Opinion pdf

OPINION OF THE COURT BY DUFFY, J.

The United States District Court for the District of Hawai'i (District Court) certified the following question of law to the Hawai'i Supreme Court:

Where a mortgagor cures its default prior to foreclosure proceeding pursuant to [Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS)] § 667-5, but an auction inadvertently goes forward, is a valid agreement created entitling the high bidder at the auction to lost profits?

Based on the analysis below, we hold that a valid agreement is not created in such a situation and that the high bidder is only entitled to a return of his or her downpayment plus interest.

Opinion pdf

OPINION OF THE COURT BY DUFFY, J.

On July 29, 2009, this court accepted a timely application for a writ of certiorari filed on June 22, 2009 by petitioner/defendant-appellant William Edward Werle (Werle) seeking review of the March 25, 2009 judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) based on its March 11, 2009 Memorandum Opinion (Mem. Op.) in State v. Werle, No. 28653. The ICA's Mem. Op. affirmed the July 12, 2007 judgment of conviction and sentence of the district court of the second circuit (district court) for Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of an Intoxicant (OVUII), in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291E-61 (a) and/or (d) (Supp. 2006).

In his Application, Werle presents the following question: "Whether the ICA gravely erred, in violation of  Werle's rights to due process and fair trial, by affirming the trial court's admission into evidence of his purported blood alcohol test result, despite five evidentiary foundational defects." Oral argument was held on September 3, 2009.

The "five foundational defects" alleged by Werle are that

the State did not present evidence from a duly qualified expert that

(1) the "radiative energy attenuation" method (REA) was a "valid technique" for testing blood alcohol levels;

(2) [the] REA had been approved by the DUI Coordinator, as required by BAR § 11-114-22;

(3) the [Abbott AxSYM] used a blood alcohol testing procedure approved by the DUI Coordinator;

(4) the "dilution method" [the medical technician] employed when analyzing Werle's blood alcohol result (dilution) was reliable; and

(5) the "extrapolation method" [the lab technician] applied to the [Abbott AxSYM]'s blood alcohol reading of the diluted sample (extrapolation) was reliable.

Based on the following, we agree with Werle that there was an insufficient foundation laid for admission into evidence of his blood alcohol test result. Accordingly, we reverse Werle's conviction for OVUll. [footnotes omitted]

Opinion pdf

OPINION OF THE COURT BY LEONARD, J.

This interlocutory appeal and cross-appeal stem from two consolidated class-action lawsuits brought by substitute teachers (Plaintiffs or Substitute Teachers) who claimed that they were underpaid by the State of Hawai'i Department of Education (DOE). In Civil No. 03-1-0305 (Garner Action), Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees David Garner, Patricia Smith, Andrea Christie, Allan Kliternick, Karen Souza, Jo Jennifer Goldsmith, and David Hudson, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated (Garner Plaintiffs), sued the DOE and other unnamed defendants (Garner Defendants), seeking back pay for class members for the period from 1996 through the end of the 2003-2004 school year. In Civil No. 05-1-0031 (Kliternick Action), Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees Allan Kliternick, David Garner, Jo Jennifer Goldsmith, and David Hudson (Kliternick Plaintiffs) sued Patricia Hamamoto, in her official capacity as Superintendent of Schools, Shannon Ajifu, Mary Cochran, Maggie Cox, Breene Harimoto, Cec Heftel, Lei Ahu Isa, Karen Knudsen, Dennis Matsumoto, Shirley A. Robinson, Laura Thielen, Garrett Toguchi, Herbert Watanabe, and Randall Yee, in their official capacities as members of the State of Hawai'i Board of Education, and the DOE (Kliternick Defendants), seeking back pay from the start of the 2004-2005 school year onward (collectively, the Garner Defendants and Kliternick Defendants are referred to as the State or Defendants).

In this appeal, Plaintiffs challenge the following seven interlocutory orders certified by the Circuit Court for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 641-1 (b) (Supp. 2005):

1. Order (1) Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Adjudication of Issues on Behalf of the Class for Class Claims as of November 8, 2000 to the Present, and for Related Injunctive Relief Filed July 13, 2004, and (2) Granting Defendant State of Hawai'i Department of Education's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint Filed January 29, 2004, filed on March 31, 2006 (Partial Summary Judgment Order #1);

2. Order (1) Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment With Respect to Liability for Damages in Both Cases for the Period From November 8, 2000 to June 30, 2005, Filed November 10, 2005, and (2) Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to All Claims and Parties, Filed November 10, 2005, filed on April 6, 2006 (Partial Summary Judgment Order #2);

3. Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Claims Arising Before January 7, 2003 Filed December 27, 2005, filed April 18, 2006 (Partial Summary Judgment Order #3);

4. Order Denying Plaintiffs Kliternick, Garner, Goldsmith, and Hudson's Motion for Award of Prejudgment Interest Filed April 12, 2006, filed on April 18, 2006 (Pre-judgment Interest Order);

5. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Third Amended and Supplemented Complaint Filed October 21, 2004, filed April 18, 2006 (Order re Third Amended Complaint);

6. Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Modify the Class and Sub-Class Definitions, Filed July 23, 2004 and June 28, 2005, filed February 13, 2006, filed on April 27, 2006 (Order Denying Class Modification); and

7. Order Denying Diane Kawashima's Motion to Intervene Filed February 13, 2006, filed on April 27, 2006 in the Circuit Court (Order Denying Intervention).

(The foregoing seven orders are collectively referred to as Interlocutory Orders).

On May I, 2006, the State filed a timely notice of cross-appeal from the same Interlocutory Orders.

We hold that: (1) the Circuit Court did not err in summarily ruling that HRS § 661-5 (1993) bars the Substitute Teachers' claims against the State for back pay prior to November 8, 2000; (2) the Circuit Court did not err in concluding that, pursuant to HRS § 661-1 (1993), the Substitute Teachers' claim for breach-of-contract damages is not barred by sovereign immunity; (3) HRS § 302A-624 (e) (Supp. 2004), as a pay-mandating statute, provided an alternative basis for invoking the court's jurisdiction under the "founded upon any statute" language in HRS § 661-1; (4) the Substitute Teachers' claim for pre-judgment interest is barred by HRS § 661-8 (1993); (5) the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs' request to modify class and sub-class definitions to include part-time employees; (6) the Circuit Court did not err in entering the Order Denying Intervention; (7) the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion when it entered the Order re Third Amended Complaint; (8) the Circuit Court did not err in concluding that, although claims prior to November 8, 2000 were barred, Plaintiffs' claims for pay due from November 8, 2000 through June 30, 2005 were not barred by the statute of limitation because,
inter alia, the statute of limitations applicable to these periodic pay claims began to run on each paycheck as it became due; and (9) the Circuit Court did not err when it concluded that the State violated its obligation to pay the per diem rate prescribed by HRS § 302A-624(e) during the period from November 8, 2000 to June 30, 2005. [footnote omitted]

Opinion pdf

OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J.

On July 15, 2009, defendants-appellees State of Hawai'i (State), the Housing and Community Development Corporation of Hawai'i (HCDCH) and its executive director and board of directors, as well as Linda Lingle, in her capacity as Governor of the State [hereinafter, collectively, the State] filed a motion to dismiss the claims of plaintiff-appellant Jonathon Kamakawiwo'ole Osorio (who is the only remaining plaintiff-appellant in the above-captioned case, which was remanded from the United States Supreme Court on May 4, 2009), contending, inter alia, that Osorio's claims "are not justiciable" inasmuch as: (1) he lacks standing to pursue the instant case; (2) the case is no longer ripe for adjudication; and (3) Osorio seeks an impermissible advisory opinion. At the outset, we observe that the State's arguments set forth in its motion, discussed more fully infra, focus on the justiciability of Osorio's claims, not merely his appeal. However, were we to grant the State's requested relief, i.e., grant its motion to dismiss, we would effectively be dismissing Osorio's appeal and, thereby divest this court of jurisdiction to address the substance of the arguments presented therein, i.e., the justiciability of Osorio's claims -- a result that the State presumably could not have intended. We, therefore, deny the State's motion to dismiss Osorio's appeal and retain jurisdiction over this case. In so doing, we are mindful of our duty to consider, sua sponte, jurisdictional issues such as standing and ripeness. Akinaka v. Disciplinary Bd. of Hawai'i Supreme Court, 91 Hawai'i 51, 55, 979 P.2d 1077, 1081 (1999) (holding that "although neither the parties nor the trial court considered the question of standing, this court has a duty, sua sponte," to determine whether the plaintiff has standing (citations omitted)); see also Kapuwai v. City & County of Honolulu, 121 Hawai'i 33, 39, 211 P.3d 750, 756 (2009 (holding that "[i]t is axiomatic that ripeness is an issue of subject matter jurisdiction"). Accordingly, inasmuch as the parties have "briefed" the issues of standing and ripeness in their memoranda in support of, and in opposition to, the motion, we address the justiciability of Osorio's claims, i.e., whether (1) Osorio has standing to prosecute his complaint against the  State, (2) the case remains ripe for adjudication; and/or (3) Osorio seeks an impermissible advisory opinion.

In his memorandum in opposition to the State's motion, filed August 5, 2009, Osorio argues, inter alia, that he: (1) "has standing to proceed in this matter as a Hawaiian"; (2) raises claims and issues that are ripe; and (3) does not seek an impermissible advisory opinion. On August 14, 2009, the State, with the permission of this court, filed a reply to Osorio's memorandum in opposition, essentially providing further support for the threshold issues of justiciabilty that it had raised originally in its motion.

Based on the discussion below, we hold that (1) Osorio has standing in this case, but (2) his asserted claims are not ripe for adjudication. Thus, we vacate the circuit court's January 31, 2003 judgment and remand the case for entry of a judgment dismissing Osorio's claims against the State without prejudice. [footnotes omitted]

Opinion pdf

OPINION OF THE COURT BY RECKENWALD, J.

Roy T. Hiraga and Solomon P. Kaho'ohalahala appeal from the November 1, 2008 decision of the Board of Registration for Maui County (Board) which determined that Kaho'ohalahala was not a resident of Lana'i "[f]or purposes of [the November 2008] election [ . ]"

The case began in September 2008, when appellee Michael P. Dupree and eleven other registered voters from Lana'i sent letters to Hiraga, the Clerk of the County of Maui, which alleged that Kaho'ohalahala was not a Lana'i resident. Hiraga subsequently found, inter alia, that Kaho'ohalahala was a Lana'i resident when he registered to vote there in July 2008. Dupree appealed that determination to the Board, which concluded that Kaho'ohalahala was in fact a resident of Lahaina rather than Lana'i.

The questions on appeal include whether: (1) the Board lacked jurisdiction because Dupree's complaint was an untimely challenge to Kaho'ohalahala's eligibility to be a candidate for the Lana'i seat on the Maui County Council, rather than to his voter registration, (2) the Board exceeded its jurisdiction by addressing issues beyond Kaho'ohalahala's voter registration, and (3) the Board erred in concluding that Kaho'ohalahala was not a Lana'i resident.

For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the Board had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, the Board did not exceed its jurisdiction by addressing issues beyond Kaho'ohalahala's voter registration status, and the Board did not err in concluding that Kaho'ohalahala did not have the right to remain a registered voter of Lana'i. Accordingly, we affirm the Board's November 1, 2008 decision.

Opinion pdf

OPINION OF THE COURT BY WATANABE, J.

In this appeal, Defendant-Appellant Brenda Irene Dickson-Weinberg (Wife or Defendant) challenges (1) the divorce decree entered by the Family Court of the First Circuit (family court) on May 18, 2006 (Divorce Decree), which ended her marriage to Plaintiff-Appellee Jan Michael Weinberg (Husband or Plaintiff) and divided their marital estate; and (2) various orders of the family court that led up to or followed the entry of the Divorce Decree.

Wife raises the following points on appeal:

(1) The family court's 86-page "omnibus" findings of fact (FsOF) and conclusions of law (CsOL), which was signed by three judges without any indication of which judge adopted which finding or conclusion, did not comply with Hawai'i Family Court Rules (HFCR) Rule 52 (2000);

(2) The family court erred when it refused to enforce (a) an agreement incident to divorce (AITD) entered into between Husband and Wife (collectively, the parties or the couple) in a prior divorce action that was dismissed, (b) an agreement to designate Wife as a beneficiary of Husband's individual retirement accounts (IRAs) (IRA Agreement), and (c) a quitclaim deed conveying the parties' home in Nu'uanu, Hawai'i (Nu'uanu property) to Wife;

(3) The family court denied Wife her due-process rights when it refused to relax pretrial deadlines, denied her requests for a trial continuance, and barred her from introducing experts, exhibits, and documentary evidence because she missed discovery and other deadlines imposed by the family court after her second counsel withdrew from representing her;

(4) The family court did not comply with Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 580-47 (2006) or partnership principles when it denied Wife credit for Category l assets and valued Husband's law practice without considering Husband's earnings or the unliquidated contingency-fee cases pending at the date of the completion of the evidentiary part of trial (DOCOEPOT); and

(5) The family court failed to consider all the factors enumerated in HRS § 580-47 (a) and abused its discretion when it denied Wife, who was unemployed throughout the marriage, any alimony.

We conclude that (1) Wife's first point on appeal is without merit; (2) the family court did not err in refusing to enforce the AITD and the quitclaim deed for the Nu'uanu property, but did err in disregarding the IRA Agreement in dividing the property of the parties; (3) the family court abused its discretion when it refused to extend pretrial deadlines and thereafter sanctioned Wife for missing pretrial deadlines by precluding her from introducing evidence that she did not produce by pretrial deadlines; and (4) the family court incorrectly valued Husband's law practice. Our disposition of this appeal renders it unnecessary to address Wife's remaining points on appeal. [footnote omitted]

Opinion pdf

OPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAYAMA, J.

Petitioner-Defendant-Appellant, Abiye Assaye ("Assaye"), has applied for a writ of certiorari from the Intermediate Court of Appeals' ("ICA") January 13, 2009 summary disposition order affirming the District Court of the First Circuit's ("trial court's") judgment convicting Assaye of the offense of excessive speeding, in violation of Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291C-105(a)(1) and/or (a)(2) (Supp. 2006). In his application for writ of certiorari before this court, Assaye asserts that the ICA gravely erred (1) "in concluding that [Respondent-Plaintiff-Appellee, State of Hawai‘i ('prosecution'),] laid the requisite foundation for the admissibility of the laser gun reading pursuant to State v. Stoa, 112 Hawai‘i 260, 265, 145 P.3d 803, 808 (App. 2006)," and (2) "by failing to recognize that the [prosecution] did not lay the requisite foundation for admissibility of the laser gun reading as required by State v. Wallace, 80 Hawai‘i 382, 910 P.2d 695 (1996), and State v. Manewa, 115 Hawai‘i 343, 167 P.2d 336 (2007)." For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court's February 27, 2008 judgment because the ICA's decision is obviously inconsistent with both this court's decision in Manewa and its own decision in State v. Ito, 90 Hawai‘i 225, 978 P.2d 191 (App. 1999). [footnotes omitted]

Concurring opinion by J. Acoba pdf

Opinion pdf

OPINION OF THE COURT BY LEONARD, JJ.

I.    OVERVIEW

Ross Takehiko Unebasami (Ross) was born on June 16, 1982. In 2000, when he was seventeen years old, he was diagnosed with acute lymphoblastic leukemia. Ross was initially treated with chemotherapy, but after a relapse that began in February of 2003, Ross received a bone marrow transplant at Kapiolani Medical Center for Women and Children (Kapi‘olani) on March 27, 2004. Ross died at another hospital on June 25, 2004, nine days after his twenty-second birthday.

This case stems from allegations that, when Ross suffered renal failure after the bone marrow transplant, he was denied admission to Kapi‘olani's intensive care unit (ICU), a pediatric ICU, and transferred to another hospital's ICU over objections from Ross, his mother, and his treating physicians. The Complaint was filed on April 17, 2006 by Ross's mother, Mary Ann Lee (Lee), as personal representative of the Estate of Ross Takehiko Unebasami, deceased, and in her personal capacity, against Kapi‘olani and Hawaii Pacific Health (HPH), Kapi‘olani's parent corporation. The Complaint alleged, inter alia, that both Ross and his mother suffered serious emotional distress as a result of the defendants' allegedly wrongful conduct. The Complaint also alleged that, when Ross was accepted by Kapi‘olani for his bone marrow transplant, defendants negligently misrepresented to Lee that Ross would be admitted, as necessary, to all of Kapi‘olani's specialized facilities and would be cared for by all of its specialized staff, as necessary, and that Lee reasonably relied upon those representations in choosing Kapi‘olani instead of a mainland bone marrow transplant facility.

The Circuit Court of the First Circuit dismissed the Complaint on the grounds that Kapi‘olani and HPH are health care providers and, therefore, Lee's administrative remedies before the Medical Claims Conciliation Panel (MCCP) must be exhausted, as prescribed under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 671-12(a), before a complaint can be filed in the Circuit Court. Final judgment was entered on February 23, 2007. Lee's claims on behalf of Ross's Estate were subsequently pursued in a separate action, following an MCCP proceeding. Lee's claims on her own behalf are the subject of her appeal in this case.

On March 22, 2007, HPH filed a notice of appeal and, on March 27, 2007, Lee filed a cross-appeal. Then, on April 10, 2007, HPH and Kapi‘olani also filed a cross-appeal.

On appeal, HPH argues that the Circuit Court erred in: (1) finding that HPH is a health care provider as defined in HRS Chapter 671; and (2) denying HPH an award of attorneys' fees based on Lee's frivolous filing of the Complaint. Lee contends that, because she has not asserted a claim as the victim of a medical tort, the Circuit Court erred in concluding that she was required to exhaust the administrative remedies of the MCCP. Kapi‘olani, like HPH, contends that the Circuit Court erred in failing to find that Lee had filed a frivolous lawsuit, and in denying its request for attorneys' fees. We affirm. [footnote omitted]

Opinion pdf

PER CURIAM

By means of an August 28, 2009 letter to the Chief Justice, the Honolulu Community-Media Council and the Society of Professional Journalists (Petitioners) seek waiver of fees for copying judicial financial disclosure statements. We accept the letter as a "motion for waiver of copying fees" in an original proceeding and deny the motion.

The Petitioners made similar requests in February and March 2009. The requests were denied by order of this court on March 13, 2009. The March 13, 2009 order concluded that Petitioners had failed to state good cause for waiver of the copying fees. In support of the current request for waiver of copying fees, Petitioners assert they have obtained an opinion from the Office of Information Practices (OIP) that concludes judicial financial disclosure documents are subject to the Uniform Information Practices Act (UIPA), chapter 92F of the Hawai'i Revised Statutes. Petitioners argue it is in the public interest, as defined by Hawai'i Administrative Rules (HAR) § 2-71-32(b) to waive the copying costs. As discussed below, we conclude that the OIP's July 8, 2009 memorandum opinion is wrong.

The records of Judicial Financial Disclosure Statements are not mere administrative records concerning the management of personnel . . . subject to  disclosure under the UIPA." The OIP concludes that Judicial Financial Disclosure Statements are records related to the supreme court's executive or administrative functions. However, Judicial Financial Disclosure Statements are judicial records, created and governed by Rule 15 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai'i (RSCH) , promulgated by this court pursuant to its inherent and constitutional judicial authority to regulate judges. The records created by RSCH Rule 15 form an evidentiary basis for motions to disqualify judges and justices and may also provide evidence that can be used to discipline judges and justices. The authority to promulgate rules and keep records with regard to judicial qualification and discipline matters (1) fall within the scope of the court's power to adjudicate, and (2) is inherently intertwined with such adjudicative power. Therefore, the rules and records are not subject to HRS chapter 92F nor OIP review. Cf. In re Kading, 235 N.W.2d 409, 412 (Wis. 1975) (adoption of judicial code and financial disclosure rule were actions performed by the supreme court under its inherent power to function as the supreme and superintending court).

We have previously noted that the separation of powers doctrine is intended to preclude a commingling of ... essentially different powers of government in the same hands and thereby prevent a situation where one department would be controlled by, or subjected, directly or indirectly to the coercive influence of either of the other departments." See, e.g., Prav v. Judicial Selection Comm'n, 75 Haw. 333, 353, 861 P.2d 723, 732 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); cf. Bester v. Louisiana Supreme Court Committee on Bar Admissions, 779 So. 2d 715, 721 (La. 2001) ("the inherent powers doctrine exists as a protective mechanism to ensure our independence as the head of a separate branch of state government"; declining to apply public records law to bar admission records).

In our tripartite system of government, judicial functions, such as promulgating rules and keeping records with regard to judicial qualification and discipline matters, are not subject to interference by an executive administrative agency. Judicial Financial Disclosure Statements are subject to disclosure under RSCH Rule 15(g), not the UIPA. Thus, HAR § 2-71-32(b) is not applicable. Accordingly, with regard to records created through the exercise of our inherent and constitutional judicial authority to regulate judges, we cannot permit the OIP to "control ... or subject [this court], directly or indirectly!,] to [its] coercive influence." Pray, 75 Haw. at 353, 861 P.2d at 732 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

The supreme court is currently seeking comments regarding revisions to RSCH Rule 15 and the financial disclosure statement form, anticipated to be adopted effective January 1, 2010. The recent and anticipated amendments to the form are designed to make necessary disclosures while protecting the safety and security of judges and their families. Judges will be required to make their financial disclosures on the revised form. The disclosures are due on or before April 30, 2010. These disclosure statements will be posted on the judiciary's website thereafter.

With regard to Petitioner's motion, this court may waive copying fees upon a showing of good cause under Rule 45(e) of the Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure. In determining whether good cause exists, this court requires applicants to make a credible showing of indigency. Petitioners have failed to establish indigency, and accordingly, the motion for waiver of the copying fees is denied.

Opinion pdf

OPINION OF THE COURT BY LEONARD, J.

Defendant-Appellant Fredy Domingo (Domingo) appeals from the Judgment of Conviction and Probation Sentence entered on June 2, 2008 (Judgment) in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (Circuit Court).

Domingo entered a plea of no contest to the offense of Accidents Involving Death or Serious Bodily Injury, in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291C-12 (2007). Domingo was sentenced to five years of probation and ordered to pay, inter alia, restitution of $13,225.94.

On appeal, Domingo contends that the Circuit Court erred by requiring that he pay restitution. Domingo also contends that the amount of restitution was unreasonable.

Domingo claims that his conduct, failing to remain at the scene of an accident, failing to give information, and failing to render reasonable assistance, in violation of HRS § 291C-14 (2007), did not cause the decedent's losses. The State agrees that the decedent in this case is not a victim, as defined in HRS § 706-646(1), and that there is no evidence in the record that the decedent's death was the result of Domingo's criminal acts. Thus, Domingo did not cause losses to the decedent, pursuant to HRS § 706-646(2). Based on the record in this case and applicable authorities, we agree that the Circuit Court erred by requiring Domingo to pay restitution. Therefore, we need not consider whether the amount of restitution was reasonable. [footnotes omitted]

Opinion pdf

OPINION OF THE COURT BY FUJISE, J.

This case arises out of the award of a capital improvements contract to a general contractor without certain specialty licenses. It comes before this court to review the judgment and order entered by the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (circuit court) ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter.

. . . .

Plaintiffs challenge, in their single point on appeal, the circuit court's ruling that Plaintiffs were required to exhaust their administrative remedies under HRS Chapter 444 before bringing the instant lawsuit and, as Plaintiffs had not done so, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs' case. "A trial court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, reviewable de novo." Casumpang v. ILWU, Local 142, 94 Hawai‘i 330, 337, 13 P.3d 1235, 1242 (2000).

. . . .

The April 11, 2006 Final Judgment of the Circuit Court of the First Circuit is hereby affirmed. [footnote omitted]

Opinion pdf

OPINION OF THE COURT BY FOLEY, J.

Defendant-Appellant Clayton Shane Suan (Suan) appeals from the Judgment of Conviction and Sentence (Judgment) filed on February 6, 2008 in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit (circuit court). A jury found Suan guilty of Unauthorized Control of a Propelled Vehicle (UCPV), in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 708-836 (Supp. 2008).

On appeal, Suan contends the circuit court (1) abused its discretion by allowing Officer Aiu to repeat inculpatory testimony on rebuttal, (2) abused its discretion and plainly erred by allowing the Deputy Prosecuting Attorney (Prosecutor) to question defense witnesses while asserting as fact matters not in evidence, and (3) plainly erred by permitting multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument that cumulatively denied Suan a fair trial. We vacate the Judgment and remand this case for a new trial. [footnotes omitted]

Opinion pdf

OPINION OF THE COURT BY FOLEY, J.

Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee Takata Corporation (hereinafter, Defendant or Takata) appeals from the Second Amended Judgment filed on November 28, 2006, in the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit (circuit court). Following a jury trial, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of:

    (1)     Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Dason Udac (Dason) and against Takata on Dason's claims for negligence, product liability, and punitive damages;

    (2)     Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant Gwendolyn N. Udac, Trustee of the Alfredo Udac Revocable Living Trust, (Gwendolyn) (Gwendolyn and Dason are collectively referred to as the Udacs) and against Takata on Alfredo Udac's claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium/pecuniary losses;

    (3)     Takata and against the Udacs on the Udacs' claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, failure to warn, breach of warranty, and alleged manufacturing defects; and

    (4)     Defendant-Appellee Hawaii Motors, Inc. (Hawaii Motors) and against the Udacs on the Udacs' claims of failure to warn, breach of warranty, alleged manufacturing defects, negligence, product liability, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium/pecuniary losses, and punitive damages.

On appeal, Takata contends the circuit court erroneously

    (1)     excluded expert testimony by Robert Douglas Banks, M.D. (Dr. Banks);

    (2)     admitted into evidence applications for seatbelt-buckle patents filed by Takata on September 7, 1984 (TK-52 patent) and April 29, 1987 (A-95 patent) (collectively referred to as the TK-52 and A-95 patents or the patents);

    (3)     admitted into evidence Nissan Design Specifications for the 1992 Nissan Pathfinder (1992 NDS);

    (4)     instructed the jury on negligent failure to warn and the latent-danger theory of product defect;

    (5)     denied the portion of "Defendant Takata Corporation's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, at Close of Evidence" (Takata's JMOL Motion) in which Takata requested that the circuit court enter judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) in Takata's favor because the Udacs did not present sufficient evidence for their false-latch theory of defect;

    (6)     denied the portion of Takata's JMOL Motion in which Takata requested that the circuit court enter JMOL in Takata's favor because the jury's punitive damages award was based on insufficient evidence; and

    (7)     denied the portion of "Defendant Takata Corporation's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and/or for New Trial and/or for Remittitur" (Takata's Renewed JMOL Motion) in which Takata requested that the circuit court enter JMOL in Takata's favor because the jury's $12,500,000 punitive damages award was excessive under Hawai‘i law and the federal due process clause.

The Udacs cross-appeal from the (1) "Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of Costs and Prejudgment Interest and for Form of Judgment Filed on January 27, 2006," filed on April 19, 2006 (Order Granting/ Denying Motion for Prejudgment Interest) and (2) Second Amended Judgment. The Udacs contend the circuit court erroneously failed to award them prejudgment interest on (1) compensatory damages from the date of the accident and (2) the punitive damages award.

We vacate and remand. [footnotes omitted]

Opinion pdf

OPINION OF THE COURT BY FOLEY, J.

Defendant-Appellant John Billam-Walker (Walker) appeals from the Judgment of Conviction and Sentence (Judgment) filed on July 2, 2007 in the Family Court of the First Circuit (family court). A jury convicted Walker of two counts of Endangering the Welfare of an Incompetent Person, in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 709-905 (1993).

On appeal, Walker contends (1) the family court abused its discretion by denying Walker's last motion for a continuance; (2) there was insufficient evidence to convict Walker; (3) the family court erred by admitting unfairly prejudicial evidence; (4) HRS § 709-905 is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; (5) the family court abused its discretion by denying Walker's motion for mistrial in light of prosecutorial misconduct; (6) the family court's jury instructions or lack thereof were prejudicially erroneous; (7) the family court abused its discretion by requiring Walker to attend domestic violence counseling as a condition of his probation; and (8) the cumulative effect of all of the errors deprived Walker of a fair trial. Walker asks this court to reverse his conviction. [footnotes omitted]

Opinion pdf

OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA, J.

Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Melodie C. Line (Petitioner) filed a petition for writ of certiorari on May 22, 2009, seeking review of the judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) filed on April 28, 2009, pursuant to its April 7, 2009 Summary Disposition Order (SDO) affirming the March 3, 2006 Judgment of Conviction and Probation for Hindering Prosecution in the First Degree under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 710-1029 (Supp. 2008), filed by the circuit court of the second circuit (the court). See State v. Line, No. 27850, 2009 WL 924509 (App. Apr. 7, 2009).

We hold that (1) unlawful police conduct is not a defense to a charge of Hindering Prosecution in the First Degree under HRS § 710-1029, however, (2) there was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for such an offense in this case, and therefore, the April 28, 2009 judgment of the ICA and the March 3, 2006 judgment of conviction of the court are vacated; but (3) the case is remanded to the court for entry of a judgment of conviction on the lesser included offense of Hindering Prosecution in the Second Degree. [footnotes omitted]