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<title>Human Security Gateway: Afghanistan</title>
<link><![CDATA[http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/browse.php?By=REGION&Selection=114]]></link>
<description>Items related to "Human Security Gateway: Afghanistan".</description>
<pubDate>Wed, 05 Mar 2008 0:09:53 +0000</pubDate>
<lastBuildDate>Wed, 05 Mar 2008 0:09:53 +0000</lastBuildDate>
<webMaster>robert_hartfiel@sfu.ca (Robert Hartfiel)</webMaster>


   <item>
	   <pubDate>Mon, 03 Mar 2008 12:30:01 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Analysis of the Growth in Funding for Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Elsewhere in the War on Terrorism</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22728</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22728</guid>
		 <description>the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has reviewed the funding provided for military activities in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the war on terrorism and analyzed the increases in appropriations that have occurred over the past several years. The United States began combat operations in Afghanistan in fiscal year 2002 and in Iraq in fiscal year 2003. To finance those operations (and other activities related to the war on terrorism), the Congress provided $18 billion and $76 billion in emergency appropriations in those years, respectively. With the exception of a slight decrease in 2004, to $74 billion, funding has increased steadily each year, to a total of $165 billion for 2007. If the Administration’s request for 2008 is funded in full, appropriations for military operations and other war-related activities in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
elsewhere in the war on terrorism will rise to $188 billion this year and to a cumulative total of $752 billion since 2001. 	   SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office</description>
	 <source>Congressional Budget Office</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Fri, 29 Feb 2008 10:23:38 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Afghanistan and the crisis in Pakistan</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22711</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22711</guid>
		 <description>NATO and the US are calling for a boost in troops for the war in Afghanistan, but it is necessary to assess whether the only options available are to provide more troops or withdraw. In view of this demand, many experts consider that military strategy should be reassessed. Development policies should be used more effectively, and the Afghan government needs assistance in managing the funds it receives. Negotiations with the insurgents are vital and the Afghan war should be situated in a regional context, particularly in relation to Pakistan. The assassination of Benazir Bhutto highlights this need. Canada, Germany and Holland are immersed in debate over sending more troops or withdrawing. The US and NATO are urging Spain, Germany and other countries to be more flexible about regulations in order to commit more troops to combat areas. Spain deploys about 700 soldiers in the less dangerous northern part of the country. 	   SOURCE: Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior</description>
	 <source>Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Fri, 29 Feb 2008 09:18:34 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>A Bad War Gone Worse</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22706</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22706</guid>
		 <description>&quot;We need intelligent people,&quot; Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara reportedly said while dismissing General Paul Harkins early in the Vietnam War. These harsh words echoed four decades later in the midst of another failed war, in Iraq. &quot;What I considered to be the most competent national-security team since [the] Truman [administration],&quot; dejectedly noted Ken Adelman, an intimate of Vice President Dick Cheney and an early supporter of the Iraq war, &quot;turned out to be among the most incompetent teams in the postwar era.&quot; 	   SOURCE: The Washington Quarterly</description>
	 <source>The Washington Quarterly</source>
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	   <pubDate>Thu, 28 Feb 2008 14:57:37 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Al Qaeda, Afghanistan and the Good War</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22703</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22703</guid>
		 <description>There has been tremendous controversy over the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which consistently has been contrasted with Afghanistan. Many of those who opposed the Iraq war have supported the war in Afghanistan; indeed, they have argued that among the problems with Iraq is that it diverts resources from Afghanistan. Afghanistan has been seen as an obvious haven for terrorism. This has meant the war in Afghanistan often has been perceived as having a direct effect on al Qaeda and on the ability of radical Islamists to threaten the United States, while Iraq has been seen as unrelated to the main war. Supporters of the war in Iraq support the war in Afghanistan. Opponents of the war in Iraq also support Afghanistan. If there is a good war in our time, Afghanistan is it. It is also a war that is in trouble. In the eyes of many, one of the Afghan war's virtues has been that NATO has participated as an entity. But NATO has come under heavy criticism from U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates for its performance. 	   SOURCE: Foreign Policy Association</description>
	 <source>Foreign Policy Association</source>
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	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Thu, 28 Feb 2008 14:39:39 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: The Case for a National Strategy</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22702</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22702</guid>
		 <description>Existing measures to promote peace in Afghanistan are not succeeding. This is not only due to the revival of the Taliban, but also because little has been done to try to ensure that families, communities, and tribes – the fundamental units of Afghan society – get on better with each other. War has fractured the social fabric of the country and, in the context of severe and persistent poverty, local disputes have the potential to turn violent and to exacerbate the wider conflict. But there is no effective strategy to help Afghans deal with disputes in a peaceful and constructive way. The nature, causes, and effects of insecurity in Afghanistan vary widely, and there is a corresponding variation in the most effective means by which insecurity can be addressed. Often a range of steps are required in different degrees, such as to strengthen the rule of law, build professional security forces, reduce poverty, or improve governance. 	   SOURCE: Oxfam International</description>
	 <source>Oxfam International</source>
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	   <pubDate>Thu, 28 Feb 2008 14:34:46 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>The impact of US-Iran enmity on Afghanistan</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22700</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22700</guid>
		 <description>The growing friction between America and Iran will have unbearable consequences for peace in Afghanistan.
The US and Iran have locked horns, undermining political and economic stability in countries throughout the greater Middle East, especially Afghanistan. Most countries in the region have the resources to absorb the impact of any eventual military confrontation in the Persian Gulf, but Afghanistan does not. The growing US-Iran enmity is affecting Afghanistan’s fragile economy and worsening the political situation. Iran has historically enjoyed great political and economic influence over Afghanistan. Unlike Pakistan, Iran does not have any territorial disputes with Afghanistan. However, the dispute over the use of water from the Hirmand River remains unresolved and could prove a flashpoint for any future conflict between the two countries. 	   SOURCE: Quqnoos.com</description>
	 <source>Quqnoos.com</source>
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	   <pubDate>Thu, 28 Feb 2008 14:27:29 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission Annual Report 2007</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22699</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22699</guid>
		 <description>This Annual Report marks the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission’s (AIHRC) sixth year of existence. During the year 2007, the AIHRC continued the implementation of its Three-Year Action Plan (2006-2008) in the context of its mandate related to the promotion, protection and monitoring of human rights in Afghanistan, and in accordance with the requirements of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and the Afghanistan Compact. The AIHRC continued to ensure an efficient financial management of the grants generously provided by the international community and to represent a model of capacity building for other national institutions. The Commission continued to advocate for the promotion of human rights and
strengthened partnerships with the Government and civil society organizations, donors and the United Nations through regular coordination meetings such as the quarterly meetings of the Project Committee. The Project Committee includes donor representatives, the United Nations and the Ministry of Finance. Its purpose is to ensure close and effective communication between partners and AIHRC, and to provide feedback and advice on progress towards achieving the Commission's Three-Year Action Plan. 	   SOURCE: Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission</description>
	 <source>Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission</source>
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	   <pubDate>Thu, 28 Feb 2008 09:38:27 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Taking Stock Update: Afghan Women and Girls Seven Years On</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22687</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22687</guid>
		 <description>Seven years after the US and the UK ‘freed’ Afghan women from the oppressive Taliban regime, our report proves that life is just as bad for most, and worse in some cases. Maternal mortality rates ― one in six women dies in childbirth ― are the highest in the world alongside Sierra Leone. Afghanistan is the only country in the world with a higher suicide rate among women than men. As WOMANKIND Worldwide’s Director, Sue Turrell, states, ‘Women in Afghanistan are working to tackle these issues by supporting individuals affected by violence and promoting legal reform — but they urgently need more support’. 	   SOURCE: Womankind Worldwide</description>
	 <source>Womankind Worldwide</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 27 Feb 2008 12:25:43 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Women and Nation-Building</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22676</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22676</guid>
		 <description>This study examines gender-specific impacts of conflict and post-conflict and the ways in which events in these contexts may affect women differently than they affect men. It analyzes the roles of women in the nation-building process and considers outcomes that might occur if current practices were modified. The recent nation-building activities in Afghanistan are used as a case study. Despite the difficulty of collecting data in conflict zones, the information available from Afghanistan provides several pragmatic points for consideration. Gender issues have been overtly on the table from the beginning of U.S. post-conflict involvement in Afghanistan, in part because of the Taliban’s equally overt prior emphasis on gender issues as a defining quality of its regime. Also, the issue of women’s inclusion is an official part of Afghanistan’s development agenda, so all the active agents in the nation-building enterprise have made conscious choices and decisions that can be reviewed and their underlying logic evaluated. 	   SOURCE: RAND Corporation</description>
	 <source>RAND Corporation</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 27 Feb 2008 11:35:38 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Combating a Modern Insurgency: Combined Task Force Devil in Afghanistan</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22665</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22665</guid>
		 <description>In early summer of 2005, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was in the midst of its sixth rotation of forces in Afghanistan since late 2001. On 1 June 2005, the 1st Brigade of the 82d Airborne Division became the core of Combined Task Force (CTF) Devil and assumed command of Regional Command East (RC East). Its area of responsibility included 10 provinces and covered a mountainous region roughly the size of North Carolina. Attached to CTF Devil were 8 provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), 5 maneuver task forces, a forward  support battalion, 2 batteries of artillery, and 9 separate companies for a total of over 5,000 Soldiers, sailors, Airmen, and Marines. Special Operations Forces, to include a Special Forces battalion, and other government agencies cooperated closely with the task force, while two brigades of the Afghan National Army (ANA) served as primary partners in addressing security within the borders of RC East. 	   SOURCE: Military Review // United States Army Combined Arms Command</description>
	 <source>Military Review // United States Army Combined Arms Command</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Tue, 26 Feb 2008 15:39:41 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>A Conversation with Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. on recent trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22650</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22650</guid>
		 <description>Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D-DE) discusses his recent trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan, calling Afghanistan the forgotten war. He says the consequences of failure in Afghanistan are significant. Biden notes the next president of the United States will have to rally the American people and the world to fight the militants at the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Biden also says “Pakistani cooperation in the fight against extremism is critical” to success in Afghanistan “but that cooperation has been sporadic at best.” 	   SOURCE: Council on Foreign Relations</description>
	 <source>Council on Foreign Relations</source>
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	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Tue, 26 Feb 2008 12:30:25 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>The Global War on Terrorism: An Assessment</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22632</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22632</guid>
		 <description>Until September 11, 2001, US counter-terrorism policy, however, was based principally (and ineffectively) on cooperative diplomacy and limited retaliatory responses. US diplomacy suffered from a chronic inability to secure decisive international cooperation. US military strikes against terrorists were neither decisive nor a deterrent against future terrorist action or state sponsorship of terrorism. More aggressive US strategies were constrained by a Cold War-policy overhang that viewed terrorism within a superpower, proxy war and crisis management context and as fundamentally a law-enforcement problem. September 11th was, in short, a strategic failure as much as an intelligence failure. It also marked an important turning point in the war with radical Islamic terrorists in that the United States struck back in a meaningful way for the first time and is now on the offensive on several fronts. The defeat of the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan was an important first victory in what will be a protracted campaign. 	   SOURCE: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment</description>
	 <source>Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment</source>
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	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Tue, 26 Feb 2008 10:59:08 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Letter dated 1 February 2008 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council (S/2008/65)</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22624</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22624</guid>
		 <description>I have the honour to convey the attached communication, dated 23 January 2008, which I received from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (see annex). - Ban Ki Moon. 	   SOURCE: United Nations Security Council</description>
	 <source>United Nations Security Council</source>
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	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Tue, 26 Feb 2008 09:19:58 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Afghanistan Is Not Iraq</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22623</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22623</guid>
		 <description>U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, speaking in Germany the first weekend in February, expressed concern about what he was hearing in capitals across Europe. “I worry that for many Europeans the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan are confused,” Gates said. “Many of them, I think, have a problem with our involvement in Iraq and project that to Afghanistan.” For his part, U.S. President George W. Bush expresses no confusion on the matter. Regardless of the consequences, the president continues to insist that Iraq and Afghanistan are the same war. Both countries, he said most recently in a speech in early February, “are part of the war on terror. These aren’t separate wars. They’re part of the same war.” 	   SOURCE: Center for American Progress</description>
	 <source>Center for American Progress</source>
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	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Tue, 26 Feb 2008 08:41:01 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Shocking Stories About the Forgotten War in Afghanistan</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22622</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22622</guid>
		 <description>They say journalists provide the first draft of history. With the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, that draft led to an almost universal consensus, at least among Americans, that the attack was a justifiable act of self-defense. The Afghanistan action is commonly viewed as a &quot;clean&quot; conflict as well -- a war prosecuted with minimal loss of life, and one that didn't bring the kind of international opprobrium onto the United States that the invasion of Iraq would lead to a year later. Those views are also held by many Americans who are critical of the excesses of the Bush administration's &quot;War on Terror.&quot; But there's a disconnect there. Everything that followed -- secret detentions, torture, the invasion of Iraq, the assault on domestic dissent -- flowed inevitably from the failure to challenge Bush's claim that an act of terror required a military response. The United States has a rich history of abandoning its purported liberal values during times of war, and it was our acceptance of Bush's war narrative that led to the abuses that have shattered America's moral standing before the world. 	   SOURCE: AlterNet</description>
	 <source>AlterNet</source>
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	   <pubDate>Mon, 25 Feb 2008 14:07:55 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Across the Borderline: Pashtuns and Taliban in Two States</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22618</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22618</guid>
		 <description>In the couple of weeks before the February 18 elections in Pakistan, attacks by presumed “Taliban” killed over 140 Pashtuns in Kandahar (Afghanistan) and over 25 Pashtuns in Charsadda (Northwest Frontier Province, Pakistan). After the elections they attacked a Pashtun wedding in Swat and killed 14 people, including the bride. Despite (or because of) this terror, the predominantly Pashtun electorate of Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province marginalized the pro-Taliban political parties in the February 18 elections. The staunchly anti-Taliban Pashtun nationalist Awami National Party will dominate NWFP's delegation to the national parliament and will form the next government of the NWFP in alliance with the PPP; the two parties control 60 percent of the seats in the NWFP Legislative Assembly. 	   SOURCE: Informed Comment Global Affairs</description>
	 <source>Informed Comment Global Affairs</source>
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	   <pubDate>Mon, 25 Feb 2008 14:05:59 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Two Winnable Wars</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22617</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22617</guid>
		 <description>No one can return from the battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan, as I recently did, without believing that these are wars that can still be won. They are also clearly wars that can still be lost, but visits to the battlefield show that these conflicts are very different from the wars being described in American political campaigns and most of the debates outside the United States. These conflicts involve far more than combat between the United States and its allies against insurgent movements such as al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Taliban. Meaningful victory can come only if tactical military victories end in ideological and political victories and in successful governance and development. Dollars are as important as bullets, and so are political accommodation, effective government services and clear demonstrations that there is a future that does not need to be built on Islamist extremism. 	   SOURCE: The Washington Post</description>
	 <source>The Washington Post</source>
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	   <pubDate>Mon, 25 Feb 2008 11:37:00 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Love, Fear and Discipline: Everyday violence toward children in Afghan families</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22604</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22604</guid>
		 <description>This AREU paper urges government agencies and civil society organisations dealing with this issue to recognise that there is a general awareness among families of the negative consequences of violence to children and to introduce alternative parenting skills appropriate to the local context by consulting with communities. In the rural and urban communities in the four Afghan provinces studied — Bamiyan Herat, Kabul and Nangarhar — there is a general awareness of the negative consequences of violence to children and that corporal punishment is not necessarily the best way to discipline or encourage them. Despite such attitudes there remains a lack of a generalised social judgement placed on this form of violence, allowing it to go unchallenged by the community. AREU’s paper, therefore, recommends that organisations working in this field design sensitisation campaigns and work with communities to create an atmosphere in which violence toward children is not tolerated. 	   SOURCE: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit</description>
	 <source>Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit</source>
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	   <pubDate>Mon, 25 Feb 2008 10:59:36 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [Updated 28 January 2008]</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22597</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22597</guid>
		 <description>U.S. and outside assessments of the effort to stabilize Afghanistan are mixed and subject to debate; many note progress on reconstruction but some deterioration of security and only halting progress, if any, on expanding governance. A November 2007 Bush Administration review of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan reportedly concluded that overall progress was inadequate, and a number of efforts to augment the U.S. stabilization effort are underway or under further consideration. Part of the debate is over the degree to which the United States can no longer rely on additional NATO and other partner contributions but must instead add its own forces to the mission and elevate Afghanistan to a level of priority on par with the Iraq effort. 	   SOURCE: Congressional Research Service</description>
	 <source>Congressional Research Service</source>
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	   <pubDate>Mon, 25 Feb 2008 10:27:32 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Interview of Mr. Hamid Karzai with Aljazeera TV [Part 2]</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22595</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22595</guid>
		 <description>The Afghan president had been attending the US-Islamic forum in Doha, Qatar. During his visit, he gave an extended exclusive interview to al Jazeera's James Bays. 	   SOURCE: Al Jazeera</description>
	 <source>Al Jazeera</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Mon, 25 Feb 2008 10:26:30 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Interview of Mr. Hamid Karzai with Aljazeera TV [Part 1]</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22594</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22594</guid>
		 <description>The Afghan president had been attending the US-Islamic forum in Doha, Qatar. During his visit, he gave an extended exclusive interview to al Jazeera's James Bays. 	   SOURCE: Al Jazeera</description>
	 <source>Al Jazeera</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 14:55:13 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Detention in Afghanistan: The Need For an Integrated Plan</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22573</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22573</guid>
		 <description>Detention issues weren’t always this controversial, but in the wake of Abu Ghraib, detention by NATO forces in Afghanistan became complicated and politically charged. Before that scandal broke, the countries fighting alongside American troops simply transferred detainees to the United States, which had the only in-theater detention facilities. After Abu Ghraib, detention became a four-letter word and America’s partners in Afghanistan found themselves politically unable to transfer detainees to U.S. custody. At the same time, U.S. allies grew more reluctant to develop their own detainee facilities. In 2005, NATO tried to fill this gap by creating a uniform detainee policy, but in the end could only agree on a policy to transfer detainees to the Afghans within 96 hours of capture. Some states, including Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, sought specific assurances that the Afghan government would ensure humane treatment of and diplomatic access to the detainees they transferred. 	   SOURCE: Center for Strategic and International Studies</description>
	 <source>Center for Strategic and International Studies</source>
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	   <pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 10:23:09 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Le prisme de l’allié fiable et influent : Analyse du rapport Manley</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22564</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22564</guid>
		 <description>Après plus de trois mois d’enquête, la commission Manley a rendu public ses recommandations à l’égard de l’avenir de la mission canadienne en Afghanistan. Comme certains le soupçonnaient dès sa mise en place , le rapport Manley recommande de prolonger les efforts de combat canadiens au-delà de février 2009 à condition toutefois d’accroître les capacités militaires de l’OTAN à Kandahar. Il n’y a là rien de trop surprenant disent certains, compte tenu du prétendu peu d’indépendance politique dont jouissaient les membres du comité, pourtant formé afin de transcender les divisions politiques sur le sujet. D’autres signalent plutôt que la commission Manley a pris soin de mettre sur la table les bases d’un compromis politique entre les positions du gouvernement conservateur et celles de l’opposition libérale à la Chambre des communes. Mais une analyse attentive du rapport Manley révèle une vision sous-jacente aux recommandations qui va au-delà de l’idéologie partisane : il s’agit de la norme bien ancrée en politique étrangère canadienne voulant que le Canada doive se comporter en tant qu’allié fiable afin d’exercer une influence notable sur la scène internationale. 	   SOURCE: Centre d’études des politiques étrangères et de sécurité</description>
	 <source>Centre d’études des politiques étrangères et de sécurité</source>
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	   <pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 09:47:18 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>International Monetary Fund Executive Board Concludes 2007 Article IV Consultation with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22560</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22560</guid>
		 <description>Since its approval by the Executive Board in June 2006 the three-year Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) arrangement (amounting to SDR 81 million) has helped maintain macroeconomic stability and has contributed to the implementation of the government's reform agenda. The arrangement supports the authorities' economic program through March 2009 and Afghanistan's participation in the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. 	   SOURCE: International Monetary Fund</description>
	 <source>International Monetary Fund</source>
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	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 20 Feb 2008 12:49:00 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Afghanistan: Psychological scars of violence on children</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22516</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22516</guid>
		 <description>Hundreds of schoolchildren who witnessed a deadly explosion and its aftermath in Baghlan Province, northern Afghanistan, on 6 November are suffering mental and psychological scars, health specialists and affected residents say. Over 48 people, including at least 18 children, died in the blast - and the subsequent indiscriminate shooting by armed bodyguards of some high-profile members of parliament (MPs) who were visiting a sugar-cane factory in Baghlan city - according to the Ministry of Education. Dozens of children and adults were injured. Over 1,000 schoolchildren, boys and girls, had been brought to the welcoming ceremony, the provincial department of education reported. 	   SOURCE: Integrated Regional Information Networks // United Nations Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</description>
	 <source>Integrated Regional Information Networks // United Nations Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</source>
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	   <pubDate>Wed, 20 Feb 2008 12:34:39 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>NATO - A Sense of Crisis</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22514</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22514</guid>
		 <description>By the end of January, security problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan were leading to a potential crisis for NATO three months ahead of a major meeting of the alliance. At the same time, there were indications of a deterioration in the security situation in Iraq sufficient to suggest that this year’s planned withdrawal of the combat brigades added during last year’s ‘surge’, would not proceed as planned. 	   SOURCE: Oxford Research Group</description>
	 <source>Oxford Research Group</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 20 Feb 2008 09:47:53 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper - Progress Report</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22507</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22507</guid>
		 <description>At a High-Level Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) meeting at the United Nations General Assembly in New York earlier this year, H.E. President Hamid Karzai stated that, “the Afghanistan National Development Strategy is the blueprint for Afghanistan’s developmentâ€. The Afghan Government, supported by the international community, aims to deliver on its development goals and priorities in a nationwide effort to improve the lives of its people. The present challenge for the Government is to finalize the ANDS, based on the I-ANDS, consultations and research, and move towards its Afghanistan Compact obligations. Throughout the development of the ANDS, the Government has taken care to ensure ownership over the process, thereby consolidating a truly “Afghanizedâ€ development vision and strategy for the country, with fully synthesized, costed, prioritized and sequenced projects and programmes for poverty reduction and economic growth. 	   SOURCE: International Monetary Fund</description>
	 <source>International Monetary Fund</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Tue, 19 Feb 2008 10:13:25 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Humanitarian situation worsens as Afghan hostilities spread</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22480</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22480</guid>
		 <description>The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is deeply concerned about the worsening humanitarian situation in Afghanistan. As armed hostilities spread and insecurity grows, more and more people are being forced to flee their homes. It is also becoming increasingly difficult for the ICRC to access displaced people throughout the country. In addition, freezing temperatures and blizzards have affected several areas, killing hundreds. Interview with Franz Rauchenstein, ICRC Deputy Head of Delegation in Afghanistan. 	   SOURCE: International Committee of the Red Cross</description>
	 <source>International Committee of the Red Cross</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Mon, 18 Feb 2008 13:52:49 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>The German Army and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: The Need for Strategy</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22472</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22472</guid>
		 <description>Alongside their NATO allies German troops are facing a growing insurgency in Afghanistan. However, the alliance still lacks a joint strategy to deal with this challenge. While the US government recently called on NATO to pursue a &quot;classical&quot; counterinsurgency campaign, Germany insisted on the development of a more &quot;comprehensive strategy&quot; before the next Summit in Bucharest in April 2008. Yet, over recent months the German position has been criticized by a range of allies for lack of credibility. To gain political influence over the making of NATO’s Afghanistan strategy, the German government first needs to adjust its national position on how to deal with the Afghan insurgency. 	   SOURCE: German Institute for International and Security Affairs // Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik</description>
	 <source>German Institute for International and Security Affairs // Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Mon, 18 Feb 2008 12:33:09 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: How To Reach the Women</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22463</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22463</guid>
		 <description>On 15 November 2005, the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) hosted a Nordic/Baltic conference on ‘Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: How To Reach the Women’, in cooperation with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The conference set out to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas and information on policy, programmes and projects among decisionmakers within appropriate ministries from the Nordic and Baltic states, representatives of international organizations, and representatives from Norwegian organizations involved in practical work in Afghanistan. A number of Afghan and international
guests were invited as speakers and participants, including H. E. Hanif Atmar, Afghanistan’s minister of education; Ms Meryem Aslan, the director of UNIFEM Afghanistan; Ms Shukria Barakzai, member of parliament in Afghanistan; Ms Orzala Ashraf of Afghan civil society organization HAWCA; H. E. Anne-Grete StrÃ¸m-Erichsen, Norway’s minister of defence; Mr Raymond Johansen, state secretary within the Norwegian ministry of foreign affairs; Lieutenant Colonel Arne Opperud, representing the Norwegian army staff; and Mr Dag StÃ¸rkesen, representing the Norwegian police. 	   SOURCE: International Peace Research Institute</description>
	 <source>International Peace Research Institute</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Mon, 18 Feb 2008 11:22:46 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Afghanistan: Gaps in Aid Accountability</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22458</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22458</guid>
		 <description>Since 2001, billions of dollars from bilateral and multilateral donors and internal revenues have been channeled through the Afghanistan’s national and external budget. However, there are no mechanisms in place to ensure civil society’s participation in evaluating if the money is being spent adequately and efficiently for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Afghanistan. Participation by the poor and women in understanding, implementing and monitoring accountability of the fund is totally limited. This limitation prevents active agency and ownership of the national programmes by the Afghan people and institutions. Hence, it is imperative that people and civil society take initiative to promote accountability and transparency in the area of public finances. As members of civil society, ActionAid and ELBAG members feel that we should take an important role in broader advocacy work to hold the development actors in country accountable on spending money on behalf of the poor. 	   SOURCE: ActionAid</description>
	 <source>ActionAid</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Fri, 15 Feb 2008 15:11:57 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Build a Judicial Sector in Afghanistan to Help Restore the Rule of Law</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22448</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22448</guid>
		 <description>One of the greatest failures in Afghanistan’s governance is the absence of rule of law, a crucial issue for the Afghan government’s legitimacy. Basic lawlessness pervades the country, and Afghanistan lacks judges, lawyers, and a competent police force. The United States must work to create and support a judicial sector strategy for addressing the absence of the rule of law. The Afghan government committed to develop a national judicial sector strategy at the conclusion of the July 2007 Rome Conference on the Rule of Law in Afghanistan, but has made little progress to date. The agreement included an international donor commitment of approximately $360 million to support the effort. The United States and other countries should meet their commitments. 	   SOURCE: Center for American Progress</description>
	 <source>Center for American Progress</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Fri, 15 Feb 2008 13:46:34 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>&quot;Provincial Reconstruction Teams:  A Case for Interagency National Security Reform?&quot; Testimony by Michael E Hess</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22440</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22440</guid>
		 <description>As you are aware, the President and Secretary of State have endorsed the concept of the Provincial Reconstruction Team as a critical component of the interagency effort to bring civilian and military experts together to help local Iraqi and Afghan communities find reconciliation, moderation and transition to self-reliance. Since the first PRT was created in Gardez in December 2002, it has become clear that the types of success experiences by PRTs in certain locations and under certain conditions cannot be achieved through military efforts alone. These are areas that require a robust partnership across the “Three D’sâ€ of the National Security Strategy. Our approach to PRTs continues to evolve as does the USAID over-arching policy on civil-military cooperation, which is currently making its way through the internal vetting process. I would emphasize the following points with regard to this higher policy dimension, one aspect
of the numerous larger national security reform concepts required to achieve whole of government “unity of effort.â€ 	   SOURCE: United States House of Representatives House Armed Services Committee // Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee</description>
	 <source>United States House of Representatives House Armed Services Committee // Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Fri, 15 Feb 2008 13:38:46 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>&quot;Provincial Reconstruction Teams:  A Case for Interagency National Security Reform?&quot; Testimony by Stephen D Mull</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22439</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22439</guid>
		 <description>Departments, and in that capacity manages issues from State-DoD policy coordination and personnel exchanges to licensing U.S. defense trade and formulating and execute over five billion dollars annually in U.S. foreign military assistance, including the five-year Global Peace Operations Initiative to expand the worldwide capacity and availability of peacekeepers. In addition, my bureau is State’s institutional lead on a range of innovative political-military policy and planning initiatives germane to the interests of this committee. I will briefly address the most important of these, which are the Building Partner Capacity programs; our political-military planning work; expansion of the POLAD program and POLAD Reserve Corps; the Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative; our recent work on Security Sector Reform.; and our support to DoD as they stand up the new U.S. Africa Command. 	   SOURCE: United States House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services // Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee</description>
	 <source>United States House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services // Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Fri, 15 Feb 2008 13:35:53 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>&quot;Provincial Reconstruction Teams:  A Case for Interagency National Security Reform?&quot; Testimony by Ryan Henry</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22438</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22438</guid>
		 <description>Key to winning the Long War is the ability to adapt and respond even more rapidly and creatively than our enemies. While the national security architecture created in 1947 worked well for the Cold War, it is  straining to meet today’s security challenges, which blur the line between peace and war demanding a continuum of responses, involving multiple government agencies and Congressional committees. To succeed in this environment we need the tools to rapidly develop effective indigenous governance and capabilities, calling on the most appropriate interagency, international, regional, and local partners for support. Obviously, the ability to marshal these tools and capabilities are not the purview of any one agency. 	   SOURCE: United States House of Representatives House Armed Services Committee // Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee</description>
	 <source>United States House of Representatives House Armed Services Committee // Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Fri, 15 Feb 2008 13:10:55 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>'Voluntary Repatriation' and the Case of Afghanistan: A Critical Examination</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22432</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22432</guid>
		 <description>Starting in 2002, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has facilitated one of the largest and most rapidly organised voluntary repatriation movements of refugees in modern history1 (UNHCR 2006a: 144). To date, UNHCR estimates to have assisted 3.7 million Afghan refugees to return to Afghanistan, 2.9 million from Pakistan, 800,000 from Iran, and 14,000 from non-neighbouring states (UNHCR 2007: 3). During the first month of this operation (March 2002) alone, 130,000 Afghans returned with UNHCR assistance and in April this number nearly doubled (Lumpp et al. 2004: 150). ‘Within another month, the volume of the return movement had reached unprecedented and unexpected levels with a peak of over 377,000 returning Afghans in May 2002’ (ibid.). This trend and pace of return continued throughout 2002, resulting in the repatriation of over two million Afghan refugees from the neighbouring countries of Iran and Pakistan that year. In the following years, repatriation continued at a slower pace with figures passing the half-million mark each year (UNHCR 2006a: 144). 	   SOURCE: Refugee Studies Centre // Oxford University</description>
	 <source>Refugee Studies Centre // Oxford University</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Fri, 15 Feb 2008 12:45:03 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>&quot;Reconstructing Afghanistan&quot; House of Commons International Development Committee Volume II Oral and Written Evidence</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22431</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22431</guid>
		 <description>As a result of 30 years of conflict Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world and will not meet any of the Millennium Development Goal targets in 2015. The UK and the international community have a responsibility to assist Afghanistan to achieve lasting peace, stability, reconstruction and development. We support fully the UK Government’s effort in Afghanistan and the priority which it attaches to these goals. Despite the difficulties it faces, Afghanistan has made significant progress in governance, economic growth, health and education. Such achievements deserve to be recognised. However Afghanistan will need substantial development assistance for a long time. DFID and the international community have a vital role to play in this regard. 	   SOURCE: United Kingdom House of Commons // International Development Committee</description>
	 <source>United Kingdom House of Commons // International Development Committee</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Fri, 15 Feb 2008 12:39:28 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>&quot;Reconstructing Afghanistan&quot; House of Commons International Development Committee Volume I Report and Formal Minutes</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22430</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22430</guid>
		 <description>As a result of 30 years of conflict Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world and will not meet any of the Millennium Development Goal targets in 2015. The UK and the international community have a responsibility to assist Afghanistan to achieve lasting peace, stability, reconstruction and development. We support fully the UK Government’s effort in Afghanistan and the priority which it attaches to these goals. Despite the difficulties it faces, Afghanistan has made significant progress in governance, economic growth, health and education. Such achievements deserve to be recognised. However Afghanistan will need substantial development assistance for a long time. DFID and the international community have a vital role to play in this regard. 	   SOURCE: United Kingdom House of Commons // International Development Committee</description>
	 <source>United Kingdom House of Commons // International Development Committee</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Fri, 15 Feb 2008 12:35:32 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Building a failed state?</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22429</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22429</guid>
		 <description>Despite all the problems of defeating the Taliban militarily, winning the peace in Afghanistan is proving almost as difficult as winning the war. The report on the reconstruction of Afghanistan from the House of Commons international development committee (http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22430) underlines the difficulties of rebuilding states which have been shattered by decades of conflict, particularly when security remains so elusive. Yet the report is curiously silent on some of the more fundamental problems caused not by the Taliban but by the ideological prescripts of the international donor community itself. The committee's report rightly criticises the amount of international aid pouring into Afghanistan that completely bypasses official government channels. Of the massive $4.3bn in aid which the country is set to receive this year, the report suggests less than half will go through the government; official Afghan sources say that barely 20% has actually been routed through governmental channels. This creation of a parallel infrastructure of service delivery by UN and non-governmental agencies is a serious long-term threat to state building, and one that was wholly unnecessary given the fact that Afghanistan already had a functioning public sector in place. With pay in UN or NGO offices running at up to 20 times that of the Afghan civil service, thousands of experienced civil servants have now deserted their managerial positions in the public sector in order to take up jobs as drivers or translators within the aid industry. 	   SOURCE: The Guardian</description>
	 <source>The Guardian</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 13 Feb 2008 13:04:12 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Iraq and Afghanistan: A Comparison Based on International Law</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22410</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22410</guid>
		 <description>Criticism of the current collective security system enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations is common among international jurists. The creation of a body such as the Security Council, with restricted membership, and with preferential competence over the General Assembly in matters relating to safeguarding international peace and security (Article 12.1 of the Charter), and in which the main victors of World War II hold a power of veto, has been the target of much criticism. However, it is worth recalling that the essential design of the Security Council stems from the Yalta Conference (1945), in which the aim was to configure a body which would not collapse in the event of conflicts in which the major powers themselves became embroiled. For all its faults, the veto mechanism in the Security Council has enabled the UN to survive all the major political and military crises that have emerged since 1945, and this is no mean feat. 	   SOURCE: Real Instituto Elcano</description>
	 <source>Real Instituto Elcano</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 13 Feb 2008 12:55:58 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>United States Fateful Choice: Save Afghanistan or Save Pakistan?</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22407</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22407</guid>
		 <description>Historically, the turn of centuries more often than not, have been marked by strategic divides pertaining to the future of the Great Powers of the day.  The advent of the 21st Century witnessed the United States at the zenith of its undisputed global predominance and with analytical forecasts predicting that the United States would continue to enjoy this strategic predominance well into the 21st century. It may well be so keeping in mind the vast differentials in power attributes that the United States enjoys over its peer competitors today. However, the other side of the coin cannot be overlooked when viewing perspectives.  Half-way down the first decade of the 21st Century, the United States is mired in strategically complex situations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, without Iran which could be an addition.  These have strained the United States military machine and distracted America from addressing China’s uninterrupted military rise in East Asia, and Russia’s resurgence. The future of the United States global strategic preponderance in the 21st Century is most likely to be determined to a great extent by the soundness of strategic priorities and strategic decisions that the United States makes in relation to the unfolding situation in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. 	   SOURCE: South Asia Analysis Group</description>
	 <source>South Asia Analysis Group</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 13 Feb 2008 12:44:19 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Winning the Invisible War: An Agricultural Pilot Plan for Afghanistan</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22405</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22405</guid>
		 <description>When this paper was undertaken in the summer of 2007, one of its purposes was to sound the alarm over Afghanistan and the critical need for comprehensive action across all sectors of society to prevent that country from becoming a failed state. The second purpose was to lay out the major areas that needed immediate attention, largely within the civil side of reconstruction and development. The third was to propose specific pilot plans for rejuvenating the agricultural sector. These plans were developed by experienced American farmers and other experts with long careers in government, agriculture, and development. The principle participants are co-authors. Now, six months later, it appears that the Bush administration and NATO are taking that warning seriously. At least three studies are underway: one at Central Command; a second at the State Department; and a third at NATO. Those studies need not take much time to finish. The issues are clear. 	   SOURCE: National Defense University</description>
	 <source>National Defense University</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Wed, 13 Feb 2008 12:19:02 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Afghanistan - Decision Point 2008</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22404</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22404</guid>
		 <description>2008 is a pivotal year in the development of the Afghan state: the situation has reached a classic decision point. The Taliban are entrenched in the South, running parallel governments in several districts and controlling the majority of secondary roads. The extent of the challenges facing the country was brought into sharp focus by the bombing of the Serena Hotel in Kabul on 14 January. Should this event prove part of a consolidated drive by militants to engage in asymmetric attacks upon high profile, ‘soft’ Western civilian targets in the capital, then the insurgency will have entered a new and dangerous phase. The inability of domestic and international actors to counter the entrenchment of the insurgency in Afghanistan is deeply troubling, and the failure of NATO’s political masters to address the realities of the security situation in Afghanistan has taken the country and the Karzai government to a precipice. 	   SOURCE: Senlis Council</description>
	 <source>Senlis Council</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Tue, 12 Feb 2008 14:26:12 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Le sommet de l’OTAN Ã  Bucarest: l’Alliance Ã  la croisée des chemins</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22354</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22354</guid>
		 <description>L'OTAN, dont jusqu’ici les sommets se tenaient tout au plus Ã  intervalle
biennal, se prépare Ã  enchaÃ®ner, en 2008 puis en 2009, deux de ces importantes réunions. Ce changement d’habitude ne tient pas tant Ã  un arriéré de décisions fondamentales que doivent éponger de faÃ§on urgente les chefs d’Ã‰tat et de gouvernement de l’Alliance, qu’Ã  la teneur mÃªme du calendrier politique international. Washington a insisté pour que soit organisé un sommet au début de l’année 2008 afin de permettre au président sortant, George W. Bush, d’avoir une dernière réunion avec les dirigeants de l’Alliance avant l’expiration de son mandat. Cette réunion aura donc lieu Ã  Bucarest en avril 2008, mÃªme si le dernier sommet de l’OTAN se sera tenu Ã  Riga moins de dix-huit mois auparavant, en novembre 2006. Et un autre sommet de l’OTAN est prévu pour 2009 - probablement Ã  Berlin - afin de célébrer le 60ème anniversaire de l’Alliance atlantique.
– Quelles seront les questions de l’heure dominantes au sommet d’avril
2008 dans la capitale roumaine?
– Quelles décisions conviendra-t-il d’y prendre?
– Parmi les principales problématiques auxquelles est confrontée l’Alliance,
lesquelles seront débattues? 	   SOURCE: Collège de Défense de l’OTAN - Division Recherche</description>
	 <source>Collège de Défense de l’OTAN - Division Recherche</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Tue, 12 Feb 2008 12:39:12 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>ICT for reconstruction and development: Afghanistan challenges and opportunities</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22346</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22346</guid>
		 <description>The term information and communication technologies (ICTs) encompasses the range of technologies for gathering, storing, retrieving, processing, analyzing, and transmitting information that are essential to prospering in a globalized economy. Advances in ICTs have reduced the costs of managing information and introduced innovations in products, processes, and organizational structures that, in turn, have generated new ways of working, market development, and livelihood practices. Internationally, ICTs are viewed as a basic enabler of informal social and economic discourse, leading to a strengthening of civil society and the promotion of economic activity. The importance the United Nations (UN) attaches to ICTs as enablers of
economic, governance, security, education, healthcare, and social well-being reconstruction and development is evident in sponsorship of two international summits, the 2003 and 2005 World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). These summits documented steps on how to establish and organize the Information Society, and their reports referenced the importance of ICT by frequently citing the phrase, “ICTs as a tool
for social and economic development.â€ 	   SOURCE: Center for Technology and National Security Policy // National Defense University</description>
	 <source>Center for Technology and National Security Policy // National Defense University</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Tue, 12 Feb 2008 12:21:57 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Analysis of the Growth in Funding for Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Elsewhere in the War on Terrorism</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22344</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22344</guid>
		 <description>The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has reviewed the funding provided for military activities in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the war on terrorism and analyzed the increases in appropriations that have occurred over the past several years. The United States began combat operations in Afghanistan in fiscal year 2002 and in Iraq in fiscal year 2003. To finance those operations (and other activities related to the
war on terrorism), the Congress provided $18 billion and $76 billion in emergency appropriations in those years, respectively. With the exception of a slight decrease in 2004, to $74 billion, funding has increased steadily each year, to a total of $165 billion for 2007. If the Administration’s request for 2008 is funded in full, appropriations for military operations and other war-related activities in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
elsewhere in the war on terrorism will rise to $188 billion this year and to a cumulative total of $752 billion since 2001. Most of the spending is concentrated in two categoriesâ€”operation and maintenance, which has roughly doubled from 2004 to 2008, and procurement, which has increased tenfold over that period. The reasons for some of the increases are difficult to determine precisely because available data on the pace of operations and other factors that might affect costs are limited and because some of the funding and reporting categories are very broad. 	   SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office</description>
	 <source>Congressional Budget Office</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Fri, 08 Feb 2008 13:58:07 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>After Ashdown, where to for Afghanistan?</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22302</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22302</guid>
		 <description>Afghanistan’s refusal to accept Paddy Ashdown as United Nations ‘super envoy’ raises questions about the future of that mission, and more generally the difficulty of post-conflict peace-building missions. Six years after the fall of the Taliban, the international mission in Afghanistan is beleaguered. Heavy fighting continues in the east and south. Between August 2006 and September 2007, for example, British troops fired off more than four million rounds of ammunition. In Helmand Province alone, they expended four times as many artillery rounds during this period than British forces used during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In other words, NATO’s task is getting harder, and the Taliban are an increasing threat to the government of Hamid Karzai, the man who nixed Ashdown’s nomination. Notwithstanding his apparent callousness towards the foreign soldiers that have fought and died for the sake of his rule, Karzai’s pandering to Afghan nationalistic bloody-mindedness is detrimental to long-term Western interests. 	   SOURCE: Royal United Services Institute</description>
	 <source>Royal United Services Institute</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Fri, 08 Feb 2008 13:56:02 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>NATO: A two-tier alliance?</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22301</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22301</guid>
		 <description>U.S Defence Secretary Robert M. Gates has issued a warning that NATO is becoming a “two-tier alliance”, with some allies willing to fight and die while others, predominately continental Europeans, remain combat-shy. The big issue is NATO’s mission in Afghanistan, which, while at some 40,000 troops is struggling to contain the Taliban insurgency. But how do the numbers look? Out of the 41,700 troops in ISAF, the U.S has by far the greatest number of troops in ISAF with 15,038 followed by the UK (7,753), Germany (3,155), Italy (2,358), Canada (1,730), and the Netherlands (1,512). 	   SOURCE: European Council on Foreign Relations</description>
	 <source>European Council on Foreign Relations</source>
		 </item>
	   <item>
	   <pubDate>Fri, 08 Feb 2008 10:37:56 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22277</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22277</guid>
		 <description>Since 2003, the so-called Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have attempted to combine relatively small civilian and military components on the ground in Afghanistan, to achieve comprehensive results by focusing on provincial and district centres and to support the political leadership as well as the Afghan society extensively, without, however, releasing them from their responsibilities, or dominating them. Up to now, experience with the PRTs (the number of which increased from seven to twenty-five between 2003 and 2007) point towards their considerable potential as an instrument in comprehensive conflict management and nation building. Markus Gauster of the Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management of the National Defence Academy in Vienna focus on the question of the PRTs’ concept and functionality – among other things during two trips to Afghanistan. Two workshops with experts organized by the Institute, and discussing this question, provided additional impetus. To provide a provisional appraisal, the results of his research are made available in this study. On the one hand this volume gives general information on the PRT model, and, on the other, compares the US, British and German realization of this model. It is to be seen as an intermediary step in the scientific analysis of a topic which, without doubt, will also become increasingly important not only for contributing nations, but also for Security Organizations like NATO. 	   SOURCE: European Center for Security Studies</description>
	 <source>European Center for Security Studies</source>
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	   <pubDate>Fri, 08 Feb 2008 10:11:40 -0800</pubDate>
	 <title>The NATO Emerging in Afghanistan</title>
	   <link>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22276</link>
	   <guid>http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/showRecord.php?RecordId=22276</guid>
		 <description>It's sometimes easy to take our allies for granted or to wonder if they are up to the challenge in a place such as Afghanistan. Today, 25 NATO allies and 14 other nations contribute to the mission there alongside American and Afghan troops. Three years ago, only a handful of us were fighting the Taliban. The 28,000 non-U.S. forces and 13 non-U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams in place across Afghanistan have allowed American and Afghan forces to focus on the fierce battlegrounds in the east. The war is tough, but without allied help it would be much tougher. NATO's decision just over a year ago to take on security responsibility throughout Afghanistan has brought 10,000 additional Canadian and British and other European troops to the south, partnered with roughly 1,000 Australians. This allowed U.S. forces participating in the NATO mission and Operation Enduring Freedom to focus primarily on countering the insurgency in the east along the Pakistan border and to increase training of the Afghans. To strengthen this effort, President Bush decided last year to send 3,500 additional U.S. troops and $10.2 billion in development and security support to Afghanistan. Many allies joined this effort. 	   SOURCE: America.Gov</description>
	 <source>America.Gov</source>
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