Information Dissemination

Some Thoughts on the Coastal Riverine Force

noreply@blogger.com (Chris Rawley) — Sat, 26 May 2012 02:17:00 +0000

Even the smallest economy-of-force programs aren’t immune to Navy budget cuts and accordingly, numerous reductions to NECC force structure were submitted for POM 13. The Navy’s Riverine and Maritime Expeditionary Security Force (MESF) units make up a significant and important part of this community, and comprise the majority of the Navy’s combatant craft outside of Naval Special Warfare. Following the decommissioning of six MSRONs over the next few years, the resulting force structure will consolidate to seven combined Coastal/Riverine Squadrons (CRF) Squadrons for a total of about 4,400 active and reserve Sailors. “The primary mission of CRF is to conduct maritime security operations across all phases of military operations by defending high value assets, critical maritime infrastructure, ports and harbors both inland and on coastal waterways against enemies and when commanded conduct offensive combat operations.” As these changes are enacted, it’s worthwhile to look at where this leaner expeditionary force has come from and where it might go in the future.

A Bit of History

Fighting in inland and coastal waters has been a regular occurrence throughout the U.S. Navy’s history, with notable campaigns in North America, China, and of course, Vietnam. Following the Vietnam War, the navy’s riverine force was largely disestablished and by the 1990s, the sole capability remained in one NSW unit. The 21st Century riverine force, assembled a few years after the Navy Staff realized that Operation Iraqi Freedom wasn’t just a ground war, now consists of three squadrons of highly trained Sailors with boats and kit sufficient to conduct their missions globally. During OIF, the RIVRONs protected the Haditha Dam and performed hundreds of combat patrols in support of ground forces along Iraqi rivers. The RIVRONs also were equipped with the RCB, a very capable troop carrying boat based on the Swedish CB-90. These boats have been recently used for coastal missions, but are not optimized for extended operations in heavier seas.

RPBs and RCB in USS Oak Hill (LSD 51) U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication
Specialist 2nd Class Michael R. Hinchcliffe

The arguably less well known Maritime Expeditionary Security Force originated out of the Inshore Undersea Warfare units that defended harbors and other inshore areas against Viet Cong sappers. In the 1970s, the IUW community reverted to the reserve force, added new equipment and missions such as electronic and acoustic surveillance. MIUWs and IBUs performed landward and seaward security roles for amphibious and JLOTs operations, with some units mobilized for Operation Desert Storm. Following the October 2000 attack on USS COLE, the then-called Naval Coastal Warfare community gradually shifted to a boat-centric force, added active force structure, and changed its name to MESF, to reflect the increased emphasis on anti-terrorism/force protection. Throughout the last decade, thousands of MSRON Sailors have deployed globally to austere locations and successfully deterred new terrorist attacks on critical maritime infrastructure. They have escorted thousands of naval and civilian ships, defended dozens of different ports, and lived for months at a time on Iraq’s rusty OPLATS – all thankless, but vitally important missions. Interestingly, the new CRF is not the first time that the Navy has combined coastal and riverine units.

On boats

The MK VI will be the newest addition to NECC’s fleet (see Chuck Hill’s post here) and provide a much needed augmentation to the smaller MESF and RIVRON craft. There is room to debate whether the MK VI will be the right vessel for coastal NECC missions. Certainly, the ability to embark a boarding team and better sea-keeping and endurance will make the MK VI a tremendously more capable platform than the MESF’s current 34’ PBs. But one the thing to keep in mind is that combatant craft are small, inexpensive relative to every other surface (and air) platform, and designed to have a short life span. Therefore, if the initial buy of six vessels doesn’t prove ideal for CRF, then OPNAV shouldn’t dwell on what amounts to rounding errors in the larger acquisition budget and move quickly to another design.

That said, it should be understood that the MK VI does not meet the requirement for a green water Cyclone PC replacement which would be more properly classified as an offshore patrol vessel or offshore support craft. The MK VI just doesn’t have the legs and payload for that mission set and requires either a near-by land base or sea-basing as seen in the above photo of well deck testing last year. Ostensibly, LCS was going to take on the offshore patrol role, along with the missions for apparently every other ship class smaller than a DDG. Time will tell how that idea works out.

Some Future Opportunities

Along with continuing to conduct NECC’s mainstay riverine, force protection, and security force assistance missions, the CRF has the opportunity to expand into new mission sets. As the combined CRF stands up next week, it’s heartening to hear one of the MESG Commodores recognize the offensive potential of these units. “Although Coastal Riverine Force will predominantly perform force protection type missions, when required it will be capable of conducting offensive operations which will enhance mission effectiveness throughout the force.” These operations will require new equipment, training, and tactics.

Although the MK VI is not heavily armed or armored, it does appear to have a remotely operated MK 38 Mod 2 (25mm) on the bow. The Israelis have similar mounts on their fast attack craft that include coaxial Spike ER laser guided missiles (8 km range). One hopes that NAVSEA CCD is planning on installing at least an equivalent capability on the MK VI to add to CRF’s offensive punch. I recently was aboard a similar sized vessel capable of carrying 16 griffin missiles in a VLS-type launcher, so this sort of firepower not out of the question for 20-30 meter fast attack craft. Furthermore, by becoming targeting nodes in a distributed naval fires network, these small vessels could fight above their weight class.

MIUWU 114 Mobile Operations Center on Khawr Abd Allah River
Iraq, April 2003 (author’s photo)

Similarly, the MESF’s land-based sensor detachments have the potential to improve targeting in the littorals. A primarily defensive force since COLE, MESF’s 90s-era equipment is in need of a radical facelift, with the addition of lighter and more numerous fixed, mobile, and disposable sensors. In the IUW era, the MIUWUs routinely deployed and listened to sonobuoys in support of coastal ASW. Today, a myriad of air and sea droppable sensor packages with various combinations of EO, signals, acoustic, and METOC collection capabilities are readily available. These smaller, smarter, and cheaper sensors can rapidly disseminate their data globally via a number of means, and along with small tactical UAVs, should become a staple of the CRF.

The Navy must sustain traditional brown and green water MSO missions, but new technology will also make it possible for NECC units to become an integral component of distributed maritime operations in higher intensity warfare.

******
Thanks to Lee Wahler, a frequent commenter on ID, and other hard core boat guys for helping with ideas and research on this article.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Have a Safe Memorial Day Weekend

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Fri, 25 May 2012 20:30:00 +0000

Have a great weekend, and stay safe. If you read one thing this holiday weekend, I hope it is this.

Pictures of the Day

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Thu, 24 May 2012 04:00:00 +0000

From here.

STRAIT OF HORMUZ (May 19, 2012) The guided-missile destroyer USS Nitze (DDG 94) transits the Strait of Hormuz with Military Sealift Command missile range instrumentation ship USNS Invincible (T-AGM 24) and British Royal Navy ships HMS Ramsey (M110), HMS Pembroke (M107) and RFA Lyme Bay (L3007). Nitze is deployed as part of the Enterprise Carrier Strike Group to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility conducting maritime security operations, theater security cooperation efforts and support missions as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Jeff Atherton/Released)

It is very interesting that while the US negotiates the future of the Iranian nuclear program in Baghdad, USNS Invincible (T-AGM-24) enters the Persian Gulf.

USS Devastator (MCM 6), USS Sentry (MCM 3), USS Pioneer (MCM 9) and USS Warrior (MCM 10)

You can learn more about the Dockwise ship TERN here, and there are more pictures here. These ships should arrive in Bahrain sometime in the 3rd week in June.

Joining Information Dissemination

noreply@blogger.com (aelkus) — Thu, 24 May 2012 01:58:00 +0000

I'm Adam Elkus, and I'm very excited to begin posting at Information Dissemination. I'm a PhD student in International Relations at American University and a recent MA graduate of Georgetown's Security Studies Program.

A little more about me: I blog at Rethinking Security, my eponymous blog, although I also am involved with CTOVision, Small Wars Journal's El Centro, and Asia Security Watch. I've also recently started posting at Abu Muqawama. My primary interest is in military theory and strategic studies, with specific interests in new operating concepts, information security, campaign design, law enforcement, and related subjects. I'm on Twitter as well.

I live in DC, and do a lot of my blogging at Baked and Wired and Snap in Adams-Morgan. My favorite books on strategic subjects are Special Operations and Strategy, The Structure of Strategic Revolution, and The Scientific Way of Warfare. Lastly, because my friend H. Lucien Gauthier will inevitably mention it, I also really, really like giant robots and the Wu-Tang Clan. Once a blue moon they intersect.

I've followed (and admired) Information Dissemination for a while, and I'm very thankful to Galrahn for bringing me on board. This site sets the standard for discussion of naval matters and strategy, and I'm looking forward to diving into what has already been an impressive and stimulating ongoing conversation.

CNAS Touts Sustainable Pre-eminence

noreply@blogger.com (The Conservative Wahoo) — Thu, 24 May 2012 00:59:00 +0000

DC based national security think-tank the Center for a New American Security has released another in its series of reports centered on how the national security establishment ought to organize/re-organize itself to be more effective and efficient in an era of declining military budgets. Entitled "Sustainable Pre-eminence: Reforming the US Military at a Time of Strategic Change", CNAS's crack team of David Barno, Travis Sharp, Nora Bensahel, and Matthew Irvine have put forward a rational, adult blueprint for change to the American military establishment, one that takes as a given our current economic malaise and assumes another $150B in cuts over the next ten years on top of those already apportioned to DoD in the Budget Control Act of 2011. This is a thoughtful, readable approach written at the broad policy level, rather than a treatise on budgets. It is worth reading in its entirety, for it is a useful and potentially prescient tonic to be taken to alleviate the pain of American military decline.


George Bernard Shaw

I say this because while CNAS has delivered up a nifty plan for us to run out the clock, it does not have to be so. We can--and should--spend roughly 4% of our GDP on national defense--making it the first bill we pay--while other "discretionary" accounts line up behind it. Additionally, the whole use of terms "discretionary and non-discretionary" amounts to a giant thumb on the scale of government spending, rhetorically walling off great stashes of national resources promised as entitlements generations ago by Congresses long since dead and buried. CNAS (wisely) walks away from a discussion of military pay and benefits in this report, saying that others have covered the subjects well and that reform therein is a matter of political will. Such could be safely said too (a matter of will) about the cowardice of leaving an increasing percentage of government spending unmolested, while we whittle down our military might so that we might fund other "investments".

One might think someone with my body of work would be pleased to see a think-tank so thoroughly embrace American Seapower. And truth be told, this report does just that--clearly in words, and by dealing the Navy fewer cuts than any of the other services, it prioritizes the Navy by reducing it less than the others. Additionally, it re-deploys that which the Navy retains in a more persistent and powerful presence, largely in the Asia Pacific. And if a gun were held to my head and I was made to say "the way it is, is the way it will ever be", then I would probably line up behind CNAS and proclaim this approach to be about as rational a way forward as we are going to see. The Navy retains most of its force structure, and it sets itself up as the strategic blocking force in the Pacific. But there are devils in the details. Much is made of the importance of SSN's in this report, but I seem only to find one addition to the current plan. A CVN and an Airwing are cut--seemingly sacrificed on the altar of "the Navy has to suffer some pain" as little else is offered to justify the cuts. Brookings scholar Michael O'Hanlon's embrace of multiple crews for surface ships is embraced by the CNAS authors, with little regard to the loss of force structure sure to follow, which results in a force that may be more present, but has less aggregated combat power. Put another way, CNAS trades presence for warfighting capacity--not an unreasonable trade--but it has to be recognized for what it is.

CNAS seems to buy the 2007 Navy Strategy's two hub model (IO/Arabian Gulf and East Asia) and shifts more naval power to the Far East. Where does this come from? A declining number of ships, to include 10% fewer Amphibs than are in today's substandard long range plan that does not meet either the COCOM or the USMC requirements, half the LCS's, and an undetermined number of CRUDES ships--already stretched thinly. All of this while the Mediterranean once again shows itself to be a place of interest to us and our NATO partners, whose approach to military power puts both their interests and ours in question.

I'm a huge fan of their suggestions for carrier aviation (cut the JSF buy, keep the Super Hornet line open, diminish/end the USMC tacair presence on CVN's and double down on unmanned), I'm dubious of USAF's ability to take up the unmanned ISR load in the maritime domain, and I'm generally well-disposed to their thoughts on the Marine Corps (which also does well, by comparison).

But in order to LOVE this report, one has to be a good bit more reasonable than I am, and I take my cue on reasonableness from George Bernard Shaw: "The reasonable man adapts himself to the world; the unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself. Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable man."

Bryan McGrath

CATO: The Future of the US Navy Surface Fleet

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Wed, 23 May 2012 06:00:00 +0000

SAN DIEGO (May 2, 2012) The first of class littoral combat ships USS Freedom (LCS 1), rear, and USS Independence (LCS 2) maneuver together during an exercise off the coast of Southern California. The littoral combat ship is a fast, agile, networked surface combatant designed to operate in the near-shore environment, while capable of open-ocean tasking, and win against 21st-century coastal threats such as submarines, mines, and swarming small craft. (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. Jan Shultis/Released)

The Policy Forum on the US Navy Surface Fleet at CATO has turned out to be a hugely successful event. It was informative and stayed interesting from start to end. In fact, I can only find one problem with the event - they used some crappy Java movie app that is terrible on mobile devices and several browsers instead of YouTube for the video of the event. Thus - I won't be embedding the video, so you'll have to go here and download it.

The panel included Robert O. Work, Under Secretary of the Navy; Eric J. Labs, Senior Analyst for Naval Forces and Weapons, Congressional Budget Office; Ben Freeman, National Security Fellow, Project on Government Oversight; Christopher Preble, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute; moderated by Benjamin Friedman, Senior Fellow in Defense and Homeland Security Studies, Cato Institute. I am a big fan of the work of Bob Work, Eric Labs, and Christopher Preble. I do not know much about either Ben, but I do appreciate what POGO does for taxpayers.

This is a great discussion start to finish, and while it is supposed to cover all of surface warfare, it really focuses on LCS because LCS really is the most interesting thing about the Navy right now - for all the right and wrong reasons simultaneously. Whether it is when Christopher Preble quoted CDR Salamander or when the Undersecretary discusses fleet design or when Eric Labs points out every other alternative to LCS costs more... this is solid gold information. Panels like this discredit the bullshit people read on LCS every day on the internet, and are hugely valuable towards informing the public on this very interesting ship the Navy is fielding to the fleet.

A Few Stories...

Did you know that I am unable to find a single expert on shipbuilding in North America or Europe who believes the US Navy can build any frigate design greater than 4000 tons - any design world wide btw - for less than LCS, but people run around the internet claiming otherwise all the time. I can't find a single expert on shipbuilding in North America or Europe who believes the Absalon class is anywhere near less expensive than LCS, but that is frequently touted on the internet all the time. I hear people say the FFG-7s are oh-so-much-better-than-LCS if we would only upgrade them like the Australians did. Well, I have talked to the Australians extensively about this, and the upgrade of the Adelaide class was such a fantastic dumpster fire the Australians had to retire 2 of their 6 ships just to afford to finish the upgrades, were ultimately only unable to upgrade 4 ships, and spent so much money on the project they could have purchased brand new ships for about the same cost. It was such a mess of a project for the Australians that it became a political scandal. Why?

Well, it turns out it was a dumpster fire for the same reasons the US Navy chose not to upgrade the FFG-7s - the compartmentalization of the ship is so intense for survivability purposes it basically rendered the ship obsolete because the cost of modernization far exceeded the benefits of doing so. Now with that said, the compartmentalization was for survivability purposes, and that meant a Perry could hit a 750lb mine and survive, and a Perry could get hit by 2 Exocet missiles and survive. There are trades, and those trades are not trivial, but the same extensive compartmentalization that saved the ships in combat prevented the entire class from ever upgrading due to the extensive costs of doing so. If you read an easy solution to naval issues on the internet, do your homework, because nothing in naval affairs is ever simple.

For the US Navy to upgrade the FFG-7s exactly how the Australians did to upgrade the Adelaide class, the estimated cost today is $300 million per - and that assumes it would be $50 million cheaper for us than it would be for them, simply because I'm being stupidly patriotic suggesting we are somehow better at this kind of stuff than they are without any supporting data (yes, stupidly). So people advocating for SLEPing the frigates, they basically would prefer to get 10-15 years out of 30 year old ships for 2/3 the price of a brand new LCS. I think that would be a bad idea, and yet - people on the internet claim it to be BRILLIANT!

In 2008 - before the Navy had brought Freedom out to salt water, I rode Freedom for 3 days from Buffalo to Montreal. During a high speed run across Lake Ontario, I walked down to the mission bays to see what it was like down there while the ship was at high speed. The first thing I learned is that in bay 3, the smallest mission zone where the Navy has apparently been putting modules for people; it is one of the loudest places on the ship when the turbines are running - so the idea the Navy can simply plug in habitat modules down there as a solution doesn't sound credible to me. Maybe Independence is different, but on Freedom it was so incredibly loud down in that mission zone I put my earphones on and turned on music. Another thing I noticed was water coming in the back door of the ship while the ship was at high speed.

Since before the ship was even commissioned, the back door of LCS-1 has been a known problem and water has been coming through that door. A natural conclusion of that would be rust in that area. But here is what bugs me - the USCGC Bertholf had a problem with her stern door, the USS San Antonio had a problem with her stern door, and the USS Independence has a problem with her stern door. Why does the US shipbuilding sector have such a big problem building stern doors for each new class of ship? I don't know, but I see a pattern that NAVSEA clearly doesn't have a good oversight program in place to address.

I don't know Michael Fabey, but I got a real kick out of his article because it really sounded like his source had an axe to grind with LCS - and apparently Michael Fabey didn't think he was being used. Michael Fabey had never been on LCS-1 before he got onboard for that article, and one of the really silly things in my opinion is that he apparently needed to sneak on the ship at all - because I have to tell you, I have never had to sneak onto a Navy ship before so that alone sounds really silly to me.

One of the first things you'll notice about LCS-1 is that it doesn't get painted very often, and as of last year some of the places had never been painted. It's a weight thing, driven by the stupid speed thing. Well, if you don't paint the ship, you will see rust, uhm - because it is a ship and without paint, you can't really hide rust.

During my last tour on Freedom I observed rust and cracks as described by the article (keep in mind, this was in Jan 2011), and I asked the CO and XO about them. They were known problems they were going to eventually deal with during maintenance availabilities, but the priority of the ship was to test as many things as possible to insure every problem had a solution that could be incorporated into the new ships under construction. The whole idea that Michael Fabey had to ninja aboard USS Freedom to discover problems is ridiculous, because neither the ship nor the crew hides problems - the ships purpose has been to identify problems for the class and I have several personal experiences where all you have to do is ask about the problems to get an interesting answer that, btw, tells you a lot more about LCS than the story Michael Fabey was trying to tell.

I found that Aviation Week article to be supremely insulting to the professionalism of the sailors and officers that I have encountered each visit to Freedom, and remarkably uninformed. Ben Freeman gets a pass by me, and while maybe he should have done better research, he isn't a ship guy and doesn't really know this stuff. Fabey writes about ships every day as his day job, he doesn't really have an excuse for not figuring out what he was looking at. I remember once standing on a Perry class in Mobile, AL several years ago asking about cracks on the ship, and the DH giving the tour told me to move my foot, because I was standing on a crack. It was a known problem, and they intended to fix it. What Michael Fabey sold as a "holy shit moment" on LCS is pretty much an every day issue the Navy deals with throughout the fleet, so pardon me if I think reporting old news being sold as new news that triggers a GAO investigation into old problems is an example of poor journalism rather than solid journalism. No, I'm not impressed, the lack of context and the inability to answer basic questions like 'why' is not impressive journalism to me. I guess my standards are too high.

I thought of these things while watching the CATO panel as Christopher Preble discussed how when he served on USS Ticonderoga 9 years after that ship was commissioned, he was still dealing with first in class problems on that ship. People keep saying LCS has a big problem, but it's basically the same as the old problem, and the absence of context blows every problem out of proportion. Apparently LCS is the only ship class in the world where a problem doesn't get fixed, because the media never reports it fixed. Really? There are some legitimate problems with the LCS hull (and I would argue the design), but they aren't always the problems you think they are, and certainly not the ones POGO discussed from documentation dated last year prior to the ships maintenance availability - particularly the problems that were fixed last year during that availability. Good thing the GAO is going to investigate those old problems that apparently never get fixed even though most already have been fixed, because it couldn't possibly be useful to focus on a real issue facing LCS that matters like the modules.

MARINETTE, Wis. (May 3, 2012) The future littoral combat ship USS Forth Worth (LCS 3) is underway for acceptance trials on Lake Michigan. Fort Worth successfully completed the trials, testing the ship's major systems and equipment in port and underway. Acceptance trials are the last significant milestone before delivery of the ship to the Navy. The ship was presented to the Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey with high levels of completion. (U.S. Navy photo by Mike Rote/Released)

Looking Ahead

So if you watch the panel at CATO, towards the end of the Q&A Robbie Harris asks a question about the LCS looking to the future, and Bob Work discusses the 6 things the Navy has to do with the LCS going forward. His 6 points are in bold below, the rest is my comment on those points.

1) Address the issues brought up by POGO/Aviation Week. There are 62 issues they listed, but 25 of the 62 problems do not actually exist and most of the issues raised are old - which means when Congress asks the GAO to do an investigation they are basically telling everyone Congress is badly out of touch and uninformed (shocking, not really, and I do think the Navy is at fault on this). There will be more problems with LCS in the future. These problems with the LCS hull to date are part of the challenge with the hulls, and the fixes must be put into the production run so the R&D ships serve the purpose they are being touted to be serving today. Based on my conversations with LCS folks over the last few years, a lot of people have been working hard on every aspect of this issue (it's basically been what the LCS has been doing). I do not see this issue as being a difficult one to overcome, indeed it is the issue that is mostly behind the Navy and only new issues with LCS-3 and LCS-4 (and later ships) will matter from this point forward in my opinion.

2) Get the core crew size right. The Navy knows they are too low on manning LCS, and they need to figure out the right number for each ship. The ships were designed to have technology replace the need for so many sailors. Some of those technology substitutions worked, and clearly some did not and never will. IMO, the solution is almost certainly going to be a mix of manpower and technology, and I suspect we will see around 10 sailors added as part of the core crew of LCS-1 resulting in a core crew of 50, roughly a 25% increase. I've been on the ship and no redesign will be necessary for this change, they will simply bunk 3 deep like on other surface combatants instead of 2 deep like they do today, and the head/shower areas may need a bit of redesign. Easy fixes I think. Expanding the stores for the galley might be another issue. My personal impression engaging with folks who know LCS is that they almost have this manpower issue figured out for LCS-1, and are still trying to figure it out for LCS-2. Because manpower is the top cost driver for the US Navy today, figuring out how to keep crew sizes low is critical to having a well sized fleet. Not figuring this issue out means the Navy can only afford about 200 ships, or less, because of the high cost of manpower that would be invested in the ships. Anyone who doesn't understand how big the manpower issue is, why it is important to reduce crew sizes for Navy ships, and how this issue is a major strategic issue for the US Navy is wildly uninformed. More than any other factor, crew sizes are limiting the size of the US Navy and is the constraint that makes 300 ships the high number for the size of the US Navy fleet. I suspect we will see a similar process play out with DDG-1000 as they work to get manpower on that ship right as well. Hopefully, all these lessons will be folded into the next large surface combatant scheduled to get funded in FY18.

3) Single up the combat systems and C4I systems to make sure the ships are interoperable inside the fleet. This will solve several problems that one runs into with disparity in a network designed to fight. For me, this is a much bigger problem with the LCS hulls than what most people moan about, like speed. It is the single biggest barrier to getting the combat side of the LCS training pipeline right, and insures that modular systems are truly interchangeable regardless of hull design. I do not know which combat system is better, and I don't care - singling up to one combat system for both hulls is the single most important part of the LCS hull going forward. Speed is something the Navy can (and has) experimented with on the tactical side. It may or may not be useful. The Navy has not accounted for the issues related to how populated seas in the information age will impact naval warfare in the future, and very smart officers on LCS have been developing tactics using ship speed that have specific value towards that challenge. Maybe speed will be useful, maybe not. Regardless, two combat systems are a big problem going forward, because unlike often discussed issues like speed; 2 combat systems represent a legitimate tactical liability for LCS long term.

4) Make sure the mission modules work. Until I see a missile that is better than the Griffin, which is a short ranged interim solution, I am not going to buy the ASuW module as viable. Until the LCS is capable of deploying multiple sensors simultaneously and capable of processing that data for useful submarine tracks as part of a battle force network, the ASW module is an exercise in PowerPoint. Until I see Mine Men praise the MIW module as better than their dedicated minesweepers, I'm not a believer. Prove the first three modules if they are the threat driving the requirements for the LCS platform as designed. More information would be useful, but that's a problem with LCS across the board.

5) Prove the Maintenance and Manning schemes for LCS will work. I know enough to say too much on this, but I believe this is going to be a huge challenge for LCS over time. I think the Navy can work through the contractor maintenance issues that most people think is the big problem, but I see that as the easy problem to solve as roles and procedures are better defined. However, the manning issues with the surface fleet are bigger than just the Littoral Combat Ship, so LCS is not only bringing a new way to man the ship, it is adding a new manning scheme on top of a manning system that works well enough to convince Congress everything is OK, but requires heavy use of statistical analysis that apparently gets manipulated to give the appearance of functional. Two examples include the TYCOM crossdecking and the way operational squadrons (the carrier squadrons) raid people from the other squadrons (non-carrier squadrons) in RW, but those are only two of many ways the Navy is basically robbing Peter to pay Paul on manpower shortfalls while claiming the manning requirement is met. How long before Gold crew raids Blue crew for people, and we end up with 2 crews per LCS where both are manned at 90% on paper, but neither is fully manned for operations in reality? 10% of a crew of 50 people in 5 people - which is a lot and may represent 50% of the total number of people the Navy needed to add to the LCS just to fix the current manning problems.

If final core LCS crews are 50 people, but Blue crew reports fully manned at 90% and Gold crew reports fully manned at 90% under USFF 90% FIT requirements, what happens when Blue crew has to raid Gold crew for a deployment? Blue crew drops from 90% (45 people) to 80% (40 people). Meanwhile USFF reports 2 fully manned LCS crews (because they average 90%), but the reality is the core crew of 40 people that is considered too small today will be what Gold crew works with, because they had to send 5 sailors over to Blue crew to man the ship to100% for deployment. This USFF 90% FIT requirement in surface warfare today is a bullshit exercise in statistics rather than a functional plan for operational fitness thanks to workarounds like TYCOM crossdecking, and the LCS manning concept will not be compatible with traditional Navy smoke and mirror manning schemes.

Sorry, but if you want to fully man a LCS, the manning requirements need to be 110%, not 90%, because losing even one body on a ship that is optimally manned is going to be a big problem with cascading impacts. Maybe if USFF would raid shore commands to meet ship manning instead of forcing crossdecking in the TYCOMs - and starts these shore raids for manpower by taking from the staffs of 4 star Flag officers - this problem would get fixed quicker.

6) Evolve new modules. Flexibility with modularity is clearly awesome, and I do see how Marine Corps modules, SOF modules, and MSO modules can and probably will be useful in the future. If we assume the Navy gets to this point in the LCS program, and I believe they will starting sometime between 2015-2017 as Littoral Combat Ships start operating in numbers with functional modules together, this is where the Littoral Combat Ship becomes something very few today understand will unfold with LCS over time.

For the surface warfare community, I believe the Littoral Combat Ship represents a "once in a generation opportunity" to innovate the new technologies and the new capabilities that will have significant impact on how naval forces fight in the future, and the reason I am confident in my belief is because the Navy has decided the LCS will be the ship that will evolve what is represented as "mothership capabilities" to the surface force. Motherships are the future of surface warfare in the 21st century, and LCS will have significant impact on virtually every surface ship design across the world. I have enormous confidence that the Littoral Combat Ship will be successful, because it has the right ingredients - top level support and well trained sailors. The promotions of the last two years highlight the top level support exists throughout the chain of leadership, and the innovation is the aspect of LCS that gets almost no time in the press (and it IS there) because the press sells train wrecks, and the LCS has a history full of them.

The surface combatants of the future will look more like LCS than they will DDG-51, and it is the same reason future submarines will look more like the converted Ohio SSGNs than they will the traditional submarine designs of most attack submarines today. The capability of motherships to deploy distributed systems - systems that distribute ISR networks and lethal payloads as a function of the platform - is going to have a significant tactical impact to tomorrows naval battlefield. Under today's model of naval warfare, if two ships face off against each other, at most the only other tactical threat deployed by the opposing ship one must worry about is the helicopter. In tomorrows model of naval warfare, when two ships face off against each other, the ship capable of distributing payloads and sensors to offboard systems under, on, and over the water at range will be able to attack their adversary from multiple angles simultaneously, thereby stressing defensive systems and creating an attrition effect on the adversary before they are able to achieve firing position against the platform. In many cases, systems are much more difficult to target - particularly small, quiet underwater systems, so they will provide huge tactical advantages for the mothership that don't exist today. When platforms begin fielding distributable systems that can deploy payloads at range, and multiple platforms are deploying multiple systems, the emerging networks of overlapping ISR and payload platforms and systems will build resiliency into the defense of the battleforce while enabling the lethality of the most capable platforms to fire effectively first at range against adversaries.

Nobody really knows how all of this is going to work, and the Navy isn't even sure they really know what all is needed to make it work, but the US Navy has decided the Littoral Combat Ship will be the low cost entry level investment towards the mothership capabilities that will expose the challenges of large battle networks and allow the Navy to work through the problems and evolve towards this new way of naval warfare. Because of that - it is the LCS sailors through their innovations (which will both succeed and fail along the way, because that is what happens when you innovate) who will usher in the truly distributed network way of war at sea. If you are wondering who the innovators are in the surface warfare community over the next decade, they are in the LCS program.

So for better or worse, I share Bob Work's optimism and excitement for LCS, and I am starting to see the change of attitude in SWOs as mentioned by the CATO panel regarding LCS. LCS looks like doom and gloom in Washington, but the further one gets from DC and the closer one gets to Norfolk and San Diego, the more obvious it is that many of the young SWOs and sailors see LCS as an opportunity and a challenge, rather than the problem and a failure reflected in media narratives.

Two good reads worth checking out regarding the CATO panel. First, Christopher Preble's After Action Report, and this VERY interesting discussion by Kurt Albaugh who has slides I would love to get a copy of, and is a topic I want to research before discussing myself.

House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Report Notes FY13

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Tue, 22 May 2012 05:00:00 +0000

The House Committee on Appropriations Defense subcommittee has completed their Defense Bill for FY13. This is just one more step in the process and far from the final bill, but it does give us a good sense of what is on the mind of Congress. I have listed a handful of items that I found interesting in the report.

Navy

Naval Aviation

F/A–18E/F Tactical Aircraft

The Committee believes a strong tactical aircraft fleet is vital to the Nation’s security. The F/A–18E/F Super Hornet aircraft, which is nearing the end of its production run, is the Navy’s current strike fighter workhorse. The future of Navy tactical aviation will be the F–35C Lightning II aircraft, which will bring a fifth generation strike fighter to the decks of the Nation’s aircraft carriers. As a result of several variables, not the least of which has been the increased flight hours flown by the Navy’s tactical aircraft fleet in support of conflicts around the world, the Navy has been faced with a strike fighter shortfall. To partially offset the severity of this shortfall, the Navy has begun a service life extension program for 150 of the legacy F–18 Hornet aircraft. While still in its infancy, this effort is expected to gain approximately 1,400 flight hours per aircraft at a cost of approximately $25,000,000 per aircraft. The Committee notes that a new Super Hornet aircraft has a cost of approximately $55,000,000 and an expected service life of 9,000 flight hours. When comparing the two options, a new aircraft would provide six times the service life at just twice the cost. While it is not reasonable to close the entire strike fighter shortfall gap with new aircraft, a small quantity of new aircraft is an attractive alternative, especially considering the additional flight hours gained. Accordingly, the recommendation provides $605,000,000 for the procurement of an additional eleven Super Hornet aircraft above the request.

I am not sure the split between SLEP and new construction for dealing with the shoftfall of F-18s, does anyone know?

EA–18G Electronic Attack Aircraft

The Department of the Navy has accomplished the Nation’s airborne electronic attack (AEA) mission for the Department of Defense for several years. This mission has largely been performed with the EA–6B Prowler aircraft flown by the Navy and Marine Corps. The mission is currently transitioning to the EA–18G Growler aircraft (a variant of the F/A–18 aircraft) as the Prowler aircraft age and are retired. There are currently 19 airborne electronic attack squadrons in the Department of the Navy, however, only 15 Growler squadrons are planned. This is due to the fact that the Marine Corps will not fly the Growler aircraft but intends to move away from dedicated airborne electronic attack squadrons and shift to an organic capability using electronic warfare payloads such as Intrepid Tiger and the inherent capabilities within the F–35 aircraft. Although this approach is envisioned to satisfy the requirements of the Marine Corps, the Committee is concerned about the reduced AEA capability for the Nation at large. The Prowler aircraft (and the compatible AEA mission) has been a high demand, low density platform since the days of Desert Storm and is expected to continue as such. Accordingly, the recommendation provides $45,000,000 above the request for the advance procurement of materials for the construction of 15 additional EA–18G aircraft in fiscal year 2014 to preserve the option of increasing the quantity of this vital aircraft.

This is just smart. It is my belief the EA-18G is the best aircraft on the planet being built today, and one of the main reasons the British have chosen exactly wrong to not put EMALS on their CVFs.

Firescount

The MQ–8 Firescout vertical take-off and landing unmanned aerial vehicle will provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data to users without the use of manned aircraft or reliance on national assets. The Navy’s original plan for this platform was for use in the mission packages onboard the Littoral Combat Ships. With the delay in construction and fielding of these ships, the aircraft has migrated to other roles and missions, which has disrupted the testing and development schedule, resulting in a concurrent development, testing, and production schedule. The current state of this program is not unlike the Joint Strike Fighter program, although both programs have arrived at their current state via different paths. Concurrency in an acquisition program is undesirable in that end items are being procured despite the development and testing being incomplete. This condition typically results in the need to modify, at some cost, these end items as problems are discovered and resolved. Recent examples of issues in the Firescout program include one aircraft that was unable to be recovered on its host ship and ultimately crashed into the water, and another aircraft that lost communications with its control station and was lost while conducting operations. These incidents have resulted in the Firescout fleet being grounded from routine operations. Additionally, the Firescout program is in the midst of a transition from the MQ–8B variant to the MQ–8C variant, which will possess much greater endurance relative to the MQ–8B. However, this transition has been delayed as not all components of the MQ–8C variant are ready for production. The result of the delay in transitioning variants in this program has been the stockpiling of development funding. The program essentially has two years of development funding to expend in fiscal year 2012 and undoubtedly a large portion of that will carry over to fiscal year 2013. Therefore the recommendation provides $33,600,000 for the development of the Firescout program, a reduction of $66,000,000.

The Committee recognizes the parallels between this program and the Joint Strike Fighter program. The F–35B variant of the Joint Strike Fighter was placed on probation as a result of some of the technical challenges it faced. Although probation was never specifically defined for the Committee, the Department recently removed the F–35B from probation, an indication that the strategy achieved its objectives. The Committee urges the Secretary of the Navy to use a similar strategy on the Firescout program and report to the congressional defense committees not later than 90 days after enactment of this Act on the strategy and its planned objectives.

The report says "unable to be recovered on its host ship and ultimately crashed into the water" which is quite confusing. What really happened was the Fire Scout had problems during landing and crashed into the water, but the ship was able to pull up beside the Fire Scout quickly enough to get it out of the water. It was basically a lucky screw up, but sailors often make their own luck and did exactly that in recovering the crashed Fire Scout.

Surface Combatants

Shipbuilding

The Navy’s shipbuilding program is the centerpiece of the Navy’s budget request. The Nation’s fleet creates our forward presence, projects power, and maintains open sea lanes. The Committee is well aware that the sight of a U.S. Navy ship on the horizon makes a powerful strategic statement in any theater. The Committee strongly supports all actions to maintain the standing of the United States Navy as the world’s preeminent sea power and a global good neighbor when humanitarian relief is required. The Committee is therefore puzzled by the Navy’s priorities in its shipbuilding plan.

As part of its new strategy, the Department of Defense has rebalanced toward the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions of the world. Despite these regions having a significantly larger area of the world’s oceans, the Navy plans to accelerate the decommissioning of seven guided missile cruisers, has reduced the shipbuilding budget by nearly eleven percent relative to the fiscal year 2012 appropriated level, and is reducing the total number of ships required to fulfill its requirements under this new strategy. The required fleet size has been reduced from 313 ships to approximately 300 ships in the long term, but the Navy will maintain 285 ships in the near term. The Navy has also deferred the procurement of an attack submarine and a guided missile destroyer, the backbone of the Navy’s combatant fleet, from fiscal year 2014 to future years and, in their place has inserted a vessel known as the Afloat Forward Staging Base. This vessel would fill a very long standing (but never fulfilled) mission need. The Committee applauds the Navy for finally fulfilling such a long standing need but is confused by the timing of this action in an era of decreasing budgets and also by the fact that a submarine and destroyer are not being procured in fiscal year 2014 in part to make funding available for this new vessel.

The decision to defer the procurement of a submarine and a destroyer is both confusing and concerning, especially the submarine. Since its inception in 1998, the Virginia Class Submarine program always intended to build two submarines per year. Although the second submarine repeatedly appeared in outyear budget projections, it was continually deferred by the Navy. The program finally reached a rate of two submarines per year in fiscal year 2011, largely due to the efforts of this Committee. Now, after only three years at this rate (2011 through 2013), the Navy is again reducing the production rate. The Committee believes this decision will increase the cost of the submarines, result in production inefficiencies, and exacerbate the Navy’s own predicted attack submarine shortfall. Additionally, with the impending addition of the SSBN replacement submarine to the shipbuilding budget, an event which will ‘‘suck the air out of the Navy’s shipbuilding budget’’ according to a former Secretary of Defense, funding in the outyears will not be any easier to come by.

The Committee believes the Navy recognizes the need to fund another destroyer and submarine in fiscal year 2014 since the Navy has approached the Committee with various plans and schemes to attempt to restore these ships to fiscal year 2014. One of these plans revolves around the incremental funding concept despite the fact that the Department’s own financial management regulations and policies prohibit incremental funding of large end items such as ships, except under certain circumstances, none of which apply in this case. The Committee strongly supports these regulations and policies because fully funded end items do not commit future Congresses to obligations they may or may not agree with and also because they provide the ability to conduct much more complete, transparent, and rigorous program oversight. Incremental funding is certainly comparable to buying items on credit by deferring payments to the outyears.

The Committee understands the constraints of the fiscal year 2014 budget, but to give up two highly prized combatants, and fund instead a vessel for a mission that can be (and has been) satisfied with existing ships, then attempt to restore those combatants through funding gimmicks in violation of the Department’s own financial regulations is deeply troubling. The Committee firmly believes that a strong Navy shipbuilding program is absolutely essential for the Nation’s security but will not mortgage the Nation’s future to accomplish it. Accordingly, the recommendation provides an additional $1,000,000,000 above the request for the procurement of an additional DDG–51 guided missile destroyer. The Secretary of the Navy is directed to use this funding as part of the DDG–51 multiyear procurement planned for fiscal years 2013 through 2017 in order to achieve a lower cost and provide a more stable production base for the duration of the DDG–51 multiyear procurement. Finally, the recommendation provides an additional $723,000,000 above the request for advance procurement for the Virginia Class Submarine program. The Secretary of the Navy is directed to fully fund an additional submarine in fiscal year 2014 to achieve a lower cost and stable production base through the course of the program’s planned multiyear procurement.

This is where is starts getting interesting. The House saves 3 of the retiring cruisers, and has funding throughout the budget markup for the five helicopters, AEGIS Mods, and other upgrades specific to those 3 cruisers.

The House has also added 1 Burke class destroyer and 1 Virginia class submarine back into the shipbuilding plan, and specifically the extra Burke would go in this fiscal year while the Virginia would go in next fiscal year. The idea is that Sean Stackley would be able to negotiate better contracts for a multi-year procurement using 10 Burke's and 10 Virginia's. over the next five years similar to how he did the Littoral Combat Ships. I hope he is successful, but I am not sure this is going to actually save much money except in certain material costs, because there really is no competition when each shipyard is basically going to get 1 ship a year regardless. Ultimately, with the House plan, the Navy is getting an extra destroyer and an extra submarine for the cost of the AFSB. I'd be very surprised if the Navy was disappointed by that trade.

Littoral Combat Ship Manning

From its inception, the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) was planned to be minimally manned by small, experienced crews and therefore contains limited berthing commensurate with the minimal manning requirement. It is the Committee’s understanding that all crewmembers were to have experienced at least one deployment prior to joining the LCS crew and that no first tour junior officers or first term enlisted sailors would be eligible to join an LCS crew without having prior at-sea experience. Since the prototypical training opportunities are not available on the LCS and manning is limited, the entire crew must be capable of performing a variety of tasks. The Committee now understands that the Navy is assigning ensigns without prior sea duty to each LCS crew as part of a new pilot program. The Committee is concerned that the lack of training opportunities will pose a particular challenge for junior officers with no at-sea crew experience. In addition, the LCS will have to rely on the addition of an interim or temporary berthing module when fully manned to accommodate all of the personnel onboard due to an insufficient number of permanent berths.

The Committee is concerned that the current LCS manning model is unrealistic and that relying on temporary solutions such as berthing modules to accommodate additional crewmembers is both impractical and detrimental to the quality of life of the entire crew. The Committee understands that more berths could be added to future ships to provide sufficient permanent berthing for all crewmembers. The Committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the congressional defense committees not later than 120 days after enactment of this Act on future manning plans for the LCS. The report should include the Navy’s plan for future manning requirements, including how additional crewmembers will be accommodated based on the outcome of the aforementioned pilot program, how training opportunities for junior crew members will be provided, a projected timeline for proposed manning changes, and a projected cost of ship modifications to accommodate additional crew members.

I'm not sure what to make of this except the Navy now appears to have an artificial deadline of 120 days after the FY13 defense budget passes to reveal what the plans are for LCS crewing. This isn't a big deal, I think the Navy already knows exactly what they are going to do regarding LCS-1, and has been simply buying time to study LCS-2 a bit more before releasing their manpower plans as part of other LCS changes.

Afloat Forward Staging Base

The request includes $38,000,000 for the advance procurement of items for the Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB). The AFSB is envisioned by the Navy to act as a mobile at-sea platform that will provide flexible mission support and sustainment. This platform will fulfill a very longstanding (at least 20 years) but never fulfilled mission need for sea-based support for a variety of missions. In the past, this mission need has been filled by a variety of ad-hoc methods to include the use of available surface combatants or amphibious ships. The closest dedicated platform to fulfilling a similar mission need was the conversion of the Navy’s amphibious assault ship, USS Inchon, to a mine countermeasure command and support ship in 1995. This was done at a time when the Navy was shifting the fleet from an organic mine warfare capability embedded on surface combatants to a more dedicated mine warfare capability of mine hunting ships and aircraft. Similarly, the Navy plans to fill this mission need in the very near term with the conversion of the USS Ponce in fiscal year 2012.

Further, the Committee notes that the AFSB is planned for construction in the National Defense Sealift Fund, whose purpose in ship construction is for strategic sealift acquisition. The Committee is struggling with placing the mission of the AFSB into a strategic sealift area and directs the Secretary of the Navy to accomplish any AFSB tasks in the traditional Navy appropriation accounts.

The Committee applauds the Navy for finally attempting to satisfy such a longstanding need, but it is confused as to the timing of satisfying this need in an era of decreasing budgets and when two combatants were pulled out of the fiscal year 2014 shipbuilding program. The Committee believes this mission need can continue to be satisfied as it has been satisfied to date. The Committee directs the Navy to apply the fiscal year 2014 funding currently projected for the construction of an AFSB toward fully funding an additional submarine to help achieve cost savings and industrial base stability in that program. Accordingly, the recommendation provides no funding for the AFSB.

This is actually too bad, because I think the Navy has something with the AFSB - although very few people really know much about it. If I was General Dynamics, I would make a huge model of both the MLP and the AFSB for conference showroom floors and show them off at conferences in 2013. Why? Because I fully expect the Navy to come right back with the AFSB and more information by the FY14 budget submission.
Here is what you need to know about AFSB - it is basically a MLP with a module that converts it into a LPH. The AFSB has a fairly large aviation capability that makes HMS Ocean look like a baby cousin. AFSB + MLP is a remarkable capability that I for one hopes to see get built and tested thoroughly, because it is a two ship system for a legitimate forward operating base at sea, and it can scale well with existing Sealift capabilities and by plugging in T-AKEs. It is certainly an 80% solution, but if it works it is an appealing capability that will go well beyond what the US Navy is using Ponce for - indeed the combination would finally get folks in the expeditionary space to start really thinking about what is possible with Sealift capabilities when you aren't married to the enormously expensive enormous amphibious ship designs.

Marine Corps

Light Attack Vehicle

The budget request proposes $186,216,000 for the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) Product Improvement Program. The Committee recommendation provides $45,342,000, which is $140,874,000 below the request. The reduction is due to a change in the authorized acquisition objective for the LAV based on a planned end strength reduction and related elimination of three Light Armored Reconnaissance companies. The acquisition objective decreased from 1,005 to 930 vehicles.

Air Force

F-22 Backup Oxygen System

The Committee is concerned by the continuing problems with hypoxia-type events involving the F–22 and the Air Force’s inability to determine a remediable root cause for this problem. As the military’s only operational fifth generation fighter, the F–22 is critical to the implementation of the National Defense Strategy. Due to the small size of the F–22 fleet, and the utmost importance of preserving the safety and readiness of F–22 pilots, the Committee strongly supports Air Force efforts to address this problem. The Committee understands that the Air Force is in the final stages of selecting a design for an automated backup oxygen system as a mitigation measure. The Committee’s recommendation therefore includes $50,000,000 only for the procurement and installation of a backup oxygen system for the F–22. The Committee further directs the Air Force to provide regular updates to the Committee on physiological events involving F–22 pilots, impacts on flight operations, and the progress of efforts to discover and implement solutions.

Odds and Ends

Department of Defense and Service Cyber Activities

The Committee acknowledges the threat to and from the cyber realm and believes it has been well documented; however, the resources being expended against the threat have not. In order to better evaluate the planning and resourcing for Department of Defense cyber activities, the Committee directs the Commander, United States Cyber Command, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and each of the Service Secretaries, to provide the congressional defense committees separate budget justification material, in the form of budget documents as defined in the Department’s financial management regulation, that details the year-to-year budgets, schedule, and milestone goals over the Future Years Defense Program for the individual programs that support the goals of cyber initiatives. The programs detailed must include cyberspace operations, computer network operations, information assurance, and full spectrum cyber operations for the Department of Defense and the Services. Further, the Committee suggests that the Department continue to refine what activities, budget lines, and programs should be considered cyber in order to better coordinate and track these budgets.

So Cyber Command wanted to grow up and be a real COCOM huh? Well, Congress rewards you with a reminder that you get to play by their rules now big boy. Welcome to the bureaucracy.

Special Operations Command Undersea Mobility Program

The Committee is concerned that frequent program and strategy changes to the Undersea Mobility Program have delayed the introduction of advanced capabilities for both wet combat submersible replacement and dry combat submersible development. The current program schedule for dry combat submersibles will not field an operational evaluation platform until early 2015 with extended integrated testing not taking place until 2016. Given current dry combat submersible capability gaps and a potential shift in strategic emphasis to the Asia-Pacific and other regions that present anti-access and area-denial challenges, the Committee believes successful development and fielding of undersea mobility capabilities are critical to meeting combatant commanders’ needs. Additionally, the Committee is concerned that the highly perishable and technical operational expertise for wet and dry combat submersibles resident within the Naval Special Warfare community have not been fully exercised and utilized in recent years, thereby increasing capability gaps and risks to the overall program.

The Committee recommends $35,000,000 above the request for the Undersea Mobility Program for the dry combat submersible program to enable the program to undertake risk reduction activities, thereby increasing the likelihood of delivery of a technically satisfactory system that meets the warfighter’s requirements.

Whenever you see $35 million extra from Congress for any program "to undertake risk reduction activities" it means the program is seen as very important, and there have been special briefings on the Hill regarding the program.

Congress loves Navy SEALs.

Experimenting with Distributed Maritime Operations

noreply@blogger.com (Chris Rawley) — Sat, 19 May 2012 16:52:00 +0000

Observing the lethality and effectiveness of modern distributed special operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere gives one an appreciation for the potential benefits these types of ISR-leveraged, economy of force operations may someday bring to the maritime realm. Over a series of posts, I’ve attempted to articulate this operational concept. Here are some thoughts on decentralized warfare in the littorals. Next, a discussion on one of the ways these operations could be employed in an irregular warfare setting. And here, some ideas on how distributed firepower could enable small ships to become a force multiplier in big wars. Finally, a post arguing that adequate bandwidth at sea is critical to tie all of these concepts together.

Sea-launched RQ-7 Shadow

The proliferation of small remotely provided vehicles is going to provide unique opportunities to test some of these operational concepts. For example, the Marine Corps and Army will soon have more than 400 RQ-7 Shadows in their inventories. This interesting article discusses the utility of these 100lb payload class platforms to drop Shadow Hawk precision guided munitions. Yes, these platforms are small, and their lethal payloads are even smaller. Though there is significant tactical value in being able to provide very precise yet low yield munitions from a small persistent drone, that isn't the point. This platform is ideal for relatively low cost experimentation on concepts of distributed operations at sea. Following pending draw-downs of Army and Marine Corps forces in Afghanistan, these assets will be available for other tasking, and conducting a series of naval experiments on distributed operations would maximize the post-war utility of these platforms. Some of the goals of these battle exercises would be to:

Test the ability to embark, support, and employ dozens (if not 100+) of small UAVs from large deck amphibious ships. Determine maximum sortie rates/ISR lines achievable, C2 and bandwidth requirements, manning and maintenance needs, and the best ratios of manned rotary wing to unmanned ISR/strike aircraft. An LHA/LHD would be an ideal platform for this testing, not only due to deck and hangar space, but because of available bandwidth, staff planning/C2 spaces, and the ability to reserve some deck space for manned aircraft used to move the various ground forces involved.
Develop concepts to support persistent armed overwatch to more lightly armed small ground units and ships and combatant craft at hundreds of miles away from the mother ship. This concept has been proven time and again on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, reducing the risks to small remotely operating troop elements and giving these elements the ability to see and sometimes engage the threat over the next ridgeline. Lightly armed vessels operating independently such as mine countermeasures, logistics ships, and yes, LCS, would benefit from having a 24x7 eye in the sky extending the ship's organic sensors, and dealing with low end threats, while allowing embarked manned helicopters to conduct higher value missions.
Test over-the-horizon cooperative targeting and engagement between these same formations against surface and ground threats.
Explore new lightweight payloads that would exploit the capabilities of large numbers of small persistent drones. These might include jammers, improvised expeditionary communication networks as an alternative to satellite communications, ASW sensors, and the ability to deploy remote unattended ground and ocean sensors.
Develop ways to employ smaller ships as forward arming, refueling, and communications relays for these aircraft.
Assess the ability to bring large formations of these aircraft together into cohesive swarms to defeat boat swarms in the littorals or complex insurgent attacks in an urban environment. Model the use of these massed formations of low cost UAS to penetrate air defenses and attack larger ground and surface targets. A few dozen 11 pound munitions would not sink a large naval combatant, but employed creatively they might achieve a mission kill rendering that vessel's sensors and weapons systems inoperable. Use the results of these tests to develop artificial intelligence algorithms that will reduce the manning necessary to control such a large fleet of remotely piloted aircraft.
Employ the above concepts with various deployed nodes of special operations forces, Marine, and NECC elements, in an effort to understand the capabilities and limitations each of these units brings to the distributed littoral fight.
Test all of the above concepts in electronically-challenged environments. Naysayers of network-centric warfare are quick to point out the difficulties of fighting in an environment where jamming is present. The thing about distributed operations from the sea is that since the platforms are always moving, fixing them and relocating jammers to be effective is more challenging than it would be in a static environment. Many critics have rightfully pointed out the liability that LCS speed requirements have produced to payload, range, and overall platform cost, but in an EW environment, her speed becomes an asset. Jammers have limited ranges and small more numerous platforms able to relocate faster than the enemy's jammers will be able to mitigate some of those issues.

RQ-7B with Shadow Hawk munition

Though distributed operations with small units are certainly not new in our Navy's history (Vietnam small boat ops come to mind), the proliferation of persistent armed and networked remotely piloted vehicles adds a whole new dynamic. The concept has applicability across the spectrum of conflict, but especially in the irregular wars in which we increasingly find ourselves engaged. The upcoming few years will provide an excellent time for experimentation on operational concepts such as distributed maritime operations and the higher end AirSea Battle. The mistakes made and lessons learned will pay dividends the next time our Navy/Marine Corps is called to war.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

An Hour on the Russians

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Sat, 19 May 2012 04:00:00 +0000

Dr. Dmitry Gorenburg, Senior Analyst, CNA Strategic Studies, an Associate at Harvard’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, and author and host of the Russian Military Reform blog is going to be the guest on Midrats this week.

Just giving folks a heads up. That is sure to be a good hour.

Lets Talk About Requirements With Clarity Sir...

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Fri, 18 May 2012 15:00:00 +0000

At the USNI Joint Warfighter 2012 Conference this week, I wanted to talk about shipbuilding. The plan came together on the last day of the conference when I used the panel moderated by Peter Swartz's on acquisition as the setting. You can read about it at USNI.

Keyhole

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Fri, 18 May 2012 13:00:00 +0000

As we continue the movie theme this week, ironically the same week the movie Battleship hits theaters, I encourage folks to check out this presentation by Michael Jones, Chief Technology Advocate at Google Ventures. Now full disclosure, this is how Google rolls and I have seen a version of this speech several times, each time tailored to the audience. Basically Google guys like Mr. Jones walks in and scares the crap out of people.

If you are interested in the power of information, you are going to love this.

Discussion and Debate on Strategy in Asia

noreply@blogger.com (The Conservative Wahoo) — Wed, 16 May 2012 20:14:00 +0000

Here is the video from today's Center for National Policy discussion between T.X. Hammes and me on strategy in Asia.

Bryan McGrath

Cartwright Unleashed

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Wed, 16 May 2012 19:30:00 +0000

It starts slow, but about 5 minutes in you'll realize why you want to watch this until the end. And I'm serious, this ends in a way you want to see.

Perception problem in the South China Sea Dispute

noreply@blogger.com (Feng) — Wed, 16 May 2012 16:18:00 +0000

The dispute between China and Philippines has gotten quite ugly in the past couple of months. It's quite a bad development for China when one considers how good the relationship was just 3 years ago. Internationally, China has been seen as the bully in this case pushing a smaller nation. I read this article on Times that put some good perspectives on this. If you want to know how Chinese leaders think, reading the quotes by Yang Yi is probably the most helpful.

“Eighty percent of the population wants us to use the military,” says Yang Yi, former director of the Institute for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Beijing. “They’re asking, ‘Why are we so weak? Why are we wasting money on our Navy if we are not going to use it?’ Outsiders really do not appreciate what is going on inside China.” Yang says there is a risk of miscalculation as China builds its military and asserts territorial claims in the region. Abroad, he says, China is seen as too assertive; but at home, it’s just the opposite.

Based on my time on Chinese forums, I can say that what Yang says here is 100% true. The question is then why do Chinese people think that Chinese leadership is weak. You have to consider 3 things here:

Chinese kids are taught from a very young age that the majority of South China Sea are part of China. If you have ever taken a look at maps of China issued in China, you would see what I mean.
A renewed self-confidence and nationalism in China in the recent years (especially since 2009)
In the past 150 years, Chinese leaders have been generally speaking very weak in dealing with foreign intrusions. So regardless of how legitimate Chinese claims over South China Sea is, Chinese public will connect it to weakness of past Chinese leadership.

So, the Chinese government has basically created a monster that it has trouble containing. When the Chinese public looks at this dispute in such contrasting light to other publics around China, it's hard to see how Chinese government can navigate through this without looking weak to its own population.

Cartwright Gets Candid at Joint Warfighter 2012

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Tue, 15 May 2012 22:00:00 +0000

I sat stunned today as Hoss Cartwright, former vice-chairman of the Joint Staff, gave a remarkable speech at the Joint Warfighter Conference in Virginia Beach, Virginia. I've probably seen a dozen or so speeches from General Cartwright, and I've never seen him put on a performance anything like this.

Without a single note card, without skipping a beat or step in his comments, the General "savaged sacred cows from the Joint Strike Fighter to cybersecurity to the AirSea Battle concept" in the words of Sydney Freedman of AOL Defense. You bet - that's one way to put it.

First he hit on the topic of sequestration, then followed with recapitalization. From AOL Defense:

That means "we've got at least another increment of a couple hundred [billion]," Cartwright went on. "If you take another two hundred billion out of this budget, we're going to start to run into a problem if you don't start thinking about the strategy," he said. "You really need strategy before you spend money, and what you spend it on needs to be something you can actually afford."

On the ground, the current strategy is one shaped by a decade of optimization for operations from static bases in Afghanistan and Iraq. "We are now an occupation force," Cartwright said. "When you go to battle by getting up in the morning in your compound, getting into your armored vehicles, go out and patrol, and return to your compound at night, that is an occupation force." With all its armored vehicles, its body armor, and -- equally important -- its massive logistical tail, "it is a very heavy force, too heavy to move by air," he said. So if the Marine Corps and Army recapitalize their ground vehicle fleets without reconceptualizing them, they will lack the agility that future operations require.

And that doesn't even include what he said about the Joint Strike Fighter. Read the article.

Congress has got to find a way to get these kind of incredibly candid comments from military leaders while they are still on active duty. It is way past time for someone who is on active duty to testify ""We built the F-35 with absolutely no protection for it from a cyber standpoint," which is exactly what he said today. We are talking about a fighter aircraft that will serve as the backbone of the United States aviation for decades, and is already hampered by millions lines of software code that isn't quite right yet, and a retired VCJCS reveals the aircraft wasn't developed with cyberwarfare in mind? The Lockheed Martin guy two tables over looked very uncomfortable, and since Cartwright is a former marine aviator, his credibility on the subject is not in question.

What a stunning speech. I'll be posting a copy as soon as it is up. It will lull you to sleep in the first two minutes before he bitch-slaps you with repeated brilliance, then ends on a topic of medical innovation developed as a result of DARPA work that is an entire topic unto itself - and makes the entire concept introduced in the Matrix movies of uploading martial arts software into your brain not simply science fiction - but very possibly the very, very near future.

Cartwright also had some very interesting things to say regarding cyber. Indeed, as far as cyber goes, Cartwright is slowly becoming the most articulate person in the room on the subject. For a sample check out this video from OpenGov yesterday. In his speech today he talked about how the US is 90% defensive and 10% offensive with cyber, which he correctly IMO described as 'bass ackward.' Said another way, Cartwright takes a very Clausewitz view on cyberspace, and that attack is the first, best option. As he was discussing it I kept thinking to myself "why have the Chinese figured this out and we seem lost on the concept?"

Lots of good stuff today. More to come.

----

As a side note from Day 1 at #JWC12 - there were a lot of foreign officers in uniform at the conference today, indeed the conference had a lot of people in uniform. It's a different vibe when you are at a conference with so many people in uniform, and today it seemed like the Army showed up in battalion strength. I bet the venders were happy, and I imagine the Army was pleased to overrun a Navy conference like they did today.

EU Strikes Somali Pirate Depot

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Tue, 15 May 2012 11:00:00 +0000

Apparently the Europeans were serious when they voted to start striking targets on land. Release from EUNAVFOR.

15th May – Earlier today, following the decision taken on 23 March 2012 by the Council of the European Union to allow the EU Naval Force to take disruption action against known pirate supplies on the shore, EU forces conducted an operation to destroy pirate equipment on the Somali coastline.

The operation was conducted in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1851 and has the full support of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. The focused, precise and proportionate action was conducted from the air and all forces returned safely to EU warships on completion. Whilst assessment is on-going, surveillance of the area during the action indicates that no Somalis were injured ashore as a result of EU action.

Speaking about the operation, the Operation Commander of the EU Naval Force, Rear Admiral Duncan Potts said “We believe this action by the EU Naval Force will further increase the pressure on, and disrupt pirates’ efforts to get out to sea to attack merchant shipping and dhows. The local Somali people and fishermen – many of whom have suffered so much because of piracy in the region, can be reassured that our focus was on known pirate supplies and will remain so in the future.”

At no point did EU Naval Force ‘boots’ go ashore. Rear Admiral Potts went on to say “The EU Naval Force action against pirate supplies on the shoreline is merely an extension of the disruption actions carried out against pirate ships at sea, and Operation Atalanta remains committed to fighting piracy off the Horn of Africa and the humanitarian mission of protecting World Food Programme ships that bring vital aid to the Somali people.”

Operation Atalanta is part of the EU’s comprehensive approach to tackling symptoms and root causes of piracy in the Horn of Africa and the EU strategic framework for that region adopted in November 2011. Currently there are 9 warships in the EU Naval Force and 5 Maritime Patrol Aircraft.

The reach of Somali pirates is vast; they have attacked merchant ships up to 1,750 miles off the Somali coast. Preventing them getting out to sea is a crucial step in removing their impunity ashore and to further the success of counter-piracy operations.

First, this is the French and the Danes, both of whom have had enough of piracy. The Danes have been particularly effective in their anti-piracy tactics for a long time. ~~The attack was likely launched from the French Mistral class vessel in the area. I am hearing the shooters were British, and concentrated on taking out the outboard motors of pirate boats.~~ We have discussed this in the past on the blog - indeed taking out outboard motors on pirate boats has been something US Navy officers who have patrolled off Somalia have mentioned several times in several venues as being one way to quickly hurt pirate operations. Why hasn't the US Navy done this before? Someone should ask the State Department...

A target in Somalia with no people was probably low hanging fruit. Its hard to believe an airstrike against a depot so important no one was there is going to be an effective deterrent against piracy.

I don't mean to sound cold, but I do think the EU is going to have to actually kill pirates if their little land attack strategy is going to be an effective deterrent. Based on the way this press release is worded, I'm not sure that's the plan.

Updated: Turns out it was a Spanish SH-60B from the frigate Reina Sofía (F-84) with other EU forces supporting. What a good sign to see the Spanish engaged like this, and with success it is more likely we will see more of this kind of activity.

Insurance Company Funded Private Navy Preparing for Pirate Wars

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Mon, 14 May 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Private Navy's to fight pirates are coming, and we are starting to see more details.

A private navy costing US$70 million (Dh257m) is being set up to escort merchant ships through the pirate-infested Gulf of Aden.

It will comprise a fleet of 18 ships, based in Djibouti, and will offer to convoy merchant vessels along the Internationally Recognised Transit Corridor (IRTC).

This is the world's most dangerous shipping lane, between the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea. The fleet will be operated by the Convoy Escort Programme (CEP), a British company launched by the international shipping insurers Jardine Lloyd Thompson (JLT) and the Lloyds of London underwriters Ascot.

Full funding will be in place by the end of next month, and the CEP hopes the fleet will be operational by December.

"The shipping industry needs to stand up and be counted," said Angus Campbell, the CEP's chief executive and a former director of Overseas Shipholding Group, the world's second-biggest listed oil tanker company. "The time is now, not in four or five years' time."

Piracy in the region is costing the global economy an estimated US$7 billion a year. For the ship owners alone, every vessel sailing through the waters off Somalia is charged additional insurance premiums of between $50,000 and $80,000.

Ships opting to carry their own armed guards can be charged an additional $18,000 and $60,000 per voyage by security companies.

Although the European Union is spending more than €8m (Dh37.94m) a year to maintain a naval force in the waters - EU NavFor - its warships still cannot provide close support to all merchant vessels.

The CEP, however, offers substantial savings to owners as well as protection from pirate attack. The CEP will buy insurance and use that to cover the ships in its convoys, so owners will no longer need to pay premiums, or hire security.

Instead, they will just pay a flat $30,000 to $40,000 per ship in the convoy.

Read the rest here.

Note the ships of this private Navy will be conducting their mission Internationally Recognized Transit Corridor (IRTC). The thing is, very few pirate attacks and maybe as few as 2 total hijackings have taken place in the corridor over the past few years, so in some ways this is smoke and mirrors from the insurance industry, and a way for them to sustain the money grab but protect product at the same time.

This sets an interesting precedent in the 21st century. It is past time to start thinking about what the role of private Navy's will be during the next war at sea - because as this demonstrates, the need for private Navy's will always exist and during war time it's a safe bet they absolutely will exist.

AQAP’s Fight From the Sea

noreply@blogger.com (Chris Rawley) — Sat, 12 May 2012 14:28:00 +0000

This week’s most excellent news from the Arabian Peninsula was that long time fugitive COLE bombing planner Fahd al-Quso was exploded. But a little noticed related story was Al Qaeda’s retaliatory attack in the vicinity of Zinjibar, which killed 30+ Yemeni troops. What is most interesting about this attack is that a portion of AQAP’s fighters reportedly infiltrated via fishing boats, demonstrating a very nascent amphibious warfare capability. The importance of Zinjibar and Yemen’s Southern coast to AQ's strategy has been discussed by this author before.

In the terrorists’ own words: “Attention is drawn to the fact that for the first time the Mujahideen attacked the puppets both by land and sea. This fact testifies to the rapidly growing potential of the armed forces of AQAP.” Since the attack on COLE, Islamic militants in Yemen have occasionally promoted their “fleet” and threatened friendly shipping. So why haven’t we seen more evidence of their maritime capability? One, as special operations folks like to say, "don't confuse enthusiasm with capability." Al Qaeda's appreciation and desire for naval power is real, but building a viable maritime capability much beyond smuggling networks and an occasional lucky attack is challenging. Second, since COLE, allied navies and commercial shipping have increased their awareness and hardened themselves against these sorts of attacks (we also have unchecked piracy to thank for that). Finally, these plots have likely been quietly disrupted by various counter-terrorism actions. Nevertheless, much like AQAP’s ongoing laser-like focus on attacking Western aviation was inspired by successful 911 aviation attacks, aspirations for a useful maritime capability bolstered by the success against COLE are unlikely to wane, so ongoing attention is warranted.

And in a tangentially-connected story, four Somalis were arrested on Yemen’s Socotra Island learning how to scuba dive. Were they these guys just enjoying a sabbatical from buccaneering or do they represent another example of the al Shabaab fighters who have increasingly adjusted their sights toward jihad in Yemen as their own prospects falter in Somalia? As AQAP still controls terrority in Southern Yemen, it has become the new magnet and safe haven for foreign fighters. Until we get serious about destroying these safe havens faster than they can regenerate, the movement will persist and the war against al Qaeda will not be won.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Panetta Warns Legislators Against Pet Projects

noreply@blogger.com (The Conservative Wahoo) — Fri, 11 May 2012 11:07:00 +0000

Presumably, SECDEF's admonitions to Congress don't apply to the Secretary of the Navy and his questionable and expensive emphasis on biofuels.

Bryan McGrath

Questionable Assumptions

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Wed, 09 May 2012 13:00:00 +0000

Robert Haddick's contribution back on March 30, 2012 in the Foreign Policy/Small Wars Journal This Week at War series is an interesting and yet very familiar take on naval developments unfolding in the Pacific theater. Even as time has passed since Bob Work spoke at Surface Navy Association conference, a theme has emerged with staying power that continues to find itself as a part of nearly every Pacific discussion lately.

Robert Haddick eloquently discusses the issues like this.

Under Secretary of the Navy Robert Work, in a January 2012 speech to the Surface Navy Association, dismissed concerns about the Navy's shrinking ship count. Work asserted that the Navy's robust plans for long-range air reconnaissance, conducted by new aircraft such as the P-8A Poseidon and a Navy version of the Global Hawk drone, will do much of the routine maritime patrolling previously done by ships. Bases in Australia, the Cocos Islands, and elsewhere in the southwest Pacific would support surveillance of the South China Sea. If ships were required to respond to problems, admirals could send them in as always. But under Work's assumption, fewer ships will be needed for routine patrolling. And with less routine steaming, the Navy will save money and keep its ships better maintained.

The question is whether more aerial maritime reconnaissance and fewer ships making fewer port visits around the South China Sea and elsewhere will provide the reassuring and stabilizing presence that the visible presence of Navy ships has heretofore provided. Work's air reconnaissance doctrine and the Navy's slumping fleet size combine to form a new theory for providing a stabilizing presence in global commons such as the South China Sea. We will know that this theory is not working if the leaders of U.S. allies increase their diplomatic hedging behavior. Regional arms races, another response to a perceived decline in U.S. military power, would be another indication of failure. China's ongoing annual double-digit increases in defense spending and a looming submarine arms race in the region are not good signs.

These two paragraphs by Robert Haddick sum up nicely the two biggest issues surrounding the US Navy today, and do so in the context of the South China Sea. The first issue is what Robert Haddick is calling Work's air reconnaissance doctrine, but the second issue is at least as important - the role the Littoral Combat Ship is expected to perform for the nation in the future.

Bob Work's air reconnaissance doctrine is probably one of the most interesting evolutions of sea power theory since WWI, and easily one of the least discussed major changes taking place in the Navy right now. At Surface Navy Association - ironically - Bob Work made clear the Navy will replace the presence of ships with ISR aircraft, and he stated that ship numbers do carry the same importance as in previous eras primarily because advanced ISR will give fewer ships more information than they have ever had, thus allow fewer ships to perform the same mission just as effectively as more ships without the ISR could. The argument that technology enables a smaller fleet to be as effective as larger fleets in previous eras is not new, indeed it is an argument Bob Work has made in several ways in the past - including at SNA when he stated the 300 ship Navy will be far more capable than the 600 ship Navy of the 1980s.

The key questions to ask as this theory is executed include whether aircraft can legitimately replace the presence of a ship, what is lost in the context of political influence as ships are substituted with aircraft, and whether replacing ships with aircraft is a legitimate approach towards maritime battlespaces in peacetime when that same effort has been largely ineffective dealing with other low intensity maritime problems like narcotics and piracy.

An aircraft, submarine, and unmanned system all suffer from a very specific problem in the maritime domain - they cannot influence any ship at sea unless they do so through fear or threat, and ultimately aircraft, submarines, and unmanned systems can either observe a target or destroy a target - with virtually no middle ground along the scales of escalation. One of the primary political values of surface warfare is the range of scalable options that naval forces have in dealing with ships of other nations; whether observe, search, seize, deny, destroy, etc.. - and the execution of these roles can be sustained with public visibility, meaning executed as an enduring political communication. An aircraft returns to base for fuel, while a ship can have fuel brought to where the ship is. I liken the presence of aircraft relative to ships the difference between virtual presence and physical presence, and while virtual presence is better than no presence, it cannot trump physical presence.

Information certainly beings a lot of power to the fleet, and aircraft are certainly viable alternatives for exercising control of the sea during wartime, but it gets highly questionable when information becomes a substitute for physical presence during peacetime.

However, it is the combination of aircraft ISR and the emerging LCS non-combat doctrine that really describes what is taking place in the minds of planners. The CNO has basically outlined the conceptual purpose of the Littoral Combat Ship, as discussed in this AOL Defense article.

the Chief of Naval Operations acknowledged that the Navy's prized new Littoral Combat Ship might not survive a shooting war against a well-armed adversary like China. But, Adm. Jonathan Greenert said this morning at a National Press Club breakfast organized by Government Executive magazine, the small, versatile vessel could free up larger warships from the day-to-day policing, presence, and partnership-building missions that are the best way to prevent a crisis from erupting in the first place.

"These are not large surface combatants that are going to sail into the South China Sea and challenge the Chinese military; that's not what they're made for," Greenert said of the LCS class. Even the LCS contingent soon to start operating out of Singapore will focus on exercises, port visits, humanitarian assistance, and counter-piracy operations with Southeast Asian partners -- taking that burden off the more war-worthy carrier, cruisers, and destroyers based in Japan.

Worldwide, said Greenert, "Littoral Combat Ships will tend to displace amphibious ships and destroyers in Africa and South America. That will free up surface combatants, more high-end ships," for East Asia.

The role of the Littoral Combat Ship for the fleet of the future is probably one of the most controversial discussions in sea power theory the US Navy has had since the Navy began fielding the aircraft carrier, and easily one of the most discussed changes taking place in the Navy right now. In my opinion, both the criticisms and defenses of the Littoral Combat Ship have largely become too absurd for just about anyone to be taken seriously anymore, and even several reporters find themselves incapable of looking to the future as they focus entirely on the past. The article about LCS in AOL Defense today that includes an interview with RADM Rowden is both really good and really rare, because it lacks the usual bullshit that accompanies a discussion of LCS. It's also worth noting the discussion over at the CIMSEC NextWar blog on LCS, including this article by LT Albaugh, this article by LTJG Matt Hipple, and this article by LT Scott Cheney-Peters. All in all, this might be the first time in my five years of blogging that 4 different uniformed members of the US Navy who are not PAOs discussed publicly the Littoral Combat Ship in a 48 hour period. It's refreshing, the goggles have been backward facing on LCS for too long, and with it coming - it's time to flip the goggles around and look forward.

It is important to note the Navy has decided the Littoral Combat Ship will be forward deployed to at least two places initially - Bahrain in the Persian Gulf and Singapore in the South China Sea. That's a big damn deal, because that is exactly where the anti-access / area denial threats are being developed with the most rigor - by Iran and China respectively. The places the LCS will be forward deployed flies in the face of what even the CNO is saying about the environment the LCS will supposedly not operate in. All indications are we are leading up to an inflection point with LCS, a pivot that will in some way reflect lessons learned from actually using the ship. With still many, many months before USS Freedom (LCS 1) will deploy to Singapore, I suspect the pivot for LCS will take place long before the first LCS calls a port in Asia home. We probably won't hear about it until the FY15 budget in late 2014 though, because to be blunt, the Navy really can't afford anything new with LCS until the FY15 budget and beyond.

The use of ISR aircraft as a substitute for ships in the South China Sea as per Bob Work's own presentation at SNA combined with the Navy's intent to base Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore for regional port visits are both new operational concepts intended to perform the same function - free up larger surface combatants for other purposes. That raises the question, once larger surface combatants are not being used for sustained presence, what will they be doing? If we follow logic driven by traditional Mahanian naval warfare doctrine, the big blue fleet will then be consolidated and concentrated in task forces towards the traditional role of maritime power projection - to the 5th and 7th fleet according to maritime strategy.

On paper (or better yet in theory) this light footprint forward approach might work, but are the planning assumptions correct? If the Littoral Combat Ship "might not survive a shooting war against a well-armed adversary like China" then why is the first place the Navy sending the Littoral Combat Ship Singapore, in the South China Sea region, where any shooting war involving China is most likely to take place? Since we are talking about the South China Sea, one could presume the challenger is China - "a well-armed adversary," so that raises the question where major combatant forces will be consolidated and concentrated in times of tension, crisis, or at the outbreak of hostilities? With the emphasis on Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles and submarines, and based on what is known about AirSea Battle in the open source - it appears that any initial consolidation of surface forces including aircraft carriers will be outside the South China Sea, indeed outside the range of China's anti-access/area denial capabilities.

Again, that leads us back to whether the US Navy has their planning assumptions correct. How does the United States assure allies with naval presence if the primary purpose in execution of both doctrines Robert Haddick hints to in his article is specific to insuring major naval combat capabilities are NOT in the area to support allies, rather out of harms way to insure the US Navy's fleet survives during opening phases of the war. Has the US Navy designed an operational model that insures the US Navy will not be present on the front lines to defend the national interests the fleet exists to defend in the first place? Such an operational theory towards protecting the major battle force elements of the fleet during the outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific is not new to the US Navy, the same theory insured the battleships were consolidated and protected at Pearl Harbor on December 1941. With that said, the Royal Navy was on the front lines of the Pacific in December 1941, and one of the most capable battleships in the world at that time - the Prince of Whales - was sunk 3 days after Pearl Harbor.

Work's air reconnaissance doctrine and the expected role for the LCS still require much more intellectual rigor towards explanation that what has been provided to date. Aircraft provide the nation very limited capacity to execute a political responsibility that is inherent to the value of naval vessels in influencing escalation of threat or tension, and the planning assumption that the LCS won't fight in A2AD environments while being forward based in Bahrain and Singapore is intellectually dishonest at best. The Navy has produced both doctrines as ad-hoc fixes to fill the gaps for a fleet that last year had a floor of 313 ships and this year has a ceiling of 300 ships - just so that the Navy can defend present force structure.

I want the LCS to work, but the LCS looks to me like a platform that needs changes right now that reflect the nations recent pivot towards Asia, and I do suspect those changes are coming - eventually. A modular ship with no modules to swap wastes a lot of money on modularity, and that speed requirement is basically a $100 million mistake designed into each hull. The LCS lacks legitimate firepower and still has no payloads to speak of. Regardless, I still believe the concept of motherships is sound and the Littoral Combat Ship makes a lot of sense as an entry level mothership platform. The network side of unmanned systems is going to be a monumental task for the Navy to execute, and assuming the modules ever arrive - that is one issue the LCS can help the US Navy solve in an operational capacity.

But I am having trouble buying into any theory that suggests ISR aircraft can somehow replace a Navy ship, because the planning assumptions of that theory undermines the political value of seapower as part of national power. Manned naval ships have the capacity to influence national interests forward in all kinds of political activities short of major war in ways standing Army's and Air Forces cannot, but the US Navy does not appear to be interested in those aspects of manned surface naval power.

With $1.2 trillion worth of US trade in transit in the South China Sea annually, and over a million people from around the world conducting commerce on the South China Seas nearly every day - the South China Seas represents the center of gravity of the global economy, so every detail in how the US Navy operates and conducts business in the South China Sea matters a great deal, and has global ramifications. Smart people like Bob Work say the size of the fleet doesn't matter as much as it used to, but how can it not matter when the lack of ships leads to promoting theories like aircraft replacing the presence role of warships, LCS replacing the presence roles of high end warships, and maritime power projection in support of allies becomes a task for the small Navy while big blue fleet concentrates out of range of the bad guys.

The US Navy today is trying to rewrite the book on US seapower to reflect our overall decline of maritime power and our numerical decline in naval power by theorizing about advantages we have from our technical and military superiority. It is an absolutely valid exercise, but I have serious questions about the validity of the planning assumptions and believe poor assumptions up front distorts the validity of the conclusions.

Still Working Out the Kinks

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Wed, 09 May 2012 05:00:00 +0000

I am not sure what I find more frustrating, that the crew is struggling with their role in the maintenance of the ship, or that the contractors are struggling with their role in the maintenance of the ship.

It's a given that by posting this, the content of what is said will get blown out of context, so for those who aren't sure what is going on here - keep in mind the TYCOM Material Inspection (TMI) is a process intended to help ships prepare for INSURV. This is by definition what you would call good work on their part, identifying problems prior to INSURV. There is both good and bad here, as there always is with any TMI.

R 071920Z MAY 12
FM COMNAVSURFPAC SAN DIEGO CA
TO USS FREEDOM
INFO COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
COMNAVSURFPAC SAN DIEGO CA
PRESINSURV VIRGINIA BEACH VA
COMLCSRON SAN DIEGO CA
COMLCSRON ONE
BT
UNCLAS
MSGID/GENADMIN/COMNAVSURFPAC SAN DIEGO CA/0805/MAY//
SUBJ/TYCOM MATERIAL INSPECTION REPORT FOR USS FREEDOM (LCS 1)//
REF/A/MSGID:DOC/INSURV/28FEB2008/4370.1//
REF/B/MSGID:DOC/INSURV/06JUN2008/4730.3//
REF/C/MSGID:DOC/COMUSFLTFORCOM/11MAR2008/4790.3//
REF/D/MSGID:DOC/INSURV/26OCT1999/4730.11//
REF/E/MSGID:DOC/OPNAV/26DEC2007/5090.1//
REF/F/MSGID:DOC/OPNAV/30MAY2007/5100.19//
REF/G/MSGID:DOC/NAVSEA/15APR2004/9593.2//
REF/H/MSGID:DOC/CNSP/22SEP2011//

REF A IS INSURVINST 4730.1 SERIES, MATERIAL INSPECTIONS OF SURFACE SHIPS.
REF B IS INSURVINST 4730.3 SERIES, TRIALS OF SURFACE SHIPS.
REF C IS COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 4790.3 SERIES, JOINT FLEET MAINTENANCE MANUAL (VOL IV).
REF D IS INSURVINST 4730.11 SERIES, DOCUMENTATION OF DISCREPANCIES.
REF E IS OPNAVINST 5090.1 SERIES, ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES PROGRAM MANUAL.
REF F IS OPNAVINST 5100.19 SERIES, NAVY SAFETY AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH (SOH) INSPECTION AND CERTIFICATION PROCESS FOR OIL POLLUTION ABATEMENT (OPA) SYSTEMS IN U.S. NAVY SURFACE SHIPS AND CRAFT.
REF H IS CNSPINST 4730.2, TYCOM MATERIAL INSPECTION (TMI) PROCESS.//

GENTEXT/REMARKS/
1. A TMI WAS CONDUCTED ON USS FREEDOM (LCS 1) IN SAN DIEGO, CA FROM 3-5 MAY, 2012. THE TMI TEAM (TMIT) ASSESSES FREEDOM AS A HIGH RISK TO PASS THEIR SPECIAL TRIAL AND DOES NOT RECOMMEND THE SHIP PROCEED TO THEIR SCHEDULED SPECIAL TRIAL UNTIL THE SHIP COMPLETES A SATISFACTORY RE-DEMONSTRATION.

2. SENIOR INSPECTOR COMMENTS: USS FREEDOM (LCS 1) IS EVALUATED AS A "NO-GO" AND IS NOT RECOMMENDED TO PROCEED WITH THE SCHEDULED SPECIAL TRIAL (ST). FREEDOM'S CREW AND CONTRACTORS WERE NOT PREPARED FOR THE INSPECTION. BOTH ENTITIES WERE UNFAMILIAR WITH THE CONDUCT OF INSURV MATERIAL CHECKS. EXECUTION OF THE SOE WAS VERY POOR. THERE WAS CONFUSION BETWEEN CONTRACTOR AND CREW RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT CHECKS. THE INSPECTION EXPERIENCE LEVEL FOR THE MAJORITY OF THE CREW IS LOW ALTHOUGH THEY DID DEMONSTRATE A GOOD POSITIVE ATTITUDE. THE CREW AND CONTRACTORS NEED TO CONTINUE TO FAMILIARIZE THEMSELVES WITH THE SHIP'S EQUIPMENT, OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES, IMPROVE IN PRESENTATION/DEMONSTRATIONS AND AGGRESSIVELY MANAGE/COORDINATE SOE. THE SHIP WAS CLEAN. SEVERAL AREAS REQUIRE PRESERVATION. SAFETY PROGRAMS ABOARD THE SHIP ARE NON-EXISTENT. THE SHIP DID DEMONSTRATE THE ABILITY TO SELF-ASSESS. HOWEVER, THEY ARE NOT AGGRESSIVELY REPORTING AND PURSUING RESOLUTION OF THE DEFICIENCIES THEY HAVE IDENTIFIED.

3. DEMONSTRATION RESULTS:

A. FULL POWER-RED
B. QUICK REVERSAL ASTERN-RED
C. QUICK REVERSAL AHEAD-RED
D. STEERING-GREEN
E. ANCHOR DROP-YELLOW
F. AFFF TEST-RED
G. SD DTE-YELLOW
H. LONG RANGE AIR SEARCH- GREEN
I. 57MM LIVE FIRE-GREEN

4. FUNCTIONAL AREA RESULTS:

A. AVIATION-RED
B. COMMUNICATIONS-RED
C. INFO SYSTEMS-GREEN
D. NAVIGATION-YELLOW
E. OPERATIONS-RED
F. WEAPONS-YELLOW
G. AUXILIARIES-RED
H. ELECTRICAL-RED
I. MAIN PROPULSION-RED
J. DAMAGE CONTROL-RED
K. DECK-RED
L. ENVIR PROTECTION-YELLOW
M. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH-RED
N. MEDICAL-YELLOW
O. VENTILATION-YELLOW
P. HABITABILITY-GREEN
Q. SUPPLY-YELLOW
R. ABILITY TO SELF-ASSESS-GREEN
S. 3M SPOTCHECKS-RED
T. ATIS DATABASE-NOT DEMONSTRATED//

Should You Happen To Be in DC May 16th....

noreply@blogger.com (The Conservative Wahoo) — Tue, 08 May 2012 23:36:00 +0000

Asia and the Future of American Strategy

The United States is in the process of "rebalancing" to Asia. To date, it has not published a military strategy in support of that balancing. Please join CNP President, Scott Bates and a panel of experts as they debate a suitable strategy that might sufficiently deter China, assure our allies, and ensure the ability to terminate a conflict on acceptable terms.

Featuring:

Dr. T.X. HammesNational Defense University

CDR Bryan McGrath (ret.)Delex Consulting, Studies and Analysis

*A light lunch will be served*

CLICK HERE TO REGISTER

Where
Center for National Policy
One Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Suite 333

Washington, DC 20001
202-682-1800

When
May 16 12:00 pm - 1:15 pm

Eponymous

noreply@blogger.com (Robert Farley) — Sun, 06 May 2012 12:49:00 +0000

The 240 ton patrol boat "Kazakhstan" is about to set sail:

The ship "is designed to destroy surface ships, boats and transports of the enemy on their own and in collaboration with naval strike forces," said an MoD release. The Kazakhstan will thus become the most powerful ship in the eponymous country's nascent navy, and the first that is really a naval ship, as opposed to a coast guard vessel. By next year, two more ships of the same class are scheduled to be launched as well. Kazakhstan naval officials had earlier said they were planning to buy three corvettes (a somewhat larger ship), as well, from South Korea, but little has been said about that lately. The ship will have a displacement of 240 tons, has a top speed of 30 knots and is armed with "modernised anti-aircraft missile and artillery units,"

While I appreciate the pride associated with a new naval vessel and the desire for a regime to associate its military achievements with national honor, the history of eponymous naming hasn't been particularly inspiring. Panzerschiff Deutschland (one of several ships with the name) represented an impressive technical achievement given Germany's legal constraints, but was renamed to avoid an unpleasant Allied propaganda victory. The Italians went the opposite way, with fascist-themed Littorio becoming the more safely patriotic Italia upon the fall of Mussolini. The unluckiest pair of eponymously named warships were probably France and Espana, dreadnoughts which ran afoul of rocks exactly one year apart (August 26 is apparently an unlucky day for battleships). A second Espana (thus dubbed following the fall of her first namesake, Alfonso XIII) hit a mine and sank in 1937.

Nor has "United States" been an especially successful name for the USN. The frigate USS United States led a successful career, but the battlecruiser (CC-6) never made it off the slip, and the abortive aircraft carrier (CVA-58) helped produce a crisis of civil-military relation and inter-service rivalry. The fate of SS United States remains undetermined.

On the upside, the names Canada, New Zealand, and Australia have worked out reasonably well, even if the main service of such ships came with the Royal Navy rather than the dominion fleets.

Liberated Information and the Future of Irregular Warfare

noreply@blogger.com (Chris Rawley) — Wed, 02 May 2012 01:13:00 +0000

The control, manipulation, and dissemination of information have always been a staple of conflict, but now the ability to use information in war is no longer a monopoly of the nation state. At USNI’s Blog, Petty Officer Lucien Gauthier cites a tremendous MIT Technology Review article on the subject and discusses the role of individuals who intervene in wars, with last year’s Libya revolution as a case study. Lucien presents some thought-provoking questions on the ethical dilemmas these activists will present to future nation state belligerents. Of interest to the naval crowd in the MIT article is how the how rebel NTC smugglers aided by one of their countrymen in Denver, Colorado circumvented NATO’s maritime embargo. “When the opposition smuggled weapons and humanitarian aid into Misrata's port, which was being heavily shelled by the regime, Benfayed gave NATO the time of the run, and the size and name of each boat, to reduce the chance of friendly fire. Benfayed ran his control room until he was confident he had directly linked NATO to the key leaders in each of his networks.”

The sort of informal humint network/virtual JOC Benfayed established is just the tip of the iceberg in regards to how global citizens will partipate in future wars. The net result of this new reality is that even future state-on-state conflicts will devolve into irregular, population-centric warfare, as vigilante groups, hacktivists, diasporas, and other individual actors become engaged in the information and cyber battle spaces.

I have been researching aspects of this subject for an upcoming journal article and will discuss in future posts here how the United States and allied nations can embrace and exploit the concept of liberated information and virtual belligerents. The alternative – ignoring the power of non-state actors – will risk ceding control of not just the information high ground, but of entire military campaigns, as the initiative shifts to groups or individuals who are able to manipulate militaries on one side or the other to do their bidding.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Center for International Maritime Security

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Mon, 30 Apr 2012 04:00:00 +0000

Many times I have noted there are few think tanks in the United States who are dedicated to maritime studies from a public consumption perspective. It would appear a few young Navy officers are doing something about that.

The Center for International Maritime Security is a non-profit, non-partisan think tank. It was formed in 2012 to bring together forward-thinkers from a variety of fields to examine the capabilities, threats, hotspots, and opportunities for security in the maritime domain. Check out the NextWar blog to join the discussion. We encourage a diversity of views.

The views expressed on this website are solely those of the authors and do not reflect the official viewpoints or policies of the contributor’s employers, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Interesting, I think. One to watch and added to the blogroll.