As part of the Evolving Europe project, UACES asked participants at the 40 Years since the First Enlargement conference to respond to the question ‘What have been the most significant changes in the 1973 accession states as a result of EU membership?’

Here Michael Gøtze (University of Copenhagen) shares his view…

The most important development as to the European Union law impact on Danish Ombudsman practice is the predominant non-impact. So far, a European influx is difficult to detect in the subareas of the broad ambit of Danish ombudsman control. The tendency to non-Europeanization after 40 years membership of the European Union is even more significant due to the fact that the Danish Parliamentary Ombudsman occupies a pivotal position as a watchdog over public authorities within the national context. The statutory and functional powers of the Danish institution are wide and the ombudsman enjoys a priori sympathy as a protector of citizen’s rights. In addition, there are no specialised administrative courts in Denmark and the ombudsman is thus to some extent unrivalled on the legal scene as the primary promoter of good administration. Nevertheless, the Danish ombudsman subscribes to a narrow scope of focus in the protection of citizens’ European rights. In practice, the ombudsman often limits his review to the authorities’ compliance with national law and in particular with national procedural requirements. The citizen’s European rights are typically written out of the legal equation unless the citizen involved in the case by his/her own means opens up the ombudsman’s eyes to European Union law aspects. The limited horizon in the control and thinking of the Danish ombudsman leaves the European Union rights of citizens largely unidentified and unprotected. The Danish ombudsman is a watchdog with teeth but with discerning taste buds. As to EU Law – 40 years after – the ombudsman is a watchdog with limited appetite.

This blog has been published as part of the Evolving Europe project which is funded with support from the European Commission. The views expressed are those of the author, and the Commission and UACES cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

Lacomeuropeene has already covered academic research on the media coverage of the European Parliament elections in 2009, and so has Die Presse (via @_paulschmidt).

In a similar direction, The Journal of Political Marketing (Issue 1, 2013) has recently published a series of four articles coverin campaign news coverage, journalists’ source use, campaign foci and Eurosceptic campaigning during the 2009 European election campaign. new media & society (Issue 1, 2013) also has two articles on web campaigning in 2009.

But while these are just the most recent outputs in academic research, there’s more to look into. Electoral Studies (Issue 1, 2011) covered a symposium on electoral democracy in the EU. Articles published in this issue deal with the second-order nature of EP elections, the role of information voters’ decisions, party conflicts covered in the news, individual campaigns as well as low turnout.

On the side of the media-related studies, there’s also more, including research on individual campaign blogs, on national elections overshadowing the EP elections, on the not-so-strategic use of the internet in UK campaigning, on differences in campaign professionalisation in Finland, Sweden, Austria and Germany during the 2009 EP elections, on Twitter in the Dutch 2009 EP campaign, on party websites in Western and Southern EU countries

A German study published in 2010 found that higher turnout would actually not change the composition of the European Parliament. A study by Spanish-German mathematicians traced the calculations of EP seats based on the 27 electoral laws. Research on the determinants of candidates’ list position in Romania revealed that electoral experience and wealth seemed to be quite important.

UK studies cannot ignore UKIP’s 2009 electoral success. Swedish studies cannot ignore the Pirate Party success. Estonian studies cannot ignore the success of individual candidates in Estonia in 2009. There’s also some work on the Austrian campaign. And on the Irish campaign. Not to forget Portugal and the True Finns in Finland.

There’s also research on the Greek part of the 2009 EP elections and on media coverage in Italy in 2009. In a much wider scope, this article looks into main campaign issues all across Southern Europe. The Romanian results are discussed here, the Hungarian EP elections here.

Simon Hix devoted some space for an essay on the failure of social democracy in 2009, while Isabelle Hertner analysed whether member state socialist parties’ campaigns had been “Europeanised” (not really). Others took a look at the Green’s differing success across Europe. There’s also studies on ethnic minority parties in Central and Eastern Europe, e.g. in Lithuania.

Other research finds that the preferences of voters and the preferences of MEPs do not necessarily overlap, especially relating to cultural aspects where MEPs seem to be much more liberal than their voters. On the other hand, Italian research argues that the preferences of member parties of the EU-level parties are quite coherent internally while they contrast to members of other Europarties (in a left-right & anti-pro EU space).

Christina Chiva researched the selection of female EP election candidates in new EU member states More recent research studies this phenomenon for all the EU countries. And related research looks into more general selection criteria for candidates in 12 EU countries, gender being just one of the aspects covered.

Now, that’s just a selection of studies one can find with a quick research on Google Scholar. Reading all these can give a hint at how and why we may or may not observe certain phenomena ahead of and during the 2014 European Parliament elections. What is obvious is that there has been quite some interest in the past EP elections, and the diversity of potential views and the variety of researchers involves actually allows a quite complex picture of what is a quite complex political process.

In my view, research on the 2014 EP elections actually should start now, because many decisions on substance and on persons are taken now, campaign strategies are starting to evolve and the attention to 2014 is slowly rising (at least in an EU attention scale). The next EP elections will definitely be different to the last ones, and it will be academic research that might be able to establish why and how.

PS: Please feel free to share any interesting research not covered in this post in the comments below.

Disclaimer: I work for the Transparency International EU Office, including on issues relating to the (financing) rules for European Political Parties ahead of the 2014 European Parliament elections. These thoughts are published in my private capacity, following earlier blog posts such as this one. or this one.

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Jon Danzig promotes the virtures of being a citizen of Europe

If you are a UK citizen confused about the value of EU membership, due to the ‘untruths’ coming from UKIP and the national press, then just follow the evidence – says former BBC journalist, Jon Danzig, in the journal ‘Public Service Europe’.

Jon has listed a number of candidates for the next European Commission President (of the centre-right, the centre left, or the rest), for the next European Council President and for the next EU foreign minister (“High Representative”).

But while Jon has put some thoughts into potential candidates for next time, it’s worth looking back to the dynamics of 2009 when the last EU leadership was chosen to figure out the potential dynamics we could expect, as speculations such as this one about who could be winner of the race were largely unsuccessful back at the time (see EurActiv link list for more reading).

What do we know about last time?

Interestingly, there’s very little academic writing about the process in 2009. In fact, the only article focussed on “The appointments of Herman van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton” (JCMS, Volume 48) I could find was actually written by a journalist, Tony Barber of the Financial Times, not by a scholar. Some of what is in there can be found in related press reports, but some issues are worth (re-)reporting.

Barber’s account differs a little from what Jean Quatremer reports, i.e. that Nicolas Sarkozy had “killed” Jean-Claude Juncker’s bid for the European Council presidency on the evening of the 29 October 2009 European Council. Barber reports that Juncker only put forward his candidacy to definitely “kill” Blair, while Merkel and Sarkozy had contacted van Rompuy already the evening before and got his interest. Interestingly, thearticle mentions a paper from Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands arguing that the European Council President should be a committed European, which effectively meant: not Tony Blair, a fact I don’t remember from back then.

What’s missing from any of the academic or journalist accounts I could find is how van Rompuy actually become part of the game, that is how, if true, Merkel and Sarkozy had thought he could become European Council President. If somebody has any sources for that, I’d be happy to read. If not, why did nobody look into that?

What is noticeable compared to national politics is that the account of party politics is a little in the background, although Barber clearly reports that it was important for the European People’s Party (EPP) to secure the the European Council presidency. After they had secured this post, this left the EU foreign minister to the Party of European Socialists (PES), who then proposed (according to Barber) the following list:

• Frank-Walter Steinmeier (Germany)
• Miguel Ángel Moratinos (Spain)
• Elisabeth Guigou (France)
• Alfred Gusenbauer (Austria)
• Adrian Severin (Romania)
• David Miliband (UK)

With Miliband declining after the others were ruled out, two more names were put forward by Gordon Brown, Geoff Hoon and John Hutton, but these failed to get support. Finally, with a push from the socialists for a female candidate for one of the top EU jobs, Catherine Ashton (EU Trade Commissioner until then) made it onto the ticket (source: Tony Barber). It’s worth pointing out that none of the other political parties seemed to have played a crucial role in 2009.

Why is all that relevant?

Jon Worth‘ and others’ speculations about who could end up on top of the list cannot be separated from the process and from timing.

On the one hand, 2009 showed that the political environment at the time of the nomination for the EU’s top jobs is crucial for who can become what. Majorities in the European Parliament and the composition of the European Council (i.e national governments and presidents) count as much as the egos of some of the individuals involved and the need to balance selections so that everyone (except the citizens) can feel satisfied.

The selection procedure last time was a political balance act in which, after the nomination of Barroso as the quasi-uncontested Commission President candidate, van Rompuy appeared to be a equilibrium between political orientation (centre-right, pro-EU), member state size (no large member state), and profile (no big egos or controversial figure), while Ashton was the political balance rounding up the field after all the other choices – including giving the European Parliament leadership to a Pole and after some countries had made clear their preferences for European Commission portfolios – had been made.

The big question for 2014 will be: Who selects or nominates the next European leaders, who will be queen- or king-makers?

How much will depend on the campaign for and the outcome of the European Parliament elections? Different to last time, there may be several figures running for European Commission President, hoping for the right majorities in the European Parliament.

In how far will timing play a role? Different to last time, the European Parliament elections will be held earlier (22-25 May 2014), so that the European Commission President (and the European Parliament President) could be nominated before the summer break in 2014, while all the haggling over all the other posts (Commissioners, EU foreign minister, European Council President) could go on all summer and up into the autumn – or will the dynamics change and everything will be clear by July?

How will national elections taking place before the nomination of the European Commission President and before the nomination of the other leaders change the composition of the European Council and “free” certain persons who could then become candidates for European offices? There will be at least parliament elections in Germany (currently EPP-led, September 2013), Austria (PES-led, September 2013), Hungary (EPP-led, April 2014), Czech Republic (AECR-led, possibly in May 2014), Belgium (PES-led, likely parallel to EP elections), Sweden (EPP-led, September 2014) or presidential elections in Lithuania (independent but conservative-supported, May 2014).

Conclusions

I’m not sure the process of 2009 gives a clear picture of how the process in 2014 will look like. It only gives an indication that speculations about who has a chance may be a little early today. It could hardly get more unpredictable than last time regarding who will or will not win what post, so we may at least come to a point where speculations a week ahead of the nominations will be more telling than they were last time.

The making of European leaders will however remain a game in which many might (want to) have their say, and whether the left or the right, the European or the national interests, the small or the large countries, the outspoken or the quiet leaders will dominate is hard to forecast.

It would just be nice if someone would inform the public about the who and why. But that could be too high a hope.

Disclaimer: I work for the Transparency International EU Office, including on issues relating to the (financing) rules for European Political Parties ahead of the 2014 European Parliament elections. These thoughts are published in my private capacity, following earlier blog posts such as this one.

This article has been corrected and slightly adapted on 21 May 2013.

The tweet was online for 10 minutes, and then disappeared. Just before it was erased, it had 130 retweets, and so I thought I’d preserve that. Many seemed to think that this was Schulz’ comment ahead of next weeks European Council, or his follow-up to the meeting of the Conference of Presidents of the European Parliament tonight.

We may never know…

Update (40 minutes later):

Previous tweet was clearly an accident – apologise everybody. But I’m glad that it made you laugh

— Martin Schulz (@MartinSchulz) May 16, 2013

The widespread view is of ‘Tory splits’ and there is a lot to that, even if the splits are largely between antis and pragmatists, rather than pros and antis. However, it also reflects two deeper trends on which we might more profitably dwell.

The first of these is righteousness. Perhaps the most striking feature of euroscepticism is not its existence, but rather its persistence. For all the bluster, eurosceptics have yet to make any real impression on policy – nationally or at a European level – at any point in the past two decades: even the British decision to stay out of the Euro was driven more by deep-seated ambivalence across the political spectrum of its political or economic value, rather than the actions of the Referendum party or Major’s ‘bastards.’

So the question has to be: why – in the face of such a lack of impact – have sceptics continued to fight their position? For me, a large part of the answer is this idea of righteousness, that the fight is a Good fight and must be fought, whatever the cost, whatever the set-backs.

Too often, non-sceptics assume that with a bit more education on how integration ‘really works’ and some engaged discussion, sceptics will have a moment of clarity and leave aside their views and actions. But this is to misunderstand the often visceral nature of much scepticism, its connection to deeply (and fundamentally) held views on the nature of the nation, identity and democracy. Such views would require a life-time of discussion to move, and a political system that didn’t undermine that message by constantly referring back to them. Even the brightest optimist could not bring that into being and I don’t know that I would want them to. In a political age when most people don’t believe in much and don’t trust in others, they hold on to what they do believe and trust and any challenge to that is a challenge to the fundaments of a democratic system that relies on some notion of community (national or civic).

If sceptics are righteous, and we cannot change their minds, then we need to think about how we construct institutions and policies that let them come inside and play a constructive role. In the case of the EU, whatever happens in the future, the UK will always be geographically, politically, economically and socially close to the continent, so we need to have some modus vivendi.  Indeed, I think we could argue (a la Beck) that this is a general problem across Europe rather requires some new form of social compact: we should not let the British case distract us from the structural dynamics in operation.

Unfortunately, this brings in the second element, of risk. Sceptic righteousness is inchoate, in that it is essentially negative (‘we don’t like the EU’) and does not offer a positive alternative. At the same time, no one seems to offer a positive alternative: neither ‘more Europe’ nor ‘less Europe’ really cut the mustard as rallying cries. This goes to the heart of David Cameron’s problem, in that his inability to articulate a clear vision of what the Union should be leaves him open to bidding by those around him. This is what the current ‘debate’ is about: how far can we move the Conservative leadership one way or the other?

It is – seemingly – only the pragmatism of government that seems to hold back the sceptics, and pragmatism isn’t a positive agenda, just a holding pattern. Like a besieged king in his castle, Cameron awaits a white knight to ride over the hill and rescue him, or hopes that some blight will kill off the gathering masses outside. Both those options are not inconceivable, but as time passes more and more of those knights will decide it’s not worth the effort and the growth in the number of besiegers will offset the loses to blight. To over-extend the metaphor, Cameron needs to break out of his castle, flying a bright standard under which both besieged and besiegers can rally.

All very nice, but not very likely. European integration is still not important enough to the electorate to make such a fight worthwhile, for one thing. However, this shouldn’t stop us trying to sketch out new options and work to find understandings and accommodations. Let us not forget that the EU itself is the product of a wave of righteousness that swept across the continent after the Second World War: that initial wave has passed, but we should not forget the value of the structures it has left.

Dr Simon Usherwood is a Senior Lecturer at the School of Politics, University of Surrey.

Twitter: @Usherwood and @surreypolitics

The same cannot be said for France’s approach to military-industrial integration at the European-level. It is for this reason that France lists the European military-technological and industrial base as a strategic priority for the country. Just as France’s national base is key for its own strategic autonomy, so to does the country believe a European base is a way to strengthen the European Union’s strategic position. One unanswered question in the White Paper, however, is how Europe can have a common industrial base when it does not have a single strategic outlook. Military-industrial bases need strategic direction, and Europe has neither a base nor strategy.

France wants to see a complete restructuring of the European armaments market on the strict principles of industrial efficiency and economic performance. It wants a European base that works for its specialised regional clusters, harmonises equipment needs, prioritises security of supply and intellectual property rights, streamlines European export procedures and protects critical military technologies in Europe. In the 2013 White Paper, such protection would involve increasing information exchanges between the European Union’s Member States, conducting political risk analysis of defence firms at the European-level to identify competitive vulnerabilities and a long-term security of supply policy for critical strategic materials.

What then is France willing to give in return for a more Franco-centered European base? The immediate response is not as much as it wants. Nevertheless, the first aspect is a more centralised role for the European Defence Agency. Indeed, the 2013 Defence White Paper wants it to play an increased role as an incubator able to trigger very early future technological and industrial cooperation between partners in the European Union. France also wants the European Defence Agency to provide a common framework for equipment acquisitions, and in return it states in the White Paper that it would implement its various codes of conduct on military matters. In the context of the Atlantic Alliance’s ‘Smart Defence’, France significantly wants to see greater coordination between the European Defence Agency and the Alliance on equipment development and procurement.

On page 65 of the White Paper, France calls for a European Union White Paper on security and defence, but this is nothing more than tinkering at the margins. Paris knows this idea will not be agreed on any time soon, but it at least gives the appearance of France’s continued interest in the Common Security and Defence Policy. France should instead aim at a ‘bottom-up’ approach to the policy. It has so far focused on issues such as a common European approach to intervention in places such as Libya. But it has always been naive to speak of a single European strategic policy without a more integrated military-industrial base; such a base is the only basis for a more meaningful European military policy.

Such an industrial base is essential for France if it is to maintain full spectrum capabilities such as aerospace, missile, naval, electronics and nuclear capacities. Additionally, the French military-industrial base – with its high-tech skills and productive capacities – is seen as increasingly critical to boosting innovation in the civilian sector of the country’s economy. Finally, in light of the shrinking demand in France and Europe, arms exports will increasingly play a critical role in France’s strategic and security policy.

But France faces a number of military-industrial problems. Firstly, military budget cuts in France and the rest of Europe are having a major impact on the French armaments industry by lowering demand. Furthermore, military budget decreases in the United States have forced American firms to seek a larger proportion of business on global markets, which in turn increases the amount of pressure on French armaments firms when competing internationally.

What is France’s response to such challenges? In the 2008 White Paper, France was determined to see the state steer corporate developments but not through direct ownership of firms. As part of this process the French government aimed to publish its long-term procurement strategies to allow firms to adjust production accordingly. In the 2013 White Paper, however, France aims to take this further by reviewing government ownership of firms with a view to supporting the strategic decisions of firms rather than the other way around; a recent example of this is EADS’ recent board restructuring. This shifts, however slightly, the strategic decision-making balance of armaments firms in favour of corporate boards.

While such changes are important however, more is needed. Indeed, another challenge for France is recognising that the country cannot face challenges such as the economic crisis, the American pivot and geostrategic uncertainty alone, while also not being able to encourage meaningful European-level military-industrial cooperation. France can convince fellow European states that national bases in Europe need to adapt to a new economic and strategic context; Brazil, China and India are not just rising military players but also competitors in military science. Yet it cannot convince other European states to ‘buy European’ (read French) equipment or to engage in a level of military-industrial integration that would result in a loss of national competitiveness and social welfare such as employment.

The 2013 White Paper underlines the fact that France sees the European military-technological and industrial base as a means to forwarding its own national military-industrial interests. As one of Europe’s leading armaments producers, this is not necessarily negative. Idealism will not get the European armaments industry anywhere. Indeed, the 2013 White Paper clearly states that European cooperation thus far has not really remedied the issues of high equipment costs, juste retour, duplication or the production of redundant capacity. This is because military-industrial nationalism in Europe is still an issue; real cooperation at the European-level still remains shallow.

National consensus – these words are missing from Bulgaria’s political vocabulary.  In the midst of bitter political contentions, Bulgaria’s political scene is once again marred by open confrontations, and the bad-blood of back stabbing.  Today, Saturday 11^th of May, is the day before the early Bulgarian elections.  In theory, this day should allow quiet time for voters, in which they could consider their political options.  Yet, there is no ‘calm before the storm,’ as the public anger has just been roused by the newly discovered 350,000 empty electoral bulletins [1].  This staggering quantity amounts to 10% of the expected vote.  Still, this is the day in which to reflect on the predictions of analysts, pollsters, and politologists about the up-coming political fortunes of the Bulgarian polis.

Not a national consensus, but another form of socio-political polarization is reflected in the latest polls, which teeter-totter in their predictions of the actual ‘winner.’  Some polls teeter on the promise of a hair-thin margin of victory to the former Bulgarian ruling party Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (abbreviated in Bulgarian as GERB), with the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) trailing behind by a percentage or two.  Other polls ever-so-slightly totter the result towards the other side: BSP leading, followed by GERB.  Mid-sized parties, such as the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (abbreviated in Bulgarian as DPS), Ataka, and the Movement Bulgaria for Citizens (abbreviated in Bulgarian as DBG), hope they will be able to jump over the electoral bar and into the parliamentary pool.  This political galaxy is completed by a host of smaller parties, which ‘capture the diversity of voters’ preference.’  Some sceptics accuse them of trying to capture the 1% of the voters’ threshold, and get a coveted government subsidy of 12 leva per vote for the next four years [2].

The Divided Voters

The public support is dispersed across the political spectrum.  The polls predict that Bulgaria’s political pool will be inhabited by two big fish: GERB and BSP.  They will have to lord over the murky political waters in coalition with some of the mid-sized parties – DPS, Ataka or Movement BG.  Gallup International (GI) expects about 3.5 million Bulgarians to head to the polls tomorrow.  According to GI (10.05.2013) the voters preference are as follows: GERB – 24%, BSP – 23.6, DPS -  7.1%, DBG – 3.7%, Ataka – 3.6%. ‘Sova Haris,’ in a survey requested by TV7 and NEWS7, predicts 20.9% support for GERB and 20.4% for BSP.  The National Center for Study of the Public Opinion (NCSPO), predicts 34.3% for GERB, BSP – 25%, DPS – 13%, Ataka – 9%.

However, NCSPO, an agency supported by the National Assembly’s budget does not have a web page, and concerned citizens point out that it is rather non-transparent structure, considering that it is financed by public money [3].  NCSPO seemingly exemplifies the problems, faced by the Bulgarian state and Bulgaria’s public institutions even now, more than 6 years after Bulgaria’s entry into the EU.  The experiences of the Bulgarian polis with coalition governments brings out fresh memories of their rather weak and definitely less-than-stellar performance.  Doubts remain, as to if a loosely stitched coalition can gain the needed wide social consensus, in tackling the enormous and controversial problems of Bulgaria’s poverty, stagnating economy, and widespread corruption.

The leaders of both GERB and BSP suffer very significant public disapproval.  Fresh secret-wire-taping scandal pains Boyko Borisov, the former prime minister.  The ghost of coalitions past haunts Sergei Stanishev, leader of the socialists.  Currently, Stanishev leads with 1% approval ahead of Borisov, (28% vs 27%).  However, the percentage of people, who stated that they have no confidence in Stanishev’s leadership is 66%, compared with 61% who expressed no confidence in Borisov.  There is nothing to boast about in this 5% difference, as both percentages exceed 60 – i.e. well over half of the voters have no confidence in either party leader.

The scene is completed by choruses of advisers, who promise bandage of reforms for the stagnating Bulgarian economy.  A throng of 200 international observers will fly in and then fly out.  How many orphanages in Bulgaria could be helped with the money for these expensive trips?  Still, with the shocking discovery of the extra-abundance of 350,000 electoral bulletins, maybe the Bulgarian elections do need this large flock of foreign observers, after all.

Electing the Un(d)electable

Analysts warn that a weak coalition government may send the Bulgarians back to the election booths as early as in September, 2013.  ‘It will take them months to come up with a coalition agreement,’ grumble some of the Bulgarian citizenry, by now well familiar with the agree-ability of the Bulgarian politicians.  Bulgaria’s political class suffers from an acute de-legitimization crisis, and one of the demands of the angry protests, which brought down GERB’s government, centered on the disappointment with the old ways of political leadership, and the desire to see new faces and new political solutions.  Seems though, that the same old political recipes will be dominating the polls on the election day.  What will tomorrow’s elections bring?  It is a ‘known unknown.’  Bulgaria’s political climate is currently characterized by widely dispersed across the political spectrum public support, and significant, exceeding 60% disapproval of the leadership of the major political organizations.  Yet, national consensus does not figure in the electoral platforms of any of the parties.

Notes:

 [1]. ‘The prosecution took away 350,000 illegal bulletins,’ Sega, 11.05.2013, http://www.segabg.com/article.php?id=648410

[2]. Gospodinova, Veselina, ‘A Piggy-Bank Vote’, Capital, 10.05.2013, http://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/izbori2013/2013/05/10/2057858_vot_-_kasichka/

[3]. ‘Parity between GERB and BSP,’ Pressadaily, 10.05.2013, http://pressadaily.bg/publication/14720-%D0%9F%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B5%D1%82-%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%B6%D0%B4%D1%83-%D0%93%D0%95%D0%A0%D0%91-%D0%B8-%D0%91%D0%A1%D0%9F

[4]. Paunova, Polina, ‘Open parliament for citizen’s positions,’ 20.05.2012,

http://openparliament.net/position/view-71

Bulgarian Parliament, http://www.parliament.bg/bg/nciom