In 1996 Atletico Madrid won la Liga.  I remember this solely because I was in Madrid that night and witnessed what might be termed extensive celebrations, including the riot police at a couple of memorable points.

Until now, that’s probably been as close to organised chaos (and I use the term rather euphemistically) as I’ve got.  But it looks like I’ll have another opportunity come the end of June, when I’m in Brussels on a study trip that will coincide with the next European Council.

After last night’s deeply dispiriting meeting, we are once again in a period of intense uncertainty.  Greek banks could easily fall into a run before we even get to the general election; Hollande has discharged his commitment to put Eurobonds back on the table, without any real consequence; the British continue to irk,  rather than support solutions to a situation in which they have a deep material interest. And Berlin has become like the Kremlin, with us all watching for any sign of flexibility in their position, largely without success.

This week’s discussions about the need to plan for Greek exit from the Euro is surprising, but more because it’s only now that anyone has admitted that such planning is prudent, rather than because it’s happening.  Given the continuing malaise across European capitals, one would have thought plenty of bodies would have at least been thinking about how they would cope with a disorderly exit, not least because none of the EU, IMF or national governments seem to be moving on an orderly process.

It strikes me that at the heart of this is a failure to remember that the Euro is a political project, first and foremost.  The economic benefits were never clear-cut, except for the inner circle of the DM-zone, and everyone knew that in the 1990s.  That was why the Germans insisted on convergence criteria and why some countries got ‘creative’ in meeting them; that was why the Commission’s original plans to have a small Eurozone was overruled by member states; that was why the Stability & Growth Pact was signed, and then ignored.  None of this should surprise us, even if the exposure of EMU’s weaknesses has been particularly brutal over the past 3 years.

Unfortunately, the Euro is at the heart of the EU’s economic project now, especially with the bolt-ons of the SGP and the six-pack, which move us further down the path of an economic government.  Either member states need to recall the political value of the Euro and find a strong and positive set of solutions to the present situation, or they must accept that the moment has passed and suffer the consequences.  Either way, it looks like there’ll be something to witness in June: the choice is between the organisation and the chaos.

Dr Simon Usherwood is a Senior Lecturer at the School of Politics, University of Surrey.

Twitter: @Usherwood and @surreypolitics

As somebody who was quite involved in last year’s bloggers meetings with the Hungarian Presidency and as someone who, because of that, had the chance to be accredited twice to EU Council meetings as a blogger, I feel I have a lot to say about that. I also have to admit, that, as somebody who has worked for the German EU Council Presidency five years ago, I am still kind of fascinated by the communicative logistics that such a rotating presidency brings about.

And I don’t say too much when I say that I miss Kovacs & Kovats.

However, the fact that I was involved so much last year makes me feel that I have already profited so much that it’s now on others to make proposals for substance and format. Second, because I am fascinated about the work of the presidency and I have seen part of that work myself, I anyway have a very particular Eurogeek view on all this, so I do not believe I could make good proposals that represent anyone’s but my very specific view. Third, since I don’t live in Brussels right now, it’s unlikely that I will be able to physically participate.

Fourth, I would already be fine if simply Kovacs & Kovats would be back.

Still, I would like to bring in my five cents on the experiences and observations I have made last year and the conclusions I would draw:

(1) The only substantive outreach into the wider European blogosphere that last year’s exercise brought were this blog post on Netzpolitik.org and Joe Litobarski’s blog post ahead of our presence at the Council. There were more blog posts and a number of interesting discussions, but they largely remained within circles that anyway discuss these topics.

Conclusion: Organising a bloggers event doesn’t necessarily create outreach. What kind of outreach to any wider audience is created depends on who is involved, whether the topics discussed matter for them, and whether they have the access to channels that are actually read. In other words, thinking a bloggers meetings from the substance is nice, but, without knowing who can actually come and what s/he is interested in at that concrete moment, it’s difficult to define this a priori.

(2) The actual profit of the Presidency meeting bloggers last year was mainly limited to the few that were physically present, i.e. people who like me happened to live in Brussels and who had the time to come.

Conclusion: It’s actually a good idea to involve bloggers from Cyprus as the upcoming presidency proposed. In my view, this event should be mainly for them. If they are political bloggers, they may learn how they can find real stories, and the presidency may be able to tell them how they can provide them with background while other European bloggers present may give hints how they interact with the Brussels sphere in order to generate stories or attention. If they are blogging on other things than politics, it may be interesting if and how they relate their subject to Brussels or to the rest of Europe. So it would actually be nice to know them ahead, to see what they write, so that those bloggers who would be in Brussels to meet them might have an idea about what connects them already and what connections could be enforced.

(3) Parts of the meetings with the Hungarian Presidency last year were “off the record”, and while journalists may like such kind of 19th-20th century favouritism, I felt rather embarrassed as a blogger to be told stuff that I couldn’t blog about.

Conclusion: Cancel anything that cannot be live-tweeted, live-blogged, live-streamed. Give that to the journalists, they earn their money with that. This also means that, if one is at an appropriate venue, WiFi and electrical plugs need to be available. A live stream and recording would be ideal.

(3) The only real sense of connection to the Hungarian Presidency came through Gergely and Márton. They were present both online and offline, and they made you feel that they liked their job and this outreach, despite a political situation in their home country that made this quite an unlikely constellation.

Conclusion: Organising a bloggers meeting is nice, but if it’s a one-time socialising event, it may just be nice. However, the impact and change to the social culture that the old-style schizophrenic Council still portrays will be zero and the money and time for the meeting might be wasted. The change comes from a different behaviour, from new styles, from a real will to openness and human interaction. A bloggers meeting should be embedded in a more credible socio-political environment if it should have any meaning.

(4) The only real “innovation” (in EU terms) in our presence in the Council was the question I could ask in the May Council press conference, a question that was proposed by a pseudonymous commentator following Joe’s blog post. This was the first time, in so far that I could observe it, that the digital sphere had at least a minimal back-channel into a real-life event with high level officials in Brussels.

Conclusion: Organising a bloggers meeting without a chance of the outside world to interact, intervene, ask questions, listen in, follow up is not a real bloggers meeting making use of the means of the 21st century. Without the credible bargain of outside interference, it’s just another socialising in Brussels. Bloggers outreach should ultimately be about creating back-channels.

(5) I personally found the meeting environment in the Hungarian representation or the reporting environment in the Council too formal, even when the atmosphere was nice. When you feel like you’re in a formal meeting or you’re in a 24h new scycle facility, you don’t feel like blogging, not even afterwards.

Conclusion: Meetings with bloggers that are not digital meetings (e.g. video conferences) should ideally take place in an informal setting where people can join or leave, sit on the ground, on a couch or at a table, interact with those in the room and those outside the room as if this was a normal conversation. The more formal it is, the less it reflects the reality of blogging and social (media) communication. The picture below (by elschy, CC-BY) shows one possible proper blogging environment:

(6) I was kindly asked to transmit Ivan’s Twitter comment that all this might be is a PR stunt, a feeling-cool occasion for a bunch of privileged bloggers and a waste of public money. I think that is a valid point.

Conclusion: Skip all extravagances that may be regarded standard in Brussels or in the political sphere. Bloggers can bring their own bottle of coke or beer, a pizza or a cake, if you tell them ahead that they are allowed to bring or should bring stuff. For the rest, spending public money should actually serve a wider cause, so maybe the bloggers meeting can be a good occasion to test equipment that may be used once everyone has returned home but still wants to communicate with the Presidency.

In summary, it’s quite difficult to define the right format and substance of a bloggers meeting. Usually, bloggers are quite communicative people, so if you give them a proper space they will communicate.

Any formal activities that actually destroy social communication is wasted time. Any bloggers outreach that doesn’t take into account that the blogger’s space is – by definition – online, is probably in vain. Any meeting that isn’t the opening door for more openness, for more digital interaction with a wider European public is a nice one-shot exercise, but will just create expectations that can only be deceived afterwards.

PS: And that’s not just something for the Cyprus presidency – presidencies come and go – but more specifically for all those who think about EU communications on a continuous basis.

Do they? Currently, the European Union has over ten ‘strategic partners’, with countries as different as the United States, Japan, Mexico, China and Russia. With some of these countries, Europeans share deep and pervasive relations and common interests. With others, Europeans have fraught relations. Has proclaiming a ‘strategic partnership’ with Russia prevented Moscow from undermining European policies in the European Neighbourhood; energy blackmail; or even, from threatening several countries in the eastern half of the European Union with pre-emptive strikes? Has the ‘strategic partnership’ with China given the European Union any long-term influence over Beijing, a proud country with thousands of years of its own history behind it? Consequentially, in the way that they are currently deployed, ‘strategic partnerships’ sometimes lack meaning. As Thomas Renard has argued:

With no clear list, no real substance and no purpose, strategic partnerships appear like an uncertain fleet of empty vessels sailing in the troubled water of multipolarity with no course to follow.

Indeed, with ‘strategic partnerships’, Brussels seems to want to make friends with everyone, and everywhere, even when others do not want to be friends, due to competing interests. In so doing, the European Union thinks its is imbued with an air of neutrality and an image of an ‘honest broker’ at the service of some idealistic post-political world. As such, ‘strategic partnerships’ are characteristically ‘unstrategic’ – strategy being an actor’s blueprint to maximise its own power. With its ‘strategic partnerships’, Brussels is a bit like the nice kid in the playground who seeks repetitively to make friends with everyone – even the school bully – only to see himself get a punch on the nose every day.

‘Strategic partnerships’ are the way of the future

They were – over ten years ago. During the 1990s, the world was relatively stable: Western power was ascendant almost everywhere. With the roll-back of Russian power in Eastern Europe, the European great powers – the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany – thrust whatever residue of Moscow’s influence in Central and Eastern Europe back into the Eurasian heartland, and enlarged both the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union to permanently restructure the region. Russia was a basket-case, China was still in the early stages of its industrial modernisation and India, South Korea and Brazil were still relatively minor powers. In this benign atmosphere, concepts like ‘strategic partnerships’, ‘peacekeeping’, ‘Human Security’, and so on became vogue – because during the ‘unipolar moment’ – Europeans and Americans faced no existential challenge. The world was ‘their’ peace, and their relationships with third countries and the nature and agenda of international organisations developed largely on their terms. Not least, their ample room of manoeuvre allowed them to engage in humanitarian interventions. In today’s world, however, where Western military spending is declining (both absolutely and relatively), and where numerous powers are seeking to enlarge their own respective spheres of influence, this approach can become short-sighted and counterproductive.

We can refashion ‘strategic partnerships’ to make them relevant to the 2010s

Perhaps. Clearly, the European Union has very close and comprehensive relations with some countries, with whom it shares values and interests, particularly with the United States, Canada and Japan. Building on these relationships makes sense. Equally, with other countries, it could improve relations, such as with India, Brazil, South Korea, Mexico or South Africa, which will become increasingly important to the geopolitical balance of power in the twenty-first century. However, there should be no ‘strategic partnership’ with a country like Russia when it continues to threaten and intimidate some of the European Union’s Member States and undermines European policies in the neighbourhoods to the east and south. Any ‘strategic partnership’ – by definition – must be based on reciprocity; and preferably one where Brussels gains more than it loses. Having such relations with countries whose policies run so clearly against the grain of European interests not only compromises the concept of ‘strategic partnership’, but also damages the European Union’s image and credibility on the regional and the world stages.

So ‘strategic partnerships’ are now redundant?

Hang on! If the European Union’s ‘strategic partnerships’ can be undergirded by a good dose of military power, they may become more effective. Trying to remove power and force from international relations is like trying to remove politics from economics – it just goes against the grain of history, and reality. Brussels may need structured relations – ‘strategic partnerships’ – with other great powers in the years ahead, but those should never come before Europeans’ own interests, which will sometimes require the use or the threat of the use of armed force. As Robert Cooper points out in The Breaking of Nations: diplomacy may be coated in a velvet glove, ‘but behind it there is always the iron fist.’ In the 1920s, the American and European idealists thought they could remake the world by removing the iron fist, instead replacing it with soft fluff in the form of the Washington and London naval treaties and the League of Nations. In so doing, what they actually did was weaken the power of the civilised nations, which paved the way for the rise of aggressive dictatorships, plunging the world into systemic war. Theodore Roosevelt once said: ‘Speak softly but carry a big stick.’ Without military power to undergird ‘strategic partnerships’, Europeans will end up braying loudly while carrying a twig.

Take for example the rather controversial topic of immigration, which is an issue that prominently features in programmes of far-right parties. Many of those parties oppose various forms of European integration that relate to free movement (e.g. Schengen area) because they allegedly go against the interest of national economies and societies. The ‘Polish plumber’ is one of the most interesting stereotypical anecdotes that the discussion on immigration has given birth to. And, although the common market (especially in combination with worsening economic conditions) does pose challenges for European governments, the various benefits of European integration, such as investment and trade opportunities, are often overshadowed. At the same time, other roots of economic or social problems are left untouched. For example, immigration is frequently linked to domestic unemployment but little has been said about other sides of the issue, such as the (often limited) incentives to work or the employability of nationals.

In this context, it is clear that Brussels as well as national governments in separate have failed to successfully communicate European integration. It is not simply a case of the so-called ‘democratic deficit’, mostly understood as the limited legitimisation that unelected EU organs enjoy. It is a far more significant failure to convey the vision and reality of an integrated Europe to its citizens. With no proactive education and information strategies from the side of Brussels and extensive reliance to national capitals for policy implementation, the EU’s message is often ‘lost in translation’. Many governments fail to realistically explain the EU to their people (in fact, they often impute the European project for the sake of domestic gains).

Ultimately, the discussion boils down to a lack of an EU understanding or even European identity, which many consider as simply utopian. Certainly, the EU is a relatively newborn entity, especially in compare to nation states. As such, the emergence of a European identity that will be equally cherished across all member states might take a while, or, indeed, be a rather futile aim. However, this does not mean that there isn’t a need for a more proactive policy that will ‘sell’ the European project in a more pragmatic and informative tone. Doing so does not guaranteed that European integration will be widely accepted. However, it does safeguard a more realistic debate, which will possibly deal with the EU’s nemesis of far-right resurgence and expose much of its simplistic rhetoric.

Hence, my complaint remained valid, and it is valid until today. Today, I received a letter from the Ombudsman telling me that (my highlight):

“On 2 February, I asked the European Commission to send an opinion on your complaint by 30 April 2012. […] [B]y letter of 15 May 2012 [sic!] the Commission let me know it will not be able to meet the above deadline and that it intends to send its reply by 31 May 2012.“

I should add that the first request for documents concerned was made on 5 July 2011. I am currently in the process of finalising the research for which I initially requested these documents.

In the meantime, I re-reread Article 42 of the Charta of Fundamental Rights of the EU:

“Any citizen of the Union, and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member State, has a right of access to documents of the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of  the Union, whatever their medium.”

I feel lucky to have such a right. With kind regards to DG MARE and to Catherine Day.

With the rise of the United States and Soviet Russia in 1945, Britain was simply too small to compete alongside the new continental superpowers – and in any case, one was an ally, the other an enemy. But the declinists were hoodwinked by their own narrative. They had turned a problem into an obsession. They believed too strongly in Britain’s decline, perhaps because it had fallen from such a lofty height. While the United Kingdom was no longer a hegemonic power – with the ability to literally change the course of world history – it was still a great power and could do a lot of things other countries could not.

This is what – for all her faults, and make no mistake, she had many – Margaret Thatcher realised. She knew that Britain was not going to fall forever, and that someone had to stop the rot. The opportunity came in 1982, when the regime in Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands. Her response was the rapid generation and dispatch of a large expeditionary force, the manifestation of which proved how the British were still a formidable power, and – crucially – on a global scale. No other country – perhaps not even Soviet Russia – could send an expeditionary force some 13,000 kilometres into the South Atlantic, into a hostile maritime environment where the nearest air station was 6,000 kilometres away, and decisively defeat a substantial regional power (one armed with modern British and French weapons). And though the Argentines will never acknowledge it, the British victory was so overwhelming that it liberated them from a nasty regime and paved the way for the democratic transformation of their nation.

The Falklands Conflict woke the United Kingdom up; it put Britain back on the world map by revealing that it remained a global power. So if she did anything good, Mrs. Thatcher put an end to declinism. Today, however, declinism haunts Britain once again. The economy needs reform and diversification and the military has suffered substantial cuts. However, declinism must not be allowed to re-emerge: the British may never again be the superpower they once were, but their geography, allied to their cultural, economic and military resources, will probably keep them in the top-tier of world powers indefinitely, so long as they retain a global outlook, good policy and a degree of confidence.

By mid-century – short of an unforeseen catastrophe – Britain’s economy will remain in the world’s top ten. Based on current projections, Britain will be the dominant power in Europe by 2050 – and in every area, having gained economic parity with Germany, which will become progressively hobbled by an ageing and declining population. Boosted by a high fertility rate, and immigration, Britain will grow to contain the largest population in Europe, overtaking Germany by the late-2040s. And culturally, it is hard to see any other European power emerging with the ability to overcome Britain’s capacity to attract others to its popular culture, liberal values and ancient democratic system. Moreover, except perhaps for Russia, it is very unlikely that there will be any significant geopolitical opponents to the United Kingdom in the wider European region. What is more, the country’s Armed Forces will not only remain Europe’s strongest – and by an increasingly large margin due to unrelenting military spending cuts in other European countries – but will also acquire capabilities that they have never had before, such as 65,000 tonne pocket supercarriers and remotely-piloted stealth global combat aircraft.

But this does not mean London should become politically complacent. Rather than a new bout of declinism, Britain must work harder to re-establish its Asian connexions. It must maintain its ability to support Australia, Malaysia and Singapore in the face of potential Chinese aggression, while it simultaneously boosts its strategic and cultural ties to Japan, India and Indonesia. The British must also keep themselves laser-focused on Europe – their strategic garden: London must work harder than ever to bolster British influence, and establish a new European grid of British power. In particular, London would be well-advised to pay far closer attention to its allies in Northern Europe – particularly as the ‘High North’ is opened up by climate change and as a potential new maritime communication line is established to East Asia as a result. Britain should firmly anchor itself into the Baltic and Nordic spaces, acting as a security provider for the smaller – often very pro-British – nations in the region; and it should boost its ties with Poland, a longstanding friend, to keep Russia’s distracting influence to a minimum.

In the south, the United Kingdom should also upgrade its relations with Spain and Turkey – not least by supporting Turkish accession into the European Union – to keep both involved in supporting a safe and secure Mediterranean. In return for Spanish support for British hegemony in the Mediterranean, London should help Spain bolster itself against Argentina’s attempts to dislocate Spanish companies, while helping Madrid to keep Moroccan designs on the Canary Isles and the Spanish African enclaves to a minimum. And – all the while – London should work closer and closer with France, its century-long ally, across every military, political and economic spectrum. This will ensure that Europe’s two pre-eminent powers assume the strategic European obligations of their hard-pressed superpower friend, the United States, as it gradually pivots – as it must – towards the Indo-Pacific space.

• Photo credit: Mageslayer99.

By Robert Strasser (flickr) | BY NC SA

Ich bin jetzt nicht so der Agrarpolitikblogger, ich geb’s zu. Aber nachdem ich bei Philip Banse letztens erzählt habe, dass es keine EU-Agrarpolitikbloggerszene gibt, obwohl da 2012 fast 60 Mrd. Euro auf EU-Ebene für ausgegeben werden, dachte ich mir, es wäre mal an der Zeit, mich halt selbst der aktuellen EU-Agrarpolitikreform zu widmen.

Ich war dann Mittwoch beim Agrarministerrat-Debriefing der EBD in Berlin, hab mir Ilse Aigners Statement beim EU-Ministerrats vom Dienstag nochmal angehört (unter dem Webcast auf die deutsche Flagge klicken), und dann gebloggt, was ich so verstanden hatte.

Was ich verstanden hatte, war, dass der EU-Kommissar Dacian Ciolos (sprich: Datschian Tschiolosch) dem Ministerrat ein neues Papier vorgelegt hatte, um seine Vorstellungen zum Greening (zur Ökologisierung) der EU-Landwirtschaft zu präzisieren. Nur leider war dieses Papier für mich nicht aufzufinden.

Also ging ich zum letzten Facebook-Eintrag des Kommissars, in dem er von seinem Auftritt beim Rat berichtete, und bat, doch sein Papier zu veröffentlichen. Mein Kommentar war um 15:34 geposted, und keine zwei Stunden später gab’s eine Reaktion mit einem Link zu einer Seite, auf der ich das Papier dann finden konnte. Und wenn man sich Metadaten des PDF-Dokuments anschaut, sieht man, dass es tatsächlich erst um 16:55 Uhr am Mittwoch erstellt wurde, das heißt 30 Minuten vor der Reaktion auf Facebook – also mit großer Wahrscheinlichkeit tatsächlich infolge meiner Anfrage.

Ich will ehrlich zugeben, dass ich eher mit einer ausweichenden oder keiner Reaktion gerechnet hatte, nicht mit einer zügigen, konkreten Antwort, die auch noch meinen Wünschen entsprach. Wenn das der Standard wird, mit der die EU-Kommission auf öffentliche Anfragen online reagiert, dann wär das echt erfreulich.

Natürlich hat der Kommissar ein gewisses Interesse, dass dieses Papier öffentlich wird, schließlich will er ja seine Sicht durchbekommen, und die Minister schienen jetzt nicht wirklich auf seiner Seite zu sein. Aber trotzdem mein Dank an wen auch immer im Team des Kommissars, die/der die Facebook-Seite betreut.

Jetzt muss nur noch jemand, der sich tatsächlich mit Agrarpolitik auskennt, dieses Papier von Ciolos auswerten. Das kann ich nicht auch noch machen.

PS.: Letztens hat schon die EU-Fischereikommissarin auf einen eher provokanten Tweet von mir mit einer Video-Antwort reagiert. Ich weiß nicht, ob ich so viel positive Aufmerksamkeit aus Brüssel noch lange ertragen kann.

After nine days of negotiations the Greek parties that were elected in the last parliament failed to form a government. National elections will take place again in mid-June. Given the overall situation, political instability only exacerbates the already chilling effects of the economic depression. The formation of a government –any government– is essential in the immediate future, otherwise Greece runs the great risk of being plunged into chaos and anarchy, as the bailout programme will be brought to an abrupt end, cutting off the financing of the state’s primary deficits such as wages, pensions and other essential expenses; Greece will be forced out of the eurozone by means of severing it from the TARGET2 payment mechanism (also see the Financial Times article on Greek banks); while the extremist elements from both sides of the political spectrum will only find more fertile ground for their propaganda.

In a previous article on the issue I outlined what I consider to be the massive failure of the political system to provide any pragmatic, detailed solutions to the socioeconomic situation of Greece. Within the context of the current analysis, I shall take this a step further, by describing in length the micropolitical forces that prevented the formation of a government and the party politics that will, from now on, prepare the grounds for the next elections. The analysis is separated into two sections. The first offers a case-by-case assessment of each party’s presumptions and power games; while the second will deal with the most plausible scenaria ahead of the next elections.

1. The micropolitical factors preventing the formation of a government

The results of the last Greek elections. Image source: Skai.gr

Nea Democratia (ND – New Democracy)

Starting from New Democracy, the centre-right conservative party, one needs to bear in mind three important things:

1. The leadership of the party is now held by Mr Antonis Samaras, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs who established himself in the hearts of his fellow conservatives as a “true patriot”, when he resigned from ND over the Macedonian naming dispute in the early 1990′s, arguing that the word “Macedonia” could not possibly be part of any official name to Greece’s neighboring country which is officially referred to as FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia). In this sense Mr Samaras, not only represents the old school of the Greek centre-right, but he also depicts himself and his party as the true patriotic force in the country. Because of this, any broad cooperation with leftist forces who generally have fundamentally different views on national issues, migration and civil liberties among others, is from the outset quite unlikely.
2. While Greece was still governed by PASOK from 2009 until the resignation of Mr Papandreou in November 2011, ND was among the most vociferous critics of the troika’s bailout programme, though always in a rather vague, opportunistic manner. The leadership of ND was in favor of “growth measures” and of “renegotiating” the memorandum of understanding with the trio of official lenders (EU-ECB-IMF). However once ND joined the technocratic government of Mr Papademos to negotiate the second bailout to Greece, including a restructuring of the 50% of sovereign debt held by private investors, ND made a U-turn and suddenly forgot its anti-austerity, anti-memorandum oratory. Instead it preached the only realistic -and thus patriotic- solution of accepting the second bailout without any conditions and of agreeing on the debt restructuring through the PSI programme, which effectively shifted systemic risk away from Greece (not good in terms of tactics for the Greek bargaining position vis-à-vis its lenders). Today ND, in its effort to model itself as a moderate force of realism and patriotic duty, speaks about “renegotiation” and “growth” in some abstract way, again contradicting itself since only a few months ago (March 2012) it signed the second memorandum of understanding with the troika. The key point is that since they signed the last memorandum they can no longer fall in line with the rhetoric of the radical left or the moderate nationalists which openly demand a cessation of debt payments and the “emancipation” from the memorandum. 
3. New Democracy is one of the two major parties (the other is PASOK) that has always been interwoven with the state apparatus of power (and corruption) ever since the fall of the military dictatorship 38 years ago. All the years prior to the current crisis ND and PASOK would easily concentrate approximately 70% percent of the votes, with one of the two commanding a majority of seats in parliament. This political duopoly changed dramatically in the last elections, at least temporarily, when their respective share of the votes was drastically reduced. In the last elections ND was asking for a clear majority in parliament, which in terms of percentages would mean something like 33% or more. Instead they got a meager 18.9%, depriving them of the upper hand in the power play. Ever since day one of the last elections, May 6, ND had a strong incentive to direct things towards new elections, with the hope of concentrating more voters to its side, either by attracting all those who are fearful of the prospect of a radical leftist government, or by absorbing other right wing forces who did not gain anything from the last elections.

Synaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras (SYRIZA – Coalition of the Radical Left)

SYRIZA is in many respects a rather peculiar case. In terms of its history, it originates from the schism in the Greek Communist Party (KKE) between those who wanted to remain faithful to the dictates of the Kremlin, when the USSR still existed, and those who wished to move away from that subservient role into a localized communist approach. This initially led to the creation of two KKEs, the KKE-exterior and the KKE-internior. The main forces of SYRIZA come from the latter.

Concerning the very composition of SYRIZA, it is not a “party” as such, but rather a “coalition” of many smaller parties of the radical left. This detail is important for two reasons:

1. A coalition of forces must maintain a strategy of devotion to its shibboleths so as to hold together any extremist, sectarianist elements. In practice this implies that the very survival of the coalition is grounded on the adherence to a hard line agenda that cannot possibly make any compromises. Any kind of compromise can lead the coalition into an existential crisis, as the “true” radicals will wish to distance their selves from the “mainstreamists” who “dilute” their ideology for the sake of gaining power. Therefore the denial of genuine concessions with non-left-wing-radicals is deeply embedded in the structure of SYRIZA.
2. In legal terms the fact that SYRIZA is not a “party” but a “coalition” deprives it of the right to gain the extra 50 seats in parliament that the Greek legislation offers to the winning party of the elections. SYRIZA will therefore aim at registering as a “party” with the ambition of finishing first in the next elections so as to leverage this (abusive and preposterous) piece of legislation.

In addition SYRIZA has a rather alternative approach to the crisis, ill grounded and amateurish as that may be to the misfortune of those who want pragmatic alternative solutions. They have been saying that they will renounce the memorandum with the troika, levy higher taxes upon “the rich”, nationalize banks, increase the number of civil servants and guarantee all kinds of welfare rights and other privileges.

In a nutshell SYRIZA’s agenda is characterized by a perniciously fallacious and irresponsible conviction in the “existence” of money -lots of money- that the Greek state will be able to use in its efforts to achieve all these lofty goals. Understandably any sensible person who knows even the basics of economics and the Greek economy, will never fall in line with such an utopian agenda.

Make no mistake, the problem is not alternative solutions, it is the false assertion of the omnipotence of the Greek state to supply all kinds of services and carry out all sorts of tasks while being bankrupt and dependent on foreign funds. SYRIZA errs lamentably on this issue to the potential detriment of the Greek society.

Panhellenio Sosialistiko Kinima (PASOK – Panhellenic Socialist Movement)

PASOK was the party that prior to the national elections of 2009 run a campaign replete with empty promises, with its former leader Mr George Papandreou insisting that “money exists” (just as SYRIZA does) and therefore any cuts in fiscal spending were absurd, meaningless, presumptuous and “neoliberal”. Once PASOK came to power it soon had to face the harsh reality, which was depicted in the soaring interest rates for Greek sovereign bonds, the deepening recession and the eventual need to resort to an international bailout mechanism in May 2010.

PASOK therefore committed two unforgivable sins in the eyes of the Greek people. It firstly lied only for the sake of gaining power (business as usual). Secondly it brought upon the country the memorandum of understanding with the troika, which finds few if any genuine supporters in the Greek interior. As such it was no surprise that PASOK was obliterated in the last elections seeing its share of the votes fall from approximately 33% in the “good old days” down to 13% in May 2012. However, as a matter of principle and honesty to both Greeks and non-Greeks, it must be stressed that PASOK lost support because it no longer had the power to employ people through the machinery of clientelism it established all these years. If Greeks were really voting according to facts and principles, PASOK would have long now fallen into disgrace due to its undeniable unscrupulousness.

In terms of today’s party politics, PASOK is perhaps the only party that wants to participate in a coalition, only for the sake of clinging on to power with the hope of stalling its free fall in popularity. Maintaining a hard line after almost two and half years of outright lies and reckless governance would only accelerate its disintegration.

While PASOK wants to be part of a government, the sentiments in other parties are not anyhow similar, since any party cooperating with PASOK runs the risk of being stigmatized and defamed. After all how can the political forces which now agitate the abolition or root and branch renegotiation of the bailout programme, cooperate with a party that is, fairly or not, the physical embodiment of all the evils and misfortunes related to the Greek crisis? It clearly is a strong deterrent. For instance the unwillingness of Mr Kouvelis of DEMAR (analyzed below) to participate in a coalition government together ND and PASOK, is in my view largely attributed to the stigma such a cooperation would have.

Anexartitoi Hellenes (Independent Greeks)

This is a newly formed party whose leader, Mr Panos Kammenos an ex-ND deputy, defected from his former party after disagreeing with its approval of the second bailout package to Greece. Mr Kammenos has maintained an anti-memorandum, anti-austerity oratory and has repeatedly expressed views which resonate with moderately nationalist sentiments of the Greek right. The members of this party are in their majority former ND or PASOK members.

Because of it being born out of defectors from the two main parties, the rivalry on both personal and political levels is quite apparent. Mr Kammenos and his associates would only form a coalition with their hated ND-PASOK only under circumstances of extreme duress and only once their core views were accepted in the government’s agenda. By “core views”, we are of course speaking about such claims as the “emancipation” from the memorandum, cessation of payments, nationalization of banks, stringent migration policies, jingoistic positions on national issues with neighboring countries such as FYROM and Turkey and other nationalistic policies along these lines.

In effect this meant that there was from the outset little room for open-minded negotiations, eventually leading any attempt to form a coalition into jeopardy. Moreover Mr Kammenos himself declared that he would never cooperate with “traitors”, referring to those who would abide by the conditions of the memorandum with the troika, or who did sign the memorandum in the first place.

Kommounistiko Komma Ellados (KKE – Greek Communist Party)

KKE is among the handful of parties in Europe that still clings on to the principles of Leninist Communism in their totality. Currently their agenda concentrates all opposition against the “neoliberal EU of the capital and the monopolies”, against the “West” and its machinery of crime, oppression, militarism and imperialism (aka NATO) and against the Greek “plutocracy”, whereby “plutocrat” is in fact anyone owing a business.

If we put aside their rhetoric about the imaginary communist society, KKE is indubitably an anti-EU party. One of the core issues in its agenda is the exit from the eurozone and the withdrawal from the EU, coupled with the nationalization/collectivization of all means of production.

As such KKE has explicitly ruled out the possibility of cooperating with any party that would even consider the possibility of maintaining a European policy. The European Union, is in their eyes the agent of hegemonism, neoliberalism and all other evils that plague the human world; hence any concessions with this allegedly satanic apparatus can only taint the communist ideal.

The denial of KKE to submit to any kind of compromises is characteristic of its modus operandi and its unflinching devotion to its much-vaunted ideology. Whether that really serves anyone in society, apart from sustaining the reveries of its short-sighted leadership is another issue.

Xrysi Avgi (Golden Dawn)

Golden Dawn is the neo-nazi party of Greece. In fact their very name comes from a proto-nazi society in the late 19th, early 20th century that together with other occultist movements such as the Thule Society laid the foundations of what was to become the National Socialist ideology.

In the last elections Golden Dawn won almost 7% of the votes, which understandably is a clear signal of the extremist views that now exist in Greek society. Their ideology is clearly racist, ultra-nationalist, militarist, anti-democratic and fundamentalist with main themes in their agenda being anti-immigration and anti-EU.

Because of their identity, no party would ever consider cooperating with them, while they themselves have little appetite to forge a coalition with parties that “betray” the “Greek nation”, by serving as the “assignees” of the “shadowy forces” behind the EU.

Democratiki Aristera (DEMAR – Democratic Left)

Finally DEMAR was the last party to enter the parliament in the May 6 elections. DEMAR is also a newborn party, representing a set of views that can classify as the “new left”, which involves some updated standard leftist views on social issues together with a pro-European mentality.

This party was formed out of defectors from SYRIZA, who could not agree with the increasingly euroskeptic/europhobic and at times opportunistic and irresponsible oratory of their former party that has to offer little to no pragmatic solutions to Greece’s woes.

DEMAR is a moderate leftist force and its leader Mr Kouvelis is a down-to-earth pragmatist who always tries to balance ideology with reality. In principle DEMAR is not against any coalition per se, for as long as its key principles are not violated. Those being a clear pro-European orientation and a gradual though determined renegotiation and eventual abolition of the memorandum with the troika.

However the fact that it belongs to the left and that until very recently it was part of SYRIZA, the radical left, creates a number of problems. The main obstacle in such cases is that the defectors are seen as betrayers of the leftist ideals and are subjected into a political purgatory.

As such it is hard for DEMAR to distance itself greatly from the left, since then it risks being seen as a new PASOK, that only wants to make its way to power by sacrificing all that it stood for. In practice this means that DEMAR cannot easily join a government that will not expressly denounce the bailout programme. Alternatively, if things reach an extreme it can form part of a government at the potential cost of extinction from political life.

Concluding remarks on the micropolitical factors

Note that I have omitted from this analysis other smaller parties such as the Greens and the liberal formations, because they did not enter the last parliament. This however does not mean that their role is insignificant. On the contrary, their behavior might shift the balance of power to either side of the spectrum, given how fragile any majority is. More insights on these parties will follow in a future article.

The abovementioned are essential to understand the landscape of Greek politics and to identify the forces that operate in the Greek political system resulting in this fragmentation. While many things can change until the next elections it seems clear that these factors will play a catalytic role towards the outcome of the negotiations ahead. The gist is that in general there is little appetite for genuine compromise in this Hobbesian “war of all against all”.

Greek parties place party interest above country interest, with everyone willing to go to the barricades in defense of their position and established power. I am afraid that if events themselves do not force upon Greek politicians any kind of compromises, then it is quite likely that the next elections will create a similar situation, with whatever that may imply for the future prospects of Greece.

2. Power play until the next elections: The four most likely scenaria

Henceforth every party, including those that did not enter the parliament such as the Greens and the liberal platforms are making all necessary preparations for the next elections that will probably take place in June 17, 2012, with each party aiming at the maximization of its own gains. Though it is hard to make any safe predictions about the course of events, a few scenaria can certainly be considered. In my view four are the most likely outcomes of the power play from now onwards. Those namely are:

1. Unholy polarization of extremes
2. Fragmentation of the left and creation of a broad centrist coalition
3. Cooperation between leftist forces with the aim of a left-wing government
4. The preservation of the status quo in a systemic failure

Without any prejudice to other possible outcomes, let us now proceed into a closer analysis to see how these four might take place.

1. Unholy polarization of extremes

What is particular to Greece though not exclusive, is that both sides of the political spectrum share one common characteristic: they are not as modernized as their European counterparts, in terms of their central ideas. In practice this means that the Greek right wing is much more “nationalistic” and conservative than the average European centre-right, while the Greek left is generally much more old school than the typical European left parties.

It is important to note this for one reason: Greek parties, with few negligible exceptions, have not really been able to construct bridges of communication and cooperation with their counterparts across Europe, litanies to the contrary notwithstanding. As such any voice coming out of Greece finds few genuine supporters in the EU. The effect is isolationism that can only fuel quasi-nationalistic inwardness on a popular basis and strengthen the backwardness of Greek politics at a systemic level.

Because of these facts and due to the chaotic situation in Greece it is possible to see a rather uneasy form of polarization emerging from the fluid political spectrum. We might witness an unholy cooperation between nationalists and radical leftists on one hand, such as Independent Greeks and SYRIZA, along the lines of anti-troika, anti-austerity palaver, competing against an amalgamation of pro-European forces with a much more moderate agenda, possibly including some speech on renegotiating the deal with the troika by extending the time frame of fiscal targets etc. Such pro-European forces can be ND-PASOK-DEMAR together with the liberals and perhaps the Greens. The next elections effectively are a vote on the European orientation of Greece, therefore such an extreme scenario cannot be ruled out as mere fantasy, which would definitely be the case under any other circumstances.

If such a polarization ever takes place, it will be short-lived and limited in scope, while any government will be very fragile. In the meantime the political system and society will remain volatile for months to come.

2. Fragmentation of the left and creation of a broad centrist coalition

Assuming that no such polarization ever takes place, it is still possible to see a broad coalition of diverse pro-European forces, which will exploit the insistence of the radical left wing parties, SYRIZA and KKE, not to cooperate with one another.

This scenario gains strength especially if SYRIZA fails to finish first in the upcoming elections and instead loses votes to other parties, out of fear of Greek voters that the agenda of SYRIZA can lead Greece out of the Euro, a prospect that the majority of the Greek populace abhors.

After all, a prolific figure of the radical left, Mr Alekos Alavanos the former president of Synaspismos which is the largest party within SYRIZA, recently said that SYRIZA must find the strength to tell people that anti-troika oratory cannot be compromised with a European orientation. SYRIZA will effectively have to choose between clinging on to its beliefs at the expense of forcing Greece out of the euro, or revise much of what it has propagated so as to remain in the eurozone.

The problem for SYRIZA is that it is not a coherent entity, due to its nature as a coalition of diverse forces. As such any revision in its agenda can be seen as a suspicious act away from radical principles. In my view this is not surprising at all, given the intellectual cowardice of radical leftists when it comes to the moment of justice to make feasible steps for social reform, even if that means some kind of compromise. I have seen it time and again and I am sure it can be repeated even in these dire moments.

If SYRIZA experiences such sectarianist tensions and if KKE insists on its stubborn position, then it is quite likely that the left will remain fragmented allowing enough space to the forces of the centre-left, centre and centre-right to cooperate and form a government.

Ultimately this scenario is quite probable if we accept that the last results were much due to reactionary votes of Greek citizens rather than actual preferences.

3. Cooperation between leftist forces with the aim of a left-wing government

On the other hand, the prospect of SYRIZA winning the next elections has created a powerful momentum, which can unite all left-wing forces under a common objective of forming a leftist government.

Towards that end SYRIZA will try to approach other left wing forces or even more moderate formations such as the Greens who failed to enter the last parliament by a few hundred votes. A renegotiation with DEMAR should also be expected under such circumstances.

Though still highly unlikely, we could even see a cooperation between SYRIZA and KKE together with any other party interested in forming a broader left-wing government.

For this scenario to become reality, two are the essential prerequisites:

1. SYRIZA, despite its dubious oratory will continue to gain popularity, while the broader left will keep its favorable momentum.
2. The non-left-radical forces in Greece will fail to react, either by pulling their selves together or by cooperating with each other.

Understandably none of this can be said with certainty, while there still are many moving pieces in the puzzle, such as the Greens, the liberal parties and even the Independent Greeks or any other formations that might appear on the spectrum.

4. The preservation of the status quo in a systemic failure

Finally we can see the preservation of the status quo in the political landscape, which practically means another deadlock and an eventual systemic failure of the Greek political world to govern the country.

It is rather easy to fathom the uncertainty that will befall a country like Greece if no government is in place over an extended period of time. While other countries might be able to afford that, due to a complex web of causes, Greece certainly lacks such a luxury.

The conditions of the bailout programme require an administration in place to implement the agreements so that the funds to Greece will continue to be disbursed. Otherwise the government will run short of money and will be unable to finance any fiscal transfers or to pay wages and pensions.

Though many can agree that any government is better than no government at all, it still remains possible that Greek political parties will continue their war of attrition since almost everyone has a strong incentive not to compromise and cooperate. This self-defeating race to the bottom is undesirable for the Greek people themselves, but given the repeated failures of the Greek political system, it might well be the end result of the next elections.

Conclusion to the Greek pandemonium

Greek politics are a jigsaw, in this already multi-faceted amalgamation of crises. Any attempt to predict the outcome of the upcoming elections must be done with extreme caution and great modesty, while there always is a possibility of failure. What seems certain though, paradoxical as that may sound, is that uncertainty will continue to be the overriding element of Greek politics in the months (years?) ahead.

Having already delineated the political landscape of Greece I may only express (in vain) my disappointment of the prevalence of opportunism over responsibility and of fanaticism over reason.

It is in periods of crisis that a country needs responsible politicians, who will be prepared to sacrifice party interest for well-meant general interest. In Greece we already saw the exact opposite. My wish is that such perverse mode of acting will not be repeated for if it does it will lead to highly unpleasant results for the Greek people that have already suffered a lot during these years and for all others affected by the situation in Greece who may also experience similar conditions if the eurocrisis continues to deepen as it seems to be the case.

Party politics in the Greek pandemonium (full analysis) | Protesilaos Stavrou

During a roundtable discussion on elections last night here at Surrey, I was asked what the impact would be of Hollande’s election on the existing European-level agreements on austerity. After some metaphorical beating around the bush, I replied that I thought the impact would be marginal, akin to a child who gets some crayons and is allowed to draw a pretty picture while the grown-ups get on with the real business.

After some reflection, I would I still stand by this. Franceis not the EU’s leader anymore, whatever its politicians say, and in the face of broad German popular support for the austerity agenda it’s very hard to see the current coalition in Berlin giving any ground on the matter. Even the poor showing in Nordrhein-Westfalen this week won’t change that.

However, I can concede that kids with crayons have their value. In particular, if we assume that Merkel needs to present at least some kind of common position with Hollande if eurozone policy is not to completely dry up, then there could be a positive effect of letting le petit François make the Fiscal Pact and the austerity packages look a bit more attractive, even as the Greeks, the Irish and the rest have to swallow them down. Even a cosmetic addition of a growth package – long on words, short on substance – would be symbolically important, giving Hollande something to take back home, and giving any new Greek coalition the leeway to move on to the next tranche of aid.

Part of the problem is clearly that there is no strong leadership from any quarter, national or European. From a sniping UK to a sanguine EU President to Merkel’s inflexible stance, there has not been a direction of travel, only of drift. Kid’s drawings might put a passing smile on one’s face but they do not make for a broad policy position on macroeconomics. Indeed, Hollande’s lack of joined-up thinking on economic policy further reinforces the impression that he is going to be a pragmatist, in an effort to avoid a repetition of François Mitterrand’s socialist missteps in the early years of his presidency.In the longer term, all this might open the door to a more fundamental swing towards growth, especially if the eurozone crisis can be contained and recession halted. Those are very big preconditions that do not appear to be in hand at all at the moment, especially if things fall apart in the next couple of months (e.g. an Irish no vote, a proper run on Greek banks, an anti-austerity coalition in Greece, etc.). For now, we might ask François to look in his colouring box to find some orange, to draw some carrots to match the huge sticks that his big sister has already put there.

Dr Simon Usherwood is a Senior Lecturer at the School of Politics, University of Surrey.

Twitter: @Usherwood and @surreypolitics

Is it possible to create a two-tier Commission without changing the Treaties?

Firstly: What do I mean by a two-tier Commission? What I mean is a Commission that, in some respects, continues to function as it does today, with one Commissioner for every Member State, voting together as a College of Commissioners. M. Piris reminded us again, today, that in the Barroso Commission (or, if one puts the cause elsewhere, the post-enlargement Commission), the College never votes. It decides everything by consensus. However, that is irrelevant for my question. I have no interest in changing the voting rights of any Commissioner, and no interest in changing their voting practice, at least not for present purposes.

Instead, I would like to change the way the Commission works outside the meeting of the College. As it is, there are too many Commissioners for them to effectively distribute the available portfolios amongst themselves. As a result, too many Commissioners end up sharing responsibility for various areas. Commissioners end up arguing and Directorates-General play their mommies and daddies off against each other until the Directors-General become the real Kings of the EU bureaucracy. A particularly urgent example of this at the moment is the in-fighting between the various Commissioners whose portfolios touch on foreign policy, where no one is willing to give an inch in order to allow Baroness Ashton to craft an effective EU foreign policy.

In the Member States, such a situation would never be permitted to occur. At the national level, the executive branch tends to be run by fewer people who oversee a wider range of policy. (There are ministers for everything the EU does, plus one for every area of public policy the EU doesn’t do.) The exact number of ministers tends to very based on the size of the country and the complexity of its party system, but my sense is that very few go near the 27 bosses enjoyed by the EU. (Quick look around: NL has 12, BE: 13, UK: 23, FR: 23, IT: 17, DE: 16, PO: 20, ES: 14.) Instead, the (core) cabinet consists of fewer individuals, and their control over the civil service operates through junior ministers, ministers without portfolio (there are five of those among the 17 members of cabinet in Italy, incidentally), secretaries of state, etc. So why not create such as system for the European Commission?

Imagine a Commission composed of a President and six Vice-Presidents, which is how many there are now. Upon assigning the portfolios, the President could identify six main areas of Commission competence, and assign one to each of his Vice-Presidents. Let’s have a go:

• Foreign Policy
• Internal Market
• Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
• Justice and Citizens’ Rights
• Regional and Local Development, and Transport
• Economic Policy

This leaves a number of smaller portfolios, but those could be assigned to the President directly. The result would be a core College that manages all Commission policy. Each could then be assigned 2-4 junior Commissioners, who could be put in charge of specific policy areas. Baroness Ashton, for example, would be in charge of foreign policy, and she would be in charge of Commissioners Piebalgs (development), De Gucht (trade), Georgieva (International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response) and Füle (enlargement and neighbourhood policy). Likewise, people like Commissioner Šefčovič (Inter-Institutional Relations and Administration), Šemeta (Taxation and Customs Union, Audit and Anti-Fraud), and Lewandowski (budget) would answer directly to the President. The authority of the Vice-Presidents would extend only to the management of the DGs and the decisions taken by Commissioners in their individual capacity. It would emphatically not affect the equality of all Commissioners in the College.

So can it be done? Let’s see what the Treaties say:

Art. 17(6) TEU:

The President of the Commission shall:

(b) decide on the internal organisation of the Commission, ensuring that it acts consistently, efficiently and as a collegiate body

Art. 248 TFEU:

Without prejudice to Article 18(4) of the Treaty on European Union, the responsibilities incumbent upon the Commission shall be structured and allocated among its members by its President, in accordance with Article 17(6) of that Treaty. The President may reshuffle the allocation of those responsibilities during the Commission’s term of office. The Members of the Commission shall carry out the duties devolved upon them by the President under his authority.

And that is it. The next level of law is the Commission’s Rules of Procedure, which clearly does contain provisions that would have to be amended in order to create a Two-Tier Commission. However, that can be done by simple Commission decision. That is to say: legally easy, politically still quite tricky, but not as tricky as overhauling the Treaties.

So this is my modest proposal. Is anyone with me?