This scholarship has supported my one-week stay in Brasília. The award was spent on return flights to Brussels and accommodation fees. This fieldwork trip forms an integral part of my PhD research, as it allowed me to meet interviews in-person, observe their work in Embassies and in the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Itamaraty.

National Museum of the Republic designed by Oscar Niemeyer 

Understanding Brasília as a city geared towards diplomacy

I arrived in Brasília in the late afternoon, around 19h. Given Brazil’s position in relation to the Equator it means that it always becomes dark around 17h. I called my uber to the hotel and observed from the ride the city in the dark. You could already tell the white round brutalist Nieymer buildings from a distance: quiet, clean, and extremely well planned – to the smallest details. Every corner, every roundabout, every building was not there by chance. This was the view of a city who was entirely designed for civil servants, like career diplomats. In my walks to the interview locations, I would notice that, instead of street signs, you have country flags. ‘Turn right, into Wing South, for the Spanish, Peruvian, Paraguayan Embassy in SQN345,’ said the GPS. Having been only founded in the 1960s, the notion of space and time in Brasília us designed by its diplomatic headquarters, rather than schools, hospitals, or even commercial buildings. For a diplomacy nerd like me, Brasília was almost being like a kid in Disneyland.

After having done nearly three years of fieldwork in Brussels about how the EU – Brazil multi-level partnership works in practice, I came to Brasília with the goal of understanding how this is being done on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. From afar, which is often where the researcher is, one can read about these practices through joint statements of the EU – Brazil Strategic Partnership, public statements from political leaders, or through social media posts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the European External Action Service. I have also heard the side of the story from Brussels, by conducting interviews with European and Brazilian diplomats stationed there. Yet, what I have realised in the last three years of talking to diplomats is that, as a researcher who is interested in knowing about the nitty-gritty details of world politics, more often than not, it is not enough to just hear, if you are interested in diplomatic practices. There is an imperceptible value in the mundane, every day, routine aspects of diplomacy. Details, such as informal discussions, diplomatic demarches, lunches with colleagues, which we often regard as irrelevant. But, as political ethnographers will tell you: it is about making the familiar strange, and the strange familiar.

Itamaraty Palace

Making the familiar strange and the strange familiar

For this reason, I wanted to have a grasp of how this partnership was viewed from those working in Brasília: how did the EU matter in the current geopolitical landscape for Brazil? Was the EU important in Brasília in the day-to-day tasks of Brazilian diplomats working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? Do they meet frequently or not at all? What did an everyday of a Brazilian and European diplomat looked like in Brasília? More concretely, what diplomatic practices help to sustain cooperation when there is political contestation? Given that my focus rests on tracing the logic behind these diplomatic practices to understand how they matter in world politics, my fieldwork in Brasília was informed by an ethnographic approach towards practice-tracing. In other words, I conducted several (on and off the record) interviews with Brazilian and

European diplomats about their routines in Brasília, and spent some dedicated time to observing the spaces (embassies, receptions, waiting halls, cafeterias, institutional buildings, offices) in which they circulate in. It is important to note that this fieldwork in Brasília would not have happened without UACES’s support through the PhD Fieldwork Fellowship, of which I was lucky to have been selected.

The EU and Brazil have shared a strategic partnership since 2007; however, this has not been without its political crises. Due to the nature of democracy, political governments, with different visions about world politics, change throughout time. Some governments, such as the current one in Brazil are more favourable to having a strong partnership with the EU, while others, such as the government of Bolsonaro, have not. In October 2026, Brazil is heading towards another Presidential election. While Lula enjoys a narrow majority, Bolsonaro’s son, Flávio Bolsonaro, is doing well in the electoral race, too. How can then the career diplomats working in Brasília ensure that there is continuity in this partnership, knowing that in October 2026, the political willingness of the Brazilian government might change soon? In the specific case of the everyday cooperation between Brazil and the EU, interviewees revealed these relational strategies are key to ensuring continuity in their cooperation.

Looking back at the interviews I had with diplomats in Brasília, one thing is certain: the devil is in the details. The current geopolitical and societal landscape is certainly forcing diplomats to adapt to new realities: both Brazilian and European diplomats are being faced with structural challenges as to how diplomacy is done. To be a diplomat entails no longer the traditional political work of mediation but demands that career diplomats are able to work in different policy fields. As one of the interviewees explained to me, ‘diplomats are like radar people’, that is, diplomats need to be able to anticipate potential political storms ahead, and if so, to know how – and most importantly whom to talk to – to deal with it. In times of growing political turmoil, interviewees revealed that there can be certain relational strategies and rituals which help to manoeuvre potential disruptions. For example, having a coffee with your regular diplomatic counterpart, a short phone call to update on negotiations, or a diplomatic demarche can often help to facilitate the continuation of international cooperation.

Hallway, while waiting for an interview (somewhere in Brasília)

Methodological challenges: positionality, confidentiality and trust

Nevertheless, it is important to note that this fieldwork was not without its challenges. While, in theory, doable, access to these elite spaces is not always easy for a researcher. These are often closed-door and secretive rooms for diplomats: an essential part of diplomacy, yet the one that is probably the most hidden away. In effect, this was one of the issues that I encountered in preparation and during my fieldwork in Brasília. To prepare for my fieldwork, I drew in from my own professional network which I have built for over the last three years for contacts (and willingness to meet, which made a world of difference). Yet, during my interviews, I still encountered some issues about questions of confidentiality. For example, one of the most insightful conversations I had was not recorded given that it was more informal and to respect the privacy of the interviewee. The fact that I did not record it allowed me as well to build a level of trust which would have not been possible otherwise. While ethnographic is an incredibly rich methodology, it does raise some considerable questions about how to study such an elite can demand significant trade-offs in research.

In conclusion, the fieldwork in Brasília became a crucial part of my doctoral research. Often times, research in international relations tends to focus on the understanding the macro picture of diplomatic relations between different countries, yet, it is crucial to not lose sight of the fact that world politics takes place between every day human interactions.

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On 9 May 2026, we celebrate Europe Day and the fourth anniversary of the closing event of the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE) hailed as a landmark transnational democratic experiment. During CoFoE hundreds of randomly selected citizens from all EU Member States deliberated alongside Members of European Parliament (MEPs) and national parliaments (MPs), producing far‑reaching recommendations for the European Union’s future.

Yet, for all the fanfare, the political follow‑up has been sobering. Most visibly, member state governments have declined to open the process of treaty reform based on the Conference’s proposals, despite the European Parliament’s plea to do so. While the CoFoE inspired a new generation of European Commission’s Citizens Panels and made them a permanent feature of the EU’s participatory toolbox, these deliberative fora remain largely disconnected from parliamentary arenas where political conflict and decision‑making actually take place. At the same time, the EU and its member states are experiencing the crisis of representative democracy manifested by decreasing trust in parliaments, increasing polarisation, populist electoral gains and widespread citizens’ dissatisfaction with democracy in general.

Four years on, one uncomfortable question looms: is the EU drifting towards a model of citizen participation that is rich in symbolism, but thin on political impact and true connection with representative policy-making?

Our recent JCMS article analyses how both MEPs and MPs talk about increased citizen participation in EU policy‑making. We depart from the premise that citizen participation is more likely to gain attention and appreciation from members of parliament when it is institutionally “coupled” with representation and the formal policy-making stage. To achieve our goal, we examine debates in the European Parliament, inter-parliamentary committee meetings, and several national parliaments between 2020 and 2023. We explore the underlying factors behind these positions, such as party ideology, institutional level, and views on European integration. Based on this analysis, we develop a refined typology of political discourses on EU‑level deliberative mini‑publics (DMPs), distinguishing between consultative, sceptical and power‑sharing stances.

A consultative Union – by design

Our first key finding is both simple and striking: across arenas and party families, a consultative discourse clearly dominates which means that parliamentarians overwhelmingly appreciate citizen participation and see value in deliberative mechanisms – as long as they remain advisory and do not fundamentally redistribute decision‑making power. In this discourse, citizens should be regularly asked, listened to, and perhaps even involved “permanently,” but final authority must stay firmly with elected representatives.

In practice, it suggests that most parliamentarians support what we call a “consultative Union”: a system where citizen participation is welcomed, but structurally non‑binding. The Commission citizens panels fit this logic very well – they create new spaces for citizen input, yet their policy-shaping potential remains largely discretionary.

MPs and MEPs: more similar than you might think

The second and unexpected finding concerns the relationship between national and European parliamentary arenas. While we might expect supranational MEPs to be more supportive than national MPs of transnational citizen involvement in EU policy-making, and national MPs to be more sceptical of EU‑level participatory innovations, our analysis suggests otherwise. We find no significant discursive differences between MEPs and MPs.

Such finding not only confirms that political conflict increasingly cuts across, rather than between, the national and supranational levels but is also normatively important since any EU participatory instrument that aspires to be more than window‑dressing needs the support of both national and European parliamentarians. The example of CoFoE showed how quickly legitimacy clashes emerge when that support is uneven.

Power‑sharing or populist plebiscites?

Perhaps the most politically explosive insight from our study is that not all calls for “giving power back to the people” mean the same thing. At first glance, there seems to be substantial support for what we label power‑sharing discourse: representatives who are willing to put citizens on an equal footing with politicians and accept binding forms of citizen involvement in EU decision‑making.

But once we look closely, this power‑sharing discourse splits into two very different strands.

In what we call deliberative power‑sharing discourse parliamentarians advocate binding deliberative mechanisms whose recommendations would directly shape EU reforms – and see citizens as partners in co‑constructing policy. This language is most prominent among Greens/EFA, the radical left and some liberal actors, who stress that strong participation can reinforce representative democracy.

On the other hand, plebiscitary power‑sharing discourse opposes institutionalized, transnational citizen deliberation postulating instead referendums that bypass parliaments and EU institutions. This strand is particularly visible among Eurosceptic and far‑right representatives, who demand EU‑wide referendums on European questions and present them as the only “real” expression of the people’s will.

This finding matters for how we interpret populism’s relationship to democratic innovation. It shows that far‑right and hard Eurosceptic parties may be enthusiastic about direct‑democracy instruments, yet deeply hostile to transnational deliberative settings such as CoFoE due to their distrust of EU‑organised participatory forums as biased or manipulated. Instead, they favour top‑down referendums whose questions and framing they hope to control. In this plebiscitary power‑sharing discourse, citizens are invoked less as co‑deliberators and more as a weapon, or at least a legitimating force for decisions aimed at weakening EU institutions.

Beyond consultation: reconnecting citizens and parliaments

What follows from these findings for the EU’s broader “citizen turn” is that the real challenge is not to invent ever more participatory instruments, but to better connect existing deliberative experiments to representative politics at both EU and national levels.

Our study suggests that while many politicians are not opposed to citizen involvement per se, they are often wary of deliberative designs that either sideline them or appear to instrumentalise citizens. This is precisely why thinking seriously about institutional linkages matters: for example, involving both MEPs and national MPs in transnational citizens’ assemblies, or hosting pan‑European citizen panels in national parliaments during rotating EU Council presidencies.

At the moment, the Commission‑led citizens’ panels risk reproducing the main weakness of CoFoE: citizens are invited to deliberate, but their recommendations are only loosely coupled to the arenas where political conflict is structured and decisions are actually taken. This fuels suspicion that participation serves primarily to legitimise pre‑set policy trajectories – “democracy without politics”, as some have called it.

Karolina Borońska-Hryniewiecka is Associate Professor at the Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Science, and Associated Research Fellow at the CESSP, Paris 1 – Panthéon Sorbonne. She is currently leading an NCN OPUS-funded project exploring transnational political discourse on EU institutional reform. Her work appeared in, among others, West European Politics, European Political Science Review, Journal of European Integration, and Parliamentary Affairs.

Jan Kotýnek Krotký is Assistant Professor at the International Institute of Political Science, Masaryk University. He is currently leading a post-doctoral project on citizen participation in the EU, supported by the Czech Science Foundation. His articles appeared in journals such as West European Politics, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, and European Security.

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Out of these moments has much research emerged. To take one example, the 2004 volcanic ash cloud that closed transatlantic air transport for over a week, trapping hundreds of European international relations scholars in Canada as their conference was ending, reputedly produced dozens of articles, funding bids and collaborative networks as people found they had time to sit, talk, brainstorm and advance ideas that might otherwise have been lost to the constant pressures of managing a regular workload.

All of which is to say that the advancement of knowledge through research doesn’t follow a straight or foreseeable path. And the growing focus of funding bodies on strategic priorities risks undermining the valuable possibilities that come from a rich and supportive research environment.

The move towards funding priority topics is partly understandable by the desire of funders to demonstrate their direct contribution to areas of political and public interest: research for gain instead of research for its own sake, if you will. In an age of tightening budgets, performance metrics and stakeholder accountability the incentives are clear.

But we now find ourselves at risk of moving too far in this direction.

Firstly, the world moves fast and uncertainly. If priorities are updated too slowly, then we risk missing important new agendas, but if they move too quickly, there is a danger that funding never lasts long enough to allow for the production of sufficiently deep analysis and findings. Supporting researchers to follow many paths – that may for time to time becoming more salient – actually improves the ability to speak to changing needs.

Secondly, priority relies on the existence of a pool of experienced researchers who can bid into designated pots of funding. But if there isn’t the support to allow such people to learn and develop in the absence of targeted monies, then the upsides of prioritisation are severely eroded.

And finally, research has never been just about material benefits. The pursuit of knowledge – in all its forms – is a human endeavour, with intrinsic value. Just as higher education can’t be simply a vehicle for getting a better-paid job, so too must research retain its wider purpose of supporting our understanding of the world and of ourselves.

That means we need to protect funding streams both within individual institutions and from external funders to allow researchers the opportunity to pursue their own agendas and ideas, and to be able to share, discuss and develop them with their communities of practice.

Having been a chair of UACES, which brings together European Studies researchers from across the world and from multiple disciplines, I have been repeatedly delighted and educated by what the rich tapestry of a vibrant and mutually supportive research environment can bring to my own work and to the full range of stakeholders, from politicians to the general public, activists to journalists.

If we can continue to preserve the value of supporting research in the broadest sense then we can not only make targeted funding work more effectively and sustainably, but also ensure that the broadest values of research are protected and shared with everyone.

Simon Usherwood is Professor of Politics and International Studies at the Open University and former Chair of UACES.

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Image from Education under Attack / Save Schools in Ukraine: https://saveschools.in.ua/en/

Kateryna Suprun

In the increasingly turbulent economic environment facing many European higher education institutions (HEIs) (Pruvot et al., 2025), performance-based funding (PBF) remains a popular instrument for allocating at least part of core public funding (European Commission, 2023). Traditionally, PBF involves governments rewarding HEIs for meeting specific objectives – an approach often assumed to improve university performance (Kivistö & Mathies, 2023). Yet a key question is: does steering by incentives actually change how HEIs work, or does it merely encourage them to look good on paper?

In my recent article (Suprun 2026) published in the Policy Reviews of Higher Education, I draw on the strategic response framework (Oliver, 1991) to establish if the PBF policy recently adopted in Ukraine has made HEIs change their internal practices. Guided by interviews, surveys and document analysis, I explore the lived experiences of 22 public HEIs between 2020 and 2022 and invite their reflections on the revival of the PBF policy in 2024 amid a protracted military crisis. This approach allows tracing how Ukrainian HEIs have responded to the PBF policy and to which extent they have internalised its expectations.

From Policy Design to Institutional Practice

The PBF policy implementation in Ukraine tells a story of policy relevance shaped by political power struggles. Formulated against a backdrop of vested interests, an inflated higher education network, and a historical reliance on student numbers, the PBF policy aimed to make public funding transparent, apply uniform performance indicators, and strengthen better performing HEIs. It was introduced during the policy window of 2020, facilitated by the political turnover, became suspended with the outbreak of the all-in Russian war in 2022, and returned to the policy agenda in 2024, after yet another change of government.

The PBF design has undergone changes in each year of its active implementation, signalling an incremental transition pathway, political volatility and war-induced adjustments of the performance metrics. The resulting fragmented and contested implementation of the PBF policy – often associated with ‘gaming the results’ (Mathies et al., 2020) – calls for its analysis from the perspective of HEIs as street-level bureaucrats tasked with its day-to-day execution.

The strategic responses of the consulted HEIs towards the PBF policy closely correspond to their gains or losses from its implementation: winners tend to comply, while others engage in compromise and manipulation. PBF beneficiaries find it easy to follow the PBF rules: they perceive the PBF targets consistent with their university goals and view the PBF logic beneficial for institutional effectiveness. At the same time, their reported dependence on PBF is modest – ranging from just a few percent to no more than one third of core budget, – supporting the argument that high-performing universities advance their work regardless of PBF incentives (Shea & Hara, 2020).

In contrast, loss-exposed HEIs feel coerced towards PBF, consider its metrics constraining, and experience uncertainty in their financial prospects. Paradoxically, these are precisely the institutions that rely most heavily on PBF disbursements, with some depending on them for up to 70% of their public funding. As the organisational responses of universities are clearly differentiated, the question is if those receiving larger incentives are more inclined to steer by performance internally.

How Universities Adapted Internally – and Where They Did Not

The data indicate changes taking place in most of the engaged Ukrainian HEIs, with several clearly emerging trends. PBF beneficiaries are particularly active in introducing internal performance structures and funding models that mirror or adapt the system-level metrics. The reported changes to institutional policies and practices concentrate primarily on the performance areas of external research funding and internationalisation. While the universities adversely affected by PBF have attempted to become more performance-driven, their efforts were reversed with the temporary halt of the national policy in 2022 – unlike those of PBF-winning HEIs who continued with performance practices.

The PBF policy has also produced a few unintended consequences, hindering institutional changes. Limited coordination among national authorities has triggered audits of universities, making them comply simultaneously with the PBF policy and its preceding regulations on student-staff ratio and pay scales. Confronted with these contradictory demands, many HEIs continued to base their financial planning on the outdated model of historical funding.

The one-size-fits-all design of the PBF model, favouring research-intensive and internationally-exposed HEIs, has too yielded frequent grievances on the part of the financially vulnerable HEIs, lacking research capacity and global networks. Finally, the zero-sum logic of the PBF policy and restricted financial autonomy have discouraged or disabled some HEIs to act on the performance targets.

Implications for Policy and Practice

The case of Ukraine shows that HEIs adapt internally when they feel aligned with policy objectives, capable of introducing changes and engaged to the decision-making process. Albeit counterintuitively, the PBF policy volatility appears to function as a double-edged sword: while universities are caught in a perpetual turbulence, frequent revisions also reduce the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour.

Importantly, most consulted HEIs recognise the relevance of the PBF mechanism also in times of protracted war. However, their testimonies highlight unresolved inquiries beyond the current design of the PBF policy: do policy-makers acknowledge the value brought by HEIs through their third mission activities? And if so, how can they be measured and incentivised in a transparent and objective manner?  Whether future iterations of the PBF policy will be able to address these challenges remains to be seen.

Kateryna Suprun is a Doctoral Researcher at the Faculty of Management and Business, Tampere University, Finland, and a member of the Higher Education Group. Her research explores policy implementation in higher education, with a focus on performance-based funding models and Ukraine. She has previously worked at the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine on higher education and digital transformation policies, alongside emergency humanitarian planning and resource mobilisation. She has also held various roles under the World Bank, European Commission, and European Higher Education Area frameworks.

Bibliography:

European Commission. (2023). Final report of the study on the state and effectiveness of national funding systems of higher education to support the European universities initiative. Volume I. Publications Office. https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2766/885757

Kivistö, J., & Mathies, C. (2023). Incentives, rationales, and expected impact: Linking performance-based research funding to internal funding distributions of universities. In B. Lepori, B. Jongbloed, & D. Hicks (Eds), Handbook of Public Funding of Research (pp. 186–202). Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781800883086.00019

Mathies, C., Kivistö, J., & Birnbaum, M. (2020). Following the money? Performance-based funding and the changing publication patterns of Finnish academics. Higher Education, 79(1), 21–37. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-019-00394-4

Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes. The Academy of Management Review, 16(1), 145. https://doi.org/10.2307/258610

Pruvot, E., Estermann, T., & Popkhadze, N. (2025). Financially sustainable universities. State of play and strategies for future resilience. European University Association. https://www.eua.eu/images/Funding_briefing_final.pdf

Shea, S. O., & Hara, J. O. (2020). The impact of Ireland’s new higher education system performance framework on institutional planning towards the related policy objectives. Higher Education, 80(2), 335–351.

Suprun, K. (2026). Implementation of the performance-based funding policy in Ukrainian higher education: impact on institutional behaviour? Policy Reviews in Higher Education, 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/23322969.2026.2622677

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Yet, the goosebumps are a momentary experience, and quickly go away as the conversation shifts to the months and years that followed. The tone gets more sour and frustrated. From a powerful innovation signifying European resolve, since 2024, the EPF has been completely blocked by the assertiveness of Hungarian vetoes. The officials I interview often use this as an example to show me that, although we tend to see the EU’s reaction to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine as an ideal case of unity, consensus is not part of the equation at all.

How and why, then, has internal disagreement not impeded a common response in support of Ukraine? The conventional wisdom – that EU foreign policy action requires unanimity – cannot explain this.

My PhD starts from a different premise. Full agreement is a lot to ask of a group of twenty-seven Member States bound together by a sprawling institutional architecture and a multiplicity of tools, but torn apart by diverging interests and strategic cultures. In a decision-making machinery still dominated by unanimity, collective action does not require the elimination of disagreement by channelling twenty-seven voices into one. It requires organising twenty-seven voices into patterns of complementarity rather than contradiction.

These are the theoretical propositions I carried with me back and forth in my Eurostar journeys from London to Brussels since January 2026, when I began my fieldwork, generously supported by the UACES PhD Fieldwork Scholarship.

What I Am Finding: Complementarity, Not Unity 

The central conceptual move emerging from my research is a shift away from thinking about EU unity as the enabling factor of common external action to thinking about complementarity.

The dominant framing treats EU unity and consensus as necessary conditions for EU presence on the global stage: either it ‘speaks with one voice’ or it fragments into competing national positions. A holistic analysis of those cases that are considered closest to ideal types in this binary – Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the Gaza conflict – reveals something this dichotomy cannot capture.

By taking into account the multiplicity of actions across the Union’s multi-actor, multi-method, multi-level system of foreign policy, one starts seeing a different picture. It is the management of conflict and disagreement – not consensus – that enables EU external action, which can exist in multiple forms short of unity. What matters is not whether agreement can be found in the Council, but whether EU institutions and Member States act, in practice, to fill the gaps left by one another.

The EU’s multi-centred architecture – its multiple voices – does not merely constrain action, but provides avenues through which action can be routed around blockages at any given level. The European Peace Facility is a particularly successful and evident example of this: where disagreement existed, and common competencies lacked to support the provision of lethal equipment to Ukraine, the Commission provided EU financing through off-budget mechanisms, Member States delivered weapons bilaterally, and the EEAS coordinated. Each maintained its distinctive organisational approach, but these were structured to complement each other. No preference convergence or further integration occurred, but institutional innovations and procedural flexibility organised these differences productively.

I propose complementarity as the concept to capture this: the degree to which EU institutions and Member States reinforce rather than contradict each other at political, strategic, and operational levels. Complementarity is not coherence or uniformity: it allows for differentiated contributions, sequenced actions, and division of labour across a spectrum. What matters is not the institutional design of decision-making, but its outcome in practice, and whether actors reinforce, supplement, or contradict one another.

What Complementarity Reveals

 This concept helps to start theorising three more and more explicit developments in EU foreign policy into a single framework. These are typically analysed in isolation or misread as signs of dysfunction. Rather, I argue that they are all part of the same phenomenon whereby the EU assumes different patterns of complementarity as the outcome of internal conflict management.

The first concerns the simultaneous rise of Commission assertiveness and Member State coalitions. The European Commission increasingly deploys its own instruments – SAFE, Readiness 2030 – to provide frameworks for action in areas where unanimity in CFSP/CSDP cannot be reached. At the same time, Member States form informal ‘coalitions of the willing’ to tackle urgent problems outside the constraints of unanimity. These are usually analysed as two distinct trends, and the latter is often read as a sign of fragmentation. Yet, I argue that they are symptoms of complementarity in action: efforts of separate actors to enable or strengthen the collective effort.

The second development concerns the increasing visibility of Commission instruments in the making and shaping of EU external action. The existing debate has long equated EU foreign policy with its most visible intergovernmental surface – Council conclusions, statements, declarations. These are either voted on by unanimity or fail to come into existence. But a more holistic view that understands Community and Member State instruments and external competencies as part of the same system of foreign policy, a different picture emerges. Political, strategic, and operational coordination do not always move in tandem: Community tools can be effectively deployed at the operational level even when political consensus is absent. What appears as “disunity” at one level does not necessarily mean the EU is failing to act, or vice versa. It is precisely in these intermediate configurations – visible through a complementary view – that some of the most undertheorised dynamics of EU foreign policy reside.

Third, these configurations are not static. Complementarity is better understood as a process than a state – something that is constructed, sustained, and that can erode. The EU’s response to Ukraine illustrates this vividly: the rapid construction of a coherent response in the weeks following February 2022 gradually became more pluralistic over time – regardless of the sustained existential threat to European security. Changes external configuration of the EU – whether it speaks with one voice or it is characterised by coalitions of the willing and Commission-led workarounds – are often read as predictive signs of the trajectory of EU foreign policy integration. My argument is that this is the wrong frame entirely. These are not steps forward, backwards, or sideways on an integration spectrum that can tell us whether the EU is advancing unevenly, retreating, or finding a differentiated middle path. They are pragmatic, adaptive responses to the specific configuration of external constraints and internal costs the EU faces at a given moment. The EU is not on a linear trajectory; rather, a kaleidoscopic, shape-shifting polity in which coalitions form and reform around specific issues, and where the relevant question is not the degree of integration but the pattern of alignment.

Bridging Theory and Practice: Fieldwork in the Brussels Bubble

The core of my fieldwork consists of elite interviews with practitioners across the EU’s foreign policy ecosystem: officials from the EEAS, the Commission, the Council Secretariat, and Member States. The interviews seek to unveil not the achievement of unanimity as described by the treaties, but the daily, often improvised work of finding éscamotages, creative solutions, and producing collective action under pressure.

Brussels is a bubble that rewards presence. Many of these conversations would not have happened over Zoom. The willingness to speak candidly about politically charged dynamics – particularly about why coordination breaks down and how dissent is absorbed rather than resolved – depends enormously on trust built face to face. The informal chats after the recorded interview, the run-ins around Schuman or To Meli, the introductions passed along by a colleague: these are the understated elements that make research beyond the diplomatic narrative possible. I still have much to do: the human component of interviews requires time – digging into the EUWhoIsWho to identify interlocutors, waiting for answers (which often never come), and finding an appropriate time in the interviewees’ busy schedules. This means: I am still deeply in the process – widening my reach to Member State officials in Permanent Representations and select national capitals.

The UACES PhD Fieldwork Scholarship is essential to sustaining this presence. The scholarship supported my travel and living costs, allowing me to conduct a far richer set of interviews than would otherwise have been feasible. I am deeply grateful to UACES for this support, and for the broader role the association plays in enabling early-career researchers to undertake empirically grounded work.

Looking Ahead

The broader ambition is to equip scholars and practitioners with a framework that makes sense of recent developments in EU foreign policy while relieving them of the unrealistic expectation of consistent unity and the frustration of apparent weakness. The EU is not a unitary state. It cannot always ‘speak with one voice’. But it can and does act – sometimes with remarkable coordination, sometimes in productive pluralism, and sometimes in disarray. Understanding why it takes these different forms can offer insights into how this adaptive quality could become a strength rather than a source of anxiety in an increasingly volatile international order.

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Tibor Illyés/EPA

Hungary will hold a parliamentary election on 12 April that many observers describe as the most significant in the country’s modern political history. After 16 years of uninterrupted rule by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz–KDNP alliance, a new political force has emerged to challenge the government’s dominance. The TISZA party, led by former Fidesz insider Péter Magyar, has rapidly reshaped the political landscape and introduced a degree of uncertainty not seen since 2010.

The stakes extend far beyond the composition of the next government. The election will influence Hungary’s economic direction, its approach to the rule of law, and its geopolitical positioning between the European Union and Russia. For many voters, the contest has become a referendum on the political model Orbán has built over the past decade and a half — a model critics describe as “illiberal democracy” and supporters defend as a sovereign alternative to Western liberalism.

How the system works

Hungary is a parliamentary republic with a unicameral National Assembly of 199 members. The PM is elected by a majority of the National Assembly members. The electoral system combines single‑member districts with proportional representation: 106 MPs are elected through first‑past‑the‑post constituencies, while the remaining 93 seats are allocated through national party lists.

Parties must cross a 5% threshold to enter parliament via the national list, although alliances face higher thresholds. A distinctive feature of the system is the “surplus votes” mechanism, which adds unused votes from winning constituency candidates to their party’s national list total. Analysts note that this tends to favour the largest party.

Recent amendments have also redrawn constituency boundaries. Budapest, where opposition parties have traditionally performed strongly, now has fewer seats, while surrounding areas that lean toward Fidesz have gained representation. These changes have prompted debate about the neutrality of the redistricting process.

The political actors 

Orbán’s Fidesz–KDNP alliance is seeking a fifth consecutive term, campaigning on themes of stability, national sovereignty and peace. The prime minister presents himself as the only leader capable of shielding Hungary from external pressures, whether from the EU, NATO or what he characterises as a “pro‑war lobby”.

Péter Magyar, left, of the Tisza Party, and Viktor Orbán from Fidesz, addressing rallies during the campaign (Balint Szentgallay and Akos Stiller via Getty Images)

The main challenger is TISZA, founded in 2024 and led by Péter Magyar. Once a high‑ranking diplomat within the Fidesz system, Magyar broke with the government and has since accused it of systemic corruption and institutional capture. TISZA positions itself as conservative, pro‑European and broadly inclusive, aiming to attract voters across ideological lines.

Other parties remain part of the landscape, though with reduced visibility. The Democratic Coalition, led by Klára Dobrev, continues to advocate for a full restoration of liberal democratic norms and closer alignment with the EU. To the right of Fidesz, the Our Homeland Movement appeals to nationalist voters dissatisfied with the government’s direction. Several traditional opposition parties — including Momentum, the Socialists and Dialogue — have withdrawn from the race to avoid splitting the anti‑government vote, effectively consolidating support behind TISZA.

The issues shaping the campaign

Foreign policy has dominated the campaign, particularly the war in Ukraine. Fidesz has framed the election as a choice between “peace or war”, arguing that the opposition and EU institutions favour escalation. The government emphasises continued cooperation with Russia, especially in the energy sector. TISZA condemns the invasion but has taken a cautious approach to questions of military involvement.

Hungary’s relationship with the EU is another central issue. Approximately €18 billion in EU funds remain frozen due to concerns about corruption and the rule of law. TISZA has pledged to implement the reforms required to unlock these funds, while Fidesz portrays EU pressure as interference in national sovereignty.

Economic concerns are also prominent. Voters face rising living costs, stagnant wages and deteriorating public services, particularly in education and healthcare. Opposition parties highlight the wealth accumulated by business figures close to Fidesz as evidence of systemic corruption. The government points to wage growth and family support schemes as signs of economic resilience.

U.S. Vice President JD Vance shakes hands with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán Tuesday in Budapest. (Denes Erdos / Associated Press)

The campaign has also been marked by allegations of external influence. Reports of Russian‑linked disinformation networks and the increasing use of AI‑generated political content have raised concerns about the information environment. A visit by US Vice President JD Vance in support of Orbán has further underscored the international attention surrounding the election.

What could happen after the vote

A party or alliance needs 100 seats to form a government. A two‑thirds majority — 133 seats — grants the power to amend the constitution and change “cardinal laws”, which govern key areas such as the judiciary, media regulation and electoral rules.

If TISZA were to win a simple majority but fall short of two‑thirds, it could form a government but would face structural constraints, as many institutional reforms require supermajority support. If no party reaches 100 seats, coalition negotiations would be necessary. Analysts note that Fidesz and the Our Homeland Movement share ideological overlaps, though no formal commitments have been made.

Depending on the margin, observers have also discussed the possibility of legal challenges or disputes over certification. These scenarios reflect the high stakes and polarisation surrounding the election rather than predictions about the outcome.

What to watch on election day

 Turnout will be closely monitored, particularly among younger voters who have been highly mobilised during the campaign. The urban–rural divide remains a defining feature of Hungarian politics: while TISZA is expected to perform strongly in Budapest, Fidesz retains deep support in rural areas, where constituency results often determine the overall balance of power.

The performance of smaller parties will also matter. Whether groups such as the Democratic Coalition or the Our Homeland Movement cross the 5% threshold will influence the distribution of list seats. Diaspora votes — particularly mail‑in ballots from ethnic Hungarians abroad — have historically provided several additional seats to Fidesz. Analysts are also watching the role of AI‑generated content and disinformation in the final hours of the campaign.

Why this election matters

The April 12 election is a watershed moment that will decide whether Hungary continues its trajectory as an “electoral autocracy” or returns toward a liberal democratic path within the European Union. The outcome will redefine Hungary’s relationship with Brussels and Kyiv, potentially removing a persistent “spoiler” to EU policy or further entrenching an illiberal vanguard in the heart of Europe. Regardless of the winner, the next government will face the daunting task of navigating an entrenched legal framework and a deeply polarized society.

The post Explainer: Your Guide to Hungary’s Election on 12 April appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Photo: Green Circuit Board by Miguel Á. Padriñán, available from https://www.pexels.com/photo/green-circuit-board-343457/

Cristina Pinna

Over the past decade, research security has moved from a technical concern discussed among specialists to a central issue in European research policy. What began as a debate about protecting sensitive technologies has expanded into a broader question about how knowledge should be governed in a changing geopolitical environment. Today, it shapes funding rules, international cooperation, and the everyday practices of universities across Europe, becoming part of a broader effort to govern knowledge flows amid geopolitical uncertainty and perceived vulnerability. It reflects a wider shift in how the European Union (EU) understands openness, collaboration, and risk.

In my ongoing research on EU research security and international academic cooperation (Pinna, 2024; Cai, Pinna and van der Wende, 2025; Pinna, 2025), I examine how this shift reflects more than a response to specific threats and is linked to the EU’s broader geopolitical repositioning and to the growing recognition that research and innovation are strategic domains. Policy debates increasingly frame scientific cooperation in terms of resilience, technological sovereignty, and economic security (European Commission 2025b) and are linked to the EU’s broader geopolitical repositioning and to the growing recognition that research and innovation are strategic domains. 

From openness to managed interdependence

For much of the early 2000s, EU research policy rested on the assumption that international openness was inherently beneficial. The development of the European Research Area (ERA), successive Framework Programmes, and mobility initiatives reflected a paradigm in which universities were encouraged to internationalise, compete globally, and integrate into the knowledge economy. International cooperation was tied to a neoliberal logic of competitiveness and excellence, where openness was seen as necessary for growth and scientific leadership. 

Over time, this consensus began to change. Advances in dual-use technologies, the strategic importance of innovation, and geopolitical rivalry led policymakers to reconsider the risks of unrestricted collaboration. Scientific cooperation is now seen not only as a driver of competitiveness, but also as a source of vulnerability. Concerns about knowledge transfer, foreign interference, and asymmetric dependencies have moved to the centre of policy debates, especially in strategic technologies. Where the previous decade emphasised internationalisation as an economic imperative, the current one increasingly frames it through a security logic concerned with exposure, dependence, and risk.

These developments are particularly visible in EU–China academic relations. Earlier narratives emphasised partnership and mutual benefit, whereas recent debates refer to reciprocity, risk awareness, and strategic dependencies (Cai, Pinna, and van der Wende 2025). Cooperation continues, but under more cautious and conditional terms. 

Recent EU initiatives reflect this recalibration. The Council Recommendation on Enhancing Research Security defines research security as the need to anticipate and manage risks related to unwanted knowledge transfer, malign influence on research, and violations of academic integrity or EU values (European Commission 2024a). Research security, therefore, goes beyond protecting technologies and includes safeguarding the conditions under which research remains open and trustworthy.  The White Paper on dual-use R&D further highlights the overlap between civilian innovation and security concerns (European Commission 2024b). Together, these documents signal a move from unconditional openness to managed internationalisation.

Security embedded in everyday research governance

This transformation has not taken the form of sudden restrictions. Instead, security concerns have been integrated into existing procedures.

Rather than imposing strict prohibitions, the EU mainly relies on regulatory and coordinative tools. Funding rules, due-diligence requirements, export controls, and risk assessments increasingly shape research cooperation. Recent Commission initiatives provide guidance and coordination tools for Member States (European Commission 2025a).

Because education and research remain largely national competencies, the implementation of research security is shaped by the relationship between the EU and its Member States. EU institutions set the direction, but Member States, funding agencies, universities, and researchers implement it. In this sense, research security develops through a multi-level governance system in which responsibilities are distributed rather than centrally imposed (Pinna 2024). Translating research security into practice is uneven across governance levels, with divergent narratives creating uncertainty for implementers and making the process more contested than official policy language suggests (Rüland et al. 2025).

A broader geopolitical context

The growing prominence of research security is closely connected to the EU’s wider geopolitical agenda. Since the late 2010s, EU policy has emphasised resilience, strategic autonomy, and reducing critical dependencies. Research and innovation are no longer seen only as drivers of growth, but as areas linked to security, competitiveness, and systemic vulnerability (European Commission 2025b).

This shift reflects not only the pursuit of power, but also growing concern about vulnerability within open research systems. Policymakers worry that openness may expose critical technologies, create dependencies, or allow foreign influence in sensitive areas. These concerns have led to new policy instruments in “like-minded” countries such as the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Australia, where governments introduced guidelines to help universities manage geopolitical risks in international collaboration (Shih, Chubb, and Cooney-O’Donoghue 2025). Comparative work also shows that in both Germany and the United States, research security is reshaping scientific cooperation under geopolitical pressure, though through different governance traditions (Rüffin et al. 2025).

The EU response remains distinctive. Rather than relying on direct restrictions, it mainly uses coordination, recommendations, and regulatory frameworks. Cooperation remains central, but with greater attention to exposure, dependence, and strategic capabilities. Research security, therefore, reflects an attempt to govern interdependence rather than abandon openness.

Changing language, changing expectations

This transformation is also visible in policy language. Over the past decade, EU documents have moved from the vocabulary of openness and global exchange to terms such as responsible internationalisation, de-risking, and strategic autonomy. These changes reflect shifting narratives about how openness should be organised. 

Earlier frameworks stressed partnership and mobility, whereas recent documents emphasise risk awareness, due diligence, and institutional responsibility. The Council Recommendation on research security places risk assessment and safeguards within normal research governance (European Commission 2024a).  Openness is no longer taken for granted but must be actively managed.

This shift is often summarised in the principle that cooperation should be “as open as possible, as closed as necessary.” Initially used in technical contexts, this expression now captures a broader change in how international collaboration is understood. It reflects the attempt to preserve openness while recognising its risks.

This shift in language is particularly visible in EU–China academic relations. Earlier narratives centred on partnership and exchange, while more recent debates increasingly refer to risk management, strategic dependencies, and the protection of sensitive knowledge (Cai, Pinna, and van der Wende 2025; Pinna 2024). These changes reorganise expectations across the research system, redistributing responsibility among universities, funding agencies, and individual researchers.

Concluding reflections

Research security has become a defining feature of EU research policy. What began as concern about sensitive technologies has evolved into a broader effort to reconsider how knowledge circulates in an increasingly contested global environment. 

The shift is visible both in policy instruments and in the language of international cooperation. Terms such as responsible internationalisation, strategic autonomy, and de-risking reflect a shift from openness as the default to a more cautious organisation of international cooperation.

For the EU, this reflects an effort to remain open while reducing vulnerabilities. For universities and researchers, collaboration continues but with stronger expectations of responsibility and risk awareness.  Understanding this shift is essential for navigating European research governance. Research security is not simply a constraint on cooperation, but an attempt to redefine how international collaboration can continue in a more uncertain and contested world.

Dr. Cristina Pinna is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow at the Department of International Relations and International Organization, University of Groningen, the Netherlands. Her research examines China’s global engagement, with particular interest in EU–China relations, the geopolitics of infrastructure and science and technology. She previously worked at the United Nations Development Programme in Beijing and has held research and teaching roles in Italy, Netherlands, Canada and China. She has launched a research group (Geo)Politics of the Global Science System – gloknos.

References

Cai, Yuzhuo, Cristina Pinna, and Marijk van der Wende, eds. 2025. Rethinking EU–China higher education cooperation in a complex and changing global environment. Special issue, Journal of Studies in International Education 29(2): 167–176. https://doi.org/10.1177/10283153251316930 

European Commission. 2024a. Council recommendation on enhancing research security. COM(2024) 26 final. Brussels.
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=COM:2024:26:FIN 

European Commission. 2024b. White paper on options for enhancing support for research and development involving technologies with dual-use potential. Brussels.
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52024DC0027 

European Commission. 2025a. Commission announces new measures to strengthen research security. Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, 28 October. Brussels. https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/news/all-research-and-innovation-news/commission-announces-new-measures-strengthen-research-security-2025-10-28_en

European Commission. 2025b. Strategic Autonomy and European Economic and Research Security. https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/strategy/strategy-research-and-innovation/europe-world/international-cooperation/strategic-autonomy-and-european-economic-and-research-security_en

Pinna, Cristina. 2024. Navigating knowledge and research security in EU–China academic relations: The case of Hungary, Italy, and the Netherlands. Journal of Studies in International Education 29(2): 319–343. https://doi.org/10.1177/10283153241307970 

Pinna, Cristina. 2025. Comparative Perspective In EU Context: Policies And Instruments In Relevant EU Countries. In van der Wende M., et al. (eds.) Changing perspectives: towards conditions for sustainable EU-China collaboration in academic cooperation and R&D. Published by the China Knowledge Network (CKN). https://www.chinakennisnetwerk.nl/publications/changing-perspectives-towardsconditions-sustainable-eu-china-academic-collaboration  

Rüffin, Nicolas V., Katharina C. Cramer, Maximilian Mayer, and Philip J. Nock. 2025.
“Research Security’ in Germany and the United States: Shifting Governance of Scientific Collaboration Under Geopolitical Pressure. Global Policy, advance online publication, pp. 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.70103

Rüland, Anna-Lena,  Rüffin, Nicolas V., Wang, Ruowei and Mauduit, Jean-Christophe. 2025.
“The Implementation of Research Security Policies in Germany: Exploring Policy Narratives across Governance Levels.” European Security, advance online publication.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2025.2591708

Shih, Tommy, Chubb, Andrew  and  Cooney-O’Donoghue, Diarmuid. 2025. Processing the geopolitics of global science: Emerging national-level advisory structures. Journal of Studies in International Education 29(2): 300–318. https://doi.org/10.1177/10283153241307971

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In our recent article for JCMS we set out to queer the European Union Foreign and Security Policy.

But what does this mean?

Queer, once a slur, is now a popular term that captures the variety of sexual orientations and gender identities. Rooted in decolonial, black feminist as well as cultural studies, queer theory uses sexuality and gender identity as an entry point to tackle taken-for-granted concepts across literature, politics, law, and international relations.

We applied queer theory to EU foreign and security policy, specifically ‘queering’ the EU’s implementation of Women, Peace and Security (WPS) – a UN-mandated agenda that aims to consider the specific needs of women and girls in conflict. We focused on three queer concepts: invisibilities, heteronormativity, and binaries.

A (brief) overview of queer theory and its place in European Studies

To be queer is to be fluid; queer theory is therefore a framework that can be tricky to pin down. Its roots can, however, be traced to the post-structural turn in the 1980s and 1990s thanks to the work of Michel Foucault, Judith Butler, and Eve Sedgwick as well as the wider LGBTIQA+ movement. Its development is linked to feminism, post-colonialism, and constructivism. And while it overlaps with LGBT Studies, it is at times in tension with it.

Petrus Liu offers a starting point:

“Queer theory challenges categories we take for granted as self-obvious, natural, or immutable… Queer theory is, moreover, a kind of doing, a form of socially conscious intervention that calls into question the blind spots of heteronormative and cisnormative worldviews.”

Queer scholars interpret and apply the theory in different ways, but we support Kath Brown and Catherine J. Nash’s suggestion that it “can be any form of research” that “highlights the instability of taken-for-granted meanings and resulting power relations”.

As we outline in our article, the EU is increasingly examined by various critical theories (most notably postcolonial and feminist theories). And while our research is the first applications of queer theory to the EU’s foreign and security policy, it builds on a rich body of queer literature that exists on the wider WPS agenda, humanitarian responses, development, human rights law, and the fight against the far-right, amongst others. Below, we try to unpack some key concepts of queer scholarship.

Invisibilities

Queer scholarship “focuses on the (in)visibility of queer representations in international politics”, as we write in our paper. This erasure has real-world implications for queer people.

We found that LGBTIQA+ people are absent in the EU’s implementation of WPS. This means they are doubly persecuted; the violence they are subject to is not recognised and so they are excluded from access to legal, health, and other services.

This erasure affects all queer people. On one hand, WPS was designed to protect women and girls – yet it ignores the experience of lesbian and trans women. On the other hand, research increasingly highlights how sexual and gender-based violence does not only affect women; because of gendered hierarchies, men and boys are “feminised” or “homosexualised” in conflict. This process of violent humiliation is often directed at queer men and gender minorities, which is why WPS is often seen to be an avenue to integrate protections for the wider LGBTIQ+ community.

The failure to include references to LGBTIQA+ people is therefore a missed opportunity.

Heteronormativity

Queer theory examines heteronormative and cis-gendered structures. In the EU’s implementation of WPS, we found that all relationships are assumed to be heterosexual. The possibility that couples could be same-sex (or that families could have a single parent, for that matter) is not considered.

But by examining heteronormativity, queer research goes deeper: it attempts to analyse why there are patriarchal (im)balances of power and how they manifest.

Queer theory posits that heteronormativity is upheld by a range of masculinities and femininities, which are expressed in individuals regardless of their gender. It is the “hegemonic masculinity” that defines what is socially expected and is in opposition to “weaker” and “feminine” Others. This violent, patriarchal hegemonic masculinity leads to, and legitimises, acts of violence against LGBTIQA+ people in conflict.

Binaries

Queer scholarship builds on its efforts to deconstruct male/female or gay/straight binaries by doing the same with Either/Or binaries across mainstream politics.

For example, it analyses West/rest, war/peace, foreign/domestic and concludes that they simplify complicated terms and erase the nuance around them. Often, this promotes a xenophobic world view: Josep Borrell’s (the then EU High Representative) now infamous statement “Europe is a garden” and “the rest of the world is a jungle” is an example of this.

As we write in our paper, tackling these binaries helps us appreciate how violence against queer people is:

“Palimpsestic; it does not commence with conflict, nor does it end with the brokering of a ceasefire, the signing of a peace agreement or in the latter stages of peacebuilding. The violence queer persons suffer in conflict-related situations is not an aberration but an extension of that which they face in times of peace.”

Future uses of queer theory: an “open mesh of possibilities”

Queer theory is an “open mesh of possibilities”. This allows us to adapt the framework, use it in parallel with work that examines coloniality, race, disability, and class, as well as find allyship with other post-colonial or critical theories.

That being said, there are queer scholars who would disagree with this, instead positing that queer scholarship should remain on the fringes and not engage with mainstream policies at risk of it being instrumentalised. We recognise this tension but believe queer theory must be driven by a curiosity to engage; its insights are too important to be left on the sidelines.

At a time of increasing pressure on queer research and rights, we hope that others will use queer approaches to interrogate and analyse EU external policies – and encourage researchers to do so.

Doing so helps question the taken-for-granted structures and practises in these policies (what is considered “normal”), revealing the resulting power hierarchies around sexuality and gender identity and also shedding light on those who have been marginalised. In turn, this can contribute to the construction of alternative, more inclusive and irenic, policies and practices.

Dimitris Bouris (he/him) is an Associate Professor and Jean Monnet Chair at the Department of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam. He is also an Associate Editor ofEuropean Security journal and a Visiting Professor at the College of Europe (Natolin). Dimitris’ research focuses lies at the intersection of International Relations (IR theory, peace and state-building, contested states, security sector reform, conflict resolution, diplomacy), EU Studies (EU External Relations, EU security, CSDP, EU foreign Policy) and Middle East and North Africa area studies. He recently co-edited together with Nora Fisher-Onar and Daniela Huber a special issue in JCMS entitled “Towards Allyship in Diversity? Critical Perspectives on the European Union’s Global Role”. In addition to the article discussed in this blog post, recent publications also include an article on the Interrelationship between Gender and European Union Foreign Policy and an article on the performance of Transnistria’s statehood by its political elites

Saul Kenny is the Communication Manager at Article 109, an international coalition of civil society organisations mobilising to review the Charter of the United Nations to make multilateralism better equipped for the 21st century. Before Article 109, Saul worked at the European Commission in support of Horizon Europe. Saul co-authored the paper discussed in this blog after completing his master’s thesis, which analysed policies the EU could adopt to protect LGBTIQA+ people during conflict. Saul has also written about cuts to aid budgets and Europe’s role in a shifting world order.

Hanna L. Mühlenhoff is a Senior Lecturer in European Studies at the University of Amsterdam. She is interested in questions of security, militarism and civil society activism in the European Union and Europe more broadly, including in the context of the UN Women, Peace and Security Agenda and Feminist Foreign Policies. In addition to the publication discussed in this blog post, she recently published a queer analysis of the EU’s Strategic Compass in the Journal of International Relations and Development, and a co-authored chapter on gender (in)justice in von der Leyen’s geopolitical turn.

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In June 2026, the European Union’s Pact on Migration and Asylum will enter into force. The Pact explicitly recognises the role of civil society organisations and NGOs in EU migration management, acknowledging their practical expertise, especially in working in contexts that are outside the EU. In recent years, EU migration governance has increasingly relied on partnerships with third countries, where border control, development cooperation, and humanitarian assistance overlap. Instruments such as the European Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) and the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) show how development funding is increasingly used to support migration management beyond EU borders. In this context, NGOs operating in countries of origin and transit have become central actors in how these policies are carried out on the ground. Much has been written about NGO criticism of EU migration policy over the past decade. Far less attention has been paid to how NGOs actually engage with these policies in practice. What does it actually mean for an organization committed to humanitarian principles to deliver EU-funded programmes inside the EU’s migration machine? My research answers this question by looking at how NGOs in Libya navigate funding pressures, ethical dilemmas, and complex local realities while delivering humanitarian and development assistance in a context heavily shaped by migration control objectives.

Libya and EU Externalisation Strategy

Libya sits at the centre of EU externalisation efforts. Since 2017, the Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) has funded Libya’s Coast Guard to intercept migrants at sea and return them to detention centres where abuse, forced labour, and torture are widely documented. Research and reports have also documented NGO involvement in alleviating the suffering of migrants in some detention centres, raising questions about whether such engagement is compatible with their humanitarian mandate. This coupling of migration control with development and humanitarian aid is not incidental but is structural, as it is openly acknowledged in Article 2 of the MoU itself.

In this context, NGOs in Libya work in an environment shaped by both urgent humanitarian needs and migration control policies. In my research I show how they navigate this terrain through two seemingly distinct but actually overlapping approaches. The first is what I call “pragmatic developmentalism”: accepting EU funding despite reservations about its political objectives, and focusing on delivering essential services and addressing urgent needs. This approach may involve engaging with local authorities and navigating informal power structures, but it remains oriented towards concrete outcomes for communities. The second is “principled humanitarianism”: an ethics-driven approach in which humanitarian imperatives take precedence over other objectives. This emphasises neutrality, impartiality, and the obligation to provide assistance based on need. In practice, it is based on the belief that NGOs can preserve spaces in which humanitarian action can operate independently of the political agendas that shape its funding context.

The RSSD Project: Where Development Meets Migration Management

The EU-funded Recovery, Stability and Socio-Economic Development (RSSD) project offers a concrete illustration of these dynamics. Targeting municipalities along migration routes in Libya, the project stabilises communities and supports local health systems, such as restoring health centres, delivering medical supplies, and training local staff. While these are developmental outcomes, practitioners themselves recognise that the project operates within a wider strategy aimed at discouraging onward movement towards Europe.

Interviews with NGO workers reveal the two overlapping logics at work. On one hand, they  accept EU funding to deliver essential services, despite some political reservations about the EU migration agenda. On the other they seem preoccupied with maintaining what they describe as ethical “red lines.” What emerges from their accounts is that the tension between pragmatism and principle is not simply an individual ethical dilemma. It may reflect a structural feature of contemporary migration governance itself. NGOs are not only making difficult choices, they are part of the mechanism through which migration policies are implemented on the ground. By delivering services within containment-oriented strategies, NGOs can simultaneously alleviate immediate harm and contribute to stabilising those same strategies. Many practitioners openly acknowledge this ambivalence. One NGO worker describes the tension in stark terms as “whitewashing”, suggesting that the humanitarian framing of their projects can serve to mask a much less humanitarian political agenda. As such NGOs operating within these frameworks are key actors through which migration policies take shape in practice.

Looking Ahead: NGOs and the Future of EU Migration Governance

While the extent to which NGOs manage to maintain independence and stay neutral remains up to debate, the interaction between pragmatic developmentalism and principled humanitarianism shows that NGOs are not simply passive implementers of EU policy. They interpret, adapt, and sometimes push back against EU objectives while continuing to deliver essential services on the ground. At the same time, their work can also indirectly support EU agendas. By framing migration through development and humanitarian action, EU external migration policies can appear more technical and less political, while part of the responsibility for their implementation is carried out by NGOs.

As the EU continues to expand its externalisation strategy, including discussions around “safe third country” arrangements and the delegation of asylum processing, the role of NGOs in transit countries is likely to grow. Understanding their work beyond the simple view of NGOs as either critics of EU policies or their enforcers is crucial for policymakers and civil society actors. It highlights the tensions that arise when migration governance is outsourced, and shows that migration policy is shaped not only by states and institutions, but also by the everyday decisions and principles of the organisations working on the ground.

Agnese Pacciardi is Research Fellow at the School of Global Studies, University of Sussex. Her work focuses on borders, mobility, and security through critical lenses. In her research, she primarily delves into European border security, humanitarianism and development cooperation in North and West Africa, exploring the impacts and implications of these policies on the communities they affect from feminist and decolonial perspectives.

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