IDF ARMOR חיל השריון-צה"ל

Israel Armoured might -historical perspective

2012-10-12T23:21:00.000-07:00

Part1

Perhaps no other conflicts of the period captured the world’s imagination as did the numerous wars in the Middle East. With the notable exception of the 1948–1949 War for Independence, the wars saw the employment of considerable numbers of AFVs and some of the largest tank battles in history. They also proved to be useful laboratories for the Western allies and the Soviet Union concerning the design and employment of AFVs (for the most part, the Soviet Union was the chief supporter and arms supplier to the Arab states; the Western powers, particularly the United States and France, at least until after the 1967 Six Day War, supported Israel).

The fighting in the Middle East also saw the beginning of a new age, with the first use in warfare of antitank and antiship missiles. In its war to gain independence, Israel initially had only a small armored force, the 8th Armored Brigade, equipped with a hodgepodge of pre–World War II French Hotchkiss light tanks, World War II–era British Cromwells, and U.S. Shermans, the latter purchased from Italy and the Philippines. These faced the far more numerous tanks of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq. During the fighting, Israel managed to form a second armored brigade, the 7th. In the war the Israelis utilized their advantages of interior lines, higher morale, better leadership, and more effective command and control to defeat the larger and better-equipped Arab armies. The major Arab problems were in logistics and organization. The Arab armies were spread out (it was 700 miles from Baghdad to Haifa, and Egyptian forces relied on a 250-mile-long supply line across the Sinai Desert), and there was no unity of command or common military strategy.

After 1949 the Israeli Defense Forces invested heavily in tanks, and the Jewish state became one of the most skillful practitioners of armored warfare in history. Working in collusion with France and Britain against Egypt in 1956, Israel Super Shermans and French tanks rolled across the Sinai Peninsula (covering more than 150 miles in only four days) to take that vast desert area from Egypt. In the process Israeli armor defeated a far larger Egyptian force of Shermans, British Centurions, and some JS-3s, in addition to 230 Soviet T-34/85s, as well as a number of armored personnel carriers and self-propelled guns. As in the War for Independence, in 1956 it was not superior equipment but rather better training, leadership, and motivation, as well as tactical doctrine and domination of the air, that were vital in the subsequent crushing Israeli victory. Although international pressure, largely from the United States, forced Israel (and Britain and France) to quit Egypt, the war led Israel to go over to a wholly mechanized ground force centered on tanks. The war also brought improved tanks into the Israeli inventory as well as better training.

In June 1967 Israel used its highly mechanized forces to launch a devastating preemptive strike against Egypt and Syria, and then engage Jordan, in the Six Day War. Israeli tactics were similar to those employed by the Germans in their blitzkrieg of World War II. Tanks would break through the enemy front and then push forward, closely followed by mechanized infantry that would engage enemy forces. This armored thrust was followed by motorized infantry to mop up enemy resistance in order to allow the vital supply column to proceed forward. Rapid Israeli envelopments allowed the numerically inferior Israeli armored forces to take the heavier Arab tanks from the rear and make short work of the Arab armies. Israel had some 264,000 troops, 800 tanks, and 300 combat aircraft; Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq had a combined strength of some 541,000 men, 2,504 tanks, and 957 combat aircraft. Of 1,200 Egyptian tanks before the war, 820 were lost. Israeli armor losses amounted to 122 tanks, many of which were repaired and returned to battle. There was also heavy fighting involving Israeli and Syrian tanks in Israel’s conquest of the Golan Heights, although the fighting there did not see the large-scale armor engagements that had marked combat on the Sinai front.

In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the tables were almost turned, thanks to Israeli complacency and new Egyptian tactics. Israel had invested heavily in the Bar Lev Line, a static defensive front along the east bank of the Suez Canal, in effect rejecting maneuver tank warfare in which the bulk of armored forces are held back in mobile reserve. The Egyptians also subjected the canal defenses to nearly constant artillery fire, to which the Israelis grew accustomed. On 6 October 1973 (Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement) Egyptian forces struck in force across the Suez Canal while Syrian forces simultaneously invaded the Golan Heights. These offensives caught the Israeli defenders completely off-guard. On the Golan Heights, Syria deployed five divisions and three armored/ mechanized brigades. Their 1,600 tanks included T-34s, T- 54s, and the latest T-62 Soviet tanks. To break through the thick Israeli minefields and defenses, the Syrians also utilized specialized armor vehicles such as flail tanks, bridge-layers, and engineer tanks. Antiaircraft missiles protected the attackers against Israeli aerial intervention. The Israelis initially had only some 50 Israeli Centurion tanks of the 7th Armored Brigade to oppose the Syrian juggernaut. Following the British practice of using secondary armament for ranging purposes, the Centurions scored a high number of long-range, first-round kills. Ordered to prevent the Syrians from breaking through, the few Israeli defenders did just that. At the end of four days of savage fighting, an Israeli force totaling only 177 tanks supported by infantry and artillery defeated a far larger attacking Syrian force centered on 1,400 tanks.

Part 2

With 1,700 tanks and another 2,500 armored vehicles, the Egyptian force on the Suez front was even larger. On the night of 5–6 October, by employing high-pressure water hoses and bulldozers and using bridging equipment, the Egyptians got across the canal and blasted through the sand embankment the Israelis had erected there. By 8 October, protected by a blanket of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and Soviet-supplied mobile antiaircraft artillery, the Egyptians had two armies of 100,000 men and more than 1,000 tanks east of the canal. After taking the Israeli positions, the Egyptians were content to set up their own defenses and put into effect their “sword and shield” tactics. The “shield” consisted of a belt of minefields, behind which infantry waited with Soviet-supplied Sagger and Snapper wire-guided antitank missiles. Beyond these, artillery, SAMs, and antiaircraft guns provided security for the defensive belt against the vaunted Israeli Air Force. The “sword” consisted of large tank formations ready to engage and destroy Israeli armored counterattacks.

On 8 October the Israelis unwisely committed two armored divisions in the Sinai to drive the Egyptians back across the canal. The Egyptian chief of staff, General Saad el Shazy, noted that the resulting confrontation saw “the first combat between the essentially World War II concept of armour and infantry weapons of the next generation.” The Egyptians promptly inflicted heavy losses on the attacking Israeli forces. The Israelis at first did not understand why infantry would be standing out in the open—until they released a barrage of shoulder-fired missiles at the tanks. Although in time the Israelis were able to develop means to counter the antitank missiles and SAMs, early in the fighting these new weapons gave the Arab forces the edge, and in two days the Israelis lost some 260 tanks. The Egyptians won the first part of the war, but their success now emboldened President Anwar Sadat, who decided on a deeper penetration of the Sinai. In taking this step, Sadat overruled General Shazy’s arguments that such a step would take his forces beyond the range of SAM cover. The Egyptian offensive began on 14 October and involved more than 2,000 tanks on both sides, making it second in history only to the World War II Battle of Kursk in numbers of tanks engaged. The Israelis brought up reinforcements but were still outnumbered 2:1 in numbers of tanks, a disadvantage that was offset by superior hardware and training and the involvement of the Israeli Air Force. The Israelis not only stopped the Egyptian advance but also destroyed some 500 tanks. Israeli forces now moved toward the canal in an effort to cross over it and take the Egyptian forces from behind and to destroy the SAM sites.

In the process, a large tank battle took place in the area known to the Israelis as the Chinese Farm. The Israelis managed to get some troops and a brigade of paratroopers across the canal, and once a bridge had been thrown across there numbers of tanks followed. The Israelis excelled at rapid maneuver warfare, and they now came up against second-echelon Egyptian troops. The advancing Israeli tanks cut off the Egyptian Third Army at Suez City and were moving north to cut off the Egyptian Second Army when Sadat managed to secure a cease-fire.

Israel won the Yom Kippur War but at a high cost, including the loss of 830 tanks. Sadat had, however, restored Arab pride and went on to visit Israel and conclude a peace settlement with the Jewish state. Many analysts concluded that the Yom Kippur War spelled the end of the tank era: small wire-guided missiles and RPGs had inflicted about a third of Israel’s tank losses. Such a conclusion, however, proved to be premature. The Israelis incorporated the lessons learned in 1973 in their new battle tank, the Merkava. As noted above, crew protection became the priority.
Merkavas spearheaded the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and destroyed the Syrian 1st Armored Division. Although Merkavas took numerous hits from enemy fire, they were not penetrated. Of 50 or so Israeli tankers wounded in the fighting in Lebanon, not one was the result of burns. Although there have been no interstate wars involving Israel since 1982, tanks and other AFVs continue to play a key role in intrastate operations. Tanks are perhaps the most visible component of Israeli security operations against the second Palestinian intifada (uprising). Despite the proliferation of new antitank weapons and predictions that the day of the tank was over, when the Cold War came to a close with the collapse of the Soviet Union, AFVs were still very much a part of the world’s military establishments.

This post was published in "War and game" site 9/ 2020

Valley of tears- 1973 film

2012-09-24T23:16:00.000-07:00

Valley of tears-Golan-1973 Yom Kippur war

A film taken by Boaz Eliahav few weeks after the Yom Kippur War 1973

in the Valley of tears in the north of the Golan.

Boaz served as an officer in the IDF 7th Brigade

more about that battle please go to: Valley of tears 1973

and valley-of-tears-golan-1973-yom-kippur

IDF Amphibious history

2012-09-22T08:01:00.000-07:00

The first amphibious operation made by the IDF was in the 1948 war of independence

Hannah Szenes Registered name: Andarta Enderta Amorta, was an iron cargo boat
in December 14, 1945, Hannah Szenes sailed from Vado Ligure (Savona), under the command of Italian Captain, carrying 211 passengers. AIDMEN (Associazione Italiana di Documentazione Marittima e Navale) cites Hannah Senesh sailing from Vado, carrying 252 passengers Palmach Information Center cites Hannah Senesh sailed from Genoa

On December 25, 1945, Hannah Szenes beached at Nahariyah, on a stormy night. She listed dangerously and close to capsizing. The passengers landed with the help of Palmach members, men from Nahariyah, and a rope connected from the ship to shore.

Hanna Szenes was refloated, restored in the Haogen shipyard in Haifa. She joined the Sea Service, the beginning of the Israeli Navy. Her ID sign in the Navy was S – 29.

When the Western Galilee was cut from the rest of the country, during the 1948 war, a unit of regiment 22 of the Carmeli Brigade boarded Hannah Szenes near the Haifa powerstation, and landed in Nahariyah.

The unit liberated the Jewish settlements in Western Galilee,evacuated the women and children from there, brought them to Nahariyah where they embarked on Hannah Szenes and were brought to Haifa. On May 15, 1948 Hannah Szenes came alongside the military jetty in Haifa the passengers disembarked in front of the British, and she sailed away.

This was part of Operation Ben Ami - Carmeli brigade seizes Arab strongholds north of Haifa and northeast of Acco (Acre) and establish communications with Yehiam and Hanita. During the operation, Shavei Tzion on the northern seacoast is reached by sea, and Napoleon hill is captured by and the town of Acco (Acre).

After the war of independence the IDF was building its amphibious force and combined the Tank Corps with the Navel in joined training .

a picture taken in Haifa navy base in the 60's

A drill near Akko (Acre) late 50's

A drill Akko (Acre) in the background

IDF Sherman tank in a drill

Moshe Dayan during a visit in Haifa naval base Sinai 1956 War

A.M.X 13 after the 1956 Sinai war

Amphibious Landing at Awali Beach, Lebanon 1982
During the First Lebanon War, IDF forces landed from the sea and deployed deep within Lebanon, hoping to surround PLO terrorists in the south. Paratroopers, armored forces and Shayetet 13 participated in the day-long operation. IDF forces landed behind enemy lines and cut off the enemy’s supplies, which led to the collapse of the PLO in the south. The operation was a great success despite the heavy artillery fired upon the ships by the terrorists.

Trophy intercepts AT missile fired at IDF tank

2012-08-01T14:21:00.000-07:00

IDF 401 Brigade around the Gazza strip

An anti-tank missile was fired at an IDF tank along Israel’s border with the Gaza Strip on Wednesday 1.8.2012 just hours after troops exchanged fire with Egyptian soldiers in the South.
The IDF said that the Trophy active protection system which defends against anti-tank missile fire was activated and the incoming projectile exploded although the IDF has yet to determine if the missile was intercepted or detonated prematurely. The attack took place near the Kissufim Crossing in the central Gaza Strip.

The Trophy system is installed on Merkava Mk 4 tanks – used by the 401st Armored Brigade. Using an advanced radar, Trophy is designed to detect and track a threat, and counters it with a cloud of countermeasures that intercepts the incoming anti-tank missile.

Golan Heights 1967 Six Days War

2012-01-19T21:43:00.000-08:00

The Battle of Golan Heights, June 9–10 Syrian-Israeli Front

False Egyptian reports of a crushing victory against the Israeli armyRetrieved . and forecasts that Egyptian forces would soon be attacking Tel Aviv influenced Syria’s willingness to enter the war.

One of the Syrian tanks in its fortified position at “Tawfik”, dominating Kibbutz Tel Katzir and the settlements on the Sea of Galilee

08/05/1967 Syrian leadership, however, adopted a more cautious approach, and instead began shelling and conducting air raids on northern Israel. When the Israeli Air Force had completed its mission in Egypt, and turned around to destroy the surprised Syrian Air Force, Syria understood that the news it had heard from Egypt of the near-total destruction of the Israeli military could not have been true.
During the evening of June 5, Israeli air strikes destroyed two-thirds of the Syrian Air Force and forced the remaining third to retreat to distant bases, without playing any further role in the ensuing warfare. A minor Syrian force tried to capture the water plant at tel dan (the subject of a fierce escalation two years earlier), Kibbutz Dan and Shaer Yesuv
But a broader Syrian offensive quickly failed. Units of Syrian reserves were broken up by Israeli air attacks, and several Syrian tanks were reported to have sunk in the Jordan River. Other problems included tanks too wide for bridges, lack of radio communications between tanks and infantry, and units ignoring orders to advance.

A post-war Syrian army report concluded “Our forces did not go on the offensive either because they did not arrive or were not wholly prepared or because they could not find shelter from the enemy’s planes. The reserves could not withstand the air attacks; they dispersed after their morale plummeted. The Syrian command abandoned hopes of a ground attack and began a massive shelling of Israeli towns in the Hula Valley instead.
On June 7 and June 8, the Israeli leadership debated about whether the Golan Heights should be attacked as well; the attack on Syria was initially planned for June 8, but was postponed for 24 hours. At 3 AM on June 9, Syria announced its acceptance of the cease-fire.

Despite this, four hours later at 7 AM, Israel’s minister of defense, Moshe Dayan “gave the order to go into action against Syria.” Syria had supported the pre-war raids that had helped raise tensions and had routinely shelled Israel from the Heights, so some Israeli leaders wanted to see Syria punished.

Dayan believed such an operation would yield losses of 30,000 and opposed it bitterly. Levi Eshkol on the other hand, was more open to the possibility of an operation in the Golan Heights, as was the head of the Northern Command, David Elazar, whose unbridled enthusiasm for and confidence in the operation may have eroded Dayan’s reluctance. Eventually, as the situation on the Southern and Central fronts cleared up, intelligence estimated that the likelihood of Soviet intervention had reduced,reconnassance showed some Syrian defenses in the Golan region collapsing, and an intercepted cable showed Nasser urging the President of Syria to immediately accept a cease-fire, Moshe Dayan became more enthusiastic about the idea, and he authorized the operation.

Syrian tank in fortified position at “Hirbet Batin” above Ha’on on the Sea of Galilee

View of Kibbutz Daphna and Dan (in background) seen from the “Tel Azaziat” fortifications on the Syrian Heights.

Toddlers with their nurses outside the entrance to underground shelter at Kibbutz Nahal Oz

House at Kibbutz Gadot damaged by Syrian shell fire.

\Children in one of the shelters at Kibbutz Gadot during an attack by Syrian shell fire on the Kibbutz

Children in one of the shelters at Kibbutz Gadot during an attack by Syrian shell fire on the kibbutz.

Six Day War. A child’s stroller among the debris of a house at Kibbutz Tel Katzir demolished by Syrian shelling.

The Syrian “Amrat Az Adin” fortified position overlooking Kibbutz Ha’on on the Sea of Galilee

View of Kibbutz Daphna and Moshav Shear Yashuv seen from the “Tel Azaziat” position on the Syrian Heights

View of the fish ponds of Kibbutz Daphna seen from the “Tel Azaziat” position on the Syrian Heights.

The Syrian army consisted of about 75,000 men grouped in nine brigades, supported by an adequate amount of artillery and armor. Israeli forces used in combat consisted of two brigades (one armored led by Albert Mendler and the Golani Brigade) in the northern part of the front at Givat Haem, and another two (infantry and one of Peled’s brigades summoned from Jenin) in the center.
The Golan Heights’ unique terrain (mountainous slopes crossed by parallel streams every several kilometres running east to west), and the general lack of roads in the area channeled both forces along east-west axes of movement and restricted the ability of units to support those on either flank. Thus the Syrians could move north-south on the plateau itself, and the Israelis could move north-south at the base of the Golan escarpment. An advantage Israel possessed was the excellent intelligence collected by Mossad operative Eli Choen (who was captured and executed in Syria in 1965) regarding the Syrian battle positions. Syria had built extensive defensive fortifications in depths up to 15 kilometers, comparable to the Maginot line

As opposed to all the other campaigns, IAF was only partially effective in the Golan because the fixed fortifications were so effective. However, the Syrian forces proved unable to put up an effective defense largely because the officers were poor military leaders and treated their soldiers poorly; often officers would retreat to escape danger, leaving their men confused and ineffective.

The Israelis also had the upper hand during close combat which took place in the numerous Syrian bunkers along the Golan Heights, as they were armed with the Uzi, a light submachine gun, designed for close combat, while Syrian soldiers were armed with the heavier AK -47assault rifle, designed for combat in more open areas. By the evening of 9 June, the four Israeli brigades had broken through to the plateau, where they could be reinforced and replaced.
However, a battalion of the Israeli 8th Armored Brigade was ambushed after taking a wrong turn. It lost 24 out of its 26 tanks, and casualties amounted to 13 killed and 33 wounded.

On the next day, June 10, the central and northern groups joined in a Pincare mouvment on the plateau, but that fell mainly on empty territory as the Syrian forces fled. Several units joined by Elad Peled climbed to the Golan from the south, only to find the positions mostly empty as well. During the day, the Israeli units stopped after obtaining manoeuvre room between their positions and a line of volcanic hills to the west. In some locations, Israeli troops advanced after an agreed-upon cease-fire to occupy strategically strong positions.

To the east, the ground terrain is an open gently sloping plain. This position later became the cease-fire line known as the "Ourole Line"“.
Time Magazine reported: “In an effort to pressure the United Nations into enforcing a ceasefire, Damascus Radio undercut its own army by broadcasting the fall of the city of Quneitra three hours before it actually capitulated. That premature report of the surrender of their headquarters destroyed the morale of the Syrian troops left in the Golan area.

\Israeli tanks in the Golan Heights . 1967

Israeli army detachment stopping by the water pool at Banias Village on the Golan Heights

P.M. Levy Eshkol (Center) with senior staff officers during a visit to northern command headquarter.

Richard Nixon (Center) visiting Kibbutz Gadot which was under Syrian shell fire until the outbreak of the Six Day War

Hold at all cost-"Tzvika Force" Golan Heights 1973 Yom Kippur War

2011-05-17T14:44:00.000-07:00

An article written by Major Michael Wickman US Army on Armor Magazeen March April 2001

At 1400 hours on 6 October 1973, Syrian and Egyptian forces surged across their borders with Israel. The massive surprise attack found Israel outnumbered in vehicles,equipment, and personnel,in some instances, by 50 to 1. Israel’s vaunted air forc was held at bay by a wall of

surface to air missiles and anti-aircraft guns, and Israeli armored columns were made vulnerable by the Syrians’ excellent use of anti-tank missiles During the first days of the battle, it appeared that Israel’s defenses would be overrun, but due to the heroic efforts of Israeli soldiers, the Israeli

Defense Force (IDF) was able to turn apparent defeat into a sudden rout of the armies of Syria and Egypt. Nowhere was the situation more critical than on the Golan Heights. The purpose of this article is to focus on the bravery and achievements of a few soldiers fighting on the Golan

Heights and their effect on the outcome of the Yom Kippur War. Of particular note are the actions of one Israeli armor officer, Lieutenant Zvika Greengold. The primary objective of Syrian

forces was the recapture of the 480 square miles of the Golan Heights lost to the IDF during the 1967 Six Day War. Syria planned to mount a major breakthrough attempt in the north with

the 7th Infantry Division, supported by elements of the 3rd Armored Division. The main thrust, however, was to be farther south in the vicinity of Rafid.This attack was to be carried out by the

5th Infantry Division, the 9th Infantry Division, the 1st Armored Division, and elements of the 3rd Armored Division,all concentrated against Israel’s 188th Brigade, which could field only around 60 tanks. The Syrian plan called for the occupation of the whole of the Golan Heights by the evening of Sunday,7 October, followed by reorganization in the area along the River Jordan on Israeli soil in preparation for a further breakthrough into Galilee. Major-General Yitzhak Hofi, head of Israel’sNorthern Command, had beenconcerned for some time over the growing concentration of Syrian armored forces. He had expressed his concerns to Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan, who authorized units of the 7th Armored Brigade, which were beingheld in General Headquarters Reserve in the southern part of Israel, to move up to the Golan Heights. This move increased the number of Israeli tanks on the Golan Heights from an initial number

of some 60 to 170.The Syrian forces arrayed along the Golan Heights consisted of the 7th Infantr Division, the 9th Infantry Division,and the 5th Infantry Division. Each was organized along Soviet lines, with an armored brigade totaling some 130-200 tanks per division. Behind

these first echelon divisions were concentrated the 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions,

each with approximately 250 tanks, along with several independent brigades. The total Syrian force facing Israel numbered approximately 1,500 Russian T-54/55 and T-62 tanks supported

by 1,000 artillery pieces, including heavy mortars. The IDF’s plan for defending the Golan Heights was based on two points. First, topography afforded the Israelis well thought-out superior defensive positions. Second,Syrian devotion to the prevailing Soviet operationa level doctrine limited availableopenings for the massive assaults prescribed by that doctrine.An anti-tank barrier was constructed to limit a Syrian armored attack over the 1967cease fire or Purple Line. The purpose of the barrier was to delay the Syrians sufficiently until reserve forces could be committed to reinforce units on the line. Time was the primary issue for both the Israelis and the Syrians. The IDF needed time to deploy reserves before a Syrian breakthrough or, “if politically possible, to mount spoiling attack” as a preemptive measure. The Syrians needed

to quickly penetrate the IDF defenses and reach the edge of the plateau overlooking

the bridges of the River Jordan before the arrival of IDF reserve forces.

This would force the IDF to move their reserves across choke points and up steep narrow winding roads, making a successful counter attack nearly impossible. The Israeli forces defending the Golan Heights were composed of two Israeli armored brigades, the 7th in the northern sector and 188th (Barak) Brigade in the southern sector, consisting of approximately

170 tanks and some 60 artillery pieces. Israeli armored forces were composed of British Centurions and M51 Shermans.The massive Syrian air and artillery strike against Israeli positions on the Golan Heights achieved tactical surprise.The Syrian 7th, 9th, and 5th Infantry

Divisions attacked across the Purple Line, while in the north, the Israeli 7th Armored Brigade repulsed the Syrian 7th Infantry Division. The Syrian 3rd Armored Division, committed

to pass through Israeli’s 7th Infantry Division, also suffered heavily and gained little ground. In the south, the Syrian 5th and 9th Infantry Divisions,taking advantage of the less restrictive

terrain, broke through the defenses of the Barak Brigade. In two days of fighting,the Barak Brigade was virtually destroyed, and the command post at Nafakh surrounded. The Syrian 9th

Infantry Division “had split the Israeli defensive forces, and now threatened the command center at Nafakh. The remnants of the Barak Brigade were barely hanging on and were in desperate need of reinforcements. The collapse of the northern sector could have forced the IDF to fall back to the Jordan River and therefore changed the outcome of the war. The original plan of reinforcing with reserve brigades was falling apart. “As Israeli reserves arrived on the shore of Lake Tiberius and the west bank of the River Jordan,they were immediately sent forward in small groups into battle.At this time, something just short of a miracle was underway at Nafakh. Frantically trying to reach the Golan by any means possible was [Lieutenant] Tzvi ‘Zvika’ Greengold, who had been on a fortnight’s leave.” Lieutenant Greengold had been safely at home, near Haifa, only seven hours earlier. He had just been released from service with the Barak Brigade and was on leave for two weeks prior to attending a company commander’s course. He was one of the first soldiers to make his own way back to the battlefield. At the Nafakh headquarters of the Barak Brigade, the commander, Colonel Ben-Shoham, was analyzing spot reports coming in from his battalion commanders on the size of the Syrian attack. While he was deciding his next moves, he was approached by Lieutenant Greengold, who arrived to find Nafakh in chaos. Greengold, having no troops nor tanks to command, assisted with the removal of the dead and wounded from disabled vehicles. He soon learned that four tanks, three of which had been battle-damaged, were about to arrive. Zvika requested and received command of the four tanks.He was delighted. Lieutenant Greengold was ordered to take the four tanks and move towards the Tapline Route, a major Syrian avenue of approach. Lieutenant Greengold and his four tanks were to be known on the brigade communications network as Force Tzvika.

Captain Tzvika Greengold in 1973

Tzvika Greengold 2010

By that time, Colonel Ben-Shoham was greatly concerned by the Syrian advances in the southern sector, where the 51st Tank Brigade had broken through and was bypassing the Israeli

fortifications in the vicinity of the Hushniya-Tapline crossroads. Savage nighttime firefights were taking place across the southern Golan Heights, and Israeli troops were cut off in their frontline fortifications. Transmissions to their headquarters at Nafakh finally produced authorization to withdraw, but this was easier said than done, with Syrian forces to their rear. At Kudne, a relieving tank force broke through to Bunker 111, despite strong Syrian forces in the immediate vicinity, and succeeded in evacuating all the men.

Along the southern flank, where the battle was then heaviest, the fight was more difficult. Israeli tanks fought through and relieved Bunker 114 and Bunker 115, but Bunker 116 was completely

surrounded. Unable to get out, the Israelis sat tight in their defenses and called for artillery support. The only available artillery was a single battery of 155mm guns, which was ordered to concentrate on Bunker 116’s position. The fire mission was extremely effective and provided

temporary relief to the troops inside. Because of the penetration in his sector along the Tapline Road, Colonel Ben-Shoham attempted to move the forward headquarters (one tank and onehalftrack) of his brigade from Nafakh to Juhader, where he believed he could

better control the battle. He moved carefully along in the dark, avoiding Syrian formations, and his staff was relieved to reach Juhader. By then, they were under constant heavy shelling,

due to poor IDF communications discipline and successful Syrian SIGINT operations. The Syrians obtained radio fixes every time a communications officer tried to contact his subordinate commanders. In the meantime, TF Zvika, which had left Nafakh several hours before, was moving cautiously along the Tapline Route. Zvika had been intent on joining

Colonel Ben-Shoham, but instead had run into a Syrian tank company. Zvika promptly sent a contact report to Colonel Ben-Shoham and first engaged the enemy at 2100 hours on 6 October. Zvika took advantage of the terrain and limited visibility, moving his force into hull-down positions and letting the enemy come to him. Zvika’s force waited only a short time until one of his tank commanders reported contact with an approaching Syrian column consisting mostly of T-55s. Zvika peered into the gloom and saw them by the dim glow of their “formation lamps and infra-red ‘cats eyes’.At about 2120 hours, Zvika spotted a solitary Syrian tank on the road about four kilometers outside Nafakh and only ten meters from his own Centurion. Zvika tapped his gunner, and the Syrian burst into flames. Fearful of being seen or set ablaze in the horrendous flash of burning fuel and munitions, Zvika ordered his driver to back up fast. He then found that he had no way of communicating with the other tank or of even speaking with his own crew. The shock of the explosion of the Syrian tank had jolted out the radio and intercom circuits. Zvika jumped down to the roadway and stalked over to the other Centurion, ejecting its commander and motioning him to climb aboard the defective tank. “Watch me,” he cautioned the other man, “and do as I do, if possible.Zvika then continued to work his way south along the Tapline Road, the two tanks moving slowly forward, using the terrain to mask their movement. Zvika soon realized that he was alone, the other tank having lost its position in the dark. Moving over the crest of a hill,Zvika was confronted by three Syrian tanks moving towards them with their driving lights on. Three rapid shots from the Centurion’s 105mm gun left the enemy tanks blazing brightly, and the illumination of the area from the fire greatly aided Zvika’s movement. The intruders belonged to the 51st Independent Tank Brigade, and they were feeling their way into the Israeli rear, seeking to exploit the breakthrough. Apparently they had turned on their sidelights to see better, to gain speed.Zvika shifted into a new position and within minutes destroyed three more T55s. Zvika realized that the Tapline Road was a major avenue of approach,that he was frequently outnumbered and he was facing tanks with superior night fighting capabilities. Zvika chose to hold in his current position, take advantage of the defensible terrain, and wait for Syrian forces. Thirty minutes passed until they were alerted by the sound of heavy engines. A long column of T-55s appeared out of the darkness, followed by a procession of trucks. “It was as if the main body of Major Ismail’s 452nd Tank Battalion was on

parade, so perfectly aligned and spaced was the column. Zvika waited until the lead tank was

only twenty meters from where he was hunkered down. The first shot stopped the first target and stalled the entire column Zvika was up against terrible odds, but he had the enemy fixed and was in position to destroy the entire column. Zvika withdrew into the darkness, taking advantage of the scrub and rocky outcrops, only to appear and fire before disappearing again. He kept this uneven match going for over an hour.The Syrians’ sole warning was a crash and a long jet of white flame shooting through the night to destroy another of their vehicles. The Syrians were extremely bewildered by the single shot that kept hitting their tanks from all along the roadway. Frustrated, several Syrian tankers switched on searchlights to try and locate what they thought was a sizeable enemy force. The illumination gave Zvika and his gunner more clear targets to engage. Ten armored vehicles were either destroyed or damaged before Major Ismail ordered the remnants of his battalion to withdraw.

What the Syrians believed was a sizable force was actually the work of a single tank crew.

Several miles further along the Tapline Road at Nafakh, Colonel Ben-Shoham realized he was surrounded. His brigade intelligence officer suggested that as it was impossible to get

back to the Nafakh headquarters by the Tapline Road, they had better cut across country. Colonel Ben-Shoham directed his tank and the headquarters’ half-track to head west toward the ridge of the Golan Heights near Ramat Magshimim. At approximately 0200 on October 7, they reached the Gamla Rise overlooking the Sea of Galilee, a primary objective of the Syrian forces. They were dismayed to observe new Syrian T-62 tanks not far away along

the escarpment, and in full view of Galilee. At that rate, Syrian forces would soon cross into Israel proper. The Israeli tank and its accompanying half-track continued to move along in

dim moonlight, keeping among the boulders on the slopes to screen themselves

from the large Syrian force moving parallel to their position. Colonel Ben-Shoham tried to determine the status of his brigade, and feared that very little remained. Meanwhile back in

Nafakh, a reserve battalion commander named Lieutenant Colonel Uzi More

received permission from the CinC of Northern Command to leave the base and take command of the tanks along the Tapline Route. He was to fight a delaying action along the Tapline

Route to slow the Syrian advance towards Nafakh Camp. This force included Zvika’s small group and two reserve tank platoons of the Northern Command Reserve, which were the

only reserves available in the southern sector. Lieutenant Colonel More received

the order from Colonel Ben- Shoham to mount a counterattack, and proceeded southwards along the Tapline Route, while Tzvika and a platooof tanks drove parallel along the road’s wire fences. Almost immediately, the first tank in Zvika’s column was set ablaze by a rocket-propelled grenade. Zvika saw Syrian tanks equipped with searchlights blocking the road ahead, and Zvikaordered one of the remaining tanks forward to rescue the crew of the burning Centurion. He positioned his own tank to cover in the flank, and both tanks were hit. Zvika’sgunner was injured, while Zvika himself reeled from the shock of the blast and searing pain. Zvika and his crew scrambled from their blazing Centurion, falling to the ground in flames and screaming as flames seared their faces and hands. Zvika’s shirt and trousers were burning,

but he rolled into a ditch and somehow smothered the flames. He was fearful that at any moment his tank, still carrying fuel and ammunition, would blow up. Not realizing the extent of his wounds, he ran towards another tank, shouted garbled instructions, and took command of the vehicle. He then activated the communications system, announcing to all that TF Zvika was still in existence Even as Colonel Ben- Shoham’s relieved acknowledgment faded on the radio, Zvika realized the extent of his wounds, and the terrible burns on his face and hands began to throb and blister. Only Colonel Ben-Shoham’s calm but insistent voice brought him back to reality. Moving straight for him were two Syrian tanks, bearing down with their guns firing. Zvika fired and screamed for his driver to reverse. The tank shuddered as its tracks tore around on the bare rocks, then raced backward into the inferno of the night, its crew still battling against the heavy odds.

The remainder of Colonel Ben-Shoham’s counterattack force also made contact with the mechanized infantry that had been accompanying the tanks that Zvika encountered. More’s tanks were hit and disabled, one at a time. When More saw a Syrian soldier aim an antitank rocket at his command tank,he grabbed hold of his free machine gun and opened fire. However, his machine gun jammed and the Syrian grenadier let fly. More was thrown from his tank and lost an arm and an eye in the blast. Colonel Ben-Shoham reported up the chain of command the failure of his counterattack and did his best to stabilize the situation. With minimal resources he calmed the nerves of his commanders, called for artillery support, and attempted to maintain situational awareness of the battle that surrounded.

In order to improve command and control, Colonel Ben-Shoham requested the command of all forces in the southern Golan from the regional commander. It was apparent that the

Syrians were swarming all over the southern sector of the Golan Heights. In the north, the Israeli 7th Armored Brigade was defending positions in and around Booster Ridge against the Syrian

7th Infantry Division, elements of the 3rd Armored Division, and a brigade of Moroccan troops. Fighting from prepared positions, the Centurionequipped 7th Armored Brigade held out

against odds sometimes as high as 15 to 1. Under constant artillery and air attack,

Colonel Ben Gal, the 7th Armored Brigade commander, calmly directed his dwindling forces, maintaining a reserve which he moved from ambush to blocking position to battle position

during 72 hours of continuous fighting. The 7th Armored Brigade, although down to a handful of operational tanks,never gave up their primary positions.In the southern sector, the crisis continued to develop. Sunrise on the 7th of October revealed that the Syrians had

achieved a major breakthrough in the southern sector of the Golan Heights. The 132nd Mechanized Brigade and 47th Independent Tank Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division had made a major penetration along the Rafid El-Al road.The Syrians exploited this penetration

with the 43rd, 51st, and 91st Armored Brigade, a force of more than 500 tanks. Colonel Ben-Shoham identified the advancing second-echelon Syrian columns, and chose to regroup his forces and attempt to delay the Syrian penetration. His tank and half-track sped back

towards Nafakh, dodging tank and RPG fire along the entire route. Colonel Ben-Shoham realized all that remained of his brigade were a handful of tanks fighting for their lives along the Tapline Route. He decided his best course of action would be to rally his meager forces and join his deputy, Colonel Yisraeli, and the 679th Reserve Armored Brigade (now reaching the front

in small numbers). “Every three tanks now reaching the front were assembled into make-shift

platoons, patched into the communications network and rushed towards Ben- Shoham’s position. All in all, two companies were pieced together, and the newly formed units reached Nafakh and re-established the Barak Brigade’s headquarters. At approximately 1145, Major Baruch Lenschner identified a lead element from the Syrian 1st Armored Division

as the 91st Armored Brigade. Major Lenschner, Deputy Commander of an independent Northern Command battalion, was commanding a hastily assembled force of initially 14 Centurions. That was now down to two operable tanks. He reported sighting the T-62s of

the 91st Armored Brigade and stated that his position was untenable. Colonel Ben-Shoham urged the young major to hold at any cost. Major Lenschner and his small force were not heard from again. It was later determined that Major Lenschner perished when the warhead

of a Sagger missile punched through the Centurion’s turret armorand his force was overrun.15 Outflanked, the brigade headquarters at Nafakh was now under attack. Ben- Shoham was ordered to return to Nafakh for the base’s defense, and ordered his deputy Lieutenant-Colonel

Yisraeli to set out and cover his force. Unknown to Colonel Ben-Shoham, Zvika had met up with Colonel Yisraeli’s force at dawn and fought in the battle that delayed the Syrian 51st Tank rigade’s attack along the Tapline Route. Just when Zvika had thought they were gaining the upper hand, Yisraeli frantically ordered his force back to Nafakh to escape the Syrians’ outflanking movement. Throughout the retreat, Colonel Ben- Shoham’s tank came under heavy Syrian artillery and tank fire. Both he and Yisraeli succeeded in destroying more

than twenty Syrian tanks and vehicles. As the battle raged and Syrian tanks approached to close range, Yisraeli’s gunner announced that the tank was out of ammunition. Yisraeli ordered his

driver to charge an oncoming T-62 with machine guns blazing. Within moments,

his tank in flames, Lieutenant-Colonel Yisraeli was dead. Ben-Shoham, unaware of the fate of his deputy, continued to issue orders. Standing upright in the turret, Ben-Shoham observed

the battle, firing at Syrian crewmen fleeing their burning vehicles. As he searched the hills for Syrian commandos, a sudden 7.62mm volley killedColonel Ben-Shoham. Losing radio con-

“Colonel Ben-Shoham realized all that remained of his brigade were a handful of tanks fighting for their lives along the Tapline Route.”tact with his commanders, Zvika left the roadway and approached Nafakh cross-country from the southeast without encountering Syrian forces, but just missing a Syrian ambush. The 91st Armored Brigade continued its push towards Nafakh. Lieutenant- Colonel Menachem (Pinie) Cooperman, deputy commander of the District (administrative) Brigade, organized Nafakh’s defenses and issued antitank weapons to soldiers manning the perimeter. Standing at the southern perimeter fence, he watched the advance of approximately two Syrian tank companies, and ordered the advanced headquarters group to withdraw from Nafakh. As this force left the base, hundreds of Syrian shells rained down on the camp. Syrian tanks were now entering Nafakh unhindered, firing pointblank at the base’s evacuated buildings, raking the Israeli defenders with coaxial and turret-mounted machine guns. Lieutenant- Colonel Cooperman grabbed the division’s deputy intelligence and operations officers, a bazooka and six shells,and rushed to try and stop the Syrians from taking Nafakh. Suddenly, the 679th Reserve Armored Brigade arrived to save the day. Firing at long range, the 679th managed to hold the Syrians and push them out of Nafakh. Yet Syrian tanks were still

inside the base, and Lieutenant Colonel Cooperman’s determined antitank unit, now out of ammunition, was cornered by a T-62. As the T-62’s 115mm gun turned towards them, the tank went up n a ball of flame. Approaching the rescued officers was a battered tank moving at a slow speed. It was Zvika! Zvika had arrived at Nafakh camp just as the Syrians were breaking in, he had joined forces with a reserve tank, and with more enthusiasm than good sense his exhausted crew attacked the Syrians.

“Zvika fired wildly at everything in sight — at the hills and the fences and at the Syrian tanks that had already flattened the perimeter fence. The truth was that his tank driver was in the

shock of exhaustion and could no longer react to orders after twenty hours of continuous, nerve-twisting battle. During the pandemonium, Zvika attached himself to the 679th Armored

Brigade and with them forced the Syrians out of the ruined camp and back

onto the Tapline Road. The Syrian advance had been stopped at Nafakh and the blackened, smoking wreckage of their tanks, personnel carriers, and trucks lay everywhere, in the

camp and on the dun-colored hills. “When the battle around Zvika ceased,he found himself standing in the turret of his fifth or sixth Centurion, suddenly unable to make a decision as to what to do next. The Barak Brigade intelligence officer — now the nominal brigade

commander — rushed up to greet the lieutenant. As he fought an overwhelming

lethargy, Zvika painfully climbed from the turret and carefully dropped to the ground, where he leveled his eyes on the intelligence officer and apologetically murmured, ‘I can’t anymore.’ The intelligence officer said not a word; he hugged Zvika close and led him to the medical evacuation center. There is no way to calculate the damage that that iron-willed redheaded youth inflicted upon the best plan with which Syria has ever entered a conflict.

To say that the actions of Lieutenant Zvika Greengold directly affected the

outcome of the Yom Kippur war would be an overstatement. But it goes without

saying that his actions greatly aided the successful defense of the Golan

Heights. “For his incredible 24 hours on the Golan, Lieutenant Greengold was

awarded the Ot Hagvura (Order of Bravery), the IDF’s medal for supreme

valor.

MAJ Michael D. Wickman, commissioned

in Armor from OCS, has

served as a mortar platoon leader

in 2-37 Armor and a tank platoon

leader in 1-37 Armor in Germany.

He served as a tactical intelligence

officer in G2 TAC, 34th Infantry Division,

and assistant J2, Task Force

Timberwolf, Guatemala. He served

as S2, S4, and tank company commander

in 1-94 Armor. He is a

graduate of AOBC, AOAC, MIOTC,

and CAS3.

                                          Rare home 8 mm film made by a IDF reserve soldier
                                          in south of the Golan during the Yom Kuppur War
                                          including a Syrian Mig 17 crash near the force
                                          during battle

IDF command half track hit during the battle

Iraqi tanks hit by the IDF in shouth of the Golan

1967 מבצע "מוקד"- מלחמת ששת הימים Moked Operation 1967 Six Days War

2011-05-02T21:19:00.000-07:00

"Moked" Operation 1967 Six Days War

the opening air strike by Israel at the start of the Six Days War of 1967. It is sometimes referred to as "Sinai Air Strike" since the focus was primarily on airfields around the Sinai At 07:45 on June 5, 1967, the (IAF) under Maj. Gen. Hod launched a massive air strike that destroyed the majority of the Egyptian air force on the ground. By noon, the Egyptian , Jordan and Syrian Air Forces , with about 450 aircraft, were destroyed. It was also very successful in disabling 18 airfields in Egypt, hindering Egyptian Air Force operations for the duration of the war.

Summary of the operation

In three main waves of aerial attacks, and several smaller waves in the days following the operation, a total of 452 aircraft were destroyed, most of them on the ground. This left the IAF in almost complete control the skies , and able to effectively assist the Israel Defnce Force (IDF) ground units.
The operational success was achieved by concentrating on the initial destruction of the runways with a new rocket assisted bomb that would come to be known as the Durandal anti-runway warhead. As designed, after release of the bomb, a parachute is deployed to point the warhead directly toward the runway being attacked; at a set altitude, the rocket ignites and drives the warhead through the pavement of the runway before it detonates. The explosion creates a small crater over a large new sinkhole, meaning the damaged runway must be removed before the hole can be filled. Once the runways were disabled, entire air bases' complements of aircraft were effectively grounded and fell victim to subsequent attack waves, resulting in near-total Israeli air supremacy

June 5, 1967

Operation Moked was launched at 7:45 am Israeli time (8:45 Egyptian time). Nearly all of Israel's 196 combat aircraft (mostly French/Dassault) were committed to the airstrike, with only twelve being held back to patrol Israeli airspace.
Egyptian defensive infrastructure was extremely poor, and no airfields were yet equipped with shelters able of protecting Egypt's warplanes in the event of an attack. The Israeli warplanes headed out over the sea before turning toward Egypt. Meanwhile, the Egyptians hindered their own defense by effectively shutting down their entire aur defence system: they were worried that rebel Egyptian forces would shoot down the plane carrying Field Marshal Amer and Lt-Gen. Sidqi Mahmoud, who were en route from al Maza to Bir Tamada in the Sinai to meet the commanders of the troops stationed there. In this event it did not make a great deal of difference as the Israeli pilots came in below Egyptian radar cover and well below the lowest point at which Egypt's SA-2 surface-to-air missile batteries could bring down an aircraft.
The first Israeli wave attacked 11 bases, catching much of the Egyptian Air Force on the ground and destroying them before they got airborne. The Israeli jets then returned to Israel, were "quick-turned" (refueled and re-armed) in 7 minutes 45 seconds, and left in a second wave that attacked 14 Egyptian bases and returned with only minor losses. They "quick-turned" again and departed in a third wave.
The opening stages of Operation Moked were a complete success: Egypt's air force of nearly 500 combat aircraft was destroyed in the space of three hours, with only minor losses to the Israeli Air Force. When Syria, Jordan, and Iraq attacked Israeli targets in retaliation for the airstrike on Egypt, their attacks were mainly directed at civilian targets^[ and were largely ineffectual. In response many of the IAF planes headed for a third strike on Egypt were diverted en route to Syrian and Jordanian targets, and other IAF aircraft were sent against Arab ground forces in support of Israeli ground forces.

June 6-10, 1967

On the second day of the war (June 6) the IAF was used against Egyptian, Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi ground forces.
On the third day (June 7) the IAF destroyed hundreds of Egyptian vehicles trying to flee across the Sinai in convoys and trapped thousands more in narrow Sinai passes. By the end of the third day Jordan's air force of 34 combat aircraft had essentially ceased to exist and the Jordanian military was no longer in the fight.
By the sixth and final day (June 10) Syria had lost approximately 100 combat aircraft and the fighting was over.

Aftermath

During the Six Days War , the IAF , with 196 combat aircraft at its disposal had prevailed over a coalition with approximately 600 combat aircraft. The IAF destroyed 452 enemy aircraft, including 79 in air combat, while losing 46 of its own. 24 Israeli pilots and an unknown number of Arab pilots were killed.

Number of aircraft destroyed by country

Egypt : 338 aircraft
Syria : 61 aircraft
Jprdan : 29 aircraft
Iraq : 23 aircraft
Lebanon : 1 aircraft
Israel lost 19 aircraft in the operation.

General Mordechai "Moti" Hod

The most famous period of Mordechai Hod's career came in June 1967. Since the beginning of the year were still evident aggressive plans for the Arab countries towards Israel. 14th May joined the Egyptian army into the demilitarized zone on Mount Sinai and UN troops are deployed to the forced withdrawal. In addition, the 22nd May Egypt blocked the Straits of Tiran to all shipping traffic, leading to the Israeli port of Eilat. These acts were flagrant violation of the ceasefire agreement concluded in 1956, despite the fact that the armies of Arab war preparations clearly showed that more Arab aggression is only a matter of time.
The Israeli government has therefore adopted a decision to carry out preventive air strike against the air forces of the neighboring Arab countries.

On Monday, 5 morning in June 1967 started the first 38 aircraft and 141 aircraft subsequent waves, which attacked the nine air bases in Egypt and was discontinued within 45 minutes of the runway and on the ground and the air had destroyed nearly 150 Egyptian military aircraft. Mordechai Hod later called it "the longest 45 minutes of my life." After these 45 minutes, but could the chief of General Staff, General Yitzhak Rabin, without any pathos historical statement said: "The Egyptian Air Force no longer exists."

After the efforts of the IDF / AF turned against Syria, Jordan and Iraq to the end of the day came back to finish their work in Egypt. In one day proved to the IAF on the status of 197 combat aircraft, 474 combat during takeoffs knees air forces of four Arab countries and destroy their 374 aircraft (286 in Egypt, Syria 52, Jordan 27 and 9 in Iraq). Over the next five days, the Israeli army occupied the entire Sinai Peninsula, the entire West Bank (today's West Bank), including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. The conflict from the perspective of history gone down in history as the " Six Days War ", from the standpoint of military strategy as a prototype of the art" parallel war ", who later triumphed in the Allied Operation Desert Storm in 1991.

The film you are about to see was edited by Al Jazeera tv a anti Israeli
station never the less the facts are real, the insight is from the Arab
point of view

IDF 37th Armored Brigade -"Ream" "חטיבת השריון 37 עוצבת "ראם

2011-01-20T14:14:00.000-08:00

37th Armored Division was established on the eve of the Sinai Campaign 1956 . In this operation the brigade was fighting in the Gaza Strip and in Umm Katef and Umm Shihane near Abu Ageila lost 41 of its members including the first commander, Colonel Samuel Galinkea

In the Six Day War the brigade was a reserve unit. On the morning of June 5, 1967 the brigade was ready to stop the attacks from Syria ,one battalion remained in the north and the rest moved to Samaria. One tank battalion brigade with A.M.X 13 tanks moved south through Taluzi and Tubas, occupied Nablus. The battalion remained in Galilee with Sherman tanks joined Golani Brigades in the battles of Tel Azziat and Tel Faher and was first to enter Kuneitra in the Golan

The division lost 27 fighters in battles in Samaria and the Golan Heights.


1973-Late Lieutenant Moshe Keren getting a special honor medal

Lieutenant Moshe Keren was a member of the 37th Armored Brigade in the Six Days War

1967 and took part in the battle of Nablus later in the Yom Kippur war he was part of

the 188th Armored Brigade and took part in the battle with the Syrians on the Golan

In one air attack by Syrian planes he shot a syrian jet wit a 0.5 Browning machine gun

For that action and for his dedication to his job repairing the unit tanks during the war

he was given a special medal of honor (in the pic with General Yanosh Ben Gal)

Moshe was passed away in 1986 may he rest in peace.

The pictures you are about to see were taken by Moshe Keren in 1967 war in

the area of Nablus in the West Bank during the armored clash with the Jordanian Army

A view on the West Bank Samaria on the way to Nablus

Local residents around Nablus

37th Brigade force on the road to Nablus

Jordanian M 48 Patton tank and a M 113 hit on the side road

A group of Jordanian M48 tanks pushed to the side

A Jordanian M 48 Patton tank

A view from IDF A.M.X 13 tank

A Jordanian M48 hit

A Jordanian M48

A unit of the 37th Brigade minutes before entering the battle 1967

A.M.X 13 of the 37th Armored Brigade

. ששת הימים, מפקדת אוג' 36 לאחר קבלת כתב כניעה מראש העיר שכם. דני אגמון מימין, אורי רום מחט 37, במרכז אלוף פלד ולידו מוסה פלד, רמ"ט האוגדה. 8.6.67

ששת הימים, בכניסה לשכם, מפקד האוגדה אלעד פלד, הרמ"ט מוסא פלד, באמצע דני. 8.6.67

IDF 45th Armored Brigade - 1967 Six Days War in the west bank-the battle of "Dotan Valley" חטיבה 45 חיל שריון במלחמת ששת הימים 1967

2011-01-15T03:55:00.000-08:00

On June 5, 1967, towards evening, the brigade broke through the border northern part of the Samarian Hills, with the intention of removing the Jordanian long-range artillery threat on the Ramat David Airbase. A large enemy force was deployed in the sector into which the brigade broke through. The force was composed mostly of Jordanian troops with some Egyptian commandos. The brigade broke through on two axes, with the main effort placed in the direction of the town of Jenin, and the other in the direction of the Um-el-Fahem area. The brigade came under heavy artillery and tank-gun fire.Yet the brigade advanced and cleared the area quickly of all enemy resistance. The following day, one of the brigade's forces entered Jenin from the direction of the Dotan Valley, and other forces gained control of the dominating ridges for to secure the area. During the battle, in which the Jordanian troops put up strong resistance and showed a high level of professionalism, the Jordanian front-line "Patton" battalion was destroyed, together with many infantry forces. In the evening, the Jordanians quickly sent their crack 40th Armored Brigade to the sector, which gained control of the Dotan Valley. During the day, the Barak brigade fought a hard and cruel battle in the Dotan Valley, in hilly, difficult terrain scattered with orchards and built-up areas. The combat was characterized by massive fire, maneuver and assault.
For 24 hours, the outnumbered Barak Brigade reserve force, equipped with limited materiel, faced 120 enemy "Patton" tanks and other large scale enemy forces. During the day, the Jordanian's fighting ability was broken and they went into retreat. The brigade gained control of the area and blew up the Damia bridge across the Jordan river.

IDF force near Jenin in the west bank

Jordanian 106 mm gun hit

Jordanian M48 Patton tank near IDF Sherman tank after the battle

2 Jordanian tanks after the battle: M47on the left and M48 on the right

IDF Ceremony near Jenin

picture of king Hussien of Jordan and Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser

Jordanian half trucks

Captured Jordanian M 47 Patton tanks near Jenin

Jordanian Army M47 hit

Merkava IDF main battle tank - the early years of development חיל השריון-טנק המרכבה -פיתוח, והשנים הראשונות

2010-11-12T21:32:00.000-08:00

Development

The Merkava series of tanks dates to the 1960s, when Israel drew up plans to remove its military-industrial complex from reliance on foreign factories. Israel's economy and national reserves, backed by U.S. military grant aid, allowed it to purchase nearly any land, sea, or air platform and weapon from friendly nations, but Israel's infrastructure was not capable of producing those items domestically.

In 1965, Israel's military establishment began research and development on a domestically-produced tank, the "Sabra" (Hebrew slang for a Jew born in Israel (not to be confused with the modern Sabra tank). Initially, Britain and Israel collaborated to develop the United Kingdom's Chieftain tank that had entered British Army service in 1966. However, in 1969, Britain decided not to sell the tank to Israel for political reasons.

Israel Tal, who was serving as a brigade commander after the Suez Crisis, restarted plans to produce an Israeli-made tank, drawing on lessons from the 1973 Yom Kippur War, in which Israeli forces were outnumbered by those of the Middle East's Arab nations. Realizing that they could not win wars of attrition, the Israelis set stringent requirements of crew survivability and safety for the new tank platform.

By 1974, initial designs were completed and prototypes were built. After a brief set of trials, work began to retool the Tel HaShomer ordnance depot for full-time development and construction. After the new facilities were completed, the Merkava was announced to the public in the International Defense Review periodical. The first official images of the tank were then released to the American periodical Armed Forces Journal on May 14, 1977. The IDF did not officially adopt the tank until December 1978, when the first full battalion of 30 tanks was delivered for initial unit training.

A Merkava prototype with a Patton "Magach" turret

A prototype with a Centurion "Shot Kal" turret

IDF 8th Armored Brigade חטיבה 8 החטיבה הראשונה בחיל השריון

2010-10-16T02:49:00.000-07:00

The 8th Armored Brigade (Hativa Shmoneh) was an Israeli Armoured brigade headquartered near Jerusalem It was the IDF' first brigade which possessed tanks and APCs, whereas all other IDF units at the time were entirely infatry -based.
The brigade was called 'armored' for morale reasons, although in reality it only had a single tank company (later in the war, two companies), and a single APC company (these companies became the brigade's armored battalion, and an assault battalion composed of jeeps.
The Brigade's first commander was Itzhak Sade

8th Armoured Brigade, 1948

Moshe Daayan was appointed commander of one of the brigade's battalions known as the "89th Mechanized Assault Battalion." The 89th consisted of four companies each made up from different groups: from kibbutz and moshves, from Tel Aviv, from Lehi and veterans from South Africa. They were stationed at Tel Levnski Their first action was against Irgun members landing arms from the Altalena at Kfar Vitikin, 23 miles north of Tel Aviv The Alexsandroni Brigade was "reluctant" to intervene, and Dayan was unable to deploy ex-members of Irgun from his battalion.
On 11 July 1948 the 89th Battalion was involved in the attack on Lyddia

Following the 1948 war, the brigade served as the backbone of the IDF's tank corps. In the Six Days War, the brigade fought on two fronts, including in the Sinai and the Golan. In the Yom Kippur War, the brigade fought in the Sinai. In the 1982 Lebanon war, the brigade was mobilized but did not take part in the fighting.
A memorial to the 8th Brigade is located adjacent to the Ben Gurion international airport

In 1948, the 82nd Tank Battalion of the 8th Armoured Brigade was the only unit in the IDF to be equipped with tanks. Two British Cromwell tanks were stolen from the British at Haifa Airport by two non-Jewish deserters, Flanagan and McDonald, who were sympathizers of the Haganah. Both men then joined the “B” Company of the 82nd Battalion, manned by South African, British, Canadian, American, Latin American, French and Czech Machal.

The Haganah had wanted four Cromwell tanks, but unfortunately, only the two deserters Flanagan & McDonald were qualified tank drivers. Two Haganah men who were “truck drivers” tried unsuccessfully to drive the other two Cromwells, which then had to be abandoned.

The Haganah also succeeded in acquiring one unserviceable Sherman tank by bribing the British soldiers in charge of the tanks. After extensive repairs the Sherman became operational, and was also attached to the 82nd Tank Battalion.

The “A” Company of the 82nd was equipped with lighter French Hodgekiss tanks, manned by experienced Gachalniks from East European countries.

The 88th Battalion of Mortars of the 8th Brigade was manned by Machalniks from South Africa, Britain, U.S.A., Holland, The Belgian Congo, Switzerland, France, Brasil, China and North Africa.

The 89th Mechanized Commandos was also manned by Machalniks from South Africa, U.K., Canada and the U.S.A.

First Tank Commander

Lionel Druker, 24, of Sydney, Nova Scotia, was the first tank commander in the history of the Israeli army. He and the tank crews he led served in the 8th Brigade against Egyptian forces in the Negev. Druker remained in Israel after the war, and, with fellow Canadian Arthur Goldberg of Vancouver, founded one of Israel’s largest travel agencies. The three tank models displayed represent Israel’s entire tank corps in the first months of the war – one American Sherman M4A3, built from pieces junked by the departing British army, and two British Cromwells delivered by two Irish soldiers who defected from the British military.

IDF 421th Armored brigade - the first armored force to cross the Suez Canal in the 1973 Yom Kippur war

2010-09-17T11:17:00.000-07:00

The 421st Armored Brigade - IDF

The brigade was formed in 1972-1973 as a M48A3 "Patton" tanks' brigade within the 143 ^rdGHQ Reserve Division. The brigade was a reserve unit, and when the 1973 war broke out, it had not completed the process of forming up.

Having been called for active service in the morning of Yom Kippur, October 6 1973, the brigade went through an arduous process of mobilization. Nevertheless, at dawn, October 7 ^th, the brigade's units organized and started moving towards the Sinai Desert. The battalions had to travel 300-400 kilometers on tank tracks. At the end of that same day, the second day of the war, the brigade, commanded by Colonel Chaim Erez, reached the central sector of the Suez Canal front. The commanders of the battalions were Major Giora Lev, Major Ami Morag, and Lieutenant colonel Shimon Ben Shushan. The division commander was General Ariel Sharon.

During its' first week in the war, the brigade participated in the Southern Front's effort to contain and block the advance of the Egyptian offensive. The brigade fought along the Tassa-Isma'ilia road, participating in several bloody battles on a long sandy dune blocking that road, code named "Chamutal". The brigade lost 19 of its soldiers in these battles. The unit gained combat experience during these battles that ultimately ended in a tank-to-tank battle against the 14 ^thEgyptian tank brigade on October 14 ^th. The tanks of the 421st brigade heavily mauled the Egyptian brigade, scoring 50-70 destroyed Egyptian tanks, loosing only one tank. Following this battle, the brigade was pulled out from the "Chamutal" area, and received orders to start preparations for crossing the Suez Canal. The brigade was assigned to deliver the engineering equipment needed to cross the Canal, including amphibious rafts, pontoons, and a large 600 foot roller bridge. The crossing of the canal was planned to take place near the point where the Suez Canal flows into the Great Bitter Lake.

On the night of October 15 ^th, most of the brigade's tanks were occupied in towing and defending the bridging equipment. The rest of the brigade took part in a battle to occupy the "Chinese Farm", an Egyptian Army stronghold that controlled the access roads to the Canal crossing point and threatened the entire operation. Shortly after sunrise on October 16 ^th, while the battle at the "Chinese Farm" was still raging, the first tank of the brigade crossed the Suez Canal, followed by 27 tanks and 10 APCs, all of which crossed the Suez Canal on "Gilloit" self propelled rafts. This armored crossing of the Suez Canal turned out to be the turning point of the war on the southern front, as the IDF shifted from a defensive position to offensive initiative on the Egyptian mainland.

After crossing the Canal, the brigade's task force organized as an armored reconnaissance group. The mission was to destroy anti-aircraft missile bases, and thereby enable the Israeli air force to operate freely on both sides of the Suez Canal. For several hours on October 16th, the task force traveled some 100 kilometers deep inside the Egyptian territory, destroying in its' wake anti-aircraft missile bases, tanks, vehicles and equipment of the Egyptian army. The Egyptians were overwhelmed by the onslaught.

In the next days the rest of the brigade joined the task force, and the brigade enlarged its' bridgehead on the West Bank of the Suez Canal. Other units of Sharon's division and other divisions crossed the canal and created a large IDF hold in the West Bank, capturing the Egyptian 3rd Army in a pocket. By the time a cease-fire was declared on October 24 ^th, the 421 ^stbrigade controlled 250 square kilometers of Egyptian territory, holding the Northwest corner of the enclave occupied by the IDF in mainland Egypt, approx. 110 km from Cairo. The brigade held these positions until the evacuation of the West Bank in February 1974, and thereafter its' personnel were released from active reserve duty.

47 of the brigade's warriors fell in battle.

The brigade continued to serve as a reserve unit until its' decommissioning in 1986.

Source: http://www.421.co.il/?

The memorial site near Latrun

Untitled from hativa 421 on Vimeo.

Captured Katyusha rocket launcher in the use of the IDF

2010-09-04T00:56:00.000-07:00

Israel captured BM-24 MRLs during the Six-Day War (1967), used them in two battalions during the Yom Kippur War (1973) and the 1982 Lebanon War, and later developed the MAR-240 launcher for the same rockets, based on a Sherman tank chassis.

M2 M3 Half Tracks in the IDF service זחל"מים בשרות חיל השריון

2010-08-14T04:00:00.000-07:00

Border Patrol Halftrack with 0.5 machine gun

120 mm Mortar on Half Track

120 mm Half Track

Half Track-TCM-2- in"hatzerim" Israel Air Force Museum

Patrol version with diesel engine

Ordnance Corps Half Track

Ordnance Corps

Half track with "Eyal" crane

Half track signal corps

Half track with anti mine rocket launcher

Half track with 90 mm gun

Half tracks with heavy machine gun

Half track with French SS 100 Anti Tank Missiles

Half Tracks -The early years of the Palmach and Haggana

IDF In the war of independence 1948

Forerunner of the modern infantry fighting vehicle, the M3 Half-Track was of half-French origin. In 1931 the U.S. Army purchased a French Citroen-Kegresse Model P17 half-track as part of a research and development effort for its own design. Working with private firms, the Army Ordnance Department produced the T14 prototype in 1939. In September of the following year the T14 was standardized and accepted for production; it became the M2 and the M3 Armored Personnel Carrie

During World War II, the M3 proved to be a versatile workhorse, and eventually over more than 41,000 vehicles in no less than 70 versions were produced. Later, improved models of the M2 and M3 were designated M9 and M5. Production stopped in 1944, but the Half-Track remained in service until early 1950s.

Some of the earliest armored vehicles operated by the Haganah in 1948 were Second World War surplus US half-tracks, some being imported into Palestine painted red and labeled agricultural machinery.'

In this early period they were predominantly M5/M9 half tracks or deactivated M14 half tracks (M5 without a Maxson anti-aircraft machine gun turret) and saw out the War as armored personnel carriers. Later, some M2 and M3 half tracks were acquired from a variety of sources, but predominantly France and war surplus dumps. The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) quickly beefed up the offensive capabilities of some of these lightly armored vehicles; to support the few tanks the IDF were able to acquire during this period.

The earliest IDF half tracks were armed with Czechoslovakian ZB vz/53 (Besa) and MG34 (not MG42) machine guns that were later supplemented by 20mm guns mounted in either turrets or on pedestal mounts with shields. Even home-made flame throwers were used in half-tracks, but these were as dangerous to the IDF troops operating them as they were to their Arab adversaries.

Half tracks used by Israel- IDF

* M3 Mk. A - M5 APC. Israeli Half-Tracks were all designated M3, even M2/M9 variants. The Mk. A APCs are identified as IHC M5s by the use of RED-450 engines for the most part. While the M49 mount was retained, a variety of machine guns were used.
* M3 Mk. B - M5 converted as a command carrier with extra radios and a front winch bumper. Mk. Bs featured M2HB machine guns.
* M3 Mk. C - Essentially an M21 MMC, an M3 type (assumed from the common use of the White 160AX engine) Half-Track with an M1 81 mm Mortar.
* M3 Mk. D - Another M3 based mortar carrier, fitted with the 120 mm Soltam mortar. Entered service in 1960.
* M3 TCM-20 - M3/M5 Half-Tracks fitted with the Israeli TCM-20 armament turret with two 20 mm Hispano-Suiza HS.404 cannon fitted to old Maxson turrets. The right hand vision port was often replaced with a ball mount for a machine gun. They proved to be very effective fighting anti-tank missile teams, their cannons would at least keep the teams under cover or bother them so they could not use their missiles effectively.

IDF Half tracks during combat- real pictures

IDF unit in 1982 Lebanon war on the east front

Half tracks crossing the Suez canal during Yom Kippur War 1973

Half track in Sinai desert during the Six Days War

Half tracks storming to the Golan during the SIX Days War 1967

Half tracks during the Six Days War1967

Half tracks along Sherman tanks during "Kadesh" 1956 war

Yom Kippur War- IDF crossing the Suez canal and ensircling of the third Egyptian army-1973 Yom Kippur War מלחמת יום הכיפורים -חציית התעלה וכיתור הארמיה השלישית המצרית

2010-07-24T12:59:00.000-07:00

Egyptian special forces taken as POW in the west side of the Suez canal

Egyptian BTR 50 in the sweet water canal in the west side of the Suez canal


Egyptian truck in the sweet water canal west to the Suez canal

Israeli breakthrough

On 14 October the IDF attacked the command and control of the Egyptian Army
in Jabbel Ataqa and destroyed 250 Egyptian tanks
The Israelis immediately followed their success of 14 October with a multidivisional counter-attack through the gap existing between the Egyptian 2nd and 3rd armies. Sharon’s 143rd Division, now reinforced with a paratroop brigade commanded by Col. Dani Matt, was tasked with establishing bridgeheads on the east and west banks of the Canal. The 162nd and 252nd Armored Divisions commanded by Generals Bren Adan and Kalman Magen respectively would then cross through the breach to the west bank of the Canal and swing southward encircling the 3rd Army in an enveloping action. The offensive was code-named Operation South-Hearted Men or alternatively, Operation Valiant.

On the night of 15 October 750 of Matt’s paratroopers crossed the Canal in rubber dinghies. They were soon joined by tanks ferried on motorized rafts and additional infantry. The force encountered no resistance initially and fanned out in raiding parties attacking supply convoys, SAM sites, logistic centers and anything of military value, with priority given to the destruction of SAMs. Several SAM batteries were destroyed in these attacks punching a hole in the Egyptian anti-aircraft screen and enabling the IAF to more aggressively pursue value targets.[96] By now, the Syrians no longer posed a credible threat and the Israelis were able to shift their air power to the south in support of the offensive. The combination of a weakened Egyptian AA umbrella and a greater concentration of IAF fighter bombers in the theatre of operations did not bode well for the Egyptians who now bore the full brunt of the IAF. EAF attempts to interdict the IAF sorties resulted in one-sided dogfights in Israel’s favor.

Despite the success the Israelis were having on the West Bank, General’s Bar-Lev and Elazar ordered Sharon to concentrate on securing the bridgehead on the East Bank. He was ordered to clear the roads leading to the Canal as well as a position known as Chinese Farm, situated just north of Deversoir, the Israeli crossing point. Sharon objected and requested permission to expand and breakout of the Bridgehead on the west bank arguing that such a maneuver would cause the collapse of Egyptian forces on the east bank. But the Israeli high command was insistent, believing that until the east bank was secure, forces on the west bank could be cut off. Sharon was overruled by his superiors and relented.[99] On 16 October, he dispatched Amnon Reshef’s Brigade to attack Chinese Farm. Other IDF forces attacked entrenched Egyptian forces overlooking the roads to the Canal. After three days of bitter, close-quartered fighting, the Israelis succeeded in dislodging numerically superior Egyptian forces from these positions. An ancillary target code-named Missouri was not taken but its capture or lack thereof proved to be of no consequence and ultimately, had no bearing or impact on the success of the Israeli counter-offensive.

The Egyptians meanwhile failed to grasp the extent and magnitude of the Israeli crossing nor did they appreciate its intent and purpose. This was partly due to attempts by Egyptian field commanders to obfuscate reports concerning the Israeli crossing and partly due to a false assumption that the Canal crossing was merely a diversion to a major IDF offensive targeting the right flank of the Second Army. Consequently, on 16 October, General Shazly ordered the 21st Armored Division to attack southward and the T-62 equipped 25th Independent Armored Brigade to attack northward in a pincer action to eliminate the perceived threat to the 2nd Army. However, the Egyptians failed to scout the area and were unaware that by now, Adans’s 162nd Armored Division was in the vicinity. Moreover, the 21st and 25th failed to coordinate their attacks allowing General Adan’s Division to meet each force individually. Adan first concentrated his attack on the 21st Armored Division destroying 50–60 tanks and forcing the remainder to retreat. He then turned southward and ambushed the 25th Independent Armored Brigade, destroying 86 of its 96 tanks and all of its APCs.

After the failure of the 17 October counter-attacks, the Egyptian General Staff slowly began to realize the magnitude of the Israeli offensive. Early on 18 October the Soviets showed Sadat satellite imagery of Israeli forces operating on the west bank. Alarmed, Sadat dispatched Shazly to the front to assess the situation first hand. He no longer trusted his field commanders to provide accurate reports.Shazly confirmed that the Israelis had at least one division on the west bank and were widening their bridgehead. He advocated withdrawing most of Egypt’s armor from the east bank to confront the growing Israeli threat on the west bank. Sadat rejected this recommendation outright and even threatened Shazly with a court martial. Ismail Ali recommended that Sadat push for a cease-fire so as to prevent the Israelis from exploiting their successes.

Israeli forces were by now pouring across the Canal on bridges, including one of indigenous design and motorized rafts. Adan’s division rolled south to the Ganeifah Hills while Magen’s division pushed west.Sharon’s drive north was halted 10 km south of Ismailia by a combined force of paratroopers and commandos. However, Adan and Magen beat the Egyptians decisively in a series of engagements, though they often encountered determined Egyptian resistance which incurred heavy Israeli casualties. In light of these casualties and the encountered resistance, Elazar made an adjustment to the operational plan, one that lacked the optimism of the original plan, which had promised a quick and decisive defeat of the Egyptians. In addressing the Israeli cabinet, Elazar said,"A battle is not being conducted according to the more optimistic model – the one that predicts the total collapse of the Egyptian army – but according to a realistic one...The Egyptian army is not what it was in '67. Furthermore, Magen's division, which possessed around 50 tanks on October 23, attempted to advance east towards Cairo from Kilometer 101. They advanced for eight kilometers, at which point they encountered an Egyptian armored force of the 3rd Armored Brigade, 4th Armored Division. After heavy fighting throughout the night, the Egyptians repelled the Israelis, who broke off the attack and returned to their original starting point.

By the end of the war, the Israelis had advanced to positions that were some 101 kilometers from Egypt's capital, Cairo and occupied 1,600 square kilometers west of the Suez Canal. The Israelis had also cut the Cairo-Suez road and encircled the bulk of Egypt's Third Army. The Egyptians held a narrow strip on the east bank of the Canal, occupying some 1,200 square kilometers of Sinai. One source estimated that the Egyptians had 70,000 men and 720 tanks on the East bank of the canal. However, 30,000 of these were now encircled by the Israelis.
Any notion that the 3rd army had any remaining offensive capabilities is absurd. if it were not for the goodwill of the IDF, they wouldn't even had drinking water.

Encircled Egyptian 3ed army transfer water and food under IDF supervision

IDF M48 tanks crossing the Suez canal back home after the agreement with the Egyptians

Yom Kippur War 1973- The cease-fire and immediate aftermath -Golan Heights

2010-07-17T11:02:00.000-07:00

Yom Kippur War - On the Golan Heights

In the Golan Heights, the Syrians attacked the Israeli defenses of two brigades and eleven artillery batteries with five divisions and 188 batteries. At the onset of the battle, approximately 180 Israeli tanks faced off against approximately 1,400 Syrian tanks. Despite the overwhelming odds and the fact that most of the Syrian tanks were equipped with night-fighting equipment, every Israeli tank deployed on the Golan Heights was engaged during the initial attacks. Syrian commandos dropped by helicopter also took the most important Israeli stronghold at Jabal al Shaikh (Mount Hermon), which had a variety of surveillance equipment.

Fighting in the Golan Heights was given priority by the Israeli High Command. The fighting in the Sinai was sufficiently far away that Israel was not immediately threatened; should the Golan Heights fall, the Syrians could easily advance into Israel itself. Reservists were directed to the Golan as quickly as possible. They were assigned to tanks and sent to the front as soon as they arrived at army depots, without waiting for the crewman they trained with to arrive; without waiting for machine guns to be installed on their tanks, and without taking the time to calibrate their tank guns (a time-consuming process known as bore-sighting).

As the Egyptians had in the Sinai, the Syrians on the Golan Heights took care to stay under cover of their SAM missile batteries. Also as in the Sinai, the Syrians made use of Soviet anti-tank weapons (which, because of the uneven terrain, were not as effective as in the flat Sinai desert).

The Syrians had expected it would take at least 24 hours for Israeli reserves to reach the front lines; in fact, Israeli reserve units began reaching the battle lines only fifteen hours after the war began.

By the end of the first day of battle, the Syrians (who at the start outnumbered the Israelis in the Golan 9 to 1) had achieved moderate success. Towards the end of the day, "A Syrian tank brigade passing through the Rafid Gap turned northwest up a little-used route known as the Tapline Road, which cut diagonally across the Golan. This roadway would prove one of the main strategic hinges of the battle. It led straight from the main Syrian breakthrough points to Nafekh, which was not only the location of Israeli divisional headquarters but the most important crossroads on the Heights." During the night, Lieutenant Zvika Greengold, who had just arrived to the battle unattached to any unit, fought them off with his single tank until help arrived. "For the next 20 hours, Zvika Force, as he came to be known on the radio net, fought running battles with Syrian tanks—sometimes alone, sometimes as part of a larger unit, changing tanks half a dozen times as they were knocked out. He was wounded and burned but stayed in action and repeatedly showed up at critical moments from an unexpected direction to change the course of a skirmish."

Over four days of fighting, the 7th Israeli brigade in the north (commanded by Yanush Ben Gal) managed to hold the rocky hill line defending the northern flank of their headquarters in Nafah. For some as-yet-unexplained reason, the Syrians were close to conquering Nafah, yet they stopped the advance before reaching Nafah, letting israel assemble a defensive line. The most reasonable explanation for this is that the Syrians had precalculated estimated advances, and the commanders in the field didn't want to digress from the plan. To the south, however, the "Barak" brigade, bereft of any natural defenses, began to take on heavy casualties. Commander Colonel Shoham was killed during the first few days of fighting, as the Syrians desperately tried to push inwards towards the Sea of Galilee.

The tide in the Golan turned as the arriving Israeli reserve forces were able to contain and, starting 8 October, push back the Syrian offensive. The tiny Golan Heights was too small to act as an effective territorial buffer, unlike the Sinai Peninsula in the south, but it proved to be a strategic geographical stronghold and was a crucial key in preventing the Syrian army from bombing the cities below. By Wednesday, October 10, the last Syrian unit in the Central sector had been pushed back across the purple line (the pre-war border).

A decision now had to be made—whether to ease the fighting down and end the war at the 1967 border, or to continue the war into Syrian territory. Israeli High Command spent the whole of October 10 debating this, well into the night. Some favored disengagement, which would allow soldiers to be redeployed to the Sinai (Shmuel Gonen's ignominious defeat at Hizayon in the Sinai had happened two days before). Others favored continuing the attack into Syria, towards Damascus, which would knock Syria out of the war; it would also restore Israel's image as the supreme military power in the Middle East and would give them a valuable bargaining chip once the war ended. Others countered that Syria had strong defenses—antitank ditches, minefields, and strong points—and that it would be better to fight from defensive positions in the Golan Heights (rather than the flat terrain of Syria) in the event of another war with Syria. However, Prime Minister Meir realized the most crucial point of the whole debate—"It would take four days to shift a division to the Sinai. If the war ended during this period, the war would end with a territorial loss for Israel in the Sinai and no gain in the north—an unmitigated defeat. This was a political matter and her decision was unmitigating—to cross the purple line... The attack would be launched tomorrow, Thursday, October 11"

From 11 October to 14 October, the Israeli forces pushed into Syria, conquering a further twenty-square-mile box of territory in the Bashan. From there they were able to shell the outskirts of Damascus, only 40 km away, using heavy artillery.

A cease fire agreement was signed in Geneva on May 31, 1974, and included, inter alia, the establishment of UN observers in the demilitarized zone, arrangements for an exchange of prisoners of war, and IDF evacuation of the territory it took in the Yom Kippur War as well as the city of Kuneitra, which was captured in the Six-Day War.

Set of pictures taken inside Syria of the IDF tank corps ceremony prior to the evacuation

Yom Kippur War 1973 - Participation by other Arab states

2010-07-17T04:15:00.000-07:00

Kuwaity armor force in Syria 1973

Besides Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq, several other Arab nations were involved in this war, providing additional weapons and financing.

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait gave financial aid and sent some token forces to join in the battle. Morocco sent three brigades to the front lines; the Palestinians sent troops as well . Pakistan sent sixteen pilots.

From 1971 to 1973, Muammar al-Qaddafi of Libya sent Mirage fighters and gave Egypt around $1 billion to arm for war. Algeria sent squadrons of fighters and bombers, armored brigades, and dozens of tanks. Tunisia sent over 1,000 soldiers, who worked with Egyptian forces in the Nile delta, and Sudan sent 3,500 soldiers.

Uganda radio reported that Idi Amin sent Ugandan soldiers to fight against Israel. Cuba also sent approximately 1,500 troops including tank and helicopter crews who reportedly also engaged in combat operations against the IDF.

"As Arab position on the battlefields deteriorated, pressure mounted on King Hussein to send his Army into action. He found a way to meet these demands without opening his kingdom to Israeli air attack. Instead of attacking Israel from their common border, he sent an expeditionary force into Syria. He let Israel know of his intentions, through U.S. intermediaries, in the hope that it [Israel] would accept that this was not a casus belli justifying an attack into Jordan... Dayan declined to offer any such assurance, but Israel had no intention of opening another front" . Iraq also sent an expeditionary force to the Golan, consisting of some 30,000 men, 500 tanks, and 700 APCs.

Forces attacked Israel:

Egypt
Syria
Arab Expeditionary Forces:
Iraq
Jordan
Morocco
Saudi Arabia
Libya
Kuwait
Algeria
Sudan
Other Expeditionary Forces:
Cuba
North Korea

188 Brigade remember Gilade Shalit

2010-07-10T07:26:00.000-07:00

Gilad Shalit , born 28 August 1986) is an Israeli soldier who was captured on 25 June 2006 by Hamas in a cross-border raid. He was abducted near the Kerem Shalom crossing (in Israel), and has been held as a prisoner in the Gaza Strip by Hamas since then.

Shalit, has a rank of corporal in the IDF's Armor Corps at the time of his capture, has since been promoted to staff sergeant.

He was the first Israeli soldier captured by Palestinian militants since Nachshon Wachsman in 1994. Shalit holds French citizenship, a fact that encouraged France and the European Union to be involved to some extent in efforts to release him.He also received Italian and American citizenship after his abduction.

Hamas has refused requests from the International Committee of the Red Cross to allow the ICRC to visit Shalit on the grounds that any such visit could betray the location where Shalit is being held. Several human rights organizations have stated that the terms and conditions of Shalit's detention are contrary to international humanitarian law. In exchange for his release, Hamas is demanding the release of all female and underage Palestinian prisoners held in Israel, as well as a further 1,000 prisoners, a number of which are convicted by Israeli courts on terrorism charges. There are currently around 8,000 Palestinian prisoners in Israel. The United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, which released a report in September 2009, called for Shalit to be released.

My son is serving in Gilad's company today

more in:http://www.habanim.org/en/gilad_en.html

"Trophy" Active Protection System -Merkava mark 4

2010-06-18T22:19:00.000-07:00

The Trophy Active Defense System (ADS) was developed by RAFAEL under an Israel Defense Research & Development Directorate support, aiming to provide armored vehicles with a new level of protection against most current anti-tank threats. RAFAEL cooperated with IAI/Elta and has signed a marketing agreement with General Dynamics, offering the system to US and other armies worldwide. GD planned to introduce the system with every new and existing combat vehicle it produces, including Stryker, M-1A2 and FCS. According to GD officials, the system can be adapted to US requirements and enter production within two years. through hundreds of live firing tests with the Israel Defense Forces and abroad, where the system demonstrated effective neutralization of anti-tank rockets and guided missiles, high safety levels, insignificant residual penetration and minimal collateral damage. By mid 2007, Trophy was selected to equip the Israeli Merkava Mk4 main battle tanks, and it is also a candidate for integration into the Namer, the future Merkava based Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicle. The system is also considered to become part of the protection suite of future light armored vehicle (such as the Stryker) when these become operational with the Israeli Army.

During the first months of 2009 the Trophy system went through comprehensive operational testing and was cleared for operational use after a successful operational firing test conducted early August 09. By the end of the year all new Merkava Mk4 tanks will be equipped with the system. Until then, Trophy is being retrofitted to operational tanks.
The Trophy active protection system creates a hemispheric protected zone around the vehicle where incoming threats are intercepted and defeated. It has three elements providing – Threat Detection and Tracking, Launching and Intercept functions. The Threat Detection and Warning subsystem consists of several sensors, including flat-panel radars, placed at strategic locations around the protected vehicle, to provide full hemispherical coverage. Once an incoming threat is detected identified and verified, the Countermeasure Assembly is opened, the countermeasure device is positioned in the direction where it can effectively intercept the threat. Then, it is launched automatically into a ballistic trajectory to intercept the incoming threat at a relatively long distance.

Specific details about the composition and mechanism of this explosive interceptor device are vague. From the briefing provided by US sources, Defense Update understands that Trophy is design to form a "beam" of fragments, which will intercept any incoming HEAT threat, including RPG rockets at a range of 10 – 30 meters from the protected platform. The Trophy development roadmap considers an enhanced countermeasure unit to be available in the future, and protect against kinetic energy (KE) threats. Trophy was designed to effectively operate in a dense urban environment, where armored vehicles operate closely with integrated infantry forces. Therefore, direction, formation and energy of the fragments are designed to ensure effective target kill with low collateral damage, and low risk to nearby troops. While not in use, the system is maintained in the stowed position, protected by an armor shield. The system has an automatic reload mechanism to handle multiple attacks.
The system can simultaneously engage several threats, arriving from different directions, is effective on stationary or moving platforms, and is effective against short and long range threats (such as RPGs and ATGM). Trophy was designed to be effective in open or closed terrain, including urban area and can be operated under all weather conditions.

source: Defense Update - on line defense magazine

IDF songs

2010-06-15T10:31:00.000-07:00

Shaytet 13 Israeli navy commando- Gaza "peace"flotilla

2010-06-03T22:01:00.000-07:00

The honor to the Shaytet 13 of the Israeli navy for their courage and dedication
dealing with the "peace" Gazza flotilla June 2010

Avigdor Kahalani -"OZ 77" -7th Brigade- Yom Kippur War 1973 עוז 77 אביגדור קהלני-חטיבה 7 -"עמק הבכא"

2010-02-11T15:10:00.000-08:00

7th Brigade
Yom Kippur War started on 6 October 1973. Egyptian forces stormed into Sinai, Syrian forces into the Golan Heights. Israel was taken by surprise. The 77th Battalion was, by chance, in the Golan. The war continued for 20 days. More than 2500 Israeli soldiers lost their lives, with thousands more injured in body and soul.

Kahalani was a career officer in the IDf
(1973), he served as commander of an armored battalion on the Golan Heights. Kahalani received the Medal of Distinguished Service

for service during the Six Day War, where he was badly wounded his tank
caught fire. He later received the Medal of Valor

During this war he commanded a hastily assembled group of tanks and crews from different armour units (The Israeli forces were in a disjointed state due to the surprise combined Arab attack which commenced the war). The group repelled a vastly superior Syrian force which had overrun the Israeli positions in the first days of the war, in the Golan Heights
The battle proved to be one of the turning points of the war. After the war, the valley where it took place was littered with dozens of burned Syrian tanks and was renamed "Emek Ha-Bacha" ("The Valley of Tears"

To read more on "valley of tears" go to:http://idf-armor.blogspot.com/2009/08/valley-of-tears-golan-1973-yom-kippur.html

Rare pictures of Avigdor Kahalni days after the end of Yom Kippur War from the Valley of Tears on the Golan

Avigdor Kahalani with his crew 1973

The crew meet years later

On a detroyed Syrian T 62

IDF and captured tanks and armor in memorial sites and military camps in Israel

2010-01-28T11:33:00.000-08:00

טנקים ורכב קרבי משורין באתרי הנצחה ומחנות צה"ל

Patton Magach tank Memorial for 4 cadets in the officers course died in Yom Kippur War

Centurion,Sherman,M3 half truck and captured Jordanian M 47 in Adar Memorial

27th Armored Brigade Memorial

Captured Jordanian M 47 in Adar Memorial site near Jerusalem

T 55 in IDF base

Half truck in the Negev Brigade memorial

3 SU 100 taken in Six Days War ,mow of Kiriat Shemona in the north of Israel

Memorial site in beer Sheva

Shot Kal -Centurion in Shizafon base

Ex Jordanian M47( 6 Days War) in a memorial site in "Dotan" west bank

Centurion in front of Armor School of the 50 -80's (Jullis)

Shot Kal (centurion) in the Golan- 7th brigade memorial site

T62 and Universal carrier in Petach Tikva memorial garden

T34 in Kibbutz Dan (near the Golan)

Kibbutz Degania-a Syrian Renault 35 tank hit in the gate 1948

Sherman and T34 in Latrun Memorial site

Sherman in Latrun Memorial site

T 62 hit in 1973 war in the Golan

Sherman in Tel Aviv

M 22 captured from Egypt in 1948 located in Kibbutz Negba

Since the war of independence in 1948 many memorial sites were built in Israel
and in the border areas close to the battle fields .
I will bring you pictures of memorial sites where armored vehicles are used as part of the site
it can be IDF or captured items and other sites such as military bases or any city or village

Hand made IDF Tank Corps insignia on olive wood

2010-01-21T12:20:00.000-08:00

For sale on order hand made IDF Tank Corps insignia on olive wood board.
The board is made by me and it includes the 7,188,401 and 460 Brigades badges,
the Zahal (IDF)and the tank corps signs,tank crewman signs and the Merkava and the Magach signs.

For more details contact me via my mail: idfarmor@gmail.com

IDF tank corps history in films

2010-01-06T11:19:00.000-08:00

Idf tank corps clip from 1977 calling youngsters to join the force!!!
The Magach Patton M 60 is in its best days.... and a glance to the new Merkava mk 1

סרט משנת 1977 הקורא לצעירים להתגייס לחיל השריון
המג"ח במיטבו וגם הצצה ראשונה למרכבה

A film about the IDF tank corps new solders first ceremony on mount Masada
"MASADA SHELL NOT FALL AGAIN"