“Ladies and gentlemen, I just came back from Tehran.  During my stay in Tehran, there was an important development on the structured approach document on which we have been working since January.

“The decision was made by me and Mr. Jalili to reach agreement on the structured approach.  Mr. Jalili elaborated that the existing difference will not be the obstacle for agreement.”

Question: You have reached an agreement?

DG Amano: “The decision was made to conclude and sign the agreement.  There remain some differences, but Mr. Jalili elaborated that the difference will not be the obstacle to reach an agreement.

“Last time I said progress was made.  This time I am saying a decision was made.”

Question: Will it go to the IAEA Board before being implemented?

DG Amano: “At this stage I can say it will be signed quite soon, but I cannot say how soon it will be. In a few days it will be clarified.”

Question: What are the differences that remain?

DG Amano: ”I hope you understand that I cannot share the details. But the document we are discussing is almost a clean text, and Mr Jalili says the difference will not be an obstacle to agreement.” [...]

“The very important thing is that I talked with policy-makers, decision-makers in Iran directly, and we understood each other’s positions better.  And I think that was the reason why we could make this important development.”

Question: Did you discuss access to Parchin?

DG Amano: “I have raised this issue of access to Parchin, and this issue will be addressed as a part of the implementation of the structured approach document.”

IAEA Press Office
[43] 1 2600 21273
press@iaea.org

Herman Nackaerts, Deputy Director General for Safeguards, and Rafael Mariano Grossi, Assistant Director General for Policy, will accompany the Director General.

IAEA Press Office
[43] 1 2600 21273
press@iaea.org

 “During these two days, the Agency and Iran discussed a number of options to take the Agency’s verification process forward in a structured way. The primary focus of our discussions was how to clarify issues related to possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear programme. We had a good exchange of views and we will meet again on Monday.”

The Agency would like to express its condolences to the inspector’s family.

For further information, contact:
IAEA Division of Public Information
[43-1] 2600-21273
press@iaea.org 

Following the 11 March 2011 accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, Japan’s Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) announced the development of a revised safety assessment process for the nation’s nuclear power reactors. At the request of the Government of Japan, the IAEA organized a team of five IAEA and three international nuclear safety experts and visited Japan to review NISA’s approach to the Comprehensive Assessments for the Safety of Existing Power Reactor Facilities and how NISA examines the results submitted by nuclear operators. A Preliminary Summary Report was issued on 31 January.

“The mission report provides additional information regarding the team’s recommendations and overall finding that NISA’s instructions to power plants and its review process for the Comprehensive Safety Assessments are generally consistent with IAEA Safety Standards,” said team leader James Lyons, Director of the IAEA’s Nuclear Installation Safety Division.

National safety assessments and their peer review by the IAEA are a key component of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, which was approved by the Agency’s Member States following last year’s nuclear accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.

The IAEA safety review mission held meetings in Tokyo with officials from NISA, the Japanese Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES), and the Kansai Electric Power Company (KEPCO), and the team visited the Ohi Nuclear Power Station to see an example of how Japan’s Comprehensive Safety Assessment is being implemented by nuclear operators.

In its report delivered today, the team highlighted good practices and also identified improvements that would enhance the overall effectiveness of the Comprehensive Safety Assessment process.

“I hope nuclear regulators around the world use this report as a tool to evaluate their own safety assessment processes,” Lyons said. “We must learn the lessons of the Fukushima Daiichi accident so we can prevent a repeat of those terrible events a year ago.”

For further information, contact:
IAEA Division of Public Information
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press@iaea.org

Speaking ahead of the first anniversary of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident on 11 March, Amano said a culture of constant vigilance and improvement was vital to ensure that the benefits of nuclear power could be harnessed as safely as humanly possible.

“Nuclear safety is stronger than it was a year ago,” he said. “Fukushima Daiichi was a very serious accident, but we know what went wrong and we have a clear course of action to tackle those causes – not only in Japan, but anywhere in the world. 

“Now we have to keep up the momentum. Complacency can kill. 

On 11 March 2011 a huge earthquake and tsunami left more than 20,000 people dead or missing in eastern Japan. Amidst widespread destruction, the tsunami slammed into Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station, disabling cooling systems and leading to fuel meltdowns in three of the six units. 

The accident was a jolt to the nuclear industry, regulators and governments. It was triggered by a massive force of nature, but it was existing weaknesses of design regarding defence against natural hazards, regulatory oversight, accident management and emergency response that allowed it to unfold as it did. For example: 

• The nuclear regulator was not sufficiently independent, allowing weak oversight of the operator, TEPCO, and regulatory requirements fell short of international best practice.
• Not enough attention was paid to guarding against possible extreme events at the Fukushima Daiichi site, leaving critical safety functions such as cooling systems vulnerable to the tsunami.
• Training to respond to serious accidents was inadequate, as were mitigation measures to prevent hydrogen explosions and protect the venting system.
• Accident command lines were unclear and response plans not sufficiently integrated. 

“Human failings such as these are not unique to Japan,” Amano said. “We humans learn from our mistakes. Countries around the world are searching out the weak links in their own systems, and taking action to strengthen them.” 

Earlier assumptions about plant safety in the face of extreme conditions have been scrutinised and revised, and defences are being strengthened. The IAEA Nuclear Safety Action Plan, endorsed unanimously last September by the Agency’s Member States, sets out a blueprint for national and international action in 12 major areas. Among these: 

• The IAEA has developed a new methodology for assessing the safety vulnerabilities of nuclear power plants, which has already been used on an IAEA expert mission to review the approach taken by Japan in its own plant safety assessment.
• The IAEA has sent a number of other expert technical missions to support Japan, and has advised the country as it establishes a new, more independent regulatory system.
• The IAEA’s Safety Standards, which provide the basis for a high level of safety, have been systematically reviewed and proposals have been made to reinforce them, with particular emphasis on a strong regulatory framework and safe siting, design and operation of plants.
• The IAEA has stepped up its peer review services, incorporating lessons of Fukushima to help Member States assess and reinforce nuclear safety, and has taken steps to improve coordination with operators.
• Member States agreed to strengthen and expand the IAEA’s communication role in response to nuclear emergencies, including provision of analysis and possible prognoses.

Resources: 

For more information on the Fukushima accident and follow-up actions, including the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, visit: Focus on Fukushima. 

For broadcast materials, including Fukushima B-roll, please contact Louise Potterton, [43-1] 2600-22446, E-mail: l.j.potterton@iaea.org

For further information, contact:

IAEA Division of Public Information
[43-1] 2600-21273
press@iaea.org

I wanted to inform you very briefly about my remarks in the Board of Governors just now.

I explained to the Board that the Agency has one objective, which is to restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities.

We wish to deal with this issue in a structured manner, based on well-established IAEA verification practice. This means that the Agency should be able to do its verification work unhampered. If too many restrictions are placed on the Agency, we cannot do our job properly.

Before the recent talks in Tehran, I had hoped that Iran had recognised that its old restrictive approach was not the way forward, and that Iran was ready to engage with us to resolve outstanding issues, on the basis of a structured approach and without preconditions.

In fact, the February talks initially took place in a constructive spirit. Differences between Iran and the Agency appeared to have narrowed.

However, on the last day of the February talks, Iran reverted to the old approach and sought to re-impose restrictions on our work. These included obliging the Agency to present a definitive list of questions and denying us the right to revisit issues, or to deal with certain issues in parallel, to name just a few.

This goes to the core of how we conduct our business. Iran’s position made it impossible to reach agreement.

Iran also refused to provide access to the Parchin site during the visits, as repeatedly requested by the Agency.

I informed the Board of Governors that statements made by Iran about the discussions with the Agency contain information which is not factually correct. This is regrettable.

The Agency is ready to continue the dialogue in good faith, respecting normal diplomatic practice. I hope Iran will work with us on a structured approach to remove all concerns and restore confidence, and not go back to the old restrictive approach that seeks to tie our hands. This is in the interests of Iran itself and of all Member States.

It is my sincere hope that we will be able to report real progress to the June Board.

Thank you.

Good afternoon, Ladies and Gentlemen.

I would like to make a few brief comments on three of the issues which I covered in my opening statement to the Board of Governors this morning.

First, the anniversary of the Fukushima Daiichi accident.

As you know, next Sunday, it will be exactly one year since this very serious accident. We have come a long way in that time. Japan has declared that the crippled reactors have reached cold shutdown status. IAEA Member States agreed a Nuclear Safety Action Plan and good progress has been made in implementing it.

The accident was caused by a huge earthquake and tsunami, but there were also human and managerial failings. These are being addressed in Japan, which has reorganised its nuclear regulatory system.

We know what went wrong at Fukushima Daiichi. The right lessons are being learned. Stress tests are being carried out at all of the world’s nuclear plants. Practical steps are being taken to strengthen defences against powerful natural disasters. All aspects of safety are being reviewed.

 Nuclear power is now safer than it was a year ago. But nuclear safety is something that must be worked at every day and we must never become complacent.

The second item I wanted to mention is the application of safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

The Agency has not been able to implement any safeguards measures in North Korea for nearly three years, so our knowledge of the current status of the country’s nuclear programme is limited.

The outcome of talks between the United States and North Korea, announced last week, represents an important step in the right direction. We are seeking further clarification about the result of those talks.

The IAEA’s inspectors have remained in a state of preparedness since being asked to leave North Korea in 2009. We are ready to return to Yongbyon if invited to do so, subject to the approval of the IAEA Board of Governors.

Finally, a few words about Iran.

As I told the Board this morning, the Agency continues to have serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. I spelled out those concerns in some detail in my report to the Board in November and again today.

 In January and February, a senior Agency team held two rounds of talks in Tehran aimed at resolving all outstanding issues. I had hoped to be able to inform this Board that substantive progress was made.

However, despite intensive discussions, there was no agreement on a structured approach to resolving these issues. Iran did not provide access to the Parchin site, as we requested.

Nevertheless, the Agency will continue to address the Iran nuclear issue through dialogue and in a constructive spirit. The basic objective is to restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities. We want to deal with this issue in a structured manner, based on well-established IAEA verification practice.

I will now be happy to take your questions.

IAEA and WANO mark anniversary of Fukushima accident, increase cooperation

Vienna/London, 5 March – Next Sunday, 11 March 2012, marks the first anniversary of the devastating earthquake and tsunami that struck the east coast of Japan. One year on, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) are increasing their mutual cooperation to maximise nuclear safety efforts around the globe.

The two organisations are revising their memorandum of understanding in light of the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident , and will be stepping up their efforts to share expertise and knowledge between operators and governments. There will be greater coordination between WANO peer reviews and IAEA OSART missions, in which international experts assess the safety of individual nuclear power plants, and discussions are under way to examine further areas to improve information sharing. This is in addition to the other work each organisation is doing to reinforce nuclear safety worldwide.

IAEA Director General, Yukiya Amano said:

“The IAEA is delighted to strengthen its coordination and cooperation with WANO. One of the lessons of Fukushima is the need for strong and effective communication between governments, regulators and nuclear operators. The IAEA’s Action Plan on Nuclear Safety underlines the need for all stakeholders to work together to put these lessons into practice as tangibly and swiftly as possible, to deliver concrete results. By working more closely together, we can help to ensure that practical experience is properly shared to reinforce nuclear safety everywhere.”

Laurent Stricker, Chairman of WANO, commented:

“While the terrible events of last year had a major lasting impact on the industry, they have also served as the catalyst for huge change. WANO has shifted from primarily focusing on accident prevention, to an emphasis on both prevention and mitigation, and has redoubled its efforts to promote excellence in nuclear safety in each and every plant across the world. All nuclear plants have carefully analysed their ability to withstand and respond to both design basis and beyond design basis events since Fukushima, and improvements have already been made to severe accident management and emergency preparedness. This work will continue over the coming months and years.”

Amano and Stricker agreed that further lessons would continue to be learned from the Fukushima accident, as they were from earlier accidents such as Chernobyl and Three Mile Island, and that strong cooperation between the IAEA and WANO would be a vital element in this process.

Notes to Editors

For further information, contact:

•             IAEA Division of Public Information

[43-1] 2600-21273

press@iaea.org

•             Claire Newell, WANO Communications Manager

+44 (0) 20 7495 9242 / newell@wanocc.org

•             George Felgate, WANO Managing Director

+44 7796 144 311 / felgate@wanocc.org

About the IAEA:

•             The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) serves as the world’s foremost intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Established as an autonomous organization under the United Nations (UN) in 1957, the IAEA carries out programmes to maximize the useful contribution of nuclear technology to society while verifying its peaceful use.

•             For more information on the IAEA, visit www.iaea.org

About WANO:

•             WANO is a non-profit member association established in 1989 by the world’s nuclear power operators to exchange safety knowledge and operating experience amongst organisations operating commercial nuclear power reactors.

•             WANO members operate some 440 nuclear units in more than 30 countries around the world.

•             WANO works with members in pursuit of its mission: to maximise the safety and reliability of nuclear power plants worldwide by working together to assess, benchmark and improve performance through mutual support, exchange of information and emulation of best practices.

•             WANO was modelled on the American organisation, INPO, which was formed after the Three Mile Island accident. INPO is a member of WANO and beyond that, the organisations work together to share programme resources and learnings.

• For more information on WANO, visit www.wano.info

Mr Chairman,

Next Sunday is the first anniversary of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan. Considerable effort has been made to restore normality at the plant and the Japanese authorities have declared that they have reached cold shut down status. But there is still much to be done in the coming months and years. I will begin today by updating you on developments in the area of nuclear safety, which is the subject of three items on your Agenda.

You have before you my second report on Progress in the Implementation of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. Good progress has been made. At a technical briefing to Member States in January, we outlined the broad range of activities still to be undertaken by the Agency and Member States under the Action Plan. We launched the Nuclear Safety Action Plan Web Platform, which provides up-to-date information on implementation and enables Member States to share safety-related technical information. The new IAEA methodology for assessing the safety vulnerabilities of nuclear power plants was used as the basis for an IAEA international expert mission to Japan in January to review the country’s approach to carrying out so-called stress tests.

We completed a systematic review of the IAEA Safety Standards. A number of areas were identified for strengthening and proposals will be considered by the Safety Standards Committees this month. I look forward to receiving a report from the Commission on Safety Standards later in the year. IAEA peer reviews have been strengthened to incorporate lessons learned to date. Last December, we held discussions at a senior level with the World Association of Nuclear Operators and agreed to improve coordination of our activities. A review of the application of the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) as a communication tool was initiated last month.

An International Experts’ Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety will take place later this month, with around 250 experts expected to attend. The Japanese Government announced that it would hold a Fukushima Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety, co-sponsored by the Agency, in Fukushima Prefecture from 15 to 17 December. 

You also have before you the Nuclear Safety Review 2012, which has been restructured to provide a better overview of the main trends, issues and challenges worldwide in 2011. It incorporates a review of the preliminary lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident in areas such as site safety and design, severe accident management and regulatory effectiveness. I hope you will find the new report interesting and user-friendly.

The third nuclear safety item on your Agenda is entitled Draft Safety Requirements: Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material. In this regard, a meeting will be held next week to consider the outcome of last October’s conference on the safe, secure and sustainable transport of radioactive material. One item on the agenda will be a proposal by the International Civil Aviation Organization for closer inter-agency cooperation in the area of transport. I welcome this proposal, which I believe would help to address problems concerning denial of shipment of medical isotopes which are essential in cancer treatment, and I count on your support.

Mr Chairman,

I am pleased to inform you about the new process which we are introducing for the development and review of the Agency’s Nuclear Security Series publications. 

As announced in my report on Development and Review of the Agency’s Nuclear Security Series Publications, I have established a Nuclear Security Guidance Committee, made up of senior experts in the field and open to all Member States. I hope that the new Committee will lead to more Member States taking part in the development of the Agency’s Nuclear Security Series.

I look forward to participating at the end of this month in the Nuclear Security Summit to be hosted in Seoul by the Republic of Korea.

Nuclear Energy

            Mr Chairman,

The Nuclear Technology Review 2012 contains interesting data on the initial impact of the Fukushima Daiichi accident on the nuclear power sector. It shows that 13 reactors were permanently retired in 2011, 12 of them as a direct result of the accident. There were seven new grid connections – the third straight year of increases. But there were only four construction starts on new reactors (three of which are reported in the NTR; the fourth was reported to us last month).

Nevertheless, the Agency’s updated projections suggest that the drop in construction starts will be temporary. The use of nuclear power will continue to grow in the coming decades. There were 65 reactors under construction at the end of 2011, 44 of them in Asia, which remains the centre of growth.

In 2012, we will strengthen our focus on supporting national infrastructure development in Member States with firm plans to embark on nuclear power. Last November, the Agency completed a sixth Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review (INIR) mission – to Bangladesh. A seventh is planned – to Belarus – in June. In January this year, we conducted the first INIR follow-up mission, to Jordan, and held the sixth annual workshop in Vienna on Managing the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power Plants, which was attended by participants from 43 Member States.

Assurance of Supply

Work is continuing on the establishment of the IAEA LEU Bank. A progress report has been circulated. Last week, the Government of Kazakhstan confirmed the site for the LEU Bank. I look forward to starting negotiations with Kazakhstan on a Host State Agreement, which will be submitted to the Board for approval.

Since the last Board meeting, the Agency has received 10 million euros from the European Union – out of its pledged contribution of 25 million – and 10 million US dollars from Kuwait. I express my thanks to both.

After almost one year, we are now moving from planning and preparation to the project implementation phase. In order to ensure effective coordination among all relevant parts of the Secretariat, my intention is to put the LEU Bank project – the most complex project the Agency has ever undertaken – under the direct supervision of the Director General’s Office for Policy.

A briefing for Member States on the status of this project will be organised when we have more developments to report.

Nuclear Applications

Mr Chairman,

I will now turn to nuclear applications. After focusing on the Agency’s work in cancer control in 2010 and on water in 2011, I plan to pay special attention this year to nuclear applications related to food. I will highlight the Agency’s contribution in food production, food protection and food safety. There are an estimated 925 million malnourished people in the world, 30% of whom live in sub-Saharan Africa. A child dies every six seconds because of undernourishment.

Let me mention a few examples of our work in this area. In food production, the IAEA has helped Bangladesh to alleviate seasonal food shortages by introducing new high-yielding rice varieties, which mature early. In food protection, the Mediterranean fruit fly has officially been declared eradicated from north-western Guatemala, thanks to the IAEA’s sterile insect technique. This has created numerous new jobs and doubled earnings from exports of certain fresh fruit and vegetables. In the area of food safety, food producers in Uruguay can now provide proof that their products do not contain harmful contaminants, thanks to IAEA support to the national veterinary laboratory.

In human health, our efforts to enhance capacity-building in radiation medicine have been furthered by the launch of a mobile learning application that broadens access to the existing IAEA Human Health Campus. This will be of particular benefit to practitioners in developing countries, where mobile phones are more widely available than personal computers.

The IAEA Environment Laboratories in Monaco have launched a new coordinated research project entitled Ocean acidification and the economic impact on fisheries and coastal society. The aim is to help Member States to understand and monitor changes in the ocean and protect both fishing conditions and corals.

The Laboratories are also contributing to the Nuclear Safety Action Plan in a number of ways. These include creating new dedicated reference materials and methods for environmental radioactivity analysis, developing an in-house technical capability to support rapid surveys of environmental contamination and helping Member States to develop underwater radioactivity monitoring techniques.

Nuclear Verification

ECAS Project

Turning now to nuclear verification, the ECAS project – Enhancing Capabilities of the Safeguards Analytical Services – is making good progress. Preparatory work has begun on the new Nuclear Material Laboratory (NML) in Seibersdorf. Construction of the “shell and core” of the building, as well as the mechanical, electrical and plumbing systems, is expected to be completed in 2013, paving the way for a phased transition of activities from the old to the new NML.

I am grateful to those Member States which have already contributed to this extremely important project, and I encourage other Member States that are in a position to do so to contribute to ECAS. 

Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols

You have before you a draft comprehensive safeguards agreement, a small quantities protocol and an additional protocol for Guinea-Bissau. Since my last report to the Board, Andorra and Namibia have brought additional protocols into force. Guinea signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement, a small quantities protocol and an additional protocol. The Republic of Moldova signed an additional protocol. Ghana rescinded its small quantities protocol.

The number of countries with additional protocols in force now stands at 115. I strongly hope that remaining States will conclude additional protocols as soon as possible. I also ask the 14 States parties to the NPT without safeguards agreements in force to bring such agreements into force without delay, and call on States with small quantities protocols that have not yet done so to amend or rescind those protocols.

Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

Concerning the application of safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, last week’s announcement about the outcome of the recent talks between the United States and the DPRK is an important step in the right direction.

As I have said before, the Agency has an essential role to play in verifying the DPRK’s nuclear programme. Pending further clarification and consultation with parties concerned, we stand ready, upon request and with the approval of the Board of Governors, to return to Yongbyon.

As you know, the Agency has not been able to implement any safeguards measures in the DPRK for nearly three years, so our knowledge of the current status of the country’s nuclear programme is limited. I again call upon the DPRK to fully comply with its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions, to come into full compliance with the NPT and to cooperate promptly and fully with the Agency.

Implementation of Safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Mr Chairman,

As my report on Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran makes clear, the Agency continues to have serious concerns regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.

In January and February, a senior Agency team held two rounds of talks in Tehran with Iranian officials aimed at resolving all outstanding issues in connection with Iran’s nuclear programme. Despite intensive discussions, there was no agreement on a structured approach to resolving these issues. Iran did not grant access to the Parchin site during the visits, as requested by the Agency. Iran provided an initial declaration on the issues listed in the Annex to my November 2011 report, although it did not address the Agency’s concerns in a substantive manner. During the visits, the Agency also submitted questions on Parchin and the possible role of a foreign expert.   

Developments since my last report include: the tripling of monthly production of 20% enriched UF6 in Iran as four cascades started operation at Fordow for the first time; the operation of fifteen additional cascades at Natanz; the start of production at Esfahan of fuel plates and a fuel assembly for use in the Tehran Research Reactor; and the start of fabrication of fuel pellets and rods for use in the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor, the IR-40.

The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement. But, as Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation, including by not implementing its Additional Protocol, the Agency is unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.

Regarding future steps, the Agency will continue to address the Iran nuclear issue through dialogue and in a constructive spirit. The basic objective is to resolve all outstanding issues, in particular those related to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme, and restore confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities without further delay. Our whole approach will be focused on achieving that objective. I believe it is essential that our future work should follow a structured approach, based on Agency verification practice. The views of Member States are of vital importance in finding a solution.

I urge Iran, as required in the binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, to take steps towards the full implementation of its Safeguards Agreement and its other obligations.

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic

Concerning the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Board will recall that, in June last year, I reported the Agency’s conclusion that a building destroyed at the Dair Alzour site was very likely to have been a nuclear reactor and should have been declared by Syria.

In response to my letter of November 2011 inviting Syria to address remaining outstanding issues regarding the full implementation of its safeguards agreement, I received a reply from Syria dated 20 February 2012, which asked for understanding of “the difficult circumstances and the delicate situation that Syria is passing through.” The letter pledged that Syria would continue to cooperate with the Agency to resolve outstanding issues.

The Agency continues to seek full access to other locations which the Agency believes are functionally related to the Dair Alzour site. I urge Syria to cooperate fully with the Agency in connection with unresolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site and other locations.

Middle East Forum

            Last November, I hosted an IAEA Forum on Experience of Possible Relevance to the Creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone in the Middle East. I was very encouraged by the positive spirit in which the Forum was conducted. I will submit a report to the Board and the General Conference in September.

One of the key lessons I took away was that it is possible to have a constructive dialogue on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone, despite the complexity of the issue and differences of views among the States concerned. Mistrust between key parties can be overcome in time and replaced by mutual confidence and cooperation. The IAEA will continue to assist, as requested, with the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free-zones, in the Middle East or elsewhere.

Management and Other Issues

Mr Chairman,

Turning briefly to management issues, the Agency’s Draft Budget Update for 2013 was released on 9 February. It proposes zero real growth, as was indicated in the 2012-2013 budget. It also includes a moderate price adjustment of 1.4%, reflecting an increase in professional salaries below that recommended by the International Civil Service Commission. The 2013 Budget Update and the current 2012 budget include basic funding for a possible resumption of Agency activities in the DPRK. Actual financing needs will be reported to the Board for its approval.

By setting clear priorities and encouraging voluntary contributions, we hope to ensure that adequate funding is available in 2013 to support the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety within the current level of the regular budget. The Budget Update also details my proposal to use underspent funds from prior years to address capital needs, mainly by using the Major Capital Investment Fund mechanism approved by Member States in 2009. Overall, I believe this is a fiscally conservative proposal.

Two final points: I wish to inform you that I have established a cross-departmental Risk Management Group which is working to address and mitigate identified risks to the work of the Agency. And, we have begun implementing the Medium Term Strategy 2012-2017, which was taken note of by the Board in December 2010.

Thank you, Mr Chairman.

“The announcement by the United States about its recent talks with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is an important step forward.

“As I have said before, the Agency has an essential role to play in verifying the DPRK’s nuclear programme. Pending further details, we stand ready to return to Yongbyon to undertake monitoring activities upon request and with the agreement of the Agency’s Board of Governors.”

Background

During both the first and second round of discussions, the Agency team requested access to the military site at Parchin. Iran did not grant permission for this visit to take place.

Intensive efforts were made to reach agreement on a document facilitating the clarification of unresolved issues in connection with Iran’s nuclear programme, particularly those relating to possible military dimensions. Unfortunately, agreement was not reached on this document.

“It is disappointing that Iran did not accept our request to visit Parchin during the first or second meetings,” IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano said. “We engaged in a constructive spirit, but no agreement was reached.”

17 February 2012 |Stockholm, Sweden — An international team of senior nuclear safety and radiation protection experts today concluded a 12-day mission to review the regulatory framework for nuclear and radiation safety in Sweden.

The Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission, which was conducted at the request of Sweden, noted good practices in the country’s nuclear regulatory system and also made recommendations and suggestions for the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) and the government. These are aimed at strengthening the effectiveness of the country’s regulatory framework and functions in line with IAEA Safety Standards.

“Throughout the mission, the IRRS team received full cooperation from SSM staff in its review of Sweden’s regulatory, technical and policy issues,” said Georg Schwarz, mission leader and Deputy Director General of the Swiss nuclear regulator (ENSI).

“The staff were open and candid in their discussions and provided the fullest practicable assistance,” he commented. The main observations of the IRRS Review team included the following:

•  SSM operates as an independent regulator in an open and transparent manner with well-organized regulatory processes;

•  SSM is receptive to feedback and strives to maintain a culture of continuous learning; and

•  Following the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, SSM responded promptly to public demand for information and communicated effectively with the national government, the public and other interested parties.

Good practices identified by the IRRS team included, though they are not limited to, the following:

•  The consolidation of the two previous national regulatory authorities into SSM was successful;

•  Overall, SSM’s management system is comprehensive and contributes to staff efficiency and effectiveness;

•  The nuclear power plant refurbishment programme as required by SSM enhanced safety; and

•  Sweden’s regulatory framework for high-level waste disposal is comprehensive and technically sound.

The IRRS Review team identified issues warranting attention or in need of improvement. These include, though they are not limited to, the following:

•  A strategy should be developed to ensure that Sweden’s regulatory framework (legislation, regulations and guides) is consistent with IAEA Safety Standards. At present, regulations and general advice documents do not cover all topics as required;

•  SSM’s internal guidance regarding its regulatory practices should be standardized;

•  SSM should re-evaluate its staffing and competence needs and seek appropriate resources; and

•  The inspection programme in many technical areas needs strengthening.

In a preliminary report, the IAEA has conveyed the team’s main conclusions to SSM. A final report will be submitted to the authority in about three months. SSM has informed the team that it will make the report public. The IAEA encourages nations to invite a follow-up IRRS mission about two years after the mission has been completed.

Background

The IRRS team carried out a review of the full spectrum of Sweden’s nuclear legal and regulatory framework. Special attention was given to the review of the regulatory implications for Sweden of the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident.

The review addressed all facilities and activities regulated by SSM including 10 nuclear power units, a fuel fabrication facility, spent fuel and waste management facilities and users of radioactive sources.

The mission included site visits to facilities to observe inspections and a series of interviews and discussions with SSM staff and other organizations. In addition, the IRRS team observed an emergency exercise which was conducted with representatives from multiple organizations, government and industry.

The mission took place from 6 to 17 February 2012 at the SSM’s headquarters in Stockholm. A press conference was conducted at the end of the mission on 17 February.

The IRRS team consisted of 18 senior regulatory experts from 16 IAEA Member States and 6 IAEA staff members.

Quick facts

Sweden has 10 nuclear power reactors in three nuclear power plants (Forsmark, Oskarshamn and Ringhals), three units in permanent shutdown and a fuel fabrication facility. As of 2010, nuclear contributed 38.13 per cent to the country’s electricity production.

The country has a central interim storage facility for spent nuclear fuel and a centre for waste treatment, storage and material investigation. Sweden has also identified a location (Forsmark) as final repository for radioactive waste.

About IRRS Missions

IRRS missions are designed to strengthen and enhance the effectiveness of the national nuclear regulatory infrastructure of States, while recognizing the ultimate responsibility of each State to ensure safety in this area.

This is done through consideration of both regulatory, technical and policy issues, with comparisons against IAEA safety standards and, where appropriate, good practices elsewhere.

More information about IRRS missions is available on the IAEA Website

Press Enquiries

Media and Outreach Section

Division of Public Information

Tel: [43-1] 2600 21273

press@iaea.org

IAEA Website

An IAEA statement on 1 February 2012 stated that Agency officials would hold a further meeting with Iran in Tehran on 21-22 February. Unfortunately these dates were incorrect; the meetings are in fact scheduled for 20-21 February. The corrected statement follows:

IAEA-Iran Discussions in Tehran, 29-31 January 2012

Vienna, 1 February 2012 – Meetings between the IAEA and Iran were held in Tehran from 29 to 31 January 2012, aimed at resolving all outstanding substantive issues. Another meeting will take place in Tehran from 20 to 21 February 2012.

The IAEA explained its concerns and identified its priorities, which focus on the clarification of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.

The IAEA also discussed with Iran the topics and initial steps to be taken, as well as associated modalities.

“The Agency is committed to intensifying dialogue. It remains essential to make progress on substantive issues,” IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano said.

National safety assessments and their peer review by the IAEA are a key component of the IAEA’s Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, which was approved by the agency’s 152 Member States following last year’s nuclear accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. At the request of the Government of Japan, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) organized a 10-person team to review the Japanese Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency’s (NISA) approach to the Comprehensive Assessments for the Safety of Existing Power Reactor Facilities and how NISA examines the results submitted by nuclear operators.

The IAEA safety review mission consisted of five IAEA and three international nuclear safety experts. To help its review, the team held meetings in Tokyo with officials from NISA, the Japanese Nuclear Energy Safety (JNES) Organization, and the Kansai Electric Power Company (KEPCO), and the team visited the Ohi Nuclear Power Station to see an example of how Japan’s Comprehensive Safety Assessment is being implemented by nuclear operators.

“We concluded that NISA’s instructions to power plants and its review process for the Comprehensive Safety Assessments are generally consistent with IAEA Safety Standards,” said team leader James Lyons, director of the IAEA’s Nuclear Installation Safety Division.

In its preliminary summary report delivered today, the team highlighted a number of good practices and identified some improvements that would enhance the overall effectiveness of the Comprehensive Safety Assessment process.

Good practices identified by the mission team include:

• Based on NISA instructions and commitments of the utilities, emergency safety measures were promptly addressed in Japanese NPPs following the accident on March 11, 2011;
• NISA’s practice of conducting an independent walkdown of emergency measures implemented at nuclear power plants enhances confidence that plants and operators can respond effectively during an emergency; and
• By observing European stress tests, NISA is demonstrating its commitment to improving Japanese nuclear safety by gaining experience from other countries.

 Improvements that would enhance the overall effectiveness of the Comprehensive Safety Assessment process include:

•  Although NISA has demonstrated a notable level of transparency and interested party consultation related to the Comprehensive Safety Assessment and its review process, NISA should conduct additional meetings with interested parties near nuclear facilities that are subject to Comprehensive Safety Assessment;
• NISA should use the experience it gains from the first few reviews to clarify its guidance for how nuclear power plants should conduct their Comprehensive Safety Assessments and for how NISA should review those assessments;
• In the Secondary Assessment, there are areas that NISA could address more thoroughly, such as seismic safety margins and severe accident management; and 
• NISA should ensure that the Secondary Assessments are completed, evaluated and confirmed by regulatory review within an appropriate timeframe;

“We enjoyed excellent cooperation from our Japanese counterparts during this mission,” Lyons said. “I encourage all nations to implement the IAEA Action Plan to improve global nuclear safety.”

Press Contacts
Greg Webb
IAEA Press and Public Information Officer (in Japan through 31 January 2012)
Email:  g.webb@iaea.org

Phone: +43-699-165-22047
Media and Outreach Section
Division of Public Information
Tel: [43-1] 2600 21273
Fax: [43-1] 2600 29610
E-mail: press@iaea.org
Website: www.iaea.org

These reports are based on a misquotation of remarks by the Director General, who at no point stated that the IAEA would open a new office.

 The IAEA is giving careful consideration to a request from Japan to open an office in Fukushima, but nothing has been decided yet. The IAEA will consult as necessary on this matter.

The team of experts will be led by the Deputy Director General for Safeguards, Herman Nackaerts, and will include the Assistant Director General for Policy, Rafael Grossi.

“The Agency team is going to Iran in a constructive spirit, and we trust that Iran will work with us in that same spirit,” IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano said.

Team Members of the IAEA International Complementary Safety Assessment Review Mission (Japan)

23-31 January 2012

Team Leader

James Lyons, IAEA, Director of Nuclear Installation Safety Division

Team Experts

Gary Booth, UK, Office for Nuclear Regulation

Charles Casto, Director of Site Operations – Japan, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Ovidiu Coman, IAEA

David Graves, IAEA

Nesimi Kilic, IAEA

Jozef Misak, Czech Republic, Nuclear Research Institute (Rez)

Javier Yllera, IAEA

At

New Year’s Reception

Vienna

19 January 2012

Dear friends and colleagues,

Thank you for joining me for this New Year reception. Happy New Year to you all!

The nuclear world has undergone some dramatic changes since my last New Year reception in 2011. The Fukushima Daiichi accident in March had a significant impact on the Agency’s work and we will be dealing with its consequences for years to come.

I believe that, overall, the Agency responded well to this unprecedented crisis. I am proud of our dedicated staff. In addition to the immediate support which we provided to Japan, I convened a Ministerial Conference on nuclear safety in June. This resulted, several months later, in agreement by Member States on a comprehensive Nuclear Safety Action Plan.

The Secretariat is working energetically on implementation of the Action Plan, as are many Member States. I will report to you on progress in the course of this year.

The Agency intends to play its part in restoring confidence in the safety of nuclear power by helping to ensure that nuclear safety is more robust after Fukushima than before.  

The Fukushima Daiichi accident significantly altered the outlook for nuclear power. Global use of nuclear power will continue to grow in the coming decades, but at a slower rate than we had previously projected. Assistance to newcomers, especially those which are most advanced on the road to having operational reactors, will remain a high-priority issue.

Helping to make nuclear power available to all countries which wish to add it to their energy mix, so they can use it safely, efficiently and profitably, is an important part of the Agency’s mandate.

Work will continue on establishing the IAEA LEU bank.

Nuclear security remains a high priority issue for the Agency. The Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul in March will provide a good opportunity for heads of state to discuss this issue.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

When I took office two years ago, I pledged my unwavering commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and stressed that all safeguards agreements and other relevant obligations must be implemented in full. I continue to pursue this goal vigorously. I am pleased with the steady rise in the number of additional protocols in force in the past two years and I hope this positive trend will continue. I also hope that the few remaining countries without comprehensive safeguards agreements in force will rectify this situation soon.

My key priority in 2012 will be to try to make progress towards restoring international confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. This is the most important of the major safeguards issues on our agenda. A senior team from the Agency, led by Deputy Director General for Safeguards Herman Nackaerts, will visit Iran towards the end of this month. I am fully committed to working constructively with Iran and I trust that Iran will approach our forthcoming discussions in an equally constructive spirit.

I will continue to engage with Syria and follow up on its pledge to cooperate with the Agency on safeguards implementation issues. I also hope that political developments will make it possible for the Agency to resume its verification activities in the DPRK. Our safeguards team is ready to go back into action in the DPRK at short notice.

Last year, after more than a decade of efforts, we held a Forum on the possible introduction of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, which proved to be more constructive than many had expected. I hope that progress will be made in this area in the coming years. The Agency is ready to play its part.

Last year, we also significantly strengthened the Agency’s safeguards analytical abilities with the opening – on schedule and within budget – of the new Clean Laboratory Extension. I trust that funding for the new Nuclear Material Laboratory will be forthcoming so that tangible progress can be made on this vital project this year.

Strengthening our technical cooperation programme has been a high priority for me since I took up office and will remain so in the coming years. Coordination between our TC Department and Nuclear Applications Department has improved, to the great benefit of Member States.

Our focus on cancer in 2010, and on water last year, proved effective in strengthening our work in the nuclear applications area. I plan to pay special attention this year to nuclear techniques related to food, which will be the focus of the Scientific Forum in September.

My experiences during my travels of just how much the Agency’s assistance matters to the thousands of people who benefit from our food, water or health projects have left a lasting impression on me. Making the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology available to developing countries will remain high on the Agency’s agenda.   

Ladies and Gentlemen,

When I took office two years ago, I stressed the need for efficient and effective management and optimum use of the resources which you have made available to the Agency.  It is now clear that we need to be prepared for a long period of economic constraint in Member States. We must demonstrate continuously that we really are prioritising effectively and working with maximum efficiency.

Nevertheless, demands for the Agency’s services in all areas continue to increase. I count on you to ensure that we have the resources we need to do the job you expect of us. I pledge, in turn, to use the resources which you provide efficiently and effectively and to the maximum benefit of Member States.

Last year, we successfully launched the first phase of AIPS, which will, in time, greatly improve transparency and accountability. We also began the introduction of IPSAS accounting standards. Roll-out of both projects will continue this year.

I would like to introduce to you our new Deputy Director General for management, Janice Dunn Lee. With her arrival, we now have a completely new team of DDsG.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

At the start of my term of office, I summarized my key objective as implementing the “Atoms for Peace” goals of our founding fathers in a 21^st century context. In my view, the Agency is first and foremost a technical organization, although its activities have political implications. I will continue to work in the coming years, under the guidance of the Board of Governors, on implementing the agenda which I outlined to you two years ago.  

We can all take legitimate pride in our collective achievements in recent years. But the Agency continues to face many challenges and we must produce tangible deliverables. I have every confidence that, together, we will meet those challenges.

I thank you again for your guidance and support. I wish you every success in the coming year and I look forward to working with you all to help make the world safer, more secure and more prosperous.

Thank you.