Tibor Illyés/EPA

Hungary will hold a parliamentary election on 12 April that many observers describe as the most significant in the country’s modern political history. After 16 years of uninterrupted rule by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz–KDNP alliance, a new political force has emerged to challenge the government’s dominance. The TISZA party, led by former Fidesz insider Péter Magyar, has rapidly reshaped the political landscape and introduced a degree of uncertainty not seen since 2010.

The stakes extend far beyond the composition of the next government. The election will influence Hungary’s economic direction, its approach to the rule of law, and its geopolitical positioning between the European Union and Russia. For many voters, the contest has become a referendum on the political model Orbán has built over the past decade and a half — a model critics describe as “illiberal democracy” and supporters defend as a sovereign alternative to Western liberalism.

How the system works

Hungary is a parliamentary republic with a unicameral National Assembly of 199 members. The PM is elected by a majority of the National Assembly members. The electoral system combines single‑member districts with proportional representation: 106 MPs are elected through first‑past‑the‑post constituencies, while the remaining 93 seats are allocated through national party lists.

Parties must cross a 5% threshold to enter parliament via the national list, although alliances face higher thresholds. A distinctive feature of the system is the “surplus votes” mechanism, which adds unused votes from winning constituency candidates to their party’s national list total. Analysts note that this tends to favour the largest party.

Recent amendments have also redrawn constituency boundaries. Budapest, where opposition parties have traditionally performed strongly, now has fewer seats, while surrounding areas that lean toward Fidesz have gained representation. These changes have prompted debate about the neutrality of the redistricting process.

The political actors 

Orbán’s Fidesz–KDNP alliance is seeking a fifth consecutive term, campaigning on themes of stability, national sovereignty and peace. The prime minister presents himself as the only leader capable of shielding Hungary from external pressures, whether from the EU, NATO or what he characterises as a “pro‑war lobby”.

Péter Magyar, left, of the Tisza Party, and Viktor Orbán from Fidesz, addressing rallies during the campaign (Balint Szentgallay and Akos Stiller via Getty Images)

The main challenger is TISZA, founded in 2024 and led by Péter Magyar. Once a high‑ranking diplomat within the Fidesz system, Magyar broke with the government and has since accused it of systemic corruption and institutional capture. TISZA positions itself as conservative, pro‑European and broadly inclusive, aiming to attract voters across ideological lines.

Other parties remain part of the landscape, though with reduced visibility. The Democratic Coalition, led by Klára Dobrev, continues to advocate for a full restoration of liberal democratic norms and closer alignment with the EU. To the right of Fidesz, the Our Homeland Movement appeals to nationalist voters dissatisfied with the government’s direction. Several traditional opposition parties — including Momentum, the Socialists and Dialogue — have withdrawn from the race to avoid splitting the anti‑government vote, effectively consolidating support behind TISZA.

The issues shaping the campaign

Foreign policy has dominated the campaign, particularly the war in Ukraine. Fidesz has framed the election as a choice between “peace or war”, arguing that the opposition and EU institutions favour escalation. The government emphasises continued cooperation with Russia, especially in the energy sector. TISZA condemns the invasion but has taken a cautious approach to questions of military involvement.

Hungary’s relationship with the EU is another central issue. Approximately €18 billion in EU funds remain frozen due to concerns about corruption and the rule of law. TISZA has pledged to implement the reforms required to unlock these funds, while Fidesz portrays EU pressure as interference in national sovereignty.

Economic concerns are also prominent. Voters face rising living costs, stagnant wages and deteriorating public services, particularly in education and healthcare. Opposition parties highlight the wealth accumulated by business figures close to Fidesz as evidence of systemic corruption. The government points to wage growth and family support schemes as signs of economic resilience.

U.S. Vice President JD Vance shakes hands with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán Tuesday in Budapest. (Denes Erdos / Associated Press)

The campaign has also been marked by allegations of external influence. Reports of Russian‑linked disinformation networks and the increasing use of AI‑generated political content have raised concerns about the information environment. A visit by US Vice President JD Vance in support of Orbán has further underscored the international attention surrounding the election.

What could happen after the vote

A party or alliance needs 100 seats to form a government. A two‑thirds majority — 133 seats — grants the power to amend the constitution and change “cardinal laws”, which govern key areas such as the judiciary, media regulation and electoral rules.

If TISZA were to win a simple majority but fall short of two‑thirds, it could form a government but would face structural constraints, as many institutional reforms require supermajority support. If no party reaches 100 seats, coalition negotiations would be necessary. Analysts note that Fidesz and the Our Homeland Movement share ideological overlaps, though no formal commitments have been made.

Depending on the margin, observers have also discussed the possibility of legal challenges or disputes over certification. These scenarios reflect the high stakes and polarisation surrounding the election rather than predictions about the outcome.

What to watch on election day

 Turnout will be closely monitored, particularly among younger voters who have been highly mobilised during the campaign. The urban–rural divide remains a defining feature of Hungarian politics: while TISZA is expected to perform strongly in Budapest, Fidesz retains deep support in rural areas, where constituency results often determine the overall balance of power.

The performance of smaller parties will also matter. Whether groups such as the Democratic Coalition or the Our Homeland Movement cross the 5% threshold will influence the distribution of list seats. Diaspora votes — particularly mail‑in ballots from ethnic Hungarians abroad — have historically provided several additional seats to Fidesz. Analysts are also watching the role of AI‑generated content and disinformation in the final hours of the campaign.

Why this election matters

The April 12 election is a watershed moment that will decide whether Hungary continues its trajectory as an “electoral autocracy” or returns toward a liberal democratic path within the European Union. The outcome will redefine Hungary’s relationship with Brussels and Kyiv, potentially removing a persistent “spoiler” to EU policy or further entrenching an illiberal vanguard in the heart of Europe. Regardless of the winner, the next government will face the daunting task of navigating an entrenched legal framework and a deeply polarized society.

The post Explainer: Your Guide to Hungary’s Election on 12 April appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Photo: Green Circuit Board by Miguel Á. Padriñán, available from https://www.pexels.com/photo/green-circuit-board-343457/

Cristina Pinna

Over the past decade, research security has moved from a technical concern discussed among specialists to a central issue in European research policy. What began as a debate about protecting sensitive technologies has expanded into a broader question about how knowledge should be governed in a changing geopolitical environment. Today, it shapes funding rules, international cooperation, and the everyday practices of universities across Europe, becoming part of a broader effort to govern knowledge flows amid geopolitical uncertainty and perceived vulnerability. It reflects a wider shift in how the European Union (EU) understands openness, collaboration, and risk.

In my ongoing research on EU research security and international academic cooperation (Pinna, 2024; Cai, Pinna and van der Wende, 2025; Pinna, 2025), I examine how this shift reflects more than a response to specific threats and is linked to the EU’s broader geopolitical repositioning and to the growing recognition that research and innovation are strategic domains. Policy debates increasingly frame scientific cooperation in terms of resilience, technological sovereignty, and economic security (European Commission 2025b) and are linked to the EU’s broader geopolitical repositioning and to the growing recognition that research and innovation are strategic domains. 

From openness to managed interdependence

For much of the early 2000s, EU research policy rested on the assumption that international openness was inherently beneficial. The development of the European Research Area (ERA), successive Framework Programmes, and mobility initiatives reflected a paradigm in which universities were encouraged to internationalise, compete globally, and integrate into the knowledge economy. International cooperation was tied to a neoliberal logic of competitiveness and excellence, where openness was seen as necessary for growth and scientific leadership. 

Over time, this consensus began to change. Advances in dual-use technologies, the strategic importance of innovation, and geopolitical rivalry led policymakers to reconsider the risks of unrestricted collaboration. Scientific cooperation is now seen not only as a driver of competitiveness, but also as a source of vulnerability. Concerns about knowledge transfer, foreign interference, and asymmetric dependencies have moved to the centre of policy debates, especially in strategic technologies. Where the previous decade emphasised internationalisation as an economic imperative, the current one increasingly frames it through a security logic concerned with exposure, dependence, and risk.

These developments are particularly visible in EU–China academic relations. Earlier narratives emphasised partnership and mutual benefit, whereas recent debates refer to reciprocity, risk awareness, and strategic dependencies (Cai, Pinna, and van der Wende 2025). Cooperation continues, but under more cautious and conditional terms. 

Recent EU initiatives reflect this recalibration. The Council Recommendation on Enhancing Research Security defines research security as the need to anticipate and manage risks related to unwanted knowledge transfer, malign influence on research, and violations of academic integrity or EU values (European Commission 2024a). Research security, therefore, goes beyond protecting technologies and includes safeguarding the conditions under which research remains open and trustworthy.  The White Paper on dual-use R&D further highlights the overlap between civilian innovation and security concerns (European Commission 2024b). Together, these documents signal a move from unconditional openness to managed internationalisation.

Security embedded in everyday research governance

This transformation has not taken the form of sudden restrictions. Instead, security concerns have been integrated into existing procedures.

Rather than imposing strict prohibitions, the EU mainly relies on regulatory and coordinative tools. Funding rules, due-diligence requirements, export controls, and risk assessments increasingly shape research cooperation. Recent Commission initiatives provide guidance and coordination tools for Member States (European Commission 2025a).

Because education and research remain largely national competencies, the implementation of research security is shaped by the relationship between the EU and its Member States. EU institutions set the direction, but Member States, funding agencies, universities, and researchers implement it. In this sense, research security develops through a multi-level governance system in which responsibilities are distributed rather than centrally imposed (Pinna 2024). Translating research security into practice is uneven across governance levels, with divergent narratives creating uncertainty for implementers and making the process more contested than official policy language suggests (Rüland et al. 2025).

A broader geopolitical context

The growing prominence of research security is closely connected to the EU’s wider geopolitical agenda. Since the late 2010s, EU policy has emphasised resilience, strategic autonomy, and reducing critical dependencies. Research and innovation are no longer seen only as drivers of growth, but as areas linked to security, competitiveness, and systemic vulnerability (European Commission 2025b).

This shift reflects not only the pursuit of power, but also growing concern about vulnerability within open research systems. Policymakers worry that openness may expose critical technologies, create dependencies, or allow foreign influence in sensitive areas. These concerns have led to new policy instruments in “like-minded” countries such as the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Australia, where governments introduced guidelines to help universities manage geopolitical risks in international collaboration (Shih, Chubb, and Cooney-O’Donoghue 2025). Comparative work also shows that in both Germany and the United States, research security is reshaping scientific cooperation under geopolitical pressure, though through different governance traditions (Rüffin et al. 2025).

The EU response remains distinctive. Rather than relying on direct restrictions, it mainly uses coordination, recommendations, and regulatory frameworks. Cooperation remains central, but with greater attention to exposure, dependence, and strategic capabilities. Research security, therefore, reflects an attempt to govern interdependence rather than abandon openness.

Changing language, changing expectations

This transformation is also visible in policy language. Over the past decade, EU documents have moved from the vocabulary of openness and global exchange to terms such as responsible internationalisation, de-risking, and strategic autonomy. These changes reflect shifting narratives about how openness should be organised. 

Earlier frameworks stressed partnership and mobility, whereas recent documents emphasise risk awareness, due diligence, and institutional responsibility. The Council Recommendation on research security places risk assessment and safeguards within normal research governance (European Commission 2024a).  Openness is no longer taken for granted but must be actively managed.

This shift is often summarised in the principle that cooperation should be “as open as possible, as closed as necessary.” Initially used in technical contexts, this expression now captures a broader change in how international collaboration is understood. It reflects the attempt to preserve openness while recognising its risks.

This shift in language is particularly visible in EU–China academic relations. Earlier narratives centred on partnership and exchange, while more recent debates increasingly refer to risk management, strategic dependencies, and the protection of sensitive knowledge (Cai, Pinna, and van der Wende 2025; Pinna 2024). These changes reorganise expectations across the research system, redistributing responsibility among universities, funding agencies, and individual researchers.

Concluding reflections

Research security has become a defining feature of EU research policy. What began as concern about sensitive technologies has evolved into a broader effort to reconsider how knowledge circulates in an increasingly contested global environment. 

The shift is visible both in policy instruments and in the language of international cooperation. Terms such as responsible internationalisation, strategic autonomy, and de-risking reflect a shift from openness as the default to a more cautious organisation of international cooperation.

For the EU, this reflects an effort to remain open while reducing vulnerabilities. For universities and researchers, collaboration continues but with stronger expectations of responsibility and risk awareness.  Understanding this shift is essential for navigating European research governance. Research security is not simply a constraint on cooperation, but an attempt to redefine how international collaboration can continue in a more uncertain and contested world.

Dr. Cristina Pinna is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow at the Department of International Relations and International Organization, University of Groningen, the Netherlands. Her research examines China’s global engagement, with particular interest in EU–China relations, the geopolitics of infrastructure and science and technology. She previously worked at the United Nations Development Programme in Beijing and has held research and teaching roles in Italy, Netherlands, Canada and China. She has launched a research group (Geo)Politics of the Global Science System – gloknos.

References

Cai, Yuzhuo, Cristina Pinna, and Marijk van der Wende, eds. 2025. Rethinking EU–China higher education cooperation in a complex and changing global environment. Special issue, Journal of Studies in International Education 29(2): 167–176. https://doi.org/10.1177/10283153251316930 

European Commission. 2024a. Council recommendation on enhancing research security. COM(2024) 26 final. Brussels.
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=COM:2024:26:FIN 

European Commission. 2024b. White paper on options for enhancing support for research and development involving technologies with dual-use potential. Brussels.
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52024DC0027 

European Commission. 2025a. Commission announces new measures to strengthen research security. Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, 28 October. Brussels. https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/news/all-research-and-innovation-news/commission-announces-new-measures-strengthen-research-security-2025-10-28_en

European Commission. 2025b. Strategic Autonomy and European Economic and Research Security. https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/strategy/strategy-research-and-innovation/europe-world/international-cooperation/strategic-autonomy-and-european-economic-and-research-security_en

Pinna, Cristina. 2024. Navigating knowledge and research security in EU–China academic relations: The case of Hungary, Italy, and the Netherlands. Journal of Studies in International Education 29(2): 319–343. https://doi.org/10.1177/10283153241307970 

Pinna, Cristina. 2025. Comparative Perspective In EU Context: Policies And Instruments In Relevant EU Countries. In van der Wende M., et al. (eds.) Changing perspectives: towards conditions for sustainable EU-China collaboration in academic cooperation and R&D. Published by the China Knowledge Network (CKN). https://www.chinakennisnetwerk.nl/publications/changing-perspectives-towardsconditions-sustainable-eu-china-academic-collaboration  

Rüffin, Nicolas V., Katharina C. Cramer, Maximilian Mayer, and Philip J. Nock. 2025.
“Research Security’ in Germany and the United States: Shifting Governance of Scientific Collaboration Under Geopolitical Pressure. Global Policy, advance online publication, pp. 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.70103

Rüland, Anna-Lena,  Rüffin, Nicolas V., Wang, Ruowei and Mauduit, Jean-Christophe. 2025.
“The Implementation of Research Security Policies in Germany: Exploring Policy Narratives across Governance Levels.” European Security, advance online publication.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2025.2591708

Shih, Tommy, Chubb, Andrew  and  Cooney-O’Donoghue, Diarmuid. 2025. Processing the geopolitics of global science: Emerging national-level advisory structures. Journal of Studies in International Education 29(2): 300–318. https://doi.org/10.1177/10283153241307971

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In our recent article for JCMS we set out to queer the European Union Foreign and Security Policy.

But what does this mean?

Queer, once a slur, is now a popular term that captures the variety of sexual orientations and gender identities. Rooted in decolonial, black feminist as well as cultural studies, queer theory uses sexuality and gender identity as an entry point to tackle taken-for-granted concepts across literature, politics, law, and international relations.

We applied queer theory to EU foreign and security policy, specifically ‘queering’ the EU’s implementation of Women, Peace and Security (WPS) – a UN-mandated agenda that aims to consider the specific needs of women and girls in conflict. We focused on three queer concepts: invisibilities, heteronormativity, and binaries.

A (brief) overview of queer theory and its place in European Studies

To be queer is to be fluid; queer theory is therefore a framework that can be tricky to pin down. Its roots can, however, be traced to the post-structural turn in the 1980s and 1990s thanks to the work of Michel Foucault, Judith Butler, and Eve Sedgwick as well as the wider LGBTIQA+ movement. Its development is linked to feminism, post-colonialism, and constructivism. And while it overlaps with LGBT Studies, it is at times in tension with it.

Petrus Liu offers a starting point:

“Queer theory challenges categories we take for granted as self-obvious, natural, or immutable… Queer theory is, moreover, a kind of doing, a form of socially conscious intervention that calls into question the blind spots of heteronormative and cisnormative worldviews.”

Queer scholars interpret and apply the theory in different ways, but we support Kath Brown and Catherine J. Nash’s suggestion that it “can be any form of research” that “highlights the instability of taken-for-granted meanings and resulting power relations”.

As we outline in our article, the EU is increasingly examined by various critical theories (most notably postcolonial and feminist theories). And while our research is the first applications of queer theory to the EU’s foreign and security policy, it builds on a rich body of queer literature that exists on the wider WPS agenda, humanitarian responses, development, human rights law, and the fight against the far-right, amongst others. Below, we try to unpack some key concepts of queer scholarship.

Invisibilities

Queer scholarship “focuses on the (in)visibility of queer representations in international politics”, as we write in our paper. This erasure has real-world implications for queer people.

We found that LGBTIQA+ people are absent in the EU’s implementation of WPS. This means they are doubly persecuted; the violence they are subject to is not recognised and so they are excluded from access to legal, health, and other services.

This erasure affects all queer people. On one hand, WPS was designed to protect women and girls – yet it ignores the experience of lesbian and trans women. On the other hand, research increasingly highlights how sexual and gender-based violence does not only affect women; because of gendered hierarchies, men and boys are “feminised” or “homosexualised” in conflict. This process of violent humiliation is often directed at queer men and gender minorities, which is why WPS is often seen to be an avenue to integrate protections for the wider LGBTIQ+ community.

The failure to include references to LGBTIQA+ people is therefore a missed opportunity.

Heteronormativity

Queer theory examines heteronormative and cis-gendered structures. In the EU’s implementation of WPS, we found that all relationships are assumed to be heterosexual. The possibility that couples could be same-sex (or that families could have a single parent, for that matter) is not considered.

But by examining heteronormativity, queer research goes deeper: it attempts to analyse why there are patriarchal (im)balances of power and how they manifest.

Queer theory posits that heteronormativity is upheld by a range of masculinities and femininities, which are expressed in individuals regardless of their gender. It is the “hegemonic masculinity” that defines what is socially expected and is in opposition to “weaker” and “feminine” Others. This violent, patriarchal hegemonic masculinity leads to, and legitimises, acts of violence against LGBTIQA+ people in conflict.

Binaries

Queer scholarship builds on its efforts to deconstruct male/female or gay/straight binaries by doing the same with Either/Or binaries across mainstream politics.

For example, it analyses West/rest, war/peace, foreign/domestic and concludes that they simplify complicated terms and erase the nuance around them. Often, this promotes a xenophobic world view: Josep Borrell’s (the then EU High Representative) now infamous statement “Europe is a garden” and “the rest of the world is a jungle” is an example of this.

As we write in our paper, tackling these binaries helps us appreciate how violence against queer people is:

“Palimpsestic; it does not commence with conflict, nor does it end with the brokering of a ceasefire, the signing of a peace agreement or in the latter stages of peacebuilding. The violence queer persons suffer in conflict-related situations is not an aberration but an extension of that which they face in times of peace.”

Future uses of queer theory: an “open mesh of possibilities”

Queer theory is an “open mesh of possibilities”. This allows us to adapt the framework, use it in parallel with work that examines coloniality, race, disability, and class, as well as find allyship with other post-colonial or critical theories.

That being said, there are queer scholars who would disagree with this, instead positing that queer scholarship should remain on the fringes and not engage with mainstream policies at risk of it being instrumentalised. We recognise this tension but believe queer theory must be driven by a curiosity to engage; its insights are too important to be left on the sidelines.

At a time of increasing pressure on queer research and rights, we hope that others will use queer approaches to interrogate and analyse EU external policies – and encourage researchers to do so.

Doing so helps question the taken-for-granted structures and practises in these policies (what is considered “normal”), revealing the resulting power hierarchies around sexuality and gender identity and also shedding light on those who have been marginalised. In turn, this can contribute to the construction of alternative, more inclusive and irenic, policies and practices.

Dimitris Bouris (he/him) is an Associate Professor and Jean Monnet Chair at the Department of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam. He is also an Associate Editor ofEuropean Security journal and a Visiting Professor at the College of Europe (Natolin). Dimitris’ research focuses lies at the intersection of International Relations (IR theory, peace and state-building, contested states, security sector reform, conflict resolution, diplomacy), EU Studies (EU External Relations, EU security, CSDP, EU foreign Policy) and Middle East and North Africa area studies. He recently co-edited together with Nora Fisher-Onar and Daniela Huber a special issue in JCMS entitled “Towards Allyship in Diversity? Critical Perspectives on the European Union’s Global Role”. In addition to the article discussed in this blog post, recent publications also include an article on the Interrelationship between Gender and European Union Foreign Policy and an article on the performance of Transnistria’s statehood by its political elites

Saul Kenny is the Communication Manager at Article 109, an international coalition of civil society organisations mobilising to review the Charter of the United Nations to make multilateralism better equipped for the 21st century. Before Article 109, Saul worked at the European Commission in support of Horizon Europe. Saul co-authored the paper discussed in this blog after completing his master’s thesis, which analysed policies the EU could adopt to protect LGBTIQA+ people during conflict. Saul has also written about cuts to aid budgets and Europe’s role in a shifting world order.

Hanna L. Mühlenhoff is a Senior Lecturer in European Studies at the University of Amsterdam. She is interested in questions of security, militarism and civil society activism in the European Union and Europe more broadly, including in the context of the UN Women, Peace and Security Agenda and Feminist Foreign Policies. In addition to the publication discussed in this blog post, she recently published a queer analysis of the EU’s Strategic Compass in the Journal of International Relations and Development, and a co-authored chapter on gender (in)justice in von der Leyen’s geopolitical turn.

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In June 2026, the European Union’s Pact on Migration and Asylum will enter into force. The Pact explicitly recognises the role of civil society organisations and NGOs in EU migration management, acknowledging their practical expertise, especially in working in contexts that are outside the EU. In recent years, EU migration governance has increasingly relied on partnerships with third countries, where border control, development cooperation, and humanitarian assistance overlap. Instruments such as the European Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) and the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) show how development funding is increasingly used to support migration management beyond EU borders. In this context, NGOs operating in countries of origin and transit have become central actors in how these policies are carried out on the ground. Much has been written about NGO criticism of EU migration policy over the past decade. Far less attention has been paid to how NGOs actually engage with these policies in practice. What does it actually mean for an organization committed to humanitarian principles to deliver EU-funded programmes inside the EU’s migration machine? My research answers this question by looking at how NGOs in Libya navigate funding pressures, ethical dilemmas, and complex local realities while delivering humanitarian and development assistance in a context heavily shaped by migration control objectives.

Libya and EU Externalisation Strategy

Libya sits at the centre of EU externalisation efforts. Since 2017, the Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) has funded Libya’s Coast Guard to intercept migrants at sea and return them to detention centres where abuse, forced labour, and torture are widely documented. Research and reports have also documented NGO involvement in alleviating the suffering of migrants in some detention centres, raising questions about whether such engagement is compatible with their humanitarian mandate. This coupling of migration control with development and humanitarian aid is not incidental but is structural, as it is openly acknowledged in Article 2 of the MoU itself.

In this context, NGOs in Libya work in an environment shaped by both urgent humanitarian needs and migration control policies. In my research I show how they navigate this terrain through two seemingly distinct but actually overlapping approaches. The first is what I call “pragmatic developmentalism”: accepting EU funding despite reservations about its political objectives, and focusing on delivering essential services and addressing urgent needs. This approach may involve engaging with local authorities and navigating informal power structures, but it remains oriented towards concrete outcomes for communities. The second is “principled humanitarianism”: an ethics-driven approach in which humanitarian imperatives take precedence over other objectives. This emphasises neutrality, impartiality, and the obligation to provide assistance based on need. In practice, it is based on the belief that NGOs can preserve spaces in which humanitarian action can operate independently of the political agendas that shape its funding context.

The RSSD Project: Where Development Meets Migration Management

The EU-funded Recovery, Stability and Socio-Economic Development (RSSD) project offers a concrete illustration of these dynamics. Targeting municipalities along migration routes in Libya, the project stabilises communities and supports local health systems, such as restoring health centres, delivering medical supplies, and training local staff. While these are developmental outcomes, practitioners themselves recognise that the project operates within a wider strategy aimed at discouraging onward movement towards Europe.

Interviews with NGO workers reveal the two overlapping logics at work. On one hand, they  accept EU funding to deliver essential services, despite some political reservations about the EU migration agenda. On the other they seem preoccupied with maintaining what they describe as ethical “red lines.” What emerges from their accounts is that the tension between pragmatism and principle is not simply an individual ethical dilemma. It may reflect a structural feature of contemporary migration governance itself. NGOs are not only making difficult choices, they are part of the mechanism through which migration policies are implemented on the ground. By delivering services within containment-oriented strategies, NGOs can simultaneously alleviate immediate harm and contribute to stabilising those same strategies. Many practitioners openly acknowledge this ambivalence. One NGO worker describes the tension in stark terms as “whitewashing”, suggesting that the humanitarian framing of their projects can serve to mask a much less humanitarian political agenda. As such NGOs operating within these frameworks are key actors through which migration policies take shape in practice.

Looking Ahead: NGOs and the Future of EU Migration Governance

While the extent to which NGOs manage to maintain independence and stay neutral remains up to debate, the interaction between pragmatic developmentalism and principled humanitarianism shows that NGOs are not simply passive implementers of EU policy. They interpret, adapt, and sometimes push back against EU objectives while continuing to deliver essential services on the ground. At the same time, their work can also indirectly support EU agendas. By framing migration through development and humanitarian action, EU external migration policies can appear more technical and less political, while part of the responsibility for their implementation is carried out by NGOs.

As the EU continues to expand its externalisation strategy, including discussions around “safe third country” arrangements and the delegation of asylum processing, the role of NGOs in transit countries is likely to grow. Understanding their work beyond the simple view of NGOs as either critics of EU policies or their enforcers is crucial for policymakers and civil society actors. It highlights the tensions that arise when migration governance is outsourced, and shows that migration policy is shaped not only by states and institutions, but also by the everyday decisions and principles of the organisations working on the ground.

Agnese Pacciardi is Research Fellow at the School of Global Studies, University of Sussex. Her work focuses on borders, mobility, and security through critical lenses. In her research, she primarily delves into European border security, humanitarianism and development cooperation in North and West Africa, exploring the impacts and implications of these policies on the communities they affect from feminist and decolonial perspectives.

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The role of markets in public health, and the frameworks provided by law to regulate and support these, generate wide-ranging questions. Acknowledging the existence of markets in public health, and the diverse aspects of law which come into play, means that discussions which respond to these can be enriched.

The guest-editors highlighted the contextual relevance of the COVID-19 pandemic as well as Dr Mina Hosseini’s COMPHACRISIS project in shaping discussions and analysis which has culminated in this Symposium. Professor Imelda Maher highlighted three themes uniting the Symposium papers: time, the State, and interest, particularly the public interest.

The webinar organised the papers into three thematic sections: pharmaceuticals and access to medicines, pandemic responses, and competition policy.

Pharmaceuticals and access to medicines

Professor Susi Geiger (UCD) examined the temporalities of current pharmaceutical markets with a view to devising a set of principles and practices to break with these and outline a social contract for a new (temporal) political economy of pharmaceuticals.

Dr Pramiti Parwani (Warwick) engaged with the question of what institutional dynamics catalyze European external regulatory impact on pharmaceutical governance in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), focusing on the technocratic outreach beyond European borders of the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and the European Patent Office (EPO).

Dr Katrina Perehudoff (Amsterdam) explored the specific needs of people with disabilities in LMICs, focusing on the EU’s extraterritorial legal obligations under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).

Pandemic responses

Professor Aisling McMahon (Maynooth) used the role of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in global access to vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic to argue that key aspects of the current institutional system align towards delivering individualistic state/ regional/ rightsholders priorities in the use of IPRs over pandemic health technologies.

Dr Mina Hosseini (UCD) reviewed the European Commission’s centralized procurement approach for vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic to identify critical challenges and propose a novel Fairness, Accountability, Competition Law, Ethics of Innovation, and Resilience (FACER) framework as a tool for EU policymakers to enhance vaccine strategy and equity in future health crises.

Competition policy

Dr Carmen de Vivero de Porras and Dr Enrique Sanjuán y Muñoz (Málaga and Málaga) examined the Spanish Competition Authority’s judgment in sanctioning the North American pharmaceutical company Merck Sharp & Dohme for abuse of a dominant position in order to delimit the difference between the legitimate and abusive exercise of the right to effective judicial protection.

Dr Łukasz Grzejdziak (Strathclyde) highlighted the emergence of a distinct, sector-specific notion of economic activity (“undertaking”) in the context of services delivered within public healthcare systems which risks generating significant distortions of competition in mixed public/private healthcare systems such as Poland.

Dr Mary Guy (TCD) juxtaposed the CJEU’s judgment in Casa Regina Apostolorum with the treatment of public hospitals in Commission decisions regarding state aid and services of general economic interest (SGEI), finding not only that two levels of analysis can emerge depending on Member State input, but also that the requirement for cross-border effects on trade may also prove as decisive as an economic activity in deciding whether EU (as distinct from national) competition law applies.

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You can find the full webinar recording here.

The full Symposium is available here.

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This scholarship has supported my two-week stay in Brussels. The award was spent on return flights to Brussels and accommodation fees. This fieldwork trip forms an integral part of my PhD research, as it allowed me to participate in an in-person forum hosted by my researched tech company in Brussels. Moreover, I was affiliated as a visiting doctoral student at Law, Science, Technology & Society (LSTS) of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB). During my visiting scholarship, I presented my research and discussion with the LSTS community, which enriched my thinking.

Ethnography, networking, and unlock other opportunities

During my two-week stay in Brussels, I took part in marketing events hosted by tech companies. This in-person fieldwork trip enables me to conduct participant observation and connect with potential interviewees for arranging future interviews. Without this scholarship, I would not have been able to spend sufficient time in Brussels to collect data. Taking this fieldwork trip is beyond switching the interviewing mode from online to offline. It means that I could obtain data that is not publicly available in London and get insights from the field by being immersed in industry knowledge. The event participation and discussion with the forum participants allowed me to gain insights into how tech companies comply with industrial standards and regulations. The operation and governance of technology is like a black box, which is not well-known to the public because of business secrecy and complex technical design. It is still impossible to figure out every detail of how the system operates, even though I have participated in some events hosted by the companies. However, this fieldwork trip has allowed me to be exposed to industrial knowledge relevant to my research. I am now in the write-up period of my PhD research. I further realize how the support of this scholarship has enriched my empirical analysis and helped me to strengthen my argument. One particular highlight is that I encountered another industrial event participation opportunity when I analyzed the fieldwork notes. As a result, I was awarded a scholarship to participate in another cybersecurity industry event.

In addition to conducting ethnographic research, I was affiliated with the LSTS Research Group of VUB, where I could present my work, conduct data analysis, and write up my research. During my visiting scholarship, I was supervised by Professor Rocco Bellanova. We had two supervision meetings discussing my drafts, which were helpful for me to crystallize my thinking and restructure my empirical analysis. I was kindly offered the opportunity to present my work at the LSTS doctoral seminar and participate in the LSTS Annual Research Day. It is a precious learning opportunity for me to present my work-in-progress and have discussions with scholars conducting interdisciplinary research on similar research topics. Not only can I receive valuable feedback, but I can also reflect on how my research can engage with scholarship from other disciplines on similar research topics. Although my stay at LSTS was limited, I was fortunate to meet a supportive community there, with whom I keep in touch by meeting at conferences and having online discussions.

Understanding the broader context of the research

On my way home, I felt so fulfilled. The support of the UACES scholarship made it possible for me to stay longer in Brussels. This allowed me to contextualize my research topic by immersing myself in the hub of drafting EU digital regulations. When I now read literature on EU digital sovereignty or the Brussels Effect, it feels so resonant. The resonances prompted me to reflect more deeply on how digital technology is framed to legitimize the ways it should be governed. Such framings not only influenced the process of regulation-making but also reshape our socio-political everyday life —for example, through urban design practices that may become aligned with these framings. I am grateful for the generous support of the UACES PhD fieldwork scholarship. This scholarship undoubtedly supported my doctoral research and future academic development.

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I took this photo during my fieldwork in Budapest in January 2023. It is the dark entrance hall of the Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE) Faculty of Humanities building. Despite being mid-term, the space is empty and unlit because the university was forced to shut the campus for in-person classes and transition to online education due to an inability to afford heating costs.

Zahra Jafarova

In the shifting landscape of European higher education, neoliberal reforms used to be celebrated as tools for financial efficiency and institutional autonomy. But how does such a market-oriented framework function when it is instrumentalized by a regime drifting away from democracy towards authoritarianism? In Hungary, the transformation of the university system stands out as a flagship project of the Orbán administration, serving as a critical case study in how neoliberal mechanisms can be systematically repurposed to reshape the boundaries of academic freedom.

In my article recently published in Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, I utilize the concept of soft authoritarianism to theorize how neoliberal mechanisms are utilized for controlling universities. Drawing on 25 qualitative interviews conducted in Hungary and Austria, this study explores three central mechanisms: (1) governance change that shifts decision-making to private foundations, (2) creating parallel institutions for research and teaching, and (3) selective coercion to signal the punitive capacity of the government. Together, these dynamics produce a system of neoliberal precarity, where academic freedom is not eliminated through open repression, but disciplined through establishment of structural insecurity.

Governance Reforms (Modellváltás) 

A crucial mechanism of this transformation is the “model change” reforms that were presented by the government as a step toward greater institutional autonomy (Kováts, 2023). Since 2018, 75% of public universities in Hungary have been transformed, transferring decision-making power within universities from academic senates to boards of private foundations (Pimenta & Rónay, 2022) that own the universities. 

As a result of model change, private foundation boards became decision-making bodies controlling budgets, hiring practices, and strategic priorities. The regime achieved indirect control by planting politically loyal individuals, including high-profile government ministers and regime-aligned business elites to these boards. Often these board members hold lifetime appointments ensuring conservative control regardless of future political changes. 

Model-changed universities lost their public institution status; faculty were stripped of their public service status and the protections of tenure. The regime introduced contract-based employment where job security is contingent on neoliberal metrics such as publication outputs and grant acquisition. This structural insecurity now functions as a tool of discipline; by forcing faculty to focus on financial survival, the regime successfully diverts attention away from politically sensitive studies.

The Rise of Parallel Institutions for Ideological Dominance 

While the model change allowed the regime to capture existing public universities from within, it simultaneously sought to bypass traditional academic spaces by building and heavily investing in a parallel infrastructure of ideologically aligned institutions (Dillabough & Peto, 2024) to expand the regime-friendly ideological knowledge production in Hungary. Central to this infrastructure are institutions such as the National University of Public Service (UPS) and Mathias Corvinus Collegium (MCC). The establishment of UPS ensured that the recruitment and educational programs of public servants are structured to serve the ruling party. Similarly, MCC has become a centre for regime-aligned intellectuals and political lobbying that were tasked to legitimize the regime’s ideological projects. In contrast to neoliberal logic, where resource allocation is justified by fair and open competition, these institutions are funded far beyond competitive necessity. For example, in 2020, MCC’s endowment of approximately €1.3 billion represents more funding than the entire public higher education system in Hungary (Kovacs-Angel, 2021).

In addition to these educational institutions, the government has established several ideologically aligned research centres, such as the Veritas Historical Research Institute, the Centre for Fundamental Rights and others. These centres produce scholarship in fields that the regime has special interest ideologically, such as national history, minority rights, and judicial independence (Trencsényi, 2021). By channelling research funding into these centres the regime ensures that sensitive topics are studied mainly within their ideological narratives, while counter-narratives are marginalized. This creates a system where knowledge production is steered through financial tools rather than open censorship, excluding openly targeted fields.

When Soft Authoritarianism Fails

While the soft aspect of  transformation relies on repurposed neoliberal mechanisms, the authoritarian nature of the regime is revealed when these indirect methods prove insufficient, for example in the case of the forced relocation of Central European University (CEU), intervention into resistance at the University of Theatre and Film Arts (SZFE) (Jafarova & Buckner, 2024), and the elimination of programs in sociology, social anthropology, and gender studies. These actions signal a clear punitive capacity, demonstrating that the regime is willing to deploy legal and administrative coercion to establish control of academic spaces.

The Cost of Academic Freedom

The soft authoritarian reforms in Hungary have created a stratified academic environment where academic freedom comes at a cost. Universities that avoided the model change reforms maintained better conditions for academic freedom due to governance structures remaining free from direct political interference. However, these institutions remain chronically underfunded, forcing faculty to work under precarious financial conditions and even forcing universities to shut down campuses for in-person classes due to an inability to afford heating costs. 

Conversely, model-changed universities offer significantly higher salaries, but this financial advantage comes at the expense of academic freedom, as faculty lost their tenure and are now evaluated by neoliberal metrics that set indirect limitations to exercise freedom in research, teaching, and expression. In this new system, the most advantageous positions are occupied by scholars of parallel institutions and research centres; faculty here enjoy stable careers and secured funding, yet this emerging academic elite is driven by ideological conformity and regime expectations. Ultimately, these reforms have fundamentally transformed the Hungarian higher education system into a mechanism that reshaped knowledge production, narrowing the space for diverse scholarship and effectively taming academic freedom through structural insecurity and neoliberal precarity.

Hungary provides an alarming example of how governments can repurpose neoliberal mechanisms to utilize university campuses as ideologically safe spaces. This study reveals that soft authoritarianism does not require the elimination of dissent; instead, it utilizes structural insecurity to fragment the academic community and weaken collective solidarity. By redirecting funding through seemingly objective neoliberal metrics, the regime can gatekeep sensitive research areas like national history studies without resorting to open repression.

Zahra Jafarova is a Research Associate at the Centre for the Study of Canadian & International Higher Education at the University of Toronto, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (Canada). She recently defended her PhD in Higher Education, which examined how historical, political, and institutional forces shape academic freedom. Her research focuses on the policy and politics of higher education, with an emphasis on academic freedom and university autonomy. Her research has been published in Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, Globalisation, Societies and Education, and the Comparative Education Review. 

Bibliography

Dillabough, J. A., & Peto, A. (2024, May 4). New deceptions: How illiberalism is hijacking the university. University World News. https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20240501143215958

Jafarova, Z., & Buckner, E. (2024). Tweeting the academic resistance in Turkey and Hungary: From cultural crisis to defending the nation. Globalisation, Societies and Education, 0(0), 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/14767724.2024.2385549 

Kovacs-Angel, M. (2021, March 29). Százmilliárdokat adott a kormány a NER elitképzőjének, már látszik, hogy hová folyik tovább a pénz. 24.Hu. https://24.hu/fn/gazdasag/2021/03/29/mathias-corvinus-collegium-mcc-balasy-gyula-kommunikacio/ 

Kováts, G. (2023). University Governance Reform in an Illiberal Democracy: Public Interest Trusts in Hungary. In Accelerating the Future of Higher Education (pp. 186–204). Brill. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004680371_012 

Pimenta, C. L. R., & Rónay, Z. (2022). Governance models of Hungarian higher education: From Humboldtian to State-controlled model. Rivista Di Storia Dell’Educazione, 9(2), Article 2. https://doi.org/10.36253/rse-12335 

Trencsényi, B. (2021, April 26). Notes from the Underground: Academic Freedom, (Un)Civil Society, and “Kulturkampf” in Hungary [Billet]. TRAFO – Blog for Transregional Research. https://trafo.hypotheses.org/27529

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It’s something of a truism to say that Brexit is a process, not an event, but nowhere is this more evident than in the UK’s continuing difficulties in managing the pieces of legislation it adopted during its time as a member state of the European Union (EU).

As we close in on a decade since the 2016 referendum, it is apparent that there is still no final and definitive list of that legislation, nor clarity about what should be done with it all. With multiple negotiations in train on renewed cooperation between the UK and the EU, that will raise increasing problems for both sides.

Following withdrawal, the then-Conservative government largely turned its back on things European; partly because of the Covid-19 pandemic and partly because of the intense discomfort the issue had wrecked within the party over the previous decade. But one area that continued to pop its head up was Retained EU Law (REUL) – assorted Statutory Instruments, primary and secondary EU legislation, case law and more which the UK adopted as a member state, and copied over as ‘assimilated’ UK law during the Brexit process.

Business Secretary, Jacob Rees-Mogg, introduced legislation in September 2022 which would see all REUL expire by default at the end of 2023 under a ‘sunset clause’, except in cases where ministers actively chose to retain or reform specific pieces. That legislation, which was to become the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act, was intended to mark a definitive break with REUL and a restoration of British sovereignty.

However, it very quickly became apparent that there was no clear record on what that might cover, which made it impossible to know whether it served any useful function or whether revocation might cause unanticipated consequences for either domestic or international obligations. With much push-back from legal scholars, businesses and other groups, as well as backbench rebellions, the final Act took a much more limited approach, abandoning the sunset clause and instead revoking only 600 items of REUL, while instigating a process for identification and review of everything else.

This process centres on a database – the REUL dashboard – which details every known item of REUL and case of reform. It has just had its regular six-monthly update, to list some 6,925 items, alongside regular reports to Parliament on progress.

The latest update is the eight substantive revision of the database from its original 2,417 items in January 2023 and marks approximately two years since the last step-change in the overall picture. Back in early 2024, over 1,700 new items were added, following the completion of a new scoping exercise across Whitehall.

Since that point, a further 168 items have joined the list, including 14 in the most recent period. This discovery includes EU decisions similar to those that have been on the Dashboard for years, and domestic legislation nearly 30 years old, highlighting the difficulty of ensuring a comprehensive coverage.

But such top line figures, which are the lead indicator on the Dashboard, mask a second kind of problem; namely that the data isn’t as robust as you might expect, or as is needed for this entire exercise to have meaning.

The database still contains several items that are there as queries as to their possible inclusion. Such cases have occurred before – for instance the removal of initial entries about the effect of several articles of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.

There are also instances where multiple references to specific provisions of an item have been rolled into a single entry, as with the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992, which started as four separate elements.

However, more common has been a one-off entry that appears to be within scope of the REUL Act, but then seems to disappear. To pick one example, the January 2023 list mentions Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/631, which appears to have been revoked in 2020, but then disappears from the database entirely. While this might be understandable as something pre-dating the exercise, it is noticeable that the previous item in the database, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/63, was similarly repealed in 2023, but still remains present.

Different again is the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The January 2023 entry clearly indicates its role in implementing an EU Council Decision that was subsequently listed in the database, but which makes no reference back to the Act. While these might be treated as a package, the lack of complete cross-linkage makes it very hard to know what item has what status.

In total, while there are 6,925 entries in the current Dashboard, it is possible to identify approximately 7,500 unique entries across the period since the first release. Some 600 items that appeared at some point in the past (often more than once) are absent from the Dashboard today.

Such inconsistencies are a function of the complexity of the UK’s membership of the EU. Some 40 years of incorporating a large volume of legislation – often through secondary instruments – with no immediate need to keep comprehensive and exhaustive records has left an almost impossible task for those in the Department of Business and Trade who run the Dashboard.

However, given that the programme of reviewing Assimilated EU Law appears continues under the Labour government, with 22 amendments and 19 repeals in the last six months, the need for clear, consistent and accessible data remains as high as ever.

At the same time, the demand on resources within the civil service to conduct such reviews also represents an opportunity cost, especially at a time when the government is embarking on multiple negotiations to pull the UK closer towards the EU in legislation-rich topics such as sanitary and phytosanitary standards and emissions trading.

Absent a clear strategic objective, there is a risk that officials spend time reviewing, amending or repealing REUL which they will soon have to be reinstate or amend once again: from decisions about SPS processes to regulations verification of emissions data.

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Although the COVID-19 pandemic seems something of the past and meanwhile overshadowed by other crises, we should still remember its profound impact on public health, people, employment and businesses. In 2020, the real GDP in the EU fell by more than 6%, which was higher than during the 2008 financial crisis. The management of the crisis was clearly dominated by national as well as by regional and local governments. Nevertheless, the EU also introduced massive economic and fiscal measures and departed from the austerity policy following the 2008 financial crisis. The EU amended its budget, created new loans, activated the general escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact and expanded the lending capacity of the European Stability Mechanism. Most importantly, the Member States agreed the largest stimulus package in the history of the EU: Next Generation EU (NGEU), which was worth €750 billion financed by joint borrowing.  The key instrument of NGEU was the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), providing €672.5 billion in loans and grants to support reforms and investments undertaken by the Member States.

Given the scale and multilevel nature of the EU’s intervention, our recent JCMS article takes a close look at the EU’s socio-economic responses to the COVID-19 crisis. By analysing existing decision-making procedures and democratic practices, principles of good governance and effective performance, we draw conclusions about the political legitimacy of the RRF and we discuss how the legacy of this measure may shape future governance arrangements.

There is a strong rationale for governments to take fast and extraordinary actions during crises, circumventing and even breaking existing conventions, procedures and rules. However, crisis management may not only challenge the political legitimacy of these actions but may also result in permanent changes to a system of governance. Therefore, we considered who took and authorised decisions and whether this was in line with existing democratic practices, and whether the input legitimacy of the EU’s crisis response (as conceptionalised by Schmidt 2022) was compromised.  Similar to previous crises (as discussed in the literature on new intergovernmentalism, e.g. Puetter 2016 and Bickerton et al. 2014), decisions were dominated by the European Council and the Commission and negotiated behind closed doors. The latter set the RRF’s policy objectives and governance structure to which the former agreed. During 2021 and 2022, Member States then had to submit national Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRP) with detailed targets, milestones, estimated costs and proposals for structural reforms. The RRPs were designed in close bilateral cooperation with the Commission, which gained the authority to decide together with the Council over their implementation.

As during previous crises (see e.g. White 2022 and Kreuder-Sonnen 2016), the newly introduced EU measures lacked transparency, accountability and judicial scrutiny. To capture these, our article also focuses on the RRF’s so-called throughput legitimacy: namely, on its compliance with rules, efficient governance, public engagement and access to information about decision-making processes, and the inclusion of (territorial) interest groups. The RRF is a performance-based instrument that is assessed and disbursed based on the fulfilment of specific milestones and targets outlined in the RRPs. Various criteria (e.g., population size, GDP per capita and unemployment levels) and formats (e.g., the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard, performance audits by the European Court of Auditors, Recovery and Resilience Dialogues, evaluation reports) were introduced to enhance the accountability and transparency of allocation of RRF funding. Yet, our article traces various issues regarding the transparency of policymaking. Only two thirds of Member States committed to publishing detailed information about the implementation of the RRPs.

It is often suggested (e.g. by Lindgren and Persson 2010) that the EU’s legitimacy relies largely on its output legitimacy, meaning on its ability to deliver effective results to the satisfaction of its Member States and citizens. It is fair to say that the RRF has supported substantial reforms within the Member States, but rather than stimulating new innovations many RRPs have not dealt with structural challenges and only supported outstanding reforms that would have been carried out anyway. The scope of the RRPs has also varied considerably. While RRPs in Italy, Spain and Greece were ambitious targeting structural challenges of labour markets or tax systems, in northern Member States RRF funding is relatively small in comparison to GDP (less than 1%) and reforms played a minor role in their RRPs. Whereas the RRF financed measures to support employment, living standards and social protection, the funding was insufficient and too short-termed to drive a sustainable green and digital transformation. Inflation and supply shortages increased the costs of investment substantially, and the administrative workload undermined the distribution of funding and delayed the delivery of milestones and targets. We conclude in our article that due to the exclusion of subnational governments in the development of the RRPs in many Member States, the delivery of the RRPs was often inefficient and failed to meet local and regional priorities and needs.

Despite some shortcomings, we suggest that the legitimacy of European crisis governance rests on its ability to deal with complex, transnational issues to the satisfaction of the Member States rather than on its democratic credentials. Whereas this may not come as a big surprise, it is particularly significant to highlight that exceptional provisions introduced during crisis are subsequently adopted and normalised within future governance frameworks. While the Commission and Member States have empowered themselves, place-based principles and multilevel partnerships with subnational governments, which were strengthened during previous decades in areas such as Cohesion Policy, are currently under threat. In its proposal for the new Multiannual Financial Framework 2028-2034, the Commission has adopted the RRF’s approach and seeks to maintain performance-based policy programmes and centralised planning with targets, milestones and structural reforms. This fosters exclusive top-down policymaking at the cost of inclusive bottom-up approaches. Two years of complex negotiations lie ahead, during which adjustments to budget items, the EU’s institutional design and the redistribution of power between the European, national and subnational levels are at stake. We do not know for sure yet what the outcome will be and to what extent it will be the legacy of the crisis.

Marius Guderjan is a Fellow at the Centre for British Studies at Humboldt-Universität Berlin, and used to work at the Otto Suhr Institute of Political Science at Freie Universität Berlin. His research interests include European integration, multilevel governance, intergovernmental relations and territorial politics; including the book Local Government in the European Union.

Website: https://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/en/polwiss/forschung/systeme/polsystem/Team/Marius-Guderjan.html

Mario Kölling is Professor in the Department of Political Science at the Spanish National Distance Education University (UNED), Madrid, and Senior Researcher at the Fundación Manuel Giménez Abad. His research focuses on methodological issues related to territorial decentralisation and multilevel governance. He has published extensively on the European Union budget.

Website: https://www.uned.es/universidad/docentes/politicas-sociologia/mario-kolling.html

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The photo accompanying this article shows the memorial stone at the site of the Nazi extermination camp based in Treblinka, Poland.

It was one of over 40,000 death camps and incarceration centres purposely built to mass-murder or enslave millions of people during Hitler’s regime.

I drove to Treblinka in 1991. It was one of the most desolate, moving experiences of my life. It was dusk and I was there all alone.

I wanted to write ‘not another soul’.

But all around me I could feel hanging in the air and deep in the ground the souls of the estimated 900,000 innocent people, who had been methodically and efficiently slaughtered in the camp’s six gas chambers.

There was a sinister silence all around. This was a most evil, awful place, and always will be.

The Nazis, in an attempt to avoid responsibility for their crimes, hastily destroyed much of the camp as they retreated from the advance of the ‘liberating’ Russian Red Army.

𝗧𝗼𝗱𝗮𝘆, 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘀𝗶𝘁𝗲 𝗼𝗳 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗰𝗮𝗺𝗽, 𝗶𝗻 𝗮 𝗯𝗮𝗿𝗲, 𝗯𝗹𝗲𝗮𝗸, 𝗰𝗹𝗲𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗶𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗺𝗶𝗱𝗱𝗹𝗲 𝗼𝗳 𝗮 𝗵𝘂𝗴𝗲, 𝗺𝗲𝗻𝗮𝗰𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘄𝗼𝗼𝗱, 𝗶𝘀 𝗽𝘂𝗻𝗰𝘁𝘂𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝘄𝗶𝘁𝗵 𝗵𝘂𝗻𝗱𝗿𝗲𝗱𝘀 𝗼𝗳 𝘀𝗵𝗮𝗿𝗱𝘀 𝗼𝗳 𝗿𝗼𝗰𝗸, 𝗰𝗮𝗿𝗲𝗳𝘂𝗹𝗹𝘆 𝗽𝗹𝗮𝗰𝗲𝗱 𝗶𝗻 𝗺𝗲𝗺𝗼𝗿𝘆 𝗼𝗳 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘃𝗶𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗺𝘀.

I prayed for them all before driving away. All the souls, but especially my grandparents, who it had been understood from patchy family history, were murdered there.

As darkness began to fall, I got completely lost trying to navigate the road leading from the camp, in the middle of the never-ending dense woods, through which light could barely penetrate, and it seemed didn’t want to either.

There were no other cars on the road, no street lighting, no signs, no satnav. For a long while I thought I’d never find a way out of there, and if I did, I never, ever wanted to go back.

But at least I can live to say that.

The memorial stone at Treblinka pleads in more than one language: “Never again”

MY GRANDPARENTS

Because of my family history, hearing the name ‘Treblinka’ always created a deep spasm in the pit of my stomach.

In recent years, however, I have learnt from new research that I am still checking out, that my grandparents – Bertold and Helena Danzig – were not sent to the Treblinka extermination camp.

As a result of meticulous documentation left behind by the Nazi regime, and carefully pieced together by compassionate researchers, I now understand they were sent by train to the Sobibór camp, in Nazi-occupied Poland.

Sobibór was an extermination camp, not a concentration camp. Its sole purpose was mass murder, almost exlusively of Jewish people.

According to a recently published database of victims, Bertold was despatched to Sobibór on Transport Ax, no. 709 from Terezín in Czechoslovakia on 9 May 1942.

Helena was despatched on Transport Ax, no. 710 on the same day.

The train journey itself would have been unbearable.

Sobibór had only just been made fully operational as a place of mass extermination in the middle of May 1942.

So, if the train record is correct, my grandparents would have been among the first to perish there.

Soon after they arrived at the camp – separated even before the train journey began – my grandparents would have been told that they were in a transit camp.

Quaint buildings at the front of the camp would have hidden its true, deceitful, notorious purpose.

Assembled with all the other condemned passengers on the railway siding, SS-Oberscharführer Hermann Michel made a speech to them.

He wore a white coat to give the impression he was a doctor.

Michel announced that they would be sent to work. But before this they would have to take baths and undergo disinfection, to prevent the spread of diseases.

We know this from the testimony given in the trials that followed the war.

The men and women were all separated. Everyone, including my grandparents, would be told to completely undress.

All the women had their hair unceremoniously shaven off with brutal and speedy efficiency.

Then, the train passengers of that day would be led through the “Tube” into chambers, where Bertold and Helena would have been gruesomely gassed.

In total, some 170,000 to 250,000 innocent people were murdered at the Sobibór death camp.

• Photo of Treblinka death camp adapted from a colour photo by Adrian Grycuk – Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0 pl

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