Information Dissemination

Sensible Advice From The Sage of Singapore

noreply@blogger.com (The Conservative Wahoo) — Sat, 07 Nov 2009 14:12:00 +0000

The President is gearing up for an important visit to East Asia next week, and by way of preparation, Lee Kuan Yew stopped by to chat about his neighborhood. In the process, Mr. Lee passed along some sage advice to the President, advice that obviously carries with it significant implications for the Navy.

"If you do not hold your ground in the Pacific, you cannot be a world leader."

What does this mean? It means that if we want influence in the region, we cannot cede--nor can we be seen to be ceding--influence. It means that we must continue to look at regional security issues in East Asia as much, much more than a Taiwan scenario or a North Korea scenario. It means a steady hand, even as longtime allies like Japan flirt with "redefining" our relationship. It means a respectful posture toward China and its "rise", but not one that ushers in some sense of inevitability. And at the macro-macro level, it means getting our domestic house in order so that we can continue to be the economic power the world needs us to be--the trusted hand on the tiller.

Bryan McGrath

Technical Issues

noreply@blogger.com (The Conservative Wahoo) — Thu, 05 Nov 2009 12:40:00 +0000

A few readers have emailed me to let me know that there are some technical issues with the site, seemingly mostly for Firefox users.

I'll pass them along to Galrahn, who is taking care of some personal business right now. Please keep checking back into the site to see new posts and the status of issue resolution.

Bryan McGrath

Update: Here is what's happening. The comments were upgraded from Haloscan to JSKIT over the past 24 hours and I have not adjusted the blog code accordingly yet. Will be taking care of this soon. My time is very limited the next 48 hours, but I will try to get this resolved. I apologize for the inconvenience and disruption this has on the blog.

The Navy and Ready to Launch Satellites

noreply@blogger.com (The Conservative Wahoo) — Wed, 04 Nov 2009 16:04:00 +0000

The Commander of the United States Strategic Command, General Kevin Chilton, USAF, gave a speech this week in which he presented the view that he would give up state-of-the-art space systems in order to swell the number of satellites the military could launch as the need arises. I rise in support of the General's view, and I would suggest that the Navy has a role to play here.

China's January 2007 ASAT test sent the US a message, that The Middle Kingdom intends asymmetrically to challenge our space dominance and our ability to exercise global command and control of our forces. This is an interesting development, one that demands a strategic response.

Clearly, if we were to assess the Chinese as having more than a "one off" capability to deny us the use of space, we (the Nation) must figure out a way to contest this capability. Persistent airborne relay systems are one part of the answer, but effective "Operational Space Responsiveness" (OSR) must also be part of the strategy. To that end, Navy platforms--surface and subsurface--should be considered for launch platforms for rapidly programmable satellites that would gap-fill or repair architectures disrupted by enemy ASAT attack.

One candidate for such a capability is the replacement for the OHIO Class SSBN. Rather than looking at the SSBN's strategic role in a narrowly focused way--i.e. as the platform for delivering nuclear ICBM's--the OHIO Replacement should be seen as a true STRATEGIC asset, one that could continue its strategic nuclear role, while also serving as a launch platform for rapidly programmable satellites, as well as long range conventional weapons and possibly even boost phase interceptors.

Additionally, the CG(X) class should be planned with missile launching systems that would be flexible enough to accommodate the large-size of rapidly programmable satellites--as well as the systems recommended above for the Ohio Replacement.

Critics of such initiatives generally take come in two flavors. The first wonder (with justification) whether these missions are best or properly carried out by Naval platforms, and this is a question worth some credible analysis. I just don't know the answer.

The other variety of critic is the one who looks at the employment of ballistic objects--missiles or satellites--from US naval platforms as inherently destabilizing. This line of thinking was of course, very logical when we were squaring off with the Soviet Union. But it strikes me as an intellectual surrender to think that we would take such capability off the table now for fear of its being misinterpreted (as in, how would someone else know whether the ballistic object launched was an ICBM nuke, an ICBM conventional, or a satellite) while we sit back and allow a Chinese developed anti-ship ballistic missile to partially drive Navy shipbuilding plans without so much as a peep as to the destabilizing nature of the weapon. Yes--I know--the ASBM's are not ICBMS--they are MRBM's. And I know that we have some capacity to discern this--at some point in the flight of the missile. But let's face it--until such time as an evaluation is made that the missile is not an ICBM headed for the US, it COULD be. Hence, the destabilizing nature of the launch.

Which brings me back to quicklaunch of rapidly programmable satellites. Such a capability--architected with airborne gap filler comms/sensor relays--provides the Chinese with a moving target so to speak, one that would be increasingly difficult to overcome. The Chinese are MAKING us compete with them (by the development of the ASBM). Let's get into the game.

Bryan McGrath

What I Learned on Election Day

Galrahn@yahoo.com (Galrahn) — Wed, 04 Nov 2009 16:00:00 +0000

I'll let this post be a good test for the comment system. I learned three things on election day.

1) NY-23 was fascinating. Bill Owens is a Blue Dog Dem who opposed the public option on health care. At the end of the day, that was enough to beat a surging conservative with national financial support from Republicans in a bleeding red district of the northeast. That should have Albany Republicans, if not national Republicans and Democrats... very, very concerned.

The lesson of NY-23 for Republicans is that "conservative" works as a fiscal platform in a campaign, but the Republican brand is still toxic. The lesson of NY-23 for Democrats is that Blue Dogs are why you currently have power and can still win elections in traditional Republican strongholds, but your biggest election win in 2009 was because the candidate rejected the public option in health care.

2) Creigh Deeds ran a terrible campaign and looked politically inept. That will make his Senate seat hard to keep next time around. He has to stand out to stay in the Senate, which makes him a possible wild card heading into the future. More than anyone else in any of the major elections, Creigh Deeds needs to rebrand himself an image distant from the one created during the campaign.

The lesson of Virginia for Republicans is that a good candidate who runs a good campaign can win in a red state. The lesson of Virginia for Democrats is that a good candidate who runs a good campaign can win in a red state.

3) $30 million dollars wasn't enough to keep a Wall Street guy like Jon Corzine in political power during a world wide financial crisis. New Jersey lost as much as anyone in the financial crisis, and Jon Corzine became the face of a brand that represents everything toxic in American politics today.

The lesson for Republicans in New Jersey is that an unpopular incumbent is vulnerable. The lesson for Democrats in New Jersey is that an unpopular incumbent makes for a big target for 2010.

CNO Discussing the Future Navy

Galrahn@yahoo.com (Galrahn) — Wed, 04 Nov 2009 06:00:00 +0000

If you haven't read the transcript from the CNO's speech at Brookings institute from Monday, you need to. A lot of focus will be given to what the CNO said about unmanned systems, indeed that was the direction Wired took in discussing the CNOs speech, but there is a lot more here than meets the eye.

Observe some of the key points made when discussing unmanned systems, specifically that he discusses both Cyber and C2. He addresses the culture of naval aviation to a small degree, but more importantly he addresses joint services approach not only with the Marines and Coast Guard, but the Air Force.

One of the topics I just can't seem to find time to write about is the development of the AirSea Battle doctrine under discussion right now inside the DoD. The AirSea Battle doctrine is, in my opinion, the single most important discussion right now in the Pentagon with enormous ramifications for the Navy, Marines, and Air Force. While there are some who make comparisons between the AirLand Battle doctrine developed during the cold war on how the Army would fight in Europe and AirSea Battle doctrine currently under discussion, the AirSea Battle doctrine is very different. The most important point on this is to understand the AirLand Battle doctrine was developed solely by the Army, and AirLand told the Air Force what was expected of them. It was not jointly developed. The AirSea Battle doctrine is an actual joint service effort - read shared - which in theory should give it both staying power as a battle doctrine and credibility in driving budget decisions.

This is Lieutenant Colonel Brad Beech's question and ponder the answer given by the CNO.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL BEECH: Lieutenant Colonel Brad Beech, Headquarters, Marine Corps Aviation Unmanned Aircraft Systems. This morning my program has moved under N2N6. One of the concerns is that some of the operational capabilities of those platforms may be moved more toward information, intelligence and network-centric and we lose some of those operational capabilities such as the delivery of kinetic and nonkinetic fighters. Do you share those same concerns? What are some of the things that we can do to mitigate these platforms becoming too information-centric and then we don't have something to affect that information?

ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD: I think it comes down to the concepts of operations that we as services employ and being able to make the tradeoffs as to what is the most effective platform that we have. The fact that they being moved under N26 I think has the potential to enhance their capabilities because we can make more coherent decisions on how the information is going to be moving on and off, how the control systems will be robust enough to ensure that they give us the level of confidence to employ kinetic effects, to get to a previous question. And so I think that it actually allows us to make better investments and better decisions in that regard, and it will be a question of do we need a manned or an unmanned system to go in and do something kinetically and if the desire is for the unmanned system to do that because of the concept of OPS, then are we moving in the right direction with the investments that we have to make there? Also to be able to think in terms of the operating environment and the support requirements that we particularly in the Navy and Marine Corps will have in being able to operate systems like this off of ships which is a different kettle of fish than taking off and landing at a land base. These airplanes operate in very, very complex electromagnetic environments, they have to be able to recover on something that is moving around, and so I think it puts us in a much better place to be able to make those decisions.

This topic, and many like it, go to the main issue in the development of the AirSea Battle doctrine as it is being developed between the services as a cooperative effort... specifically this is where we find the Division of Labor.

As the DoD continues to be tasked to do more and more around the world while budget resources are scare, the services are pooling resources to meet the political obligations they are tasked with globally. The Division of Labor discussion is part redundancy, part requirement, part role, part training, part cooperation, part communication, and part consolidation of resources. There are still many questions without answers whether one can take the sum of these many parts and find a whole, or whether one is left with just holes.

Missile pictures with PLAN

noreply@blogger.com (Feng) — Wed, 04 Nov 2009 05:27:00 +0000

With the PLAAF's 60th founding anniversary coming up, a bunch of TV programs have been showcasing newer portions of the air force. There is also a new museum showing different types of missiles in service with PLA. As part of the recent unveiling, we saw some pictures of the RIF long range SAM with 051C. These are probably the best pictures we've seen so far of the naval S-300 missiles purchased from the Russians.

The ones below showcase China's new shored based anti-ship missile YJ-62. The first 3 pictures show the command truck that comes with YJ-62 missile launchers. The operators in there get targeting data from reconnaissance targets and then launch the missiles to them. According to some sources in China, this was deployed along the shorelines as early as May of 2005. YJ-62's ship launched version can be deployed on the 052C class. I think this system is often overlooked in the face of the ASBM talk, because this missile actually has a 400 km range. The export version has a range of 280 km, because of the MTCR restrictions. Due to this range, it certainly poses a threat to possible USN ships in the theater and also all of the ROCN ships. And I think this is where the ASBM system would really help. By deploying a reconnaissance and data relay system capable of tracking ships from beyond the visual range, such a system could be used in both ASBM system and for your typical long ranged anti-ship cruise missiles. YJ-62's advantage over ASBM is its much lower cost, higher accuracy and rate of production. It obviously have major disadvantage to ASBM like shorter ranger and much higher chance of being intercepted. I certainly think that this missile along with the newly deployed long range LACM CJ-2000 are 2 systems that are totally overlooked due to the ASBM development.

USS New York

Galrahn@yahoo.com (Galrahn) — Wed, 04 Nov 2009 05:00:00 +0000

Impressive. Very impressive. I had a few friends who took the ride on USS New York (LPD 21) from Norfolk this week, I imagine they had fun. Both the Navy and New York City are doing this commissioning in a first class way, and the buzz surrounding the event this week even as far north as Albany is proof.

For those down in the city, the schedule for public visitation is as follows:

Wednesday, November 4 – 10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.
Thursday, November 5 – 1:00 to 4:00 p.m.
Sunday, November 8 – 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m.
Monday, November 9 – 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.
Tuesday, November 10 – 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.
Wednesday, November 11 – 9:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.

I encourage anyone who lives close to the city to get out and see her. The ship is a lot bigger than you think, and is a lot different than any Navy ship you have ever been on. If you haven't been on an LPD-17 class ship yet, you should have a look around (particularly Marines who have deployed on other amphibious ships).

They may have completely screwed up the USS San Antonio (LPD 17), but I believe there is something special about this class of ship, and the Navy would be wise to build as many of them as possible.

Also, whoever decided to take a MV-22 and CH-53 on her to the ceremony is very smart. Having them on the flight deck for everyone to see... nice touch.

Book Review: Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money

noreply@blogger.com (Robert Farley) — Wed, 04 Nov 2009 03:00:00 +0000

Martin Murphy's Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money is a detailed and exhaustive investigation of piracy, smuggling, maritime robbery, and maritime terrorism. Although Murphy delves into some historical aspects of piracy, his central focus is the development of modern piracy, and the use of maritime terror by modern terrorist organizations.

Murphy investigates the legal and definitional problems of piracy in some detail. He locates the rise of modern piracy in decolonization, and in the development of modern maritime law. With the collapse of the great European empires, successor states acquired legal responsibility for the maintenance of order within their territorial waters. Unfortunately, these successor states often lacked either the capacity or wherewithal to control criminal maritime activity. At the same time, the need to express and reinforce sovereignty limited the degree to which colonial successor states could request or accept assistance from major states. Accordingly, Murphy argues that maritime piracy tends to increase as the interest and capability of local states (and local substate actors) to police their areas decreases. Maritime piracy in Southeast Asia, for example, declined after Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore began to pay attention and devote resources to the problem. Poverty certainly creates opportunities for recruitment of pirates, but poverty alone cannot create piracy; lack of state authority enables the success of pirate organizations. Moreover, successful piracy creates a negative feedback loop by empowering criminal organizations and separatist groups.

Murphy's analysis of the social and organizational networks that pirates and maritime terrorists occupy is sophisticated, well argued, and readable. He argues that piracy is, because of some definitional issues, probably more widespread than most analysts acknowledge. Robbery in port, for example, does not count in piracy statistics, even though it makes up a substantial percentage of all criminal maritime activity. Similarly, distinctions between "public" and "private" purposes, which has traditionally been the manner in which piracy has been distinguished from war or terrorism, often serve to obscure the extent and scope of piracy.

Murphy's chapters on terrorism detail the long history of terrorist attacks in the maritime arena. Murphy has little patience for formulations of the maritime terrorism question that treat such terrorism as an unrealized potential; terrorists have used the maritime arena for years, and have done so effectively. Speculation about what terrorists might do is less useful, in Murphy's account, than analysis of what they have done thus far. Like piracy, maritime terrorism is an essentially local phenomenon, usually performed by local actors with local grievances. The Tamil Tigers remain the prototypical maritime terrorist groups, but various other terrorist organizations have resorted to the maritime arena. These campaigns have often lacked the flash associated with other terrorist campaigns (major events such as the seizure of the Achille Lauro and the bombing of the Cole excepted) but have nevertheless been as effective as any other terrorist campaign.

Murphy's conclusion regarding piracy is that it represents an irritant to international trade, but a genuine threat to the stability of the states and regions that it afflicts. Piracy helps maintain criminal syndicates and other illicit actors that undermine state authority, and which can limit the development and effectiveness of domestic institutions. Similarly, Murphy is skeptical of some of the more alarmist warnings about maritime terrorism; he details why certain maritime terrorist scenarios discussed in the media are practically implausible. Nevertheless, he is not reassuring regarding the threat of maritime terrorism; terrorist use the maritime arena regularly, and will continue to do so in the future.

This is the best one volume discussion of illicit activity in the modern maritime arena that I've seen. It is an exceedingly helpful corrective to the conceptions of piracy and maritime terrorism that occupy the public conversation. Murphy's account is too complex and detailed to summarize in this relatively short review; many of the arguments that he makes bear additional analysis and discussion. Most who have any interest in piracy and illicit maritime affairs will find something of use in the book. Academics will be pleased by the organizational and anthropological analysis, while policymakers and policy executors will find the detailed accounts of piracy, smuggling, and terrorism extremely useful.

Earmarking FutureTech in Hawaii

Galrahn@yahoo.com (Galrahn) — Mon, 02 Nov 2009 20:00:00 +0000

Herbert A. Sample of the Associated Press has been looking into Sen. Daniel Inouye's (D-Hawaii) earmarks, and has an impressive list on display. This one in particular stands out:

Pacific Marine/Navatek Ltd., Honolulu: $2.2 million to build model of amphibious vehicle.

Like them or not, earmarks are a part of Congress not going away. They aren't always bad, but they don't always make sense either. I'm going to have a tough time complaining too much about this one though, because to me, this is a case where Sen. Daniel Inouye is putting up the money to build something way outside the box. It is for Navatek's version of the T-Craft, which ONR did not accept in phase II. From the February 20, 2007 Honolulu Advertiser:

"If our preliminary $2 million design is accepted, we move to phase two where we would receive an additional $10 million to produce and model-test a detailed design of the ship," said Navatek President Steven Loui in a written statement. "If awarded the phase three work, Navatek will receive an estimated $150 million to design, build and test a 350-foot prototype craft."

It was not accepted in phase two, but it is certainly one of the most interesting designs for amphibious ship to shore connectors presented in some time. The $2.2 million earmark is to build a half-scale model of the Navatek T-Craft version. Good or bad, it is certainly interesting.

It should be noted that Navatek has produced interesting new designs for the Navy in the past. It was only a few years ago they built Sea Flyer.

Seeking 2 New ID Writers

Galrahn@yahoo.com (Galrahn) — Mon, 02 Nov 2009 14:00:00 +0000

Information Dissemination is seeking a new contributor to the blog whose primary contribution would be on matters related to the United States Air Force. The contributor is expected to have some conceptual knowledge of the ongoing AirSea Battle doctrine development and be capable of producing constructive discussions to this development from an Air Force perspective, and additionally provide analysis to ongoing activities of the USAF as news events occur. A strong understanding of USAF strategic direction is desired.

Information Dissemination is seeking a new contributor to the blog whose primary contribution would be on matters related to the United States Marine Corps. The contributor is expected to have some conceptual knowledge of the ongoing strategic and doctrinal discussions of the Corps today, in particular provide analysis and opinion regarding the Marine Corps focus to return to being a sea service. Additionally, the contributor is expected to provide analysis to ongoing activities of the USMC as news events occur, in particular in both wars. A strong understanding of USMC strategic direction is desired.

The contributors will be expected to post 2-3 times a week. Send me an email if you are interested for either position. As always, the contributors will have flexibility to discuss whatever they want - in whatever way they want, and are expected to treat the blog as an owner.

HA/DR: Operational or Strategic?

Galrahn@yahoo.com (Galrahn) — Mon, 02 Nov 2009 13:15:00 +0000

From a Sept. 30 bloggers roundtable with Rear Adm. Richard Landolt, Commander of the Amphibious Force 7th Fleet based in Okinawa, Japan. I was supposed to make the call, but my work schedule has been fairly crazy for 6 weeks (ends later today, thankfully). I was able to email in a question early that morning, and Petty Office Selby let the question fly.

PETTY OFFICER SELBY: Okay. And we'll go back around the horn in a second. I have a question from Galrahn, sir: 7th Fleet generates a lot of regional publicity surrounding their humanitarian assistance programs, like Pacific Partnership, but also their disaster response and recovery operations -- the 2004 tsunami being one of the most visible, but also in several cyclone and mudslide responses in southeast Asia. As we are at the two-year anniversary of CS21, I was wondering if you can answer whether HA/DR is strategic or operational for the Navy, and how and why; or even what might be missing.

ADM. LANDOLT: I would say it's both strategic and operational. We're going to continue to do these. The amphibious force is that force that's on call and in high demand to practice these with other countries, as we do during Pacific Partnerships or African Partnership Station, or when they go down to South America. But we also make money when we do this and create those relationships during their execution that stand the test of time.

I have -- as I just said, USS Denver has done this twice now in the last two months. It's a good example of this -- to set for other countries who could be thinking about this, because a lot of countries take heat, their governments take heat when they don't respond well to these type of events. We are more than happy to show them how we train for this and the capability we bring. And that, in turn, might help them to drive some of their programs towards those kind of platforms or assets they may need.

Having been around the world in a number of places, for instance, I see too many countries that -- they want to buy a fast, sexy, pointy-nose aircraft; and what they really need are helicopters that can lift cargo and get into mountainsides and help their own people out during times like these.

So I think it -- the answer is both, strategic and operational. We will continue to do this. Pacific Partnership, by the way, is going to involve Indonesia next year. And in fact, the Indonesians have a hospital ship called the "Doctor Soeharso," S-O-E-H-A-R-S-O. Because there was so much damage to the hospitals in Padang, the Soeharso pulled into port there, and was very useful to them. And that same ship will take those lessons learned -- she learned from this real-world exercise -- real-world event, and use it during the Pacific Partnership next year.

I would have followed up by asking what he means when he says "we also make money when we do this." I have a few ideas how this analogy applies, but I'd be curious for his specific examples.

I think the answer is interesting, but I'm not sure I am convinced. I remain unsure, two years after CS-21, whether HA/DR is strategic or operational. Obviously it is operational, but there are so many things that go into effective HA/DR and I am starting to lean towards the camp that says for the US Navy, HA/DR is operational.

That isn't to say HA/DR can't be, or isn't strategic, only that it isn't for the US Navy. Let me touch on my thoughts here.

Many of the aspects of HA/DR that make the effort strategic comes from outside the US Navy, for example, the strategic communications and political cooperation and partnerships that build from HA/DR can have a strategic quality about them, but the Navy piece is operational. With that said, all of those other pieces that make the combined total effort don't work without the Navy, so this is a complex issue and not cut and dry.

What this means is Navy can do everything right in HA/DR and still fail in a strategic objective, and the Navy can do everything wrong in HA/DR and still succeed in a strategic objective. That doesn't mean the quality of the Navy effort doesn't matter, only that the effort itself is dependent upon so many external factors and the work of so many others throughout government that I think that elevating HA/DR as a prominent strategic activity in CS-21 is going to always be controversial, particularly as it may not always be a strategic activity.

Obviously this is theory and academic as a discussion, built on the idealism that assistance is always welcome in times of disaster or need, but we all should recognize that is not always the case. In the Pacific I think there is a good argument to be made that assistance provided to the Philippines and Indonesia are strategic, when part of a strategic communications package at the political (and population) level that contrasts our response with the response of others, specifically the Chinese. I am not much into the financial analogy used by Rear Adm. Richard Landolt regarding how we make money, but I do see a college football sports analogy here.

As an operational effort the US Navy is scoring political points by helping the local political leaders be seen as responsive. As a strategic effort, the more our assistance is contrasted with the absence of assistance by those like China, we are scoring strategic points in the region as well. The domestic political points are field goals and close wins as they don't impress much, but the strategic points enabled by the STRATCOM wizards who engage the population and political level in a meaningful way are like touchdowns and can ultimately influence the perception of the games outcome, in particular by influencing the BCS voters around the region who like to see blowouts over close victories.

----

I think there is plenty of room for a good discussion on this topic. I'll get the comments fixed tonight (doesn't show comment count), and be moderating throughout the day to insure comments are posted quickly (be aware, regular users are approved immediately and will no longer be moderated, only new users are moderated through the first 5 posts). If you want to sign up with a unique nickname for comments, sign up with a js-kit account.

FYI

Galrahn@yahoo.com (Galrahn) — Sat, 31 Oct 2009 05:00:00 +0000

Comments may not work properly during the transition this weekend. Just be aware, you may have to post twice if they are lost during this transition period.

Update: Some of these issues should be resolved today, and instructions will be forthcoming for those having issues.

New Chinese naval flotilla to Aden

noreply@blogger.com (Feng) — Sat, 31 Oct 2009 03:59:00 +0000

It's set, they are sending another Flotilla to Aden to replace 529 and 530 according to this article. This is the 4th task force to Aden.

ZHOUSHAN, Zhejiang Province, Oct. 30 (Xinhua) -- A new Chinese naval flotilla was deployed to the Gulf of Aden and waters off the coast of Somalia on Friday to protect merchant vessels against rampant pirates that still hold a Chinese ship for ransom.

The flotilla of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has been the fourth task force of its kind that China has sent to the region since the end of last year.

Missile frigates FFG-525 Ma'anshan and FFG-526 Wenzhou will relieve the FFG-529 Zhoushan and FFG-530 Xuzhou from the PLA Navy's third flotilla which have patrolled the area since June.

The new warships will join Qiandaohu, a supply ship, which has been on duty in the region for about three months. The fourth flotilla will have a crew of more than 700, including a special force unit and two ship-borne helicopters.

They would actively take part in international humanitarian rescue missions, said Liu Xiaojiang, the Navy's political commissar.

A Chinese coal-carrying vessel "De Xin Hai" with 25 crew members on board was kidnapped by pirates about 1,000 sea miles away from the patrolling area of Chinese warships in the Indian Ocean.

So far all the 25 crew members have been identified as Chinese citizens by the shipping company they worked for. The Ministry of Transport is working on the release of the ship.

It is not immediately known whether the new naval task force will bear a rescue mission for "De Xin Hai", but the two Chinese frigates currently patrolling the area have intensified the frequency of surveillance by shipborne helicopters, skiffs and the special force unit for merchant vessels passing by.

China made an unprecedented move by sending three warships to the Gulf on Dec. 26 last year in the first overseas escort mission for merchant vessels.

The PLA Navy warships have escorted hundreds of domestic and foreign vessels since the first flotilla arrived in the region.

I guess they really have no choice but to keep on sending after the major hijacking news. 525 and 526 are the only frigates of the 054 class and they are from the East Sea Fleet. The same replenishment ship will be there since the last flotilla was also from the East Sea Fleet.

Time To Look Ahead

Galrahn@yahoo.com (Galrahn) — Fri, 30 Oct 2009 18:00:00 +0000

If something happened the last two weeks, I probably missed it. I have been 'in the bunker' putting in the work hours while I have hours remaining on my contract as I lead into professional uncertainty in the near future. As regulars should know by now, I embrace challenges associated with change; fear of the unknown is for the people who don't take risks nor take the chances in life necessary to earn the rewards of risk.

My contributions on the blog over the past several weeks (if not much longer) have been rather pathetic. My apologizes, but thankfully the blog has been in good hands with the other authors. Two points:

The blog comment system will change very soon, hopefully by Sunday. People who leave unprofessional content in my comments will no longer be tolerated.
I have never been so excited to write on several subjects, and November is loaded with so much to discuss it may carry well into the rest of the year. Some have suggested a public forum isn't really the best place to discuss some of these emerging concepts, ideas, and doctrines; but I intend to show people they are incorrect and that the larger community of experts have plenty of good ideas to contribute. Be thoughtful and wise about contributions, because I assure you over the next few months many important folks will be reading.

Before we look too far ahead, it is important to look back to this week and examine a critical section of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 SEC 125. I think there is a lot here to ponder as we approach several new emerging discussions. The Navy no longer can afford the luxury of frustration regarding where they have been. Collectively, the Navy with the DoD must be thoughtful in decision and analysis regarding the future. The ideas must be bigger than technology, and technology must align with the bigger ideas.

SEC. 125. PROCUREMENT PROGRAMS FOR FUTURE NAVAL SURFACE COMBATANTS.

(a) Limitation on Availability of Funds Pending Reports About Surface Combatant Shipbuilding Programs- The Secretary of the Navy may not obligate or expend funds for the construction of, or advanced procurement of materials for, a surface combatant to be constructed after fiscal year 2011 until the Secretary has submitted to Congress each of the following:

(1) An acquisition strategy for such surface combatants that has been approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

(2) Certification that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council--

(A) has been briefed on the acquisition strategy to procure such surface combatants; and

(B) has concurred that such strategy is the best preferred approach to deliver required capabilities to address future threats, as reflected in the latest assessment by the defense intelligence community.

(3) A verification by, and conclusions of, an independent review panel that, in evaluating the program or programs concerned, the Secretary of the Navy considered each of the following:

(A) Modeling and simulation, including war gaming conclusions regarding combat effectiveness for the selected ship platforms as compared to other reasonable alternative approaches.

(B) Assessments of platform operational availability.

(C) Life cycle costs, including vessel manning levels, to accomplish missions.

(D) The differences in cost and schedule arising from the need to accommodate new sensors and weapons in surface combatants to be constructed after fiscal year 2011 to counter the future threats referred to in paragraph (2), when compared with the cost and schedule arising from the need to accommodate sensors and weapons on surface combatants as contemplated by the 2009 shipbuilding plan for the vessels concerned.

(4) The conclusions of a joint review by the Secretary of the Navy and the Director of the Missile Defense Agency setting forth additional requirements for investment in Aegis ballistic missile defense beyond the number of DDG-51 and CG-47 vessels planned to be equipped for this mission area in the budget of the President for fiscal year 2010 (as submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code).

(b) Future Surface Combatant Acquisition Strategy- Not later than the date upon which the President submits to Congress the budget for fiscal year 2012 (as so submitted), the Secretary of the Navy shall submit to the congressional defense committees an update to the open architecture report to Congress that reflects the Navy's combat systems acquisition plans for the surface combatants to be procured in fiscal year 2012 and fiscal years thereafter.

(c) Naval Surface Fire Support- Not later than 120 days after the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Navy shall submit to the congressional defense committees an update to the March 2006 Report to Congress on Naval Surface Fire Support. The update shall identify how the Department of Defense intends to address any shortfalls between required naval surface fire support capability and the plan of the Navy to provide that capability. The update shall include addenda by the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps, as was the case in the 2006 report.

(d) Technology Roadmap for Future Surface Combatants and Fleet Modernization-

(1) IN GENERAL- Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Navy shall develop a plan to incorporate into surface combatants constructed after 2011, and into fleet modernization programs, the technologies developed for the DDG-1000 destroyer and the DDG-51 and CG-47 Aegis ships, including technologies and systems designed to achieve significant manpower savings.

(2) SCOPE OF PLAN- The plan required by paragraph (1) shall include sufficient detail for systems and subsystems to ensure that the plan--

(A) avoids redundant development for common functions;

(B) reflects implementation of Navy plans for achieving an open architecture for all naval surface combat systems; and

(C) fosters competition.

(e) Definitions- In this section:

(1) The term `2009 shipbuilding plan' means the 30-year shipbuilding plan submitted to Congress pursuant to section 231, title 10, United States Code, together with the budget of the President for fiscal year 2009 (as submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code).

(2) The term `surface combatant' means a cruiser, a destroyer, or any naval vessel, excluding Littoral Combat Ships, under a program currently designated as a future surface combatant program.

This is a very interesting inclusion in the FY 2010 Defense Bill. The Future Surface Combatant, not the restart of the DDG-51, is now the major focus of Congress. If I was taking bets, I would read this as saying CG(X), CG-47, DDG-1000, and DDG-51 will all be replaced by a new large, modular future surface combatant yet to make the design board, and DDG-51s will be filling the gap until that program gets off the ground.

The Future Surface Combatant is the heart of the discussion leading into the next decade. We will be building 2 submarines a year for the next several years, that will not change. The Navy will be replacing the SSBNs next decade, that will not change. The Navy will be building 15 new Littoral Combat Ships between FY11-FY15, and that will not change.

Everything else is a question mark. Everything is on the table. It is not a question of what the US Navy will look like in the 21st century, it is a question of what they will be doing, and how they will be doing it. It is time to begin blogging the discussion how the Navy will fight, and see if the doctrinal ideas hold up to public examination and scrutiny. I suspect we will see plenty of resistance to change; there always is.

Dr. Colin Gray on the Teaching of Strategy

noreply@blogger.com (The Conservative Wahoo) — Fri, 30 Oct 2009 16:44:00 +0000

I'm about a third of the way through Dr. Gray's "Schools for Strategy: Teaching Strategy for 21st Century Conflict" (download available here), and I'm finding it quite interesting--perhaps you might too.

One paragraph (following a brief discussion of COIN and CT) caught my eye:

"Because we believe that we understand
the conflicts of the 2000s, with their highlighting of the
phenomenon of the “accidental guerrilla,” we need to
be alert to the danger that our new found confidence
will prove largely misplaced should we assume it to
be authoritative for the conflicts of the years to come."

Bryan McGrath

EMP Awareness Advocacy

noreply@blogger.com (Robert Farley) — Fri, 30 Oct 2009 00:47:00 +0000

A couple weeks ago I published at article at Right Web on EMP awareness ddvocacy, the idea that an electromagnetic pulse attack presents a clear and immediate danger to the United States. I've received several good responses to the article, including one correspondent who discussed the wide variation in EMP preparation onboard new US naval vessels, and another who posed some serious and difficult technical questions about the feasibility of any EMP attack. The science of EMP is quite complex and is the subject of bitter disagreement among experts. I think it would be fair to say that there is no clear scientific consensus on a) the amount of damage that a concerted EMP attack could cause to the United States, or b) the size of the nuclear warhead(s) needed to cause a substantial EMP effect. One key reason for this uncertainty is simply that there are hard limits on what can be learned about the effect of EMP in the absence of an actual EMP attack, and certainly in the absence of atmospheric nuclear weapon testing.

Because of the limitations of the science, I'd like to focus on the strategic question. EMP awareness advocates argue that an EMP attack provides the perfect opportunity for China, a rogue state, or a terrorist organization to strike a devastating blow against the United States. Rather than simply destroying one city, the story goes, an EMP attack could wipe out the entire US economy, and even (according to the wildest estimate) lead to the deaths of 90% of the US population within a year. The EMP attack probably wouldn't eliminate the ability of the United States to respond, but because of the initial lack of lethality, the story goes, it would be difficult to launch a devastating nuclear counterstrike. While the US could respond with its own EMP attack, China and the various rogue states have economies less dependent on modern technology than that of the United States, and accordingly could weather a counterattack.

Alright, deep breath. Here are the parts of the story that I find strategically implausible:

That any adversary could believe that an EMP attack on the United States would not incur retaliation. If the Chinese launched several ICBMs as part of an EMP attack against the United States, how could they be certain that a devastating American counterstrike wouldn't be delivered even before any damage was done? The same goes for any rogue state; the idea that an EMP attack wouldn't incur retaliation assumes an extraordinary level of risk acceptance on the attacking state. There may be other reasons to believe that rogue states are immune to deterrence, but the idea that EMP is key to this belief seems implausible.
That any adversary would willingly endure the impact of an EMP counterstrike. China hasn't spent the last thirty years developing a modern economy to risk its destruction overnight. It may in some abstract sense be true that the Chinese could weather an EMP assault better than we, but such an attack would still leave the Chinese economy a global basket case. Same goes for any rogue state.
The idea that a rogue state or terrorist group would use one of its small, scarce atomic warheads in an attack with an extraordinarily low chance of success, and with extraordinarily high costs whether the attack succeeded or failed. The technical details matter here; EMP awareness advocates have argued that a 12-20kt warhead could, if properly used, have a massive EMP effect. There is approximately zero evidence to back this up, but then it's hard to prove that it couldn't happen. Awareness advocates would have us believe, however, that Iran, North Korea, or a terrorist group would be so confident of the success of the attack that they would use one of their very few weapons to launch an attack for which they have done no testing. To reiterate, the story is that a terrorist group would prefer to launch its nuke into the atmosphere on the chance that it could destroy US electronics, rather than use the weapon to attack a US city. I think that using the term "radically improbable" to describe this scenario is a bit of an understatement.

I have doubts that any state would attack the United States with nuclear weapons in the face of overwhelming retaliation. I have further doubts about the ability of a terrorist organization to procure a nuke, procure a missile, put the nuke on a missile, put the missile on a boat, and successfully launch it from off the US coast. But even if I were to accept that either or both of these scenarios were plausible, the idea that the attack would take the form of an EMP assault seems, well, ludicrous.

Now, I suppose you could argue that, in spite of the fact that such an attack is unlikely, the United States should be prepared to counter all manner of threats. I don't find this argument terribly plausible; any strategic analysis ranks potential threats, and preparedness for extremely unlikely events is discounted. More importantly, as noted above the United States already has the capacity to respond to, and accordingly to deter, the most likely forms of EMP attack.

All of this makes it terribly difficult for me to take EMP awareness advocacy seriously as anything other than as a front for arguments in favor of missile defense and preventive war. There are plausible arguments in favor of both, but neither involve electromagnetic pulse. As I suggest in the article, the weak science feeds hysteria-mongering; since no one knows exactly what might happen, advocates are emboldened to make claims about barge launched MRBMs and the death of 90% of the American population within a year. The appearance of EMP in several major Hollywood films (The Matrix trilogy, Ocean's Eleven, Goldeneye) would seem to make EMP fertile ground for political fearmongering.

What's perhaps most interesting, however, is that the EMP hype has failed utterly to catch fire. The EMPACT Niagara Conference was covered by approximately no one, despite the presence of Newt Gingrich and Mike Huckabee. That a pair of GOP heavy hitters could show up a a conference and still earn very little coverage tells you something about how seriously the media takes EMP. Moreover, this disdain isn't limited to the mainstream media. I couldn't find any articles at the New York Post, the Washington Times, or even Fox News on the Niagara conference. I'll let an editor at the Weekly Standard, with whom I spoke in service of the article, give the final word:

No…I don't go for that EMP stuff. Kind of more interested in dangerous scenarios that might actually happen. It's a f****** ludicrous scenario.

DDH-144 JS Kurama

noreply@blogger.com (The Custodian) — Wed, 28 Oct 2009 19:31:00 +0000

The news (and the rest of the web) has been reporting on the collision between the JMSDF Helicopter Defense Destroyer DDH-144 Kurama and a South Korean container vessel.

Not being a professional operator, I'll leave commentary on the ship operations to those more knowledgeable than I. I will note that the official cause of the fire which seems to have caused the majority of the bow damage to the Kurama is the ignition of a paint locker during the collision. In other words, non-combat volatiles stored on the ship managed to mostly melt a large chunk of the bow area.

A sobering reminder of the energies and risks that seagoing ships deal with on a daily basis, quibbles over storage methods and the like notwithstanding. It's also a troubling commentary on the firefighting status aboard. I will be looking with interest to see if there were material or procedural errors aboard which allowed things to progress this far. Although the fire started in the midst of sudden, unexpected and traumatic events on board, that is practically the definition of some combat damage...

(I couldn't find an image of the post-collision ship that wasn't obviously copyrighted, but Google is your friend, there.)

High End Cooperative Maritime Relationships

noreply@blogger.com (The Conservative Wahoo) — Wed, 28 Oct 2009 18:59:00 +0000

As many readers know, the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower places a premium on cooperative maritime relationships. All too often though, these relationships are thought about on the low-end, and in many cases, there is a certain "patron/client" feel to how they are described. Put another way, some see "cooperative maritime relationships" and "building partner capacity" as the same thing--which they are not. The recent response to piracy in the Indian is a fine example of how they are not.

Still another example is on the high end--Maritime Ballistic Missile Defense. Today's news of a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force Destroyer's intercept of an MRBM target in the Pacific shows how such relationships can run the gamut from cooperative maritime security all the way to the most sophisticated technological combat capabilities afloat. The relationship must be mutually beneficial, it must allow the parties involved to participate in a manner meaningful to them, and it must be consistent with both parties' technology bases and resources.

Maritime Ballistic Missile Defense is an area around which the US Navy is building lasting operational relationships with considerable strategic value. In addition to Japan, other obvious partners are South Korea, Australia, India, the Gulf Nations, Israel, Turkey and NATO. Linking afloat units with enhanced land and space-based sensors and weapons could create regional missile defense networks into which units could plug and play as they came and went. As ballistic missiles continue to proliferate, a cooperative response--catalyzed by the US--seems a worthy response.

Bryan McGrath

Navy Cyber/IT Update

Galrahn@yahoo.com (Galrahn) — Tue, 27 Oct 2009 15:18:00 +0000

This is forward thinking.

Project Valour-IT 2009

Galrahn@yahoo.com (Galrahn) — Tue, 27 Oct 2009 04:00:00 +0000

It is Project Valour-IT fund drive time. This year the fund drive will run through Veterans day. Sounds good to me.

I have been involved with Soldiers Angels for several years now. Several years ago my wife emailed me one day and said "I adopted a soldier." I didn't really understand, so she sent me over to the Soldiers Angels website to look around. I've been involved ever since.

A little about Soldiers Angels and Valour-IT.

Soldiers' Angels is designated a 501(c)(3) non-profit charity by the IRS. Donations are tax-deductible and may be eligible for matching funds from donors' employers (ask your employer). Be sure to consult your tax advisor for further information. All funds received go directly to our wounded troops; 100% of your donation to Project Valour-IT will be used to purchase laptops and other technology that will support recovery and provide independence and freedom to wounded Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines.

All money donated to Project Valour-IT goes directly to the purchase and shipment of laptops and other technology for severely wounded service members. As of November 2008, Valour-IT has distributed over 2700 laptops to severely wounded Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines across the country, and is now expanding its mission to include other technology that supports physical and psychological recovery.

Valour-IT accepts donations in any amount to support our mission, but also offers a sponsorship option for laptops. An individual or organization may sponsor a wounded soldier by completely funding the cost of a laptop and continuing to provide that soldier with personal support and encouragement throughout recovery. This has proved to be an excellent project for churches, groups of coworkers or friends, and members of community organizations such Boy Scouts.

Originally Valour-IT provided the voice-controlled software that accompanies the laptops, but now works closely with the Department of Defense Computer/electronic Accommodations Program (CAP): CAP supplies the adaptive software and Valour-IT provides the laptop. In addition, DoD caseworkers serve as Valour-IT’s “eyes and ears” at several medical centers, identifying patients in need of laptops and other technological support for their recovery.

It isn't just laptops though, last year I was having a conversation during Monday Night Football with a friend who has two sons in the Marines. She was looking forward to Christmas, because her oldest was coming home. Their oldest was wounded in Iraq, had both of his hands shot. She told me what helped him the most was staying busy playing the full body activity games on the Wii, with his hands wrapped up and multiple surgeries required to get his wrists working again, it was all he could do to stay active. While surfing around the Soldiers Angels website this morning i noted they have recognized this technology for those purposes and the Wii is also a supported Soldiers Angels technology for supporting recovery. That Christmas, the local pub raised over $1500 to get that Marine some Wii gear. It made a difference in his life, and Soldiers Angels is in the business of making a difference in the lives of soldiers and Marines wounded in the wars.

If you have a blog, join the cause, spread the word, help raise some money for a good cause. If you have a few dollars to spare, you will be hard pressed to find a cause you could spend the money on more deserving than Project Valour-IT.

If you have donations to spare, click the widget at the top of the blog and lets beat the shit out of Army this year.

Rift Between Turkey and Israel Genuine, Serious

noreply@blogger.com (Robert Farley) — Mon, 26 Oct 2009 16:15:00 +0000

To be clear, there's no question that there's been a serious deterioration in defense ties between Turkey and Israel over the last several months. Last week's Defense News article details the drift, and includes explicit argument by Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan to the fact that popular pressure is limiting the extent to which Turkey can cooperate with Israel. The issue, rather, is whether the rupture represents a dispositional shift in Turkish foreign policy (Turkey abandoning the West for the camp of radical Islam), or whether it's simply the result of Turkish dissatisfaction with Israeli military and security policy. I lean rather heavily towards the latter interpretation; whatever the sins of the AKP, Turkey internally operates much more like a Western liberal democracy than any state associated with "radical Islam," and indeed Turkey's internal politics are more in line with liberal democracy (including especially reform of the role delegated to the military in a liberal democratic state) than they ever have before. The error made by Glick and others, in my view, is in the effort to derive domestic regime type from foreign policy; it is possible for Turkey (or France, or Germany) to be simultaneously democratic and queasy about the Gaza operation. Indeed, in Turkey's case I think that achieving any other outcome would be difficult.

Now, in the short run this means that military dominated regimes may be easier for the United States (and certainly Israel) to deal with. In the long run, however, I don't see that this policy has much of a future. You don't need to be a neoconservative to be deeply skeptical about a policy of maintaining authoritarian allies of convenience; such a policy is far more likely, in my view, to lead to events like the Iranian Revolution than is tolerance of parties like the AKP.

1 CV, No Planes?

noreply@blogger.com (Robert Farley) — Mon, 26 Oct 2009 14:12:00 +0000

This is... bizarre.

With consummate ill-timing U.S. policy makers efforts to sustain a second-engine for the F-35 are met with claims that London is ready to ditch equipping its planned second carrier with the aircraft.

Britain’s “Sunday Times” claims the Royal Navy has “agreed to sacrifice” one of its two 65,000 ton aircraft carriers, instead saying the navy would use the ship only as a helicopter carrier. For good measure the story speculates only about 50 of the F-35 will be bought, to save on cost.

Given budgetary pressures cutting the initial number to 50 appears credible – it would provide enough aircraft to equip the first carrier with a strike wing, and also for training needs.

The notion of having the second 65,000-ton carrier and using it only for helicopters seems far less so.

So... some questions:

1. This seems to suggest that one CV would be permanently configured for F-35s, and the other for helicopters. Wouldn't it make more sense to give both ships a flexible configuration, given the inevitable downtime that carriers need? The Times article suggests that Prince of Wales will be the helicopter/commando carrier, which would "save" the RN the 600 million it would otherwise require to replace HMS Ocean.

2. Can the RN possibly justify the construction of Prince of Wales as a glorified amphibious assault ship?

3. What does this mean for the rest of the Royal Navy's procurement plans? Does it get anything back for giving up an airwing?

UPDATE: Correspondents (as well as commenters) are indicating that the answer to question #1 is "No." The Times article is wrong, by this account, to suggest that Prince of Wales will be permanently configured around commando and helicopter operations. Rather, the two ships are likely to trade off the F-35 air group. This makes much more sense, and does suggest that the revision is more modest than the initial reports implied.

Observation

Galrahn@yahoo.com (Galrahn) — Fri, 23 Oct 2009 11:30:00 +0000

Have you been to Yahoo today?

When you build a ship that looks like nothing else, it gets attention. A big front page picture of Independence? Wow, talk about a good marketing day for Austal and General Dynamics, and I don't believe you can pay for that making it priceless.

Big pictures of new warships on the front page of Yahoo captures mindshare and interest, something the Navy doesn't get much of on a normal day.

Best Navy Times Article Ever

Galrahn@yahoo.com (Galrahn) — Fri, 23 Oct 2009 01:00:00 +0000

Give credit to Phil Ewing, this is one hell of a phenomenal article. Throw in this Navy Times article by Andrew Tilghman and a pattern is developing.

There are several posts by VADM John Harvey over at his Fleet Forces Blog on some of the topics discussed in these articles. Presuming sailors want to be heard on the topic of optimal manning, there is a place to offer an opinion to the guy who appears to be working this problem as we speak.

What to do with Turkey?

noreply@blogger.com (Robert Farley) — Thu, 22 Oct 2009 14:42:00 +0000

Jerusalem Post contributor Caroline Glick asserts that Turkey has moved into the camp of radical Islam; she's troubled by a lack of Turkish support for Operation Cast Lead. The merits of this argument aside (and I think it's bat**** insane), what would the policy implications of such a shift be? This is to say, if Turkey really did join Tehran's camp (and, given Turkey's massive military and economic superiority over Iran, it would shortly become Ankara's camp), what policy changes ought the United States conduct? I must admit that the question is animated, in large part, by the last chapter of Wayne Hughes' Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat; replace Greece with Israel, and replay?