Information Dissemination

A Good Week for Navy

noreply@blogger.com (The Conservative Wahoo) — Thu, 16 May 2013 13:15:00 +0000

This week's launch of a UCAS demonstrator (X-47B) was a good week for the Navy--a really good week. To the extent that anyone pays attention to what the Navy does these days, this achievement has captured imaginations and has helped to reinforce the notion (fact) that the Navy is indeed moving forward with important technologies even in a time of scarcity. Whether this continues or not is an open question, but for the moment, we all have something to nod approvingly about.

Here's something you don't read often from me--I am going to give the Secretary of the Navy credit for something.

He has made investing in unmanned technologies a priority of his term from day 1. He has set aggressive--yet achievable--goals for integration of unmanned capability into the Carrier Air Wing. He has--through this prioritization--been able to fence off a number of important unmanned initiatives from cuts that some in the Navy would have gladly administered in order to keep their pet programs more fully funded. And while I remain convinced that he has squandered much of his term in the pursuit of side-shows that don't meaningfully contribute to American Seapower, his emphasis on unmanned systems in all domains will be something upon which he can stake a legacy someday.

Bryan McGrath

Land Power in the Asia Pacific

noreply@blogger.com (The Conservative Wahoo) — Tue, 14 May 2013 23:59:00 +0000

Spend a few moments with this piece from Armed Forces Journal entitled "Back to Reality: Why Land Power Trumps in the National Re-balance Toward Asia." Although I am not persuaded that the author makes the case for land power "trump"ing anything, there is a considerable amount of impressive thought here about the role of (U.S.) land power in Asia, and some really insightful thinking about AirSea Battle, conventional deterrence and escalation.

Anyone who thinks conflict with China in the Asia-Pacific will leave out ground forces is mistaken. If such a conflict comes, China will almost certainly seek to extend its defensive perimeter against U.S. power projection forces, and this will almost certainly involve the PLA seizing land from nations with which we have treaty obligations or with which we are increasingly friendly. Land power--and a lot of it--will be needed. But it won't get there unless the Navy and Air Force can create operational seams in the A2AD environment, and it won't survive long without the ability to neutralize PLA advantages in the missile bombardment campaign.

Major Chamberlain also is insightful about the role of land based air and missile defense forces in shaping the operational environment. I was particularly gratified to read his advocacy of increased air and missile defense force structure within the Army TOA. Hopefully this thinking will catch on.

Bryan McGrath

LGM Podcast: Canadian Security and Defence Policy

noreply@blogger.com (Robert Farley) — Sun, 12 May 2013 12:50:00 +0000

A couple days ago I sat down for an LGM Podcast with Dr. Paul Mitchell of the Canadian Forces College to talk Canadian military and procurement policy. We went on a bit about general issues of Canadian strategy, followed that up with a long discussion of Canada's relationship to the F-35 project, moved on to a discussion of the future of naval aviation, and concluded with a few words about Canadian perspectives on the "Pacific Pivot." All images courtesy of Wikipedia. Here's a link to the .mp3 version of this podcast.

Let's All Emote Together!

noreply@blogger.com (Robert Farley) — Thu, 09 May 2013 13:07:00 +0000

For this week's Diplomat column I delve into (gasp!) actual political science:

But what if even the leaders of states don’t know how they’ll react to certain events? A recent International Organization article by Jonathan Mercer investigated the role of emotion in decision-making. Although the theory is somewhat complicated, the argument boils down to the idea that we use our own emotional reactions to events as evidence of our interests and preferences. A classic experiment along these lines involves a coin flip, with heads deciding one course of action and tails the other. By flipping a coin, you determine whether you’re happy or sad about the outcome; accordingly, you know which path you really prefer.

Mercer argues that the leadership of the United States sent costly signals of disinterest in the fate of South Korea, withdrawing all forces and de-emphasizing the possibility of intervention in case of a North Korean attack in 1950. When the attack came, however, U.S. leaders had an unexpected emotional reaction of alarm, which led to concern about how the rest of the world would interpret inaction. As Mercer points out, U.S. policymakers used their own sense of shock and alarm as evidence that the world would see the United States as weak. Consequently, the United States intervened in contravention of its own expectations.

Disclosure: Mercer was my dissertation advisor at UW. It's interesting work, and I recommend reading the full article. The focus on emotional response has some fairly interesting implications for decision-making, especially in disputes prone to brinkmanship. The framework also suggests that messaging and prediction are more complicated than we often allow for; as Mercer argues, "Strategy depends on imagining not only how another feels, but how another will feel as a result of one’s policy."

Thoughts on Benghazi

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Wed, 08 May 2013 15:00:00 +0000

The Benghazi hearings are today, and I'll be paying attention. I'm not sure yet if today will turn out to be anything other than a political circus. Time will tell.

Today we are going to learn who is serious and who is a clown. There will be opportunities for both Democrats and Republicans to pick a side. A Democrat today will prove themself a clown if they become overly defensive to the point they push the idea that the Federal government cannot be held accountable for anything. It will be a defensive political reaction on behalf of leaders who are responsible, but may not be holding their agencies accountable. Republicans will identify themselves as clowns if they are simply seeking political blame, because there is nothing productive to find if that is the objective.

Leaders will be the elected politicians who try to figure out what went wrong, and what needs to be fixed.

I have a few theories, but the one specific thing I will be looking for is not new, rather it is a problem that has always existed but has, in my opinion, become worse under Obama. Dan Drezner highlighted this very well just before the election last November.

the most troubling element of Barack Obama's first-term foreign policy legacy -- his management of the foreign policy process. As my Foreign Policy colleague Rosa Brooks has written about in agonizing detail, the dysfunction that was talked about in Obama's first year in office hasn't disappeared along with Osama bin Laden.

Indeed, the aftermath of Benghazi puts this on full display. To be blunt, for all the GOP efforts to make the lack of pre-attack planning an indictment of the White House, consulate security in Benghazi is not the kind of decision that rises to the White House level. The aftermath of the attack is another story, however. In the past 24 hours alone, report after report after report after report shows Obama's foreign policy agencies defending their own turf, leaking to reporters in ways that heighten bureaucratic dysfunction, and revealing the White House's national security team to be vindictive and petty.

That's the key in my opinion, inter-agency cooperation is at an all time low, and it is never really very high. It is not just CIA, State, and the DOD - indeed we have to add DoJ and DHS to the mix, because we saw manifestations where the lack of good inter-agency cooperation allowed one of the terrorists involved in the Boston marathon bombing to slip through the cracks.

And that is another reason why unserious politics will be very unwelcome today. Benghazi was the first attack, but with Boston we now have a trend of successful terrorist attacks. Are we learning the right lessons? Are decision makers asking the right questions? Assigning blame to Hillary Clinton or someone else isn't going to help resolve why we have similar breakdowns in both Benghazi and Boston, and if no one in Congress is seeking to address the roots of those issues today, the next successful terrorist attack that kills Americans leaves blood on the hands of Congressmen as far as I am concerned.

I don't want to hear about some State Department dweeb who thinks four SOF guys who were on the other side of Libya when all-hell broke loose, with no situational awareness at all in Benghazi, could have swooped in and saved the day with M-4s. That's not even credible and represents the tactical expertise of a paper pusher in State, even if cable news reports it as if it is some important revelation. The issue isn't what four SOF dudes were doing, it was why NOTHING, NO WHERE, was being staged for contingency. The DoD leaders watched and sat on their hands - HOUR after HOUR after HOUR, knowing Americans were probably being killed. Two of our top Army Generals, one of which is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It's hard to believe, but that's what happened. Secretary Panetta was taking advice from the top General in the United States military, who was in the same room. It was supposed to be the best advice one could possibly get on a military action like that. Clearly it was not.

I very much would like to know why the COCOM requirement for a ARG in the Mediterranean Sea was being unmet during most of the Arab Spring, including late last year. There is a reason the Marines want 38 amphibious ships, and yet Congress is only willing to fund 33. Only a forward deployed and ready Amphibious Ship with a blue/green team could have produced the necessary intelligence and situational awareness, and fielded at the scene of action a combat ready force to rapidly respond to the attacks on our facilities in Benghazi. That is fact. That is a mission Marines are trained to do, and why we keep ships forward deployed. There was an unmet COCOM requirement for amphibious ships there. DC politicians have to date completely avoided that part of the issue.

So we have CIA security at a State Department facility without any DoD situational awareness whatsoever. Within two months we have the Department of Justice intentionally leaking evidence from an investigation that takes down General Petraeus, the top CIA man. We have Russia telling the CIA that Tamerlan Tsarnaev is a suspected extremist, information that comes not long after Tamerlan Tsarnaev is being examined by the FBI and DHS knows he leaves the country. FBI's investigation at Benghazi is so thorough the very first group of journalists to actually go to the battle location finds all kinds of sensitive information at the scene. Seriously? The agencies aren't talking, and are clearly not working very hard for each other. The agencies are all doing their own thing, and events continue to unfold where Americans are being killed in terrorist attacks - foreign and domestic. We elect leaders to insure taxpayer money is not being wasted. Right now at least 5 federal agencies appear to be completely out of control.

Now lets ask the hardest question of all - is it time to start asking whether this the inter-agency cooperation issue has become much worse as a result of the Bradley Manning effect. We knew there was going to be fallout in information sharing between agencies because of what Bradley Manning did - a member of the Department of Defense stealing accessible data from the Department of State and exposing that sensitive data to the public. Anyone with any experience in the real world knew that was going to come back and hurt the data sharing process, and create friction in inter-agency information sharing capacity. B2B experts know how easy it is to share data - hell most Americans wouldn't believe the kind of data sharing about Americans that takes place in states that do background checks for firearms purchases, but the Bradley Manning effect has created all kinds of hurdles to sharing intelligence information in the federal agencies; an effect one might suggest is integrating into the culture of inter-agency business.

My starting assumption, based on information that I have read to date, is that both Benghazi and Boston represent acts of terrorism that manifested because of communication and cooperation breakdowns between federal agencies, and the reasons for those breakdowns are many - but were influenced in no small part due to the cultural changes in federal agencies insiders and keen observers noticed taking place after Bradley Manning released those diplomatic cables. American people are dieing. Two attacks is a trend. Who is part of the solution, and who is part of the problem?

Benghazi is a tough issue, maybe too difficult and complicated for serious people to score any political points. So today, if it becomes about scoring political points, expect another successful attack. If it becomes a serious issue where political points are scored on accident rather than intentionally, it means suddenly some elected officials decided to be leaders for a change, and do their job.

The result of all of this should, most likely, be a lot of work for the President.

PLAN amphibious development

noreply@blogger.com (Feng) — Tue, 07 May 2013 03:47:00 +0000

For PLAN followers, the past couple of months have brought some really interesting developments for PLAN amphibious warfare. The first Zubr was handed over from Ukraine to China on April 20th and the construction of the second one is well under way. The original contract called for 2 to be built in Ukraine and the other 2 to be built in China. It remains to be seen whether or not PLAN will see the need to procure more than that.

Last year, we were introduced to a LHD design that Chinas was offering for export. A couple of months ago, we’ve seen this LHD design displayed for export to Turkey and also at Abu Dhabi. This mysterious design is said to be 211 m long, 32.6 m in beam and 26.8 m high for a displacement of 20,000 to 22,000 ton. It’s a little wider than Type 071 and has a flat top, so it can hold 8 helicopters with the hangar space for 4. This is an increase over Type 071, but I would imagine the first Chinese LHD (let’s call it Type 081) to be much larger than this (30,000 to 40,000 in displacement) and able to hold carry more helicopters and armored vehicles. I personally think PLAN has studied USMC long enough that it would also want the LHD to be able to support STOVL fighter jet. Such a ship would be much more complex than Type 071, but is well within the technical capabilities of Chinese shipyards.

More than anything else, the most interesting development for me to watch recently is the recent exercise involving 999, the second Type 071 ship, launching attack and overtaking a defended island in the South China Sea. While I’m sure this development scared a couple of people in the Phillipines and Vietnam, it was interesting seeing all of the news report videos talking about what they tried to do in that exercise. It was also interesting to see that Type 071 can carry more hardware than I previous thought. Its hangar is said to be able to carry 4 helicopters of Z-8 class (the main helicopter used with Type 071 right now). Its well deck can hold a maximum of 4 Type 726 LCAC. Although in reality, we’ve never seen more than 1 Type 726 and several fast attack boats in the well deck due to the fact that only 2 Type 726s have thus far been commissioned. Each of the Type 726 is said to be able to carry 2 IFVs and one tank. It can also apparently transport 80 soldiers. It can travel at 50 knots and can reach 55 to 60 knots. So, it’s an impressive hardware if China can build enough of it. In front of the well deck, there is also a door to a large compartment of 2 floors holding armored vehicles and other heavy machineries. We’ve also seen numerous photos of well deck holding 1 Type 726 along with 15 or more amphibious IFVs. Depending on the number of Type 726 and boats it carries, a Type 071 could hold different numbers of IFVs and tanks based on the mission. According to news report, Type 071 has allowed PLA to launch assault 40 nm from the beach.

In this recent exercise, we can really see PLAN practicing different kind of maneuvers and learning how to really use Type 071. Z-8s were used in flanking maneuvers to attack the rear along with Type 726 sometimes later. This is used to soften the opposition while amphibious IFVs and fast attack boats are storming the beach. The first Type 071 was commissioned at the end of 2007 and this was the first time we’ve heard about this type of exercise. Maybe this would have happened sooner if Type 726 was available earlier, but I think this also shows how long it takes PLAN to learn to start using a new ship like this. They still have a shortage of Z-8s and Type 726s when we consider how many Type 071 they already have. So they will have to ramp up the production of those assets if they want to continue training and developing more advance doctrines and tactics in storming a guarded coastline. They will also need more of those if they want to build a much larger LHD. Attention has been shifted away from PLAN’s amphibious build up over the past year due to the development of CV-16, but it remains an important part of PLAN modernization.

Seapower History Bleg

noreply@blogger.com (Robert Farley) — Tue, 07 May 2013 00:44:00 +0000

Does anyone know of any good work on competition/conflict between the Army and the Navy in either the Civil War or the Spanish-American War? Most of the extant work on inter-service conflict treats it as a 20th century phenomenon, generated by the expansion of warfare into the third dimension, but it seems likely to me there were instances of conflict in prior wars. Would appreciate any suggestions in comments.

Syria: Go Little, Go Big, or Stay on the Sidelines?

noreply@blogger.com (Chris Rawley) — Mon, 06 May 2013 03:30:00 +0000

Calls for U.S. intrusion in the Syrian civil war seem to grow louder each day, especially from people in positions of authority within the polity. This talk of no fly zones, providing lethal aid to rebels, etc. must be realized for what it is - a call for a U.S.-sponsored regime change. Policy outcomes must be measured against the complex ramifications of choosing sides, taking a limited approach, or continuing to let events play themselves out. Despite its noble origins in the Arab Spring fervor of 2011, fundamentally the war in Syria is now a proxy conflict between two of America's adversaries: al Qaeda's foreign jihadists on one side and Iran's surrogates on the other. Why would the U.S. want to get stuck in the middle of that steaming mess?

But Chris, Israel just entered the Syrian war with airstrikes in Damascus. Haven't they made a decision to support the rebels against Assad and shouldn't the U.S. do likewise? No, Israel just targeted a weapons facilitation node of one of its primary antagonists, Lebanese Hezbollah. Despite the "Allahu Akabars" from Sunni rebels, the world shouldn't believe that Israel's strikes represent a vote for one side or another in the fight, but should understand that they were conducted in a way that supports defense of Israeli territory by defanging LH's increasingly modern Iranian-provided arsenal.

Should America help these gentlemen? If so, how? (AP Photo)

Unfortunately, history tells us that time and again decisions to go to war are often based on emotion, political expediency, or perception, rather than rational reasons founded on national interests such as the calculus demonstrated by Israel. That being the case, if the U.S. inserts itself into this war, will half-measures such as up-arming the rebels be enough to finish the job and defeat Assad? Recall that the U.S. intervention in Libya two years ago began with a no-fly zone notionally enacted to protect the population and ended with a targeted UAV strike on Gaddafi's convoy that enabled a Libyan kid in a NY Yankees cap to shoot the colonel-for-life in the face. The lesson is that incremental approaches in war usually fail and mission creep in these sorts of interventions are more common than not.

Will a more comprehensive unconventional warfare plan be required to depose the Syrian regime? Or does it even matter if any sort of kinetic action we undertake works if it meets the three "feel good" criteria above? Regardless of the reasons for an entry into the Syrian conflict, if this ill-advised road is taken, what's the best way to execute a regime change campaign these days? Here is my treatment of the subject in more detail, including the application of precision air and seapower to overthrow an onerous government.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

"Protip: Boats Can't Fly"

noreply@blogger.com (Robert Farley) — Sun, 05 May 2013 12:31:00 +0000

Haven't tried the game, but the trailer is awesome:
Haven

Shaping My Discussion Points

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Wed, 01 May 2013 05:00:00 +0000

With the budget released and the first of the Congressional hearings out of the way, several topics have emerged as those most critical to the Navy in 2013. These are the topics that I have been spending my nights reading and researching. Expect most articles from me until at least June to discuss these topics.

1) When and if the Navy should make a concerted move away from current fleet design.

There are many competing schools: stay the course; stay the course, but improve ability to fight from range; submerge a greater portion of the fleet; demassify, creating larger numbers of smaller ships; prepare for the age of robotics, etc etc.

We all know Navy is in a state of great technological and fiscal flux. So, does Navy pull the trigger now? Choose a way forward and take early steps; pursue technologies that extend current design for a while? Does sequestration answer the question, or simply ask the question? Many ways to think about the issue.

2) Along those lines, should the Navy be asking Congress for alternative funding streams to pay for the SSBN(X)?

3) With directed energy, cyber, and electronic warfare emerging as high demand and desired capabilities for forward deployed naval forces today, is the R&D funding for these technologies sufficient to keep the Navy ahead of the curve of competitors?

4) Will a true debate over the nature of air-sea battle emerge in public, beyond much of the drivel one reads today?

5) What is the future of the amphibious fleet? Should it be optimized for amphib assault? Should it be optimized for global patrolling and crisis response? Should the Navy/Marine Corps team stay with stark delineation of grey and black hulls, or is it time to move to a more affordable mix?

6) Is naval aviation in tune or out of sync? UCAS-D, UCLASS--is it really heading toward a new dawn in aviation, or will bureaucratic and institutional inertia keep Navy from really making a concerted shift to carrier-based unmanned aviation? Is the issue the platforms deploying aircraft or the carrier air wing design, or both?

7) The LCS discussion is vibrant. Navy has spent around $12 billion so far on LCS. The JSF discussion is not vibrant. Navy has spent $50 billion on that program so far. Is Navy getting what is being paid for?

Book Review: China's Search for Security

noreply@blogger.com (Robert Farley) — Thu, 25 Apr 2013 18:04:00 +0000

I reviewed Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell's China's Search for Security for H-Net:

Nevertheless, Nathan and Scobell argue that, despite its growing power, China’s international position remains almost uniquely precarious. China borders more countries that any nation on earth, and continues to have border disputes with several of the most powerful. Other strong states, such as the United States and Japan, threaten China’s littoral. Internally, political discontent threatens Beijing’s control of outlying areas, including Tibet and Xinjiang. Concerns about political discontent and the maintenance of economic growth continue to draw the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) focus inward.

On a related point see here, although I suspect that there are some translation issues regarding the terms "invasion" and "occupation."

On the FY 14 Shipbuilding Plan

noreply@blogger.com (The Conservative Wahoo) — Thu, 25 Apr 2013 12:06:00 +0000

AEI's Mackenzie Eaglen and I have an Op-Ed at RealClearDefense this morning. Here's a key point: "The latest interim plan will cause aggregate combat power to decline along with numbers, leaving the fleet less capable of dealing with open ocean submarine threats, enemy surface fleets, and the majority of threat aircraft and missiles. Additionally, the Navy continues to under-resource its amphibious ships, meeting neither the Marine Corps’ combat requirement of 38 ships nor the worldwide combatant commanders’ requirement for a similar number."

We can talk all we want about re-balancing and relying more heavily on American Seapower, but in the end, what we buy is a reflection of what we value.

The plan relies on over-optimistic budget assumptions (which is not surprising, but is rather the norm in the kabuki played out between the Navy and Congress when it comes to the shipbuilding account) and ignores the impact of sequestration. It does not appear to reflect any real shift in emphasis to Seapower derived of the strategic guidance issued by the President last year. It retires ships long before the end of their service lives not because they aren't useful, but because we cannot afford to both operate them and build the future force given the current resource allocation.

We cannot afford the Navy we have nor the Navy we need. We must either strategically re-prioritize to obtain the resources necessary to buy and operate that Navy (progress toward which I see little evidence of), or we need to change the Navy we have to one we can afford. Jerry Hendrix wants to de-emphasize carriers. I want to shed the SSBN nuclear deterrence mission. Wayne Hughes wants to alter the fleet design. Simply shrinking the same fleet we have now to one 2/3 of its size over the next 15 years (the actual glide-slope we are on) is not the answer, unless what you desire is the ability to do what we do now a little less well, in fewer places with diminished simultaneity.

Bryan McGrath

Africa Maritime Updates

noreply@blogger.com (Chris Rawley) — Tue, 23 Apr 2013 23:40:00 +0000

With so much in the news this month, it's been easy to overlook the interesting events occurring in and around the water of today's most dynamic continent.

Somali Piracy remains practically non-existent this year, thanks to the continued presence of armed security detachments on commercial vessels. While commercial shipping in the Gulf of Aden is relatively safe, hundreds of smaller private sailing vessels and motor yachts remain unable to transit the area because they simply can’t afford armed security.

Two years ago this month, U.S. and NATO forces were pounding away at Libya's armed forces and pretty much totaled Gadhafi's Navy. Earlier this month, Royal Navy frigate HMS Kent made an unprecedented good will visit to the port of Tripoli. Other countries such as France and Malta have been helping Libya to rebuild its naval forces, which are critical for patrolling the country's 2,000 kilometer coast line, interdicting smugglers and migrants trying to reach Europe, and securing the export of more than 1.3 million barrels per day of petroleum.

The MEND is at it again.

On the west side of the continent, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) group killed 10 police in a boat and renewed attacks on maritime oil infrastructure. More troubling though, are reports that MEND, historically a group with secular aims, may be entering the sectarian conflict started by Boko Haram terrorists in the North. Threatening attacks on Muslims in the Niger Delta, the group's spokesman recently issued a statement: "On behalf of the hapless Christian population in Nigeria, The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta will from Friday, May 31, 2013, embark on a crusade to save Christianity in Nigeria from annihilation." Nigerian security forces are already overwhelmed fighting terrorist in the North (with very heavy handed tactics it must be noted) and a renewed insurgency in the South could threat stability in this important economic anchor for West Africa.

Also in the Gulf of Guinea, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration recently conducted a rather audacious under-cover operation at sea to detain Guinea-Bissau's former Chief of Naval Operations and drug kingpin Bubo Na Tchuto. The impact of narcotics proceeds on the ledgers of terror groups in Africa has been overstated by DEA (at least in my opinion), but this operation was worthwhile if only to remove one of the most corrupt officials in West Africa.

In Northern Mali, French Forces have begun a gradual withdrawal from fighting al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. AQIM and its associated militant groups made use of the Niger River during the French intervention. France is hoping for a U.N. force to replace African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) troops and that force will certainly need some sort of riverine capability to keep the waterways leading up to Timbuktu and Gao clear of extremist activity.

Malian military patrols the Niger River.

The last update isn’t really maritime-related, but does involve the USN participating on a unique foreign internal defense mission in the Sahara. Last month, four U.S. naval officers deployed with special operations forces (SOF) from all over the globe to West Africa to train African special operators for counter-terrorism missions in the region. SEAL LCDR Kaj Larsen explains more here about FLINTLOCK 13.

Instability around the continent and the recent attacks on U.S. embassies last September have driven the military to examine various options for both future crisis response and steady state capacity-building operations. The Army is regionally aligning some forces, with a dedicated Brigade Combat Team to support training missions and be prepared to intervene on the continent should the need arise. Africa has been described as an "economy of force" operation for DOD and generally the introduction of any element other than culturally-attuned, small footprint forces (read SOF) raises the eyebrows of State Department diplomats. I find it hard to believe that the Army could get a brigade-sized element - or even pieces of it - nimble enough to deploy rapidly, with a minimal number of "boots on the ground" and adequate logistics train to satisfy these requirements. Along similar lines, the Marine Corps has instituted a company-sized crisis response element for this mission which leverages the speed and long-range mobility of the MV-22. Expeditionary crisis-response is in the Marine Corps DNA, but without adequate amphibious shipping, the Corps' unique capabilities can't be exploited. That said, it will be interesting to see which force the COCOM and Ambassador calls on next time there is a crisis in Africa.

Learning from the Doolittle Raiders

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Thu, 18 Apr 2013 04:00:00 +0000

The following contribution is written by Congressman J. Randy Forbes from Virginia's fourth district, Congressman Forbes is chairman of the House Armed Services Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee and founder and co-chairman of the Congressional China Caucus.

71 years ago today, 16 U.S. Army Air Force B-25 Mitchell bombers took off from the aircraft carrier USS Hornet on the way to bomb Tokyo. Coming only months after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Doolittle Raid (named for the mission’s commander, Lt. Col. Jimmy Doolittle) constituted the first American offensive operation of World War II and helped shatter the illusion of our adversary’s invincibility.

Despite occurring over seven decades ago, the Doolittle Raid offers lessons intensely relevant for our time. The personal heroism of the Doolittle Raiders, seven of whom died during the raid or in captivity, is a timeless tribute to the bravery and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform. The operation’s brazenness - placing bulky bombers on an aircraft carrier in the Pacific Ocean in order to reach and hit the very heart of the Japanese Empire - reminds us that effective military operations require leaders of vision and daring to achieve our national security objectives. And the Raid’s effective use of Army Air Force personnel and aircraft, launched from a Navy carrier and defended by Navy surface vessels and submarines, illustrates how the demands of modern warfare refuse to neatly delineate between services- cooperation between our Navy, Marines and Air Force is an enduring necessity.

Most importantly, the Doolittle Raid reminds us that the ability to project military power from the sea in times of crisis is the essential mission and defining feature of the U.S. Navy. As in 1942, the aircraft carrier remains the most effective instrument of projecting American power onto hostile shores, deterring potential adversaries and, if necessary, delivering overwhelming force to defeat the enemy. No other platform possesses the striking power of the carrier. This power is packaged into a system that has both global reach and almost unimpeded growth potential. The carrier can sail through the world’s oceans, free from the political complexities associated with overseas bases. At the same time, this floating airfield can also be “modernized” with new naval aircraft that can bring a mix of capabilities demanded to operate in future security environments.

Today’s Navy carriers have advanced beyond anything the sailors onboard the Hornet could have imagined; a modern Ford-class carrier is roughly 80,000 tons larger than the Yorktown-class ship which launched the Doolittle Raiders and can house over 75 advanced aircraft. Despite the technological advances of the last seven decades, the aircraft carrier’s status as the fulcrum of the Navy’s Fleet remains unchallenged.

As the Navy prepares for the challenges of the coming decade, the question will not be whether our carriers remain vital; rather, the key determination will be the appropriate mix of aircraft comprising the Carrier Air Wing (CVW). It is this flexibility that is the true utility of a carrier. In an anti-access/area-denial environment (A2/AD), where nations from Iran to China are investing in missile technology designed to restrict our carrier operations, it is imperative that the Navy’s CVWs contain aircraft with the right mix of of range, persistence, stealth, payload, and electronic attack to successfully execute its missions. The Navy’s investments in shorter range aircraft have left it dependent on the carrier’s ability to get relatively close to hostile shores. As the Doolittle Raid proved, there is great strategic and military advantage in maintaining a long-range strike capability. As I have written here before, the UCLASS, if done right, is poised to offer the CVW an option for long-range ISR and strike that will help anchor the carrier’s power projection mission for decades to come.

The world we face in 2013 is very different from the one the Doolittle Raiders knew as their B-25s hurtled down the Hornet’s flight deck in April 1942. But while the technologies and competitors may have changed, the utility of the aircraft carrier to American defense policy remains constant. We honor the legacy of the Doolittle Raiders today while being mindful that the success they achieved in projecting American power far from home against a determined and resilient enemy is an achievement we must jealously protect in our own time. It is incumbent upon all of us to never stop working, and to never stop asking the difficult questions, to ensure that those who follow in the footsteps of the Doolittle Raiders have the tools they need to deter, prevent and, if absolutely necessary, win America’s wars.

Navy’s Continued Commitment to Europe

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Wed, 17 Apr 2013 04:00:00 +0000

The following contribution comes from Rear Admiral Michael Smith. Rear Admiral Michael E. Smith is Director, Strategy and Policy Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

Last Tuesday, at the Sea-Air-Space Expo, I had the opportunity to sit on a well-attended panel with USMC Major General (sel) Rocco and USCG Rear Admiral Lee to discuss a range of issues for the three Sea Services relating to the Asia Pacific rebalance. In the exchange with audience members following our remarks, we fielded a number of very pointed questions that were really variations on the same concern: will the rebalance negatively impact our commitments to Europe?

From my perspective, the answer to these questions is a resounding no - as long as we approach the future with a new way of thinking. NATO is without question the most powerful military alliance in the world and will continue to be a centerpiece of security in an unpredictable world, and the Navy's relationship with the maritime forces of our European allies and partners remains a cornerstone of cooperative activities across the globe as we confront numerous, collective challenges together. In fact, the Navy continues to pursue greater integrated and cooperative activities with our European counterparts. Examples of continued and enhanced U.S. commitments to Europe include the forward deployment of four of our most advanced Aegis ships to Rota, Spain, where they will support a broad range of missions in addition to their focus on NATO ballistic missile defense, and our ongoing feasibility study of deploying new Littoral Combat Ships and Joint High Speed Vessels to the region. Further, Navy’s contribution to Ballistic Missile Defense of Europe includes not only the maritime BMD piece but also Aegis ashore with the first site planned for Romania in 2015.

Especially in light of fiscal challenges felt across the NATO alliance, we should approach this era of fiscal austerity with significantly greater focus on the potential we all can gain from a more advanced approach to cooperation and engagement between allies and partners - this issue was the focus of an article I recently wrote for Proceedings, Strategic Cooperation: Everybody Wins.

In short, if we take an approach that more fully leverages allied and partner contributions then not only will we maintain our commitments in Europe; we will more efficiently manage resources globally. Now is the time to grasp this opportunity and approach allied and partner contributions in a new light. While the Asia Pacific rebalance is a current area of focus, our commitments to Europe and the Mediterranean are not wavering and can in fact be strengthened if we are willing to challenge our previous planning assumptions and embrace the full capabilities our partners can bring.

Strength in Numbers: The Remarkable Potential of (really) Small Combatants

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Mon, 15 Apr 2013 05:00:00 +0000

The following contribution is from LT Jimmy Drennan. LT Jimmy Drennan is a Surface Warfare Officer. He is the prospective Weapons Officer aboard USS Gettysburg and a Distinguished Graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School's Systems Engineering Analysis program.

You are a tactical commander tasked with a mission to seek out and destroy one of the enemy’s premier capital ships in his home waters. You have two potential striking forces at your disposal: a world class surface combatant of your own with a 99% probability of mission success (Ps = 0.99) or a squadron of eight independently operating, missile carrying small combatants – each with a chance of successfully completing the mission no better than a coin flip (Ps = 0.5). Do you go with the almost sure thing and choose to send in your large combatant? As it turns out, the squadron of small combatants has an even higher overall Ps. But let’s assume now that you’ve advanced to operational commander. You might have more concerns than just overall Ps. What are the defensive and logistical requirements for each option? How much fleet investment am I risking with each option? What will it cost to replace the asset(s) if it is lost? What capability does the striking force have after successful enemy action (i.e. resilience)? An analysis of these factors, intentionally designed to disadvantage the small combatants, actually comes out overwhelmingly in their favor over the large combatant. The results verify what naval strategists and tacticians have long known: for certain offensive missions, an independently operating group of even marginally capable platforms can outperform a single large combatant at lower cost and less risk to the mission.

The War at Sea Flotilla: A Test Case

In the Autumn 2012 edition of the Naval War College Review, Captains (U.S. Navy, Retired) Jeff Kline and Wayne Hughes introduce “A War at Sea Strategy” in which they describe a flotilla of small, missile-carrying surface combatants designed to challenge Chinese aggression in East Asian waters. The flotilla ships would utilize largely independent tactics, relying little on networked command and control, to produce a powerful cumulative combat capability.

“What would the flotilla look like? In rough terms, we envision individual small combatants of about six hundred tons carrying six or eight surface-to-surface missiles and depending on soft kill and point defense for survival, aided by offboard manned or unmanned aerial vehicles for surveillance and tactical scouting. To paint a picture of possible structures, we contemplate as the smallest element a mutually supporting pair, a squadron to comprise eight vessels, and the entire force to be eight squadrons, of which half would be in East Asian waters. The units costing less than $100 million each, the entire force would require a very small part of the shipbuilding budget (Hughes and Kline, 2012).”

This flotilla concept provides an ideal test case to compare against a world class surface combatant but first we must establish a few key assumptions on which this analysis is based.

Statistical Independence. The math behind this analysis hinges on the idea that the outcome of one small combatant’s engagement has no effect on the others in the squadron. While true statistical independence is nearly impossible to achieve in real world naval operations, the War at Sea Flotilla concept models it closely with independently operating units, the potential for various ship classes, and the inclusion of allied navies which may use different tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). This concept of operations is a major departure from today’s heavily networked forces which generate combat power through the integrated actions of several units. In those forces, the actions of one unit can have profound impact on the effectiveness of another.

Defensive and Logistical Requirements. For the purposes of this analysis, we will assume that the defensive and logistical requirements are roughly equivalent for both the small combatant squadron and the large combatant. Both would require defensive support in warfare areas not directly related to the current mission. Even a multi-mission, blue water combatant would employ inorganic support, such as maritime patrol aircraft or early warning assets, to watch its back while it conducted a focused offensive mission. As for logistics, any surface asset would need an oiler nearby to conduct sustained operations in enemy waters. A nuclear powered aircraft carrier would still require periodic support to replenish its stores of jet fuel. The logistics tail would be shorter for a large combatant than a flotilla, since it carries much of its own maintenance and supply support, but that can be a detriment in a mission involving an exchange of missile salvos. While the structure of defensive and logistical support may differ greatly between the flotilla and the large combatant, one can assume the drain on resources would be about the same for both options.

Unit Cost. Captains Hughes and Kline estimate the unit cost of the flotilla small combatants at $80 million (Hughes and Kline, 2012). Therefore, a squadron of eight combatants would cost $640 million. The unit cost of the large combatant is assumed to be $1 billion, which is an underestimate for relevant US Navy platforms. The cost estimates in this analysis are intentionally set up to work against the flotilla concept in order to emphasize its potential for savings.

Enemy Capabilities. To further disadvantage the flotilla concept, let’s assume the small combatants are significantly overmatched by the enemy combatant. In a first strike, the enemy combatant is capable of simultaneously targeting six of the eight squadron combatants. Against the large combatant, it is capable of conducting a devastating mission kill in which the ship may not be sunk but the cost to repair it to fully mission capable would be comparable to the unit cost. As a starting argument, let’s assume in either case the enemy can achieve a mission kill with 10% probability (Pmk =0.10) since both striking forces have similar levels of defensive support. You might argue that Pmk should be lower for the large combatant because it possesses superior self defense capabilities; however, you could also argue that the mobile, distributed nature of the small combatant squadron compensates for each ship’s lack of self defense by complicating the enemy’s targeting process. It may be relatively easy for the enemy to target one or two of the small combatants, but it remains a challenge to simultaneously eliminate the entire squadron.

Selecting the Right Striking Force: Analysis Results

Using the generic introductory scenario, we can compare the small combatant squadron to the large combatant in terms of performance, cost, and risk.

Overall Effectiveness. We are given the overall effectiveness of the large combatant as Ps = 0.99 and the individual effectiveness of the small combatants as Ps,ship = 0.5. To determine the overall effectiveness of the squadron, it is easiest to first estimate the probability that none of the small combatants successfully accomplish their mission. The probability that any one small combatant will not accomplish the mission is,

Since the outcomes of each engagement are estimated as independent of one another, the probability that none of the eight small combatants accomplish the mission is,

The probability that at least one of the small combatants accomplish the mission is the converse of the previous result, or

In other words, the squadron has a 99.6% probability of success vice 99% for the large combatant. This may not seem like much of an improvement, but it is more remarkable when considering the unit cost of each option.

Cost Effectiveness. The unit costs are given as $1 billion for the large combatant and $80 million for the small combatant, so we know that the squadron of eight small combatants is the more affordable option at $640 million. In addition, we have established that the squadron can outperform the large combatant for this particular offensive mission in which the individual squadron ships are actually overmatched by the enemy. The squadron is not only more cost effective than the large combatant; it actually delivers better performance at lower cost. As a commander, would you rather invest $1 billion in striking force that fails 10 times in 1000 attempts, or save $360 million with a striking force that fails only 4 times in 1000 attempts? To put it another way, if you were to invest the same $1 billion in 12 small combatants, you could deliver a striking force that failed only 2 times in 10,000 attempts (Ps = 0.9998).

Resilience after Enemy Action. One way to consider risk is to look at the impact to the mission if the enemy is able to successfully consummate a first attack. We have assumed the enemy is equally capable of attacking the large combatant and the squadron of small combatants. If the enemy combatant achieves a simultaneous mission kill against six of the small combatants, then only two will remain to continue the mission. These two small combatants have a combined 75% probability of successfully completing the mission. On the other hand, if the enemy successfully conducts a mission kill against the large combatant, the probability of successfully completing the mission is 0% and you lose the other warfare area capabilities that the large combatant could bring to bear in other missions. The additional investment required to provide onboard logistics support is also lost.

Another way to look at this risk is to calculate the expected damage cost of each option in the long run. Assuming the enemy is able to conduct devastating mission kills (in which the repair costs are comparable to the unit cost) a conservative 10% of the time (Pmk = 0.1) for both the large and small combatants, then the expected damage cost for the large combatant is,

Likewise, the expected damage cost for the squadron of small combatants is,

In the long run, the enemy is expected to cause $52M less damage per mission in the case of the small combatants. Even if the enemy were more likely to successfully target six small combatants simultaneously, how much would you as a commander be willing to pay for 75% follow-on capability vice 0%?

Less Communications, Less Cost, More Combat Power: Analysis Insights

The results of this analysis seem to indicate that the squadron of small combatants is an obvious choice for naval missions involving direct action against the enemy fleet. Yet the scenario described is quite generic and says nothing about the actual TTPs and systems the squadron will utilize in prosecuting the enemy. How can such a generic scenario really prove anything about the effectiveness of small combatants? The key is that two fundamental principles underlie this analysis and can be applied in much broader terms.

First, independently operating, redundant, and at least marginally capable units will greatly increase any system’s overall effectiveness, primarily because unit faults and errors are not permitted to propagate through the system as they would in net centric warfare (e.g. flawed group tactics or a false link track). For surface combatants, an individual effectiveness of 50% is sufficient to affordably produce a formidable striking force. For less expensive systems, that number may be even less. Ultimately, this kind of system is so effective because it is highly unlikely that none of the individual units will successfully complete the mission.

The second principle that contributes to the appeal of the small combatant squadron is that the price of military systems increases exponentially as you attempt to improve individual unit performance closer and closer to perfection. Most of our warships today are designed well past the “knee” in the cost curve. Small combatants can be built with marginal capability at (relatively) very low cost. One new concept illustrates how less capable ships can affordably produce equivalent performance as more capable ones in certain situations. In his 2009 essay, “Buy Fords, Not Ferraris” Captain (U.S. Navy) Henry Hendrix proposes Influence Squadrons, composed of light amphibious ships, large combatants, littoral combat ships (LCS), and small combatants, to alleviate the need for some Carrier Strike Groups – with a smaller price tag (Hendrix, 2009). The purpose of the War at Sea Flotilla, however, is not to replace current fleet assets but to fill a vital niche not now covered to fight a war at sea in littoral waters. Therefore the cost must be small. Captains Hughes and Kline suggest the cost of maintaining a fleet of 64 flotilla ships, steady state, should be less than 3 or 4% of the shipbuilding budget (Hughes and Kline, 2012).

Think Small: Analysis Conclusion and Recommendations

One look at the writings of Sir Julian Corbett or Captain Hughes’ Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat will show the reader that the benefits of small combatants in certain aspects of naval warfare are not a new discovery. In fact, this analysis may seem like the kind of thinking that led to the development of LCS, which was, after all, born out of wargaming and analysis that advocated for small combatants (Johnson and Long, 2007). The LCS program is not, however, a realization of the principles discussed in this analysis. Both Freedom and Independence class LCS are large multi-mission warships (albeit one at a time) in which mission packages cost a premium to achieve very high probabilities of success. The War at Sea Flotilla, if constructed as Captains Hughes and Kline recommend, would exemplify the advantages of independently operating small combatants.

None of this is meant to condemn LCS or any other ship class for that matter. Every ship in the US fleet, along with the distributed networks that multiply its combat power, has an important role in the mission of winning the nation’s wars, deterring aggression and maintaining freedom of the seas. The purpose here is to provide an analytical basis for including independently operating squadrons of small combatants in the discussion for future force structure. For targeted offensive missions at sea, concepts such as the War at Sea Flotilla can provide higher performance than large combatants at lower cost and with greater resilience to enemy action. In today’s fiscal reality and tomorrow’s projected operational environment, that is a combination Navy leaders should not ignore.

A Global Navy for a Global Mission

noreply@blogger.com (D. Eric Sayers) — Sat, 13 Apr 2013 18:25:00 +0000

My boss, Rep. J. Randy Forbes, published two pieces last week on Seapower issues. While I think many came across the one he co-authored on attack submarines with Rep. Courtney (AOL Defense), I also wanted to highlight the second piece he did for the new RealClearDefense website. American Seapower: A Global Navy for A Global Mission is written as a foundational piece that Rep. Forbes hopes will be part of a broader thesis he continues to expand on for why the Nation should prioritize a larger Navy. You can find it here.

Why does the United States maintain such a robust Navy? It's a fundamental question we should be asking because the answer has both major economic and national security implications. Many assume we have a strong Navy simply because others states that may do us harm also have strong Navies or because the U.S. is flanked by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, waterways potential enemies may use to bring war to our shores. But if we maintained a Navy just to defend our coasts than our current battle force fleet of 285 ships would be more than sufficient for the task.

A better question, then, might be to ask what the Nation expects its Navy to provide. A number of enduring American interests present themselves....

2014 Navy Budget Share Predictable, Not Newsworthy

noreply@blogger.com (The Conservative Wahoo) — Fri, 12 Apr 2013 22:01:00 +0000

Searching for any real evidence for a rebalance to the Pacific and a concomitant shift in national military strategy as reflected how the budget is allocated among the Services continues to be unsatisfying.

Here is a table I put together of how the base defense budget has been allocated in the recent past (actual budgets 2010-1013) and projections for how the pie would be split up from 2014-2017. The figures in this table for future years are from the 2013 budget. All figures were rounded up or down to the nearest whole number, which is why some years do not equal 100:

	Army	Navy	Air Force	DoD
2017	24%	29%	28%	19%
2016	24%	29%	27%	19%
2015	24%	29%	27%	19%
2014	25%	29%	27%	19%
2013	25%	29%	26%	19%
2012	26%	29%	27%	18%
2011	26%	29%	27%	17%
2010	26%	29%	27%	17%

Next, I took figures from the 2014 Budget Submission as reported by DoD Buzz in an article trumpeting that fact that the “Navy” hauled in the largest budget share. Putting aside the fact that the “Navy” has two Armed Services in its budget, the Navy has been receiving the largest slice of the pie for several years and the size of it has been fairly consistent. Here is the table above with the 2014 line showing both the pre-FY 14 budget line and post FY 14 budget line, using the figures from the DoD Buzz story:

	Army	Navy	Air Force	DoD
2017	24%	29%	28%	19%
2016	24%	29%	27%	19%
2015	24%	29%	27%	19%
2014	25%/24%	29%/29%	27%/27%	19%/19%
2013	25%	29%	26%	19%
2012	26%	29%	27%	18%
2011	26%	29%	27%	17%
2010	26%	29%	27%	17%

Again, in the second table, the 2015-17 budgets have not been updated with figures from the 2014 budget input. It is entirely possible that the 2014 line is just the beginning of more important shifts of money among the Services and DoD. But don’t let anyone fool you; the 2014 budget—from the perspective of how budget shares reflect priorities—is business as usual.

Same Lyrics, Different Beat

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Fri, 12 Apr 2013 17:30:00 +0000

The plan is to create chaos and force political rivals to work together as they struggle to wrap their mind around what is happening. The plan includes ignoring laws and discarding good governance to achieve desired political objectives. The plan is to create as much fear and uncertainty as possible to cloud the judgment of the various parties involved. The hope is that by creating enough chaos everyone eventually gets tired and agrees to concessions.

This is North Korea's plan, right?

Nope. This looks to be Barack Obama's plan with the FY14 defense budget sent to Congress. Now political rivals, no not China and the US, but Republicans and Democrats - must find a way to work together as they struggle to wrap their mind around a budget that ignored - outright - the statutes related to sequestration. The last couple years suggest that's unlikely.

This is the worst possible way to govern, but good governance towards stability that would save the taxpayer money be damned, because political objectives must be met - the primary political objective apparently being to avoid making tough choices. Congress will fight it out, eventually get tired (probably sometime in Q2 next fiscal year), and will concede to concessions.

Don't tell me North Korea is acting irrationally unless you are ready to say the same about the way the President is handling sequestration. North Korea is playing games with the lives of others in the region, but Barack Obama is playing games with the jobs of Americans. Either way, the objective is political instability until everyone is worn out.

Kim Jong Un and Barack Obama are basically executing the same political strategy under different contexts. Worth noting that Kim Jong Un will likely ultimately lose because the world elites are not stupid and refuse to put up with people who create dangerous instability, but Barack Obama will likely ultimately win because American elites choose to act stupid and will put up with a President who creates dangerous instability.

Thinking Americans might want to ask themselves why the President of the United States is executing political strategies and tactics in America targeted at Congress that have everything in common with the political strong arm tactics being used by North Korea today, and whether that political standard is good enough.

Asia Pacific Integrated Air and Missile Defense

noreply@blogger.com (The Conservative Wahoo) — Thu, 11 Apr 2013 16:21:00 +0000

I will be a panelist at today's AUSA LANPAC 2013 Symposium Panel entitled "Integrated Air and Missile Defense in the Pacific Region". It will be livestreamed here, with our panel beginning at 2:40 PM Eastern time. Although I will be focusing on land based IAMD forces, implications for the Navy are easily discerned.

Bryan McGrath

Post Vacation Links

noreply@blogger.com (Robert Farley) — Wed, 10 Apr 2013 15:08:00 +0000

Some bits that may be of interest:

Colin Snider and I talked about Maggie Thatcher's legacy in Latin America, especially how the conflict is remembered in Argentina:
Along similar lines, some enduring strategic (as opposed to tactical and operational) lessons of the Falklands War.
Why accidental war on the Korean Peninsula is unlikely.
Doubt that this will be of interest to anyone who's not a political scientist, but some thoughts on blogging and the discipline.
And in case you're interested, this is the latest iteration of our work on intellectual property and military diffusion.

Joint Warrior 131 - Order Of Battle

noreply@blogger.com (GvG) — Fri, 05 Apr 2013 21:39:00 +0000

From 15-25 April the largest military excercise in Western Europe will be held in Scotland.

Around 12,500 personnel from 13 countries will be involved. And apart from around 40 aircraft (Typhoons, Tornado's, Rafale's, Super Etendards, EC2 Hawkeye, Sentry E3D, CP-140 Aurora's and other MPA's and tanker aircraft) there will also be a huge naval presence.

Here's a list of participants I found.

Belgium
BNS Bellis (M 916)

BNS Primula (M 924)

Canada

HMCS Iroquois (DDG 280)

HMCS St Johns (FFH3 40)

HMCS Preserver (AOR 510)

Denmark

HDMS Absalon (L 16)

HDMS Esbern Snare (L 17)

HDMS Vaedderen (F 359)

France

FS Primauguet (D 644)

FS Emeraude (S 604)

FS Marne (A 630)

Germany

FGS Bremen (F 207)

FGS Emden (F 210)

FGS Hessen (F 221)

FGS Weilheim (M 1059)

FGS Datteln (M 1068)

FGS Ueberherrn (M 1095)

FGS Werra (A 514)

FGS Frankfurt am Main (A 1412)

FGS Rhon (A 1443)

The Netherlands

HNLMS Evertsen (F 805)

HNLMS Rotterdam (L 800)

HNLMS Bruinvis (S 810)

HNLMS Urk (M 861)

HNLMS Vlaardingen (M 863)

HNLMS Luymes (A 803)

HNLMS Mercuur (A 900)

Norway

HNOMS Gnist (P 965)

HNOMS Steil (P 963)

HNOMS Uthaug (S 304)

HNOMS Karmoey (M 341)

HNOMS Hinnoey (M 343)

HNOMS Rauma (M 352)

HNOMS Valkyrien (A 535)

Poland

ORP Czernicki (511)

ORP Czajka (624)

Sweden

HSwMS Sundsvall (K 24)

HSwMS Visby (K 31)

United Kingdom

HMS Illustrious (R 06)

HMS Bulwark (L 15)

HMS Diamond (D 34)

HMS Sutherland ( F 81)

HMS Richmond (F 239)

HMS Montrose (F 236)

HMS Westminster (F 237)

HMS Talent (S 92)

HMS Brocklesby (M 33)

HMS Chiddingfold (M 37)

HMS Hurworth (M 39)

HMS Pembroke (M 107)

HMS Grimsby (M 108)

HMS Echo (H 87)

RFA Fort Austin (A 386)

RFA Lyme Bay (L 3007)

USA

USS Stout (DDG 55)

USS The Sullivans (DDG 68)

USS Bainbridge (DDG 96)

USS De Wert (FFG 45)

 USNS John Lenthall (T-AO 189)

Nine Month Deployment Barely Worth Notice

noreply@blogger.com (The Conservative Wahoo) — Fri, 05 Apr 2013 17:03:00 +0000

News here of the return of USS JASON DUNHAM (DDG 109) from its nine-month maiden voyage. Nine months. This is happening more and more frequently, and average deployment lengths continue to creep up.

We either need a bigger fleet or fewer things to do. Perhaps both. But not neither.

Some will look at this and compare it to the multiple, longer deployments made by US ground forces in the past decade. There is no question, they have borne a mighty load, a wartime load. Yet we should not forget that regular out of area deployments have been what the Navy does since there has been a Navy. And long after we have pulled out of Afghanistan, Navy and Marine Corps forces will routinely deploy around the world in support of our national interests.

Consequential decisions are at hand. Secretary Hagel said many things in his speech at NDU the other day to make me believe he is interested in fundamental strategic reform. We shall see.

Bryan McGrath

The Future of High End Surface Combatants

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Fri, 05 Apr 2013 15:00:00 +0000

I have intentionally taken a few weeks to think about the recent article by Chris Cavas in Defense News on the memo widely discussed in the media by Vice Admiral Tom Copeman, Commander Naval Surface Forces. The article outlines a lot of different areas for discussion, everything from destroyers to LCS to amphibious ships to MLP to the SLQ-32 to new anti-surface missiles, and what is interesting is that I hear some of the topics in the article isn't even in the memo VADM Copeman sent.

Navy leadership, as a community, doesn't like it much when these type of upper level debates get out through the press. The reality is, Flag officers in the Navy have debates and discussions internally all the time, so it doesn't necessarily mean anything that different Flag officers will promote different ideas in a private discussion and there will be disagreement in those discussions. What does mean something is when the discussion goes public, because that suggests there is a legitimate split in the surface warfare community on what the best way ahead is.

Each topic mentioned in the Defense News article is a unique subject, so I intend to treat each topic as such when discussing. The first big topic is the debate over the way ahead for high end surface combatants. I've been discussing for years the split, which is actually into two main groups and a third minor group. The first main group is the DDG-51 Flight III crowd who prefers to continue the evolution of the existing Arleigh Burke class destroyers because it is suggested to have the least cost risk and can presumably be fielded the fastest. The second main group is the new destroyer crowd who sees the Arleigh Burke class as lacking the growth margin necessary to stay competitive for the next 50-65 years the new ship class would be expected to serve. By 50-65 years I mean a new Flight III built later this decade would be delivered around 2025 and be expected to serve until 2065, and if the Flight III is still being build in 2030 the ship would be fielded in 2035 and serve until 2075 - 62 years from now.

The third crowd, which is small and not really a legitimate option, advocates using the DDG-1000 hull for a new destroyer. Let me be clear, DDG-1000 as a three ship class is great for keeping the industrial base solid and has some great new technologies that will have significant, positive long term impacts to the US Navy, but the hull is not a model for the future. Let the DDG-1000 be a class of three, my bet is long term no one in the Navy will regret having built three ships and no one in the Navy will regret the decision to build no more than three ships.

I'm in the second crowd that believes the Navy needs a new destroyer. As things already are, a Flight IIA DDG-51 built in 2017 is going to be fielded in 2022, and be expected to serve as a relevant capability until 2062, meaning the DDG-51 will serve the US Navy at least 70 years - longer than any other US Navy ship than the USS Constitution. It is possible DDG-51 will still field a relevant combat capability in 2062 when the last of the ships are retiring. It's also unlikely. Those who believe DDG-51 will be relevant must first point to a ship commissioned in 1943 that would be relevant today. The counter argument to that is USS Iowa (BB-61) and USS New Jersey (BB-62) were commissioned in 1943, and both would be relevant today. All I will say is when a piece of equipment is absurdly unaffordable, it is not relevant.

The Navy needs a new surface combatant, and this is my argument why.

SWOs, take this as a compliment. As a community you only really care about what you can see, touch, hold, handle, etc.. yourself. If you don't have it and don't use it, it's a powerpoint slide and you couldn't care less about it. Good quality to have. DDG-1000 is both a blessing and a curse. It is going to be a mess, and will also be fantastic. The electric drive of DDG-1000 is going to change the way the Navy thinks about power on warships, and once SWOs have the capability to use power in a dynamic way, they will never want to be without that capability.

So my first key for the future of surface warfare is the development of a roadmap for electric drive, and DDG-51 Flight X doesn't do that.

The Navy must get operations and maintenance costs down. As much as people bitch and moan about the cost of ships, anyone who actually looks at defense budgets knows that procurement of "stuff" in the Navy budget is not where the future cost growth or the big expenses are. Reducing operations and maintenance costs of new ships is the key to sustaining a fleet large enough to be responsive to the demand signal of politicians leading a superpower. As much as the LCS is hated upon by people, even in profiles where the ship races around the world at high speed with a tanker in tow and has contractor maintenance all over the word, the CBO and Navy numbers both show today that LCS is still less expensive than the current FFGs over the life of the ship, and every LCS that replaces a FFG saves the Navy money - even with additional crew on LCS.

So my second key for the future of surface warfare is the development of a roadmap that reduces the operations, manning, and maintenance costs of large surface combatants over the life of the ship without allowing quality degradation of the ship over time, and DDG-51 Flight X doesn't do that.

Finally, technology is rapidly changing best practices. Admiral Greenert's single most important contribution to the US Navy so far as CNO is to get everyone thinking about the future in a platform/systems context. It's not a new idea to the Navy, see how Spruance/Ticondoroga shared a hull, for example. What is new on top of this concept however is the integrated reliance of CEC, and several of the advances we are seeing in networked ASW sonar tech. Now Navy has Hawkeye 2000, AMDR, AESA radars, new sonar tech, P-8, unmanned sensor capabilities, etc.. all being integrated to enable AEGIS to be a legitimate theater level networked combat capability unlike anything ever fielded before. Modern Surface Warfare executes US political policy in what I call the four primary domains US Policy depends on for Strategic Dominance; Sea, Air, Space, and Cyber. For the air and space picture, getting AMDR right and insuring the ship can support (via power) a radar for the duration of the life of the ship is critical for the future of surface warfare.

So my last key for the future of surface warfare is the development of a hull sized to support power capacity and sensor equipment that will remain relevant to the battlespace environment AEGIS is being fielded in, and DDG-51 Flight X doesn't do that.

To me that means Navy needs a new large surface combatant hull form at between 10,000 - 12,000 tons (not named DDG-1000), and needs a plan to fill the gap of time it will take to develop a new 21st century warship. In my opinion, if the Navy designs the large surface combatant hull form right, the hull should be able to support different variants that field different types of payloads (systems). My thoughts are heavily influenced by the work and opinions of many others, a great source for those who want to understand the primary issues is Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress by Ronald O'Rourke (PDF). Allow me to suggest the bottom 2/3s of Page 41 is required reading for all.

From the PACOM Playbook to PACOM's Plan B(MD)

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Thu, 04 Apr 2013 06:00:00 +0000

WATERS TO THE WEST OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA (March 17, 2013) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS John S. McCain (DDG 56), front, the Republic of Korea Navy Aegis-class destroyer ROKS Seoae-Yu-Seong-Ryong (DDG 993), middle, and the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS McCampbell (DDG 85) move into formation during exercise Foal Eagle 2013. McCampbell and McCain are members of Destroyer Squadron 15, forward deployed to Yokosuka, Japan, and are underway to conduct exercise Foal Eagle 2013 with allied nation Republic of Korea in support of regional security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Declan Barnes/Released)

Every year as winter ends in March, North Korea holds an annual military exercises as part of their spring training period that usually concludes with a big meeting with all the leaders in early April. This years meeting appears to have occurred on April 1st with the announcement that North Korea will restart their dead reactor. Despite news reports, I am skeptical that reactor will be back online this calendar year.

This annual training period in North Korea typically coincides with South Korea and the United States holding their annual Foal Eagle and Key Resolve exercises. For the past few years the pattern has been fairly consistent with North Korea being extra threatening (and feeling extra threatened) and usually a war of words breaks out for about a month or so. Once the US/South Korean military exercises end, North Korea will call for negotiations and take credit for resolving the crisis they manufactured in the first place. Last year when this chess game was over, many in the US had a bad taste in their mouth unhappy with the result, and as a result a lot of thought and planning by PACOM went into this years Foal Eagle 2013 exercises.

Everyone who follows me on Twitter might have noticed about mid-February that I was gearing up for this years annual chess match on the North Korean peninsula. I will never be an Asia expert, but I admit to being fascinated by the North Korean government that has somehow remained completely resilient to any type of external influence for over a half century. In particular North Korea, not China, is a subject I like to raise when talking about geopolitical issues in the Pacific with Admirals and Generals, because with North Korea the biggest threat is the lack of good intelligence.

Earlier this year I was following up with various Admirals and Generals I had met over 2012. As part of those calls I had a long conversation with someone I have gotten to know at PACOM on AirSea Battle and specifically the Pacific region; and more specifically we often discuss North Korea, not China. I was informed that the 2013 Foal Eagle exercise would be something I, in particular, would appreciate because it truly leverages public affairs within the context of both strategic communications and operations; a topic I have frequently written about. I was given no hints as to what this meant, except I was told Secretary Panetta had set aside extra funding for the Air Force for Foal Eagle 2013, and most of the details were already worked out. This conversation took place 2 months ago.

The Playbook

Adam Entous and Julian Barnes at the Wall Street Journal have revealed the US script that has played out over the month of March. Described as the 'Playbook', they detail events in their latest Wall Street Journal article.

The U.S. is putting a pause to what several officials described as a step-by-step plan the Obama administration approved earlier this year, dubbed "the playbook," that laid out the sequence and publicity plans for U.S. shows of force during annual war games with South Korea. The playbook included well-publicized flights in recent weeks near North Korea by nuclear-capable B-52 and stealth B-2 bombers, as well as advanced F-22 warplanes.

The U.S. stepped back from the plans this week, as U.S. officials began to worry that the North, which has a small nuclear arsenal and an unpredictable new leader, may be more provoked than the U.S. had intended, the officials said.

"The concern was that we were heightening the prospect of misperceptions on the part of the North Koreans, and that that could lead to miscalculations," a senior administration official said.

The Wall Street Journal goes on to detail the Playbook, even describing Secretary Hagel as one of the playbook's chief backers, even though I know for fact the Playbook was actually written by PACOM on Secretary Panetta's watch and with his full support. The article then highlights the meat of the politics.

The public-relations effort was designed not only to send a message to North Korea, but also to assure a hawkish new government in South Korea that it had full U.S. backing and there was no need for it to respond militarily to the North's provocations.

U.S. intelligence agencies assessed the risks associated with the playbook and concluded there was a low probability of a North Korean military response because the regime's top priority has been self-preservation. U.S. officials believe the North understands that taking military action could prompt a devastating U.S. and South Korean counter-strike that could destabilize the regime.

"Everyone is concerned about miscalculation and the outbreak of war. But the sense across the U.S. government is that the North Koreans are not going to wage all-out war," a senior Obama administration official said. "They are interested first and foremost in regime survival."

The U.S. plan was discussed during several high-level White House meetings, according to participants. The effort was backed by Mr. Hagel in one of his first acts as defense secretary. John Kerry, the new secretary of State, supported the Pentagon, as did other top administration officials, according to meeting participants.

In the deliberations, supporters said it was better for the U.S. to control the escalating steps, to ensure the situation didn't spin out of control. In part, according to these officials, the plan was an effort to ensure that South Korea's new government wouldn't feel compelled to respond to North Korean threats, which often emerge at the time of the exercises, as the North conducts its own annual legislative meeting.

But within the administration, some officials voiced concern about unintended consequences of provoking North Korea. Some of these officials questioned the faith the White House and Pentagon placed in the intelligence agencies, which have a mixed record of predicting North Korean behavior.

The intelligence gaps are particularly acute when it comes to reading new North Korean leader Kim Jong Eun, who remains an obscure figure and someone who intelligence agencies themselves have described as potentially more unpredictable than his father.

However, few objections were raised at the highest levels during the meetings, according to participants—unlike in other Obama administration deliberations about using military force abroad, including Libya, Northwest Africa and Syria, that have been marked by protracted debates. President Barack Obama gave the green light to proceed with the playbook, these people said.

The First Quarter: March

The Playbook was intended to function as escalation control by the Obama administration. As someone who jumps online every night at 8pm EST to read the morning news in North Korea, allow me to suggest the Playbook worked better than expected. When North Korea abandoned the Armistice back on March 10, it was clear to observers that North Korea was operating from a script. As I discussed at that time, escalation control was the key to managing the tensions, and I do think the US still maintains escalation control over the situation today, with or without the old Playbook.

As I have observed the US airpower show of force that has visited South Korea over the past month, I found myself in huge admiration for how well the US was playing the game with North Korea in 2013. What headlines that bluster the presence of US military power failed to mention is that every single aircraft that has been flown over South Korea over the past month had been planned many months ago as part of the planning process for the Foal Eagle 2013 exercise. This was never a secret btw, I exchanged emails with a public affairs officer who confirmed this for me right after B-52s made their appearance on March 19. The B-52s, the B-2s, the F-22s, etc... all those flights and activities were planned to appear in Foal Eagle long ago, and there was nothing new or reactionary by the United States taking place as events unfolded throughout March. While bombers and advanced fighters have been involved in previous Foal Eagle exercises, the key distinction this year was the announced use of those platforms.

Unlike previous years, this year the US publicized the presence of B-2s and F-22s through defense public affairs, because otherwise North Korea (or you and I) would never know they were involved in the exercises, even though the actual flights by those aircraft were planned and paid for months ago. So what is new this year? The public affairs piece that mentions their presence and activity, and the PA professionals who were able to mingle those activities into the context of the North Korean rhetoric - so reporters could go write plenty of news stories - is the only thing that is actually different from the US/SK perspective relative to previous years. Talk is cheap, which may explain why our defense public affairs folks are actually pretty good at it when given the green light.

Throughout the entire month of March as North Korea has stepped through their well orchestrated script for escalating tensions in the region, the US has been following a script of their own; a script written long ago for the Foal Eagle exercises and supported fully by the White House. In my opinion, everything North Korea is doing - even through today - is part of their script, and everything we have been doing has been part of our script. The intelligence officials in the WSJ report are right, there is no evidence that North Korea is off script. We do not know what their script is, but there does appear to be broad agreement that North Korea didn't write a script that ends with them being wiped out in a war. Neither script was written in a way that predicted the others actions, and public affairs and the use of media by both North Korea and the US is solely responsible for connecting the activities of the other side.

It would appear that in the end, the actions contained in the North Korean script forced us to abandon our script.

April Fools Day

If the US and North Korea have been playing a game of chicken as each side executed their scripted events in the public sphere, it is now clear that beginning on April Fools Day North Korea won that game of chicken, and the US was the first to flinch.

Every military activity related to the Korean peninsula discussed in the public was part of the script until on Tuesday - for the first time - the narrative being produced by US media was no longer fully incorporated into the Playbook. The retasking of USS Decatur (DDG 73) to head towards North Korea was a new event, and everyone who follows naval power closely knew it. The problem was, PACOM was one ballistic missile defense destroyer short of what was needed to meet demand signal coming from North Korean activities.

While most of the media made a big deal about the USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) being close to the Korean peninsula, the fact is the US Navy has a BMD capable destroyer on that patrol every single day of the year. Without going into too much detail, USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) is on a regular patrol that gives the United States an early warning detection capability should someone in Asia launch a ballistic missile at us. There is an AEGIS warship there 24/7/365 and on leap year day too. As soon as the media started talking about USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) and USS Decatur (DDG 73), neither of which has any attachment to Foal Eagle 2013 or the Playbook, apparently that is when the Obama administration got nervous and pulled back on the Playbook.

But here is the issue: PACOM needed USS Decatur (DDG 73) because there wasn't another BMD ship available. Attention Congress, there is a capacity issue in 7th Fleet for BMD capable destroyers in the Obama administrations 'pivot to Asia' plan, because the Navy fell short one forward deployed BMD capable warship when PACOM came calling in regards to a North Korean crisis.

The challenge PACOM faces is that PACOM believes North Korea is going to be launching a ballistic missile soon, but the difference between this ballistic missile and previous North Korean ballistic missile launches is that this missile has a mobile launching platform. That makes the launch time of the next ballistic missile an unknown, and just as important the launch point for the next ballistic missile an unknown. This combination of unknown time and unknown launch location requires PACOM to cover every threat axis from North Korea in this threat environment, just in case, to insure regional security.

What you have been reading in the press is only partially correct, because there are actually nine US Navy ballistic missile defense capable warships operating throughout the 7th Fleet today, not two or three as has been reported. As we navalists know, AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense is an integrated network approach to developing a very large regional shield where each ship is both a radar and a shooter, and by integrating other assets in the region, the Navy can track a ballistic missile at launch and potentially develop a firing solution within only a handful of seconds. The more sensors and the better the quality of data, the faster a threat assessment can be made by AEGIS thereby enabling options for response quickly. This process is one that the Navy is well trained for, and in complicated exercises has practiced successfully in actual intercept events that last no longer than 20-30 seconds in practice windows that have spanned days.

While Foal Eagle and the "Playbook" was essentially a strategic communications exercise with North Korea in this environment of higher tension, when PACOM faced a situation where the potential for an actual missile launch in this environment became a legitimate possibility, PACOM has reacted by establishing a regional ballistic missile shield around our partners and bases. This regional ballistic missile defense shield layers around the Japanese ballistic missile defense capabilities, which can be integrated with the US Navy capability through AEGIS.

The US already has an X-Band radar in Japan that can track launches, additional radars in South Korea that can be utilized for launch detection, and nine BMD capable warships that can help track and develop firing solutions for intercepting any ballistic missile threat. Because the area that requires defense from the particular missile North Korea intends to launch is fairly vast, the US Navy ultimately was one ship short to meet the ballistic missile shield demand PACOM needed for full protection. When USS Decatur (DDG 73) was retasked, as a public asset outside the Playbook, political leaders got the impression they had lost escalation control with the Playbook and apparently gave it up. It is somewhat disappointing the Playbook was so rigid it couldn't adapt when inserting a new asset into it's strategic messaging.

Seapower as Strategic Deterrent

Throughout the duration of the cold war, mutually assured destruction is often credited for deterring nuclear war. While the debate over mutually assured destruction still exists today regarding the wisdom of the policy; the bottom line is MAD worked. Ballistic missile defense, in theory, adds a new strategic option for the United States in dealing with nuclear powers like North Korea that have limited capabilities. For the first time in human history, the United States is fielding a fully mature and developed ballistic missile defense shield to protect US allies and territories from an announced threat of nuclear attack.

One of the key strategic differences between ballistic missile defense as a deterrent and mutually assured destruction as a deterrent is that the United States is basically saying the enemy can shoot first, and if the attack is a nuclear attack but is also successfully defended against, then the United States reserves the option of responding without using nuclear weapons. This is a critical point critics of ballistic missile defense apparently don't believe is important, because a successful nuclear attack against US allies or territories requires a nuclear response. The option of not having to respond to a nuclear attack with nuclear weapons is the value of successful ballistic missile defense, and why smart investment and stewardship of ballistic missile defense is in the best interests of the United States.

It has been reported that the deployment of land based interceptors to Alaska is going to cost one billion dollars. That suggests the latest announcement that THAAD interceptors will be deployed to Guam will probably also cost one billion dollars. THAAD interceptors are expensive, and about half the time they even work. Those two land based ballistic missile defense deployments cost as much as a single new AEGIS ballistic missile defense destroyer, and while the AEGIS system is only capable of intercepting ballistic missiles in the very early and final stages of a ballistic missiles flight, the AEGIS BMD system has a much more reliable track record and has been tested under much more realistic conditions, including multiple targets and decoys, unlike the THAAD system. An AEGIS ballistic missile defense destroyer is also mobile, which is why the US Navy will be protecting Guam with an AEGIS ballistic missile defense warship for the next several weeks until the THAAD system can be deployed to Guam.

In theory THAAD is more capable than the AEGIS system because it can intercept at a higher altitude. The problem is THAAD is less reliable than AEGIS, less mature than AEGIS, and more expensive than AEGIS; but for now it is all the US has.

There is another reason why I believe Seapower is important right now as a strategic deterrent. I believe North Korea's creativity is interesting primarily because they are limited by means and are simplistic in method, and sometimes North Korean methods are so simple they appear absurd at first glance. North Korea publicized today that they have "smaller, lighter and diversified" nuclear weapons, which in theory makes some sense because they have only a limited supply of material to make nuclear weapons with. I know it has been something of a running joke for years, but if things go hot I would not be surprised if North Korea tried to deliver a nuclear weapon via a sea mine rather than by missile. North Korea is very skilled in developing sea mines, but not so much when it comes to rocket technologies. The ability to keep North Korea's naval forces from causing any problems is going to be important over the next month in preventing a war. An incident like the sinking of the Cheonan 3 years ago right now could spark a chain of events that leads to Korean War II, but an even worst case scenario is if North Korea was to find a way to sink a US or Japanese warship, because that puts South Korea in the middle of a crossfire.

Halftime Adjustments

While I can understand why PACOM called in the US Navy to build a regional ballistic missile defense shield when it became clear North Korea might launch a ballistic missile from a mobile launcher, I don't understand why the Obama administration threw out the Playbook and then ran off to tell the Wall Street Journal about it. Regardless, someone clearly needs to clue Hagel in on a little secret: Seapower is the winning playbook if the objective is to prevent war.

The ballistic missile defense shield PACOM is setting up is a defensive capability. It is also a very limited piece of the US Navy's capability - indeed it's only a small piece of the surface combatants being used for the ballistic missile defense shield. There are no carriers projecting power into the Yellow Sea, there are no submarines launching missiles, and there are no amphibious ships preparing to send Marines ashore in South Korea.

If North Korea does continue to escalate further, and I believe they will, the Stennis Carrier Strike Group is deployed and is currently in port in Singapore, and the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group is deployed currently off the US west coast heading east. Those two carriers represent 100+ aircraft that can project power as needed in any contingency, and can do so right into downtown Pyonyang if necessary.

And if tensions result in a hot war, those submarines nobody in North Korea can detect will be the first strike that knocks out the Command and Control capabilities of North Korea in the first minutes of hot war.

And if for some reason the US needs to reinforce the South Korean Army, US Marines will be delivered into theater from amphibious ships.

And if, God forbid, a nuclear device goes off in South Korea, the nearby SSBN that no nation on the planet can find today will make sure Pyonyang is melted off the face of the planet.

American Seapower is inherently designed to be an escalation control mechanism for political leaders during a crisis. Seapower is a stabilizing presence capable of preserving peace through projecting strength or providing defensive, and an enabling capability when it is time to deliver the US Army to win a war.

No matter what the Playbook was last week, the winning Playbook for the US going forward dealing with North Korea is Seapower. Military strategists have spent most of the 21st century convincing political leaders in Washington that US military power is best exercised with land power - in Asia of all places, but hopefully with a splash of cold water called the threat of nuclear war, political leaders are waking up to the historical reality that Seapower is how Superpowers manage enduring peace without being intrusive on the sovereignty of partners. Seapower enables nations to enjoy enduring prosperity through maintenance of stability, lines of communication for trade, and security. Seapower is also going to be how PACOM will be managing peace in the Pacific crisis of the present and future, so I hope those involved with Hagel's strategic review are paying attention.

It's only April 4th, Foal Eagle still has 25+ more days. It is going to be a long month with plenty more threatening rhetoric and behavior ahead. Is a ballistic missile launch how this ends? Maybe, but I still believe North Korea desires a limited skirmish of some sort as part of their script, although it could be that the Playbook has actively deterred that potential outcome.

There is a lot of good analysis of the situation in North Korea out there. I highly recommend two sites in particular that may not be part of your regular web readings. The Interpreter Blog at the Australian Lowy Institute is always a great source for analysis of events in the Pacific, and in particular North Korea right now; and just about everything written by Jeffery Lewis these days covers every angle of North Korean nukes and missiles.