In general terms EU Food Law is a distinguished case of product-law as regulations on pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, toys, machineries et cetera are. However EU Food Law has a number of peculiarities the other product regulatory frameworks rarely have: the groundbreaking tool lies on the existence of a definition of Food Law both at EU and Member State level: Nomen omen! [1]

Definition of Food Law within EU Single Market is as follows: “the laws, regulations and administrative provisions governing food in general, and food safety in particular, whether at Community or national level; it covers any stage of production, processing and distribution of food, and also of feed produced for, or fed to, food-producing animals”.[2] Two elements are clearly highlighted by the mentioned provision: i) “food in general” and ii) “food safety” in particular. Such a two-fold objective is confirmed by Article 5 of GFL according to which: “food law shall pursue one or more of the general objectives of a high level of protection of human life and health and the protection of consumers’ interests, including fair practices in food trade, taking account of, where appropriate, the protection of animal health and welfare, plant health and the environment” (Article 5, par. 1, of GFL). It is important to bear in mind that such a definition applies to all legal acts or measures governing foodstuffs adopted at both the Community and national levels. Consequently, public authorities and private operators should pay attention to both elements: safety management and the other legal issues enclosed in the definition of Food Law, namely: protection of consumers interests, fair practices and, where appropriate, the protection of animal health and welfare, plant health and the environment.[3]

Secondly, EU Food Law is based upon general principles specifically governing the food market: risk analysis and precautionary principle, consumer protection and transparency.

Thirdly, the complex regulatory organization and the establishment of an Independent Authority play for an increased distinction of food (and feed) regulations from the other sister – regulations.

Fourthly, EU regulation on food calls for a more stringent integration within national systems for control of conformity.[4]

Since its very beginning, European legal acts in the domain of food trade called for more integration, mutual cooperation and assistance between public authorities. EU Food Law dates back to 1960s as veterinary activities in the EEC Commission were first formalised in 1963, when Directorate-General VI – Agriculture – established a new Directorate F – Agricultural Legislation – with Division F.3 in charge of harmonisation of the legislative, regulatory and administrative matters in the Member States. The year before (1962) the plan for a Common Agricultural Policy was adopted. As the demand for fresh meat increased dramatically in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s it was decided to harmonise the veterinary requirements for trade in live cattle and swine and in fresh meat, between the Member States: in 1964 the Council adopted the Directive 64/432/EEC on animal health problems affecting intra-Community trade in bovine animals and swine and the Directive 64/433/EEC on health conditions for granting temporary and limited derogations from Community health rules on the production and marketing of fresh meat. This piece of legislation harmonised veterinary legislation in the Member States based upon the following principles: the responsibility of the exporting Member State, the control procedure, the importance of certification, the safety clause. Its scope was “partial harmonisation”, i.e. the rules were limited to products traded between the Member States.[5]

Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety (hereinafter, also General Food Law, GFL) gave rise to a number of innovations: i) general principles of Food Law (Risk Analysis, Precautionary Principle, Protection of consumers’ interests and principles of transparency); ii) general framework on risk assessment and risk management and the establishment of an Independent Authority dealing with risk assessment (the European Food Safety Authority, EFSA); iii) new and general obligations for food business operators (general safety requirements,[6] duty of compliance,[7] traceability[8], withdrawn of unsafe foods[9], and product presentation[10]); iv) general outline on food control within the Single Market[11], including importing and exporting foodstuffs[12].

Such a general set of rules has to be integrated with a number of sectoral legislations laying down rules for specific products (baby foods, supplements, products of animal origin et cetera) or aspects (Food Hygiene, for example), specific product safety and quality requirements, presentation rules (labelling and promotion), and other aspects. As of today, European Union has a well planned food policy involving Community and National Level and an intensive training programme, managed by the Commission Services.

Objectives of EU food Law as addressed by General Food Law are to ensure a high level of protection of human life and health and the protection of consumers’ interests, including fair practices in food trade, taking account of, where appropriate, the protection of animal health and welfare, plant health and the environment; and to achieve the free movement in the Community of food and feed manufactured or marketed according to the general principles and requirements of EU law. Other ground principle is proportionality as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty, according to which EU Regulation should not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve the objectives pursued; also principle of subsidiarity applies, according to which where objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and would therefore, by reason of their complexity, trans-border character and, with regard to food imports, international character, be better achieved at Community level, the Community may adopt measures. These objectives have been inserted within the Lisbon Strategy addressing the aim at promoting better regulation and maintain/support competitiveness.

These objectives have been implemented by means of the Hygiene Package which consists of a number of EU legal acts[13] laying down main provisions as regards food hygiene meaning “the measures and conditions necessary to control hazards and to ensure fitness for human consumption of a foodstuff taking into account its intended use” (Article 2, litt. a) of Reg. (EC) No 852/2004 laying down general hygiene rules for foodstuffs).

One of the key concept in the EU Food Law is that Food Business Operators (hereinafter, FBOs) at all stages of production, processing and distribution within the business “are responsible for ensuring the fulfilment of food law which are relevant to their activities”[14]. This is one of the cornerstones in EU regulation since the involvement of public authorities in food safety assurance was a key point in the first phase of harmonisation in the EEC food market. On the other side, Public Authorities (rectius, Competent Authorities) are called to test compliance of products marketed within the Single Market. EU Hygiene Laws requires a radical change of mind for civil servants operating within the framework of official control for foodstuffs. Additionally, as enforcement  of EU Food Law is at a large extent under the competence of Member States, execution may be hampered by a number of factors as: i) shortcomings in assessing EU Food Law Requirements; ii) misunderstanding of roles of FBO and CA within the Food Chain; iii) Misuse of Traceability and poor Crisis Management enhancement, iv) lack of knowledge about rights and obligations addressed by EU regulation; v) uncertainty about legal status of norms in case o coexistence of National and EU food related provisions; vi) Low financial resources in respect of (bigger) trading flow; vii) Low capacity in recovering incompliance. Another important shortcomings in the light of a proper enforcement of EU food regulation is the diaphragm between Regulatory Framework and Product Liability System as it is addressed by Regulation no. 178/2002.

Daniele Pisanello

[2] Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety.

[3] Pisanello D., What do Food Safety and Fair Trade stand for? Reconciling the twofold objective of EU Food Law, European Food and Feed Law Review, 5/2009 and Van der Meulen B., The Function of Food Law, On the objectives of food law, legitimate factors and interests taken into account, Food and Feed Law Review 2/2010.

[4] It is to be noted that the mentioned features are given in respect of pharmaceutical, from one side, and substances covered by REACH as well, but a lower level of integration in respect of Food Law.

[5] European Communities, The EU Veterinarian, Animal Health, welfare & veterinary public health  developments in Europe since 1957, 2008.

[6] Article 14 of GFL.

[7] Article 17.1 of GFL.

[8] Article 18 of GFL.

[9] Article 19 of GFL.

[10] Article 16 of GFL.

[11] Article 17.2 of GFL.

[12] Articles 11 to 13 of GFL.

[13] The main EC legal acts providing the legal framework for the hygiene rules and official controls (so called Hygiene Package) are: Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs; Regulation (EC) No 853/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 laying down specific hygiene rules for food of animal origin; Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls performed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare rules; Regulation (EC) No 854/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 laying down specific rules for the organisation of official controls on products of animal origin intended for human consumption. Other pieces of legislation related to hygiene rules within the Single Market are: Directive 2004/41/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 repealing certain Directives concerning food hygiene and health conditions for the production and placing on the market of certain products of animal origin intended for human consumption and amending Council Directives 89/662/EEC and 92/118/EEC and Council Decision 95/408/EC; and Council Directive 2002/99/EC of 16 December 2002 laying down the animal health rules governing the production, processing, distribution and introduction of products of animal origin for human consumption. Further legislation in the field of food control should consider the specific rules on certain aspects or products (for example Veterinary law, microbiological criteria (Reg. (EC) No 2073/05), safety requirements for contact-materials (Reg. (EC) No 1935/04), Implementing rules listed under Reg. (EC) No 882/04, Annex VIII and those rules still in force by virtue of the transitional provision Article 61 Reg. (EC) No 882/04; in addition: specific rules for Intra-Community control; contingency plans as referred to Article 55 of Reg. (EC) No 178/02; specific rules on Import Conditions (for example: Dir. (EC) No 97/78 on principles governing the organisation of veterinary checks on products entering the EU from third countries; specific rules on an animal welfare and others. Recently, the Commission Regulation (EC) No 669/2009 of 24 July 2009 introduced implementing rules to Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 as regards the increased level of official controls on imports of certain feed and food of non-animal origin and amending Decision 2006/504/EC.

[14] Article 17.1 of GFL.

Call for proposals IX-2011/01 — ‘Grants to political parties at European level’; OJEU 24.6.2010 C 164/12 – The total sum, subject to approval by the budgetary authority, is EUR 17 400 000, in order to be eligible, the political party at European level must satisfy the conditions laid down in Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003, the closing date for forwarding the applications is 1 November 2010.

Call for proposals IX-2011/02 — ‘Grants to political foundations at European level’; OJEU 24.6.2010 C 164/17 – the closing date for forwarding the applications is 1 November 2010.

Curious about the meaning of the terms “political parties at European level” and “political foundations at European level“, I looked in the Treaties, and found that political parties at European level are regulated:

● by Article 10(4) TEU:

4. Political parties at European level contribute to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the Union.

 ● by Article 224, TFEU:

The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, by means of regulations, shall lay down the regulations governing political parties at European level referred to in Article 10(4) of the Treaty on European Union and in particular the rules regarding their funding.

The Treaties do not further define or explain the concepts „political parties at European level“ and „political foundations at European level“. The definition of „political party at European level” can be found in Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 that also defines „political party“ and „alliance of political parties” as follows:

1. “political party” means an association of citizens:

- which pursues political objectives, and

- which is either recognised by, or established in accordance with, the legal order of at least one Member State;

2. “alliance of political parties” means structured cooperation between at least two political parties;

3. “political party at European level” means a political party or an alliance of political parties which satisfies the conditions referred to in Article 3.

Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003, and Section 2.2. of the Call for Proposals lay down the conditions of eligibility for a grant:

A political party at European level shall satisfy the following conditions:

(a) it must have legal personality in the Member State in which its seat is located;

(b) it must be represented, in at least one quarter of Member States, by Members of the European Parliament or in the national Parliaments or regional Parliaments or in the regional assemblies, or it must have received, in at least one quarter of the Member States, at least three per cent of the votes cast in each of those Member States at the most recent European Parliament elections;

(c) it must observe, in particular in its programme and in its activities, the principles on which the European Union is founded, namely the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law;

(d) it must have participated in elections to the European Parliament, or have expressed the intention to do so.

I would appreciate recommendations for further research (Chapters in books, articles), because I think that the above is not enough to explain the area of EU law to students.

In recent weeks, various commentators, academics and analysts have been busily arguing for various things to be included in Britain’s upcoming strategic defence and security review. Some of these interventions have been interesting, focussed and well-reasoned. Both Chatham House and the Royal United Services Institute have been running a series of lectures and articles putting forward various options for the new coalition government to consider.

Other interventions have been decidedly less helpful. On Friday, Sir Max Hastings, author of several works on military history, called for the scrapping of both Britain’s aircraft carrier construction programme and its sea-based nuclear weapons system. Two new 65,000 tonne ‘pocket supercarriers’ are due to be brought into service in 2016 and 2018, respectively. Over three times the size of Britain’s current aircraft carriers, these vessels will be by far the most formidable warships ever put to sea by a European navy; their only competitors will be the American Nimitz supercarriers. Confirmed to be named HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales, Britain’s two new behemoths will enable London to project overwhelming power into any region within range of their onboard air squadron, which will bring approximately seventy percent of the world’s population within reach. They will also improve Britain’s ability to engage in ‘coercive diplomacy’ (what was once known as ‘gunboat diplomacy’) and provide an integrated platform for overseas crisis and disaster response, if required.

But according to Sir Max, aircraft carriers and sea-based nuclear deterrents are unnecessary; Britain is unlikely to face any conventional – that is, State-based – enemy; and the armed forces should be radically re-calibrated to fight only Islamist terrorists and other non-State actors.

This view, not without its merits, has gained increasing traction in recent years, especially since the globalisation hysteria of the 1990s. The argument goes: war and conflict between the great powers is effectively over. Interdependence and democratisation have greatly increased the likely economic and political cost of war, which is further compounded by the fact that there is currently no country strong enough to directly challenge the military reach and wherewithal of North America and Western Europe (or, more precisely, the Americans, British and French). Anyone foolish enough to do so will be struck down fast. The evidence? Britain decisively crushed Argentina’s junta in 1982. Iraq’s Ba’athists were thoroughly quashed in 1991 and 2003 by two different Anglo-American led coalitions. Serbia was undone in 1999 when Slobodan Milosevic initiated genocidal policies in Kosovo. And the Ivory Coast lost its entire airforce in a few hours in November 2004 when its president challenged France.

Further, larger countries, such as China and Russia, while sometimes a nuisance, are still a long way from reaching parity, particularly with the United States. Insofar as they have harmed Europeans or Americans, they have done so using underhand methods, such as industrial espionage, cyber attacks and poisonings, which are better dealt with using effective intelligence agencies than expensive weapons programmes. Meanwhile, the threat from Islamist terrorism is still very real, and this too is increasingly more of an internal threat than an external challenge.

Yet there are several reasons to suggest that Britain still needs its behemoths:

1. The argument that interdependence and democratisation have reduced the likelihood of great power conflict looks very different if we enlarge the context. The world has been getting more interconnected over the past five-hundred years, yet each century has been bloodier than the last. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to assert that the peace between the great powers since 1945 has less to do with interdependence and democratisation, and more to do with the rise of American, British and French power – both spatial and temporal – on a planetary scale. More abstractly: order is not natural; it has to be imposed by a central authority and carefully backed up with an iron fist. The key question, then, is what will happen if European and American power wanes relative to countries like China, India and Brazil, as is currently projected? Given that aircraft carriers and nuclear weapons are a long term investment that cannot be rustled up overnight, and given that other countries are busily building them, surely it makes sense for a country like the United Kingdom, entirely dependent on the sea for its imports and exports, to have them?
2. Sir Max states that it is ‘incredible’ that Britain would use its nuclear weapons to threaten (or deter) countries like Russia and China. Is it? What the world will look like in 2040 or 2050 is impossible to know. In 1900, when the British and French empires seemed almost eternal, few would have foreseen their collapse in less than fifty years. Equally, few people foresaw the demise of Soviet Russia in 1980, and fewer still the full consequences of 11th September 2001, even a year after the event itself. In short: the future is full of surprises and we should be careful not to replace careful calculation with hope. For it is surely the case that countries with international duties to uphold and obligations to discharge must retain the tools of power? Nuclear weapons are proven to deter and aircraft carriers are unlikely to be replaced by anything better – even a new generation of advanced unmanned combat aircraft will need versatile maritime platforms off which to operate.
3. Economically, contrary to the claims of people like Sir Max, a country as wealthy as the United Kingdom can afford to build large aircraft carriers. First, there is little to be gained by cancelling the current vessels and building something smaller, except a whopping fine for breaking the contract with the coalition of shipbuilders constructing the vessels. After all, aircraft carriers become cheaper to operate the larger they get relative to the desired military and political impact they can be deployed to achieve. Second, the cost of these vessels, or the nuclear deterrent, is minimal, insofar as this should be the overriding factor. The cost of the two carriers, including their air squadrons, is around £15 billion (€17.8 billion), and they are projected to last for thirty or more years. Likewise, the nuclear deterrent is planned to cost approximately £20 billion (€23.8 billion) and will last for a similar period of time. Is £1.2 billion (€1.4 billion) per year so expensive for a country with an annual national income of £1.7 trillion (€2 trillion)? That is less than 0.05% per year of Britain’s gross domestic product! This debate therefore has little to do with cost, and everything to do with political priorities.

To scrap Britain’s behemoths – the aircraft carriers or its nuclear weapons system – would reduce both the country’s national power and its options during any potential future crises. As an island, the United Kingdom can be nothing other than a seapower: pruning it of its two greatest military assets would be tantamount to selling future generations down the river. What is more, these behemoths could form the centrepiece of a greatly enhanced Common Security and Defence Policy, which means that their cancellation could have far wider ramifications.

• Image: Royal Navy

The advisory opinion was requested by the General Assembly (GA) on 8 October 2008. The ICJ established that the question was clearly formulated, not asking about the legal consequences of the declaration of independence, nor whether Kosovo had achieved statehood, nor about the validity or legal effects of the recognition of Kosovo by the states that had recognized it as an independent State.

Although the GA had determined that the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo declared independence from Serbia, the ICJ wanted to establish the identity of the authors of the declaration of independence, because it considered that the answer to the identity question could affect the answer to the question, whether the declaration of independence was in accordance with international law. Security Council (SC) resolution 1244 (1999) contained rules that were specified in UNMIK regulation 2001/9 of 15 May 2001 on a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government, which regulation defined the responsibilities for administration of Kosovo between the Special Representative of the SG and the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo. There was the SG’s intention to start a political process with the aim to determine Kosovo’s future status, as was foreseen in SC’s resolution 1244 (1999), and supported by the SC. Former Finnish President, Martti Ahtisaari, was appointed as the SG’s Special Envoy for the future status process for Kosovo with Letter of Appointment, to which letter had been annexed “Terms of Reference”. The SC Members attached to their approval of Mr. Ahtisaari’s appointment the Guiding Principles of the Contact Group (an informal grouping of France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the UK, and the US from 1994 to address the situation in the Balkans), which Principles foresaw „negotiated solution“ of the situation as international priority. Negotiations took place between 20 February 2006 and 10 March 2007. In his report on Kosovo’s future status, the Special Envoy concluded: „Upon careful consideration of Kosovo’s recent history, the realities of Kosovo today and taking into account the negotiations with the parties, I have come to the conclusion that the only viable option for Kosovo is independence, to be supervised for an initial period by the International community“. After additional negotiations under the auspices of the EU, the Russian Federation, and the US, no decision on Kosovo’s independence was taken.

On 17 February 2008, the declaration of independence was adopted. The Declaration itself states that its authors were „[c]onvened in an extraordinary meeting on February 17, 2008, in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo“ and recalls „the years of internationally-sponsored negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina over the question of [Kosovo’s] future political status,“ regretting „that no mutually-acceptable status outcome was possible”. But the Declaration also states that it is in full accordance with the recommendations of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and his Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement.

The ICJ now started to determine, whether the Declaration was an act of the “Assembly of Kosovo”, one of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (established under Chapter 9 of the Constitutional Framework), or adopted by the people acting in a different capacity. The ICJ established that when the declaration of independence was adopted, the President of the Assembly and the Prime Minister of Kosovo made reference to the Assembly of Kosovo and the Constitutional Framework, but although the ICJ was of opinion that the Declaration must be seen in its larger context, it concluded that the authors of the Declaration did not act as one of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government within the Constitutional Framework, but rather as persons who acted together in their capacity as representatives of the people of Kosovo outside the framework of the interim administration.

Answering the question, whether the Declaration corresponded to international law, the ICJ established that no practice of States pointed that there was a rule prohibiting the making of declarations of independence, and that one of the major developments of international law during the second half of the twentieth century had been the evolution of the right of self-determination. Since neither general international law, nor the SC resolution 1244 (1999) banned issuance of declarations of independence, the Declaration could not violate general international law and SC resolution 1244 (1999) respectively.

Since the declaration of independence was not issued by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, nor was it an act intended to take effect, or actually taking effect, within the legal order in which those Provisional Institutions operated, the ICJ also established that the declaration of independence did not violate the Constitutional Framework, about which Framework the ICJ stated that it derived its binding force from the binding character of resolution 1244 (1999) and thus from international law, that way possessing both international and internal legal characteristics.

The conclusion was that the adoption of the declaration of independence did not violate any applicable rule of international law. Meaning that Kosovo’s independence is not illegal.

In favour of that part of the judgment were President Owada; Judges Al-Khasawneh, Buergenthal, Simma, Abraham, Keith, Sepúlveda-Amor, Cançado Trindade, Yusuf, Greenwood; against that part of the judgment were Vice-President Tomka; Judges Koroma, Bennouna, Skotnikov.

The following documents are added to the judgment:

● Declaration by Vice-President Tomka;

● Dissenting opinion by judge Koroma;

● Declaration by judge Simma;

● Separate opinions by judges Keith, and Sepúlveda-Amor;

● Dissenting opinions by judges Bennouna, and Skotnikov;

● Separate opinions by judges Cançado Trindade, and Yusuf.

The ICJ also clarified some other more or less general international law issues in this advisory opinion:

In paragraph 94, the judgment casts light on the difference between international treaties and SC resolutions that should be taken into account when interpreting SC resolutions – namely, SC resolutions are issued by a single, collective body and drafted through a very different process than that used for the conclusion of a treaty, being the „product of a voting process as provided for in Article 27 of the [UN] Charter, and the final text of such resolutions represents the view of the Security Council as a body“. In addition, SC resolutions can be binding on all Member States irrespective of whether they played any part in their formulation.

The judgment inter alia clarified the “four pillars” of the UNMIK regime, namely, according to the Secretary General’s report, there were four Deputy Special Representatives working within UNMIK, each responsible for one of four major components of the UNMIK regime: (a) interim civil administration (leaded by the UN); (b) humanitarian affairs (leaded by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)); (c) institution building (leaded by the OSCE); and (d) reconstruction (leaded by the European Union – the latter regime was one of the reasons allowing discussions about the EU’s presumed legal personality).

The ICJ’s advisory opinions are not formal-legally binding.

The judgment has been reflected, for example, by Euractiv that also brings the reactions of the EU institutions on Kosovo.

The reason why I bought the book was Chapter 3 in it: “Human Rights and “Values in Asia”: Reflections on East-West Dialogues”, which Chapter discusses the values in Asia (mainly Japan, Korea, and China) vs. Western liberalism, asks for the moral differences and their justification, and for the cross-cultural dialogues on human rights. On the one hand, the question, whether and how “Asian rights” should have place in the Western World, for example, in such international institutions as the United Nations, is justified. The UDHR, for example, was composed outside of East-Asian influence.  On the other hand, the concept “Asian rights” touches different religions, such as Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, Judaism, but also Christianity, and consequently the author argues that there are no distinctly Asian values as such. The author also demonstrates how the constitutional provisions of different Asian states differ. Against such background, the quest of universality seems specifically complicated, because certain rights may conflict, and consequently, the states have sacrificed some rights.

Chapter 5 of the book poses the question, „What’s wrong with active citizenship?“ The Chapter begins with Immanuel Kant’s words: ”the problem of setting up a state can be solved even by a nation of devils”.  Bell comments that just institutions neutralize or eliminate individuals’ “self-seeking inclinations”, but he also demonstrates the insufficiency of democratic institutions, because people can circumvent civic responsibilities evading taxes, refraining from voting, deserving from the battlefield, etc. that does not enable even the most beautifully designed democratic institutions exist long, or produce desirable results. Bell connects such circumvention with narrow self-interest of people, offering democratic education (that he sees as motivating the ability to participate) as a solution.  Connectedly, Bell supports also physical education as enhancing participation. (The idea supported in, for example, ancient Greece (that Bell enjoyably compares with ancient China), and consequently by the Christian Church (The Holy Sacrament as both spiritual communion and physical participation). I am also impressed by the 1 Corinth 3, 16 that inspired the first Estonian professional composer and organist Rudolf Tobias: “Wisset ihr nicht, daß ihr Gottes Tempel seid und der Geist Gottes in euch wohnt?“)

For a long time, strategic studies and European studies appeared to mutually ignore if not disdain each other. In the context of the Cold War, strategic studies concentrated on the exercise of hard power as an instrument of foreign policy. Its natural focus was the military strategy of the United States and the Soviet Union. Ignoring the European Economic Community, which except for the informal consultation mechanism of European Political Cooperation did not venture into the realm of foreign policy, let alone security and defence policy, came equally naturally. European studies, for the most part, did not look at the European Community as an actor in the field of security and defence either, turning instead to conceptualisations of the Community as a ‘civilian power’ or, more recently, a ‘normative power’.

Even when the European Union came into existence alongside the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), to be followed by the European, now Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), many scholars focused their efforts on trying to explain how these developments did not detract from Europe’s status as a civilian or normative power. Others, who thought these developments did just that, offered recommendations to put things right, as if somehow it would be wrong for the European Union to venture onto another path and become a fully-fledged actor in the field of security and defence. Strategic studies scholars meanwhile, if they could be convinced at all to allow themselves to be distracted for a moment and take a look at the European Union, did not take the tentative steps of the CFSP and CSDP very seriously.

The cause of this dichotomy is that both strategic studies and European studies scholars for the most part have a very narrow interpretation of the notion of strategy. Too often, strategy is understood as pertaining only to the use of military force to achieve political ends. If analysed through this lens, the European Union obviously is less well developed than other, unitary actors. Many scholars of European Union politics rightfully reject such an exclusively military-oriented approach for ideological reasons or because, less obviously, strategic studies is associated with an exclusively realist approach to foreign policy. Many strategic studies scholars on the other hand feel that the European Union is too insignificant an actor in the field of security and defence to merit their attention – although every classic author about strategy actually warns again underestimating the enemy.

However, military force, even coercive instruments in the broader sense, are but one of a much broader range of instruments at the disposal of a foreign policy actor. Admittedly the most dramatic tool, force, is also the instrument of last resort – an actor that had no other available instruments, would not last very long. As on the international scene, the European Union, a state-like actor, is much more than a military actor – like any other actor for that matter – no useful analysis of it can be limited to military strategy.

Even during the Cold War, the ‘traditional’ strategic studies perspective was too reductionist. A broader understanding of strategy is needed if the strategic lens is to be valuable in analysing and interpreting today’s world. If the notion of strategy has its origin in the study of the use of force as a tool of policy, today its application is much broader. Even without including the private sector, a logical application is found throughout all policy areas addressed by public authorities. Inspired by the tradition of public management or policy science, strategy can therefore be defined as a policy-making tool which, on the basis of the values and interests of the actor in question, outlines the long-term overall policy objectives to be achieved and the basic categories of instruments to be applied to that end.

Applying this definition to the European Union as an international actor, strategy refers to a comprehensive foreign policy strategy, covering all dimensions of external action, from aid and trade to diplomacy and the military. In other words: a grand strategy. A military strategy thus is no more – and no less – than a sub-strategy to the overall foreign policy strategy. The latter serves as a referential framework for day-to-day policy-making in a rapidly evolving and increasingly complex international environment, and guides the definition of the means – in case the civilian and military capabilities – that need to be developed.

Clearly, this updated definition of strategy can no longer be exclusively tied to the Realist school. Not that that ever made sense: a strategy inspired by a realist world view is just one option out of many that any international actor can follow. The 2003 European Security Strategy, with its focus on a preventive, holistic and multilateral approach, proves as much. As strategy concerns foreign policy in its entirety, civilian or normative power should not be seen as being in contradiction with the development of military power by the European Union, but as complementary dimensions of a single grand strategy. Furthermore, every theoretical school captures only part of the European Union. The strategic perspective by contrast offers a methodology rather than a theory, which can be applied regardless of the different International Relations schools and their proselytes, and which immediately yields policy-relevant results.

Thus, this modernised, broader definition of strategy allows for the useful application of the strategic perspective to the European Union, which has become an actor in its own right in all fields of foreign and security policy. It can no longer be ignored by strategists.

• Image: Salvatore Vuono and FreeDigitalPhotos.net

I cannot help feeling that it is not only Angela Merkel, the Greek state, and Eurostat who have plenty of egg on their faces after the events of the last year. But also European Studies as a discipline with public responsibility has some hard questions to answer about why it has on the whole failed to criticise publicly the many mistakes that led to the current impasse. To recall: the Eurozone is still faced with an existential crisis, only temporarily eased by the belated financial rescue package to prevent the bankruptcy of Greece and further contagion. Yet another round of Treaty change appears necessary to ensure the survival of the Eurozone, just at a time when it is politically least feasible.

The crisis is essentially about the credibility of the common currency in the absence of political union. It has become abundantly clear that the current situation in which Southern European countries are facing sovereign debt problems, a loss of competitiveness and no opportunity to devalue is unsustainable without fiscal transfers in some form or another from Northern surplus countries to the rest. The alternative is a deflationary spiral in Southern countries with falling wages and brutal austerity measures that can hardly be politically sustained. On the other hand, Northern European and in particular German politicians have found it impossible to tell their compatriots that fiscal transfers to the “Euromed” countries are a price worth paying for the political unity of Europe, the openness of export markets and a common currently that does not cause constant problems for exporters (ask the Suisse how happy they are about the strong Franken).

How did we get there? While the financial crisis and its specific dynamics were quite unpredictable, economists have long argued that monetary union without at least fiscal union is unsustainable, that the Stability and Growth Pact designed to fill the gap was deeply flawed, and that the countries forming monetary Union were not sufficient similar economically to absorb an asymmetric shock. I remember writing a postgraduate essay on it in Cambridge in 1997, which basically arrived at the conclusion that fiscal transfers will be necessary and likely. Kohl would not allow Monetary Union to fail. Merkel said the same recently, but the markets still doubt this commitment given the short-term costs and long-term risks to the German taxpayer.

How come, therefore, that there we so few people that pointed out the fallacy of letting high debt countries join that historically relied on currency devaluations for their competitiveness such as Italy and Greece and which were facing major problems of economic governance? How was it that hardly anyone of note in the discipline raised publicly hard questions about Greece joining at the time and the lack of scrutiny it faced by DG Ecfin, Eurostat, and the ECB?

Why has the critique of the neofunctionalist logic underlying the move to Monetary Union, which is visible now (integrate deeper or fail), not been expressed more vociferously, but outsourced to ideologically Eurosceptic economists? This is not just a question of speaking-up in public, but also about some of the scholarship and its foresightedness.

For instance, just a year ago, the introductory article in a special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy (16:4) on 10 years of EMU by two leading scholars of EMU, Amy Verdun and Hendrik Enderlein, painted a overwhelmingly positive picture of how monetary union had performed in the absence of political union, including its performance during the financial crisis. They acknowledged the potential negative as well as positive effects of the “financial crisis”, but with the benefit of hindsight we must conclude that this was too much praise, too early. In retrospect, also my own writing on this topic (in: Economic Government of the EU, Palgrave, 2007) could have highlighted more the risks and tensions in the current edifice.

My diagnosis is the following: Most people doing European Studies, including myself, are Europhiles. They have an emotional attachments to the European “project”, the joys of cultural diversity, the idea of overcoming centuries of violent rivalry and parochial nationalism, for the benefit of its own citizens and possibly even as a force of good in the world. It is true that many people have seen the many flaws of design and practice and even formulated critique of integration and governance in general and EMU in particular in academic papers (Hodson, Begg, de Grauwe, etc). Overall, however, I feel there is still too much of what I call “the delicate plant syndrome” in European Studies: It is common norm that pro-Europeans most somehow spare “the project” harsh and public critique for fear of strengthening Euroscepticm, especially those working in a UK context. This is of course a flawed proposition as critique could help to improve the project, rather than dismantle it.

Despite all the writing about the EU legitimacy deficit, the flaws of the Lisbon Strategy and the mislabelled Constitutional Treaty, or the calls for more visible conflict and politics in EU governance, we have not cultivated the kind of hard but fair criticism of EU institutions and national governments needed to prevent some of the major mistakes that are haunting European elites now. Such public critique by leading figures of the discipline could have also sparked the kind of debates that might have countered citizens’ impression of the European integration as a plot of like-minded elites that do not wish to hurt each other. It is high time for introspection, but also to be more open about the failures of European integration and how they may be remedied.

• Economy, employment and social policy;

• Health, environment and energy;

• Justice and security;

• Citizenship, culture and education;

• Europe in the world.

The second phase was devoted to the National Advisory Councils, including at the level of the Communities and the Regions, were given the opportunity to put their expectations and priorities for the Belgian Presidency to the government.

The third step consisted of a series of thematical seminars on seven themes:

• The financial-economic crisis;

• Energy, environment and climate change;

• Citizenship, culture and education;

• Justice, security and judicial cooperation;

• Conflict prevention and management Europe and the challenges in terms of development cooperation;

• Expansion, neighbourhood policy and European borders;

• The Lisbon Strategy.

These seminars, inter alia, offered an opportunity for the NGOs to express their concerns and formulate policy suggestions.

The fourth phase was organized to satisfy the wish of civil society to engage in dialogue with the political authorities.

The Presidency also lies on the legacy programme, consisting of 5 theme clusters:

1)      Combating the economic crisis and promoting economic and financial modernization;

2)      Combating global warming and the environmental aspects in the broader sense;

3)      Expansion of the EU;

4)      Further strengthening of the social dimension in the EU;

1)      Implementation of the Stockholm Programme’s action plan for justice and home affairs, asylum and migration.

Belgium has also promised to pay particular attention to an important horizontal theme – the implementation and correct application of the new rules of the Treaty of Lisbon, and to promote a smooth working relationship between the President of the European Council, the rotating Presidency, the Commission and the High Representative.

Of course, an impetus comes from the previous Spanish Presidency – Belgium is completing the regulation of the European Citizens’ Initiative, and continuing advancement of the negotiations for the accession of the EU to the ECHR.

But then I started to think that can it be as simple as that? Perhaps the answer to the question should be connected with the new rules on Council Presidency in the Lisbon Treaty, according to which rules the President of the European Council is elected. The Council that prior to the Lisbon Treaty was only setting the guidelines for the EU, is now defining the EU’s directions and priorities, and its President chairs and drives forward the European Council’s work; ensures preparation and continuity of the European Council’s work in cooperation with the President of the Commission, and on the basis of the General Affairs Council; presents a report to the European Parliament after each European Council meeting; ensures external representation of the EU on issues under the CFSP. But what could be the impetus for the new European Council President?