertail, a steel guide rod, ambidextrous safety and serrations along the forward part of the slide to facilitate slide manipulation.

As with the other guns in the TCM series, the TAC Ultra FS comes out of the box being capable of shooting two calibers.  All one has to do to switch calibers is install the appropriate barrel and recoil spring.  Most shooters are familiar with the 9mm round.  They probably aren’t with 22TCM, a round that may eventually prove to be an effective .22 caliber self-defense round.  22TCM looks like a shrunk and overweight 5.56 round.

The single stack’s magazines are MecGar in manufacture with a sizeable baseplate pad which helps mags drop quickly as well as driving them home in the pistol grip.  Capacity is 10 +1 9mm or 22TCM rounds.  It’s a nice plus being able to use the same magazine regardless of what ammunition you are using. 9mm will not seat in a .22 TCM barrel while the opposite will.  I DID NOT try and fire 22TCM through a 9mm barrel.

I’ve written a couple of reviews on Ruck Island’s TCM pistols.  To add a new perspective, I approached my friend and master gunsmith Pat Sleem of All American Firearms & Training Gunsmith for his insight on the pistol and input.

Pat is a story unto himself.  As he pursued competitive shooting post West Point he learned local commercial gunsmiths wouldn’t be able to support his shooting passion and so set about standing up his own gunsmithing capability.  A three time All-American collegiate pistol champion while on the United States Military Academy’s pistol team, he went on to earn the Army’s prestigious President’s One Hundred marksmanship distinction four times and deploy to Iraq twice as an Infantryman.  He is currently a Major and competes in the Army Reserve’s marksmanship team while running his gunsmith business full time.

Loaning Pat the TAC Ultra FS along with several boxes of 22TCM ammo and asked him to go at it.

Thanks Will.  From the top I’d say, “22TCM has a very high cool factor!”  When fired, the 22TCM fireball is impressive (que Robocop theme) but the recoil will surprise you.  There is hardly any, surprising considering what one would expect coming out of a 1911 chassis especially when spewing basketball sized flame.  

While 22TCm is fun and blistering fast I found 9mm to be more accurate.  Besides the ammo, using one barrel bushing for two different barrels is inherently going to make one barrel and the round it fires less accurate.  The point of aim shifts. 

After shooting I noticed some brass marks to the rear of the ejection port caused by ejected brass.  I suspect the extractor could use some tuning.  Harmless in the short run and maybe a requirement to ensure reliable extraction of that pudgy 22TCM round.  I had one failure to extract in about 100 rounds.    I also noticed a magazine fitting problem.  It’s not strange to 1911;s though and like all the other minor issues can be readily tweaked.  I’ve worked on a few and they turn out to be great guns.

I like the TAC Ultra FS.  It shoots true, is a hell of a lot of fun and complements those with 1911 muscle memory and preference a platform to shoot two calibers especially the ubiquitous 9mm round.  Like I said, very high cool factor!” 

Thanks for the opportunity.

You’re welcome Pat.

I agree with Pat on his observations though I didn’t have any failures to extract.  My groupings with 9mm were nickel sized at 15 yards though I prefer a blades and/or dots vs. fiber optic front sights.  The 9mm recoil seemed less than my Glock maybe due to that all steel 1911 frame though grip geometry may have an impact also.   One thing I did notice was that my railed 1911 holsters didn’t fit the TAC Ultra FS.  Most railed 1911’s don’t have full length rails on them.  It’s something to remember as you assess your railed 1911 holster’s compatibility.

Most of my 1911’s are double stacks.  This traditional single stack was pretty easy to hold and still has 2-3 more rounds than the traditional 1911 chambered in .45.  As with all the Rock Island TCM’s I’ve shot I LOVE that checkered slide stop.  Magazine changes just seem to flow smoother as that slide stop while not bigger seems surer to operate.  I’m going to get my other 1911 slide stops checkered.

Rock Island’s TCM TAC Ultra FS out of the box with extra mag. Photo by Will Rodriguez

Here are Rock Island’s specs on the TAC Ultra FS (51961):

Caliber:  22 TCM / 9mm
Capacity:  10 + 1 Rounds
Sights:  Front- Dovetail Fiber-Optic Front Sight, Rear-LPA MPS1-Type Adjustable Rear Sight
Weight:  Unloaded-2.35 lbs / 1.07 kg, Loaded-3.12 lbs / 1.45 kg
Dimensions:  Length- 8.75 inch / 222.25 mm, Height- 5.5 inch / 139.7 mm
Grips:  G10
Frame & Slide:  Parkerized
Barrel:  Length- 5 inch / 127 mm, Grooves- 6 Grooves
Trigger Pull:  4 – 6 lbs / 181 – 2.72 kg
Length of Twist:  1 in 16 inch / 400 mm

MSRP $891

Pros and Cons:

Pros:

Beautiful Gun
Solid with Crisp controls (LOVE that slide release!)
Chock full of extras (e.g. steel guide rod, adjustable trigger, fiber optic front sight, ambi safety, front slide serrations, picatinny rail!)
Very manageable recoil
Dual caliber capable!

Cons:

One magazine (sadly this is what I understand production guns come with)
Typical 1911 tweaking may be required.

All in all the TAC Ultra FS is a winner.   After addressing the 1911 bugs and firing a couple hundred rounds to confirm this gun could serve as an everyday carry or home defense gun.  When firing 22TCM, be prepared to be the focus of the firing line.  It’s loud and luminous.  “Coolest gun on the market”

Rock Island’s TCM TAC Ultra FS L & R view. Photo by Will Rodriguez

This story was originally published in SpotterUp.

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This undermines decades of efforts by the US to learn the final disposition of up to 40 Americans, mostly pilots who remain missing from the Korean War.  A large body of evidence suggests US servicemen were taken to the Soviet Union for their intelligence value.  The Russians had a keen interest in US aviation technology, dogfighting tactics, and general intelligence.

The development deeply undermines US diplomatic efforts to get into closed Russian intelligence files that would show US troops ended up in Siberian Gulags never to see America again.  While this may sound farfetched to Americans today, this type of behavior wasn’t uncommon during the Cold cialis 20mg War.  Even before WII was over Russia was in the habit of holding on to US servicemen that came under their control.  Some of these were B29 bomber pilots who had to emergency land in Russia.  Russia subsequently copied the B29 and fielded  the Tupolev-4 (Tu-4) as its first strategic nuclear bomber.

Later, when the Cold War heated up in Korea Russian pilots actually flew Russian Mig-15’s with North Korean or Chinese markings in dogfights with US aircraft.  So secret was this effort that Russian pilots were under orders to kill fellow pilots if they risked being captured by Americans.

Linnington’s comments send an unintentional message that the US isn’t interested in learning the eventual fate of captured Americans sent to communist countries during the Cold War.  Korea isn’t the only instance where this may have occurred as there are cases of Americans being reportedly sent to Russia and China during the Vietnam War to never be seen again.

Linnington left the troubled DPAA (a 2015 organization created from merging the scandal ridden JPACC & DPAA organizations) shortly after taking over Directorship for a high level position in the troubled Wounded Warriors charity.

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This time around we can be a touch more hopeful about the future of our beloved Corps.  While nobody knows how the new Administration will deal with its duties and responsibilities… it is extremely likely that foisting unfit women into the Infantry (of the Corps and Army) as an exercise in social metaphysics will not be one of their priorities.  Hopefully the slicing of muscle from combat branches will be reversed.

The purpose of the Marine Corps is to fight.  When it is not fighting, its purpose is to prepare to fight.  Anything that detracts from that needs removed from the lash-up.

Old salts like myself should not have to worry about politicos trying to make the Corps “PC”…  We should be able to concentrate on wallowing in the glories of Marine Corps history.

USMC China early 1900s…

Happy Birthday Marines

-Yankee Papa-

USMC 0311

1968-70

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The class started at 10AM at a classroom on the sprawling Altair facility.  Altair Gun Club and ALTAIR Training Solutions deserve their own article.  A former high security prison, ALTAIR Training Solutions and Gun Club provide the individual shooter and government organizations an unbelievable spectrum of facilities to meet just about every training need.  Shirley Watral, the General Manager for the Gun Club can just about support every client’s requirements ranging from recreational shooting to full immersion scenarios with on facility accommodations to include full seclusion if that’s your operational requirement.  You really just have to visit their sites just to see the plethora of ranges and training they host.  It runs the full gamut from basic/advanced shooting, to specific niches like vehicle defensive, to personal protection courses and this crown jewel the aerial interdiction course.

Jeff Cotto is the man behind BAT Defense, a former Ranger Battalion veteran he’s put together a group of individuals that provide spectacular instruction.  Between the three instructors in this course they share experience gained from over 15 deployments down range employing the latest and most cutting edge techniques tactics and procedures.

The classroom instruction for the Aerial Target Interdiction Course was short, intense and highly relevant to the experience.  Jeff strives to get the student shooting as quickly as possible because he believes the best teacher is experience.  Students were given about 90 minutes of classroom/lecture style instruction.  The facilities administrative rules, point of aim while flying and safely approaching/departing the helicopter as well as weapon’s handling were covered.  Assistant instructor “Vegas” provided an emergency procedures safety block of instruction straight out of what one would expect during an operations order, “direct” with a little bit of gallows humor.  It was not the first time I would be “taken back” to my days in uniform.

Paul Barth briefing next to Airborne Tactical Training Solutions’ (ATTS) “Little Bird” styled MD500. Photo by Will Rodriguez

Shortly before moving to the Range we moved outside and met Paul Barth and Ian Veltri from Airborne Tactical Training Solutions (ATTS).  We formed around Paul’s desert painted MD500 Hughes “Little Bird” style helicopter (complete with side benches) for a briefing on safely approaching/departing a helicopter and actions on the helicopter.  Paul has decades of flying experience, is an instructor pilot and aviation mechanic.  He also runs Camera Copters, which provides aviation support to media, movies and just about any user that may need to see the ground from the air.  He has a couple dozen movie and TV show credits.

At this point students and cadre left the classroom and barracks billeting compound and drove about a mile to the “range” which was the former high security compound consisting of the jail block houses surrounded by two rows of razor wire topped fences with guard towers in the corner.  Running about 500 yards down the center of the compound eight steel white metal plates were deployed in two rough rows.  They would serve as the targets for the gun runs.

BAT Defense’s Aerial Target Interdiction course affords the client to experience shooting targets from a helicopter, a technique most commonly utilized by the special operations community, law enforcement SWAT units and hunters with access to a helicopter.  The military most often employs small arms from helicopters while isolating an objective keeping enemy “squirters” from escaping or the enemy from reinforcing an objective.  The technique also comes in handy in attacking high value targets in transit, overwatching an objective for fleeting targets or unexpected resistance.  Law Enforcement can employ the approach in similar situations as well as high speed chases when the public is not in close proximity.

BAT Defense precedes actual flying engagements with a stationary exercise.  Paul Barth landed ATTS’s “Little Bird” on a small building and students climbed onto the roof.  Each student cycled through engaging two closer targets from both sides of the bird.  The dry/wet run allowed Jeff Cotto and his assistant instructor Matt Edmonds ample opportunity to stress safe and proper movement around the helicopter as well as how to buckle in and get the most stable positions possible from the outboard benches to engage targets.

It’s an interesting note that the helicopter used for training is visually very similar to the Army’s Task Force 160’s MH-6 helicopter but there are some fine differences.  The military version is instrumented for the primary pilot or “pilot in command”, to fly from the right seat.  The various benches on MH-6’s (MH-6 is the designation for troop carrying little birds vs. the minigun armed AH-6’s) are also a bit different.  While the military can get by with riders “snapping in” to their outboard Little Bird benches with a safety line the FAA is a bit more demanding.  ATTS created FAA compliant benches incorporating tie in points and seat belts.

The excitement was palpable waiting for the actual gun runs to start.  Shooting from a helicopter is a pretty unique experience. The shooter has to take into account not only the speed of closure on the target but the angle to properly offset one’s point of aim.  Simply put, when a stationary target is positioned through the 9-3 o’clock arc one must hold short of the target to account for one’s forward movement.  It’s the opposite when moving away from a target.

BAT Defense graciously allowed me to experience a run.  Having personally fired just about every firearm, cannon and missile in the Army’s inventory from 9mm to 120mm and done it from almost every platform I can comfortably say shooting from the bench of a little bird easily ranks at the top of my small arms experiences.  Donning some wireless headphones tied into the helicopters intercom we faced away from the backyard sized landing zone to avoid dirt being blown in one’s face.  As the helicopter settled to drop off its previous riders we were tapped on the shoulder and moved to our assigned bench cognizant of the spinning blades.

Quickly buckling in, the helicopter gently lifted off flying downrange to pick up speed and executed a banking right turn.  It would have been a great opportunity to take it all in but I was busy “lock & loading” and trying to ID targets early.   I was also sure to keep facing in the direction of flight for fear of my sunglasses being blown off.  (Note to self, “Suicide strap or goggles next time!”).  As we finished the banking turn the little bird leveled off and the targets became visible.  To ensure the client sees the target and control fires Matt Edmonds who was my instructor, pointed out targets and directed when to cease and shift fire.  I loosed six to seven rounds per target ensuring I went to slide lock on the last target as I loaded a fresh magazine.  From the strike of my rounds and the dust kicking up I’d meekly say I achieved 30% accuracy.   I don’t remember looking straight into the ground on the sweeping left turn of the helo even though I’m sure I was facing it.  Too busy “lock & loading” a fresh magazine and not being “that guy” that dropped his magazine.

The second run went very much like the first.  I’d like to think I shot better and Matt graciously said I did well but it is exceedingly difficult to do precision shooting from a moving helicopter.  As one can imagine, sitting on outboard benches engaging targets is exhilarating.  It’s a very unique experience that very few have ever had.  The ballistics alone is challenging.  Being a couple of hundred feet in the air and flying at 40 knots or so doesn’t make it any easier.  Mr. Ziebarth a student at the course filmed his run and graciously allowed me to link it.  If you’d like to experience a gun run vicariously check it out.

Afterwards, Jeff conducted a post class AAR and demonstrated a unique holster he was wearing and was developed by Vegas one of his assistant instructors for those who don’t have both hands free while shooting like K-9 handlers.  There was little to add to BAT Defense’s execution.  Sure it’d be nice for things to blow up when you shoot them but the reality is assessing how effective your shooting is and adjusting it is a real world task.  Maybe for a graduation event a load of tannerite?  Who knows?  BAT Defense earns very high marks for their instruction.  Taking a bunch of individuals (most with little to no experience around helicopters) with very varied shooting experiences and providing them a safe, yet satisfying experience shooting from an aircraft is no easy task.

BAT Defense delivered excellent instruction and even more challenging, one on one coaching and supervision that didn’t make the event seem canned or restrictive.  Doing this sort of stuff real world wouldn’t entail shooters being escorted to the helicopter, handed magazines or being specifically directed which target to shoot at.  BAT Defense was able to do that without making the shooter feel like they were being led by the nose.  Hey, this isn’t easy and there are real world concerns when operating around helicopters.  Loading/unloading, avoiding whirring blades, keeping the shooting safe and inside the designated range are very real concerns and BAT Defense handled them superbly while giving their students a once in a lifetime experience.

I strongly encourage any shooter to look up BAT Defense and get their instruction.  I know I will and am looking forward to the next time I can interact with these guys.  Jeff Cotto has put together an outstanding team that provides EXCELLENT instruction by some soft spoken and extremely competent former service members.  I can’t imagine getting better instruction anywhere else and their Aerial Interdiction Course is a singular life event.

Staff & Cadre from the course. From L-R: “Vegas”, Matt Edmonds, Shirley Watral, Paul Barth, Jeff Cotto & Ian Veltri. Photo by Will Rodriguez

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Hacksaw Ridge tells the epic tale of Desmond Doss, a conscientious objector who ultimately is awarded the Medal of Honor for his superhuman valor in the maelstrom surrounding the taking of a ridge called the Maeda Escarpment (“Hacksaw Ridge”) during the battle of Okinawa in World War II.

The movie starts during Doss’s childhood where he overcame a troubled home life but one which inculcated in him a strong belief in God and a conviction that taking life was wrong.  He of course meets and falls in love with a girl which becomes an additional reason for him to be the best man he can be.

Doss was drafted in 1942.  Even though he had a deferment due to working in a war industry, Doss declined and asked to serve in a manner where he didn’t have to carry a weapon.  He became a medic.

The movie is a pretty accurate portrayal of Desmond Doss’s true story.  If this movie were 100% accurate it would be even more difficult to believe the things that Doss did in the thick of battle.  Let’s just say Doss really did have a rough time during training because of his conscientious observer status and he singlehandedly did rescue 75 wounded soldiers.

I’m partial to movies that show the true horror of war.  The public needs a counter to the popular antiseptic push button version we are fed by the media and our politicians when it suits their purpose.  Wars are always evil and all too often justice is one of the first casualties but wars are sometimes necessary to stop greater evil from spreading and befalling us.  These kinds of movies can realistically portray how war creates ultimate tests of an individual’s commitment to his principles, values and morality.  Desmond Doss while believing killing was wrong also believed that WWII was right.  Into that dichotomy we vicariously experience the struggle Desmond Doss goes through trying to save life while avoiding taking any.

While Doss’s true exploits are beyond belief, the struggle and context under which he accomplished them are a big part of the struggle and ultimate victory which makes this movie so good.  I love war movies based on true heroes.  Our society all too often puts people on pedestals due to their celebrity status vs. concrete contributions to society.  There are many stories on the battlefield that can give us life lessons.  It’s nice to see Hollywood get one right for once.

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They were late getting all the men into the boats and underway.  It would be long after dawn before they arrived where the arms cache was reportedly hidden.

 The men had been ordered to prepare their uniforms as if for a parade.  A cruel waste of time.  Almost none of the boats could access solid ground and most of the troops had to wade ashore through waist deep muck.  So their uniforms parade ready (from the waist up), the British soldiers started their march to Lexington and Concord.

British Army

Military uniforms (intended to be worn in combat) have most definitely not always been practical.  The intent here is not to prepare an exhaustive history of combat uniforms (or their camouflage subset), but rather to examine high points (and low) along the way.  Part One examines some aspects as military uniforms prior to 1917 (especially in the U.S.) became (for the most part) more practical.  Weapons, equipment and tactics only mentioned in passing (with the exception of the British Rifle Brigade) and concentrating on combat branches… most especially the Infantry.

The British soldiers marching toward Lexington Green were dressed for the day’s show of force… exactly as they would be for any other day.  To a potential recruit who was thinking of “taking the King’s shilling” the uniform may have looked just fine… but even routine upkeep would prove to be a never-ending task.

                ” Contemporary sources state that the common British soldier spent more than three hours preparing his uniform for “parade”. The order in which they prepared was: First, dress the hair. Stiff curls were worn falling alongside the face and a “pig tail” in the back. This was accomplished by using an ample amount of pomade, or the end of a tallow candle. Then they had to powder their hair white. The next step was to shine the three dozen brass buttons on their red coats. All white facings had to be whitened with pipe clay.

                   Their shoes had to shine like new. The last article of clothing to be put on was their gaiters, which were whitened with pipe clay and put on WET to insure they fit snug when dried. The cross belts and waist belt were all whitened. Bayonet scabbard, short sword scabbard (if one was carried) and the cartridge box were shined. And finally, the “Brown Bess” musket was polished until it gleamed. The brown color having long been rubbed off, the muskets often shined like stainless steel.”

-AmericanRevolution.org-

Further information regarding the standards of grooming and appearance of troops in both the British and Continental Regular Army:    https://www.scribd.com/document/260315949/Soldier-Hygiene-Grooming-Laundry

European armies were not overly concerned with practicality, and certainly not with “camouflage.”  Aside from being mesmerized with spectacle… generals wanted to see and recognize their troops from a good distance (though sometimes enemy units might inconveniently wear same color.)  Bad enough you might have to send some of your men out foraging… certainly wouldn’t want them to no longer stand out if they decided to take “French leave…”  In any event tactics and weapons of the day in major battles required at least battalion sized units shoulder to shoulder.

The “unfortunate” experience of Braddock in the wilderness in the French and Indian War suggested that the British needed at least some units with more “flexibility…”  “Light Infantry”… that could operate in smaller size units and be trained (and trusted) to operate independently.  Sometimes used as skirmishers.

The natural evolution of light infantry in the British forces led… in the Peninsula campaigns in Spain during the Napoleonic Wars to the deployment of the “Rifle regiments…”   Not only would junior officers be allowed (even encouraged!) to use their own initiative… but NCOs, and to some extent… individual riflemen.

Rifle Brigade as portrayed in “Sharpe’s Rifles”

The men were clad in green uniforms.  They used rifles… not muskets.  While a rifle regiment could fight quite splendidly as such, it was more routinely used in smaller groups.  Not just skirmishing, but recon and combat patrols in terrain not well suited to cavalry.

The rifles took longer to load, but were far more accurate… a veteran rifle regiment could manage 3 rounds a minute to the musket’s 4 rounds a minute in the hands of excellent line infantry.   (French skirmishers used muskets and did poorly against British riflemen who were deployed as skirmishers.)

Physical fitness was paid  more attention than in line regiments (often riflemen on rough ground or deployed at a run.)  Marksmanship of course was prized.  Line outfits until much later in the 19th Century had the command, “Ready, present, fire!”  “Present…”  not “aim.”  A Baker rifle could reliably drop men at 200 yards in the hands of a trained riflemen.  Exceptional marksmen could obtain amazing results at much longer ranges.

The rifle regiments proved to be a template for modern infantry that would not be fully realized until well into the 20th Century.

In 1798 the U.S. Marine Corps was reconstituted.  As part of the uniform a new leather “stock” was issued once each year to each Marine enlisted man and company grade officer.  Approximately 3.5″ wide with one or two buckles in the back.  Propaganda said that it was to “…protect the men from sword cuts…”  In reality it was a barbaric means of keeping the mens’ chins up.  Used also by British Royal Marines and some British line regiments.

The original “leatherneck…”

Horribly impractical for anything but formal occasions.  ( British observer remarked soldiers appeared… “Like geese looking for rain…”) Stock made it nearly impossible to aim a musket or rifle and pretty much negated peripheral vision.

Wise commanders reserved use to formal parades and inspections and the like… and certainly did not commit their troops to battle wearing them (though some British line outfits infamously did…)  The Marine Corps finally retired the filthy things in 1872.  The name “Leatherneck” remained… the name being far easier to wear than the stock…

By 1846 at the start of the Mexican-American War, uniforms for Regulars in the U.S. Army had become far more practical.  The Civil War updates for Union soldiers even more so.  Still, there were issues.  Leaving aside crooked contractors who (in the early part of the war) sold the Army shoes that would fall apart within a few miles and coats that would dissolve in the rain… there was still room for improvement.

Dark blue coats over sky blue trousers certainly better than British Red… but still a tad noticeable.   The (decent quality) issue footwear for the infantry had no left or right shoes.  While “lasts” to make both had been developed earlier in the century, they were not in common use.  Infantry expected to alternate which shoe on which foot each day to “equalize wear…”  Boots for officers were generally custom made.

Civil War infantry shoes (“Brogans”) for reenactors

Wool uniforms (by honest contractors) were durable, and kept heat in when damp.  But often too light for really cold weather… and definitely too heavy for hot… and especially… humid weather.

While officers had fancy “cassock” type coats available, experienced ones who spent time in the field more likely to put their shoulder straps on a private’s four button “sack” coat.  (Grant wearing one at Appomattox…)

Civil War uniforms. US Army

The Indian fighting Army after the Civil War started out wearing the same uniforms, but as the years passed more practical garb made available… and a great deal of flexibility on what was worn and how…

Looking at photos of regiments on the frontier, the black regiments seem to present a more military appearance.  Part of that might be chalked up to their fierce pride (which led to a low desertion rate compared to white regiments…)  But another reason was that their regiments were formed after the war.  The last of the poorly made and worst fitting uniforms had already been issued and the black regiments got much better quality uniforms that didn’t fit like potato sacks…

https://gruntsandco.com/frontier-infantry-1866-91/

Winter in the South was colder than Union soldiers thought that it might be… but the Northern Plains might as well have been the Arctic in winter.  Buffalo robes, hat… and sometimes “mitts” in order.

“Buffalo Soldiers” with buffalo robes. US Army Photo

As the years passed, on campaign soldiers started to look more like cowboys or bandits.  Near the end of the Apache wars American Infantry in company sized units marched across the Mexican desert often wearing only long underwear and straw hats during the day.  Mules carried essential gear.  The officers left their swords behind, made cold camps, and did without bugle calls until action was joined.

The troops that made these marches had no shirkers with them… no weaklings.  With slight modifications their type could be seen on patrols in the Philippines, Haiti, and Nicaragua into the early 1930s.

The Spanish American War saw most American soldiers deployed in blue wool uniforms, with some new features… a “campaign hat”, (worn by some but not all… some wore the light gray or brown model of earlier years…) leggings, and an early type of web belt first deployed in the 1870s.

Spanish American War. US Army Photo

The blue wool uniforms of course were not optimal for the campaigns in Cuba and the Philippines.   Like many soldiers during the war the lad in the above photo has been issued an obsolescent black powder Trapdoor Springfield and will face Spaniards with modern Mauser rifles with smokeless powder.

https://gruntsandco.com/u-s-ordnance-rogue-fiefdom/

Shortly after the war with Spain, khaki trousers were issued… sometimes with a khaki jacket.  The blue shirt continued to be worn for some years by soldiers and Marines with the khaki trousers.   Both services would wear them for a time in the Philippines and in China during the Boxer Rebellion.  The Army, and then the Marines would switch over to khaki shirts.

Philippine Insurrection. US Army Photo

By the early 20th Century, Army and Marine Infantry had a (reasonably) durable field uniform that suited the climate of the Philippines and soon Latin America.    The all khaki uniform was not highly visible.  It was comfortable and easy to maintain.  But come 1917 the uniform situation needed to be revisited.

Marines in Haiti, 1915. US Marine Corp

Coming in Part 2, A Century of Change…

Suggested Reading:

The post UNIFORMS: Towards The Practical Part One 1775-1915 by Yankee Papa appeared first on Grunts and Co.

Check out the rest of my review of one of Rock Island’s 1911 combo 22 TCM & 9mm pistols here!

The post TCM ROCK Standard FS HC Combo – 22TCM/9mm Review appeared first on Grunts and Co.

Marathon Smart Targets delivers eight robot targets in a trailer to your range.  It takes one operator to control the eight robots and the trailer serves as a charging and storage facility.  The chassis of each target is armored up to withstand up to 7.62 fire and the life sized mannequin type targets are instrumented to react a variety of ways to hits.  Marathon Target’s proprietary target sensors allow for each target to be programmed to “die” after a certain number of hits or even require specific location hit(s) to the target.  The area instrumented for specific hits aligns with the cylindrical region running from one’s head down to the groin.  These areas include but are not limited to critical hit areas like the brain, throat, and center chest area, areas shooters are taught to engage when trying to stop a target.   When “killed” the robot target drops to a 45 degree angle and stops moving.

The benefits to having moving targets are pretty obvious…

More here.

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On the morning of Sept. 15, 1916, soldiers of the German 1st Army rushed to their defensive positions between Flers and Courcelette, on the Western Front. The lifting of the Allied artillery barrage typically presaged an infantry charge, and the defenders made their machine guns ready to cut down advancing British and French troops. But this time, instead of onrushing infantry, from the smoke and mist emerged grinding mechanical contraptions, spewing bullets and shells. The Germans poured machine-gun fire onto the strange, new vehicles lumbering across the ragged mud and wire of no man’s land, but the bullets had little effect. The day of the tank — a concept that would go on to define land warfare in the 20th century — had arrived.
The Battle of Flers-Courcelette was part of the ongoing Battle of the Somme in France and the first time that modern armored fighting vehicles were deployed in combat. Yet despite triumphant claims in the British press of a new weapon that would turn the tide of war by breaking the impermeable German lines, the tank’s initial deployment was largely inauspicious. Those first tanks were rushed into service and woefully underpowered for the terrain they would encounter while saddled with the weight of armor. Riddled with developmental problems and manned by crews with almost no training, of the 49 original Mark I tanks deployed to France 100 years ago, 36 set off from the British line of departure Sept. 15. Only 27 made it as far as German forward positions, and a meager six trundled as far as the secondary and tertiary objectives. Mechanical failure plagued the new invention, but the concept had been proved, and successive generations of tanks and tank tactics would turn a “mobile pillbox” into a battle-winning asset.

Analysis

The concept of a mobile, protected engine of war has been around for millennia. A means of collectively defending assault troops from projectile weaponry — with the potential inclusion of offensive capability — has fascinated the greatest minds of every era.

Greek hoplites employed bronze armor to good effect in phalanx formation — shield, helmet and greaves protecting a fighting man from the front and effectively nullifying the Persian advantage of massed archers. A good example of early armored tactics is the testudo (tortoise) formation employed by the Roman legions, specifically to protect against light projectiles as soldiers advanced. By interlocking full-length shields forward and overhead, legionnaires could easily deflect harrying fire. Though useful for closing on a fixed enemy position or defending from swarms of arrows, the formation was slow and limited the infantry’s ability to fight in close quarters.

The Romans also pioneered protective siege engines. These were designed to deliver troops to the enemy’s doorstep in one piece and were less dependent on individuals managing to maintain formation. Towers, galleries and other mobile fortifications protected assault troops from an enemy’s ranged weapons. In medieval warfare, mantlets and pavises, portable shelters or shields intended to protect clusters of troops from arrow fire, were common. A mantlet bore wheels for mobility, while the freestanding pavis was borne by one soldier.

In 1487, Leonardo da Vinci conceptualized an armored fighting vehicle, although his design was impractical because of the technology of the age. War engines or battlewagons pulled by horses were employed throughout history, but not until the industrial age did the armored fighting vehicle really come into its own. It needed the power of the internal combustion engine, mass-produced sheet metal and the technical sophistication to produce advanced running gear and automatic weaponry to make the true armored fighting vehicle feasible. The inspiration for the British tank was a mobile platform impervious to machine guns that could trample basic defenses, operating alongside infantry to breach and exploit enemy positions.

In June 1900, a young captain from the Corps of Royal Engineers had something of an epiphany, envisioning a possible solution to what he saw as the pressing military issue of the time: how to counter the withering, destructive capacity of the machine gun. He pursued his vision with vigor, becoming a respected tactician, innovator and staff officer. Maj. Gen. Ernest Swinton was a driving force when it came to the adoption and use of the armored fighting vehicle. He even coined the term “tank,” which became synonymous with the new invention. Swinton was not alone in his aspirations, but he did consider how tactics would need to evolve to make the armored fighting vehicle useful on the battlefield, informing subsequent tacticians such as British compatriot Col. J.F.C. Fuller and German Gen. Heinz Guderian.

The Evolution of the Tank

The appalling conditions of static trench warfare in World War I made life miserable for the fighting troops, and the incessant mud and rain also presented severe logistical problems. Moving large amounts of men and materiel by sea and rail was efficient. But getting ammunition, supplies or replacement troops from the railhead or port to the front lines was not. The constant passage of foot traffic and light vehicles made the largely unpaved roads and dirt tracks impassable. The wheeled vehicles of the time were inadequate for the conditions. Engines lacked the power to cope with broken terrain, and wheels simply sank into the muck. As a result, most armies continued to use horses and horse-drawn artillery for the duration of the war.

Innovators of the industrial age prided themselves on finding mechanical solutions to man’s problems, and the answer to moving heavy supplies to the front lines was continuous track technology — already prevalent in agriculture. That innovation was initially ignored by the British military establishment, but worsening battlefield conditions eventually resulted in trials of vehicles such as the Holt Caterpillar tractor, which was deemed suitable for hauling heavy artillery — but little else.

In a conflict known for its technological innovation and rapid prototyping, it is somewhat ironic that the inception of the tank was such a fraught and painful process. Early designs for armored fighting vehicles failed to capture the interest of the British or French hierarchy, and it fell to the Royal Navy to nurture the imaginatively titled “landships” project. At the insistence of Winston Churchill, then first lord of the admiralty, the Landships Committee sought to develop an armored fighting vehicle prototype. The aptly named “Little Willie” was tested Dec. 3, 1915, but was found insufficient for the breaching and crossing tasks envisaged. This led to the development of the now-classic rhomboidal tank design, which serves to this day as the insignia of the British Royal Tank Regiment. Following a successful demonstration during which the fledgling Mark I (christened “Mother”) defeated a number of typical Western Front obstacles, including low wire entanglements, cratered ground, trench systems and parapets, an initial order of 100 vehicles was made.

The development of the vehicles was shrouded in secrecy, and the terminology associated with them is attributed to Swinton, then a lieutenant colonel and heavily involved with the clandestine project. Some of the steel originally used on the Mark I design was repurposed from water boilers, and the original factory paperwork referred to the new inventions as “water carriers,” nomenclature adopted by workers who said they were manufacturing water tanks. Swinton made the “tank” code name official, then went on to give the two main types of Mark I vehicles their designations. “Male” tanks had a pair of Hotchkiss 57 mm Quick Firer naval guns in side-mounted sponsons, plus a brace of machine guns. “Female” tanks carried all machine guns and were, in effect, man-killers.

Tactical Analysis

The tank was originally conceived as an infantry support platform and moved at walking pace. Able to traverse trenches and breach wire obstacles, tanks relied on intimate support from ground troops. The steel armor offered some degree of protection from small arms, and the tanks’ weapons were effective in knocking out German gun positions. Successive generations of tanks, most notably the Mark V, sought to rectify the mechanical problems that plagued the early designs. Even so, tanks remained prone to mechanical failure throughout World War I. Crew comfort was an afterthought, and conditions inside the first tanks were infamously bad. It was not uncommon for a tank to stop midattack because its crew had passed out from internal fumes.

In September’s Battle of Flers-Courcelette, the Allies gained substantially more ground with about half the casualties than in a similar attack that they had staged in July. Though the addition of tanks to the attack was one factor in increasing their success, a general revision of battlefield tactics was underway, and other technologies were having a larger impact on the war. Better integration between infantry and artillery, aided by aerial spotters, was to prove pivotal. A more decentralized approach to command and improved liaison between formations also improved operational effectiveness on the ground. And in terms of troop tactics, the first major update to prewar methodology had been disseminated in May 1915. This paved the way for an updated training manual in February 1917 that effectively did away with “traditional” infantry tactics — namely, forming up in an extended line and advancing slowly toward the enemy. Several techniques from the revised manual are still employed by modern infantry platoons.

The infantry support tank served its purpose, and massed assaults combining armor and infantry continued. Spurred on by French and British innovations, the German army proceeded to make its own heavy tank. But it was the advent of the “cruiser” tank by the British in the 1930s that best illustrated where the future of armored warfare lay. Cruisers were lighter and faster than heavy tanks (often at the expense of protection and firepower) and operated more like traditional cavalry — exploiting battlefield gains and pursuing fleeing troops. Lighter tanks also proved useful for reconnaissance, and the British continued to experiment with tank design and tactics in the postwar years. Though the Allies led in the field of tank design in World War I, after the war, the Germans and the Russians recognized the untapped potential of armored warfare and invested heavily in design and employment.

The holy grail of tank design is a highly mobile platform with excellent protection and formidable armament, embodied by the German Tiger series of World War II. Tank technology and battlefield tactics matured during the years between the two wars, but the masterstroke was to fully utilize radio communications as an aid to command and control, leading to more effective maneuver and shock action. The German high command in World War II realized that an integrated force comprising infantry, armor, artillery and air assets operating in concert was devastating on the battlefield.

The impact of the tank on the World War I battlefield was very localized and, while they contributed to tactical success, tanks were not independently responsible for it. Still, where infantry proved vulnerable, the tank plowed on regardless, cleaving a path for skirmishers to follow. That in itself was revolutionary, and the advantage of defense held by the entrenched German army took a critical blow as a result.

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