Horn of Africa Blog

British Prime Minister David Cameron’s grand conference will bring together many parties but no one is forecasting a breakthrough

2012-02-24T02:06:00.004-08:00

SOMALIA | BRITAIN No great expectations British Prime Minister David Cameron’s grand conference will bring together many parties but no one is forecasting a breakthrough After two decades of political mayhem, Somalis and more perspicacious foreign diplomats are intensely sceptical about high-level conferences. Many approach the London Conference on Somalia on 23 February with muted hopes of any political advance and say that its most important contribution will be to raise the profile of Somalia’s internal political and social crisis, plagued by intermittent conflict and chronic food shortage. British Prime Minister David Cameron and his Foreign Secretary William Hague have evidently succeeded on the promotion front. Thanks to the Foreign Office’s invitations to Arab countries, it is the first big Somalia meeting in which several Muslim states are seriously involved. The challenge to the London conference will be to go beyond the recent International Contact Group (ICG) on Somalia or the United Nations Security Council. Both those meetings endorsed policies decided elsewhere and seemed unable to assess why those policies are not working. Delegates in London could start the search for a strategy. Announced by Cameron in late November 2011, the London Conference was supposed to offer fresh thinking on Somalia’s current political dynamics. It promised to broaden the international representation in efforts to tackle Somalia’s crisis and to strengthen the role of the UN there. Central to that is Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), veteran Tanzanian diplomat Augustine Philip Mahiga. Mahiga has held the fort in difficult times but is reticent about spelling out any vision of an eventual solution. He may take comfort from the support he receives from the East African Community but he is prisoner of a dysfunctional UN Political Office on Somalia. UNPOS suffers from internal inefficiencies and rivalries, we hear. The Deputy SRSG, Austrian diplomat Christian Manahl (who worked in Congo-Kinshasa and Sudan), attempted reform but was outmanoeuvred and recently recalled to UN headquarters in New York, says a diplomatic source. The UN Office is also obliged to pursue a political strategy that cannot survive the end of the transition period, when the writ of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) ends on 23 August. What happens after that should – but may not – be central to discussions in London. Neither UNPOS nor the SRSG have spelled out how the future institutions might work nor have they publicly identified the emerging leaders who could manage the political transition. The dual-track approach There seems to be a deep ambiguity about the ‘dual-track’ approach in Somalia. Pushed strongly by the United States, it involves recognising the so-called central authority of the TFG in Mogadishu but also showing a willingness to work with the local and regional entities in Somaliland and Puntland. Although the devolved authority of those two entities is widely accepted, UN officials have been slow to engage with them. It is diplomatically delicate: Somaliland is petitioning the UN for statehood but cannot get the African Union to recognise it, despite open support from South Africa and Ghana, and covert support from Ethiopia. Most critically, the UNPOS lacks a political strategy to confront the Haraka al Shabaab al Mujahideen and translate recent military advances into political gains. Nor has it got a clear policy toward the encroachment of Kenya’s and Ethiopia’s armies in Somalia. Neither Nairobi nor Addis Ababa saw fit to tell the UN that they were sending their armies into Somalia, and have no interest in coordinating their plans with the UN. The London Conference is not going to change any of that. The draft final communiqué, we understand, is nearly identical in substance to that of the ICG meeting in Djibouti on 5-6 February. The Conference appears to have been prompted by concern over the recent famine in Somalia and the Horn of Africa and by worry about the radicalisation of one of Somalia’s largest diaspora communities just before the Olympic Games in July. The Conference lacked the preparatory groundwork needed to generate a new direction for international policy on Somalia, say its diplomatic critics. As Africa Confidential went to press, the 53 delegations expected will discuss the future of Somalia up to August, with little idea of what is to happen afterwards. There is no strategy on how to confront Al Shabaab beyond the usual military and security policies. This includes a proposal to raise the number of troops in the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom) to 17,000. Nothing has been said about the unhealthy polarisation between the West and the Muslim countries (Qatar, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates) which are being put forward as new sources of funding. They complain they are under pressure to endorse strategic priorities that favour Ethiopia and the USA. Although the preparatory meetings may not produce a groundbreaking conference, they did table important issues and obliged states to make their positions clear. The most striking example was the debate on Al Shabaab. Qatar, Turkey, the UAE and Scandinavian countries favoured engagement, and Britain and some other European countries looked interested. The USA, however, firmly opposed any further discussion of the idea, with strong backing from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD, where Ethiopia has great influence). As has happened before, Britain immediately lost interest and the debate closed. Therefore, countries such as Qatar (which has been accused by UN investigators of covertly arming Al Shabaab via Eritrea) may be moving towards negotiation but in the absence of any international framework. The announcement of a conference in Istanbul in June to focus on development issues is a small consolation prize for interested Muslim governments. It risks being as irrelevant as the spring 2009 conference organised by the then SRSG, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah. Conferees were planning the reconstruction of Mogadishu in a five-star hotel in Istanbul as bloody war blazed in the Somali capital. As daily clashes demonstrate, security in Mogadishu and towns liberated from Al Shabaab may not improve enough to allow ambitious reconstruction. The timing is also problematic. Western states, led by the US and Britain, seem to be rerunning their policies of early 2007 when they celebrated the Ethiopian intervention and the return of the TFG to Mogadishu. Then, Western states were not inclined to consolidate the TFG’s return with the economic help which might have provided it with a sliver of legitimacy. If progress is to be made, the population needs to see quickly that economic benefits will follow any defeat of Al Shabaab. Complex institutional and political developments will not enthuse Somalis: after two decades of mayhem, they want financing for schools and clinics, as well as jobs. After Al Shabaab At the preparatory meetings for London, Amisom’s recent military successes were celebrated but European diplomats did not hide their concern that there was no credible plan to fill a political vacuum left by a defeated Al Shabaab. The expansion of Amisom may result in more targets for the enemy than in more security, as in Afghanistan. IGAD countries have already divided south-central Somalia into zones of influence with little consideration for history or Somali views: military planners do not factor in such niceties. Kenya will hold sway over Lower and Middle Juba, where the Ogaden clan is dominant, as it is in Kenyan Somali politics. Gedo is associated with Bay and Bakool and would constitute the best possible buffer zone for Ethiopia. Apart from Beled Weyne, which is currently allocated to Amisom’s Djiboutian contingent, the least warlike of them, the Central Region will not benefit from an increased Amisom presence. The proxy forces there get substantial support from Ethiopian and Western security services. Kenyan troops’ inability to take over Kismayo or even Afmadow, plus the many clashes in Beled Weyne, could encourage a fight-back by Al Shabaab. If it successfully takes on the Kenyan and Ethiopian forces, together with their local proxies, Al Shabaab could regain some of the popular support it has lost. As for the TFG, the sole option offered for discussion is a new constitution. In any other country, the presence of four foreign armies, an ongoing civil war and the lack of a legitimate government – many see the TFG as a gang of looters – would not be the best moment for a highly polarised population to discuss a constitution. The SRSG and UNPOS downplay such limitations. Yet the institutional framework limits interaction with any Somali actors apart from the TFG. The question of who will enforce this new dispensation is unresolved, too. By making the constitution the only option available, the international community risks becoming hostage, again, to a chaotic constitutional process that cannot succeed in such a short time. This will also offer new opportunities to Islamist militants. The London Conference will announce sanctions against spoilers intent on derailing the processes and corrupt officials. This is likely to fail and will trigger anger in Somalia, since the main targets are the more than 300 members of parliament who sacked the Speaker, Sharif Hasan Sheikh Adan, last December, although UNPOS still invites him to all international gatherings. For years, the international community has threatened to take action against corrupt TFG ministers and MPs. None have ever come before a court although many pay tens of thousands of US dollars into their bank accounts in Western countries (especially Britain and the US) and buy property. Some of the spoilers may not be Somali but regional states. While IGAD presented itself as unified in the preparatory meetings, beyond the 1964 mutual Defence Pact against any Somali aggression, Ethiopia and Kenya do not share the same view of solutions. Will other governments sanction Addis Ababa or Nairobi because they put their own clients in charge in their ‘liberated areas’ instead of genuinely local representatives? The Somaliland government is invited but will face bitter criticism if its delegates return with the usual set of pledges and counter-terrorist cooperation projects. Somalilanders and their backers in the UK, may resent that Galmudug (South Gaalkaayo) is ranked in protocol at the London Conference with Somaliland. In her excellent new book, Getting Somalia Wrong, BBC journalist Mary Harper points out that international conferences on Somalia ‘have produced a succession of weak transitional governments which have paid lip-service to federalism but have tended to be highly centralised. They lack popular legitimacy because Somalis tend to see them as entirely foreign creations.’ The London delegates will struggle to buck the trend. Copyright © Africa Confidential 2012 http://www.africa-confidential.com [http://www.africa-confidential.com/article/id/4340/No_great_expectations]

Somalia: An Opportunity that Should Not Be Missed

2012-02-24T01:59:00.000-08:00

The next six months will be crucial for Somalia. The international community is taking a renewed interest in the country; the mandate of the feeble and dysfunctional Transitional Federal Government [TFG] expires in a half-year; and emboldened troops from the African Union Mission in Somalia [AMISOM], Kenya and Ethiopia are keen to deal the weakened [though still potent] extremist Islamist movement Al-Shabaab further defeats. This confluence of factors presents the best chance in years for peace and stability in the south and centre of the country. To achieve that, however, requires regional and wider international unity of purpose and an agreement on basic principles; otherwise spoilers could undermine all peacebuilding efforts. The crisis has been climbing steadily back up the international agenda. The one-day London Somalia Conference on 23 February will bring together senior representatives from over 40 countries, the UN, African Union [AU], European Union [EU], World Bank, Inter-Governmental Authority for Development [IGAD], Organisation of Islamic Conference [OIC] and League of Arab States. Somalia’s Transitional Federal Institutions [TFIs] will participate, as well as the presidents of Somaliland, Puntland, Galmudug [regional governments] and representatives of the largest armed group, Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a [ASWJ]. It should prepare the way for desperately needed greater coordination, especially with Gulf and regional states, as well as between AMISOM and the UN. Coordination is required because the mandate of the TFG is set to run out in August 2012. Although it has failed to achieve any of its core objectives, many officials desire another extension, such as it received a year ago. But it is unreformable – too many of its members benefit from the fully unsatisfactory status quo. It must not be extended. Instead, the London Conference should agree on a new political framework and principles for governing Somalia. Readmore

Undercounting, Overcounting, and the Longevity of Flawed Estimates: Statistics on Sexual Violence in Conflict

2012-02-24T01:57:00.000-08:00

Sexual violence has been associated with several recent conflicts and their aftermath, including – but not limited to – conflicts in Bosnia, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo , East Timor, Liberia, and Rwanda. Recent efforts by the international community have sought to address wartime sexual violence. In March 2007, the United Nations Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict body was launched to coordinate efforts across 13 United Nations entities and increase efforts to end sexual violence during and in the wake of armed conflict. In January 2010, United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, appointed Margot Wallström as his Special Representative on sexual violence in conflict. Further, in December 2010, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1960, which called for commitments to “enhance data collection and analysis of incidents, trends and patterns of rape and other forms of sexual violence” to improve targeting and policy response. These coordinated efforts to influence policy and the call for rigorous research including enhanced data collection on wartime sexual violence are long overdue. Although standard reporting and data collection efforts of any kind are compromised in situations of civil unrest, our understanding of sexual violence dynamics is particularly poor. Despite this acknowledgement, flawed estimates are often perpetuated by well intentioned actors because of the desire to provide numbers to illustrate the magnitude of violence. Citation of secondary sources with little understanding or explanation of methodology and limitations of the estimate is rampant. Sources of bias and limitations specific to research on wartime sexual violence are numerous but can be broadly categorized into macro-level [or institutional] and micro-level [or individual] constraints. Among the macro-level constraints, as previously mentioned, are logistical barriers to collecting large-scale nationally-representative surveys and the break-down of routine reporting systems during conflict. As a result, the majority of available databases of estimates from conflict areas come from reports to law enforcement authorities or record reviews at health facilities. Estimates from these sources are typically lower than the true prevalence of sexual violence because they capture only cases that were reported or where medical attention was sought, which are often only a fraction of the true incidence. Readmore

No Place for Children: Child Recruitment, Forced Marriage, and Attacks on Schools in Somalia

2012-02-24T01:54:00.000-08:00

Children in war-torn Somalia face horrific abuses, including forced recruitment as soldiers, forced marriage and rape, and attacks on their schools by the parties to the conflict. Those responsible are never held to account. This report documents al-Shabaab’s targeting of children for recruitment as soldiers, forced marriage, and rape, with a focus on abuses in 2010 and 2011. In addition, it documents how the group has targeted students, teachers, and school buildings for attack. Al-Shabaab fighters have also used schools as firing positions, and the students inside as “human shields,” placing children at risk of injury or death from indiscriminate or disproportionate return fire from TFG or AMISOM forces. Children have served within TFG forces and TFG-aligned militias, although Human Rights Watch has not been able to independently confirm how widespread children’s participation is. Readmore

A Shift in Focus: Putting the Interests of Somali People First

2012-02-24T01:50:00.003-08:00

Responsibility for this situation lies first and foremost in Somalia, where warring factions are accused of impeding and diverting aid flows, but the international community has also been at fault. Policies focused more on international security concerns than on the needs, interests and wishes of the Somali people have inadvertently fueled both the conflict and the humanitarian crisis. In February 2012, key governments and institutions from the region and the wider Islamic and Western world will meet in London to chart a way forward. They must seize this opportunity to refocus on the Somali people that past policies have failed, developing more coherent strategies to ensure that aid and protection reach those who need it and addressing the root causes of the protracted conflict and chronic vulnerability in the country Readmore

Time Works Against Justice: Ending Impunity in Eastern Congo

2012-02-18T03:37:00.002-08:00

The United States and the international community must strongly support Congolese partners to reform the country’s justice system in order to break the flagrant cycle of impunity and promote accountability, according to a new Enough Project report. This report recommends strategies to tackle justice reform in Congo, where a lack of accountability has fostered a war that has killed more than five million people. “There has never been a systematic attempt to address the issue of impunity within the Congolese justice system,” said Aaron Hall, Enough Project Congo policy analyst and report co-author. “The lack of accountability for war crimes including the murder of civilians, rape, plunder, and extortion is one of the key obstacles to creating an environment for peace and development in eastern Congo.” The international community should use a multi-pronged approach of state-level conditionally-based pressure and civil society support to ensure Congo implements Specialized Mixed Courts to try international human rights crimes committed in Congo that fall outside the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, according to the paper Read More

The International Contact Group and Steps Toward Stability in the Great Lakes

2012-02-18T03:36:00.000-08:00

On February 9-10, 2012 the International Contact Group on the Great Lakes Region will meet at the Department of State in Washington, DC. This body, consisting of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the European Union, and the United Nations, aims to meet on a quarterly basis and has been convened regularly since the early 2000s. The Contact Group works to address political, diplomatic, security, and development issues in the region, and since 2008 has included a task force focused on the illegal trade in natural resources. The intention of the group is to act as a medium for regular exchange of information, the harmonization of messaging, and for the identification and discussion of gaps that exist in regional foreign policy among the members of the group. The group originally included regional countries such as Angola and South Africa, but over the years has slimmed down to its current members that now act as a North American - European alliance on development, security, and economic diversification in the Great Lakes Region. The Contact Group has a unique ability to advance a coordinated regional policy from all members based on the collective knowledge the group brings to the table. The Group tends to meet just below the ministerial level, occasionally receiving participation from senior principals, and in general allowing for interaction among working level and deputy assistant secretary level and equivalent representatives. This framework is beneficial in that it engages those who have an in depth working knowledge of the issues and situations on the ground. Ultimately, this allows those officials most responsible for crafting the nuts-and-bolts of policy to communicate and coordinate with their counterparts. The upcoming meeting in Washington will focus on four urgent subject areas: the Congolese elections, security sector reform in Congo, conflict minerals, and armed groups and regional dynamics including the LRA. As a whole, these areas represent core impediments to peace, stability, and development in the Great Lakes. The following are recommendations to the group on specific elements of each subject area where this body can act to create real progress to mitigate conflict and fill critical gaps in cross-border coordination and communication. Read more

Conflict-Sensitive Conservation in Nyungwe National Park: Conflict Analysis

2012-02-17T02:24:00.000-08:00

In September 2011 the Wildlife Conservation Society and the International Institute for Sustainable Development initiated a two-year collaborative project on conflict-sensitive conservation in Nyungwe National Park, in southwest Rwanda. The collaboration focuses on building the capacity of the Rwanda Development Board and Nyungwe-area district representatives to understand, manage and resolve conflicts. The work is funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development. Conflict-sensitive conservation is conservation programming and implementation that takes into account the causes and impacts of conflict and the actors in it, in order to minimize conflict risks and maximize peace-building opportunities. As a central part of the project, a two-day workshop on conflict-sensitive conservation was held in Kitabi on September 22 and 23, 2011. The objectives of the workshop were to introduce the staff of the Rwandan Development Board and other stakeholders to the CSC methodology, identify existing and potential conflicts affecting the conservation of Nyungwe National Park and the surrounding communities and prioritize those conflicts that require action, analyze the prioritized conflicts, and identify potential solutions through which Development Board and its partners can address these conflicts. The findings of the workshop, as well as those from consultations with conservationists and communities, form the basis of the conflict analysis presented below and will contribute to the development of a conflict resolution strategy for Nyungwe National Park. Read more

Report of the Secretary General: Conflict-Related Sexual Violence [A/66/657]

2012-02-17T02:22:00.000-08:00

The report covers the period from December 2010 to November 2011 and includes: information on parties to conflict credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for acts of rape or other forms of sexual violence; highlights major outcomes of missions and political engagements undertaken by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict; and describes key initiatives taken by the UN to address conflict-related sexual violence. Read more

The Causes of Stability and Unrest in the Middle East and North Africa: An Analytic Survey

2012-02-15T01:46:00.002-08:00

We have updated and greatly expanded our analysis of the metrics that can cause political instability and unrest in the Gulf and Middle East. The report focuses on underlying forces and causes at a time when political crisis -- and serious security issues -- dominate the region. These political dynamics and unrest are, however, only part of the story. The trends in demographics, economics, internal security and justice systems, governance, and social change show how much other factors affect both the region and individual nations, and will remain sources of violence and instability until they are dealt with. They show how basic data on the size of given economies, per capita incomes, populations, and population growth rates also contribute to instability. Finally, they illustrate the critical role of governance, social change, and justice systems in shaping and dealing with each nation’s problems. Read more

Sudan: No End to Violence in Darfur: Arms Supplies Continue Despite Ongoing Human Rights Violations

2012-02-14T02:07:00.001-08:00

In the last twelve months, as other developments in Sudan overshadowed international attention on Darfur, the region has seen a new wave of fighting between armed opposition groups and government forces, including governmentbacked militias. The fighting has shifted during 2011 away from former epicentres of the war near the border with Chad and elsewhere, to eastern Darfur in particular. This has included targeted and ethnically motivated attacks on civilian settlements, and indiscriminate and disproportionate aerial bombings that have contributed to the displacement of an estimated 70,000 people from their homes and villages. This briefing describes some of these events; the types of arms in use by those responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law; and the suppliers of those arms to Sudan. These arms have in some cases been supplied to Sudan barely 12 months before their use in Darfur. Critically, this briefing shows that the governments whose exported military equipment have over the years turned up at the site of serious human rights violations in Darfur -- including Belarus, the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation -- continue to supply those kinds of equipment to Sudan on a regular basis. Read more

Violence, Identity Mobilization and the Reimagining of Biafra

2012-02-11T02:17:00.000-08:00

The events leading to the Nigeria Civil War marked the triumph of force and violence over dialogue and negotiation as a means of conflict resolution. The success of the Nigerian state in imposing a military solution on the preceding political crisis, and then suppressing the ensuing Biafran rebellion, has had a lasting effect on state–society relations. As a result, the state has not refrained from using violence at the slightest provocation against competing and conflicting ethno-religious groups. The tendency of the state to exercise domination through the deployment of violence implies an ongoing crisis of state hegemony rather than a resolution of civil unrest. This article argues that state violence was more important than ethnic divisions in triggering the secessionist attempt of Biafra, and has continued to create rather than resolve ethnic divisions across the country. The emergence in post-Civil War Nigeria of regimes that perpetrated or permitted mass violence against restive social groups remains critical to understanding the contemporary rise of ethno-nationalist movements and waning allegiance to the Nigerian state, particularly among the Igbo. The aim of the article is to underscore the understated salience of state violence in the debates on identity and citizenship in multi-ethnic societies. Read more

Protection of Health Care in Armed and Civil Conflict: Opportunities for Breakthroughs

2012-01-27T01:57:00.000-08:00

During recent uprisings in Bahrain, Syria, and Libya, security forces obstructed access to health facilities; harassed, arrested, and prosecuted medical personnel; and even assaulted patients within hospitals. In Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, where drug-related violence has escalated over the past three years, criminal organizations have killed and abducted health workers and interfered with patient care inside hospitals. As a result of the insecurity, doctors and nurses have fled, and 60 percent of the city’s clinics have closed, jeopardizing the health of individuals in a city of 1.5 million people. In some areas of the city there are no clinics left at all, and night and weekend services have been severely compromised. Assaults like these have long been part of the landscape of armed and civil conflict. They jeopardize the lives and well-being not only of those directly attacked but of others who may never be able to access the health care they need. Yet, for decades, a paucity of regular reporting on the frequency, dynamics, and impacts of these assaults; lack of attention to strategies to prevent attacks; and absence of accountability mechanisms for those who perpetrate assaults has allowed these assaults to continue with impunity. Read more

Up to 50,000 flee South Sudan violence - U.N.

2012-01-02T15:58:00.000-08:00

KHARTOUM (Reuters) - Up to 50,000 people have fled violence in a remote border area of South Sudan, the United Nations said on Monday, after days of clashes between two tribes. South Sudan became independent in July last year under a 2005 peace deal with Khartoum to end decades of civil war. But the new nation is struggling to build state institutions and stop rebel and tribal bloodshed that has killed thousands. On Monday, some 6,000 armed members of the Lou Nuer tribe attacked the remote town of Pibor in Jonglei state bordering north Sudan after days of clashes with the rival Murle tribe, U.N. sources said. Lise Grande, U.N. humanitarian coordinator for South Sudan, said tens of thousands of civilians had fled Pibor and nearby towns to escape the violence. "We are worried about their conditions. They are without water, shelter and food. They are hiding in the bush. I think it is between 20,000 and 50,000. This is an estimate only," she told Reuters. She had no information about casualties. South Sudan's armed forces are sending reinforcements to Pibor, army spokesman Philip Arguer said. "They attacked the town this morning. Civilians were evacuated from Pibor three days ago," he said, without giving further details. U.N. sources said around 3,000 soldiers and 800 policeman were on their way to Pibor. Cattle raids, they said, had sparked the latest violence. Doctor Without Borders (MSF) suspended operations in the area after two of its clinics were damaged by fighting, said MSF worker Jean-Marc Jacobs. "We evacuated our international staff," he said. "We have been unable to make contact with most of our local staff. We advised them to stay safe and they are hiding in the bush." (Reporting by Ulf Laessing; Writing by Tom Pfeiffer; Editing by Philippa Fletcher) Readmore

South Sudanese flee to escape deadly ethnic vendetta

2012-01-02T15:53:00.001-08:00

Tens of thousands of South Sudanese are fleeing their homes after inter-ethnic clashes around the town of Pibor. The UN is warning villagers to run for their lives as some 6,000 fighters advance on their ethnic rivals. Fighters from the Lou Nuer ethnic group are pursuing members of the Murle community, reports say, as a deadly vendetta over cattle raiding continues. A UN official told the BBC that peacekeepers and government troops are heavily outnumbered. The government is sending additional police and troops in a bid to quell the violence. About 1,000 people have been killed in recent months as reprisal attacks over cattle raids have escalated. Tens of thousands of Murle fled Pibor after it came under attack from the Lou Nuer on Saturday. BBC East Africa correspondent Will Ross says the Lou Nuer are attacking villages and burning homes and that it could take a week for the Murle to walk to an area of safety. Deputy UN deputy humanitarian coordinator in South Sudan Lise Grande told the BBC that several hundred UN peacekeepers and government troops were "far outnumbered" by about 6,000 Lou Nuer fighters. "Several flanks of the attackers have moved in a south-easterly direction [from Pibor], almost certainly looking for cattle," she said. She said the main part of Pibor had been held but that a clinic belonging to the charity Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) had been "overtaken". Ms Grande said the UN was tracking the movement of the Lou Nuer and warning others in their path to "disperse into the bush for their safety". 'Mother and sister missing' Our correspondent says many of the Lou Nuer fighters were now believed to be in pursuit of the Murle who had fled Pibor. The BBC has learnt that some of the displaced - mainly women, children and the elderly - have been killed although it has not been possible to verify how many. A resident of Pibor who fled to the capital Juba told the BBC that the Lou Nuer were still occupying parts of the town. Continue reading the main story map * Audio slideshow: Cattle country "The UN troops are there but they are not fighting the fighters who entered the town," said Rev Orozu Lokine Daky of Pibor's Presbyterian Church. "They are just trying to protect the city centre only, the rest of the town is now under [the control of] the fighters. "The situation is deteriorating. My own mother and my own sister are now missing. I don't know where they are. I assume they are dead," he added. South Sudan's President Salva Kiir has called on the Lou Nuer to stop their advance and return to their traditional areas. The government said it was deploying more troops and an additional 2,000 police to Pibor. Military spokesman Col Philip Aguer said on Sunday: "The 2,000 police are being sent within the next 24 hours. Troops will be deployed as soon as possible." MSF said it had lost contact with some 130 of its staff in Pibor and was "extremely worried" about their safety. The MSF workers were believed to have fled into the bush when Pibor came under attack. The medical charity's head in the country, Parthesarathy Rajendran, told the BBC they had only been able to get in touch with 13 members of the MSF team in the town. The Lou Nuer fighters have arrived in Pibor after marching through Jonglei state in recent weeks, setting fire to homes and seizing livestock. The entire town of Lukangol was burnt to the ground last week. About 20,000 civilians managed to flee before the attack, but dozens were killed on both sides. The governor of Jonglei state and the vice-president of South Sudan have been trying to mediate between the rival ethnic groups. South Sudan became independent on 9 July 2011 following decades of civil war with the north. One legacy of the conflict is that the region is still flooded with weapons. These are now being used in ethnic power-struggles, which often focus on cattle because of the central role they play in many South Sudanese communities. Read more

MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: AN OVERVIEW

2011-12-25T12:25:00.000-08:00

Migration is clearly a major issue across Africa. Indeed, migration – both within countries and across borders – can be seen as an integral part of labour mar- kets and livelihoods across much of the continent for at least the last century. Over time, and in different places, migration has taken a number of different forms. It has cut across class and skill boundaries, and exists in widely differ- ent geographical and demographic contexts. Migration represents an important livelihood strategy for poor households seeking to diversify their sources of income, but is also characteristic of the better off, and indeed of many African elites. In practice, however, the link between migration and poverty is often viewed more negatively. It is assumed across much of the continent that it is poverty that forces poor people to migrate, rather than migration being a potential route out of poverty. The poor are also generally seen as those worst affected by conflict-induced migration, itself a prominent feature in Africa. The movement of skilled and/or wealthy Africans is also generally viewed negatively (e.g. there is long-standing concern on the African continent with the impact of the ‘brain drain’ of African professionals). Only slowly, and in relatively few quarters, is understanding emerging of the potentially positive role that migration itself can play in reducing poverty, or of the possibilities for ‘mobilisation’ of the African diaspora in the fight against poverty. Meanwhile, public policy remains a long way from building effectively on such understanding Read more

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND THE STATE OF ERITREA

2011-12-25T12:13:00.000-08:00

During 2005 the political landscape in Eritrea continued to be dominated by the lack of progress towards a peaceful solution in Eritrea – Ethiopian relations. Structural economic imbalances continue to hamper economic development. Weather conditions have been favourable in the highlands comparative to other years, but food security remains a serious issue. In line with the Mid Term Review of the EU - Eritrea Cooperation, signed in 2004, projects, programmes and activities comprise interventions in three main sectors: 1) Infrastructure –including Transport and Energy 2) Rehabilitation and Recovery Programmes, covering reconstruction of economic and social infrastructure, resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons, demobilization and de-mining and 3) Education. During 2005 progress was made towards the implementation of EU funded programs in most sectors. Problems were faced in the completion of certain tender procedures and in the implementation of the de-mining program. As shown in Annex I, in 2005 some €19M have been disbursed in Eritrea, of which €3.8M out of budget lines financed projects. The forecasts for 2006, provided in Annex VII, indicate that disbursements shall take place at a quicker pace: it is anticipated that some €29.9M will be paid out during this year, of which €6.8M from budget lines. For 2007, forecasted disbursement will further accelerate to €39.9M, of which some €4M from budget lines Readmore

PROFILE OF THE SOMALI REFUGEES IN EMKULU CAMP ERITREA

2011-12-25T10:56:00.000-08:00

he Somali refugees in Emkulu Camp Eritrea are mainly of the Madiban tribe who immigrated to Djibouti region after the down fall of President Siad Barre in 1992. They crossed from Djibouti to Eritrea in 1993 in search of better protection and job opportunities and settled in Assab, the second largest port city of Eritrea. The influx of refugees from Djibouti towards Assab was never-ending and UNHCR established a refugee camp about 20 kms. South of Assab at Harsile Camp. The camp did not last long due to the war that took place between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998. Yet again the same refugees were relocated from Harsile Camp to Emkulu Camp. Currently Emkulu Camp hosts over 4000 Somali refugees and even now there are new arrivals each month. The first arrivals have resided in the camp for the last 8 years and have good relationship with the locals in Emkulu district and the vicinity Read more

Rape and the Arab Spring: The Dark Side of the Popular Uprisings in the Middle East

2011-12-23T01:51:00.000-08:00

The Middle East is undergoing a profound and dramatic political transformation. But the analysis of the scope, pace, and quality of this change has focused largely on the quality and results of initial elections in countries such as Tunisia and Egypt. Unfortunately, this sort of analysis overlooks how these transitions are affecting women and minorities— key indicators of the robustness of democracies around the world. Despite the prominent role played by women in organizing the popular movements that have overthrown and challenged authoritarian regimes across the region, the early results on the treatment of women in three key countries—Egypt, Yemen, and Libya— raise serious concerns about the future of democracy and human rights in the Middle East as the region experiences tectonic political change. As momentous as these changes are, they are occurring within a social context that has made sexual violence against women a powerful instrument of political repression. In many cases sexual violence against women is a desperate reaction of the powerful elite groups linked to authoritarian leaders and dictators who are rapidly losing power and relevance. Like other forms of violence and repression, sexual violence against women has been used as a tool to punish or intimidate those advocating for political change. The most horrific of these tools being used to control women is rape. Using rape as a weapon of war is not new, but in the context of patriarchal religious societies, it holds unique potential as a horrific tool of political repression. This issue brief outlines the role women have played in three countries that experienced changes in leadership—Egypt, Yemen, and Libya. It analyzes the use of sexual violence as a tool of continued repression and a means to hold back political change, and attempts to offer recommendations to U.S. policymakers and others in the international community to help protect women in the Middle East. At the same time, the limitations in influence foreign powers like the United States have in shaping the social and political realities of these countries must be acknowledged. Read more

SOUTH SUDAN: DISPLACEMENT PLAGUES WORLD’S NEWEST NATION

2011-12-23T01:49:00.000-08:00

The Republic of South Sudan (RoSS) is going through a major displacement crisis. The country is playing host to tens of thousands of refugees who fled fighting in Sudan’s Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States. In addition to this, hundreds of thousands of people are displaced due to violence within South Sudan itself. The country also has to contend with a large influx of southerners returning from northern cities. This crisis could soon become overwhelming for the world’s newest country – a country already struggling to deliver security and basic services to its citizens. If this displacement crisis is not adequately addressed, all the positive efforts now being made to incorporate returnees into the social, political, and economic fabric of South Sudan will be short lived readmore

The Creation of South Sudan: Prospects and Challenges

2011-12-16T15:38:00.000-08:00

On July 9, 2011, South Sudan achieved independence by separating from the northern state of Sudan to become the youngest nation in the world. The redoubtable challenge it faces is the continuance of the violent conflicts, mainly in the north, that is frustrating any attempt to bring about peace so necessary to get on with the first task of any new nation–socio-economic development. After nearly five decades of struggle, two civil wars and the deaths of nearly 2.5 million people, Sudan has reached a pivotal moment in its history. The dictates of its present circumstances emerge from its long history of oppression and the need now to find its own identity, as also the confidence of being an autonomous state. South Sudan's complex and interdependent relationship with Sudan will have a definitive impact in its trajectory as a nation, and on the prospects and challenges it currently encounters. This paper seeks to assess the present challenges that exist for South Sudan through an understanding of the historical narrative of the Sudanese state prior to the independence of the southern state. A crisis of national identity has been the key to the Sudanese state's history of violence and has manifested itself through recent ethnic conflicts such as in Darfur and in the Nuba Mountains. A history of interdependency and tensions over resource ownership has led to the heightened standoff in the oil-rich Abyei region, raising questions regarding the way ahead for the two warring regions. Sudan and South Sudan's dependency on oil, the strategic importance of countries (like India) investing in the region, and the longterm issues of sustenance will play a vital role in ensuring a future of peace, progress and prosperity for both the Republics. read more

South Sudan Nhial Deng Nhial: We are on brink of war

2011-12-10T02:53:00.001-08:00

South Sudan's foreign minister has warned his country is on the brink of war with Sudan following days of fierce fighting along the border. Nhial Deng Nhial told the BBC Sudanese forces had invaded the town of Jau, which was in the south. He urged the international community to intervene and said he hoped full-scale hostilities could still be avoided. South Sudan seceded from the north in July following years of civil war in which some 1.5m people died. The border between the north and south has not yet been officially designated. Since July Khartoum and Juba have accused each other of supporting rebels in the border areas. 'Tanks and aircraft' Mr Deng Nhial said the clashes in Jau, which he said was a town in Unity state, were the biggest threat to peace since South Sudan's independence. "Although there have been frequent aerial bombardments of different places in the Republic of South Sudan, we think that Khartoum has raised this offensive to an entirely new level by committing ground forces to cross into the Republic of South Sudan," he told the BBC's Focus on Africa programme. "We are still very much committed to the principle of dialogue with Khartoum - we are still hopeful that we can pull back from the brink of outright war." Earlier, Col Philip Aguer, spokesman for South Sudan's army - the South People's Liberation Army (SPLA) - told the BBC that Khartoum had used tanks and long-range artillery in the offensive on Jau, which started on Saturday. Read more

"Turning Pebbles": Evading Accountability for Post-Election Violence in Kenya

2011-12-10T02:43:00.001-08:00

This report examines the police and judicial response to the violence following the 2007 elections, which pitted ruling party supporters and the police against opposition-linked armed groups and civilians. Human Rights Watch found that of the 1,133 or more killings committed during the violence, only two have resulted in murder convictions. Victims of rape, assault, arson, and other crimes similarly await justice. Police officers, who killed at least 405 people during the violence, injured over 500 more, and raped dozens of women and girls, enjoy absolute impunity Read more

Recovery and Development Politics: Options for Sustainable Peacebuilding in Northern Uganda

2011-12-10T02:32:00.001-08:00

This Discussion Paper addresses questions related to the causes, evolution and legacies of the prolonged war in Northern Uganda between the rebel LRA and government forces. It critically examines the Government of Uganda’s experience in drafting and implementing various plans for recovery and peacebuilding in Northern Uganda and proffers explanations for their limited success. It also analyses the threats posed by the continued marginalisation of Northern region and the persistence of poverty and underdevelopment relative to the more prosperous regions of the country. Of note is the concern about a possible regression into violent conflict and the breakdown of the fragile peace in Acholiland. The paper providesan alternative reading of the conflict and makes a compelling case for a radical paradigm of economic recovery, sustainable peace and development based on conflict-sensitive, inclusive, socially just and people-centred policies. It is essential reading for scholars, peace and security practitioners, activists and humanitarian and development workers with a keen interest in post-conflict reconstruction, reconciliation and peacebuilding in Africa. Read more

Stabilising the Congo

2011-12-10T02:30:00.001-08:00

The brief considers the ‘stabilisation approach’ adopted by both the international community and national government to address the continued insecurity in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Considering stabilisation also offers a way of conceptualising and engaging with the root causes of displacement. Political implications of the stabilisation agenda are brought into sharper relief by focusing on a single question: stabilisation by whom and for whom? Rather than continuing to support the State unconditionally, the brief calls on international actors to strengthen and exercise their combined leverage in critical priority areas that together form a comprehensive ‘road map’ to long-term peace and stability following the elections. Read more