Human Security Gateway: Pakistan

Sectarian Strife in Gilgit Baltistan

Fri, 25 May 2012 11:58:29 -0700

Gilgit Baltistan, a part of Pakistan occupied Kashmir, has been in the grip of another bout of violence and unrest for the last three months. February 2012 witnessed the blatant killing of Shia pilgrims in Kohistan on the Karakoram Highway when they were returning from Iran. In the aftermath of this particular incident, a series of clashes have taken place in the region, the most grievous among them being the massacre of Shias at Chilas on April 3, 2012. The spate of killings has unleashed fear and uncertainty among the people and there is an open outcry about the government’s inaction and inability to control the situation. And it has also once again stirred sectarian sentiments, heightening tensions not only between the rival sects but among the public at large. SOURCE: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

The Crisis State: Pakistan's Security Dilemma

Wed, 23 May 2012 11:19:15 -0700

The author of this brief argues that Pakistan's biggest security challenge is a matter of definition. In most of the democratic countries, the political leadership and the Parliament defines the security threats to the State, and the military and intelligence Establishment support the government’s decision. In most of the non-democratic states, the Establishment, primarily the military defines the security threats, with the security agencies supporting it. Pakistan is unique; despite being a democratic government, neither the Parliament nor the government have complete control over its foreign and domestic policies, including the strategic weapons. SOURCE: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies

Fixing Pakistan's Civil-military Imbalance: A Dangerous Temptation

Tue, 22 May 2012 08:59:49 -0700

• Out of the proposed alternatives for dealing with Pakistan discussed in Washington, one that seems to have gained some traction calls for aggressively playing up Pakistan’s civil-military divide by propping up civilians while dealing harshly with the military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

• While normatively attractive, the approach to deal with Pakistan as two Pakistan's is unworkable. It grossly exaggerates the U.S.’s capacity to affect institutional change in Pakistan and fundamentally misunderstands what underpins the civil-military dynamic.

• In reality, any attempt by the U.S. to actively exploit this internal disconnect is likely to end up strengthening right wing rhetoric in Pakistan, provide more space for security-centric policies, and further alienate the Pakistani people from the U.S.

• A more prudent approach would be one that limits itself to targeted interventions in areas truly at the heart of the civil-military dichotomy and that would resonate positively with the Pakistani people: by continuing to help improve civilian governance performance and by providing regional security assurances to Pakistan. SOURCE: United States Institute of Peace

Pakistan's Political Transition: One More Step Forward

Tue, 15 May 2012 14:33:55 -0700

On 26 April 2012, Pakistan took one giant step forward in its long struggle to erect a political structure supported by a legal system in which citizens have full confidence. That will happen when the people’s elected representatives can exercise full authority and when there is respect for the rule of law. On that day, as helicopters hovered over the imposing structure that houses the senior judiciary, the Supreme Court decided to hold Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani guilty for having committed contempt of court. The much anticipated verdict by the court was delivered not by a bench headed by Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry who has shaken up the Pakistani political system on more than one occasion. This time the sentence was read out by Justice Nasirul Mulk, presiding over a bench of seven men. No woman is a member of the 19-man Supreme Court. How will this verdict affect the political development of Pakistan? This “Insight” maintains that the decision to hold the prime minister to account – for contempt of the court – has enormous implications for the development of the Pakistani state. SOURCE: National University of Singapore // Institute of South Asian Studies

Moving Forward with the Legal Empowerment of Women in Pakistan

Tue, 15 May 2012 08:52:38 -0700

The history of laws affecting women’s rights and empowerment in Pakistan involves a complex pattern of advances and setbacks, with the state’s efforts to articulate a definition of women’s rights complicated by the need to balance divergent views on the place of women in Pakistani society.

After General Pervez Musharraf’s 1999 coup, a number of factors, including international perceptions of Pakistan, brought women’s rights, greatly curtailed by General Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamization project, to the fore. Most critical among the changes to women’s rights during this period was the 2006 revision to the Hudood Laws, resulting in the Protection of Women Act.

The incumbent Pakistan People’s Party government has passed several important pieces of legislation continuing the progress for women’s empowerment made under Musharraf. These new laws focus on sexual harassment at the workplace, antiwomen practices, and acid throwing. Additionally, the National Commission on the Status of Women has recently achieved elevated status.

Despite these advancements, new legislation is needed to address ongoing challenges such as women’s ability to control inherited land and human trafficking. If the Pakistani state is to make lasting improvements on these and other challenges facing the legal status of Pakistani women, it must find solutions that will not only benefit women in the country but create consensus among Pakistanis on the best and most achievable way to prioritize global rights for women while adhering to Islamic precepts. SOURCE: United States Institute of Peace

The Jirga: Justice and Conflict Transformation

Tue, 08 May 2012 10:22:42 -0700

The conflict that erupted in the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas in 2007 with the takeover of Swat and other areas by militants loyal to the Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan led to the displacement of 3.2 million people, the interruption of education and health provision and destruction of vital infrastructure as the Pakistan Army fought a violent counter-insurgency. The impact of the conflict was heightened by the floods in 2010 and 2011 which devastated large parts of the region.

There are a number of complex causes of the conflict including poor governance, low levels of state legitimacy and poverty. In the case of PATA, one of the key drivers of the conflict was the inability of the local population to gain access to equitable and responsive justice systems. The lack of provision for justice, in either the formal or informal spheres, led many to turn to extreme forms of Islamic jurisprudence in search of justice. This is in part because of the reforms of the Musharraf government, but also because of long-standing policies with regard to the status of PATA which not only reduced the capability and reach of the formal justice system, but also undermined the informal justice system, the Jirga, by de-recognising it. This is despite the fact that the Jirga in PATA has been central to governance and justice provision for several hundred years.

Even though the Jirga has been restricted in recent years it has remained essential to informal justice provision, and was a central institution that challenged the militants. This places the Jirga in a critical position where it still retains social legitimacy in the eyes of the population. However, it is unable to support and foster conflict transformation and justice provisions as it has historically done because of incoherent policies by the state. SOURCE: Saferworld // Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme

Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined?

Tue, 08 May 2012 09:12:19 -0700

This report is a study of 17 declassified documents captured during the Abbottabad raid and released to the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC). They consist of electronic letters or draft letters, totaling 175 pages in the original Arabic and 197 pages in the English translation. The earliest is dated September 2006 and the latest April 2011. Some of the letters are incomplete and/or are missing their dates, and not all of the letters explicitly attribute their author(s) and/or indicate the addressee. In addition to Bin Ladin, the recognizable individuals who appear in the letters either as authors or as recipients are `Atiyyatullah and Abu Yahya al-Libi, both of whom are al-Qa`ida leaders; Adam Yahya Gadahn, the American al-Qa`ida spokesman and media advisor; Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr, the leader of the Somali militant group Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin; Abu Basir (Nasir al-Wuhayshi), the leader of the Yemen-based al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); and Hakimullah Mahsud, the leader of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Given the small collection of documents released to the CTC, it is impossible to construct a coherent evolution of al-Qa`ida or its current state. “Letters from Abbottabad” is an initial exploration and contextualization of 17 documents that will be the grist for future academic debate and discussion.

A note on translation: The quality of the English translation provided to the CTC is not adequate throughout. When the translation was deemed inadequate, quotations cited in this report have either been amended or translated a new by Nelly Lahoud. Furthermore, the conversion of the dating of the letters from the Hijri to the Gregorian calendar is inaccurate in some places. The Appendix provides corrected dates to some of the letters, along with some pointers on how some letters relate to others. For those wishing to conduct their own analysis of the documents, it is highly recommended to refer to the original Arabic documents, not the translations. SOURCE: Combating Terrorism Center

United States-Pakistan Relations: Facing a Critical Juncture

Mon, 07 May 2012 11:38:31 -0700

One year after the death of Osama bin Laden on Pakistani soil, the tenuous relationship between the US and Pakistan is critically analyzed. As President Obama returns from his surprise visit to Kabul after signing a strategic agreement with Afghanistan, the relationship between the United States and Pakistan and their involvement with key regional players is now more important than ever.

Few would disagree that 2011 was a difficult year for the United States and Pakistan. The shaky relationship deteriorated rapidly over the past twelve months as a result of a series of incidents shortly after the American raid on the Pakistani compound that killed Osama bin Laden on May 2 of last year. It has become a cliché to compare the rocky relationship to a bad marriage, one in which divorce is impossible yet both parties are forced to trudge along unhappily. Never smooth even during the best of times, the past year has brought the relationship to an all-time low. In a November 2011 CBS poll, a majority of Americans said that Pakistan is either unfriendly (39%) or an enemy (24%).Only 2% called it an ally. For their part, Pakistanis don’t see the relationship as any healthier. A June 2011 Pew Research poll showed that most Pakistanis see the United States as an enemy and a potential threat to their country’s security. This paper will address the tumultuous relationship between these two countries including recent turmoil, regional dynamics, often opposed agendas of each country, and options for rebuilding the relationship.

On the one hand, since joining hands in late 2001, Washington has been praising Islamabad for its commitment and sacrifice of more than 3,500 military personnel and as many as 35,000 Pakistani civilians in the “war on terror.” Last year, soon after the killing of Osama bin Laden inside Pakistan, President Barack Obama said, “We have been able to kill more terrorists on Pakistani soil than just about anyplace else. We could not have done that without Pakistani cooperation.” On the other hand, American officials have suspected and often accused the Pakistani military of supporting militant groups, particularly the Afghan Taliban. Although Washington and Islamabad have never been on the same page since 9/11, both sides have always made an effort to maintain their ties. SOURCE: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding

The Al Qaeda Document Release: What They Tell Us About Bin Laden and his Supporters

Fri, 04 May 2012 16:00:22 -0700

The al Qaeda documents released by the West Point Combating Terrorism Center provide a unique and tantalizing insight into the inner workings of al Qaeda and its boss Osama bin Laden. As usual the CTC has done a fabulous job of not only releasing the documents but also putting them into context. But in the end what has been released is only a tiny sample of what was obtained in bin Laden’s hideout in Abbottabad and readers would be wise to make their judgments tentative until we see much more.

According to administration officials the SEALs brought out of Abbottabad the equivalent of a small college library of documents and electronic files, perhaps up to 6000 documents all together. The head of al Qaeda was hiding but he was not incommunicado. Bin Laden appears to have been a collector of letters and messages in his last years. CTC has released only 17 documents, a small sample to work from. As the CTC report emphasizes there is much that is missing. For example, although there are notes about ‘trusted Pakistani brothers,’ the references to Pakistan are sparse and incomplete. Thus the mystery of who helped hide bin Laden for nine years in Pakistan remains unanswered. There is also very little here about bin Laden’s deputy and heir, Ayman Zawahiri, perhaps because those documents are still being exploited to find the new amir of al Qaeda. SOURCE: Brookings Institution

Pakistan, Afghanistan and the US Withdrawal [Transcript]

Fri, 04 May 2012 15:23:39 -0700

As the United States and Britain begin their withdrawal from Afghanistan, the speaker will provide a guide to the changing cast of characters in the region. He will offer his thoughts on the future of international terrorism, and the policies and strategies both within Pakistan and Afghanistan and among the Western allies. He will also discuss how the death of Osama bin Laden has affected the relationship between the US and Pakistan, and examine the choices facing Pakistan, Afghanistan and the West in their efforts to bring stability to a fractured region. SOURCE: Chatham House

Pakistan’s Relations with India: Beyond Kashmir?

Thu, 03 May 2012 10:03:05 -0700

In March 2011, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP)-led government resumed the composite dialogue with India, with the rapid pace of its economic liberalisation program demonstrating political will to normalise bilateral relations. The November 2011 decision to grant Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to India by the end of 2012 is not merely an economic concession but also a significant political gesture. Departing from Pakistan’s traditional position, the democratic government no longer insists on linking normalisation of relations with resolution of the Kashmir dispute. India no longer insists on making such normalisation conditional on demonstrable Pakistani efforts to rein in India-oriented jihadi groups, particularly the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT), responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks and hence suspension of the composite dialogue. The two countries need to build on what they have achieved, notably in promising economic areas, to overcome still serious suspicion among hardliners in their security elites and sustain a process that is the best chance they have had for bilateral peace and regional stability.

Within Pakistan, the normalisation process enjoys broad political support, including from the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz, PML-N), the largest opposition party. Viewing liberalised trade with India as in Pakistan’s economic interest, the PML-N also believes that broader economic ties would provide a more conducive environment to address longstanding disputes like Kashmir. SOURCE: International Crisis Group

Exclusion: A Hidden Driver of Pakistan's Fragility

Fri, 27 Apr 2012 09:33:53 -0700

Deeply entrenched patterns of political, social and economic exclusion are fuelling Pakistan’s fragility. Large segments of the population are denied basic rights, access to resources, or a political voice based on their identity or location. This creates grievances that motivate people to violence. It also perpetuates Pakistan’s elite and unaccountable governance, which itself is a major cause of instability.

There are four main axes of exclusion that most clearly drive Pakistan’s fragility. These are the political and economic exclusion of some regions by the political centre; the exclusion from access to land experienced by much of the rural population; the profound exclusion and violence faced by religious minorities; and the exclusion of many young people and women, which contributes to Pakistan’s demographic instability. Ultimately, all these forms of exclusion serve the interests of Pakistan’s civilian, military and traditional elites. Hence there is little political will to challenge them.

The international community has so far failed to pay sufficient attention to issues of exclusion and inequality within its response to Pakistan’s fragility. European actors are particularly well placed to address exclusion through their political engagement and development assistance to Pakistan. However, they are likely to face strong resistance from Pakistani elites, as well as other challenges. SOURCE: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre

Applying Conflict Sensitivity in Emergency Response: Current Practice and Ways Forward

Mon, 02 Apr 2012 15:35:21 -0700

How can emergency response be delivered in a more conflict-sensitive manner? To what extent should this be a priority for the sector? What practical tools and approaches have aid agencies used to better understand their contexts of intervention and minimize conflict risks?

As these issues become increasingly prominent in regions of the world as diverse as the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan and Libya, this paper offers insights to these pressing questions.

Drawing on field research from Haiti, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, this paper maps the current state of conflict-sensitive practice in emergencies. It identifies good practices which can be built upon, key gaps, and points out practical ways to integrate conflict sensitivity more strategically across the emergency programme cycle.

One of the key conclusions from this study is that there are clear opportunities for synergy between conflict sensitivity integration and the emergency capacity-building initiatives currently ongoing within many agencies. Significant improvements can be achieved through relatively simple steps which complement existing tools, standards and efforts to improve programme quality. The paper suggests six minimum standards for conflict sensitive emergency response which, if applied, would not only help minimize harm and reduce conflict risks but also increase the overall effectiveness of humanitarian response. SOURCE: Humanitarian Practice Network

The Menace That Is Lashkar-e-Taiba

Wed, 14 Mar 2012 11:32:13 -0700

Though the international community first began taking notice of the terrorist group Lashkare- Taiba (LeT) after its spectacular coordinated bombing and shooting attacks in Mumbai, India, in November 2008, the group was established in 1987 at a time when Pakistan was in the throes of Islamic ferment. Then, LeT had access to a steady supply of volunteers, funding, and—most important of all—concerted state support. Long bolstered by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, this Wahhabi group promotes the vision of a universal Islamic caliphate through tableegh and jihad—preaching and armed struggle. Though India and Kashmir have been LeT’s primary area of operations so far, the group has an unsettling presence internationally.

It is clear that after al-Qaeda, LeT is the most dangerous terrorist group operating in South Asia because of its:

1. Global vision and international ambitions
2. Distinct ideology that underwrites Islamic revanchism, justifying collaboration with other terrorist groups
3. Loyalty to Pakistan and willingness to protect its patron state against domestic opponents
4. Diversified network for mobilizing resources, promoting its international presence, and recruiting members, which minimizes its dependence on the state
5. Involvement in terrorism and social development concurrently, which limits Pakistan’s ability to target the group even if it were so inclined
6. Cohesive and hierarchic organizational structure that is effective at both the conduct of violence and the delivery of social programs
7. Proficiency at exploiting science and technology, extra-national social links, and state vulnerabilities in order to advance its political aims

LeT is a formidable and highly adaptable adversary with a genuinely global reach and the ability to grow roots and sustain operations in countries far removed from its primary theater of activity in South Asia. Though India’s proximity to Pakistan has resulted in New Delhi absorbing most of the blows unleashed by LeT, the carnage in Mumbai demonstrates that the terrorism facing India is not simply a problem for New Delhi alone. An attack could even reach U.S. soil.

The only reasonable objective for the United States is the permanent evisceration of LeT and other vicious South Asian terrorist groups—with Pakistani cooperation if possible, but without it if necessary. SOURCE: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Central Asia and Afghanistan: Insulation on the Silk Road, Between Eurasia and the Heart of Asia

Fri, 09 Mar 2012 11:39:41 -0800

Is Afghanistan the heart of Asia, from where regional security can be threatened and cooperation induced? Or is it an artificial heart whose beat does not echo the genuine security interests of neighbouring countries? This question is the essence of the PRIO research project ‘Afghanistan in a Neighbourhood Perspective’, which this third paper in the series aims to answer from the point of view of the Central Asian Regional Security Complex [CA RSC].

In the lead-up to the Bonn II Conference by the end of 2011, the USA and Coalition partners had broadened their ‘regional approach’ to peace in Afghanistan from its initial narrow focus on the AfPak region, to a new ‘Heart of Asia’ concept which cast Afghanistan as the political and economic hub of a conglomeration of regional countries, near and distant. The widened approach was based on two assumptions: First, that potential insecurity instigated by the destructive behaviour of non-state actors necessitated new collective security arrangements for all neighbouring countries; and second, that the stabilization of Afghanistan would herald positive externalities and economic dividends, which the US administration envisioned as a New Silk Road. Yet, the ‘Heart of Asia’ concept had two conceptual limitations in addition to a number of political impediments. First, it fundamentally underestimated the potential for non-cooperation among states, even if they shared common concerns for dangers emanating from non-state actors. Second, by assuming that there was a large region where interests merged for cooperative security, the ‘Heart of Asia’ vision failed to recognize genuine security dynamics within sub-regions and how Afghanistan is surrounded by three Regional Security Complexes [RSCs], each with its own security dynamic.

The author argues that the Central Asian states’ [lack of] involvement with Afghanistan is reflected specifically by this RSC’s internal rivalry and common need to balance external actors. While CA countries are concerned about insecurities stemming from Afghanistan, their main security problems lie elsewhere. SOURCE: Peace Research Institute Oslo

CTC Sentinel [Volume 5, Issue 1, January 2012]

Mon, 27 Feb 2012 13:39:22 -0800

In the past six months, a series of major incidents between the United States and Pakistan has brought their relationship to a new low. Although all of Pakistan’s international relationships are important, it is the one with the United States that is most critical to its future stability as well as the maintenance of peace in South Asia. A key question for the year 2012 will be whether the United States and Pakistan can rebuild a much abused relationship. The cover story article, The U.S.-Pakistan Relationship in the Year Ahead, will review the primary incidents that led to the worsening of relations in 2011, identify some U.S. missteps, warn of a number of flashpoints that could occur in 2012, and finally offer critical suggestions for how the U.S.-Pakistan relationship can be resuscitated in the months ahead.

Other articles in this issue include:

1. Profiles of Mexico’s Seven Major Drug Trafficking Organizations | Peter Chalk

2. Bioterrorism: Still a Threat to the United States | Leonard A. Cole

3. Radicalization Processes in Afghanistan | Marisa L. Porges

4. Individual Jihadist Operations in Europe: Patterns and Challenges | Petter Nesser

5. Al-Shabab’s Western Recruitment Strategy | Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens

6. Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity SOURCE: Combating Terrorism Center // West Point

Crises in South Asia: Trends and Potential Consequences

Thu, 23 Feb 2012 16:58:27 -0800

To paraphrase Raymond Aron, crises have become the substitute of wars between nuclear-armed states. This corollary to nuclear deterrence applies to South Asia, where Pakistan and India have so far experienced two crises with the advent of covert nuclear weapon capabilities and three more after carrying out underground tests of nuclear weapon designs. One of these crises prompted a war limited in geographical scope, duration, and intensity.

The most recent of these crises was sparked by mass-casualty assaults in November 2008 against iconic targets in Mumbai, including two luxury hotels and the central train terminus. The perpetrators of these attacks were trained, equipped, and directed by handlers within Pakistan. They were affiliated with the Lashkar-e-Taiba [LeT], an extremist group with ties to Pakistan's military and intelligence services. The Government of India quickly chose not to strike back against the LeT or other targets within Pakistan. An earlier coalition government in New Delhi showed similar restraint after another extreme provocation in 2001, an attack against the Indian Parliament building and those within it. The perpetrators of the attack on Parliament are widely believed to be affiliated with the Jaish-e-Mohammed [JeM], another extremist group which, at that time, maintained close ties to Pakistan's security apparatus.

The progression of attacks carried out by Pakistani nationals directed against Indian targets has raised questions about whether New Delhi's forbearance might be expected to continue in the event of future mass-casualty assaults against iconic targets that can be traced back to Pakistan. This essay assesses the progression of five crises between Operation Brasstacks in 1986-7 to the Mumbai crisis in 2008, looking for patterns, shifts, and implications for crisis management and escalation control. SOURCE: Stimson Center

The Political Economy of State-building in Situations of Fragility and Conflict: From Analysis to Strategy

Tue, 14 Feb 2012 11:13:08 -0800

Fragile states have been at the heart of Western development and security strategy for over a decade. Bringing together the findings of five case studies of states that show clear signs of illegitimacy or a weak capacity to govern, including Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Guatemala, Kosovo and Pakistan, this paper examines the roots and dynamics of state fragility by placing the spotlight on the way political power works. The paper highlights the aspects of political economy that give rise to weak or fragile state institutions, freeze or reverse attempted reforms, create public insecurity and paralyse economic development.

The paper concludes with suggestions that may help guide a pragmatic and realistic approach. Above all, donors must be constantly sensitive to the structures of power, interests and incentives that can capture and subvert new formal governance arrangements. SOURCE: Clingendael // Netherlands Institute of International Relations // Conflict Research Unit

The Secret War

Fri, 27 Jan 2012 10:22:26 -0800

A revealing look at the CIA’s drone program in Pakistan and covert support for elements of the Taliban by the Pakistani military and its intelligence service, the ISI. SOURCE: Frontline // Public Broadcasting Service

Crisis Watch No. 101 [1 January 2012]

Fri, 27 Jan 2012 09:46:35 -0800

In Iraq, the official withdrawal of the last U.S. combat troops, nearly nine years after the invasion, was quickly followed by a political crisis. Authorities issued an arrest warrant for the country’s top Sunni politician, Vice President Tariq Al-Hashimi, accusing him of running death squads.

Tension remained high after November’s flawed presidential and parliamentary elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Continued violence and repression by security forces claimed at least 30 lives. Incumbent president Joseph Kabila was sworn in for a second term on 20 December, despite international observers finding that the results “lacked credibility”.

Relations between Sudan and South Sudan deteriorated further. Tension over the status of Abyei continued, with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon calling for the withdrawal of both sides’ armed forces, while the two countries’ militaries clashed in the disputed territory of Jau.

In Senegal, President Abdoulaye Wade showed no signs of reconsidering his candidacy for a controversial third term. Clashes between ruling party and opposition supporters left one dead and several injured.

In Nigeria a spate of violent attacks by militant Islamists Boko Haram left at least 100 dead and 90,000 displaced. President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency. In Guinea-Bissau an attempted coup by renegade soldiers on 26 December left at least two dead. The navy chief, former army chief, and a number of politicians suspected of orchestrating it have been arrested.

Tensions between Pakistan’s government and military leadership escalated as the Supreme Court began its probe over a memo last May requesting U.S. help to avert a military takeover. In Afghanistan bomb attacks by Pakistani Sunni militants Lashkar-e-Jhangvi in Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif killed 84 people on the Shia holy day of Ashura. Relations with Pakistan remained strained, as Pakistan’s boycott overshadowed the Bonn conference.

At least fifteen people were killed and 100 injured in Janaozen in western Kazakhstan on 16 December as government forces clashed with a crowd including former oil workers, who have been on strike for 6 months.

Bosnia avoided an intensified political crisis as leaders of the six main political parties agreed to form a government at the end of the month, ending fourteen months of deadlock after the October 2010 elections.

SOURCE: International Crisis Group

Security Sector Governance in Pakistan: Progress, But Many Challenges Persist

Thu, 19 Jan 2012 11:48:26 -0800

The US Navy SEAL raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound on May 2, 2011 brought into question the Pakistani army’s domination over nearly all aspects of the state. Pakistanis wondered how these events could have occurred right under the nose of the military. This issue paper examines the prospects for security sector governance in Pakistan and identifies the reforms necessary for the government to make meaningful strides in this area. The paper examines persistent shortcomings in security governance; however, it also highlights key areas where there have been recent improvements, including disaster management and control of nuclear arms.

Improved security governance in Pakistan is identified as a growing priority for the country’s citizens and its government, the region and the international community, but there is a lack of political will for such change. Real progress in this area will require Pakistan’s military to step down and its civilian institutions to step up. This paper outlines several ways in which the international community can encourage much-needed reforms, including conditions on military assistance and support for civilian institutions. SOURCE: The Centre for International Governance Innovation

Sustainable Strategies for Afghanistan and the Region After 2014 [Conference Papers]

Thu, 19 Jan 2012 10:57:17 -0800

After foreign troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan in late 2014, the future stability of the country, neighboring Pakistan, and the general regional neighborhood will be open to question. A renewed civil war and an eventual return of the Taliban to power cannot be ruled out. Pakistan itself may continue to be characterized by growing instability. The surrounding region will be the subject of great power competition involving regional and extra-regional actors. Given the importance that the Afghanistan-Pakistan area has for the stability of the wider region, for the fight against Islamist terrorism, and for future nuclear non-proliferation, the strategic challenges that NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan pose for the international community are enormous. The 2012 Aspen European Strategy Forum will tackle this challenge by seeking to address a number of related questions.

Table of Contents

- "U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Ten Years after 9/11" by Christine Fair
- "The NATO Drawdown: Implications for Afghanistan and Pakistan" by Keith Crane
- "Launching an Afghan Peace Process" by James Dobbins
- "Transition in the Afghanistan-Pakistan War and the Uncertain Role of the 'Great Powers'" by Anthony Cordesman
- "Militant Islam in South Asia: Past Trajectories and Present Implications" by Sumit Ganguly
- "Afghanistan between Democratization and Civil War: Post-2014 Scenarios" by Thomas Ruttig
- "Scenarios for Afghanistan & for the Region & Political Options for the International Community" by Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh SOURCE: Aspen European Strategy Forum // The Aspen Institute // Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung

Transition in the Afghanistan-Pakistan War: How Does This War End?

Mon, 16 Jan 2012 14:54:33 -0800

The future of Afghanistan and Pakistan will be shaped by the way in which the US, NATO/ISAF, and major aid donors interact with the Afghan and Pakistani governments as they “transition” by withdrawing their forces and cutting their spending and aid. This “transition” is already underway, but no one can yet predict how the withdrawal of US and other NATO/ISAF combat forces from Afghanistan in 2014 will play out over time.

It is not clear how the US and its NATO/ISAF allies will actually manage withdrawal of their forces. It is not clear how much continuing support aid donors will provide to Afghanistan through 2014 and beyond, or whether the coming massive cuts in military spending and aid will trigger a major recession or depression during a period when outside troops will leave and Afghanistan’s weak government and forces must go through another election.

This report examines these issues by analyzing the current trends in strategy, in the fighting, in in peace negotiations, and in dealing with Pakistan. It looks at the options for transition in terms of the attitudes and goals of other Central Asian power and China and Russia, and then examines Afghanistan’s ability deal with the withdrawal of US and other ISAF forces, and major cuts in outside military spending and aid. It concludes with an analysis of the prospects for transition in terms of Afghan politics, governance, economics, and ability to develop security forces capable of taking responsibility for Afghan security.

The most likely post-2014 outcome in Afghanistan is a situation where the insurgents control and operate in some Pashtun areas, while others are controlled by factions of the Northern Pashtuns. Other Afghan ethnic factions are likely to create some new form of the Northern Alliance, and the central government in Kabul is either likely to play some limited role, or become a key player in a limited form of civil conflict. The most likely case in Pakistan is that it will draft further towards the status of a failed state until some coup or leadership crisis produces an new leadership that actually begins to react to Pakistan’s internal problems rather than focusing on its own power, living in denial when it can, and exporting blame when it must. Outside powers can encourage change and reform, but Pakistan’s problems go far beyond the war in Afghanistan and no faction has yet visibly emerged that offers serious hope of the level of reform that can only come from within. SOURCE: Center for Strategic and International Studies

How Pakistan’s Unstable Tribal Areas Threaten China’s Core Interests

Thu, 12 Jan 2012 15:11:12 -0800

Pakistan's refusal to go after militants based in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas [FATA] will have a great impact on China, argues the author of this publication. She analyzes the political, economic and military dimensions of the threats FATA-based militants pose to China's core interests. She also examines the increasing Chinese Turkisanization of Al-Qaeda. The Turkistani Islamic Party [TIP], which appointed a Chinese Uyghur as their leader, and Al-Qaeda threaten to destabilize Xinjiang if Islamabad fails to control its militants. Changing security pressures may lead Beijing to diverge from its previous policies of "nonintervention" and deploying troops abroad. SOURCE: The Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy (Institut für Strategie- Politik- Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsberatung)

Islamic Parties in Pakistan

Mon, 12 Dec 2011 10:13:40 -0800

The ability of Pakistan’s radical Islamic parties to mount limited but potentially violent opposition to the government has made democratic reform, and by extension the reduction of religious extremism and development of a more peaceful and stable society, more challenging. This is a reflection of those parties’ well-organised activist base, which is committed to a narrow partisan agenda and willing to defend it through violence. While their electoral support remains limited, earlier Islamisation programs have given them a strong legal and political apparatus that enables them to influence policy far beyond their numerical strength. An analysis of party agendas and organisation, as well as other sources of influence in judicial, political and civil society institutions, is therefore vital to assessing how Pakistan’s main religious parties apply pressure on government, as well as the ability and willingness of the mainstream parties that are moderate on religious issues to resist that pressure.

These parties’ ability to demonstrate support for their various agendas is an expression of coherent internal structures, policymaking processes and relations between the leadership and the rank-and-file. These aspects of party functioning are, therefore, as critical to understanding their role in the polity and prospects of influencing policy in the future as in understanding their relationship to the state. SOURCE: International Crisis Group

Perspectives on Involving Non-State and Customary Actors in Justice and Security Reform

Wed, 07 Dec 2011 16:14:24 -0800

Focusing on the role of non-state and customary actors in security and justice reform, this e-book engages with one of the most central debates in current international development intervention in fragile states. Its does so by questioning the key pillar of such interventions: state-building. Written by both practitioners and academics, the contributions suggest that international development programming should focus on "what works" and what is seen as legitimate justice and security by ordinary citizens, rather than on "what ought to be", based on Western normative frameworks. This means engaging with the variety of justice and security actors that already exist and are used by local citizens, rather than trying to build something entirely new. In the majority of contexts this implies a move away from the dominant state-centric approach, which focuses on building formal state institutions or on 'fixing' those that have failed.

The crux of the matter is that non-state actors, such as customary leaders, are the primary providers of justice and security in the Global South. They deal with an estimated 80 to 90 percent of disputes. This is an empirical reality that needs to be taken serious: even if state institutions did work as intended, they would unlikely fulfill the same justice needs as their non-state counterparts. A more pluralistic framework, which is both context-sensitive and evidence-based, is therefore a welcomed alternative to mainstream state-building.

Another key argument of the book is the need to bring politics into the center of program design and implementation. Not only are justice and security provision inherently political arenas where power, resources and rights are at stake, international agencies' engagement with them also have significant political implications.

The book includes a general Introduction written by DIIS researchers Peter Albrecht and Helene Maria Kyed, who provide an overview of how non-state actors have been integrated into development programs over the past 5-10 years, and give a number of recommendations for improving such engagements. These are based on insights from the 9 chapters of the book, which explore concrete programme experiences and/or suggest alternative approaches based on in-depth analysis of the justice and security landscapes in specific contexts. Six different countries are covered in the book: Afghanistan, Indonesia, Ghana, Nepal, Marshall Islands, and Pakistan. One chapter focuses specifically on women’s access to justice in fragile state contexts. SOURCE: International Development Law Organization (Organisation Internationale de Droit du Developpement) // Danish Institute for International Studies

From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National Approaches to Internal Displacement

Mon, 05 Dec 2011 15:10:26 -0800

It is a central tenet of international law that states bear the primary duty and responsibility to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of persons within their borders, including the internally displaced. While internally displaced persons (IDPs) remain entitled to the full protection of rights and freedoms available to the population in general, they face vulnerabilities that nondisplaced persons to not face. Therefore, in order to ensure that IDPs are not deprived of their human rights and are treated equally with respect to nondisplaced citizens, states are obligated to provide special measures of protection and assistance to IDPs that correspond to their particular vulnerabilities. Reflecting these key notions of international law, the rights of IDPs and obligations of states are set forth in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (hereafter, “the Guiding Principles”).

Using the Guiding Principles as a departure for analysis, this study examines government response to internal displacement in fifteen of the twenty countries most affected by internal displacement due to conflict, generalized violence and human rights violations: Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Georgia, Iraq, Kenya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Turkey, Uganda and Yemen. The analysis seeks to shed light on how and to what extent, if any, governments are fulfilling their responsibility toward IDPs, with a view to providing guidance to governments in such efforts. In so doing, this study also seeks to contribute to research and understanding regarding realization of the emerging norm of the “Responsibility to Protect.” To frame the analysis, the introduction to this volume examines the connections among the concepts of national responsibility, “sovereignty as responsibility” and the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P). SOURCE: Brookings Institution // London School of Economics // Project on Internal Displacement

Crisis Watch No. 100 [1 December 2011]

Fri, 02 Dec 2011 11:06:59 -0800

The Democratic Republic of Congo’s presidential and parliamentary vote went ahead on 28-30 November, after a campaign marred by violence and amid allegations of rigging and mismanagement. Political rallies were banned in the wake of election-related clashes in Kinshasa on the eve of polls, and sporadic reports of violence emerged, including from Lubumbashi and West Kasai, during voting. In Burundi state troops clashed with the recently formed Forces for the Restoration of Democracy; the government reported 18 rebels killed.

Relations between Sudan and South Sudan deteriorated further this month. On 9 November the Sudanese Armed Forces reportedly launched cross-border airstrikes on Maban County in South Sudan’s Upper Nile State, and a day later bombed Yida refugee camp in Unity state, killing 12. Late-month negotiations between the two sides failed to achieve a settlement on contentious oil and transitional financial arrangements. Both Sudan and South Sudan also grappled with internal instability.

In Syria violence continued, with the regime’s brutal crackdown ongoing, elements of the protest movement increasingly militarised, the conflict internationalised and the Arab League’s attempt to end the bloodshed running aground. Tensions continued to rise in Kosovo. Late month violence in the north between international KFOR troops and ethnic Serbs who are barricading customs gates with Serbia left dozens injured.

NATO airstrikes on two Pakistan military border outposts left 24 Pakistani soldiers dead and U.S.-Pakistani relations in tatters. Islamabad swiftly condemned the attacks, requesting NATO vacate its airbase in Balochistan and shutting down its supply routes. The incident also damaged already strained Pakistani relations with Afghanistan, with the Pakistani government threatening to boycott forthcoming Bonn talks on Afghanistan.

Myanmar saw further positive developments this month. The announcement by opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD party that they will contest seats in forthcoming by-elections marked their return to the political process. On 1 November leaders of Nepal’s four main political parties signed a landmark deal to integrate one third of former Maoist rebels into the national army and give others financial rehabilitation packages, removing a major stumbling block to the drafting of a new constitution. Morocco held the first elections under its new constitution, approved by referendum in July, which devolved some power from the monarch. Following the official announcement of last months’ historic election results, Tunisia’s new Constituent Assembly held its first session on 22 November. The main parties quickly agreed to form a new government, with Hamadi Jebali, the leader of the moderate Islamist An-Nahda party which took over 41% of the vote, assuming the post of prime minister. The first stage of parliamentary elections in Egypt took place at the end of November. The polls, the first since President Hosni Mubarak was toppled in February, were mostly peaceful despite deadly protests earlier in the month against the interim military leaders who replaced Mubarak. SOURCE: International Crisis Group

A Deadly U.S. Attack on Pakistani Soil

Thu, 01 Dec 2011 10:01:02 -0800

In this piece, Nate Hughes provides context needed to understand the likely causes of the American attack on Pakistani soldiers on November 26. The article reviews the claims surrounding the attack, by both the Pakistani and the Americans. It describes the types of patrols usually undertaken on this section of the Afghan-Pakistan border, and the agreements and information the forces on both sides have, in general, about each side's standard operating procedures. It explains the factors playing into the perceptions of both sides' forces on the ground, and the likely reasons for the presence of close air support on behalf of the US forces. Finally, the article places this single incidence in the big picture, explaining its likely impact on relations between the US and Pakistan, as well as possible implications for the conflict in Afghanistan. SOURCE: STRATFOR

Pakistan, Russia and the Threat to the Afghan War

Wed, 30 Nov 2011 12:19:49 -0800

Days after the Pakistanis closed their borders to the passage of fuel and supplies for the NATO-led war effort in Afghanistan, for very different reasons the Russians threatened to close the alternative Russia-controlled Northern Distribution Network (NDN). The dual threats are significant even if they don’t materialize. If both routes are cut, supplying Western forces operating in Afghanistan becomes impossible. Simply raising the possibility of cutting supply lines forces NATO and the United States to recalculate their position in Afghanistan.

The possibility of insufficient lines of supply puts NATO’s current course in Afghanistan in even more jeopardy. It also could make Western troops more vulnerable by possibly requiring significant alterations to operations in a supply-constrained scenario. While the supply lines in Pakistan most likely will reopen eventually and the NDN likely will remain open, the gap between likely and certain is vast. SOURCE: STRATFOR

Jaish-e-Muhammad’s Charity Wing Revitalizes Banned Group in Pakistan

Tue, 29 Nov 2011 11:30:42 -0800

Often tagged as the second most lethal India-centric terror group based in the Pakistani Punjab, Jaish-e-Muhammad [Army of [the Prophet] Muhammad - JeM] is once again raising its head under the guise of charity in an apparent attempt to revitalize its fledgling stature in the jihadi landscape of South Asia.
JeM has inherited its terror lineage from three jihadi movements: Harkat ul-Jihadi Islami [HuJI], Harkat ul-Mujahideen [HuM] and Harkat ul-Ansar [HuA]. SOURCE: The Jamestown Foundation // Terrorism Monitor

Ten Years of Fragile States: What Have We Learned?

Mon, 28 Nov 2011 12:25:36 -0800

Ten years ago this month, the World Bank established a taskforce to examine how the development community, and the bank in particular, should approach fragile states. This project took on special significance in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks, as Western governments awoke to the threats posed by weak and unstable countries, and expressed a new willingness to engage with them.

Looking back at the taskforce’s report, there is much that remains salient and even prescient. For instance, the report frames the development agenda for fragile states around a narrow prioritization of reforms, starting with security, stability and the rule of law; emphasizes the attainment of feasible, quick wins; and advocates looking beyond government channels for service delivery. Engagement strategies stress the need for sociopolitical analysis and much deeper forms of donor coordination. Many of these same ideas will, ironically, be presented as new innovations at the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Korea later this month. SOURCE: Brookings Institution

Growing Urban Islamist Militancy in Punjab Province Poses New Challenge for Pakistani Authorities

Fri, 25 Nov 2011 14:42:13 -0800

While Pakistan has directed its focus and significant resources to fighting terrorism in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas [FATA] and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa [KPK], the growing activities of banned militant organizations and their influence in Punjab, the country’s most populous province, have been largely ignored. Militants, most trained in Afghanistan and others ex-inmates of Afghan prisons, have recently surfaced in Punjab and become active in Punjabi jihadi groups. SOURCE: The Jamestown Foundation // Terrorism Monitor

Dante in Karachi: Circles of Crime in a Mega City

Tue, 22 Nov 2011 15:13:14 -0800

Karachi’s astonishing violence is generally ascribed to political and ethnic rivalry. While this may be true to an extent, its roots run deep into the incredibly complex structure of this city of 18 million people, where politicians, criminals, terrorists and migrants from nearby warzones compete for power and survival.

This article analyses the political struggle and layers of tension within Karachi which provide context for the ferocious spree of killing in July and August 2011, which left more than 300 people dead, according to conservative estimates. The article explores: the Muttahida Qaumi Movement [MQM], the political party that until recently was in full control of the city; the increasing competition by the Awami National Party [ANP]; and the Pakistani Taliban, formerly blamed by both the MQM and the ANP for killings in Karachi. SOURCE: openDemocracy

The Peace Process and Prospects for Economic Reconstruction in Kashmir

Mon, 21 Nov 2011 16:33:06 -0800

The main argument of this paper is that the ongoing peace process between India and Pakistan provides enough space to carry on development activities in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir [J&K]. It further argues that development activities can continue in a conflict zone, thus letting the conflict situation gradually subside as, among many other factors, poverty and underdevelopment are a cause of violence. Violence has affected the development scenario in the state of J&K, thereby not only discouraging private investment, but also creating obstacles in effective implementation of the developmental policies initiated by public authorities. However, with the ongoing peace process between India and Pakistan and with concomitant initiatives such as opening of the traditional intra-Kashmir routes, the hope for a durable and sustainable development in the state has gained ground, along with a renewed hope for peace. SOURCE: Peace and Conflict Review

The Nature of a Friendship: Making Sense of Sino-Pakistani Relations

Thu, 17 Nov 2011 14:48:20 -0800

The May 2nd 2011 Abbottabad raid that resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden heightened long-standing tensions between America and Pakistan. What little trust still existed between the establishments of the two countries almost completely disappeared. It is in this context that Pakistan made immediately clear that it was not dependent on Washington’s benevolence and that it could turn at any time to its “all-weather friend” China for assistance that is free of criticism. Originating more than 60 years earlier, the Sino-Pakistani relationship until then had gone relatively unnoticed by most observers. After Abbottabad, while American policymakers were busy questioning the reliability of the Pakistani state and suspending some of the huge flows of military aid that had been poured into that country since 2001, Islamabad was swiftly taking countermeasures.

Relations with China were vigorously revamped, with their extensive corollary of official visits, and presented to Pakistan’s (former) ally in the global war on terror as a warning that the American-Pakistani strategic alliance could not be taken for granted. State propaganda about the depth and solidity of the Sino-Pakistani friendship is again in full swing. Generally, Pakistan’s resentment towards America has grown significantly in recent years, especially after the intensification of the drone campaign in mid-2008, and is concomitant with a more pronounced shift towards China as a strategic counterweight.

This policy brief outlines a complex set of interactions between China and Pakistan. Some of them relate to stable factors, such as military cooperation and the rivalry with India, but some involve issues that in the long term could damage the relationship if not properly dealt with, such as Sino-Pakistani economic and counter-terrorism cooperation. SOURCE: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre

The Afghanistan-Pakistan War at the End of 2011: Strategic Failure? Talk Without Hope? Tactical Success? Spend Not Build (And Then Stop Spending)?

Wed, 16 Nov 2011 10:40:31 -0800

The US faces hard decisions in the Afghanistan/Pakistan War that are growing steadily harder as the time before transition runs out, the US faces growing budget pressures, and the situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan becomes more unstable.

The report addresses the grim fact that the US is on the thin edge of strategic failure in two wars: the war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan/Pakistan. Yet failure may never reach the point of outright defeat in either country.

The key question now is whether the US can minimize the scale of its strategic failure. Can the US move from concepts and rhetoric to working with its allies, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to create a credible transition plan that can secure Congressional and popular support and funding? Can they actually implement such a transition plan with the effectiveness that has been lacking in its efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan to date?

Some form of success (or limited failure) may still be possible, but the analysis in this paper warns that nothing the US government has said to date raises a high probability that this will be the case, and that much of the progress it has reported may be misleading.

Also view, a separate annex of detailed charts and maps comparing US, UN and other recent reporting on the war: Afghanistan: Violence, Casualties, and Tactical Progress: 2011 SOURCE: Center for Strategic and International Studies

Declaration of the Istanbul Process on Regional Security and Cooperation for a Secure and Stable Afghanistan

Wed, 09 Nov 2011 16:30:57 -0800

The declaration of the Istanbul Process on Regional Security and Cooperation for a Secure and Stable Afghanistan was adopted on November 2, 2011 at the Istanbul Conference on Afghanistan. The declaration was agreed to by Afghanistan, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and the United Arab Emirates. SOURCE: Council on Foreign Relations

Women, War, and Peace: The Taliban Versus Women in Pakistan

Fri, 04 Nov 2011 14:56:55 -0700

Acclaimed Pakistani filmmaker and journalist Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy (Children of the Taliban) talks with us about the insidious tactics employed by the Taliban against women and children in Pakistan. SOURCE: Public Broadcasting Service

Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Volume 12

Mon, 31 Oct 2011 10:24:19 -0700

Table of Contents

Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood After the Revolution
By Samuel Tadros

The Spring of a New Political Sala?sm?
By Hassan Mneimneh

Islam in the National Story of Pakistan
By Aparna Pande

The Assertion of Barelvi Extremism
By Ismail Khan

The Extremist Reaction to the UK’s Prevent Strategy
By Jack Barclay

Organization vs. Ideology: The Lessons from Southeast Asia
By David Martin Jones and M.L.R. Smith SOURCE: Hudson Institute // Center on Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World

The Assertion of Barelvi Extremism

Tue, 25 Oct 2011 16:21:08 -0700

On January 4, 2011, Salman Taseer, the governor of the Pakistani province of Punjab, was shot to death in the capital city of Islamabad by one of his bodyguards, Malik Mumtaz Qadri. In his confession statement, Qadri said that he committed the cold-blooded murder to avenge the governor's public criticism of Pakistan's blasphemy law. The controversial law provides for punishments, ranging from fines to death sentences, for those found guilty of desecrating religion. Governor Taseer emerged as an outspoken critic of the law through his advocacy of leniency in the case of Aasia Bibi, a poor Christian woman convicted to death on November 11, 2010 for allegedly speaking "ill" against the Prophet Muhammad [a charge that Aasia flatly rejected]. As she waited in prison to be hanged for her offense, Taseer personally visited her and forwarded her clemency appeal to the President of Pakistan. The governor's efforts on Aasia's behalf-and his labeling of the blasphemy law as a "black law"-outraged many in Pakistan. By late November 2010, religious groups around the country were staging mass demonstrations against the government to show support for the law and to condemn Taseer, with some claiming that the governor himself was guilty of apostasy-a crime punishable by death in Islamic law. SOURCE: Hudson Institute // Center on Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World

Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA): Lessons from Pakistan

Thu, 20 Oct 2011 10:12:43 -0700

In the early 1990s, on the basis of prior experiences of International Development Agencies (IDAs) in conflict zones, a need was identified to explore, understand and carefully address impacts of such projects. In response to concerns regarding development and humanitarian interventions in conflict zones, the concept of Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) evolved. PCIA emphasizes that IDAs need to conduct conflict analyses at key points during and before entering into project cycles in conflict or conflict-prone areas, to ensure peace and conflict sensitivity. This paper provides a critical analysis of PCIA as adapted by IDAs in Pakistan. It is shown that an understanding of PCIA is non-existent at the grassroots-level, and that there is a lack of comprehension of such tools at a project-level. The gap between theory and practice is analyzed and several recommendations are offered. SOURCE: Peace and Conflict Review

Governance and Militancy in Pakistan’s Swat Valley

Tue, 18 Oct 2011 11:05:31 -0700

In 2009, the Swat Valley became a focal point of Pakistan’s war against militancy and terrorism. The government signed a peace agreement effectively ceding control of the district to the local Taliban faction, allowing it to enforce its interpretation of Islamic law. By April 2009, Taliban fighters had swept into neighboring Buner district and were portrayed by the international media as being on the verge of a siege of Islamabad. The following month, Pakistan’s military forces launched a campaign to regain control of Swat. The campaign succeeded, but the fighting displaced hundreds of thousands of people from Swat into nearby areas, creating a serious humanitarian crisis in the country’s northwestern region. A little more than a year later, as many of those internally displaced persons were returning to a newly stabilized Swat, the worst flooding in Pakistan’s history created a new crisis that threatened to undo what little progress on reconstruction the military or civilian governments had achieved.

In early 2011, two years into the longest sustained military operation in Pakistan’s history, the army began a phased withdrawal from the surrounding districts of Shangla and Buner. While welcomed news, the details of the plan have not been made public, and the ability of local security forces to maintain order is untested. More importantly, the capacity of local governance officials to lead reconstruction efforts and improve service delivery in justice, education, and health may be constrained by the absence of a cohesive local governance framework. While there have been some significant changes to the laws and institutions that provide justice in Swat, namely the implementation of the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation, the formal judicial system has escaped much needed reform, and there are currently 2,500 alleged terrorist suspects being illegally detained by the military. There has been no talk of community reconciliation and very little in terms of oversight reform. This paper addresses these issues and others related to governance and militancy in the Sway Valley. SOURCE: Center for Strategic and International Studies

Islam in the National Story of Pakistan

Fri, 14 Oct 2011 09:59:09 -0700

Pakistan was not originally imagined as an Islamic State. And yet today, according to a 2009 report by the British Council, more than seventy five percent of Pakistanis consider themselves to be Muslims first and Pakistani nationals second. Moreover, a May 2011 survey by the Gilani Research Foundation, a Pakistan-based polling organization, showed that sixty-seven percent of Pakistanis favored the state-led Islamization of their country. How could this have happened in a country that was founded only a few generations ago by a secular, Westernized elite as the homeland for South Asia’s Muslims?

The political turmoil and growing radicalization of Pakistani society have their roots in an ideologically-driven Islamic Pakistani identity. The Islamist narrative on which the country’s identity and politics are based has been constructed and crafted in such a way that even secularists have inadvertently contributed to both its rise and spread in Pakistan. The roots of this narrative lie in the political beliefs that emerged among wealthy Indian Muslims of British India in the late nineteenth century. SOURCE: Hudson Institute

Pak-Saudi Relations (1999-2011)

Thu, 13 Oct 2011 10:36:51 -0700

Pakistan, ever since its establishment on August 14, 1947, has enjoyed the most cordial relations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Both countries have always been cooperating in political, economic, commercial, security and religious matters. Frequent visits by leaders of the two countries reflect the warmth, trust and depth of their bilateral relations. The people of Pakistan have a special love and respect for the Haramain Sharifain and their Custodian, King Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz. Earlier, in 1974, in a demonstration of brotherly concern for Pakistan, King Faisal Shaheed supported the convening of the 2nd Islamic Summit Conference in Lahore, Pakistan.

Pakistan has always shown solidarity with Saudi Arabia and vice versa. There is complete identity of views on regional and international matters, such as Middle East, Iraq, Afghanistan and the problems faced by the Muslim Ummah as well as in matters relating to the Organization of Islamic Conference.

However, in the wake of 9/11 attacks, Pak-Saudi relations needed increased cooperation in combating terrorists who are the enemies of both Islam and humanity. Both countries are being targeted for playing an active role against terrorism. They condemn all acts of terrorism anywhere in the world in all forms and manifestations.

To fight the menace of terrorism globally, it is essential that all nations of the world build mutual trust and harmony. There should be love, reconciliation and concern for human co-existence among the people of the world irrespective of their religion and nationality. This is the real spirit of Islam and all other religions. In fact, Islam as per al-Qur’an ordains “that if one slew a person unless it be for murder or for spreading mischief in the land, it would be as if he slew the whole people. And if any one saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the whole people.”

The IPRI Factfile contains documents, articles, editorials, and joint statements on Pak-Saudi relations which were published by Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Saudi Embassy or appeared in the media during May 1999 and March 2011. SOURCE: Islamabad Policy Research Institute

Arabs Rise for Change

Thu, 13 Oct 2011 10:27:21 -0700

The 21st century world has become a global village. The people of one country and region are influenced by happenings in other countries and regions. The level of education and political consciousness of the masses is on the increase. Beside textbooks, the students are benefiting immensely from new technologies and the internet. The younger generation is not the same in their outlook as their forefathers. Unlike the old generation, they are not prepared to accept repression and authoritarianism. In addition, there is a dichotomy between the aspirations of the people and the policies of their governments. Thus, the people have risen for change and there have been unprecedented protests against their rulers.

Tunisia’s “Jasmine Revolution” is the Arab world’s popular uprising triggered by the self-immolation of a young Tunisian on December 17, 2010 resulting in President Zaine El Abidine Ben Ali’s fall after 23 years of authoritarian rule. This epoch making event stirred almost the entire Arab world from North Africa to Middle East up to the Persian Gulf in Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, etc. The people have succeeded in Tunisia and Egypt, but, as yet, there is a stalemate elsewhere.

The Arab world is in a state of flux. Mass protests have turned violent in several Arab countries. So far the Western nations have restricted themselves to counseling the Arab rulers where they do not have any major strategic, political or economic interests. But the NATO is involved in air operations against the government forces in Libya, perhaps because, besides humanitarian considerations, there is oil and a sea of fresh water underneath. However, they should be cautious that military action may have its unintended momentum and consequences. Already, Russian Prime Minister Viladimir Putin has observed that the concept of a “just war” may turn into a “crusade”.

The future of the Arab world seems uncertain but change is imminent in the Middle East. All countries in turmoil have not demanded elections but, ultimately, the people’s power shall prevail. Apparently, the solution lies in pressurizing and motivating the contending parties to end violence. The rulers and the ruled should negotiate and resolve their differences peacefully, avoid bloodshed, introduce necessary changes and implement reforms to accommodate people’s demands. It would be better if outside powers do not have a partisan attitude but play a constructive role so that they may facilitate in restoring peace and stability in the region.

As for Pakistan, there does not seem any likelihood of an uprising for change as that is possible through elections. But the Foreign Secretary, Salman Bashir, has stated before the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs that the ongoing unrest in the Arab region might affect Pakistan. He may be right because the Pakistani diaspora is there in most of the Arab countries, providing their services in various capacities, and sending valuable foreign exchange back home. Already Pakistan has been suffering economically, politically, socially and in terms of security for the last three decades due to a spill over effect of turmoil in Afghanistan. Similarly, Pakistan’s economy and security is interlinked with the events in the Middle East. Pakistan should therefore support sincere and sustainable efforts for peace and stability in the region.

The IPRI Factfile contains a collection of selected articles appearing in the media from January 15, 2010 to April 25, 2011 SOURCE: Islamabad Policy Research Institute

Sixty Years of Pak-China Diplomatic Relations

Thu, 13 Oct 2011 10:21:43 -0700

There are no permanent friends and foes in international relations. The only permanent thing is national interest. It is a nation’s self interest which determines its foreign policy. Pakistan’s international relations have also seen ups and downs depending upon the prevailing regional and international situation. For instance, Pakistan’s relations with the US are said to be like a roller coaster, some time going very high and at others very low. But the relations between Pakistan and China have remained constant from the very beginning. The reasons may be many. Both countries are immediate neighbours. There is no conflict between them. Both countries have cooperated with each other diplomatically. Their friendship is based on sovereign equality, brotherhood and mutual cooperation. Although China is a great power, it has shown no hegemonic designs and has never interfered in the internal affairs of Pakistan. Their strategic partnership remains as reliable as ever. They are committed to fight against terrorism, separatism and religious extremism, which is necessary for the stability, peace, progress and prosperity of the region.

China has come to the help of Pakistan whenever it was needed. Apart from several minor projects, the very prominent symbols of friendship in Pakistan are the Karakoram Highway, deep sea Gwadar Port, Chashma Nuclear power plants, Heavy Mechanical Complex at Taxila, subsidized construction of frigates, joint production of JF-17 Thunder aircraft, etc. At present, China is helping Pakistan in the most needed energy sector. The Pakistan-China Joint Economic Working Group is an ideal platform to discuss energy related issues. Mutual trade is increasing slowly but steadily. It was only $ 10 million in 1953. In 2010 it was $ 9 billion and it is expected to increase to $ 15 billion in the coming years.

There have been mutual visits of top leaders, middle level leaders, scholars, businessmen and others. Besides government, people to people contact has increased. The depth of the relationship can be seen by the fact that in the recent past, the President of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari, visited China in July last year, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani, visited China in May 2011. Earlier, in December 2010, HE Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, visited Pakistan. China has an observer status in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation [SAARC] and likewise Pakistan enjoys an observer status at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization [SCO].

Pakistan and China are celebrating 60th anniversary of their bilateral relations. Both countries have declared the year 2011 as the year for celebrating Pakistan-China diplomatic relations. A series of “commemorative activities covering fields like politics, economy, culture, education, sports, etc.” Sixty Years of Pak-China Diplomatic Relations 5 are being organized [details on pages 69-71]. Pakistan has already issued a commemorative coin to celebrate the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries. A group of Pakistani parliamentarians representing multiple political parties led by the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly visited China in July 2011 as part of the celebrations.

The current IPRI Factfile contains the text of Pak-China Border Agreement 1963, selected newspaper editorials, news items and articles on Pak-China relations mostly published during March 2010-July 2011 SOURCE: Islamabad Policy Research Institute

Post-Withdrawal Scenario in Afghanistan

Thu, 13 Oct 2011 10:15:17 -0700

The pull-out plan that President Obama announced in his speech of June 22, 2011 is being seen as faced with a number of challenges, though he claimed that the drawdown was from a “position of strength.” This reference to “strength” itself is being contested since the perception that the insurgency in Afghanistan has been weakened or controlled effectively is not entirely correct. Some recent Taliban incursions into well guarded places and the assassination of key government personalities have shaken this assessment. In fact, the realization in Washington that force alone was insufficient; that a multilateral regional approach was preferable and that the more amenable insurgents should be engaged in negotiations, goes contrary to the said claim of the US President, even though it reveals a healthy shift in policy from the earlier unilateral thinking.

Observers are also pointing to not only the demands of the approaching election year for Mr Obama but the economic constraints being caused by the war that the President himself mentioned in his policy speech as the more tangible reasons for the withdrawal programme.

Though no specific indications have been given as to what happens after the drawdown is complete in 2014, there are all indications America would retain a strong presence in Afghanistan, probably for an indefinite period. If this happens it would be a cause of tension in the region and something that Russia, China and other stake holders will resent. Whether the Afghans would accept it for long is another question. As it is, the relations between President Karzai and the US government are not without wrinkles. Addressing a youth rally recently Karzai accused the US and Allies of using his country for their own purposes. The civilian deaths in NATO and US operations inside Afghanistan are also a constant source of recriminations. Moreover, there is no certainty that the planned expansion of the Afghan forces [to nearly 400,000 by 2014] to take over from the western forces will materialize, as the question of the loyalty of the new recruits has become a serious impediment since instances of Afghan forces’ turning their guns on their own allies have surfaced.

In Pakistan the focus of the debate on the so-called endgame in Afghanistan is on Mr Obama’s insistence that Pakistan “keeps its commitments” and that the US “will continue to press” this country. The severity of tone and accusatory content in subsequent statements of important members of the American government is naturally causing concern. A considerable section of the opinion here favours the view that the shift in vi IPRI Factfile attention to Pakistan and increased pointing of fingers at Islamabad is to find a scapegoat for the failure of the decade-long US-led campaign in Afghanistan which near its denouement is becoming harder to explain.

This issue of the Factfile contains reports and reviews in the media on the US drawdown strategy announced by President Obama and covers both domestic and foreign opinion. SOURCE: Islamabad Policy Research Institute

The Legality of the U.S. Drone War in Pakistan

Wed, 12 Oct 2011 16:18:37 -0700

ISPU Legal Fellow Sikander Shah delves into the current debate surrounding the legality of U.S. drone attacks as self-defense as well as the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Examining the effectiveness of drones, Shah stipulates that consistent use of force actually augments the gravity of the threat of terrorism. Recommendations to stakeholders are also put forth, including ending the United State's use of aggressive military tactics and instead fostering nation-building through political dialogue. SOURCE: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding

Recent Trends in Pak-US Relations

Wed, 12 Oct 2011 16:07:26 -0700

Pakistan has always desired to be on good terms with the US. The father of the nation, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, while welcoming the first Ambassador of the United States of America on February 26, 1948 had described Pakistan and USA as equal partners in defence of democracy. He had said: Though Pakistan is a new State, for well over a century now there have been many connections of trade and commerce between the people of Pakistan and the people of the United States. This relationship was strengthened and made more direct and intimate during two World Wars and more particularly and more recently during the Second World War when our two people stood shoulder to shoulder in defence of democracy. The historic fight for selfgovernment by your people and its achievement by them, the consistent teaching and practice of democracy in your country had for generations acted as a beacon light and had in no small measure served to give inspiration to nations who like us were striving for independence and freedom from the shackles of foreign rule….

Pakistan has been a strategic partner of the US during the Cold War and thereafter in the war against terrorism as a non-NATO ally. Pakistan has suffered more casualties than the combined losses of all countries operating in Afghanistan. The reason is that Afghanistan has the longest border with Pakistan, besides having close ethnic and cultural ties. Apart from the colossal damage the war has caused to the economy, the following is the count of human losses:

Almost 34,000. That’s the number of Pakistanis who have been killed in terrorist attacks between 2003 and 2011. The ISPR offers more numbers; 2,821: the number of Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps personnel killed in the fight against terrorism; 8,765: the number among their ranks wounded.

However, after de-hyphenating Pakistan and India, the US policy has made a strategic shift in favour of India relegating its old and current strategic partner. Therefore, there remains a perception among a large section of people of Pakistan that the US employs double standards and is not treating Pakistan as fairly as could be expected. Keeping in view the historical partnership both countries should desist from confrontational attitudes and cooperate with each other in the defence of democracy and in fighting against terrorism. The IPRI Factfile is a compilation of selected articles, editorials and reports appearing in the media between March 28 and August 18, 2011. SOURCE: Islamabad Policy Research Institute