Ijaz Khan

Documenting National Security Policy is a good step. Documenting helps to know and understand it better, thus making it easier to analyze and discuss it. Though, the language of the National Security Policy document of Pakistan shared publicly is futuristic, implying change, however, it does not claim to be a new or changed policy and reading it confirms it is not. Though, it uses some new terms and phrases to describe it. However, the same language and phrases read carefully shows there is neither any change nor any intentions to change. At best one can see tactical adjustments. Expecting change without change in the political context or Strategic Culture is futile.

The document claims to take a ‘Comprehensive Security’ Approach. In the 1970s, the term ‘Comprehensive Security’ came as a conceptual response to the changing international system. It referred to both broadening, meaning inclusion of non-military issues, and deepening, referring to inclusion of domestic concerns in the concept of security. We started hearing of ‘human security’ focusing on the person of individual rather than the geography of the state. Barry Buzan, a British professor, wrote of securitisation — referring to the broadening/expansion of the security through inclusion of governance, economy and socio-economic elements. This meant that in the calculus of state security, one must include much more than tanks, fighter planes and bombs. The document does talk of all these aspects of Comprehensive Security. The problem is it does so without any change in the primacy of traditional security.

Comprehensive Security in democratic states furthers democratization of decision-making by increasing the role of non-security segments on security issues, along with political control. Where the security establishment dominates decision-making, like in Pakistan, it expands its control in fields hitherto left to the civilians. The document claims to be result of wide consultations. However, we know political parties or parliament was not a part of this consultation. It was not even presented in the parliament after being written, let alone debated there. The document was authored by National Security Division after consultations with some independent scholars and Civil Society members, whose identity is not known. It also discussions in Universities, but mentions only National Defense University, a fully owned and managed Armed Forces institution.

Due to limitation of space, this essay just gives an overview of the document, with the help of some selected terms and phrases, showing why it fails to be a comprehensive security approach. The document considers traditional military security as the primary concern and thus emphasizes it centrality. Rather than treating the non-military elements of security at par with military elements and the need to secure people as much important, if not more, it treats them as supportive and required for strong military, required for territorial security from military threats posed by (a rising Hindutva) India. There term cost effective is used to present the case for military preparedness. There is nothing to show what is meant by ‘Cost Effective’. Though there was no need for spelling it out in a policy document. But, a policy approach based on the concept of ‘Comprehensive Security’ will aim for ‘Cost Effective’ by a balance between what is allocated for military expenses and for ‘Human Development. The current tilt is heavily towards military. Future implementations actions (Budget) will tell how much this tilt has been corrected.

The document acknowledges the diversity of Pakistan, however, the policy continues to deal with it as State of Pakistan has always dealt with it. Same is true of acknowledgement of the terrorist threat. The words used are to differentiate between ‘reconcilable and non-reconcilable’ along with an ‘inclusive approach’ tells the thinking between the lines .The distinction should be between those who articulate their views on rights and wrongs, present policy alternatives and different strategies for resolution of issues or complain and peacefully protest for/ against what they consider to be just or unjust and those who use unconstitutional violent means to further their views or demands. There may be some foreign elements among the later too. However, the terms irreconcilables and reconcilable implies insistence on all agreeing on State Narratives.

The intention to carry out development activities, so that different ethnicities or people of geographic areas, are not exploited by foreign agents shows a continuation of policy, educated by a non-democratic, centrist and elitist mindset. This negates the claimed inclusivist approach. Inclusive approach means, including the marginalized in decision making and not just concerning them which should be their exclusive domain, but in decisions concerning collective issues too. The smaller ethnicities are not people of colonies and so should be accepted as sharing the burdens and bounties of the state. Inclusion does not mean just giving them benefits, but letting them be a part of both good and bad. In early 2021, a consultative meeting was convened by the office of Moeed Yosaf at University of Peshawar, for discussing Afghanistan (whether that was part of the National Security Policy Documentation was not mentioned). Just discussing Afghanistan or former FATA or Terrorism with Pashtun academics is not including them in decision making. Inclusion would require inviting and considering their views on economic policy, broader Foreign Policy as well as other common State level policies/ concerns (to ser the record straight this is the approach of the main stream Pakistani democrats and Liberals too).

Maintaining India as the traditional military threat (increased due to Hindutvaisation), even if correct and justifies military preparedness, the policy to deal with it, by denying Afghanistan (even under the control of supposedly friendly Taliban) and India to connect through its territory and at least one very important factor for supporting Taliban in Afghanistan being stopping any Indian influence negates the claimed policy of seeking security in connectivity and can be justified only through a traditional security and geopolitical approach. This also continues using Pakistan’s location as of geopolitical significance and not as that of a geo economic significance or ‘economic hub’ as claimed by the document.

A change of policy only results from change of perceptions; perceptions change when those whose perceptions count are changed. Democratic decision making by including by un included in decision making and thus enabling decision making that introduces the diversity of which all states are made in the process, inclusive. This changes perceptions and thus policies based on them.

National Security Policy

· The security of our land, air, and sea borders along with space and cyber domains is paramount. Pakistan is pursuing ‘open and secure borders’ with respect to ease of movement, economic activity, and linkages with overall plans for economic connectivity. The recent war against terrorism has highlighted the role of military, paramilitary, and Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs). LEAs have taken on an expanded role in urban cities and far-flung rural areas. P 24

· With a regressive and dangerous ideology gripping the collective conscience in our immediate neighbourhood, the prospects of violent conflict have grown immensely. The possibility of use of force by the adversary as a deliberate policy choice cannot be ruled out Hybrid threats against Pakistan originate from states and their proxies as well as from non-state actors. Pakistan will adopt a holistic, interconnected whole-of-nation approach to neutralise attempts to undermine Pakistan’s security and stability through hybrid warfare. P 24

· Policy Objectives: Defend Pakistan’s territorial integrity at all costs. Deter any aggression by maintaining a cost-effective and adaptive military focused on modernisation and optimisation of force structures to ensure adequate conventional capability and maintain full spectrum deterrence within the precincts of credible minimum nuclear deterrence, without getting involved in an arms race. P.26

· Fringe violent sub-nationalist tendencies have been exploited by hostile intelligence agencies that have provided support and sanctuary to subversive elements. The ideological undercurrent for violent sub-nationalisms exploits socio-economic disparities and governance gaps. Pakistan will adopt a four-pronged policy of engagement: separating reconcilables from irreconcilables; cutting off recruitment; constricting financial sources; and pursuing targeted socio-economic policies to address governance-related concerns in regions where violent sub-nationalist elements operate. P30

· Pakistan is a diverse nation comprising various ethnicities, religious beliefs, sects, and languages. Extremism and radicalisation on the basis of ethnicity or religion pose a challenge to our society. The exploitation and manipulation of ethnic, religious, and sectarian lines through violent extremist ideologies cannot be allowed. P.31

· Great power competition and regional pivots are defining the race over resources and influence. Traditional regionalism that once provided an alternative mechanism for cooperation is giving way to issue-based partnerships. P.34

· Pakistan has adopted a dynamic and self-confident approach to a fast-changing world order. This requires bolstering traditional political diplomacy while refocusing our energies on engagement under new realities. Economic diplomacy in Pakistan’s context requires leveraging political relations for economic gains while building new economic partnerships to in turn support our political and strategic interests. As trade and economic connectivity gain importance in a more connected world, Pakistan must ensure a greater focus on economic diplomacy with human resource that has the right skill set to capitalise on economic opportunities across the world. Our geo-economically pivotal location affords Pakistan the ability to offer itself as a melting pot of regional and global economic interests through connectivity P 34. initiatives. This remains a priority and its success requires regional peace and stability to which Pakistan remains fully committed p.35

· Pakistan’s location at the cross-roads of historic confluence provides unique opportunities amidst regional and global competition, especially as a hub for connecting important economic and resource-rich regions. Historical, ethnic, and religious ties to Pakistan’s immediate west create externalities wherein peace and stability have a positive influence on internal security. Towards the immediate east, bilateral ties have been stymied as a consequence of the unresolved Kashmir dispute and India’s hegemonic designs. Pakistan remains committed to normalisation of relations with its neighbours based on mutual respect, sovereign equality, and a collective effort to find pathways for conflict resolution with the belief that shared economic opportunities are cornerstones for achieving prosperity in Pakistan and the region. Pakistan also maintains mutually beneficial relationships with all major powers and will further these based on commonality of interests. P.35

· Jammu and Kashmir

o A just and peaceful resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute remains a vital national security interest for Pakistan. India’s illegal and unilateral actions of August 2019 have been rejected by the people of Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJK). Indian occupation forces continue to undertake human rights abuses and oppression through war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocidal acts in IIOJK. In addition, India continues to create false propaganda around the Kashmiri resistance to hide its illegal actions. Pakistan remains steadfast in its moral, diplomatic, political, and legal support to the people of Kashmir until they achieve their right to self-determination guaranteed by the international community as per UN resolutions p. 35

· Afghanistan

o Pakistan and Afghanistan share historical ties. Pakistan remains committed to facilitating and supporting peace and stability in Afghanistan in close collaboration with the international community through addressing economic, humanitarian, and security issues. Afghanistan’s potential as a gateway for economic connectivity with Central Asian states is a key driver for Pakistan’s support for peace in Afghanistan p. 36

· China

o Pakistan’s deep-rooted historic ties with China are driven by shared interests and mutual understanding. Bilateral relations continue to expand based on trust and strategic convergence. Pakistan will continue to strengthen this relationship across all areas of mutual engagement. As a project of national importance, China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) enjoys national consensus. It is redefining regional connectivity and providing impetus to Pakistan’s economy with the potential to jump-start domestic growth, alleviate poverty, and improve regional connectivity. Pakistan welcomes Foreign Direct Investment in CPEC-related and other Special Economic Zones from interested countries P. 36

· India

o Pakistan, under its policy of peace at home and abroad, wishes to improve its relationship with India. A just and peaceful resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute remains at the core of our bilateral relationship. The rise of Hindutva-driven politics in India is deeply concerning and impacts Pakistan’s immediate security. The political exploitation of a policy of belligerence towards Pakistan by India’s leadership has led to the threat of military adventurism and non-contact warfare to our immediate east. Growing Indian arms build-up, facilitated by access to advanced technologies and exceptions in the non-proliferation rules, is a matter of concern for Pakistan. Besides impacting regional stability, such policies of exceptionalism also undermine the global non-proliferation regime. India’s pursuit of unilateral policy action p36 - on outstanding issues are attempts to impose one-sided solutions that can have far reaching negative consequences for regional stability. India is also consistently engaged in an effort to spread disinformation targeting Pakistan. Pakistan continues to believe in resolving all outstanding issues through dialogue; however, recent Indian actions remain significant hurdles in this direction.

· Iran

o Pakistan enjoys historical and religious ties with Iran. As neighbours, Pakistan and Iran continue to share interests in border management and regional peace and stability. Improving intelligence sharing and patrolling of border areas will have a positive effect on bilateral ties.

· United States

· Pakistan and the United States share a long history of bilateral cooperation.

· Pakistan does not subscribe to ‘camp politics’. We believe that our continued

· 37

· United States

o cooperation with the United States will remain critical for regional peace and stability. We seek to diversify this relationship through mutually beneficial engagements. Communicating Pakistan’s concerns to policy makers in Washington while seeking to broaden our partnership beyond a narrow counter-terrorism focus will be a priority. Pakistan will continue to seek areas of convergence with the United States in trade, investment, connectivity, energy, counter-terrorism, security, and intelligence cooperation. P. 38

· Central Asia and Russia

o Pakistan’s geo-economic pivot is focused on enhancing trade and economic ties through connectivity that links Central Asia to our warm waters. Under ‘Vision Central Asia’, Pakistan is working towards actualising agreements on energy and transit with the Central Asian Republics. Pakistan is committed to reimagining its partnership with Russia in energy, defence cooperation, and investment. The relationship is already witnessing a positive trajectory and Pakistan will continue to strive to maximise mutual gains. Russia, Central Asian countries, and Pakistan are also important partners in our shared objectives of peace and stability in Afghanistan.

How Afghanistan Civil Society is resisting / Breaking the Cycle of Violence

2021-12-29T13:12:00.004-08:00

How Afghanistan Civil Society Is Courageously Resisting The Taliban

Prof. Ijaz Khan

Friday Times 29 December 2021

The Taliban have taken control of Afghanistan. US and NATO have left after being defeated. The Afghan National Army has collapsed, though there is some resistance in Panjsher.

Regional and world powers are adjusting to these facts for a new geopolitical setting in Afghanistan. But what is new about these facts? Violent changes with outsiders supporting different parties has always been the history of Afghanistan.

This cycle of violence with a few years of relative peace, is the story of Afghanistan. This small essay attempts to see a probability of that historic cycle of violence ending, and Afghans moving out of it towards a peaceful, democratic, modern state.

For the printed version, edited by TFT due to their space limit click any where above

For the unpublished full version with original title click below

Breaking the Cycle of Violence in Afghanistan: The assertive Civil Society https://drive.google.com/file/d/1PMKvbOsBQ3PK_yfIAaUzl-tz280s8cDY/view?usp=sharing

Afghanistan Crisis: Interpreting Taliban Government

2021-09-12T01:22:00.003-07:00

The composition of the 33 member Taliban Government is well known. It is not inclusive is also not contested as well as it reflects the more hardliners, old guard is well established and has been commented by many. Why it is so and what it means for domestic, regional and international scenario needs further debate and understanding. The answer to why will answer the three questions.

The general expectations were, Taliban will announce a cabinet which will have some non Taliban, as well as will be representative of all the ethnic identities of Afghanistan, even If that was just symbolic. But most were taken by surprise by when they announced an exclusive Taliban government. Again the wider expectations/opinions, of Mulla Abdul Ghani Baradar heading it has been proved wrong. Instead they announced an exclusive Taliban Cabinet composed and dominated by hardline, old guard Taliban with strong Haqqani Network presence. Pakistan’s ISI chef Gen. Faiz Hameed made a very public visit to Kabul on the eve of this announcement.

For more click anywhere on the text above

Published Friday Sept 10 2021

Pakistan's Political System

2020-11-12T03:11:00.002-08:00

This video is part of the HSF Pakistan explanatory video series on democratic devolution 2020. Dr. Ijaz Khan (Visiting faculty at School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad) explaining the Pakistan's political system

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dLXhB9NZ38Q

Joe Biden Presidency: Implications for Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Region

2020-11-08T02:31:00.003-08:00

Joe Biden is the new President elect of the United States. He will take office on 20 Jan 2021. Now, the question for us is, what Biden Presidency will mean for us in Afghanistan and pakistan and the broader region.
For more, click anywhere on text above

My presentation on 'Pakistan's Role in Afghan Peace Process

2020-10-13T07:02:00.001-07:00

My presentation on 'Pakistan's Role in Afghan Peace Process at Webinar on Afghan Peace Process held on 29 September 2020

China India Stand Off: Implications for Regional Geo Politics

2020-06-18T23:55:00.002-07:00

Published at Geopolitics Matters

Friday 19 June 2020

Just when some signs of cooling down appeared, the standoff between China and India saw the bloodiest conflict since 1962 War between the two. While many expected a de-escalation, this sudden violent escalation has put the regional geo politics on hold. De-escalation having become more difficult; it is bound to leave an impression on regional and by extension global geo politics. This brief write-up, focuses on the probable shape of that impact.

For the whole write up, click anywhere above

United States, Afghanistan And Taliban: An Overview

2020-06-03T16:02:00.005-07:00

https://nayadaur.tv/2020/06/united-states-afghanistan-and-taliban-an-overview/
June 3 2020 Naya Daur online

For my presentation/ views of the rise of Islamic State (IS) which will help in better understanding the current writeup better read - Islamic State and Religious extremism that I wrote in 2014

United States International Terrorism and Taliban: An Overview

Prof. Ijaz Khan

After the end of Cold War, the significance of Afghanistan had downgraded to a very low level in the US security perceptions and policy. It was never of much significance in economic evaluations, except for a possible alternate route to Central Asian states. Some concern was expressed when the foreign Jihadis started returning to Afghanistan, poppy production and also due to the increasing regional interventions and rivalries inside Afghanistan, especially that of Iran. However, for US these matters were not significant enough to divert its attention from Eastern Europe.

When Taliban emerged in 1994 and took control of Kabul in 1996, the US developed a cautiously positive view of them. In most of the 90s, at least till the 1998, not Al Qaeda (and Sunnis), but Iran (Shias) was considered the threat. Further, with the rise of Taliban, US experts started differentiating between the traditional Islamists and Pan Islamists. Taliban were termed traditional Islamists, with no international agenda and interested in Islamic system in their country (Afghanistan) only, while the Pan Islamists were those groups that had a global agenda, which included the emerging Al Qaeda too, but more dangerous were Shias, supported by Iran. The US expected Sunni Taliban can be useful against Shia Iran. The fact that Taliban were mostly Pashtuns added to their attraction, due to historic Persian-Afghan rivalry. This perception was further strengthened by the initial negative reaction of Pan Islamists aligned Mujahideen groups, to Taliban. Gulbadin Hekmatyar called Taliban as British agents.
click below to read here or on the link to Naya Daur

However, when in August 1998 Al Qaeda carried out lethal attacks against US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the US started taking Al Qaeda as an eminent and serious threat. The positive (at least acceptability) view of Taliban that may have existed in the US started eroding, as Al Qaeda and its leader were using Afghan territory as a safe haven under the protection of Taliban. Around the same time Human Rights concerns, special treatment of women by Taliban started getting more visibility in the US and West. The suicide attack by the Al Qaeda against USS Cole, a destroyer of the United States Navy, in October 2000, in Yemen's Aden harbor, ended any hopes from Taliban and signaled the loss by US of Taliban to Al Qaeda. The US still engaged Taliban in negotiations via Pakistan, to stop them from permitting the use of Afghan territory by Al Qaeda and other global jihadists, but nothing came of it.

Then 9/11 happened and after demand to hand over Osama Bin Laden (OBL) was not acceded to by Taliban, the US leading an international coalition attacked and removed Taliban government.

The US main and consistent goal in Afghanistan has been to ensure that it is not used by terrorists against it anywhere and to eliminate Al Qaeda hide outs along with its leadership there. In line with its policy of Liberal Hegemony, US along with military action, supported and helped the creation (not just re construction) of liberal Afghan State. Its military success against Al Qaeda (different than against Taliban), the high point of which was the killing of OBL in May 2011, was also partially facilitated by emergence of Islamic State (IS) which gradually replaced by Al Qaeda.

The US started negotiating with Taliban in 2019, with changes in in its Foreign Policy, which now was based on ‘America First’, abandoning the ‘Liberal Hegemony’ ideas.

For US, under the ‘America First’ policy, it became irrelevant, whether there is democracy or not in a country, the only or at least the most important determinant became, security of US interests. Liberal Hegemony had tied US security with liberal democracy, ‘America First’ untied them. The US considered Taliban minus Al Qaeda is not its problem. Taliban found no problem in accepting severance of ties with an almost non existent organization. The result was the deal with Taliban.

US expects, Taliban sans Al Qaeda will return to being what they were originally, traditional Islamists, with no global agenda, rather in conflict with the new face of global Jihadists, the IS and anti Iran. In the post Al Qaeda era, Iran has regained its status as the top threat to its interests in the Middle East.

The recent UN report, claiming continued relations between Al Qaeda and Taliban, even if correct, though significant to the words and spirit of the US Taliban Deal, is not vital to the ground situation. As noted above, IS has by and large replaced Al Qaeda as the terrorist threat. However, if correct, it indicates the level of trust Taliban can claim to adhere to their commitment of not permitting the use of Afghan territory by global Jihadists.

The issue is, what is the level of surety, IS and Taliban may not get closer (if they are not already) ala Taliban and Al Qaeda? And how much can be counted on 2^nd and 3^rd level Taliban Commanders, not to join IS in case there is no truce/ alliance between their organizations. It must be remembered; even though Taliban were fighting Mujahideen, most Taliban were originally Mujahedeen and more Mujahideen joined them along the way. IS- Khorasan as the IS in Afghanistan is known is also mostly composed of former Taliban. There has been no violent conflict between Taliban and IS in the post deal time. There are also reports of low-level collaboration when either of them attacks Afghan Government of civilian targets. IS founder stayed in Afghanistan under the protection of Taliban, till he moved to Iraq after the US attack on Iraq, forming ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria).

Due to faulty negotiation process leading to a faulty Peace Deal and post deal statements/ actions, there is a likelihood of US leaving Afghanistan, on schedule or earlier, to be in more violent conflict and have pockets which will serve as safe havens for Global Jihadists. Alternatively, there is also a real chance of US getting bogged down in Afghanistan with even more forces.

The Emerging Post, Post-Cold War World Order: Bipolar, Multipolar, Anarchic or Pluralist?

2020-05-29T05:03:00.000-07:00

Published by GEOPolitics online at

https://www.geopoliticalmatters.com/2020/05/geopolitics-emerging-post-cold-war.html

Prof. Ijaz Khan

The apparent growing statism and return of geo political competition and conflict with weakening of Globalization and Internationalisation in the wake of economic recession forced by the Covid-19 Pandemic has raised debates on what shape will the emerging order be. China’s ascend to the position of alternate with its ‘China Model’ and as a balancer to the US, which no more sees its interests tied with spread of democracy, has put the existing post cold war order on its deathbed. Though this process had started earlier, the Covid-19 Pandemic has fast forwarded it.

The increasing Chinese role and influence is accompanied by a model of development, known as the ‘Chinese Model’ also termed meritocracy or Confucianism (Daniel A. Bell: The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy. Princeton, 2015) as an alternate to the liberal model. The Chinese model replaces the socialist ‘Soviet Model’ combining the liberal economic system with the political administrative system of the Soviet Model. Chinese Model permits more political parties, thus claiming to be a multiparty state, however, all parties has to work under the control of the ruling Communist Party, not as a challenger or alternate to it. The Chinese Model also permits relatively stronger and autonomous local governance elected through popular vote, however to graduate from local to mid-level and above, the candidates have to go through a selection process of exams and interviews, not elections. To many in developing countries this may sound familiar, finding it more attractive alternate to western liberal democracy or the Soviet Socialist models.

The ruling elites of the global south, has been wary of both the liberal democracy and the socialist economy. The Chinese model seems to suit them. It gives them a conceptual / ideological basis to have liberal economy without having to be worried about liberal politics. We have seen some raw variations of that in Pakistan as well as other Asian, African and South American states. Gen. Musharaf of Pakistan came closest to it, when he introduced a system of strong local government, educational qualifications for membership of legislatures, and the President in military uniform, with Corps Commanders in place of Communist Party Secretary General and its Politburo, with overall control.

The US abandoning the policy of a liberal World Order, and showing readiness to deal with anyone (e.g. US Taliban deal in Afghanistan), who can guarantee its interests is not a new policy. It is rather a return to the cold war era. During the Cold War too, the US allied with and supported despotic authoritarian regimes as long as they opposed Soviet Union. A cursory look at the western allies during the Cold War would find an overwhelming majority of authoritarian regimes. In the post cold war era US pursued a policy based on tying its security and other interests with promotion of liberal democracy along with liberal economy. The merits or demerits and its successes or failures can be debated, but going into that is out of the scope of this essay.

There is a qualitative difference between the US–Soviet rivalry and the US–China rivalry. Soviet Union challenged the liberal economic system, not just the liberal political system. The main attraction for the ruling classes of the non-European states was the protection, the west led by US provided was the capitalist economy. The developed liberal side of the cold war had never really cared for the liberal political part of the liberalism. In the post-cold war era, the democratic voices within the non-European states started receiving more support. A vibrating civil society advocating for Civilian supremacy and Human Rights emerged with strong ties across the North South divide and support of the western governments. Though one can point out many limitations and priorities of geo politics on it, the dominant theme of US foreign policy tied security with liberal democracy and internationalism, till President Trump changed that with his slogan of America first.

In the current competition between US and China, neither liberal economy nor liberal governance are the issues, as one does not have a liberal governance itself and for the one that is a liberal democracy itself, in foreign relations it is not of much significance. Both sides agree on liberal economy as a better system. This contest is for leadership and control of international economy, not alternate systems. In the US mainstream debate is on how to maintain US leadership in the face of the Chinese challenge, made more intense and brought up to the fore by Covid-19 pandemic. Two factors will determine, which side a state stands, economic interests, aid and local geopolitics. China is already being recognized as supporting and helping the Covid-19 hit countries and is getting appreciative reviews for its role.

The World is witnessing the end of the unipolar world Order. There are predictions of it resulting in a new bipolar order or a global anarchy. The argument for global anarchy is based on the assessment of the weakness of the both China and USA, to be strong enough to be the two balancers at the top. There is little if any consideration of a third possibility, a multi- polar World, with Europe as a separate pole than US at global level, with a number of regional powers or alliances, closer to one or the other of the main global powers, but not in any of these camps/ poles. That is a possibility that needs further research focus and may prove to be a more probable in addition to being democratic and peaceful order than the apparent most popular conceptions of a new bi polar order. Weaker big powers may pave way for international collaboration, a pluralist and more democratic order, leading towards complex interdependence, stronger international institutions (perhaps new ones or with fundamental alteration in the existing), international law and peace.

Post Covid-19 World: Pro People or Authoritarian?

2020-04-30T03:40:00.002-07:00

Post Covid-19 World: Pro People or Authoritarian?

Prof. Ijaz Khan

published at Naya Daur online on 30 April 2020

The global Covid-19 Pandemic has not reached its peak and there is no vaccine for it yet is a mere restatement of a well-known fact. Many experts are also telling us, even when vaccine for it is found and the world controls it, such control will not be final eradication of the Corona virus and its spread will be a recurring phenomenon, with varying intensity for a long time. So, if it is going to stay, then most of the precautions will stay with us, some more permanent and for others the world will have to be always ready to go back to. The world will never be as it was again in all spheres of existence, however this essay points out some of the probabilities in the political space. Change means, increased pace of existing processes of change as well as reversal / change of direction of some processes.

The pandemic has strained the health infrastructure to its outer limits even in the developed world, however in developing countries it has/ is becoming unmanageable. Even if one goes by the official statistics of the less developed states, the less numbers does not mean less burden. They will soon reach the stage where they simply will not have enough infrastructural resources, even if they somehow manage financial resources, through aid or re-allocations.

For full write up at Naya Daur website, click anywhere above

Peace in Afghanistan and the Corona Pandemic

2020-04-04T12:26:00.003-07:00

Peace in Afghanistan and the Corona Pandemic

Prof. Ijaz Khan

4 April, 2020

Also Published by Naya Daur Media at https://nayadaur.tv/2020/04/peace-in-afghanistan-and-the-corona-pandemic/
also published by Geopolitical Matters on 13 May 2020 at
https://www.geopoliticalmatters.com/2020/05/coronavirus-corona-pandemic-afghanistan.html

The Doha agreement between US and Taliban was hailed by some as peace agreement, Taliban celebrated it as a victory, some including the US, called it the first step in a peace-making process, while a few considered it as the initiation of a more violent conflict within Afghanistan. The post agreement progression of events and controversies is strengthening the perception (right or wrong) of Taliban victory or more violence.

The Corona Pandemic has slowed or dampened all other concerns the World over, however in Afghanistan it has not dented to any significant level the conflicts and the challenges to peace. ------------ click below
The Taliban massacred 35 Afghan soldiers just before the arrival of Mr. Pompeo who was neither able to resolve the Afghan presidential conflict nor make any progress towards initiation of the intra Afghan dialogue. The US expressing displeasure over lack of progress in the initiation of Afghan Peace Process and the failure to resolve the Afghan Presidential controversy announced cutting of $ 1 billion from its aid to Afghanistan. Apparently under US pressure, Afghan Government announced the release of 5000 Taliban prisoners and named its negotiating team, however, Taliban responded by declaring the team as non-inclusive, thus refused to talk with it and occupied of more territory. Though, the process for exchange of prisoners has started, the reluctance to compromise is very visible.

One very important factor of the continued violent conflict is attempts by outsiders, including but not only, its neighbors to use their influence inside Afghanistan to control it to the exclusion of others and the others countering those attempts. The internal strife and divisions aided by external overt and covert interventions have broken down Afghan state and society to a level that it is not able to restore the internal balance, thus further facilitating external influences and intervention and a continued Civil War.

The weakness in US Afghan policy of its use of force or negotiations lies in not taking note of the need for internal and external balance. Coming quickly to the present, that is Trump era, US policy has been even less educated by the geopolitics of Afghanistan or what may be termed as its strategic culture. The conduct of negotiations with Taliban and the resultant deal shows that and has helped in further distorting the internal and external balance.

The US-Taliban negotiations and deal created certain perceptions (Correct or not) among many, both Afghans and non-Afghans; US is in a hurry to leave, Taliban have won/are winning, Afghan Government has become very weak and is about to collapse and finally Pakistan has gained tremendously. These perceptions, whether correct or not, are creating new and intensifying existing fault lines.

The perception, US in a hurry coupled with the perception of Taliban victory, had hardened the Taliban during negotiations and is reflected in the deal too. This led to resumption of attacks on Government troops and attempt to take Helmand. The US had to use air power to reduce the intensity of the attacks and protect Helmand. Their refusal to start intra Afghan dialogue unless 5000 Taliban are released, rejecting the offer of release of 1500, showed they don’t feel the urge to compromise. The going back of the Afghan Government on the Prisoners release has further strengthened the Taliban perception of victory. Their declaring the Government negotiating team as non-inclusive has furthered their confidence resulting in more attacks and territorial gains. For any negotiated settlement, readiness to compromise is a pre requisite. A balanced deal cannot result from perceptions of victory by one side, it can only be a surrender deal. The Taliban seems to be looking towards such a result of any intra Afghan Dialogue, if and when held.

The perception of Taliban victory and US hurry has resulted in the perception of weakness of the Afghan Government, which has intensified the existing differences among the non-Taliban Afghans, whether part of the Government or outside it. The inability of the Afghans to resolve the elections dispute themselves or through the help/intervention of US at least partly is a result of this intensification. The international community’s recognition of President Ghani may bolster Afghan Government, slightly lower the influence of such perception and its impact. However, Sec. Pompeo’s statements after his recent visit and developments (mentioned above) has pulled the rug from under any such strengthening

Pakistan feels it has achieved diplomatically a lot as a result of the whole process. Other interested states, specially India and also Iran cannot take that lightly. Their ability to influence the resulting situation, though limited is not absent. Their resistance to the balance in Afghanistan tilting towards Pakistan to an uncomfortable level can and is intensifying existing tensions beyond the borders of Afghanistan; Pak India tensions including in Kashmir, Religious extremism in both India and Pakistan, as well as Shia Sunni sectarian conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan, even if not the exclusive result of the Afghan situation is definitely influenced by it. Religious extremism and sectarianism will logically re kindle terrorism. Sectarian conflict will make Taliban to find ways to go around honoring the requirement of break with Al Qaeda. These increased regional tensions will impact peace making inside Afghanistan to a deterministic level.

Pakistan needs to exercise self-restraint. The attendance of President Ashraf Ghani’s oath taking ceremony by Pakistan’s ambassador and PM Imran Khan’s felicitations to him and relaxing the closing of international borders due to the Corona Pandemic to let Cargo pass to Afghanistan are positive indicators, however, more symbolic and real actions will help Pakistan’s interests and peace. The perception that Pakistan is happy with the peace deal is not due to its belief that it will help in peace but because it considers it vindication of its Afghan policy and considers it a Taliban victory, needs to be corrected. Pakistan has to learn a peaceful Afghanistan which is not harmful to its interests cannot be an Afghanistan where regional balance of interests is lost, even if it appears to favor it momentarily. US needs to back up its diplomatic efforts, with real on ground actions, to dispel the perceptions of hurry and defeat as well as a new perception of its abandoning the Afghan Government, if it wants to leave a peaceful Afghanistan, not a threat to its interests in the region and elsewhere.

However, the tragic Corona Pandemic that has taken away focus from Afghanistan, can be turned into an opportunity for peace and the strengthen the role of Afghan people in their country’s affairs. Corona Pandemic may slow down diplomatic efforts in more than one way, but if the government supported by the international community tries to reach out to all Afghans, Taliban or non-Taliban without any conditions or considerations can help in weakening the barriers. International diplomatic efforts should more focus on convincing all sides to not permit their continued conflict hinder internal or external efforts fighting the Corona challenge. If Mr. Pompeo had given more importance to this and made some headway, he would have achieved a lot. Pakistan can and should use its influence on Taliban and others to convince them to permit Government or non-Government organizations as well as other states, specially all regional states reaching out to control the Pandemic, should go unhindered. This can be a strong argument to convince all sides to cease hostilities for the duration. This can help create pressure on all sides to compromise and restore both internal and external balance, leading to peace.

William Holland Interviews me on US Taliban Negotiations - video

2019-02-14T04:36:00.000-08:00

https://www.globalstrikemedia.com/…/prof-khan-former-chairm… …

The interview was conducted around 12 pm 13 February via Skype

Negotiating Peace or Withdrawal

2019-02-02T14:45:00.000-08:00

Negotiating Peace or Withdrawal

A lot of optimism is in the air about peace in Afghanistan amid some voices of caution and some disappointment at what is being reported about the ongoing negotiations between the United States and Taliban.

A question that needs to be answered first is, whether these negotiations are about peace in Afghanistan or US withdrawal from Afghanistan? A related question is, are the US and Taliban the only parties to the conflict in Afghanistan? Answers to these questions in the context of US foreign policy as it is taking shape under the Trump Presidency will help better understand what is happening and its implications.https://www.thenews.com.pk/tns/detail/567177-negotiating-peace-withdrawal

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What Makes a University?

2018-11-18T04:15:00.004-08:00

What Makes a University

The News on Sunday 18 November 2018

In the past about 18 years, universities have mushroomed in Pakistan. Does the increase in numbers reflect improved quality too? Are universities really universities in Pakistan? Has the HEC established by Gen. Musharraf to improve the quality of higher education done its job? If you think yes, there is no need to read any further. However, if your answer to the above questions is negative, then read on for at least one perspective on why?

There is a basic flaw in our understanding of the institution called university and higher education. This flaw is in almost all aspects of the characteristics/requirements that make an educational institution a university.https://www.thenews.com.pk/tns/detail/566701-makes-university

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Pompeo's visit - PTI Government's first major Foreign Policy Challenge

2018-09-05T04:21:00.000-07:00

PTI Government's first major Foreign Policy Challenge

Daily Times 03 September 2018

Ijaz Khan

United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo will be stopping in Islamabad en route New Delhi on September 5. His visit will provide an opportunity to both sides to interact with each other directly for the first time after the change of government in Pakistan. The issues in Pak-US relations remain the same, however, there is an opportunity for a fresh start, as a new government will now represent Pakistan.

The key question remains whether Pakistan will change its policy towards the US, or will it be able to convince the Americans to change theirs. Secondly, how shall we assess the impact of Donald Trump’s presidency on the US policy towards Pakistan?

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