Human Security Gateway: Afghanistan

Happy Christmas (2014), Will War Be Over?

Fri, 25 May 2012 11:55:11 -0700

The spin from Chicago is working. Many media reported that the war in Afghanistan will be over and Western troops gone by 2014. Apparently, they did not get President Obama's full message that was much more subtle: that the war ‘as we know it’ will be over. It will change its character and the new NATO mission will be smaller and less visible while western governments hope that less visibility will get the war in Afghanistan off the front pages. But don’t be fooled, says Thomas Ruttig, a Senior Analyst at AAN, there is no full NATO withdrawal and war will not be over just because you do not read about it anymore. SOURCE: Afghanistan Analysts Network

Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians

Wed, 23 May 2012 09:50:48 -0700

This report collects statistics from a variety of sources on casualties sustained during Operation Enduring Freedom, which began on October 7, 2001, and is ongoing. OEF actions take place primarily in Afghanistan; however, OEF casualties also includes American casualties in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Guantanamo Bay, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, the Philippines, Seychelles, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Yemen.

Casualty data of U.S. military forces are compiled by the U.S. Department of Defense, as tallied from the agency’s press releases. Also included are statistics on those wounded but not killed. Statistics may be revised as circumstances are investigated and as records are processed through the U.S. military’s casualty system. More frequent updates are available at DOD’s website at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/ under “Casualty Update.” SOURCE: Congressional Research Service

Transition and Peace Talks: Optimism and Confidence in Herat?

Tue, 22 May 2012 12:40:42 -0700

Transition of security and the possibility of a process of peace talks with the Taleban are a concern to most Afghans. According to reports, house prices are falling, investors are getting more careful and more and more people are contemplating to leave the country because of concerns that the situation may get worse. However, the situation is not the same in all of the country; provincial differences are many. AAN’s Hamisha Bahar looks at what is happening, and what these processes mean to the people of Herat, the capital of one of the biggest and most affluent provinces of Afghanistan. SOURCE: Afghanistan Analysts Network

No Country for Good Policemen?

Tue, 22 May 2012 12:08:33 -0700

At the NATO summit in Chicago, everybody’s attention seems to be focused on the budget for the defence of Afghanistan and how much donors will spend after 2014, in other words on the quantity of security forces that the country will be able to field. But what about their quality? A new, excellent report on the Afghan Local Police (ALP) by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) offered AAN’s Fabrizio Foschini new points of view on the issue. SOURCE: Afghanistan Analysts Network

Illicit Drugs and Insurgency in Afghanistan

Thu, 17 May 2012 09:39:45 -0700

It is argued that the relationship between illicit drugs and the insurgency in Afghanistan cannot be captured by the simplistic concept of “narco-terrorism”. Rather, it has to be seen in terms of linkages of various types and degrees between two distinct phenomena. Drug trafficking may generate criminal violence in both peacetime and conflict settings. In the latter case, the illicit drug business becomes a “conflict resource”, while also serving shadow economic functions (such as serving as a social-economic coping strategy to peasants in some areas) and generating organized criminal violence and street delinquency. Organized crime groups play the main role in the illicit drug business, especially at the higher, internationalized levels of the drug chain. Drug profits are in fact lowest in the drug producing areas themselves. In the case of Afghanistan, only 4.3 per cent (or US $ 2,9 billion) of the US $ 60 billion average annual volume of the global market for Afghan opiates remain in the country. Of the proceeds that stay in Afghanistan, the author estimates that no more than between US $ 100-150 million probably went to the Taliban in 2011. The US/NATO war on the Taliban has not significantly reduced Afghanistan’s opium economy. The prospects for achieving significant results in counternarcotics after the US/NATO withdrawal in 2014 are dim unless major armed conflict comes to an end – a goal likely to be achieved only if Afghanistan is decentralized and regionalized and the Taliban is given a regional role in Pashtu parts of the country whereby tougher counternarcotics provisions should be a negotiable demand/condition for any configuration of talks with the insurgents on the political settlement. SOURCE: Perspectives on Terrorism

Disjointed Ways, Disunified Means: Learning From America’s Struggle to Build an Afghan Nation

Wed, 16 May 2012 14:45:34 -0700

Remarkably ambitious in its audacity and scope, NATO’s irregular warfare and nation-building mission in Afghanistan has struggled to meet its nonmilitary objectives by most tangible measures. Put directly, the Alliance and its partners have fallen short of achieving the results needed to create a stable, secure, democratic, and self-sustaining Afghan nation, a particularly daunting proposition given Afghanistan’s history and culture, the region’s contemporary circumstances, and the fact that no such country has existed there before. Furthermore, given the central nature of U.S. contributions to this NATO mission, these shortfalls also serve as an indicator of a serious American problem as well. Specifically, inconsistencies and a lack of coherence in the U.S. Government’s strategic planning processes and products, as well as fundamental flaws in the U.S. Government’s structures and systems for coordinating and integrating the efforts of its various agencies, are largely responsible for this adverse and dangerous situation. This book explores these strategic and interagency shortfalls, while proposing potential reforms that would enable the United States to achieve the strategic coherence and genuine unity of effort that will be needed in an era of constrained resources and emerging new threats. SOURCE: Strategic Studies Institute

Transition Phase Three: A Big Leap Forward

Wed, 16 May 2012 08:28:59 -0700

A new phase of the security transition, the third, has been announced. Every Afghan province is now going to be involved, at least partly, in the transfer of security from ISAF troops to the Afghan National Security Forces [ANSF]. This is the case even in areas where foreign troops are no longer present or where Afghan troops are not present in sufficiently large numbers. A new report by AAN ‘Beating a Retreat’ examines the long-term potential impact of transition – also known as enteqal - on security and the economy. Here, AAN analyst, Fabrizio Foschini looks at the more immediate impact, both positive and negative, of the process on the ground, especially in the face of continuing [or resumed] Taleban operations SOURCE: Afghanistan Analysts Network

Beating A Retreat: Prospects for the Transition Process in Afghanistan

Wed, 16 May 2012 08:24:16 -0700

The US and its allies in NATO are now beating a retreat from Afghanistan. Although there are plans for a continuing US-‐led counterterrorism strategy in the region, the phased transfer of full responsibility for security, governance and development to the Afghan government, its forces and people is underway. But after one year of a transition process that started in 2011, and will officially be completed by the end of 2014, concerns are mounting over the formidable challenges facing the transition and whether it will succeed in delivering its objective: a self-‐sustaining Afghan state. SOURCE: Afghanistan Analysts Network

Afghanistan as a Test of Canadian Politics: What Did We Learn from the Experience?

Tue, 15 May 2012 14:30:03 -0700

This paper considers lessons that can be drawn from the Canadian effort in Afghanistan, especially the challenges of trying to build security, governance and development in Kandahar. First, it examines how the Canadian Forces [CF] adapted over time, both in Afghanistan and in Ottawa. Second, it looks at the challenges presented by a minority government and what can be learned from this political context. Third, it examines what was learned about the constraining forces on Canadian defence policy — the Opposition and public opinion — and evaluates the consequences for Canada’s next military engagement. The paper concludes by developing the implications for Canada’s future missions. SOURCE: The Centre for International Governance Innovation

The U.S. Cost of the Afghan War: FY2002 - FY2013: Cost in Military Operating Expenditures and Aid and Prospects for "Transition"

Tue, 15 May 2012 09:49:57 -0700

It is surprisingly difficult to get a meaningful estimate of the total cost of the Afghan conflict, total spending on Afghan forces and total spending on various forms of aid. More data are available on US efforts – which have dominated military and aid spending, but even these data present serious problems in reliability, consistency, and definition. Moreover, it is only since FY2012 that the US provided an integrated request for funding for the war as part of its annual budget request. The data for the period before FY2009 are accurate pictures of the Department of Defense request, but there is only a CRS estimate of total spending the previous years.

This report addresses the fiscal cost to the US of the Afghan War from FY2000-FY2013. It provides estimates of total cost, cost to the Department of Defense, and estimates concerning aid costs to State, USAID, and other federal agencies. It also reports on the total cost of international aid when this takes the form of integrated aid to Afghan development and Afghan forces – a fraction of total aid spending. No reliable estimate exists of total international aid to Afghanistan, since so much of this aid has been direct and has not passed through the Afghan Central government.

The resulting figures provide important insights for “transition.” They show the scale of past US efforts, how the aid has been allocated, and the differences between the total aid appropriated during the course of the war, the amount obligated (around 60% of the amount appropriated), and the amount actually disbursed (around 45% of the appropriation). SOURCE: Center for Strategic and International Studies

Afghanistan Field Trip Report VII: The Overall Transition in Afghanistan

Mon, 14 May 2012 14:59:51 -0700

The year 2014 will mark a critical juncture in Afghanistan’s future. After a decade of extensive international engagement and arduous fighting in Afghanistan, the international presence will be significantly reduced and circumscribed. Although the international community has committed itself not to abandon Afghanistan as it did in the 1990s, the onus will be on the Afghan government to provide for the security of its country and its economic development.

If security can be maintained and improved, Afghanistan’s mineral riches can start generating vast revenues in years to come. Their wise andAfghans are thirsty for sovereignty. Many, especially those living in highly-contested areas, are tired of the foreigners’ presence. At the same time, Afghans are also deeply afraid of the post-2014 future. A disintegration of the country into yet another phase of civil war is on everyone’s mind. Indeed, various preparations for a possible civil war are under the way. Ethnic tensions are running at the decade’s peak, and are reflected in the resurrection of militias, strengthening of alignments with powerful local patrons, and hardening of ethnic networks. Many Afghans are hedging their bets, often giving, for example, two sons for the Afghan National Army (ANA) and two sons to the Taliban, thereby maximizing their chances of aligning with the winning side – no matter who winds up in power when the fighting ends. In this context of great uncertainty, the dominant tendency is to operate on the basis of short-term horizons, and to maximize power and profit before it all comes down. SOURCE: The Brookings Institution

USAID in Afghanistan: Partnership, Progress, Perseverance

Mon, 14 May 2012 12:03:34 -0700

Great strides have been made in health and education, bringing more Afghans back into economic and civic life. Institutions that can accountably respond to people's needs and aspirations are being restored. Investments in infrastructure and human capital are making the country less vulnerable to insurgents and illicit business and more attractive for private-sector enterprise.

At the same time, USAID has improved how we work in Afghanistan. These reforms are core to our mission to accomplish results sustainably and cost-effectively.

We've boosted incomes, created jobs and reduced poverty, and we're supporting security gains against extremists. USAID and its partners will continue to build on this foundation. Our focus will include investing in energy, industries and capacities that will generate broad-based and inclusive economic growth. We are working with the Afghans to lay the foundation that enables a successful transition from a donor-supported economy to one driven by Afghan growth and ingenuity.

This report (pdf, 6.7mb) demonstrates the results we can achieve when we, in strong partnership with the Afghan people, focus on achievable goals. It also reiterates our commitment to the nation of Afghanistan and the U.S. taxpayers that support us, our partners in this important work and the lasting impacts we are achieving together. SOURCE: United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

Assessing Military Information Operations in Afghanistan, 2001–2010

Fri, 11 May 2012 15:54:04 -0700

This research brief offers an overview of the effectiveness of U.S. psychological operations in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2010, with particular attention to how well messages and themes were tailored to target audiences.

Key Findings:

Efforts to win the support of the Afghan population for U.S. and allied military operations have had mixed success.

The most successful initiatives were those involving face-to-face communication.

The most notable shortcoming was the inability to effectively counter Taliban propaganda against U.S. and NATO forces regarding civilian casualties.

Inadequate coordination, long response times for message approval, and an inability to exploit informal, oral communication were among the most significant problems with these initiatives. SOURCE: RAND

Afghanistan: Political Dialogue in the Shadow of Violence and Insecurity

Fri, 11 May 2012 08:47:05 -0700

The current security, political and economic environment in Afghanistan presents significant challenges to ending the conflict. Facts on the ground have largely worked against political dialogue in the first four months of 2012. In recent weeks, however, there have been small steps forward in four areas: 1) dialogue with the Taliban; 2) easing tensions with Afghanistan’s neighbors; 3) Afghan leadership exercising its sovereign authority; and 4) international commitment backed up by credible action. Accelerated progress in these areas is essential to create an atmosphere that facilitates a peace and reconciliation process. SOURCE: Global Observatory

Measures of "Progress" in Afghanistan in the Spring of 2012: The Need for Strategic Focus, Transparency and Credibility

Thu, 10 May 2012 09:21:39 -0700

Military progress is only one of the tests that the US and ISAF must meet to accomplish a successful transition in Afghanistan – even on the basis of minimal security and stability or Afghan “good enough:”

- The Afghan civil government must have enough public support and provide enough services to win popular support once outside military and aid programs largely depart.
- There must be enough outside aid to help Afghanistan through the period in which massive cuts in outside aid and military spending take place.
- The Afghan national security forces must become effective enough to replace US and ISAF forces and be sustainable with the level of self-financing and aid that are actually forthcoming.
- A new post-withdrawal balance of power must be established between the non-Pashtun north, various Pashtun elements, and areas under Taliban/Haqqani/Hekmatyer influence and control to create a reasonable level of stability.
- Pakistan and other neighboring states need to accept the creation of a “new” Afghanistan to the degree they do not actively undermine its stability.

It is not clear at this point in time how many of these other tests can be met. None, however, can be decoupled from the level of progress that the US, ISAF, and ANSF are making in defeating the insurgents. Moreover, the overall success of both the war and every aspect of transition depend on the progress being made in defeating insurgents at the political level relative to the political popularity of the Afghan government and regional power brokers. SOURCE: Center for Strategic and International Studies

Afghanistan in Transition: Crafting a Strategy for Enduring Stability

Thu, 10 May 2012 08:50:38 -0700

More than a decade after the United States and allied countries toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Afghanistan is preparing for another major transition: this time the substantial withdrawal of many of the foreign forces that have been providing security in the country, battling the resurgent Taliban insurgency, and propping up the regime in Kabul.

Arguably, the very narrow counterterrorism objectives of the mission have been accomplished. Al-Qaida has lost its safe havens in Afghanistan and much of its leadership structures, fundraising capabilities, and even popular appeal are in tatters. But the success of the larger project of establishing a stable and legitimate national government in Afghanistan and anchoring it in a solid regional arrangement remains a huge question mark. Even as Afghans are tired of foreign presence in their country, many fear that the departure of foreign troops will once again plunge the country into greater violence. The Afghan National Army is improving as a force capable of providing security to the Afghan population and assuring Kabul’s writ; though whether the improvements will be sufficient remains yet to be seen. The quality of governance in Afghanistan meanwhile continues to be poor, even if it is locally improving. SOURCE: The Polish Institute of International Affairs

The Afghan Local Police: "It's Local, So It Must Be Good" - Or is It?

Thu, 10 May 2012 08:42:48 -0700

Among the most controversial aspects of the transition strategy in Afghanistan are various efforts to stand up self-defense forces around the country. These Afghan “militias” are supposed to increase security in areas where Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and ISAF presence are highly limited. With ISAF denying that the various programs amount to a militia effort, calling the units everything else but militias and insisting that they are based on Afghan traditions, such as arbakai, the most visible version of these efforts right now is the Afghan Local Police. The ALP currently numbers around 13,000 members and is slated to increase to at least 30,000 by the end of 2014. SOURCE: The Brookings Institution

Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined?

Tue, 08 May 2012 09:12:19 -0700

This report is a study of 17 declassified documents captured during the Abbottabad raid and released to the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC). They consist of electronic letters or draft letters, totaling 175 pages in the original Arabic and 197 pages in the English translation. The earliest is dated September 2006 and the latest April 2011. Some of the letters are incomplete and/or are missing their dates, and not all of the letters explicitly attribute their author(s) and/or indicate the addressee. In addition to Bin Ladin, the recognizable individuals who appear in the letters either as authors or as recipients are `Atiyyatullah and Abu Yahya al-Libi, both of whom are al-Qa`ida leaders; Adam Yahya Gadahn, the American al-Qa`ida spokesman and media advisor; Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr, the leader of the Somali militant group Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin; Abu Basir (Nasir al-Wuhayshi), the leader of the Yemen-based al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); and Hakimullah Mahsud, the leader of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Given the small collection of documents released to the CTC, it is impossible to construct a coherent evolution of al-Qa`ida or its current state. “Letters from Abbottabad” is an initial exploration and contextualization of 17 documents that will be the grist for future academic debate and discussion.

A note on translation: The quality of the English translation provided to the CTC is not adequate throughout. When the translation was deemed inadequate, quotations cited in this report have either been amended or translated a new by Nelly Lahoud. Furthermore, the conversion of the dating of the letters from the Hijri to the Gregorian calendar is inaccurate in some places. The Appendix provides corrected dates to some of the letters, along with some pointers on how some letters relate to others. For those wishing to conduct their own analysis of the documents, it is highly recommended to refer to the original Arabic documents, not the translations. SOURCE: Combating Terrorism Center

Local Institutions, Livelihoods and Vulnerability: Lessons from Afghanistan

Mon, 07 May 2012 11:04:12 -0700

Social relationships are central to the ability of Afghan households to reduce vulnerability and gain a degree of livelihood security. Where there is a robust rural economy, relationships of relative equality provide a high level of security, mutual support and the opportunity to prosper. Where relationships are based on deep inequalities or where the rural economy is in poor health, there may be few benefits beyond precarious survival.

Drawing on a study of 11 villages in Afghanistan, this paper argues that there are significant differences between villages, both in the quality of relationships that can be established and the behaviour of these villages in relation to the provision of public goods. What underlies these differences is the behaviour of village elites and the level of their interest in supporting the common good. Where land inequalities are high and elites are economically secure, they have few incentives to widen the provision of public goods and are largely immune from social sanctions. Where elites are economically less secure, they are likely to have a shared interest in supporting social solidarity and promoting the provision of public goods. Such differences between villages can be analysed, and this paper proposes a way to do this systematically. SOURCE: Overseas Development Institute

Countering the New Orthodoxy: Reinterpreting Counterinsurgency in Iraq

Fri, 04 May 2012 16:29:48 -0700

Success, it is said, has a thousand fathers. Now four years removed from the advent of the 2007 Baghdad “Surge,” the situation in Iraq, while not perfect, has dramatically improved. Violence is down significantly, despite continuing acts of terror against the Iraqi people by Al Qaeda in Iraq [AQI] and some Iranian surrogate forces. Admittedly, the formation of the new Iraqi government following the 2010 election has been less-than-efficiently executed. But even so, Iraq continues to find a “good enough” solution and has avoided a return to the violence of 2006-2007. While it is not exactly a victory parade or “Mission Accomplished,” this may well be what success in a stability operations looks like.

But for all this attention, exactly what was causal in reducing the violence (and what was not) remains clouded. 2007 was a year when many techniques for limiting violence were tried. It is almost certain that not all of them were helpful, but given the overlapping efforts, empirical methods of verification are fairly limited. The technique of “throwing the kitchen sink” at the problem may be good policy, but it makes for terrible social science. We simply have no counterfactual to test against. So in the absence of a natural experiment, what follows is an alternative storyline that parallels but challenges the military-centric conventional wisdom, and which may serve as a competing hypothesis until an authoritative version emerges from a combination of the memoirs of senior Iraqi, American, and Iranian actors and comprehensive historical analysis based on the largely inaccessible official records from the period. SOURCE: New America Foundation

The Al Qaeda Document Release: What They Tell Us About Bin Laden and his Supporters

Fri, 04 May 2012 16:00:22 -0700

The al Qaeda documents released by the West Point Combating Terrorism Center provide a unique and tantalizing insight into the inner workings of al Qaeda and its boss Osama bin Laden. As usual the CTC has done a fabulous job of not only releasing the documents but also putting them into context. But in the end what has been released is only a tiny sample of what was obtained in bin Laden’s hideout in Abbottabad and readers would be wise to make their judgments tentative until we see much more.

According to administration officials the SEALs brought out of Abbottabad the equivalent of a small college library of documents and electronic files, perhaps up to 6000 documents all together. The head of al Qaeda was hiding but he was not incommunicado. Bin Laden appears to have been a collector of letters and messages in his last years. CTC has released only 17 documents, a small sample to work from. As the CTC report emphasizes there is much that is missing. For example, although there are notes about ‘trusted Pakistani brothers,’ the references to Pakistan are sparse and incomplete. Thus the mystery of who helped hide bin Laden for nine years in Pakistan remains unanswered. There is also very little here about bin Laden’s deputy and heir, Ayman Zawahiri, perhaps because those documents are still being exploited to find the new amir of al Qaeda. SOURCE: Brookings Institution

Security Aspects of Peace and Reintegration

Fri, 04 May 2012 15:36:35 -0700

This is the final report in a four-part series addressing peace and reintegration in Afghanistan. The document reviews security aspects of the reintegration process in Afghanistan with particular regard to verifying, monitoring and protecting former insurgents, and discusses some of the benefits of successful reintegration. SOURCE: Civil-Military Fusion Centre

Pakistan, Afghanistan and the US Withdrawal [Transcript]

Fri, 04 May 2012 15:23:39 -0700

As the United States and Britain begin their withdrawal from Afghanistan, the speaker will provide a guide to the changing cast of characters in the region. He will offer his thoughts on the future of international terrorism, and the policies and strategies both within Pakistan and Afghanistan and among the Western allies. He will also discuss how the death of Osama bin Laden has affected the relationship between the US and Pakistan, and examine the choices facing Pakistan, Afghanistan and the West in their efforts to bring stability to a fractured region. SOURCE: Chatham House

Can NATO Rethink Its Exit Strategy from Afghanistan?

Thu, 03 May 2012 10:27:16 -0700

The United States and its partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have embarked on a political and military transition in Afghanistan whose outcome will determine whether the country will begin to break free of the continuous warfare it has suffered since 1979 or will plunge into a new round of civil conflict. The principal feature of the transition is a plan to reduce international combat forces drastically by 2014, perhaps to just a few thousand, and to transfer lead responsibility for security to the Afghan National Army, police, and a patchwork of local militias. Because it involves military plans that encompass several dozen national governments, difficult logistic and supply challenges, and coordinated aid and external financing from around the world, the transition plan is necessarily bulky and difficult to move in new directions—it is the proverbial ocean liner, pointed at the distant horizon of 2014 and difficult to maneuver off its path. SOURCE: Centre for International Policy Studies

Political Governance and Strategy in Afghanistan

Thu, 03 May 2012 09:29:07 -0700

Afghanistan’s de facto system of governance is a politically driven “hybrid” order made up of shifting links among many different formal, informal, and illicit actors, networks, and institutions. Because its central government does not have the capacity to govern through its extremely centralized system and will not have that capacity for at least a generation, it will need to share the burden of stabilizing and governing the country with other governance and political actors. Alone, those other actors will not have the capacity to keep Afghanistan together either.

To use Afghanistan’s hybrid system as a resource for stabilization, the United States should work with its international and Afghan partners to develop a “political governance” strategy. The requirements for such an approach are detailed in this report. The governance component would encourage and enable formal and informal actors to share the burden of governing. To make sure power brokers do not contribute to instability, the politics component would give some a stake in the political and economic system while giving the most malign a set of targeted incentives to behave in ways conducive to stability. SOURCE: Center for Strategic and International Studies

Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan: United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces [April 2012]

Wed, 02 May 2012 16:07:25 -0700

Since initial publication in June 2008, the Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan has provided the U.S. Congress semi-annual assessments on developments in Afghanistan and the state of the international coalition’s civil-military campaign. The June 2008 report presented a bleak assessment of the situation in Afghanistan: “The Taliban regrouped after its fall from power and have coalesced into a resilient insurgency.” A year later the situation had declined further; as noted in the June 2009 report: “The security situation continued to deteriorate in much of Afghanistan.” However, these trends gradually began to change as shifts in strategy were supported by critical resources, and in November 2010, the report for the first time highlighted “modest gains in security, governance, and development in operational priority areas,” noting as well their uneven and fragile character. The last three iterations reported that progress has continued to expand, with the most recent report in October 2011 highlighting “important security gains” and “reversal of violence trends in much of the country.”

During the current reporting period of October 1, 2011 to March 31, 2012, the International Security Assistance Force [ISAF] and its Afghan partners have continued to build on and expand this progress. The year 2011 saw the first year-over-year decline in nationwide enemy-initiated attacks in five years. These trends have continued in 2012. The performance of the Afghan National Security Forces [ANSF] and the close partnership between the ANSF and ISAF have been keys to this success. As a result, the ANSF continue to develop into a force capable of assuming the lead for security responsibility throughout Afghanistan. Security progress and the development of the ANSF during the reporting period have enabled the security Transition process to continue in accordance with Lisbon Summit commitments. As of the end of the reporting period, nearly 50 percent of Afghans were living in areas where the ANSF have begun to assume the lead for security. SOURCE: United States Department of Defense

Peace & Reintegration: An Introduction

Tue, 01 May 2012 15:46:23 -0700

Formal and Informal Governance in Afghanistan

Mon, 30 Apr 2012 15:59:22 -0700

Formal and Informal Governance in Afghanistan is one of a series of analytical papers on The Asia Foundation's recently released public-opinion survey, Afghanistan in 2011: A Survey of the Afghan People. The series of essays provide detailed analysis of the survey data on the opinions and perceptions of Afghans toward government, public policy, democracy, and political and social change as interpreted by specialists who have in-depth knowledge of the region. This paper provides detailed analysis of the survey data on governance in Afghanistan, explores Afghans' views of governance, and considers the implications of those views on efforts to improve governance in Afghanistan in the short term. SOURCE: The Asia Foundation

Death of an Uruzgan Journalist: Command Errors and ‘Collateral Damage’

Thu, 26 Apr 2012 15:18:06 -0700

Omaid Khpulwak was killed at his place of work, the RTA building in Tirin Kot, Uruzgan, in July 2011, when it came under Taleban suicide attack and US counter-attack. Omaid was one of the outstanding journalists of his generation, who had worked with courage and integrity for the BBC, Pajhwok Afghan News and Afghanistan’s national broadcaster, RTA, yet the question of how he was killed and by whom emerged only slowly.

ISAF initially published a press release on the attack at RTA and a simultaneous attack on the governor’s compound in which it described the heroic success of Afghan commandos in defeating the Taleban. It refused to say whether US or other international forces had also been at the scene. The Afghan government insisted Omaid had been killed by the suicide bombers, but his family was sceptical: Omaid had bullet wounds, rather than injuries caused by a blast or shrapnel. The family received death threats in anonymous phone calls – presumed to come from a local, pro-US commander - in which they were told to stop voicing their suspicions that a US soldier had killed Omaid. An initial investigation by AAN based on interviews, ballistics and other evidence, pointed to the possibility that a US soldier had killed him.

This indeed turned out to have been the case. In September, the US military published the executive summary of its investigation into Omaid’s death, revealing that one of the US soldiers who cleared the RTA building had mistaken him – a ‘military aged male with a beard’ – for a possible suicide bomber and shot in self-defence.

AAN’s new report draws heavily on the military investigation which has been published after a Freedom of Information request. ‘The last two hours of Omaid’s life are revealed in granular detail,’ said Clark. ‘He survived three Taleban suicide bombs and fire from a helicopter gunship and heavy machine gun, texting his brother to pray for him as he hid in a bathroom.’ His shooting was likely a legal act of war. Yet, the military investigation also pointed to shortcomings on the US side: a failure to establish whether civilians were trapped inside the RTA building before launching the counter-attack and a failure to exercise ‘tactical patience’. Decisions made about how to deal with the Taleban suicide bombers worsened an already volatile situation and created the context in which Omaid was shot dead and seven US soldiers were injured by the suicide bombers. SOURCE: Afghanistan Analysts Network

Afghanistan: The Uncertain Economics of Transition

Fri, 20 Apr 2012 16:59:57 -0700

The economics of Afghanistan are only one aspect of the challenges posed by US, allied, and Afghan efforts to accomplish a successful transition. There are many reasons that transition will either fail or be determined by Afghanistan’s internal dynamics and the role of regional states regardless of what the US, Europe, and other aid donors do.

It is still clear, however, that the economics of transition – and the level of future US and other donor military and civil aid efforts – are critical if transition is to have any chance of creating a reasonable level of post-2014 security and stability. It is also important to remember – for all the problems involved in creating any form of successful transition –that the various insurgent groups still represent relatively small, unpopular movements with ethnic and sectarian ties that limit their influence to part of the country.

Even if the US and its allies cannot achieve the level of post-2014 stability and security they desire, this does not mean that Afghanistan cannot achieve relative stability based on some form of de facto federalism. This will limit insurgent gains and control as well as mitigate the risk that Afghanistan will become a center of terrorism.

Developing this stability, however, requires as much focus on economics as politics, governance, and security. It also requires that planners approach economics with a level of integrity that has been sadly lacking to date. Transition planners and managers need to be honest when the data and sources are in conflict, or so conflicting and poorly based that they cannot credibly be used for planning. SOURCE: Center for Strategic and International Studies

The Peace Process and Afghanistan's Women (Part II)

Thu, 19 Apr 2012 08:55:47 -0700

Since 2001, research and statistics indicate that the position of women in Afghanistan has improved. While women’s positions vary within the country, they are active as nurses, prosecutors and teachers and have continued to work alongside men in provinces, districts and villages. According to The Guardian, only around 5,000 Afghan girls were enrolled in school in 2001 in Taliban-controlled parts of Afghanistan. Today, more than five million children attend school, and more than a third are girls, according to the UK Department for International Development. Millions of women have turned out to vote in successive rounds of presidential, parliamentary and provincial elections, and thousands more have competed for positions in parliament and provincial councils, according to the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). Yet, while women are guaranteed equal rights under the present day Afghan constitution, they continue to face formidable barriers, according to the Council on Foreign Relations. A June 2011 Thomson Reuters poll ranked the country as the most dangerous in the world for women due to violence, conflict, limited healthcare and other factors. SOURCE: Civil-Military Fusion Centre

Water Use & Local Conflict: Case Study from Kunduz

Tue, 17 Apr 2012 12:24:07 -0700

This paper is one of four case studies prepared for Center for Policy and Human Development/UNDP as background document for the 2011 Afghan National Human Development Report (The Forgotten Front: Water Security and the Crisis in Sanitation). The case studies have been implemented in Faryab, Wardak, Kunduz and Kabul. They are focused around water and local conflict, water use in informal settlements, long-term and short-term effects of drought and the Karez system. SOURCE: Cooperation for Peace and Unity

Contextual Analysis of Police and Justice System in Kunduz: 2011 Baseline Assessment

Tue, 17 Apr 2012 12:16:42 -0700

This publication provides the results of a 2011 baseline evaluation on the current state of the Afghan police and the justice system in Kunduz Province. This evaluation, conducted by CPAU with funding support from the Dutch government, provides a comprehensive overview of rule of law and access to justice issues in Kunduz. The main emphasis is on the capacity of the Afghan Uniform Police as well as other state and non-state actors to provide security and justice to Afghans, including vulnerable groups, living throughout all seven of the province’s districts. This paper is the first in a series of four, and the data presented in this initial report will be the foundation for three annual follow-up evaluations to be conducted in 2012, 2013 and 2014. SOURCE: Cooperation for Peace and Unity

Afghanistan: Durable Solutions Far From Reach Amid Escalating Conflict

Mon, 16 Apr 2012 09:41:41 -0700

More than ten years after the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan´s transition towards peace and stability remains far from complete. Decades of armed conflict, natural disasters and extreme weather have had a devastating effect on Afghan society, causing significant civilian casualties, widespread destruction of property and infrastructure and numerous waves of displacement. Some 75 per cent of Afghans are thought to have experienced some form of displacement at least once during their lives, and the escalation and spread of armed conflict in recent years has led to a renewed rise in the number of internally displaced people (IDPs). Armed conflict and violence continue to disrupt the lives of Afghans today; an average of 400 Afghans a day have fled their homes since 2006, bringing the current number of IDPs to well over 500,000. SOURCE: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre // Norwegian Refugee Council

Stabilization and Reconstruction After Iraq and Afghanistan

Fri, 13 Apr 2012 15:49:09 -0700

The following conversation derives from an on-line chat between Global Forecast editors and two CSIS scholars on what stability operations might look like under the next administration.

As Washington debates the pace of withdrawal from Afghanistan, it may be time to look back and ask what we have learned as a country after a decade of massive state-building operations. SOURCE: Center for Strategic and International Studies

The International Relations of the Narcotics Trade through Afghanistan and Central Asia [Meeting Summary]

Thu, 12 Apr 2012 11:02:42 -0700

This is a summary of an event held on 7 March 2012 at Chatham House.

The seminar, which was held under the Chatham House Rule, analysed the politics of drugs at their source and in transit. The speakers also discussed the effects of the drug trade on the wider region and aim to provide recommendations for the international community. SOURCE: Chatham House

Afghanistan: Urgent Investments in the Long Transition

Wed, 11 Apr 2012 10:04:58 -0700

After a very busy and politically demanding year, the United States, Europe and their key international partners in Afghanistan are at risk of wasting the modest opportunity that they managed to create. Yes, there is now a plausible political strategy in place where there was none before. But the twin hopes for long-term international assistance and a sustainable political settlement with the Taliban remain too doubtful and ambiguous to make a positive difference yet. To make success more likely, the international community needs to deliver a truly impressive follow-up on the decisions made in Bonn.

In the short term, a stronger focus is required on getting ready to subordinate international military operations to the emerging political negotiations, on preparing for the presidential elections in 2014 and on managing local power transitions as a result of ISAF redeployments. At the same time, the decisions being made in the coming weeks and months to predetermine the size and shape of the long-term international engagement with Afghanistan must meet a double challenge: to break or at least slow the cycle of fear that grips the country, and to avoid building the next series of well-intentioned political traps for the international community by a new emphasis on thoughtful analysis and program design. SOURCE: Global Public Policy Institute

Peace and Reintegration: An Introduction

Tue, 10 Apr 2012 11:38:54 -0700

This document provides an introduction to peace and, in particular, reintegration. These are approached both as abstract policy objectives and as very tangible processes and programmes such as the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme [APRP]. This report, which is the first in a four-part series, particularly emphasises reintegration given that peace talks involving the Afghan government, the United States, insurgent groups and others have received significant and sustained attention from the media and analysts. In contrast, reintegration efforts have received relatively less coverage despite the fact that significant effort is being dedicated within Afghan and international institutions to reintegrating insurgents. After reviewing global research findings related to the role of peace and reintegration within mid-conflict and post-conflict contexts, the author turns to the APRP. The piece addresses the APRP’s [i] origins and objectives, [ii] associated institutions, [iii] envisioned reintegration process and [iv] progress to date. As with all publications from the Civil-Military Fusion Centre [CFC], the entirety of this paper is based upon open-source information, a large volume of which has been made publicly available by agencies involved, including the Force Reintegration Cell [F-RIC] within the International Security Assistance Force [ISAF]. Think tanks and research institutions, particularly RAND, the United States Institute of Peace [USIP] and the International Peace Research Institute Oslo [PRIO], have also provided in-depth reviews of the project’s design and progress. As with any on-going initiative, publicly-available documents suggest that the APRP and the broader pursuit of peace and reintegration in Afghanistan are evolving in response to emerging opportunities and challenges. Hence, it is worth noting that this report – and the CFC’s forthcoming series on peace and reintegration in Afghanistan should be read with the dynamic, sensitive and daunting nature of these processes in mind. SOURCE: Civil-Military Fusion Centre

Myths and Misconceptions in the Afghan Transition

Tue, 10 Apr 2012 10:31:57 -0700

The coming period of transition to Afghan control of national security will require greater cooperation and understanding between all parties. Cooperation between the international community, the Afghan government and local communities is currently being undermined by a series of myths and assumptions which stem from the unstable conditions, a perceived lack of shared interests and a handful of highly publicized incidents. The international community often underestimates local capacity for governance in Afghanistan and ignores the success that Afghanistan did have with self-rule for much of the 20th century. Local Afghan communities are skeptical of the aims of both counterinsurgency and statebuilding measures, as projects, such as internationally sponsored elections, have failed to yield anticipated results despite the continued presence of international troops. There is an urgent need to rethink some of the assumptions on both sides of the table which threaten to undermine the long-term prospects for peace in Afghanistan. SOURCE: United States Institute of Peace

Women’s Perceptions of the Afghan National Police

Thu, 05 Apr 2012 11:21:34 -0700

The security needs of Afghan men and women differ. Whereas men bear the brunt of the direct impacts of conflict, women disproportionately suffer from the indirect effects such as increased levels of domestic violence, decreased access to health care and poverty. Due to this difference in security needs, gender must be taken into account when evaluating the relationship between citizens and the Afghan National Police.

Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung commissioned this study to examine the perceptions active women in Kabul hold of the police. Active, urban women were targeted specifically as they are more likely to interact regularly with police than women that spend a majority of their time at home. The report seeks to:

i) establish a gender-focused baseline for the evaluation of community trust building and police capacity building programs;
ii) identify major trends and evolutions in public perceptions of the ANP in Kabul, notably amongst women; and
iii) propose pragmatic recommendations for improving the relationship between Afghan women and the police.

Given its focus on active, urban women, this study is not representative of all Afghan women. It should be used as an entry point for exploration of gender dynamics in the security sector and a tool for advocating a more gender-balanced approach to supporting the Afghan National Police. SOURCE: Heinrich Böll Stiftung // The Green Political Foundation

Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines

Fri, 30 Mar 2012 12:01:09 -0700

The international community has discussed the impact of mines other than antipersonnel mines (MOTAPM) for several years. The First Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in 1996 resulted in the adoption of Amended Protocol II, which is less restrictive with regard to the use of MOTAPM than with regard to the use of anti-personnel mines (APMs). Since then, efforts have continued in exploring the need and options for further legal regulation.

In 2001, the Second Review Conference of the CCW established an open-ended Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to address the issue of MOTAPM. Despite the discussions in this GGE from 2001 to 2006, lack of consensus among High Contracting Parties prevented the adoption of an additional, legally binding protocol at the Third Review Conference. However, at that occasion, a number of States Parties committed themselves in a political declaration to take the necessary steps to adopt, as a matter of national policy, the practices contained in the draft Protocol on MOTAPM.

During the Fourth Review Conference in December 2011, High Contracting Parties to the CCW decided to convene an open-ended Meeting of Experts in 2012 “to discuss further the implementation of international humanitarian law with regard to mines other than anti-personnel mines.”

There is no agreed definition of MOTAPM in the context of the CCW. For the purpose of this Issue Brief, the term MOTAPM is restricted to and referred to as anti-vehicle mines (AVMs). This publication provides an overview of the humanitarian impact linked to the use of AVMs and challenges related to the clearance of this category of weapon. SOURCE: The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining

Human Security Research [March 2012]

Fri, 30 Mar 2012 10:30:18 -0700

Human Security Research is a monthly compilation of significant new human security-related research published by academics, university research institutes, think-tanks, international agencies, and NGOs.

Articles in this issue:

MEDIATION: UN Mediation and the Politics of Transition after Constitutional Crises
LOCAL PROTECTION: Local to Global Protection in Myanmar (Burma), Sudan, South Sudan and Zimbabwe
POLICE REFORM: Policing in Palestine: Analyzing the EU Police Reform Mission in the West Bank
UGANDA: "The Dust Has Not Yet Settled": Victims' Views on the Right to Remedy and Reparation: A Report from the Greater North of Uganda
REBELS AND GOVERNANCE: The CNDD-FDD in Burundi: The Path from Armed to Political Struggle
NORTHERN IRELAND : Progressing Good Relations and Reconciliation in Post-Agreement Northern Ireland
HORN OF AFRICA: Impact of Conflict on Pastoral Communities' Resilience in the Horn of Africa: Case Studies From Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda
YEMEN: “No Safe Places”: Yemen’s Crackdown on Protests in Taizz
SOMALIA: The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia
CRIMINAL VIOLENCE: In Transit: Gangs and Criminal Networks in Guyana
DDR: Rumours of Peace, Whispers of War: Assessment of the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants into Civilian Life in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri, Democratic Republic of Congo
AFGHANISTAN: Fleeing War, Finding Misery: The Plight of the Internally Displaced in Afghanistan SOURCE: Human Security Report Project

Healing the Legacies of Conflict in Afghanistan: Community Voices on Justice, Peace, and Reconciliation

Wed, 28 Mar 2012 16:56:28 -0700

This paper synthesises the findings from AREU's Legacies of Conflect research project from across the Bamiyan, Ghazni and Kabul research sites, in search of broadly acceptable approaches to address the legacies of conflict and support reconciliation in the country. It also examines the political context for transitional justice and reconciliation and considers which policies might need to be changed or adopted.

The research found that many Afghans continue to struggle with the legacies of their wartime experiences. They usually saw peace and justice as complementary, and not as alternatives to each other. Justice was often widely conceived to include processes of recognition and recompense, and not simply criminal trials or punitive measures. There was a widespread desire for a strong and caring government that could drive a justice process and also negotiate for a peace that would not only end the insurgency, but reconcile Afghanistan’s different groups. However, a widespread pessimism prevailed about the prospect of this occurring in the near future. In the meantime, certain initiatives—whether locally-driven or at the national level—have the potential to provide a measure of comfort to conflict victims while paving the way for a more enduring peace. SOURCE: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

The Only Game in Town: Assessing the Effectiveness of Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police

Wed, 28 Mar 2012 14:09:34 -0700

This paper seeks to analyze and assess, to the extent possible, the efficacy of the Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police missions currently being carried out by U.S. Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan. By examining security indicators for provinces where VSO/ALP operations are being conducted, scholarly research and assessments, and Congressional records, this paper finds that VSO/ALP is having a positive impact on security and governance at the local level in Afghanistan. In addition, this paper addresses areas of concern regarding VSO/ALP and makes some recommendations for improving the size and scope of these initiatives. SOURCE: Small Wars Journal // Small Wars Foundation

Talking About Talks: Toward a Political Settlement in Afghanistan

Mon, 26 Mar 2012 09:48:50 -0700

A negotiated political settlement is a desirable outcome to the conflict in Afghanistan, but current talks with the Taliban are unlikely to result in a sustainable peace. There is a risk that negotiations under present conditions could further destabilise the country and region. Debilitated by internal political divisions and external pressures, the Karzai government is poorly positioned to cut a deal with leaders of the insurgency. Afghanistan’s security forces are ill-prepared to handle the power vacuum that will occur following the exit of international troops. As political competition heats up within the country in the run-up to NATO’s withdrawal of combat forces at the end of 2014, the differing priorities and preferences of the parties to the conflict – from the Afghan government to the Taliban leadership to key regional and wider international actors – will further undermine the prospects of peace. To avoid another civil war, a major course correction is needed that results in the appointment of a UN-mandated mediation team and the adoption of a more realistic approach to resolution of the conflict.

No matter how much the U.S. and its NATO allies want to leave Afghanistan, it is unlikely that a Washington-brokered power-sharing agreement will hold long enough to ensure that the achievements of the last decade are not reversed. A lasting peace accord will ultimately require far more structured negotiations, under the imprimatur of the UN, than are presently being pursued. The Security Council should mandate Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to appoint a small team of mutually agreeable mediators as soon as possible to ensure that critical stakeholders are fully consulted and will remain engaged in the negotiations process. The unequivocal commitment of the Security Council, which includes among its members Pakistan [through December 2013], will be vital to this endeavour. Consultations on preparations for the appointment and organisation of the team and the appointment of an individual to lead it should begin immediately with the aim of having the team in place well before the security transition is completed. SOURCE: International Crisis Group

Challenges Facing Afghanistan’s Education Sector

Fri, 23 Mar 2012 15:49:54 -0700

In December 2001, a team led by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) completed a “Preliminary Needs Assessment (PNA) for the Recovery and Reconstruction of Afghanistan”, which was soon followed by a “Comprehensive Needs Assessment” of Afghanistan’s education sector. As noted in an ADB report on “A New Start for Afghanistan’s Education Sector”, these assessments elucidated numerous challenges facing the school system. According to the report, education in Afghanistan had been undermined, both institutionally and in terms of physical infrastructure, by 23 years of war. The report notes that politicisation was a particular concern; various groups, including the Taliban, had attempted to use education as a means of spreading ideology. The PNA estimated that, during 2001, the Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) in primary education was 38% for boys and 3% for girls. In secondary education, the situation was worse, with an enrolment rate between 5% and 11% for boys and 1% and 2% for girls. The PNA reportedly found that approximately 80% of the school buildings had been either damaged or destroyed; only two teacher training colleges were partially functioning nationwide. Furthermore, the curriculum had not been revised in 30 years. Teachers had not been paid for months. Many had fled the country or were either working in other sectors or in refugee camps abroad. In this challenging context with a diminished system capacity to supply basic items such as buildings, teachers and materials, the ADB estimated that, after 2001, there was a need to train 43,500 teachers and construct almost 14,000 schools in order to provide primary education to Afghan children in Afghanistan as well as to those returning from neighbouring countries. SOURCE: NATO Civil-Military Fusion Centre

Women and Gender in Afghanistan

Fri, 23 Mar 2012 15:40:43 -0700

The promotion of rights and opportunities for both women and men and the prevention of gender-based discrimination are priorities for the United Nations, which is dedicated to “promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted by the United Nations in 1948 ensures equal rights and freedom for all regardless of their gender. According to the United Nations, gender equality refers to “the equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities of women and men and girls and boys. Equality does not mean that women and men will become the same but that women’s and men’s rights, responsibilities and opportunities will not depend on whether they are born male or female.” The promotion of women’s human rights and access to opportunities and service has been a particular emphasis of the international community and its partners in Afghanistan. This document addresses the current status of women in Afghanistan and addresses both progress made and challenges which remain. SOURCE: NATO Civil-Military Fusion Centre

The Impact of Governance Agreements and Programmes on Stabilisation

Fri, 23 Mar 2012 15:31:27 -0700

The UK’s Stabilisation Unit defines stabilisation as “the process of establishing peace and security in countries affected by conflict and instability.” It notes that this process often requires “external joint military and civilian support to perform some or all of the following tasks: prevent or reduce violence, protect people and key institutions, promote political processes and prepare for longer-term development.” Several such elements, particularly fostering institutions and political processes, closely concern governance.

This document refers to governance as defined in a policy paper from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). That paper defined governance as “the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels.” More recent definitions, UNDP reports, also include issues such as transparency, accountability and judicial reform, which are addressed to varying degrees within the following pages. Governance agreements and programmes are therefore not only formal policies or diplomatic pacts but also initiatives that seek to build governance capacity, strengthen rule of law and expand a state’s legitimacy among it citizenry and throughout its territory (e.g., by fostering development or providing basic services). This broad definition of governance relates closely to the definition of stabilisation noted above, as evident in a governance “issue note” from the Stabilisation Unit.

The Conflict Research Unit at the Clingendael Institute also points out that governance can even affect the likelihood of conflict and instability. The specific manner in which governance contributes to stability in Afghanistan is taken up in the remainder of this piece, which is divided into two sections – one dedicated to agreements and another focused upon programmes at the national and subnational levels. SOURCE: NATO Civil-Military Fusion Centre

Afghanistan: A Case Study: Strengthening Principled Humanitarian Response Capacities

Thu, 22 Mar 2012 10:51:27 -0700

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) is undertaking a study on strengthening principled humanitarian response capacities with research input from the Overseas Development Institute (ODI). Donors and humanitarian actors have committed themselves to providing humanitarian aid in accordance with the following principles, which are enshrined in the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) principles and the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief:

This study seeks to examine the challenges to adhering to these principles in practice and how donor funding restrictions can hamper the ability to provide principled humanitarian assistance. The case study in Afghanistan is the second of four case studies (Democratic Republic of Congo, Pakistan and South Sudan are the other three).

The principal aims of the research are as follows:

Analyse the current status of humanitarian funding in terms of donor adherence to commitments under GHD and the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid. It will focus on conditions (be they positive or negative) placed on partners’ programme implementation and assess the implications of these on their ability to adhere to the principles of humanitarian action.

Assess current practices within the humanitarian community with regards to accepting/refusing funding and their adherence to principled humanitarian action more broadly.

Develop guidance based on lessons learned and best practices in the provision and acceptance of humanitarian funding. SOURCE: Nowegian Refugee Council // Humanitarian Policy Group

Torture, Transfers, and Denial of Due Process: The Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghanistan

Tue, 20 Mar 2012 15:36:39 -0700

This report, published jointly by the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission [AIHRC] and the Open Society Foundations, documents evidence of torture of conflict-related detainees by Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security [NDS], Afghanistan’s intelligence agency, and the Afghan National Police [ANP].

The report found credible evidence of torture at nine separate NDS facilities and a number of ANP locations, including beatings, suspension, electric shocks, and threats of physical violence and sexual abuse, which were routinely used to obtain confessions and other information. The report also details systematic violations of due process, and a persistent failure to hold Afghan officials accountable for abuse. The AIHRC and Open Society also documented cases in which U.S. transferred detainees were subjected to torture by NDS officials.

The report calls on the Afghan government to fully investigate allegations of abuse, hold those responsible accountable, and ensure that AIHRC monitors have full, unfettered access to all detention facilities. The report also recommends that the ISAF and the United States ensure no detainees are transferred to Afghan detention facilities where they face a real risk of torture and that all U.S. forces in Afghanistan are subject to ISAF detainee transfer policies and monitoring. SOURCE: Open Society Foundations // Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission