(This was originally published in Pragati)

In The Wonder That Was India, A L Basham presented a dramatic picture of the decline of the Harappan civilisation. According to him, from 3000 BCE, invaders were present in the region. After conquering the outlying villages, they made their move on Mohenjo-daro. The people of Mohenjo-daro fled, but were cut down by the invaders; the skeletons that were discovered proved this invasion. Basham concluded that the Indus cities fell to barbarians “who triumphed not only through greater military prowess, but also because they were equipped with better weapons, and had learnt to make full use of the swift and terror-striking beats of the steppes.” Sir R Mortimer Wheeler claimed these horse riding invaders were none other than Aryans and their war-god Indra destroyed the forts and citadels at Harappa. But Basham was not that certain of the identity of the charioteers; he stated that they could be non-Aryans as well.

Basham wrote his book in early 1950s and a lot has changed after that. The decline of the Harappan civilisation is no longer attributed to “invading Aryans”, though that theory is still kept alive by political parties in South India. Even the non-Aryan invasion theory has been refuted as there is no trace in the archaeological record for such a disruptive event or the arrival of a new culture from Central Asia. The skeletons, which were touted as evidence for the invasion, were found to belong to different cultural phases thus nullifying the theory of a major battle. Due to all this, historians like Upinder Singh categorically state that the Harappan civilisation was not destroyed by an Indo-Aryan invasion. Instead of blaming the decline of the civilisation to invading or migrating population, the end is now attributed to environmental changes and whims and fancies of rivers.

From the late 1950s, historians believed that Mohenjo-daro was destroyed due to tectonic shifts in the region. According to one version, tectonic movements blocked the course of lower Indus river which must have caused floods that submerged the city. An opposing and the currently favoured theory suggests that instead of submerging in water, the city was starved of water. This happened because Indus shifted away from Mohenjo-daro, thus disrupting the crop cycle as well as the river-based communication network.

While Sindh, where Mohenjo-daro and Harappa are located, has just 9 percent of the 1140 Mature Harappan sites, the Ghaggar-Hakra basin has 32 percent of them; Archaeologists like S P Gupta and J M Kenoyer identify Ghaggar-Hakra with Sarasvati river. Around 1900 BCE, Kalibangan, located on the left bank of Ghaggar, was abandoned. Between the Mature and Late Harappan period, the number of sites along the river reduced considerably implying that the some hydrological change stopped the river from flowing.

One theory suggests that declining monsoons impacted water availability in Ghaggar-Hakra and that in turn caused the societal changes. Around 4000 years back, a dramatic climate change happened across North Africa, the Middle East, the Tibetan Plateau, southern Europe and North America. In India, during that period, there was an abrupt shift in monsoons, which lasted two centuries. In general, if you observe the patterns of recent years, monsoons have strong years and weak years, but they rarely deviate far away from the mean due to the dynamic feedback systems. It is a self-regulating system, but there have been occasions when the anomaly has lasted for few decades.

But what happened 4,000 years back was truly unusual; it was an anomaly larger than anything the subcontinent had faced since in the last 10,000 years. A paper published recently by Berkelhammer was able to narrow down the exact time frame during which this shift happened and it coincides with the decline of the Harappan civilization. This new study does not depend on indirect proxies (like pollen data), but uses a direct terrestrial climate proxy from the Mawmluh Cave in Cherrapunji and hence was able to show an unprecedented age constraint.

According to the paper, the most dramatic change occurred between 4071 (+/- 18) years and 3888 (+/- 22 years) Before Present (BP) for a period of 183 years. First there was a small rise between 4315 and 4303 years and a more precipitous one between 4071 and 4049 years BP. Once this change — which was earlier onset of monsoons or earlier withdrawal — happened, the monsoons stayed in this state for around 180 years before returning to normal values. Earlier monsoon withdrawal suggests that monsoon, which is tied to ocean-atmosphere dynamics and influences from the land surface, was weakened. For the Ghaggar-Hakra, which was fed by the monsoons, the impact was quite serious as it affected the habitability along its course. The study is quite interesting because it provides precise numbers for the duration and onset time for this climactic event. The previous studies did not have proper age constraints and some of them depended on factors (pollen, sedimentation rates) which could be influenced by external natural and man-made causes

Thus when one study claims that Ghaggar was a monsoon fed river and hence was easily susceptible to the vagaries of declining rainfall, there is another which shows that Sarasvati was a glacier-fed river and climate is not the only cause for changes. A paper in Current Science by K S Valdiya published in January of this year, titled The river Sarasvati was a Himalayan-born river, provides numerous counter arguments. First, the Sarasvati flowed through Western Rajasthan, which is one of the dustiest places on earth. 3500 years of dust storms have altered the landscape so much that the landforms created by the river would not be visible today. Second, the river ran through a region which saw tectonic upheavals and that would have altered the course of the river, like what happened to Indus. Third, the dimensions of paleochannels in the upper reaches of the river show that it was created by a large long-lived system. The paper strongly states that it was not a weakened monsoon, but the deflection of rivers by powerful tectonic activities which caused the decline of the Harappan civilisation along the Ghaggar river. Around 3,750 years Before Present, the Tamasa river joined Yamuna and a millennia later the Sutlej joined Beas. Due to this, the discharge of water in the Ghaggar was reduced and forced the Harappans to migrate elsewhere.

This is a contentious issue among academics; arguments and counter-arguments arrive sooner than you can digest them. While one controversy is over if tectonics or monsoon was responsible for the drying up of the river, there is another one over the climatic conditions during the Mature Harappan period. Some papers claim that Mature Harappan period occurred in a wetter phase and there are several others which show that Harappan urbanism rose in an arid phase. Paleoclimatology is a complicated field and more studies will give clarity to this controversy. But there is one certainty: the decline of the Harappan civilisation was not caused by invading Aryans or non-Aryans.

References:

1. Singh, Upinder. A History of Ancient and Early Medieval India: From the Stone Age to the 12th Century. 1st ed. Prentice Hall, 2009.
2. Basham, AL The Wonder That Was India;: A Survey of the Culture of the Indian Sub-continent Before the Coming of the Muslims. 21st ed. Evergreen, 1977.
3. Danino, Michel. Lost River: On The Trail of the Sarasvati. Penguin Books India, 2010.
4. Berkelhammer, M, A Sinha, L Stott, H Cheng, F S R Pausata, and K Yoshimura (2012), An abrupt shift in the Indian monsoon 4000 years ago, in Climates, Landscapes, and Civilizations, Geophys. Monogr. Ser., vol. 198, edited by L. Giosan et al., 75–87, AGU, Washington, D. C., doi:10.1029/2012GM001207.
5. Valdiya, KS “The River Saraswati Was a Himalayan-born River.” CURRENT SCIENCE 104, no. 1 (2013): 42–54.
6. Giosan, Liviu, Peter D Clift, Mark G Macklin, Dorian Q Fuller, Stefan Constantinescu, Julie A Durcan, Thomas Stevens, et al. “Fluvial Landscapes of the Harappan Civilization.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (May 29, 2012). doi:10.1073/pnas.1112743109.

The ruins of Sikandar Bagh palace showing the skeletal remains of rebels in the foreground, Lucknow, India, 1858

From the late eighteenth century to mid-nineteenth century, as the world changed through conquest, colonialism and capitalism, a set of people rose around the world, reacting against such changes. Ironically, global historians – historians who look beyond regional and local causes – call these men prophets in an ode to Abrahamic religions. During this period of encounters and social changes, these charismatic leaders revitalised traditional ways and reorganised societies to challenge foreign institutions and ideas. Garnering support of broad swaths of society, they promised to restore lost harmony, bring in a new moral order, and a bright future. While global historians were able to find leaders for such movements in China, Middle East, United States, Mexico and Europe, they missed the leaders of the First War of Independence in India and fell back on the same old narratives.

As we look at examples from around the world, we get to see some of the qualities and methods of these leaders who influenced fields as diverse as economics, politics and religion. Due to encounters with the Western world, new ideas circulated in the Islamic world and alarmed by the lax religious practices and attempts by rulers in Saudi Arabia and sub-Saharan Africa to model their administration along European lines, leaders arose to return Islam back to its pure form. In Saudi Arabia, this led to the rise of Wahhabism under the leadership of Ibn abd al-Wahhab (1703 – 1792) whose work still influences the modern world. In West Africa, Usman dan Fodio (1754 – 1817) too attacked unbelievers and false religions and his movement led to Islam becoming a majority religion in the Nigerian region.

Tecumseh

During this period, leaders also provided political leadership and created larger states from tribal clans. As Africa became overpopulated and there was competition for cattle-grazing and farming lands, small family clans found themselves overwhelmed. This traditional structure which had existed for centuries could no longer cope with the changes brought by long distance trade. It was the right moment for a cruel and powerful leader like Shaka (1787 – 1828) to rise up, wipe out other clans and unite the winners into a large monarchy, which in turn led to the creation of the Zulu kingdom. In the United States of America, Native Americans had to compete for land with the European colonisers who forcefully took over their land. As a reaction, groups under leaders like Tenskwatwa (1775 – 1836) and Tecumseh (1768 – 1813) exhorted their followers to renounce European goods and shun the missionaries. They tried to forge unity among native Americans, but were eventually betrayed by the British and left to perish.

In China, after a humiliating defeat in the Opium War that forced the country to open other ports to foreign merchants, there rose a fear of western power. During that period, as the rulers became inefficient, masses of people joined what is known as the Taiping Rebellion, motivated by a Christian leader named Hong Xiuquan (1813 – 1864). Like the Islamic leaders in Saudi Arabia and Nigeria, his goal was to return China to an era before it was corrupted by human conventions. Their war was not against the Europeans, but against the Chinese leaders who they thought were the main obstacle in obtaining God’s kingdom on earth. Hong came up with a radical new system which basically countered all the established Chinese traditions, but in the end it was defeated.

Analysis of these prophetic movements across the world show that whenever there is a structural change – in religion or rebellions – it is triggered by a leader. These revolutions were not accidents, but the result of planned action by certain individuals who inspired the masses through messages, symbols and charisma. In the pantheon of prophets we see leaders like Jacinto Pat and Cecilio Chi who led the Mayans in 1847 by blending Christian rituals with Mayan beliefs, Charles Fourier who had a utopian socialist vision and Karl Marx who inspired many nations and their leaders with this theory of proletarian revolt. While many such movements were defeated, the ideas they created lived longer.

Wikipedia says this picture is Tantya Tope, after his capture in 1859, but this is a fake(See note 2)

When global historians evaluate the “Rebellion of 1857” in this context, it is mentioned as an uprising which was sparked by the greased cartridge controversy. Compared to the other global revolutions, this one was not triggered by any prophet, but was a spontaneous uprising or mutiny and it was after the uprising happened that leaders came up. But if one asks questions like how thousands of Indian soldiers marched successfully to Delhi without a supply line, it is evident that something is missing from the known narrative.

New, as well as ignored evidence now tell us that the Anglo-Indian war of 1857 was a carefully planned operation. Leaders like Baija Bai Shinde, Nana Saheb and his Diwan Tatya Tope, Begum Hazrat Mahal, and the Nawab of Banda were involved in the planning using red lotus flowers and chappatis to count the number of soldiers and ensure the commitment of the villages along the army path. Letters translated for the first time in Parag Tope’s “Operation Red Lotus” reveal that Tatya Tope was aware of military movements, logistics and provisions.

Global historians alone cannot be blamed for this lapse because Indian historians themselves have not accepted this view. Then, misrepresentation of the war of 1857 is not new. Depending on the bias of historians, it had many interpretations. According to the official version by Surendra Nath Sen, it was a spontaneous uprising. Marxist historians marginalised the leadership and saw it as a peasant revolt. Another Indian historian wondered how it could be a war at a time when India was not a nation. Now we know that the leaders of the war of 1857 used symbols (red lotus) and messages (Azamgarh proclamation) similar to the prophets of China and USA, and promised a new moral order where people would have political, religious and economic freedom.

Thus, the Anglo-Indian war of 1857 doesn’t have to be relegated to a secondary status in the global prophetic narrative as it satisfies the criteria met by the others.

Notes

1. This was adapted from an assignment I did for “A History of the World since 1300”  by Princeton University. It was first published at Pragati
2. Personal communication with Parag Tope

References

1. Tignor, Robert, Jeremy Adelman, Stephen Aron, Stephen Kotkin, Suzanne Marchand, Gyan Prakash, and Michael Tsin. Worlds Together, Worlds Apart: A History of the World: From 1000 CE to the Present (Third Edition).W. W. Norton & Company, 2010.
2. Tope, Parag. Tatya Tope’s Operation Red Lotus. Rupa & Co., 2010.

In Punchtantra, my bimonthly column in Pragati: The Indian National Interest Review, I argue,

Third, the policies pursued by its government often fail to reflect the limitations of India’s development. Despite its remarkable growth over the last two decades, India remains a poor country. With barely three percent of its citizens as income tax payers and a low tax-GDP ratio, the Indian state lacks the resources to implement the policies it champions. Worse, it wastes precious resources in implementing policies which may be attractive in abstract but are unsuitable for India’s current needs.

Take for instance something as simple as seat belt laws. Despite some controversy in the academic literature, at least in theory, increased seat belt usage would be expected to save lives. But as Vivek Dehejia and Rupa Subramanya point out in their new book Indianomix: Making Sense of Modern India, the vast majority of fatalities on Delhi roads are pedestrians. Even if seatbelt laws are properly enforced, they would hardly make a dent in the tragically high number of traffic deaths. Should not the severely undermanned Delhi Traffic Police then direct its limited resources towards ensuring that pedestrians are able to safely cross the road rather than worry about errant car drivers? The argument is not that the safety of car drivers does not matter. Of course, it does but to recognise that even the safety-challenged cars vastly improve the odds of surviving a trip on Indian roads. [link]

In a piece in Outlook, I argue,

In a multi-ethnic/religious country like India, no leader can perhaps command the support of all communities but he must not attract the implacable hostility of India’s largest minority. For instance, former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee may not have enjoyed widespread support among Muslims but was not treated as an enemy either. Call it what you will, but it is this ‘Muslim veto’  which makes Modi unacceptable as India’s next leader. This may disappoint those who place their faith unflinchingly in the power of the individual. But as Pratap Bhanu Mehta has argued, even some of the founding fathers agreed that any concept of citizenship which distances itself completely from religious identity would be untenable in India. Communitarianism is a sociological reality in India and while there is always the danger of it degenerating into narrow sectarianism, its political effects simply cannot be ignored.

Whether it makes Modi unelectable as NDA/BJP’s putative leader is another story. Nevertheless, India can survive poor governance for the next few years but what it cannot survive is the further estrangement of its Muslim minority. Even if the promise of a high Modi-led growth is accepted at its face value, it is simply not worth risking the fraying of India’s multiple fault lines.  [link]

In my column in The Wall Street Journal, I examine the recent protests against the brutal rape-cum murder of a medical student in New Delhi,

So it’s worth paying attention when this important section of society realizes it has a stake in the state’s performance. Some of this was apparent in the anticorruption movement that began in late 2010, when activist Anna Hazaretapped into the middle class’s frustrations about pervasive corruption.

Last month’s incident in Delhi is perhaps a bigger moment. Housewives and office-goers understand that while they may be secure in their homes and offices, they still require a strong and accountable police force to protect them on the streets. The recent protests underline that India needs a strong but limited state, an entity which does fewer things but does them well. [link]

Read the rest on The Wall Street Journal. (subscription required)

The Special Investigation Team (SIT) report on Narendra Modi’s alleged role in the Gulbarg massacre held no particular surprises. As widely discussed previously, the SIT report held that there was no ‘prosecutable evidence’ to proceed against Modi and his fellow co-accused in this particular case. Naturally, the much-anticipated report has set off a political maelstrom in the media: His supporters see it as the final vindication of Modi’s innocence while his opponents have sworn to pursue the legal case against the Gujarat chief minister to its logical conclusion.

In this highly charged debate, it is imperative to separate the legal case against Modi from the political case. As I have argued elsewhere,

However, instead of accepting the findings of a duly constituted investigative body, many have attempted to put the SIT itself on trial. It appears that their faith in the legal process may not be as unshakable as they have repeatedly claimed — especially if it yields results that they find unpalatable. In fact, lambasting the legal system in India and labelling it fundamentally unfair to the poor and the marginalised seems to become an element of faith among the Left-liberal section of the Indian polity and civil society. Even the argument that SIT has ‘ignored’ important testimonies is fallacious. Any investigative and judicial process rests on weighing competing narratives and evidences; mala fide intent is not proven merely because the ultimate verdict favours one particular narrative over the other. Finally, the legal options for Modi’s critics have hardly closed. They can certainly contest the SIT’s findings in a judicial forum, but casting aspersions on an investigative body constituted and monitored directly by the Supreme Court is hardly appropriate.

Naturally, Modi can and should be confronted politically. It can be reasonably argued that Modi’s administrative and moral failures in 2002 make him an unsuitable candidate for the highest office in the land.

Instead of launching a calumnious campaign against SIT chief R.K Raghavan, Modi’s opponents should let the judiciary adjudicate on the SIT report. If the SIT has indeed ignored important evidence—as critics like Teesta Setalvad allege—then surely the Supreme Court can be trusted to take the SIT to task and order a fresh investigation. Retaining faith in India’s institutions is of paramount important and is a concern Modi’s opponents would ignore at their own peril. After all, it is the same SIT which recently secured the conviction of 23 accused in the Ode massacre case.

But as the judiciary evaluates the SIT report, the political battle continues unabated. Modi’s supporters see the SIT report as a golden opportunity for the Gujarat strongman to finally emerge in the national spotlight. They believe that only Narendra Modi can confront Rahul Gandhi and lead the BJP to victory in the 2014 general elections. But can Modi finally lay the ghosts of 2002 to rest merely because he has won an important legal battle? Writing on the Indian National Interest platform, blogger Pragmatic perfectly captures the Modi dynamic:

Let me explain how. Mr Modi may never get around to be acceptable to a majority of people in a diverse country like India. No politician in India is, whether it be a Nitish Kumar or a Naveen Patnaik. But unlike Mr Modi, a Nitish or a Patnaik are not unacceptable to a vast majority of people. People may not vote for them but they are not going to come out to vote against them. It is not the case with Mr Modi, as the Time poll clearly shows. A Nitish Kumar in a similar internet poll may have got only 30-35% of the Yes votes that Mr Modi received but the No votes for Nitish wouldn’t have been more than 10-15% of the No votes that Modi got. This is Mr Modi’s handicap.

That in essence is the conundrum his supporters consistently ignore. Indubitably, Modi has passionate followers but he has even more aggressive opponents and there is no evidence yet that his supporters constitute anything more significant than a vocal and loud minority. Many even argue that because Modi has been so consistently vilified over the years, that he may even emerge as a figure deserving sympathy. It is hard to believe that even Modi would buy this vast leap into sophistry but on such fond hopes politics in India is conducted.

The closest approximation for Narendra Modi is senior BJP leader and former home minister L.K Advani. To Advani goes the ‘credit’ of constructing a political movement around the Ram Janmabhoomi agitation; he was easily Hindutva’s tallest leader before Modi usurped his throne. Advani, of course, faced a lot of criticism for his role in the Babri Masjid demolition and the subsequent communal polarization whose apogee was perhaps reached in the Gujarat riots. Yet, Advani was slowly able to rehabilitate his image to the extent that he was the unanimous choice as the prime ministerial candidate of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in the last general elections. Even leaders like Bihar chief minister Nitish Kumar, who baulk at even sharing a stage with Narendra Modi lest their pro-Muslim image be damaged, accepted Advani as NDA’s leader. Advani gave multiple media interviews during the elections but one would be hard pressed to recall an interview in which the issue of the Babri Masjid merited anything beyond a perfunctory mention.

Can Modi replicate his mentor’s model and construct a less antagonist relationship with his critics? While impossible should never be part of the political lexicon, Modi faces an exceedingly uphill battle for multiple reasons. First, the difference in their personalities: While Modi can frequently appear coarse and unsophisticated (Miyan Musharraf), Advani retained a suave and urbane facade. Perceptions matter in politics and listening to Modi one frequently gets the impression—rightly or wrongly—of a visceral distaste for Muslims. Second, 6th December and its bloody aftermath were a series of events and it was hard to link them to a single person. Modi, on the other, was the face of India’s first televised riots. Third, Advani benefited tremendously by being closely associated with former Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee with his moderate and inclusive image. Indeed, it is to Advani’s credit that he abdicated in favour of Vajpayee during BJP’s Mumbai convention. Advani understood that the moderate Vajpayee was far more likely to be acceptable to the regional allies BJP desperately needed if it was to be a serious contender for power at the centre. Modi, on the other hand, is egotistical and dictatorial, and it is highly unlikely that he would be able to display Advani’s sagacity and wisdom of 1995. Finally, Advani worked hard at his image rehabilitation even describing 6th December as the saddest day in his life. He also benefited from fortuitous circumstances.

Finally, many argue that Narendra Modi should apply a healing touch to help the unfortunate victims of the riots achieve some sort of closure; they further argue that such a policy of rapprochement would likely benefit Modi politically as well. While there is little doubt that a healing touch is required, it is utterly naive to believe that it would bring any political dividends to Modi. His legions of political opponents are unlikely to find him acceptable merely because he expresses regret for the riots—10 years late. In fact, they are more likely to see it as a sign of weakness and move in for the kill. And as far as his supporters are concerned, what they find most endearing about Modi is his take no prisoners approach. An apology is unlikely to make them happy either.

As Advani’s example shows, the path to political rehabilitation is long and arduous. It is only likely to be tougher for Narendra Modi

Cross-posted at Outlook Web

Unfortunately, the undeniable benefits of the treaty to Pakistan have been obscured by misplaced apprehension and aggression.  Ayub Khan’s fears of Pakistan’s water insecurity did not prevent him from waging war against India in 1965. Since then, Pakistan has imposed war on India twice and provokedIndia through insurgencies and terror. Yet, India continues to respect the IWT in letter and spirit, not denying Pakistan its share of water even during times of war.

Certainly, transnational water sharing is a complicated subject. In our own region, the sharing of water between states and provinces has been an emotive issue, as evidenced by the disputes over the Kalabagh dam between the Pakistani provinces of Punjab and Sindh, and the Kaveri dispute between Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. There is no denying that Pakistan’s water challenges are real, notwithstanding the dubious causes suggested. And it behooves India, as a neighbour, to help Pakistan address some of these challenges, where possible.

However, one must recognise that Pakistan’s water problems are its own and that to a great extent, the solutions to these problems lie in Pakistan. India cannot be expected to display magnanimity towards Pakistan when Pakistan itself has not demonstrated a basic desire to tackle structural and governance issues in water management. [Pragati]

Read the article in its entireity in Pragati ( PDF; Web page).

While India must no doubt protect and promote its national interests in this turbulent region, it must also use its goodwill to promote ideals that it holds dear.  The recent killing of Col. Qaddafi, the brutality of the al-Assad regime in Syria and troubling actions of the Egyptian army post-Mubarak all indicate that “popular” uprisings are not a sufficient condition for the emergence of democracy in the Middle East.

Real democracy can only come in the Middle East through the slow, and sometimes frustrating process of legislative reform that allows greater participation of citizenry in deciding their future with the support (and urging) of democracies in the West, and indeed, India.  India must learn to embrace this role as its global visibility grows.

India’s growing ties with Middle Eastern countries are a reflection of its growing stature on the world stage. How India chooses to engage with these and other countries will help define what sort of power India will be. In the past, India avoided criticism of Middle Eastern countries for a myriad of reasons. While this has proven to be a successful strategy, an emerging India will increasingly be challenged on what some might perceive as duplicitous positions.

For example, while Prime Minister Manmohan Singh criticized the West for using force to bring about regime change in his speech at the UN General Assembly, he chose not to draw attention to the brutal suppression of human rights by regimes in the Middle East. While he steadfastly supported the right of the Palestinians to statehood, he refrained from drawing attention to the sub-conventional war imposed on Israel by state and non-state actors.

Worse, while India chose to abstain from a UNSC vote condemning Syria’s human rights record, its ambassador, in an interview with CNN-IBN, virtually endorsed the al-Assad regime’s brutality by dismissing reports of the number of Syrians killed during the protests as “exaggerated.” India has an interest in ensuring not only a stable Middle East, but also one where citizens have a stake in deciding their own future.

As India emerges as an important actor on the world stage, it must use its goodwill and growing power to influence its friends in the Middle East, and must work with other countries in promoting shared ideals in the region. In this regard, the India-U.S. “West Asia Dialogue” launched in July
2011 is a welcome sign.

Read the entire article in this month’s Pragati. (Web link; PDF; 2.2 MB;)

In my article in the September issue of Pragati-The Indian National interest Review, I argue that while Anna Hazare’s agitation has rightly focused the nation’s attention on the issue of corruption, its adoption of blatantly  unconstitutional means ultimately undermines Indian democracy and would only be counter-productive in the long-term,

Nevertheless, the methods adopted by Mr. Hazare must give pause to every Indian who retains faith in India’s constitutional democracy. As many other commentators have enumerated, his so-called Jan Lokpal bill itself suffers from many lacunae and is hardly the panacea to the ills of corruption. Worse, it appears to violate the constitutionally mandated division of power between different pillars of the state. In any case, no single body—howsoever constitutionally well-protected—can single-handedly tackle corruption which pervades virtually every aspect of Indian society.

But forget what may be wrong with Mr. Hazare’s bill for a moment. After all, the government’s proposed Lokpal bill is hardly perfect in itself and suffers from serious deficiencies which may severely handicap its functioning. What is truly troubling though is Mr. Hazare’s reliance on blatantly unconstitutional means to push forward his legislation. Instead of attempting to reform the system, he has harnessed populist disgust and attempted to hijack the entire political process. What is particularly offensive is his gimmickry resort to repeated bouts of fasting [link]

Download the latest issue of Pragati to read the rest.