INI Recent Publications

Dhruva Jaishankar | Digital India vs Net Neutrality

Dhruva Jaishankar — Wed, 30 Sep 2015 13:34:00 +0000

The following article appeared in The Indian Express on September 30, 2015. The full text is below.

Today, when you start up your computer or iPhone and open a web browser such as Chrome or Safari, you can access over 100 million domain names with a few clicks. Your data costs do not change depending on whether you go to Rediff or Flipkart, or whether you download an app to order pizza or post on Twitter or watch a YouTube video. Your data provider — be it Airtel or Reliance or BSNL — does not discriminate between different kinds of content, only how much data you use. This is the benefit of a neutral net, a system that has worked to the advantage of both internet users (who have enjoyed greater choice of content) and numerous start-ups (which have enjoyed unparalleled market access).

But a shift is underway. When Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited California to drum up support for his Digital India initiative, he effectively endorsed Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg’s vision of expanded access to a pared down internet. Expanded access is, after all, one of the three pillars of Digital India (the other two being e-governance and electronics manufacturing). Why not shift costs to content providers (such as babajobs.com), who enter into exclusive contracts with data providers (such as Reliance), all enabled by Facebook’s Free Basics app? Such an arrangement could expand internet use rapidly in a country where some 80 per cent of the population does not have access, benefiting crores of people. It would also, naturally, benefit Facebook.

Advocates of net neutrality — a vocal minority linked to NGOs and internet start-ups — are unhappy with such an arrangement, which they feel will disadvantage consumers by limiting choice. It could also discriminate against smaller content providers struggling to compete with established internet companies. Net neutrality advocates have argued that there are other ways to expand access and lower costs, such as subsidising data plans or through advertising.

But this line of argument, too, has its critics. Some believe implicitly that net neutrality is an elitist concern, echoing Zuckerberg’s view that “It’s not an equal internet if the majority of people can’t participate.” Others contend that net neutrality requires unnecessary government intervention, a forcible levelling of the playing field. Why should the government prevent Facebook, Reliance and certain websites from entering into exclusive arrangements, particularly if it helps to expand access and deflect costs from consumers? The arguments against net neutrality, rather bizarrely, offer one area in which populists and free-market enthusiasts might find common cause.

Both sides of this debate bring certain compelling arguments to the table. In the United States, the government eventually came out decisively in favour of net neutrality. This made sense in an economy where the vast majority can afford access to the internet, and where monopolistic data providers were effectively price gouging. Consumer choice advocates and Silicon Valley entrepreneurs were overwhelmingly pleased.

India’s circumstances are, however, radically different. Broadband infrastructure is weak. Spectrum is expensive. Power is still in short supply. Digital access is now linked to the basics: Subsidies and rations, identification, financial inclusion and political participation. Expanding access today is therefore a top priority, which is why most of the big announcements during Modi’s visit to Silicon Valley were in this domain — not just Facebook, but also public commitments made by Microsoft and Google to connect villages and railway stations.

The prime minister has made it clear that access is his top priority, but net neutrality advocates need not completely despair. The relentless drive to expand digital access in India may be necessary in the short term, but may make less sense once the Indian internet market becomes more saturated. That is another way of saying that the access vs neutrality dilemma could resolve itself organically. As incomes rise, consumers may gradually opt for data plans that give them greater access, foregoing more restrictive but free data services. Facebook’s Free Basics would, in that event, simply be a stepping stone that contributes in time to its own irrelevance.

Dhruva Jaishankar | An App Won’t Solve India’s Bloated Bureaucracy Problem

Dhruva Jaishankar — Sat, 26 Sep 2015 12:04:00 +0000

The following article appeared on Foreign Policy on September 26, 2015. An excerpt is below and the full text can be accessed here.

Technology offers considerable hope in overcoming many of India’s challenges, given the rapid rate of change. At about 19 percent, India has one of the lowest Internet penetration rates among major economies. That said, some 30 million users, or roughly 2.5 percent of India’s population, are coming online annually, and that figure is set to accelerate. Facebook wants to tap into that market, in part with its Free Basics app, which allows users access to pared-down Internet services at no cost. But for India’s poor, the difficulties in getting online — including language barriers, illiteracy, and poor infrastructure — are more complicated than just affording the price of a phone or computer.

The implications of expanded Internet access for media dissemination, education, and entertainment are self-evident. It’s not just about enabling Indians to watch more cat videos. Digital access is critical to integrating India’s citizens — particularly the poor — into the economy. For example, efforts underway toward financial inclusion, biometric identification, and digital access have the potential to overhaul India’s massive and wasteful subsidy regime. Better identification, more bank accounts, and expanded online access can cut out middlemen and corruption and can ensure that the poor receive what they are owed by the state. There has been significant progress: So far, some 900 million people, or roughly 72 percent of India’s 1.25 billion people, have signed up for a national biometric identification scheme begun under Modi’s predecessor, Manmohan Singh. And Jan-Dhan Yojana, Modi’s signature effort to enable access to banking, credit lines, and insurance, has resulted in the creation of more than 180 million bank accounts (though critics have noted that many are left unused). While basic mobile services are widespread and cheap in India, enabling access to cost-effective broadband will be necessary to tap the full potential of these efforts. [Read the full article.]

Dhruva Jaishankar | US Academics Worried About Modi Visit Need To Do Their Homework

Dhruva Jaishankar — Wed, 02 Sep 2015 12:01:00 +0000

The following article appeared in The Huffington Post India on September 2, 2015. An excerpt is below, and the full text can be accessed here.

The tragedy is that many of the letters' authors are in positions to play much more constructive roles in advancing educational objectives, information dissemination and open debate in India. Their views should not be dismissed simply because they are professors in the social sciences or the humanities. Indeed, questions of history, law, ethics, sociology and political theory are more relevant than ever to the formulation of sound digital policies. The academic community should be providing the Indian government more advice, not less. But if only the statement's signatories had opted for less posturing and better-informed and more constructive criticism, they may have advanced their objectives of promoting academic and online freedoms without resorting to petty, personal and puerile attacks. [Full text.]

Dhruva Jaishankar | Book Review: India's Rise as an Asian Power

Dhruva Jaishankar — Tue, 01 Sep 2015 11:57:00 +0000

My review of India's Rise as an Asian Power appeared in Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 37, No. 2 (2015). An excerpt is below, and the full text can be accessed here.

The underlying presumption of many critiques of contemporary India is that Indian policymakers are somehow unaware of the challenges facing their own country. But India’s leaders, whether politicians, bureaucrats or public intellectuals, are more aware than most that India is, in Gordon’s words, “a vast polity with enormous problems to overcome” (pp. 168–69). Gordon’s study presents a useful, and perhaps necessary, reality check to those willing to overlook or wish away many of India’s complications and contradictions. Yet it may have been a more useful exercise for him to have focused on the underlying structural causes of policy inertia and poor implementation, many of which — as Modi is ﬁnding out — may indeed prove difﬁcult for India’s leadership to overcome. [Full text.]

Dhruva Jaishankar | Missed Connections

Dhruva Jaishankar — Wed, 01 Jul 2015 09:44:00 +0000

The following article originally appeared on the website of the Berlin Policy Journal on July 1, 2015. An excerpt is below, and the full text can be accessed here.

Narendra Modi’s tenure as India’s prime minister has been marked by incredibly active diplomatic efforts. In his first twelve months in office he visited 18 countries – including the United States, China, Brazil, Japan, and Australia – and hosted the presidents of the United States, China, and Russia.

But amid this flurry of foreign policy activity, Brussels was conspicuous in its absence. On Modi’s first trip to Europe this April, he visited Berlin and Hanover, Paris and Toulouse – indications of where India’s strategic and commercial priorities lie in Europe. Although the prospect of a one-day stopover in Brussels was floated, it did not come to pass. Three years have now elapsed since the European Union and India – the world’s two largest democratic polities – held a summit meeting.

The reasons for the latest missed connection vary depending on whom one asks. [Read more.]

Dhruva Jaishankar | Grexit and the Melian Dialogue

Dhruva Jaishankar — Tue, 16 Jun 2015 09:14:00 +0000

The following article originally appeared in E!Sharp on June 1, 2015. An excerpt is below and the full text can be accessed here.

The Melian Dialogue – the dramatization of a meeting between delegates from the city-state Athens and the island of Melos in 415 BCE – is one of the most famous passages of Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War. It has long been a favourite of students of politics and rhetoric and, more recently, of game theorists. Greece’s finance minister, the economist Yanis Varoufakis, is well-versed in the text, and even offered his own translation in a 1997 game theoretical discussion. It is all the more reason that the Melian Dialogue – with its ruminations on power, morality, and rational choice – should be required reading for European policymakers seeking a resolution to the Greek debt crisis, particularly given the failure of the recent round of dialogue between Greece and its creditors. Below is an abridged version, liberally updated for contemporary relevance:

The Greeks, who were increasingly friendly with Russia, would not submit to Brussels like the other Europeans, and had assumed an attitude of open hostility. Upon receiving the Europeans, led by three known as the Troika, the Greek representatives said: ‘These talks, in and of themselves, are unobjectionable. But your calls for austerity and structural reforms are too far advanced, as if you have already made up your minds. All we can reasonably expect from this negotiation is conflict or servitude.’

‘There is certainly no need to repeat how we got into this mess, nor harp upon your past follies,’ replied the Europeans. ‘But let us focus on what is now feasible. You know as well as we do that right and wrong are only in question between equals in power. The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.’ [Read more]

Dhruva Jaishankar | Myanmar Is Pivoting Away from China

Dhruva Jaishankar — Mon, 15 Jun 2015 09:01:00 +0000

The following article originally appeared in Foreign Policy on June 15, 2015. An excerpt is below and the full text can be accessed here.

Beijing’s effort at currying favour with Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD is borne partly of desperation, and indicates how swiftly Beijing’s stock in Myanmar is falling. China was Myanmar’s main backer and largest investor during its years of international seclusion, supporting strategic infrastructure projects such as oil and gas pipelines, ports, and dams. Between 1988 and 2013, China accounted for a whopping 42 percent of the $33.67 billion in foreign investment that flowed into Myanmar. But the nature of these projects — including concerns about forcibly-relocated populations, land confiscation, environmental hazards, and the inflow of cheap goods and labor — made China unpopular with the Burmese public (the extent of such sentiments is impossible to determine, in the absence of reliable public-opinion surveys.)

Myanmar’s military was even more reliant on China: Almost 60 percent of the country’s arms imports during that same period came from the Middle Kingdom. And until recently, the military remained favorably disposed to their northern neighbor. Yet Beijing appears to have ruined the one good relationship it had going in the country. The suspension of the Chinese-backed Myitsone dam on the Irrawaddy River in 2011 — a project initially agreed between Myanmar’s military junta and the state-owned China Power Investment Corp. in 2005 — hurt ties. But it was the killing of five Chinese citizens by Myanmar’s air force in March, while conducting raids on rebels along the border, and China’s response, that has significantly widened the rift with the military. Although Naypyidaw offered a grovelling apology, Beijing’s provocative decision to stage live-fire military exercises along the border in early June further tarnished relations with its one real constituency in Myanmar. [Read more.]

Dhruva Jaishankar | Modi's Transatlantic Agenda

Dhruva Jaishankar — Thu, 16 Apr 2015 10:44:00 +0000

The following article was published as a Transatlantic Take by the German Marshall Fund on April 16, 2015.

Diplomatically speaking, it has been a busy first year in power for India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi. In addition to hosting the leaders of the United States, China, and Russia, he has embarked upon state visits to India’s major democratic partners — including Japan, the United States, and Australia — and attended multilateral summits in Brazil, Nepal, Australia, and Myanmar.

Over the past week, Modi undertook an unconventional transatlantic tour to France, Germany, and Canada. This constituted his first visit to Europe as prime minister and a common theme was implicit in that all three countries are G7 members, and as such, advanced, industrialized democracies. While Modi has received some criticism at home for his foreign trips, the flurry of diplomatic activity in his first year as prime minister indicates his clear desire to position India as an active international actor. Modi’s multifaceted agenda on his latest set of visits also conformed to what is now a familiar pattern of international engagement. Broadly speaking, his transatlantic tour over the past week served five important purposes.

The first was to seek investment and technological partnerships with the goal of rapidly developing India’s economy. This objective is at the centerpiece of Modi’s domestic agenda and political platform. While poverty levels in India have fallen dramatically since the early 1990s, the country is still home to the largest number of the world’s poor. The opportunity for growth is now immense given India’s political stability, market size, and low wages.

As advanced economies, France, Germany, and Canada are well-placed to be partners in India’s development. For this reason, Modi met privately with French business leaders in infrastructure and defense technology in Paris as well as investors in Toronto. He visited the Airbus facility in Toulouse and the Siemens vocational training center in Berlin. Modi’s participation in the Hannover Messe, the world’s largest industrial fair, also highlights India’s privileged role this year as a partner country. The prime minister used this opportunity to advertise business opportunities in India, which is proving a rare bright spot in a slowing global economy.

The second objective, closely tied to the first, involves outreach to the Indian diaspora, whose investments have helped drive the Indian growth story. Diaspora outreach is particularly relevant for Canada, which is home to over 1.2 million people of Indian origin. In France, Modi’s engagement with the local Indian community was broadcast to French territories, many of which have sizeable ethnic Indian populations.

Third, there is naturally a political and diplomatic dimension, which involves increasing the face-time and improving personal relations with other world leaders. Modi took a boat tour on the Seine with French President François Hollande and had lunch and dinner with Chancellor Angela Merkel in Germany. He has also long enjoyed a strong rapport with his Canadian counterpart, Stephen Harper, who was among the first world leaders to call Modi following his election victory last year. Additionally, in an implicit acknowledgement of India’s appreciation for democratic traditions, Modi opted to meet privately with leaders from his host countries’ second-largest political parties, including former French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Sigmar Gabriel, leader of Germany’s Social Democrats.

The fourth dimension, and the one that has grabbed headlines, involved strategic relations. France, in particular, has historically been a close partner of India in terms of defense, space, and nuclear technologies. The announcement that India would buy 36 Dassault Rafale combat aircraft, with the option of buying more, was especially significant, and the deal promises to keep that platform’s production line running.

Finally, there were aspects to Modi’s visits that were of considerable symbolic significance. In France, Modi visited a memorial at Neuve-Chappelle honoring the Indian soldiers who perished during World War I. Although little-remembered in either Europe or India today, over 60,000 Indians died fighting in Europe, with some units suffering casualty rates of over 100 percent as replacements were decimated. In Hannover, Modi unveiled a public statue of an Indian icon, Mahatma Gandhi. And in Toronto, Modi paid his respects at a memorial for the 1985 bombing of an Indian airliner that was en route from Canada to India. The attack, in which 329 people were killed, was the worst terrorist attack in aviation history until 9/11. Modi’s visit to the Toronto memorial underscored the common threat posed by terrorism to India and the West.

In the age of jet-setting diplomacy, there are diminishing marginal returns to official visits by heads of government. However, the rich agenda on offer during Modi’s tour to Europe and North America offers one example of purposeful messaging and specific deliverables. Modi’s economic agenda was, as usual, at the forefront. But, equally, the political aspects related to India’s common values with the transatlantic community should not be overlooked.

Dhruva Jaishankar | The Dying Art of the Visa: A Personal History

Dhruva Jaishankar — Sun, 12 Apr 2015 11:51:00 +0000

The following article was originally published by the Huffington Post (India) on April 12, 2015. An excerpt is included below, and the full text can be accessed here.

Poor Phileas Fogg. In his fictitious journey around the world in eighty days, Jules Verne's globetrotting hero may have saved a woman from ritual immolation, been mistaken for an arch-criminal and survived an attack by Sioux warriors. But he also had to undergo the bothersome, mundane exercise of attaining a visa, whether upon arrival in Suez or in San Francisco.

It's an experience seasoned international travellers know all too well. Our wanderlust compels us to spend many wasteful hours at embassies and consulates, filling out mind-numbingly bureaucratic forms (sometimes in triplicate) and shelling out hundreds of dollars on visa applications.

But all that is fast changing. More countries are beginning to issue visas electronically or upon arrival, while others are doing away with short-term visas completely in order to encourage tourism and business travel.

Today, anyone lucky enough to be in possession of a valid American passport can take a holiday or business trip to Peru or Poland, Malawi or Mongolia at a moment's notice. The same holds true for travel to some 156 other countries. Many citizens of Europe are even better off. Finns, Swedes and Brits are able to travel on a whim to 173 countries and territories. Even some of us less fortunate have it easier than ever. As an Indian passport holder, I can now visit about 45 countries without a prior visa, and in some other cases can have visas issued electronically.

The slow death of the visa is naturally for the best in our ever globalising world. But one minor casualty is that the visa -- as a physical object -- has become something of a dying art. Visas were traditionally meant to serve several purposes. They had to easily communicate necessary information to authorities, such as validity and the terms of stay. They were often designed to prevent easy forgery. And they were occasionally used to convey aspects of a country's national character through visual symbolism and imagery. For all these reasons, the visa, in its brief heyday, was (like the modern airline baggage tag) a little-appreciated masterpiece of modern design.

Over the past 25 years, the visa's form and function has evolved, along with technological advances. Security holograms, watermarks and other such breakthroughs made visas -- like banknotes -- less susceptible to forgery. Bleeding ink, security fibres and raised printing were often added, serving both security and design functions. And various digital technologies, from machine-readable text to digital photography allowed for easier data access and identification by airline and immigration officials. A glance through visas in my old passports -- I found six going back to 1988 -- revealed some fascinating technological, political and artistic trends from the past quarter century. [Read more]

Dhruva Jaishankar | Beijing Unravelling

Dhruva Jaishankar — Tue, 17 Mar 2015 21:48:00 +0000

The following article originally appeared in the Indian Express on March 18, 2015. An excerpt is included below and the full article can be accessed here.

The future of single-party rule in China ought to be of major concern to India. China is among India’s largest trade partners and the two countries collaborate closely on various multilateral issues. At the very least, China’s political fortunes will have implications for the global economy, with which India’s future is closely intertwined. China alone was responsible for a third of global growth last year and remains an important driver of international commerce and finance.

At the same time, the border dispute remains a serious test of bilateral relations between China and India. The relationship between the CCP and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) means that there could be uncertain, and potentially severe, security implications for India should the CCP disintegrate or lose its hold on power. Whatever India’s concerns may be regarding China’s rise today, the sudden termination of Communist China would present New Delhi with an economic and strategic crisis of the first order.

Indeed, the most satisfactory outcome for all involved may be a soft landing, one by which the party gradually liberalises, democratises, and becomes more accountable and transparent. The probability of this is low, at present. Vested interests in China are resistant to such change and Xi is moving the country in a very different direction, socially and politically — although not necessarily economically. But it is in India’s interests to assess and anticipate the likelihood of various possibilities, and do anything in its power to realise an optimal outcome.

Dhruva Jaishankar | Internet Freedom 2.1

Dhruva Jaishankar — Fri, 27 Feb 2015 18:15:00 +0000

The following report was published by the German Marshall Fund on March 2, 2015. The Executive Summary is copied below, and the full report can be downloaded here.

The Internet has become closely associated with freedom of expression and the global economy. Today, it plays a direct or indirect role in almost every aspect of life. Yet many fear the Internet as we have come to know it is at risk, with restrictions forcing fragmentation along political, corporate, or cultural lines. Despite growing concerns about the future of the Internet, discussion surrounding online freedom remains largely mired in a handful of issues: the necessity and appropriateness of government surveillance in the United States, digital privacy in Europe, and censorship in authoritarian states such as China. However, between them, the United States, Europe, and China account for less than half of the world’s Internet users. For much of the rest of the world, any discussion of Internet freedom falls at the complex intersection of political and social liberties, nation-building, security threats, economic development, and resource constraints.

Asia’s biggest developing democracies — India, Indonesia, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Thailand — account for one-quarter of the world’s people, but only about one-tenth of the global online population. The policy decisions these states make going forward will be of considerable importance for the future of the Internet and offer some useful lessons about the limitations and vulnerabilities of the global Internet freedom agenda as it is currently being pursued by the United States and Europe.

Six broad conclusions or principles can be drawn from a survey of these countries’ experiences.

1.The online world is an outgrowth of the offline world, rather than a distinct phenomenon. Internet policy cannot be considered in a vacuum, or divorced from other relevant aspects of public policy, such as security, economic policy, or governance.

2. Laws, norms, and cultural attitudes related to Internet use vary widely, even among democracies. A one-size-fits-all approach to Internet freedom will not work and may even prove counterproductive.

3.Online freedoms and greater security are not inherently at odds with one another in open societies. Discourse that presents a false choice between security and freedom is harmful for both, as well as for state legitimacy and economic growth.

4.While much discussion of Internet freedom frames the issue as a conflict between governments, corporations, and civil society, each sector is divided on the merits of unfettered Internet freedom.

5.Current legislation pertaining to the Internet in many democratic countries is deeply flawed, even in the context of their own constitutional rights pertaining to freedom of expression. By and large, Internet-related legislation is vague, making implementation arbitrary, and undermining public trust in state institutions.

6. Users are often not adequately informed of the privileges and restrictions associated with Internet use in their native countries. Policies and initiatives designed to advance Internet freedom globally — whether by Western governments, Internet companies, international NGOs, or local Internet activists — have not necessarily been developed with these constraints in mind.

The Internet freedom agenda consequently suffers from a lack of capabilities, skepticism about intentions, misplaced objectives, a dependence on unreliable technological solutions, and charges of double-standards. Governments and Internet activists in Asia’s large democracies can take a few important steps to address some of these shortcomings. First, they can better integrate issues related to Internet freedom with other aspects of policy discourse, including security, intelligence, trade, economics, healthcare, immigration, and the environment. Secondly, they can overcome the apparent trade-off between freedom and security by strengthening the rule of law: empowering independent regulators to oversee government programs and ensuring avenues for recourse to justice for those accused of online infractions. These steps can help improve security while protecting individual rights and privacy. Finally, they can introduce Internet awareness as an element in school curricula, in a manner similar to drug, sex, health, and civic education, along with other measures to better inform the public about the privileges and restrictions of Internet use.

Meanwhile, U.S. and European governments, institutions, and NGOs would be better off adopting a more modest and less eye-catching approach to Internet freedom. If the first step of Internet freedom was recognizing the challenge, and Internet Freedom 2.0 involved putting ideas into practice, what may now be required is a patch to fix glitches in current policy: Internet Freedom 2.1. In addition to assisting developing democracies in their efforts, U.S. and European governments, institutions, and NGOs could help educate legislators, jurists, and journalists from around the world on comparative Internet laws and practices. They could also help “de-Americanize” Internet discourse by highlighting case studies of successful Internet businesses from around the world. And lastly, they could support better research on the relationships between online communications, political and social freedom, and economic development.

Dhruva Jaishankar | The Specter of Japan-Like Stagnation

Dhruva Jaishankar — Thu, 19 Feb 2015 00:02:00 +0000

The following article was originally published by U.S. News & World Report on February 19, 2015. An excerpt is below, and the full article can be accessed here.

The economist Simon Kuznets used to tell his students that there were four types of countries: developed countries, undeveloped countries, Argentina and Japan. His aphorism pithily captured Japan as the positive outlier, the non-Western country that industrialized in one generation in the 19th century, and rebounded even more quickly after the devastation of World War II. By the 1980s, Japan was a global economic powerhouse, giving us Sony, Toyota and Nintendo, pioneering the bullet train and buying up American real estate. Business leaders the world over scrambled to learn the secrets behind the country’s success.

But Japan has since lost its luster. Today it may be the first major economy feeling the full effects of post-industrialization. It has experienced two decades of little or no real economic growth. With a median age of 45, its shrinking working-age population struggles to support a growing number of elderly. Low-cost imports and robotics have slashed the demand for wage labor. And Japan now suffers from a discernible lack of economic dynamism as a homogenous society with a rigid work culture that continues to be hostile to immigration. Ironically, the very characteristics that once made Japan so successful are now among its biggest liabilities.

Japan’s example serves as a cautionary tale for other industrialized societies, and Europe in particular.

Dhruva Jaishankar | Anti-Americanism is Dead

Dhruva Jaishankar — Tue, 27 Jan 2015 08:12:00 +0000

The following article originally appeared in The Indian Express on January 27, 2015.

In the two days since US President Barack Obama has arrived in India, we have witnessed a multitude of memorable photo opportunities: Obama and Prime Minister Narendra Modi hugging, them having tea at Hyderabad House, and Obama’s appearance at the Republic Day parade. But what is this visit all about? What is it meant to achieve? There are three ways of evaluating Obama’s second — and most likely final — visit to India as president.

The most obvious is through a purely symbolic lens: the significance of having a US president as chief guest at India’s Republic Day. This alone ensures that it is no ordinary visit but an implicit acknowledgement and celebration by the US of India’s constitutional democracy, its diversity and role as a responsible military power. Additionally, between his two visits, Obama will have spent almost a week of his eight-year presidency in India, a not-insignificant amount of time, given his priorities at home and abroad with respect to West Asia, Afghanistan/ Pakistan, Russia and China.

Obama was also greeted warmly in the Indian capital this week, at a time when US relations with several other major countries — Russia and China, and even allies such as Germany, Japan, Turkey and Israel — are relatively poor or frosty. Despite the tyranny of routine crisis management, both sides have shown that they can take the time to invest further in a mutually beneficial partnership. By this measure, Obama’s very presence at Republic Day already makes this visit a success.

A second way of evaluating the visit is by its political logic, on both the domestic and international fronts. Obama’s presence at Republic Day removed the last vestiges of a reflexive anti-Americanism that had persevered among many members of the Indian political and policy establishment. Modi’s government has gone further and recognised the domestic political value of a closer relationship with the US. While many in the UPA felt that maintaining equidistance in India’s relations with major powers was politically beneficial, this view was increasingly out of step with Indian public attitudes. Surveys still consistently reflect a high opinion of the US, especially among younger Indians, although this has declined somewhat since the global financial crisis.

The political logic within the US is less pronounced, beyond the gradual rise in importance of the Indian-American community as a politically organised actor that values good relations with their country of origin. Indian-Americans constitute the best-educated and wealthiest ethnic group in the US, and their numbers are no longer insignificant from a political standpoint. Obama’s administration has been the most heavily populated by Indian-Americans. But in future years, Democrats and Republicans will be in greater competition for Indian-American support. None of this means that there will not be continued differences — and sometimes sharp ones — between India and the US. But as long as they are discussed frankly and managed privately, they need not impede the overall relationship.

Another kind of political logic is international. Modi has been unabashed about deepening partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific region with which India shares both interests and values, particularly Japan and Australia. And the Chinese military incursion during President Xi Jinping’s visit last year reinforced the need to manage China’s rise by diversifying regional security partnerships, even while deepening economic engagement with Beijing. A closer relationship with the US, a keystone of security in the Indo-Pacific, helps accomplish that objective.

Meanwhile, Obama’s advisors, after some vacillation, have come around to broadly sharing this viewpoint. The first term of Obama’s presidency swung from attempts at reassuring and accommodating China’s rise to a policy of managing it, described as the “Pivot” (or rebalance) to Asia. While it was only a year or two ago that the momentum behind the pivot was beginning to slow down, Obama’s India visit is one of a number of minor corrective measures that appear to be taking place. The international implications of this visit will not be dramatic, but are part of a gradual and steady process.

A third way of evaluating such bilateral visits is in practical terms, as decision-forcing mechanisms. India and the US now have a vast range of bilateral dialogues and working groups, and negotiations often get bogged down in bureaucracies. High-profile visits are a way of forcing negotiators to reach compromises.

A few such compromises appear to have been reached. These include modest efforts at joint defence development as part of operationalising the Defence Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI), as well as initial discussions on more ambitious projects related to jet engines and aircraft carriers. A deal on civil nuclear liability appears to have also been struck, as well as a renewed defence framework agreement, and financing initiatives for clean energy. The visit, therefore, proved an occasion to finalise several agreements that might otherwise be languishing in working-level negotiations.

There has been much criticism in both countries, sometimes justified, of the India-US bilateral relationship becoming too transactional, at the expense of strategy. But combined, the symbolism, political logic and decision-forcing aspects of Obama’s visit amount to the closest thing to a strategic partnership that is possible in an increasingly tactical world. Obama’s advisors have made much of the fact that he is the first US president to visit India twice during his tenure. Hopefully he will not be the last.

Dhruva Jaishankar | Beyond the Obama-Modi Bromance

Dhruva Jaishankar — Mon, 26 Jan 2015 08:15:00 +0000

The following article originally appeared in the Huffington Post India on January 26, 2015. An excerpt is included below, and the full text can be accessed here.

Official negotiations have a tendency to be bogged down in bureaucracies, at one or both ends. And this is particularly true when it comes to technical or legal discussions, when either one or both negotiating teams lacks the authority to stray from their guidelines. Today, high-profile bilateral summits serve a useful function in providing clear deadlines for decisions to be reached, and forcing negotiators to compromise.

Such periodic brinkmanship has been a hallmark of India-U.S. engagement since at least 1998, when India conducted a series of nuclear tests. Bilateral India-US negotiations have been described in detail by the likes of former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, Indian scholar and journalist C. Raja Mohan, the Indian Prime Minister's former media adviser Sanjaya Baru, and academic Rudra Chaudhuri in their books, and hint at some of the limitations of bureaucratized working-level talks.

Similar negotiations were taking place over the past few months, and Obama's visit enabled a series of compromises, detailed in the joint statement and a joint press conference. Headlines will undoubtedly be dominated by the two leaders announcing an agreement on civil nuclear liability, an issue that had stymied U.S. civilian nuclear commerce with India despite a U.S.-led initiative between 2005 and 2008 to grant India access to nuclear imports and investments. The lack of compromise had lead to much frustration with India in Washington, and limited cooperation in an area that has important implications for India's energy needs and economic growth.

A further set of agreements relates to defense. In addition to agreeing to a ten-year defence framework agreement, which follows a similar agreement signed in 2005, the two sides agreed to operationalize four small-scale joint defence development initiatives. These include jointly developing and improving tactical Raven drones for battlefield scenarios, surveillance and reconnaissance equipment for C-130J aircraft, protection for soldiers against chemical and biological weapons, and mobile electric hybrid power sources. They also agreed to start talks on the joint development of jet engines and aircraft carriers, which are far more ambitious and long-term.

Finally, the two sides agreed to establish, continue, or strengthen a series of discussions, financing initiatives, and technical information sharing endeavours. These relate to economic growth, energy and the environment, and technological fields such as health and space. While an agreement comparable to that between the United States and China on climate targets was not forthcoming, nor realistically expected, clean energy initiatives find considerable space in the joint statement. Additionally, there were a range of issues related to third countries and regions, the most important of which was the Joint Strategic Vision for Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region.

Dhruva Jaishankar | A Symbolic Visit

Dhruva Jaishankar — Thu, 22 Jan 2015 08:10:00 +0000

The following commentary was originally written for the Asia Society Policy Institute on January 22, 2015.

The bilateral relationship between the United States and India has entered a new, and arguably more normal, stage. When a U.S. President visits Britain, France, or Japan, there is not always an expectation of major breakthroughs, announcements, or deliverables. Similarly, observers should get used to seeing India-U.S. bilateral summits for what they are: regular consultations and demonstrations of goodwill between the leaders of two important and friendly countries with a wide set of converging interests.

That being said, President Obama’s visit to India to participate in the 2015 Republic Day festivities is of immense symbolic and political importance. By inviting a U.S. President as Republic Day chief guest for the first time, New Delhi has shown a willingness to embrace its relationship with Washington in an extraordinarily public manner. Until recently, the act of featuring a U.S. president at a nationally-televised parade showcasing India’s culture and military power would have been perceived as being in contravention of the cherished vestiges of non-alignment. The government of Prime Minister Modi, however, recognizes that the presence of the president of the United States holds significant domestic and international political value.

Such visits also do continue to serve as valuable, decision-forcing mechanisms. We may see some forward movement on possible joint defense and civil nuclear initiatives, trade and investment, and climate and energy cooperation. The details, however, are likely to be negotiated until the very last minute.

Rohit Pradhan | Public Policy in the Indian Democracy

Sun, 10 Mar 2013 02:16:05 +0000

And its challanges

In Punchtantra, my bimonthly column in Pragati: The Indian National Interest Review, I argue,

Third, the policies pursued by its government often fail to reflect the limitations of India’s development. Despite its remarkable growth over the last two decades, India remains a poor country. With barely three percent of its citizens as income tax payers and a low tax-GDP ratio, the Indian state lacks the resources to implement the policies it champions. Worse, it wastes precious resources in implementing policies which may be attractive in abstract but are unsuitable for India’s current needs.

Take for instance something as simple as seat belt laws. Despite some controversy in the academic literature, at least in theory, increased seat belt usage would be expected to save lives. But as Vivek Dehejia and Rupa Subramanya point out in their new book Indianomix: Making Sense of Modern India, the vast majority of fatalities on Delhi roads are pedestrians. Even if seatbelt laws are properly enforced, they would hardly make a dent in the tragically high number of traffic deaths. Should not the severely undermanned Delhi Traffic Police then direct its limited resources towards ensuring that pedestrians are able to safely cross the road rather than worry about errant car drivers? The argument is not that the safety of car drivers does not matter. Of course, it does but to recognise that even the safety-challenged cars vastly improve the odds of surviving a trip on Indian roads. [link]

Rohit Pradhan | What Makes Modi Unacceptable

Sun, 10 Mar 2013 02:13:00 +0000

In the Outlook

In a piece in Outlook, I argue,

In a multi-ethnic/religious country like India, no leader can perhaps command the support of all communities but he must not attract the implacable hostility of India’s largest minority. For instance, former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee may not have enjoyed widespread support among Muslims but was not treated as an enemy either. Call it what you will, but it is this ‘Muslim veto’ which makes Modi unacceptable as India’s next leader. This may disappoint those who place their faith unflinchingly in the power of the individual. But as Pratap Bhanu Mehta has argued, even some of the founding fathers agreed that any concept of citizenship which distances itself completely from religious identity would be untenable in India. Communitarianism is a sociological reality in India and while there is always the danger of it degenerating into narrow sectarianism, its political effects simply cannot be ignored.

Whether it makes Modi unelectable as NDA/BJP’s putative leader is another story. Nevertheless, India can survive poor governance for the next few years but what it cannot survive is the further estrangement of its Muslim minority. Even if the promise of a high Modi-led growth is accepted at its face value, it is simply not worth risking the fraying of India’s multiple fault lines. [link]

Rohit Pradhan | The Great Indian Middle Class Awakening

Thu, 17 Jan 2013 02:50:15 +0000

And the pit-falls ahead

In my column in The Wall Street Journal, I examine the recent protests against the brutal rape-cum murder of a medical student in New Delhi,

So it’s worth paying attention when this important section of society realizes it has a stake in the state’s performance. Some of this was apparent in the anticorruption movement that began in late 2010, when activist Anna Hazaretapped into the middle class’s frustrations about pervasive corruption.

Last month’s incident in Delhi is perhaps a bigger moment. Housewives and office-goers understand that while they may be secure in their homes and offices, they still require a strong and accountable police force to protect them on the streets. The recent protests underline that India needs a strong but limited state, an entity which does fewer things but does them well. [link]

Read the rest on The Wall Street Journal. (subscription required)

Rohit Pradhan | On Modi

Wed, 11 Apr 2012 05:11:59 +0000

Can Modi do an Advani?

The Special Investigation Team (SIT) report on Narendra Modi’s alleged role in the Gulbarg massacre held no particular surprises. As widely discussed previously, the SIT report held that there was no ‘prosecutable evidence’ to proceed against Modi and his fellow co-accused in this particular case. Naturally, the much-anticipated report has set off a political maelstrom in the media: His supporters see it as the final vindication of Modi’s innocence while his opponents have sworn to pursue the legal case against the Gujarat chief minister to its logical conclusion.

In this highly charged debate, it is imperative to separate the legal case against Modi from the political case. As I have argued elsewhere,

However, instead of accepting the findings of a duly constituted investigative body, many have attempted to put the SIT itself on trial. It appears that their faith in the legal process may not be as unshakable as they have repeatedly claimed — especially if it yields results that they find unpalatable. In fact, lambasting the legal system in India and labelling it fundamentally unfair to the poor and the marginalised seems to become an element of faith among the Left-liberal section of the Indian polity and civil society. Even the argument that SIT has ‘ignored’ important testimonies is fallacious. Any investigative and judicial process rests on weighing competing narratives and evidences; mala fide intent is not proven merely because the ultimate verdict favours one particular narrative over the other. Finally, the legal options for Modi’s critics have hardly closed. They can certainly contest the SIT’s findings in a judicial forum, but casting aspersions on an investigative body constituted and monitored directly by the Supreme Court is hardly appropriate.

Naturally, Modi can and should be confronted politically. It can be reasonably argued that Modi’s administrative and moral failures in 2002 make him an unsuitable candidate for the highest office in the land.

Instead of launching a calumnious campaign against SIT chief R.K Raghavan, Modi’s opponents should let the judiciary adjudicate on the SIT report. If the SIT has indeed ignored important evidence—as critics like Teesta Setalvad allege—then surely the Supreme Court can be trusted to take the SIT to task and order a fresh investigation. Retaining faith in India’s institutions is of paramount important and is a concern Modi’s opponents would ignore at their own peril. After all, it is the same SIT which recently secured the conviction of 23 accused in the Ode massacre case.

But as the judiciary evaluates the SIT report, the political battle continues unabated. Modi’s supporters see the SIT report as a golden opportunity for the Gujarat strongman to finally emerge in the national spotlight. They believe that only Narendra Modi can confront Rahul Gandhi and lead the BJP to victory in the 2014 general elections. But can Modi finally lay the ghosts of 2002 to rest merely because he has won an important legal battle? Writing on the Indian National Interest platform, blogger Pragmatic perfectly captures the Modi dynamic:

Let me explain how. Mr Modi may never get around to be acceptable to a majority of people in a diverse country like India. No politician in India is, whether it be a Nitish Kumar or a Naveen Patnaik. But unlike Mr Modi, a Nitish or a Patnaik are not unacceptable to a vast majority of people. People may not vote for them but they are not going to come out to vote against them. It is not the case with Mr Modi, as the Time poll clearly shows. A Nitish Kumar in a similar internet poll may have got only 30-35% of the Yes votes that Mr Modi received but the No votes for Nitish wouldn’t have been more than 10-15% of the No votes that Modi got. This is Mr Modi’s handicap.

That in essence is the conundrum his supporters consistently ignore. Indubitably, Modi has passionate followers but he has even more aggressive opponents and there is no evidence yet that his supporters constitute anything more significant than a vocal and loud minority. Many even argue that because Modi has been so consistently vilified over the years, that he may even emerge as a figure deserving sympathy. It is hard to believe that even Modi would buy this vast leap into sophistry but on such fond hopes politics in India is conducted.

The closest approximation for Narendra Modi is senior BJP leader and former home minister L.K Advani. To Advani goes the ‘credit’ of constructing a political movement around the Ram Janmabhoomi agitation; he was easily Hindutva’s tallest leader before Modi usurped his throne. Advani, of course, faced a lot of criticism for his role in the Babri Masjid demolition and the subsequent communal polarization whose apogee was perhaps reached in the Gujarat riots. Yet, Advani was slowly able to rehabilitate his image to the extent that he was the unanimous choice as the prime ministerial candidate of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in the last general elections. Even leaders like Bihar chief minister Nitish Kumar, who baulk at even sharing a stage with Narendra Modi lest their pro-Muslim image be damaged, accepted Advani as NDA’s leader. Advani gave multiple media interviews during the elections but one would be hard pressed to recall an interview in which the issue of the Babri Masjid merited anything beyond a perfunctory mention.

Can Modi replicate his mentor’s model and construct a less antagonist relationship with his critics? While impossible should never be part of the political lexicon, Modi faces an exceedingly uphill battle for multiple reasons. First, the difference in their personalities: While Modi can frequently appear coarse and unsophisticated (Miyan Musharraf), Advani retained a suave and urbane facade. Perceptions matter in politics and listening to Modi one frequently gets the impression—rightly or wrongly—of a visceral distaste for Muslims. Second, 6th December and its bloody aftermath were a series of events and it was hard to link them to a single person. Modi, on the other, was the face of India’s first televised riots. Third, Advani benefited tremendously by being closely associated with former Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee with his moderate and inclusive image. Indeed, it is to Advani’s credit that he abdicated in favour of Vajpayee during BJP’s Mumbai convention. Advani understood that the moderate Vajpayee was far more likely to be acceptable to the regional allies BJP desperately needed if it was to be a serious contender for power at the centre. Modi, on the other hand, is egotistical and dictatorial, and it is highly unlikely that he would be able to display Advani’s sagacity and wisdom of 1995. Finally, Advani worked hard at his image rehabilitation even describing 6th December as the saddest day in his life. He also benefited from fortuitous circumstances.

Finally, many argue that Narendra Modi should apply a healing touch to help the unfortunate victims of the riots achieve some sort of closure; they further argue that such a policy of rapprochement would likely benefit Modi politically as well. While there is little doubt that a healing touch is required, it is utterly naive to believe that it would bring any political dividends to Modi. His legions of political opponents are unlikely to find him acceptable merely because he expresses regret for the riots—10 years late. In fact, they are more likely to see it as a sign of weakness and move in for the kill. And as far as his supporters are concerned, what they find most endearing about Modi is his take no prisoners approach. An apology is unlikely to make them happy either.

As Advani’s example shows, the path to political rehabilitation is long and arduous. It is only likely to be tougher for Narendra Modi

Cross-posted at Outlook Web

Rohan Joshi | In Pragati: Don’t tinker with the treaty

Thu, 08 Dec 2011 06:20:10 +0000

In December’s Pragati, I caution against any attempt to substantially alter the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) between India and Pakistan. The framework provided by the treaty has stood the test of time and has withstood the pressures of three wars. While there is no doubt that Pakistan faces a water crisis, we in India need to tread carefully when it comes to altering aspects of IWT to accommodate Pakistan’s problems. India’s national interest should be the only consideration in determining where we go with IWT in the future. Magnanimity is not always a virtue.

Unfortunately, the undeniable benefits of the treaty to Pakistan have been obscured by misplaced apprehension and aggression. Ayub Khan’s fears of Pakistan’s water insecurity did not prevent him from waging war against India in 1965. Since then, Pakistan has imposed war on India twice and provokedIndia through insurgencies and terror. Yet, India continues to respect the IWT in letter and spirit, not denying Pakistan its share of water even during times of war.

Certainly, transnational water sharing is a complicated subject. In our own region, the sharing of water between states and provinces has been an emotive issue, as evidenced by the disputes over the Kalabagh dam between the Pakistani provinces of Punjab and Sindh, and the Kaveri dispute between Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. There is no denying that Pakistan’s water challenges are real, notwithstanding the dubious causes suggested. And it behooves India, as a neighbour, to help Pakistan address some of these challenges, where possible.

However, one must recognise that Pakistan’s water problems are its own and that to a great extent, the solutions to these problems lie in Pakistan. India cannot be expected to display magnanimity towards Pakistan when Pakistan itself has not demonstrated a basic desire to tackle structural and governance issues in water management. [Pragati]

Read the article in its entireity in Pragati ( PDF; Web page).

Rohan Joshi | In Pragati: Opportunities post Arab Spring

Thu, 20 Oct 2011 18:40:23 +0000

In the October 2011 issue of Pragati, I make the case for greater Indian awareness and engagement with a rapidly changing Middle East. India has historically walked the tightrope, balancing its relations with often warring actors in the Middle East; but India’s growing stature in the world will attract more vocal criticism of what some might see as New Delhi’s duplicitous positions.

While India must no doubt protect and promote its national interests in this turbulent region, it must also use its goodwill to promote ideals that it holds dear. The recent killing of Col. Qaddafi, the brutality of the al-Assad regime in Syria and troubling actions of the Egyptian army post-Mubarak all indicate that “popular” uprisings are not a sufficient condition for the emergence of democracy in the Middle East.

Real democracy can only come in the Middle East through the slow, and sometimes frustrating process of legislative reform that allows greater participation of citizenry in deciding their future with the support (and urging) of democracies in the West, and indeed, India. India must learn to embrace this role as its global visibility grows.

India’s growing ties with Middle Eastern countries are a reflection of its growing stature on the world stage. How India chooses to engage with these and other countries will help define what sort of power India will be. In the past, India avoided criticism of Middle Eastern countries for a myriad of reasons. While this has proven to be a successful strategy, an emerging India will increasingly be challenged on what some might perceive as duplicitous positions.

For example, while Prime Minister Manmohan Singh criticized the West for using force to bring about regime change in his speech at the UN General Assembly, he chose not to draw attention to the brutal suppression of human rights by regimes in the Middle East. While he steadfastly supported the right of the Palestinians to statehood, he refrained from drawing attention to the sub-conventional war imposed on Israel by state and non-state actors.

Worse, while India chose to abstain from a UNSC vote condemning Syria’s human rights record, its ambassador, in an interview with CNN-IBN, virtually endorsed the al-Assad regime’s brutality by dismissing reports of the number of Syrians killed during the protests as “exaggerated.” India has an interest in ensuring not only a stable Middle East, but also one where citizens have a stake in deciding their own future.

As India emerges as an important actor on the world stage, it must use its goodwill and growing power to influence its friends in the Middle East, and must work with other countries in promoting shared ideals in the region. In this regard, the India-U.S. “West Asia Dialogue” launched in July
2011 is a welcome sign.

Read the entire article in this month’s Pragati. (Web link; PDF; 2.2 MB;)

Rohit Pradhan | No Counter-Revolution Please

Wed, 07 Sep 2011 01:46:15 +0000

Preserving India’s constitutional democracy is more important than a feel-good agitations

In my article in the September issue of Pragati-The Indian National interest Review, I argue that while Anna Hazare’s agitation has rightly focused the nation’s attention on the issue of corruption, its adoption of blatantly unconstitutional means ultimately undermines Indian democracy and would only be counter-productive in the long-term,

Nevertheless, the methods adopted by Mr. Hazare must give pause to every Indian who retains faith in India’s constitutional democracy. As many other commentators have enumerated, his so-called Jan Lokpal bill itself suffers from many lacunae and is hardly the panacea to the ills of corruption. Worse, it appears to violate the constitutionally mandated division of power between different pillars of the state. In any case, no single body—howsoever constitutionally well-protected—can single-handedly tackle corruption which pervades virtually every aspect of Indian society.

But forget what may be wrong with Mr. Hazare’s bill for a moment. After all, the government’s proposed Lokpal bill is hardly perfect in itself and suffers from serious deficiencies which may severely handicap its functioning. What is truly troubling though is Mr. Hazare’s reliance on blatantly unconstitutional means to push forward his legislation. Instead of attempting to reform the system, he has harnessed populist disgust and attempted to hijack the entire political process. What is particularly offensive is his gimmickry resort to repeated bouts of fasting [link]

Download the latest issue of Pragati to read the rest.

Rohan Joshi | In Pragati: Bringing our citizens home

Tue, 26 Apr 2011 05:40:59 +0000

A very belated blogpost: in this month’s Pragati, I review India’s evacuation efforts as uprisings raged in Egypt and Libya. While the government can indeed be pleased about the overall effectiveness of its response, there are lessons to be learned from the experience:

India is no stranger to security uncertainties in the Middle East. At the time of the first Gulf War, India had about 180,000 citizens living in Kuwait and 20,000 in Iraq. Over the course of the war, India dispatched ferries to Dubai and chartered Air India flights to Amman, Jordan to evacuate citizens from the region. Direct evacuation from Kuwait was impossible because of air and sea blockades by the US-led coalition, a point that drew repeated protests from Inder Kumar Gujral, then foreign minister. India incurred costs exceeding $1 billion, having evacuated over 100,000 citizens via 500 flights from Amman to Mumbai. Again, in 2006, when conflict broke out between Israel and Hizbullah in South Lebanon, India dispatched four warships of Task Force 54 (INS Mumbai, INS Brahmaputra, INS Betwa and INS Shakti) to rescue not only the 2,000 Indian citizens but also Sri Lankans and Nepalis, as part of Operation Sukoon.

[T]he bulk of India’s evacuation efforts were concentrated on Libya, where over 18,000 Indian citizens lived and worked. As anti-Gaddafi forces gained momentum in Benghazi, the MEA launched Operation Safe Homecoming on February 28, its largest evacuation exercise since the Gulf War. The initial focus of New Delhi’s efforts was Scotia Prince, a passenger ferry with a capacity of 1,200, chartered to evacuate its citizens from Benghazi and Eastern Libya to Alexandria, Egypt. From Alexandria, four special flights (including one Indian Air Force IL-76 transporter) operated to fly evacuees back to India. The Indian government also chartered MV Red Star One, which evacuated citizens to Malta, from where they were flown back to India via flights operated by Kingfisher and Jet Airways. [Pragati]

Read the article in its entirety in April 2011′s Pragati (webpage, pdf).

Rohan Joshi | In Pragati: The twists in the Middle Eastern revolutions

Thu, 10 Mar 2011 05:01:11 +0000

In this month’s Pragati, I argue that while despots in the Middle East may be out, the ruling establishments will still continue to maintain control. A delirious Western media has consistently misinterpreted the recent uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia as pro-democracy and pro-freedom movements; they are neither. At best, these are anti-establishment movements that will only yield a new generation of despots in the region. But hope for democracy in the Middle East is not lost.

In its enthusiasm to support the mass social movement in Egypt, the world failed to appreciate the history of post-colonial Egypt, the Mubarak regime and its support structure. Mr Mubarak, like his predecessors, Naguib, Nasser and Sadat, is a product of the military-security structure that has dominated post-colonial Egypt since 1952. Even as Mr Mubarak transitioned power to his vice president Umar Sulayman and deputy prime minister Muhammad Tantawi (as indeed General Naguib did, albeit under coercion, to General Nasser) the military-security apparatus’ hold over Egypt will likely remain. Indeed, the jubilation on the streets of Cairo after the army’s take-over indicates that democracy and freedom became lesser issues than the people’s desire to see the last of the man they blamed for Egypt’s social and economic ills.

In this regard, the United States erred in continuing to push for Mr Mubarak’s expeditious exit after he announced his decision to withdraw from the presidential elections in September 2011. With Mr Mubarak “gone,” and calm restored to the streets, the regime is unlikely to be under pressure to institute meaningful, time-bound democratic reform in Egypt. [Pragati]

Read the article in its entirety in this month’s Pragati. (webpage; pdf).

Rohit Pradhan | The Growing Governance Gap

Sun, 07 Nov 2010 17:14:53 +0000

India must learn the right lessons from the Commonwealth Games fiasco

In my article in the November issue of Pragati—the Indian National Interest Review, I argue that India must understand that the world would hold her to higher standards—if India wishes to be treated as a growing power, it must ask more from her self,

Second, there was constant criticism of the games with even minor glitches eliciting disproportionate coverage. While frequently churlish and unfair, it does indicate a grudging acceptance of India’s arrival. India’s inefficiencies may have evoked a patronising shrug a few decades back but now provoke outrage. The world, no longer willing to make allowances for India’s third world status, demanded that she deliver first-class games. Yes, this criticism may sting, but India must not offer excuses anymore. Success and victimhood do not march well together.

What also needs to be emphasised is the fact that India’s public institutions have failed to keep pace with her growth. India has hitherto grown despite the weakness of the state. However, this cannot be true indefinitely, and the lack of institutional capacity would ultimately undermine India’s success. This situation is unacceptable—much less in the global arena in which India operates—and calls for urgent corrective actions. [link]

Rohit Pradhan | Rahul Gandhi for Prime Minister

Sun, 07 Nov 2010 17:10:39 +0000

The era of power without responsibility must end

In an article in the October issue of Pragati—The Indian National Interest Review I argue that it’s time Rahul Gandhi stepped up and accepted direct responsibility for governance,

The other—and only plausible alternative—is for Mr Gandhi to bite the bullet. Even those who detest Congress’ sycophantic culture and India’s dynastic politics cannot deny that Nehru-Gandhis have the mandate to rule. It is time they exercise it openly, and not in stealth. With Dr Singh touching 80, and willing to make way for Mr Gandhi, the transition can be managed smoothly.

Rahul Gandhi would then be free to pursue the policies he appears to so strenuously advocate. If his politics is truly driven by ideological convictions and not merely political expediencies, then he should have the confidence to step forward and assume responsibility. The government then would no longer be a cacophony of voices but reflect a common resolve and purpose. After that, it would be to the Indian electorate to offer its judgment on the Congress party, its leader and his policies. [link]

Rohit Pradhan | Sharm-el-Sheikh by Another Name

Thu, 03 Jun 2010 00:46:34 +0000

The damaging consequences of wishful resignation – for a large section of India’s political and intellectual elite, talks with Pakistan are an end in itself. Unfortunately, that’s hardly enough.

In our article in the June issue of Pragati—The Indian National Interest Review, Sushant K. Singh and I argue that talks with Pakistan must be part of a well thought out strategy backed by credible military capacity,

It appears that for a large section of India’s political and intellectual elite, talks with Pakistan are an end in itself, and not an instrument to secure India’s long-term interests. Now, peace with Pakistan is surely desirable but if the past two decades of dialogue—always accompanied by terrorist attacks and proxy war against India—are any indicator, talks have singularly failed to ensure peace. In any case, even the oft-cited “peace dividend”—accelerated economic growth as a direct offshoot of détente —while theoretically sound, fails the empirical test as India’s growth has been fastest in the period of the worst terror attacks from Pakistan.

Indeed, the template of bilateral dialogue over the years has remained depressingly the same: after every major terror attack, India withdraws from talks; backchannel diplomacy resumes in a few months followed by full-fledged talks despite little change in the ground situation.

But what is the alternative, cry the commentariat: War? [link]

Download the June issue of Pragati to read this and much more.

Rohit Pradhan | The Right Response to Maoists

Thu, 08 Apr 2010 03:29:54 +0000

A well calibrated strategy and not brute force is the way forward

In an op-ed in Mint, Sushant K Singh and I argue that the proper response to the Dantewada tragedy must include capacity building —political and administrative—and long-term reforms rather than reliance on brute power,

Unfortunately, the first response—indiscriminate use of brute force—has been the state’s favoured response, simply because there is little political incentive for the government to undertake a long-term, resource-intensive overhaul, when public pressure—momentary and whimsical as it is—is satisfied with “strong” action. And in a sharply divided discourse, there is little likelihood of any influential political or intellectual figure opposing such a course—except those who have willy-nilly aligned themselves with the Maoist cause.

However, it is obvious that if Maoism is to be extinguished, the state needs to choose the rational, smart longer-term strategy. But for that to happen, constraints imposed by the Indian state’s lack of capacity—political, security and administrative—must be immediately tackled. [Link]

Rohit Pradhan | The New Bihar

Fri, 02 Apr 2010 04:02:44 +0000

Nitish Kumar must eschew politics of personality and strengthen institutions—Bihar still has a long way to go

In my article in April 2010 issue of Pragati—the Indian National Interest Review, I argue that Bihar under Nitish Kumar must move from personality driven politics to institutional reforms,

More importantly, it is essential that Mr Kumar set into motion the process of long term institutional reforms so that Bihar’s journey is no longer held captive by caprices and whims of its leaders. Instead of appearing to make himself indispensable, the greatest contribution Mr Kumar can make to Bihar’s regeneration to make himself incidental to the process. Mr Kumar must also remember that he has hitherto benefited from low expectations of the people of Bihar. But if the Nitish revolution rolls on, expectations will increase dramatically and he will be required to provide much more than the minimal level of governance. At that stage, providing the tools for his people to compete in the economy of new India, and creating economic opportunities—not merely by government schemes—by unshackling the latent entrepreneurial spirit of Bihar will be imperative for him. If he wins the assembly elections scheduled for November 2010 then that should be Mr Kumar’s agenda for next five years.[link]

Download the April 2010 issue of Pragati for the complete article and much more.