According to media reports, the explosion at approximately 11:30 a.m. resulted in multiple fatalities and injuries and caused off-site damage.

CSB lead investigator Don Holmstrom said, “The CSB’s investigative team will examine the activities that were ongoing at the time of this accident, including any gas purging, as indicated by initial media reports.”

At a public meeting on Thursday, February 4, the CSB issued urgent recommendations that the national fuel gas codes be changed to improve safety when gas pipes are being purged - cleared of air - during maintenance or the installation of new piping. The Board’s urgent recommendations resulted from the CSB’s ongoing federal investigation into the June 9, 2009, natural gas explosion at the ConAgra Slim Jim production facility in Garner, North Carolina, which caused four deaths, three critical life-threatening burn injuries, and other injuries that sent a total of 67 people to the hospital.

The CSB issued a safety bulletin on gas purging in October 2009, because of the occurrence of multiple serious accidents during purging operations. Key safety lessons described in the bulletin included purging gases to a safe location outdoors away from ignition sources, evacuating non-essential workers during purging, using combustible gas monitors to detect any hazardous gas accumulations, and effective training for personnel involved in purging operations.

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There was a big explosion and fire at the Kleen power plant in Middletown, Connecticut, that may have had several fatalities. More than 100 divisions of Police, Fire department and other Emergency services were responded to the accident. The injured were being shifted to hospitals and emergency care facilities by helicopters. A search for survivors in the blast rubble at the site is on.

Apparently the plant had not yet opened and was still in the construction phase. People several miles away heard the blast and shockwaves. The gas based power plant had several contractors working on it. An unconfirmed report claimed that a survivor said that he was thrown up 30 feet in the air due to the blast!

The blast was so powerful that it could be heard for several tens of miles in the area surrounding the plant. Residents of Clinton, Prospect, Madison, Deep River, Ivoryton and Durham could feel the impact.

Reporters are not being allowed entry near the site by emergency officials.

Though the cause has not yet identified, it appears to have happened during gas line purging. Ironically just two days ago the CSB has voted to change the codes that apply to this kind of operation, due to the findings in the Conagara Slim Jim blast.

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Raleigh, NC, February 4, 2010 - The U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) is set to consider two urgent recommendations that national fuel gas codes be changed to improve safety when gas pipes are being purged (cleared of air) during maintenance or installation of new piping.
The recommendations - to be voted on by board members at a CSB public meeting in Raleigh tonight - grow out of the CSB’s ongoing federal investigation into the June 9, 2009, natural gas explosion at the ConAgra Slim Jim production facility in Garner, North Carolina, which caused four deaths, three critical life-threatening burn injuries, and other injuries that sent a total of 67 people to the hospital.

In preliminary findings to be presented at a news conference this morning and at the public meeting tonight, CSB investigators determined that the catastrophic explosion resulted from the accumulation of significant amounts of natural gas that had been purged indoors from a new 120-foot length of pipe during the startup of a new water heater in the plant that made Slim Jims, a popular beef-jerky product. During pipe purging, workers feed pressurized gas into a pipe in order to displace air or other gases so that only pure fuel gas remains in the piping when it is connected to an appliance such as a water heater or boiler.

CSB Chairman John Bresland said, “The board is very concerned that companies across the country continue to purge pipes indoors, and this evening we will consider recommendations to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), the American Gas Association (AGA) and the International Code Council (ICC). Currently, the codes of the NFPA and ICC do not require gases to be vented outdoors or define adequate ventilation or hazardous conditions, nor do they require the use of combustible-gas detectors during these operations. The CSB recommendations, if adopted, would urge that these things be done.”

The NFPA and the ICC are prominent organizations whose codes are used and followed by government bodies, private organizations and individuals nationwide.

CSB investigations supervisor Donald Holmstrom said his team made the recommendations to the board during the course of the ConAgra investigation after discovering gaps in the fuel gas codes. “Purging flammable gases into building interiors is a recipe for disaster. At ConAgra, we determined the accident would not have happened had the gas been vented safely outdoors through a hose or pipe.” Mr. Holmstrom noted that since the June 2009 accident, ConAgra has instituted strict policies on purging, requiring it be done to safe outdoor locations.

As proposed, the CSB recommendations would urge the NFPA, the American Gas Association (AGA), and the ICC to enact tentative interim and then permanent changes to the National Fuel Gas Code. These would require that purged gases shall be vented “to a safe location outdoors, away from personnel and ignition sources.” In cases where outdoor venting is not possible, companies would be required to seek a variance from local officials before purging gas indoors, including approval of a risk evaluation and hazard control plan. The recommendation would also require the use of combustible gas detectors to continuously monitor gas concentrations; the training of personnel about the problems of odor fade and odor fatigue; and warnings against the use of odor alone for detecting releases of fuel gases.

The CSB issued a safety bulletin in October 2009 entitled “Dangers of Purging Gas Piping into Buildings.” The bulletin’s key lesson is: “Purging new or existing gas piping into a building can be highly hazardous due to the possible accumulation of gas … and the associated danger of fire and explosion.” It notes that large numbers of workers are at risk, including plumbers, gas installers, maintenance workers, contract supervisors, and industrial facility managers.

Mr. Holmstrom said, “The CSB has examined several other similar accidents in which gas was purged indoors and not detected. We have determined that workers cannot rely on their sense of smell to warn them of danger, in part because people become desensitized to the odorant added to natural gas and propane. Gas detectors must be used.”

Other incidents examined by the CSB include: a 1999 explosion at a Ford power plant in Dearborn, Michigan, killing six, injuring 38, and causing a $1 billion property loss; a 2008 explosion at a Hilton Hotel under construction in San Diego, California that injured fourteen people; a 2005 school explosion in Porterville, California, burning two plumbers; and an explosion at a hotel in Cheyenne, Wyoming, in 2007 severely burning two plumbers.

In addition to Chairman Bresland, the board consists of William E. Wright and William B. Wark. There are currently two board vacancies. Approval of recommendations requires a majority vote. The CSB meeting will be held at the Sheraton Raleigh Hotel, 421 South Salisbury Street.

Following a presentation of preliminary findings by the investigation team, the board will receive the views from a panel of experts: Chris Noles of the North Carolina State Fire Marshal’s Office (the state has passed strict regulations to require outdoor gas purging since the accident), Ted Lemoff of the National Fire Protection Association, and Belinda Thielen of the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, which represents employees at the ConAgra Slim Jim plant.

Finally, the board will hear from members of the public who wish to speak. “This was a devastating accident,” Chairman Bresland said, “and it is my hope that workers and residents in the area will let us know their views on the need for the stricter codes that we will be considering on Thursday evening.”

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Well, confined spaces are places in your workplace that are  “confined” because their configurations restrict the activities of employees who must enter, work in, and exit them. A confined space has limited or restricted means for entry or exit, and it is not designed for continuous employee occupancy. Think underground vaults, tanks, storage bins, manholes, pits, silos, process vessels, and pipelines and even elevator shafts.

OSHA uses the term “permit-required confined space” (permit space) to describe a confined space that has one or more of the following characteristics: contains or has the potential to contain a hazardous atmosphere; contains a material that has the potential to engulf an entrant; has walls that converge inward or floors that slope downward and taper into a smaller area which could trap or asphyxiate an entrant; or contains any other recognized safety or health hazard, such as unguarded machinery, exposed live wires, or heat stress.

Training in confined spaces is absolutely essential for all employees who are going to work in confined spaces, as well as for those who supervise them. It’s the law! And what better and cost effective training to get than e-learning? You control the pace of the course, the time it can be taken and it costs almost next to nothing, if you factor in the yearly refresher training. An excellent choice would be a CD based confined space entry training given below. Check it out!

It is a legal requirement if you are running a factory or doing other business related to the chemical industry in Canada, formulated and enforced by Canada’s own OSHA-like body, called CCOHS (Canadian Center for Occupational Health and Safety).

The majority of the “information” requirements (and exemptions) of WHMIS legislation were incorporated into the HAZARDOUS PRODUCTS ACT and the HAZARDOUS MATERIALS INFORMATION REVIEW ACT. These apply to all of Canada.

Suppliers, employers and workers all have different specific responsibilities under these acts.  For more information please visit http://www.ccohs.ca/oshanswers/legisl/intro_whmis.html

So if you are in anyway connected with the Canadian chemicals or petrochemical and allied industries,  dealing in controlled chemicals, you better be familiar with WHMIS.

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Prior to this latest incident were two other accidents at the same plant. One was an ongoing release of chloromethane from the plant’s Hexazinone unit, which went undetected for several days, and a release of sulfur dioxide from a spent sulfuric acid unit. Following this series of unfortunate events the management has closed down the facility entirely, giving “safety checks” as the reason behind the closure.

Meanwhile the US Chemical Safety Board (CSB) has taken a dim view of these events and announced an investigation. Speaking for the three-member board, Member William E. Wright said: “The Board is concerned by these releases, which had tragic consequences, and will proceed with an investigation to understand why these unfortunate events occurred.”  Mr. Wright cautioned that the new case would likely delay efforts to complete other investigations that are being conducted by same investigative team, including those at the Bayer CropScience facility in Institute, West Virginia, and an Ohio environmental services company.  Including DuPont, the CSB has 17 open investigations, the largest number in its 11-year history.

In voting to approve the investigation, the Board noted that the CSB was aware of six other releases from the plant since December 2006.  The DuPont Belle complex is a large facility that is regulated under the EPA Risk Management Program and the OSHA Process Safety Management standard because of the volume and hazards of the materials it handles and the potential risk to workers and the community.

CSB investigator Johnnie Banks will lead the four-member team which is expected at the site on Tuesday.

A collision between an oil tanker (ship) and a barge towing vessel caused an oil spill in the waters off Port Arthur,TX.  The oil spilled is estimated to be about 450,000 gallons, a huge amount by any account.The spill is being cleaned up with booms. Fire and emergency responder officers reported that several blocks of the downtown area had been evacuated. Other reports siad that Hydrogen Sulfide gas is also being emitted from the spilled oil.  The gas, which smells like rotten eggs,  is highly toxic and can be fatal if inhaled in large quantities.

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University officials told the CSB the accident occurred in the chemistry department during the handling of a high-energy metal compound, which suddenly detonated. Texas Tech had entered into an agreement with Northeastern University, which holds a contract from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to study the high-energy materials.

“We see serious accidents in high school and university labs every year, including a tragic fatality a year ago at UCLA,” said CSB Chairman John Bresland. “I believe it is time to begin examining these accidents to see if they can be prevented through the kind of rigorous safety management systems that we and others have advocated in industrial settings.”

Mr. Bresland said the CSB planned to collect information on several laboratory accidents for a future study on the topic. Investigations Supervisor Don Holmstrom, who manages the Board’s Western Regional Office in Denver, will lead the investigation, along with CSB Investigator Dr. Mary Beth Mulcahy, a physical chemist.

The CSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating serious chemical accidents. The agency’s board members are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. CSB investigations look into all aspects of chemical accidents, including physical causes such as equipment failure as well as inadequacies in regulations, industry standards, and safety management systems.

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The meeting will begin at 6:00 p.m. at the Raleigh Sheraton Ballroom located at 421 South Salisbury Street in downtown Raleigh. The meeting is free and open to the public.

At the meeting the CSB investigative team will present its preliminary findings on the circumstances of the accident to the three CSB board members and the public. The Board will then receive testimony from outside experts concerning safety issues raised by the accident, focusing on the topic of safe purging of natural gas piping. Following a public comment period, the Board is expected to consider draft staff recommendations for changes to the National Fuel Gas Code, which establishes gas purging practices followed across the country. The meeting will be videotaped and an official transcript will be published.

The explosion occurred during the commissioning of a new, gas-fired industrial water heater at the plant, when natural gas was purged into the interior of the building. The gas accumulated to an explosive concentration and ignited; the ensuing blast caused large sections of the building to collapse.

“This was a serious accident which claimed the lives of four workers, injured scores of others, and resulted in hundreds of job losses,” said CSB Chairman John Bresland. “The goal of the CSB investigation is to recommend measures that will help prevent other devastating accidents during gas purging operations.”

Board investigators said they have identified a number of similar gas purging accidents in recent years, including an explosion at a Michigan power plant in 1999 that killed 6 and caused $1 billion in property damge and an explosion in 2008 at a San Diego hotel that injured 14.

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They were all working atop a tank battery when apparently one of them fell down,  the result of Hydrogen Sulfide’s feared “knockout effect” . The gas is deadly because it has a bad smell in lower concentrations (smells like rotten eggs), but in higher concentrations, it simply desensitizes the human nose, which can no longer smell it and hence the “knockout effect”.

What is surprising in this case is that all of them were reportedly wearing Hydrogen Sulfide gas monitors, that are supposed to measure the H2S concentration in the ambient air and sound an alarm if dangerous levels are detected. It is not clear if the instruments did not work, or whether the workers simply ignored them.

The workers were rushed via an air ambulance to a hospital, but it was too late for one of them. The rest are still serious, although stable.

The incident once again highlights the safety precautions that need to be taken when dealing with Hydrogen Sulfide gas.

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