It's hard to imagine, much less understand, the personal hell that Dreier created for himself. Dreier's letter provides a glimpse of how it happened.

The webs we weave.

As everyone following the Stanford Financial Group scandal knows by now, at the request of the Department of Justice, U.S. District Judge David Hittner overruled a federal magistrate's order last week that would have allowed Stanford to remain free on bond pending his trial on business fraud charges. As a result, Stanford is imprisoned in Houston's Federal Detention Center pending his trial, which will probably not occur until sometime next year.

Meanwhile, the DOJ, the SEC, a federal court-appointed receiver and a British receiver operating in Antigua have frozen all of Stanford's personal assets, as well as the assets of the Stanford Financial empire. Consequently, Stanford has no funds with which to retain counsel.

And now he doesn't even have the freedom to help his attorneys prepare his defense.

However, it's now become reasonably clear that the DOJ and the SEC's repeated public allegations that Stanford was running a Ponzi Scheme through Stanford Financial are, if not outright false, at least misleading and irresponsible.

Stanford Financial clearly owned substantial assets, including the Antiguan Bank that also owned substantial assets itself. Perhaps those assets were over-valued and perhaps Stanford and his associates misled investors on the bank's capability of repaying the certificates of deposit that the company promoted and sold. But that's a far cry from running a Ponzi Scheme.

Moreover, the government's efforts to prevent Stanford from paying for defense counsel are downright scary.

The fact that Stanford Financial is not in a position to pay them is not particularly surprising. The company would probably be in bankruptcy if it were not already in receivership, and it's unlikely that either a bankruptcy judge or a U.S. district judge would allow the company to pay for Stanford's criminal defense.

But putting aside for the moment the issue of Stanford not being allowed to use his personal assets to defend himself, Stanford Financial has a Director's & Officer's insurance policy that provides for payment of at least a portion of Stanford's defense However,  the Stanford Financial receiver has threatened to seek contempt charges against the insurer (Lloyds) if it pays Stanford's defense costs as it is contractually obligated to do under the policy. At the same time, the receiver, the DOJ, and the receiver are spending millions in preparing the case against Stanford. My conservative estimate is that the government's tab is more than $25 million already (the receiver alone has a pending request for $20 million in fees).

Finally, Stanford has exhibited absolutely no inclination to flee from the charges against him. He has numerous family ties to Texas and the Houston area, and he has no prior criminal record. And it's not as if Stanford can just walk away from the charges if he is allowed out on bond. He has no passport and, with the GPS tracking device that the U.S. Marshal's Office requires criminal defendants to wear these days, the U.S. Marshals know immediately when a defendant is going somewhere that he is not supposed to be.

It's easy to look the other way when this type of concerted effort by the federal government essentially strips an unpopular businessman of the capacity to defend himself against charges that could imprison him for the rest of his life.

But remember -- if it can happen to R. Allen Stanford, then it can certainly happen to you and me.

A copy of Stanford's motions seeking release of funds for his defense and for reconsideration of his detention order are below.

Stanford Mtn to Release Funds

Pastor Chun Ki Won is the director of Durihana, a Christian missionary organization that helps North Korean defectors make the treacherous journey along the Asian underground railroad to safety in South Korea. In the six-minute interview below, Chun describes the ordeal that the defectors endure and the complex relationship that they have with Christianity. The Wide Angle website on Crossing Heaven's Border is here.

Although they are performing only slightly better than predicted before the season and are in fifth place in the six team National League Central Division, the Stros are only two losses behind the first-place Cardinals (45-39). 

How could that be? Are the Stros better than expected? Do they really have a good chance of contending for a playoff spot? What is going on here?

The answers: (1) Baseball remains a funny game; (2) Only slightly; (3) Not much of a chance; and (4) Mediocre teams playing mostly other mediocre teams will generally split about even over the long haul of a season.

In coming to these answers, it's helpful to review the aggregate RCAA and RSAA numbers of each club because that statistic provides a simple but revealing benchmark of how a team is performing during the long MLB season. Baseball remains a deceptively simple game. If your team's hitters generate more runs than the opposition, and your team's pitchers allow fewer runs from being scored than the opposition's pitchers, then your team is going to be a winner.

A club's RCAA reflects how many more (or fewer) runs that a club's hitters generate than a National League-average club and RSAA measures how many more (or fewer) runs that a club's pitching staff saves than a National League-average club (an exactly National League-average club's score is zero). Accordingly, a club's combined RCAA/RSAA number shows how many more (or fewer) runs the club's hitters have generated and the club's pitchers have saved (or given up) in comparison to a National League-average club.

A negative RCAA number reflects that a club's hitters have generated fewer runs relative to what an average National League club would have generated using the same number of outs, and a negative RSAA number reflects that a pitching staff has saved its club fewer runs than an average National League pitching staff would have prevented in the same number of innings. Positive numbers in both cases are just the opposite -- hitters are generating more runs than a National League average club and a pitching staff is saving more runs than a National League average staff.

Although the Stros' record during the second quarter of the season was a bit above-average (23-19), the Stros remain a National League-average hitting team (2 RCAA) with a below National League-average pitching staff (-19 RSAA) at the halfway point of the season. Not surprisingly, that performance leaves the Stros smack dab in the middle (8th) of the 16 teams National League clubs from a hitting standpoint and the bottom 25% of the league (12th) in regard to pitching.

Interestingly, that aggregate -17 RCAA/RSAA figure is a considerable improvement over the club’s performance at roughly the same time last season [-42 RCAA/RSAA = (-41 RCAA +-1 RSAA], although the 2008 club’s hitting was quite a bit worse while it’s pitching was quite a bit better than this year’s outfit. But is that 25-run improvement in RCAA/RSAA the main reason why the Stros are just 3 games out of first place in the NL Central this season while they were 13 games out at about the same time last season?

No, it's not. The main reason the Stros are in a better competitive position this season is simply that the Stros' competition is decidedly less imposing this season. Last season, both the Brewers and the Cubs were well-balanced clubs with hefty, positive aggregate RCAA/RSAA numbers that had generated records 10 games over .500 for each club by this point in the season.

In comparison, through half of the 2009 season, none of the Stros' NL Central competitors have been particularly well-balanced. The division-leading Cardinals (45-39) have the best-balanced club in the division with a solid 26 RSAA and a decent 13 RCAA, but that latter number pales when the realization hits that 1B Albert Pujols' 57 RCAA covers up the fact that the remainder of the Cards' hitters have generated 44 fewer runs than a National League-average hitters would have created using the same number of outs as those players have used. Given the fall off between Pujols and the other Cardinals' hitters, why do pitchers give Pujols any pitches to hit?

Meanwhile, the Brewers (43-39) still hit well (45 RCAA, although most of that is attributable to IB Prince Fielder's 41 RCAA), but their pitching staff has fallen apart (-30 RSAA). The Cubs' (41-39) pitching remains dominant (35 RSAA), but their hitting has been pathetic (-32 RCAA). Similarly, the Reds (40-40) young pitching staff has bloomed (50 RSAA), but the club’s hitting has been the worst in the NL (-53 RCAA). Finally, the last-place (but not by far) Pirates (37-46) have actually performed a bit better than the Stros [-8 RCAA/RSAA = (-4 RCAA + -4 RSAA)].

In fact, except for the 52-30 Dodgers (55 RCAA/27 RSAA), the National League teams have been either mediocre or downright poor this season. Although that performance level doesn’t generate the best quality of baseball, it certainly does keep games competitive for the most part.

So, do the Stros have a legitimate shot at a playoff spot? On the surface, it would appear so.

Roy Oswalt (2 RSAA/3.81 ERA) has had three straight superlative starts after a generally lackluster first half and 1B Lance Berkman had an excellent second quarter of the season to boost his season statistics toward his more typical output level (21 RCAA/.398 OBA/.526 SLG/.924 OPS). Although LF Carlos Lee (7 RCAA/.346 OBA/.466 SLG/.812 OPS) and 2B Kaz Matsui (-11 RCAA/.284 OBA/.310 SLG/.594 OPS) were mediocre and poor respectively during the first half of the season, it's not unreasonable, based on previous performance, to assume that both will increase their production considerably in the second half of the season.

Thus, if pleasant surprises RF Hunter Pence (14 RCAA/.372 OBA/.495 SLG/.867 OPS), SS Miguel Tejada (8 RCAA/.356 OBA/.472 SLG/.828 OPS) and CF Michael Bourn (8 RCAA/.359 OBA/.395 SLG/.754 OPS) can maintain their first half production levels, it's not unreasonable to project that the Stros could end up a well above National League-average hitting club. And that's the case even though the hitters continue to carry the albatross of over-the-hill starters C Ivan Rodriguez (-13 RCAA/.274 OBA/.395 SLG/.669 OPS) and 3B Geoff Blum (4 RCAA/.333 OBA/.333 SLG/.667 OPS), as well as the brittle Matsui.

However, appearances are deceiving. There is a reason that the Stros are currently projected to have only an 8.7% chance of reaching the NL playoffs.

The reality is that this is simply not a team that is strong enough either in hitting or pitching to string together the type of winning streak that separates a contender from the rest of a the pack in a pennant race. Except for Oswalt and Wandy Rodriguez (9 RSAA/3.21 ERA), every other Stros starter has been below National League-average in terms of saving runs. Moreover, a couple of them -- Brian Moehler (-12 RSAA/5.64 ERA) and Felipe Paulino (-16 RSAA/6.66 ERA) -- have been among the least productive starters in the National League.

That doesn't mean that those below-average starters won't occasionally pitch a good game, as all of them have done at some point in the first half. But what it does mean is that it is extremely unlikely that they will do so consistently. And the reason that these below-average pitchers are pitching is that the Stros do not have anybody better down at AAA. Combine that ineffectiveness with continued reliance on below-replacement level "veterans" such as Darin Erstad (he of the incredibly low .481 OPS!), Matsui, Blum, Brandon Backe and Rodriguez, and it's not hard to understand why the Stros are more likely to descend into the NL Central cellar than rise to the top. The fact that Manager Cecil Cooper often makes dubious decisions (why would Blum ever bat before Pence in the lineup?) doesn't help matters, either.

Consequently, for the remainder of this season, the Stros most likely will continue to mosey along at around a .500 clip or dip below that closer to my pre-season over/under number for wins (74) if injuries begin to take their toll. Just as last season, when the Stros never attained much more than a 10% of making the playoffs even during their hot stretch drive, the odds are decidedly against this club achieving a playoff spot.

Nonetheless, there is reason for optimism about the club. The Stros have completed signing a substantial number of their draft picks for the second straight year, continuing the re-stocking of the club's farm system that is one of the main reasons for the club's demise since its 2005 World Series appearance. Lisa Gray has posted a couple of interesting posts (here and here) in regard to the Stros' drafts, so check them out if you are interested in how a few bad drafts can negatively impact a club such as the Stros. The Stros are still at least two strong drafts away from re-establishing a strong farm system, but after a decade of poor drafts (see also here and Zac Levine's overview of the Stros' minor leaguers for the first half of this season), it's better to get started late rather than never. I'm bullish on the way in which GM Ed Wade and personnel director Bobby Heck have handled the past two drafts.

So, hang in there. The playoffs are not in the cards for the next few seasons, but the Stros ship appears headed in the right direction. Given the seemingly unending downward spiral since 2005, that's progress in my book.

The 2009 season statistics for the Stros through the first 80 games are below, courtesy of Lee Sinins' sabermetric Complete Baseball Encyclopedia. The abbreviations for the hitting stats are defined here and the same for the pitching stats are here. The Stros' active roster is here with links to each individual player's statistics:

Although better known for his gangster movie roles, Cagney was actually Hollywood's best dancer for much of his long and storied career. Check out three of Cagney's signature dance scenes below from the 1942 film, Yankee Doodle Dandy, in which Cagney plays the early-20th century composer, George M. Cohan.

The first video below is probably Cagney's most famous dance sequence, the "Yankee Doodle Boy" scene from Cohan's first big-hit musical in the movie. The end of that video includes a short clip of a later salute to Cagney by Mickey Rooney and Judy Garland, which serves primarily to prove just how far Cagney's glorious talent exceeded that of a couple of pedestrian Hollywood hoofers. The third video below is the final dance scene of the movie in which Cagney as an ebullient Cohan descends the White House staircase after receiving the Congressional Medal of Honor from President Roosevelt. Note that the scene is shot in one take (the camera never strays from Cagney) and Cagney never once looks down at his feet. Heck, I cannot even walk down a staircase of that size without watching my feet. Enjoy!

Nevertheless, the local paper's recent coverage of disgraced financiers R. Allen Stanford and Bernard Madoff reflects that no such soul-searching is likely to emerge anytime soon down on Texas Avenue.

Take this recent Loren Steffy column in which he asks the following: "Why, then, does Madoff get a sentence six times that of [former WorldCom CEO Bernie] Ebbers or Enron’s Jeff Skilling?"

I mean, really. Is the answer to that question all that difficult?

Madoff turns himself in and admits from the outset that he was stealing money from investors for years by running a Ponzi scheme. Any wonder why he was hammered by the sentencing judge?

Ebbers was essentially convicted of covering up accounting fraud at WorldCom, but he at least put up a colorable defense that he was not responsible for such matters and had no knowledge of the fraud.

Moreover, Skilling wasn't even accused of accounting fraud. He was convicted essentially of making too many rose-colored statements about Enron, notwithstanding that his belief in the truth of those statements was never seriously challenged.

Finally, neither Ebbers nor Skilling stole a dime from the investors of their respective companies. Yet, Steffy insists upon comparing them with the larcenous Madoff. who essentially stole tens of millions. The Greed Narrative prevails again.

But here's my main point. Now that what happened to Enron has happened to numerous other trust-based Wall Street firms, shouldn't the Chronicle be advocating that similarly aggressive criminal prosecutions be mounted against numerous executives of the Wall Street firms who made the same type of rosy statements about their wobbling companies as Skilling made about Enron?

Now, I don't believe that there was widespread criminal fraud at Enron. The only true criminal fraud there was relatively small and isolated in Andrew Fastow's Global Finance unit. Similarly, I don't believe that there was widespread criminal fraud at the Wall Street firms that endured the same downward spiral that engulfed Enron.

But inasmuch as the Chronicle fanned the flames of criminal prosecutions against dozens of Enron executives and others involved in transactions with them, shouldn't the Chronicle be taking the same position with regard to executives at the similarly-situated Wall Street firms? Or at least shouldn't the Chronicle be explaining why it threw dozens of Enron executives under the bus even though it now fails to advocate similar treatment for executives of the failed Wall Street firms?

It seems like the least that the local newspaper can do.

The widespread use of expensive cancer drugs to prolong patients’ lives by just weeks or months was called into question by an article published Monday in the Journal of the National Cancer Institute.

Crunching data from published studies, the authors found that treating a lung-cancer patient with Erbitux, a drug that costs $80,000 for an 18-week regimen, prolongs survival by only 1.2 months.

Based on that estimate, extending the lives of the 550,000 Americans who die of cancer annually by one year would then cost $440 billion, they extrapolated.

How to control escalating spending on end-of-life care is one of the thorniest questions facing lawmakers working on the overhaul of the U.S. health-care system. [.  .  .]

“Many Americans would not regard a 1.2-month survival advantage as ‘significant’ progress,” the authors wrote. “But would an individual patient disagree? Although we lack the answer to that question, we would suggest that the death of a mother of four at age 37 years would be no less painful were it to occur at age 37 years and 1 month, nor would the passing of a 67-year-old who planned to travel after retiring be any less difficult for the spouse were it to have occurred one month later.”

While some policy experts consider the rationing of health-care resources inevitable in the quest to control medical spending, many Americans have long resisted putting the collective fiscal good over their individual health.  .   .   .

Read the entire article. I have many reservations about the direction of the Obama Administration's proposed reforms of the U.S. health care finance system. But that the proposed reforms are triggering discussion of key issues such as the one set forth above is not one of them.