Information Dissemination

Mayday!: A Panel Discussion of Seth Cropsey's New Book at Hudson

noreply@blogger.com (The Conservative Wahoo) — Wed, 19 Jun 2013 18:52:00 +0000

For those with two hours to kill, here's a link to the Hudson panel on Seapower generally and Seth Cropsey's new book specifically. Of note: HASC Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee Chairman Randy Forbes' introductory remarks.

UPDATE: By way of correction at 1:38:18 I speak of the ships that will be present in East Asia in 2020, and I say "DDG" when I mean "LCS" initially.

Bryan McGrath

When "I" or "We" Speak Clearly, and When "We" Don't

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Tue, 18 Jun 2013 05:00:00 +0000

The following slides are from Document One - Maritime Strategy Presentation (for the Secretary of the Navy, 4, November 1982) that can be found in Newport Paper #33 U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents, edited by John B. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz (2008) (PDF).

If you take these slides and compare them to the second document in Newport Paper #33, The Maritime Strategy of 1984, you can almost match up everything in these slides to a section in the Maritime Strategy.

With history I enjoy the luxury of hindsight. As I was reading these slides, and various other documents associated with the Maritime Strategy of the 1980s, I noted this particular maritime strategy was only tested once while the cold war was still hot - in the Persian Gulf in dealing with Iran in 1987-1988.

And ironically, everything the Navy discussed ahead of time was executed. The Maritime Strategy discussed protecting sea lines of communication for oil, and that happened. The maritime strategy of 1984 specifically discussed the Army having an essential role in the littorals, and it was US Army special forces aviation that was deployed to the Persian Gulf - off US Navy ships - to deal with Iran. For a maritime strategy written before the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the Navy was thinking about maritime strategy in a remarkably Joint context. It was also a global context.

The focus was clearly the Soviet Union, but the scope of strategy was global and while the maritime strategy was incredibly detailed on the main issues, it included general information related to all contingencies, and it was very specific in how it prioritized theaters, what responsibilities in each theater were, and how the Navy was going to execute political policy with naval power regionally within a global context. There wasn't room for buzzwords, because this was a serious strategy by serious people intended to be seriously executed by the United States Navy.

The US Navy is about to either finish or has already finished the rewrite of the Cooperative Maritime Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, which is in my opinion perhaps the least influential maritime strategy of any nation with a coastline in the 21st century. If you want to read a serious maritime strategy in the 21st century - read the English translation of virtually every nation in the Pacific that has written a maritime strategy over the last decade. I have admittedly not read them all, but I have had the brief on many of those documents, and serious people tend to speak seriously when they have something important to say.

The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower has almost nothing in common with today's US Navy, an organization that is being stretched to the limits to meet COCOM demands; a US Navy that is deployed for war in the Middle East; a US Navy that has been deployed again and again to conduct some form of combat operations throughout the rest of the Middle East and Africa since the day the maritime strategy was signed; and a US Navy that is involved in a major pivot to the Pacific specifically for the purposes of reassuring allies during the uncertainty associated with the rise of China, who hasn't exactly been making friendly relations with neighbors when it comes to maritime territories.

Explain why we need italics to emphasize statements like Seapower will be a unifying force for building a better tomorrow? The US Navy doesn't build a thing in the world, it insures access so that others build upon the peaceful prosperity the US Navy enables.

So here is my question. As it is completely impossible to develop anything similar to the first 12 slides shown above from the original Cooperative Maritime Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, does anyone believe it will be possible to produce slides similar to that with the rewrite of the Cooperative Maritime Strategy for 21st Century Seapower? Here is what I think... if one can rewrite the Cooperative Maritime Strategy for 21st Century Seapower based on the first 12 slides updated to the modern maritime challenges and environment the US Navy operates in today, the 13th and 14th slides become very easy to write, and the whole thing will actually sound like a strategy when it is done.

Except one thing... there is one challenge I am unsure anyone in the military can do well in the age of PowerPoint and groupthink, and it may in fact doom the effort of a rewrite the strategy regardless of content.

The Unclassified Maritime Strategy of 1986 - the Fifth document in Newport Paper #33 - which is really a collection of articles by the CNO, Commandant, and Secretary of the Navy; are written in first person singular and plural. I have read the Cooperative Maritime Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (PDF) many times, and there is something that always bugged me - for the most part; it is sometimes difficult to tell who exactly "we" is in that document. One thing that is clear as day though, "we" represented a lot of people and was not consistent. Depending upon what was being said, "we" might be the Navy, "we" might be America, and "we" might be some military or political entity that remains undefined. I linked the document, so go back and read about what "we" were saying - and maybe like me you might ask yourself who the hell "we" are.

The point is, "we" was a product of groupthink and committee that lacked clear definition, rather than the "we" that carries with it a personal touch. In 1986, "we" were Admiral James Watkins, General P.X. Kelley, and Secretary John Lehman, Jr., and the reader easily understood when "we" meant a service, because the word "I" was used intentionally in the articles when talking about what a person thought.

In 2007 "we" didn't sound anything like General Conway, Admiral Roughead, or Admiral Allen. In 2013 or 2014, or whenever this new rewrite of the Maritime Strategy comes about, my hope is that who is talking and what "we" are saying is clear to the reader - and if "we" can't produce something similar to those 12 slides highlighted above, then maybe "we" don't actually have anything important to say.

River Wars II

noreply@blogger.com (Chris Rawley) — Sat, 15 Jun 2013 19:23:00 +0000

While I was about two years premature with Part I, it appears that predictions about Ethiopia's hydro-electric developments on the Blue Nile have panned out with increased rhetoric and the potential for war in the region. Egypt's President has recently stated plainly that he is prepared to defend its water rights, keeping military conflict open as an option.

These threats shouldn't be taken too lightly. Reduced down-stream water levels would have severe negative impacts on Egypt's electrical and agriculture production. For years, while Egypt should have been focused inward in developing infrastructure to assist their people, the previous Mubarak regime - with our help through billions in defense support and a series of Bright Star exercises - instead developed the military force structure and tactics to fight a Desert Storm-like scenario. Throw in continued dissatisfaction with the Mursi government, ethnic proxy fighting upstream between the Sudans, and some possible religious undertones, and the potential for a wider conflict is readily apparent.

The Nile River supports the lives
of more than 100 million Africans.

The U.S. has interests in both countries. Egypt, as the most populous country in North Africa, is geo-strategically important to the U.S. and Europe because it controls the vital Suez chokepoint. Ethiopia, while land-locked, has proven to be a strong ally in the fight against al Qaeda in East Africa. The Ethiopian National Defense Force currently holds ground in southwest Somalia, preventing al Shabaab from regaining a foothold there until the nascent Somalia National Army can take its place. So while discussion of intervention in Syria, continued threats by al Qaeda in other parts of Africa, and a multitude of other issues currently absorb limited national security band-width, this water conflict should not go ignored by diplomats and military planners.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Past Strategy for Relative Decline

noreply@blogger.com (Lazarus) — Sat, 15 Jun 2013 02:00:00 +0000

Lord Selborne (Spy Magazine)

Admiral Sir John Fisher (also from Spy)

Several posters here and on other sites have commented that the Littoral Combatant Ship (LCS) might have had a better development process if it had been connected to a defined strategy. That may be true. Since the end of the Cold War the United States has operated under varying degrees of trans-oceanic strategy with a focus on affecting events ashore rather than war at sea. A decline in relative U.S. economic and financial strength, an increase in entitlement spending, the rise of new peer competitors and the additional financial stress imposed by a lingering large scale counterinsurgency effort have all contributed to weaken the ability of the U.S. Navy to continue a global trans-oceanic strategy and simultaneously prepare for future wars at sea. Can LCS play a successful role in both trans-oceanic and war at sea strategies? Perhaps we first need to manage our own “relative decline” with a bold new strategy that meets both needs before trying to define where LCS really fits? This is not a new situation in that our immediate predecessor in the role of liberal democratic global power (the British Empire) faced a similar crisis at the dawn of the 20^th century. The Royal Navy’s remarkably successful effort to re-balance its force structure for a new century is a useful example for the U.S. in preserving global influence while maintaining an effective battle force.

When he assumed the role of Great Britain’s First Lord of the Admiralty in 1900 the Earl of Selborne was ordered to maintain Britain’s superiority over its immediate rivals France and Russia, account for the rising strength of the German, Japanese, and American fleets and make cuts in his own budget to ensure successful prosecution of the Boer War. Rising British entitlement spending in the first several years of the 20^th century further complicated Selborne’s efforts. In the end he made a bold recommendation to scrap nearly a century of trans-oceanic British naval policy in exchange for a smaller, more powerful and globally deployable fleet capable of both warfighting and traditional show-the-flag missions. Arguing that the British Navy’s global disposition dated from “a period when the electric telegraph did not exist and when wind was the motive power,” Selborne consolidated isolated British squadrons into concentrated capable fleets. He also ordered the wholesale scrapping of both outdated ships and those too slow for global combat operations. After a long naval supremacy throughout the world’s oceans, the British welcomed the development of the Japanese and American navies and significantly reduced both their Pacific and North American forces.

To carry out this scheme, Selborne brought fiery Admiral Sir John Fisher from his post as Britain’s primary battle fleet commander in the Mediterranean in 1902 to London and made him First Sea Lord (the Royal Navy equivalent of the Chief of Naval Operations). Fisher, a technologist and transformational innovator who often stalked the halls of the Admiralty wearing signs that said “I have no work to do” or “bring me something to sign,” ruthlessly implemented Selborne’s plan over the collective protests of many Royal Navy officers. The admiral advocated high speed cruisers armed with battleship guns to patrol the trade routes and serve as Britain’s “911 colonial defense force”. He experimented with aircraft and submarines, and instituted a new reserve force intended to preserve older ships too expensive to operate in peacetime but useful for combat. Fisher also sought to bring logic to the business of naval strategy and operations. He stated that “Strategy should govern the types of ships to be designed. Ship design, as dictated by strategy, should govern tactics.” Naval officers of the time were aghast at such thinking. Surely all one needed to do was to place their ship alongside the enemy in true Nelsonian tradition. Fisher also successfully communicated his strategy to the general public in that every Englishman of the first decade of the 20^th century knew his nation’s fate depended on that of its fleet. The British Navy was reasonably well deployed for war in 1914. Despite a crippling German U-boat campaign that was blunted with help from the U.S. Navy, the British were able to achieve many of their naval objectives of the war. Acquiescence in the growth of both Japanese and American allies ensured both would be British allies in the First World War.

What then can the United States learn from the British example of “relative decline” and naval rebalancing? Our force structure and global deployment has undergone some revision since the end of the Cold War but perhaps more change is required. This change must be based on a clear strategy and the platforms, weapons and systems allocated must be designed to fit this strategy. The operational and tactical employment of these elements should be determined by their design features and how they best support the desired strategy. If the U.S. does indeed intend to re-balance a significant portion of its naval forces to the Pacific, that change may involve leaving large parts of the oceans in the care of other democratic nations much as the British did in the early 1900s. The Indian Navy would be such a partner. Europe may also need to completely provide for its own naval security, including ballistic missile defense. The U.S. can then focus its naval assets on those regions where naval supremacy is vital to securing our strategic interests. Admiral Fisher replaced slower armored cruisers with battlecruisers capable of rapid transits for defense of imperial trade routes and as Britain’s “911 force” for naval intervention. U.S. naval units should also be high endurance units capable of rapid deployment across the globe. We must also avoid the mistake Fisher made in not building enough flexibility into his ship designs. His battlecruisers were excellent for imperial defense but highly vulnerable in a line of battle with peers. In short we need to think more about what the strategy for the next few decades ought to be before populating it with operational art, new platforms and tactics. Hard choices like those made by Selborne and Fisher may be needed to balance any U.S. relative decline while continuing to secure our vital maritime interests. For further information on Great Britain’s solutions to relative decline, read Aaron Friedberg’s The Weary Titan and for one expert’s take on building a strategy first and then platforms in its support, see Seth Cropsey’s Mayday. Both are excellent reads.

The Growth and the Leap Ahead

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Wed, 12 Jun 2013 04:00:00 +0000

I like this slide, but I keep thinking this slide needs to be associated with a slide that details what kind of ships the US Navy is buying through the years.

In FY2012 numbers, the FY14 budget is around $150 billion, which can be compared with the green number.

The Naval Strike Warfare Center ("Strike U") is probably the most important major initiative in the 1980s, because in 1983 it is legitimate to say naval aviation was terrible at actually hitting targets. Following the embarrassment in Lebanon, strike warfare in naval aviation reoriented itself much in the same way Top Gun reoriented intercept.

This increase in naval aviation strike efficiency combined with the addition of long range cruise missiles on both ships and submarines had an effect that was greater than the naval buildup in the 1980s, it increased the lethality at range of each platform. By 1989 not only was the US Navy fielding 14 CV/CVNs, 4 Battleships, over 100 cruisers and destroyers, and 99 submarines; but each ship was increasingly more capable. The ultimate effect of the naval buildup of the 1980s wasn't simply the expanded growth of the fleet, but in every category of naval power the force was extending the gap separating the capability of US naval power and naval power throughout the rest of the world.

It is simplistic to focus on the raw numbers of fleet size when looking at the 1980s when measuring naval power of the United States relative to the world. It is more important to focus on the elements within each community that increased capabilities relative to the world. Technology was only a small part of the story, the increased emphasis on quality training for the all-volunteer force was at least as important as technology was in extending the gap between what US naval forces were capable of and what competitors were capable of.

Some revisionist history food for thought

noreply@blogger.com (Lazarus) — Tue, 11 Jun 2013 05:41:00 +0000

I’m Lazarus and I’m honored to be a contributor on Galrahn’s site. I’m a retired surface navy officer who decided to go back to school and get a PhD in Military history. Some may recognize me either from my posts here, or over on sailorbob.com where I have been hanging out since 2005 and frequently discussing (or arguing) with Galrahn over the pros and cons of the Littoral Combatant Ship program. My chief interest, both as an academic and a poster here is in presenting examples from history that influence today’s military issues. While history does not repeat itself, certain patterns of conduct by nations and individuals frequently repeat their cycles. Historians, both amateur and professional have access to a wide knowledge base and their advice has the potential to improve many aspects of defense policy.

A good example of a piece of history that ought to be re-examined by historians is the defense reform movement of the 1980s and the notable legislation it produced. The effort’s primary product, the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 has for all intents and purposes become canon law for the U.S. military. It is referred to reverently in U.S. Defense publications as if it were the Declaration of Independence or the Magna Carta. Its legislative creators thought that empowering the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and his staff to manage service issues would end inter-service bickering, prevent future Vietnam wars, and free the nation from the tyranny of military novices like Lyndon Johnson picking military targets over lunch. Critics like Navy Secretary John Lehman countered that the legislation would not cut defense costs and would prevent the individual military services from effectively allocating resources and personnel to their respective areas of warfare expertise. What resulted was more of a compromise. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) gained considerable power at the expense of the military service chiefs but the organization of the JCS remained unaltered despite the efforts of reformers to replace it with a council of retired officers who would not have service-centric views. Although intended to improve Cold War military planning and organization, it made its strongest claim for legitimacy in a post-Cold War conflict. Goldwater Nichols was widely touted by its legislative backers as one of the keys to victory in the 1991 Gulf War by preventing excessive service chief and civilian meddling in the conflict and organizing the disparate U.S. military service into a victorious joint force. Buoyed by these pronouncements Goldwater Nichols sailed on through the 1990s and 2000s, unlike many other Cold War-era programs and organizational doctrines without significant review.

How did Goldwater Nichols really fare? U.S. led coalition forces quickly defeated Iraqi forces in 1991, but technological advancements in weapons, sensors, and communication networks, as well as a disorganized enemy with poor morale played a far greater role than the re-organized Pentagon leadership. President George H.W. Bush did not micromanage his military commanders as Lyndon Johnson had, but he may also have allowed them to end the war too soon and in conditions too favorable for the Saddam Hussein government. Coalition commander General Norman Schwarzkopf rather than a civilian official or group negotiated the armistice agreement with the Iraqis. The terms he approved allowed the Iraqi Army to fly helicopters after the end of the conflict, supposedly to repatriate scattered and disorganized Iraqi soldiers. Instead the Iraqi Army was able to use these helicopters in suppressing uprisings by Shiite and Kurdish groups in the wake of the Iraqi defeat. These uprisings might have toppled the Hussein government and obviated the need for a second war in 2003.

Goldwater Nichols has not stopped inter-service bickering and the joint processes it created and/or sustained such as the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) are more about ensuring that each service gets its fair share of the budget rather than determining what the nation’s defense requirements really are. The legislation was supposed to prevent future Vietnams, but the vast joint bureaucracy it created was unable to effectively anticipate or plan for an Iraqi resistance after major combat operations in the 2003 conflict had ended. If one reads former George W. Bush Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith’s superb book War and Decision, it is apparent that the Joint Staff had a decidedly passive role in shaping the the Iraq war effort. The vaunted Iraqi “Surge” of 2007 that has been credited by many in fatally wounding the Iraqi insurgency was the brainchild of think tanks and retired military officers, rather than the Joint Staff.

In short a revision of the Goldwater Nichols Act is extremely desirable, but not for the reasons usually suggested. The June 2 Defense News article on U.S. military “bloat” suggested a review of Goldwater Nichols with an eye to cutting burgeoning joint staffs. An analysis of how Goldwater Nichols came about and how effective (or ineffective) it has been in organizing and the United States for war might prompt calls for a fundamental overhaul of the legislation. Perhaps John Lehman might even get a “profile in courage” award for opposing Goldwater Nichols rather than his current casting as its nefarious villain.

Three Theaters Shape Context

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Tue, 11 Jun 2013 05:00:00 +0000

There was one area of the CNA study related to the 1970s that I found lacking, and that was how the political uses of of United States naval power in the Mediterranean Sea shaped opinions inside the US Navy and how the US Navy viewed the world outside of the Korean and Vietnam wars. It is very easy to get sucked into the Korean War followed by the Vietnam War and note how carrier aviation and naval support of Marines in both conflicts shaped the perspective of naval leaders, but I would argue you can only reconcile naval strategy in the cold war leading into the 1980s by studying the three major theaters and what they represented.

The Atlantic

Once upon a time the nuclear threat was the dominant military discussion in the DoD. As someone whose only up close and personal experience with the cold war was watching Pink Floyd at Brandenburg Gate in July of 1990 at 14 years old... clearly I struggle to relate to the time period and threat of nuclear war. I read about it, I study it, I know the stories, but I simply cannot relate.

Naval power in the Atlantic for nearly the entirety of the cold war was about maintaining a balance of power for nuclear war. The expected use of tactical nuclear weapons and the various kinds of nuclear weapons revealed during this period speaks to how virtually all strategic planning in the North Atlantic was probably unrealistic, because if nuclear war broke out there would be no supply from the US to Europe, the US would be too busy picking up the pieces of a nuclear strike. The primary mission was really the only mission that mattered - keeping track of Soviet ballistic missile submarines. I have no sense for how effective the US may or may not have been in actually protecting the US from that threat, but the all nuclear powered submarine force of today is a direct product of developing the deterrence regime underwater necessary to protect the United States from nuclear attack.

That Hymen Rickover experimented with nuclear power on aircraft carriers and surface combatants was part of the innovation process, and like all true innovation some of it didn't quite work out. Ultimately nuclear power worked for aircraft carriers and submarines, but not so much for everything else. The Atlantic theater throughout the cold war is primarily about strategic deterrence where the US Navy was heavily engaged in a sea control and sea denial campaign against the Soviet Union, specifically the US Navy tracked and monitored Soviet submarines.

The Pacific

The Korean War and the Vietnam War confirm what has been said of naval power since the cold war, command of the global commons has for the most part been conceded to the US Navy since 1945. In both wars the US Navy basically operated as they pleased off shore feeding aircraft into the theater of war operations, and at no point were aircraft carriers ever considered under legitimate threat.

Consider how completely different the experiences of Vietnam were for Admiral Zumwalt and Admiral Holloway, both CNOs - back to back even. Admiral Zumwalt fought a violent green and brown water war attempting to control inland waterways and littorals with an Army of sailors, while Admiral Holloway and the rest of big Navy sailed around Yankee Station and Dixie Station where ships sailed as they pleased rarely encountering a legitimate threat. The burden of danger for big Navy was entirely on the shoulders of airmen flying sorties in support of the war, a burden of danger sailors in big Navy never faced.

The Navy has been organized for projecting power in uncontested seas in the Pacific since 1945. The question facing navy planners today, indeed the reason for Air Sea Battle, is to ask difficult questions of whether the US Navy that has been organized around aircraft carriers since 1945 is prepared for an emerging maritime environment where the seas are contested. Beyond tailing a submarine every now and then, the US Navy has not needed sea control capabilities in the Pacific for almost 70 years. That inexperience suggests to me it is hard to believe the US Navy is very good at sea control today.

The Mediterranean Sea

To me, everything about who the US Navy is today can be found in studying the political use of naval power in the Mediterranean Sea since 1945.

In April 1946 the US supported Turkey to deter the USSR. We sent a battleship.
In July 1946 the US Navy operated in the Adriatic Sea to deter Yugoslavia and Italy from hostilities.
In September 1946 the US Navy deployed to Greece in support of the Greek government, and continued that support for Greece at sea through 1949 to deter Soviet influence.
In May 1956 US naval forces deployed to the Eastern Med in support of Jordon to deter Egypt.
In October-November 1956 naval forces deployed to the Eastern Med in support of Israel, France, and the U.K. and to deter Soviet meddling.
In April 1957 naval forces deployed to the Mediterranean Sea in support of Jordon and to deter Egypt.
In May 1958 naval forces deployed off the shores of Lebanon in support of Lebanese politics, trying to deter Egypt.
In August of 1958 naval forces deployed to support Jordon and deter the Soviets.
In April 1963 naval forces against deployed to support Jordon, but this time to deter Egypt.
In June 1967 naval forces deployed to the Eastern Med to deter the Soviet Union from engaging in the regional conflict.
In September 1970 naval forces deployed to the Eastern Med to coerce Syria and deter Soviet influence, while supporting Jordon.
In October 1973 naval forces against deployed to the Eastern Med to deter the Soviet Union from engaging in the regional conflict.

The United States maintained between two and four aircraft carriers at all times in the Mediterranean Sea throughout the entirety of the cold war. The 6th Fleets job was to protect Europe's southern flank but project American power into North Africa and the Middle East.

Strategically, the United States Navy enjoyed freedom to maneuver in the Mediterranean Sea, because there were very few ways to see how the Russians would attack the US without getting nuked. This gave the US Navy in the Mediterranean Sea tremendous flexibility to engage with partners and deter aggression throughout the region.

If one did not believe that interests in the Mediterranean Sea justified nuclear war, and it is clear that neither the US nor Russia ever believed that, then influence in the Mediterranean Sea was determined almost entirely by naval presence and the threat of credible combat power. All indications are the Soviets accepted the balance and understood that naval presence was the essential piece to influence and power in the region, but the Soviet Union fell apart before the ships that would provide vital naval presence were built.

I note this because it would appear the Russians remember well the lessons of the cold war. It was recently reported the Russians are sending their aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov to the Mediterranean Sea in support of Syria. Hard to see a scenario where the US gets involved in Syria when the Russians are cruising a large deck aircraft carrier with escorts off the Syrian coast. The Russian carrier deployment schedule for later in 2013 is a vivid reminder of how influential presence can be in supporting allies or how armed suasion can influence competitors.

It seems to me that the CNA study could have done a better job focusing on the three primary theaters in the 1970s, particularly operations in the Mediterranean Sea, but simply how each theater was different but each theater shaped the context by which naval leaders were looking at the world. In my opinion this was something Admiral Holloway did very well in his book Aircraft Carriers at War: A Personal Retrospective of Korea, Vietnam, and the Soviet Confrontation, using personal stories to explain how the Pacific and Mediterranean theaters shaped his views. Another excellent book that covers much of this is The Political Uses of Sea Power by Professor Edward Luttwak. His follow up Strategy and History, Collected Essays, Volume 2 is easily one of my favorite book of all time.

Each theater contributed towards the strategic deterrence, naval presence, power projection, and sea control strategic framework that was developed at the time. It is noteworthy that as the Navy moved into the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s as the Navy became less involved in the historic naval strategic missions in the Mediterranean and Atlantic theaters, the Navy also put less emphasis in strategy on the traditional naval missions associated with those theaters.

The Littoral Combat Ship: Give it time

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Mon, 10 Jun 2013 05:00:00 +0000

PACIFIC OCEAN (Feb. 22, 2013) An MH-60R Seahawk assigned to Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 73 flies in front of the littoral combat ship USS Freedom (LCS 1). This is the first fleet MH-60R to operate with a Right Hand Extended Pylon (RHEP) and a full compliment of eight AGM-114 Hellfire Captive Air Training Missiles as it joins Freedom for sea trials off the coast of Southern California. Freedom, the lead ship of the Freedom variant of LCS, is expected to deploy to Southeast Asia this spring. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class James R. Evans/Released)

The following contribution is from Rear Admiral John F. Kirby, Chief of Information for the United States Navy. For those who don't know about Rear Admiral Kirby, I highly recommend listening to the first 30 minutes of this interview on Midrats.

I’ve been following closely all the debate over the Littoral Combat Ship. I’ve even chimed in here and there to refute what I thought was bad reporting and erroneous claims by those using old information. I figure that’s part of my job as the Navy’s spokesman -- not to staunchly defend but rather to inform and to educate.

The truth is, these are healthy debates. We need them. Talking about problems is a good thing. And yet, as a guy who also taught naval history at the Academy, I can’t help but think how very often we’ve been here before. Throughout our history, it seems, the boldest ideas are often the hardest to accept.

Take legendary shipbuilder Joshua Humphreys, contracted in 1794 to build a new class of frigate for the fledgling American Navy. Longer and broader than traditional frigates, Humphrey’s ships were designed with graceful underwater lines for speed, packing an impressive 44 guns and over an acre of sail.

But to many, the design seemed freakish. With its angled hull curving inward from the waterline, unusually flush decks and several feet of extra beam, it was deemed too ungainly to be of service.

Worse yet, Humphrey’s design had only partial support from a reluctant Congress not particularly interested in stirring up the ire of the British or French, both of whom were at each other’s throats again. We didn’t need a Navy, not now, they said. And even if we did, it shouldn’t consist of anything quite as drastic as Humphrey’s frigates.

All that changed in 1797, when, in response to warming relations between the United States and Great Britain, French privateers began raiding American commerce. By the summer of that year, they had captured no less than 300 U.S. ships.

In a huff and in a hurry, Congress ordered the completion of three of Humphrey’s frigates: United States, Constitution and Constellation.

They would accord themselves well, proving vastly superior in speed and durability to their French foes. In one of the most famous battles of that short, little undeclared war, Constellation forced the surrender of one of France’s mightiest frigates, Insurgente, in little more than an hour. Humphrey’s frigates would go on to even greater glory against the Barbary pirates of the North African coast a few short years later.

The critics had been silenced.

Silencing critics became almost sport for a whole generation of ship designers and engineers in the early 1800s. Robert Fulton shut them up by proving the power of steam over wind; Commander John Dahlgren did it with a revolutionary new gun capable of far greater range and accuracy, and Swedish designer John Ericcson awed them with something called a gun turret.

Ericcson didn’t stop there, of course. He went on to design a whole new class of warship. He called them Monitors, and they changed naval warfare forever.

The Monitor’s case is instructive for any discussion of LCS. Nearly everything about it was new and untried. Its features were striking: a long, low stealthy profile, making it hard to locate; a shallow draft and good maneuverability, making it perfect for work in the littorals; and a radically new weapons system that boasted the largest and most powerful gun in the Navy's inventory -- John Dahlgren’s.

The ship operated with less than a third the number of Sailors required of conventional warships. And it was multi-mission in scope, capable of offshore operations and supporting campaigns on land. Even the material used to form the hull -- iron -- was revolutionary and added to the ship's defensive capability.

Ericcson called it his “self-propelled battery at sea.”

Critics called it a mistake. Too small, too slow and too lightly armed it would, they argued, be no match for the larger, cannon-bristling sloops of the Confederate Navy. Even Union Sailors had taken to calling it a “cheesebox on a raft.”

It wasn’t until much later in the war, after improvements had been made to the design, that the Monitor-class would prove its worth.

There were Monitors with Farragut at Mobile Bay. They took part in the Red River campaigns of the West and proved ideal for coastal blockading work. A Monitor even served as then-Admiral Dahlgren’s flagship during the 1863 attack on Charleston. They proved durable ships and had an incredibly long service life, the last of them not being stricken from Navy rolls until 1937.

The spirit of Monitor -- and every other type of revolutionary ship -- is alive and well in LCS. As Monitor ushered in the era of armored ships and sounded the death knell for those of wood, so too will LCS usher in an era of a netted, flexible and modular capabilities.

With its interchangeable mission packages, its raw speed, and its ability to operate with so many other smaller navies around the world, LCS gives us a geo-strategic advantage we simply haven’t enjoyed since the beginnings of the Cold War.

The response by Singapore and by other Pacific partners to Freedom’s deployment, for example, has been overwhelmingly positive. They like the ship precisely because it isn’t big, heavily-armed or overtly offensive. They like it because they can work with it. I fail to see how that’s a bad thing in today’s maritime environment.

Let’s be honest. LCS was never intended to take on another fleet all by its own, and nobody ever expected it to bristle with weaponry. LCS was built to counter submarines, small surface attack craft, and mines in coastal areas. Thanks to its size and shallow draft, it can also conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations, maritime security and intercept operations, as well as homeland defense missions. It can support Marines ashore, insert special operations forces and hunt down pirates in places we can’t go right now.

Let me say that again … in places we can’t go right now.

That counts for something. The CNO always talks about building a Navy that can be where it matters and ready when it matters. Well, the littorals matter. The littorals are where products come to market; it’s where seaborne trade originates. Littorals include the major straits, canals, and other maritime chokepoints so necessary to this traffic. It’s also where a whole lot of people live. Coastal cities are home to more than three billion people right now, a figure that some experts estimate will double by 2025.

In addition to strains on local economies and the environment, this rapid population growth will continue to exacerbate political, social, cultural and religious tensions. You don’t have to look any further than today’s headlines to see the truth in that. Consider the Levant, North Africa, the South China Seas. And you don’t have to look any further than at our current fleet of ships to see what we’re missing.

We need this ship. We also need to be more clear about it -- what it is and what it isn’t. This ship is a light frigate, a corvette. I never understood why we didn’t just call it that in the first place. Maybe it’s because a corvette conveys something less muscular, less macho. I don’t know. Maybe it’s because a corvette is something completely new to us, at least those of us with no memories of picket destroyers, PT-boats, and hydrofoils.

Remember the whole debate over the Perry-class frigates? I sure do. My first ship was a frigate. Too small, the critics said, too slow, too vulnerable. It couldn’t defend itself, they argued. The 76mm gun was little more than a pea-shooter. The Phalanx system, poorly situated aft on the O-2 level, fired rounds too small to be effective against incoming missiles. The sonar? Well, let’s just say that some people compared it being both deaf and blind. Sailors on cruisers and destroyers used to joke that “they wished they were on a ‘fig’ so they could get sub pay.”

As one contemporary observer noted, “When [then] Soviet Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov goes to bed at night, he's not lying awake counting Oliver Hazard Perry frigates.”

And yet, the little frigates became one of the most useful -- and most popular -- ships in the Navy. “By saving money, manpower, and operating costs, the FFGs helped the Navy pass through the economic trough of the 1970s and, with upgrades available from increased defense spending in the 1980s, have served as a reliable platform through the end of the 20th century,” writes Dr. Timothy L. Francis, a naval historian.

“Moreover,” he continues, “without these low-end ships the U.S. Navy never would have been able to grow to the numbers needed to conduct the last phase of the Cold War, which allowed the service to meet the multi-faceted challenges of that period.”

Criticism is good. Criticism is healthy. We should have to justify to the very public we are charged to protect how we are spending their hard-earned tax dollars. And we are. We’re working very hard to be as forthright and open as we can about all the problems still plaguing both variants of the ship. But let’s not forget that it was critics who laughed at the aircraft carrier, disparaged the F/A-18 Hornet and the MV-22, and scoffed at the idea of propelling submarine through the water with the power locked inside an atom.

The critics have been plenty wrong before. And even the most skeptical of us have to be willing to admit that they will be wrong again.

Look, LCS isn’t perfect -- by any stretch. But it’s still experimental. It’s still a bit like Humphrey’s Constellation and Ericcson’s Monitor when they first joined the fleet. New and untried, yes, but valuable in their own way to making us a more capable Navy.   It just takes a little time to prove the concept. Sailors didn’t exactly clamor for PT-boat duty in World War II until it became a tactically proven and exciting option for them.

Navy leaders have been very clear that all options for LCS remain on the table. If we find that LCS needs to be more lethal, we’ll make it more lethal. If we find the ship needs to be manned or maintained differently, we’ll do that too. Just like with the Perry-class, we’ll upgrade and we’ll update. We’ll change.

But one thing that hasn’t changed is the dangerous world we live in. The threats and the opportunities we face are real. And, quite frankly, they are every bit as “multi-faceted” as were those we faced at the end of the Cold War.

As Aviation Week’s Mike Fabey wrote recently, “The Navy needs to rid the service of the ‘old think.’”

“Whether the Navy achieves operational or acquisition success with LCS remains to be seen,” he noted. “But we do most definitely have a ship that is designed to be operated far differently than any other warship before it. At the high-altitude conceptual level, that is precisely what the Navy wanted.”

He’s absolutely right. We want -- and we need -- a new class of ships that can meet these new challenges, that can get us on station fast and close, one that can perform in the coastal areas where our partners, our forces and our potential foes will also operate.

To the critics I say, this is such a ship. Give it time.

Revisiting Some Old Concepts

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Thu, 06 Jun 2013 13:00:00 +0000

The aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), foreground, USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63), center, and USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72). 2006 U.S. Navy photo by Chief Photographer's Mate Todd P. Cichonowicz

The following contribution is from Prof. Robert C. Rubel, Dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College.

While I would not characterize the years since 1945 as a golden age, in terms of naval warfare, the seas have been a remarkably peaceful place. The United States has enjoyed unchallenged command of the sea, allowing her commerce to move unmolested and allowing her to insert the US Army virtually anywhere she chose. Even engaging in local sea control was a rare need. For the most part, the US Navy has focused on power projection ashore. However the good old days are drifting away as China, Iran and others develop potentially contending navies and land-based forces that can exert powerful influence out to a thousand miles or more. The Navy will have to get its mind right about fighting at sea again, and to do this it wouldn’t hurt to dredge up some old concepts, knock the seaweed and barnacles off and see if they can be made seaworthy again.

On Tuesday, June 4th, the 71st anniversary of the Battle of Midway, I gave a presentation to the students at the Naval War College on operational leadership connected with the battle. To do this, I engaged in comparative analysis in which I argued that the mistakes in planning and decision making that General Robert E. Lee made in the Gettysburg campaign were similar to those made by Isoroku Yamamoto during the Midway campaign. I wrote an article about this in the Naval War College Review back in 1995. Of course, a lot of new books have been written about Midway since then, and I decided to go into some of the newer literature to make sure my remarks were up to date. As I read the Parshall and Tully book Shattered Sword, I realized that there were some additional insights I could use concerning the role of moral courage in high level leadership, but also, a couple of operational concepts jumped out of the page at me. The first was the notion of a combined air fleet, and the second was the utility of skirmishers. I think that both of these ideas are at least worth a second look in today’s emerging naval operational environment.

Combined Air Fleet

This was the brainchild of Minoru Genda. His idea was to combine six aircraft carriers together in order to have a virtual air force at sea. Depending on the classes of carrier in the mix, the combined air fleet might have 3-400 aircraft available. That air strength, operating from six decks created something that was more than a naval task force. In those days, it was well understood that naval forces should not get into a mano-a-mano fight with land-based forces, resulting in the “250 mile rule.” Moreover, in 1942, the offense was king; he who struck effectively first won. Carriers toted relatively fewer fighters, so the dive bombers were likely to get in devastating hits if they found the carriers. This was true tactical instability. However, if you had a lot of fighters, radar directed or not, defense was more robust. Moreover, lots of decks meant you could multi-task; perhaps do power projection at the same time you were engaged in a sea fight. In any case you were packing a serious punch either way. Had Nagumo had two more CVs at Midway, the outcome would likely have been much different, American code breaking or not.

What would a combined air fleet look like today? Let’s start with the basic inventory of CVNs. We certainly have enough to gang six of them together. That would give us roughly 300 strike fighters in a single air force. The question is would we know what to do with such a force? In Desert Storm we had seven CVs participating, but they were just feeding an ATO; there was no underlying naval doctrine for how the planes should be used. Plus there was no appreciable sea threat other than some mines. What would an air strike doctrine look like for a modern combined air fleet?

I think doctrine would have to start with understanding the differences between command of the sea, sea control, sea denial and battlespace superiority. Without going into detail on these things (you can check out my NWC Review article at http://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-College-Review/2012---Autumn.aspx ), we can say that offering up six CVNs as a target is pretty risky, so a) they either would need to operate tactically dispersed and/or b) the threat level would have to be manageable, plus c) the strategic stakes must be worth the risk. The idea would be to concentrate effects. What effects would we want? I would say that the first thing would be air superiority. The good news today is that we have strike fighters, so the old tradeoff dilemma between bombers and fighters is moot. But we must work in conjunction with the Air Force, surface units and even subs to create a condition for the enemy in which if it flies over water, it dies. At the same time we work to eradicate their surface shooters (especially ones with good SAMs). Once those conditions are met, suppressive ASW becomes a possibility. Of course, the enemy still might have land-based missile systems that could contest the sea space, and if defensive means do not suffice (both right and left of launch), then strike will have to be considered, but preferably with our own missiles.

If we bought into this concept, the next question would be how do we generate such a force and in what time frame. Right now, it would take some doing to round up the necessary decks. Having such a force in readiness year round would mean that we would not be able to continue deploying CVNs as we do now. Moreover, we would have to conduct quite a bit of exercising in order to work out the kinks and nail down doctrine. Presence would have to be performed by gators or CRUDES. So, there would be a strategic price to pay for developing such a concept, but man, would it be impressive. I can see it scaring people into being quiet.

Variations on the theme: perhaps all the CVs don’t carry the same kind of wing. Some have different kinds of UAVs; X-47s, big wings, etc. Perhaps you pack the E-2s, and most helos on one deck and load the others with fighters. The whole concept is a blank canvas just waiting for artists to start painting.

Skirmishers

This sounds like a Civil War thing, but as I compared Gettysburg and Midway I realized that skirmishing played an important role in the carrier fight. Gettysburg: Brigadier General John Buford placed his dismounted cavalry in a blocking position to delay Heth’s division until Major General Reynolds could bring up the First Corps. The First Corps, in turn, conducted a delaying action (really they were forced into flight) long enough for General Mead to get his army into position along Cemetery Ridge. Buford’s command acted as a skirmisher to find, delay and disrupt the enemy.

Midway Island, that is its air base and air forces performed a similar role at Midway. They found Nagumo’s force and their attacks, while unsuccessful, served to delay and disrupt the Japanese carriers, forcing them to maneuver. This disrupted fighter operations and arming/rearming, and produced the golden moment when McClusky, Best and Leslie arrived overhead unmolested.

In a new era of potential sea fights, we ought to think again about the potential utility of skirmishers. What would constitute cavalry in this age? LCS? Subs? The USN has been locked into the group paradigm for so long, it doesn’t even have words to describe something else. I have a feeling that in the event of a real fight, the flags and COs would improvise, probably brilliantly in some cases and rediscover skirmishing on the fly, but why not think about it now? Yes, I get that cyber could be a skirmisher too.

Ok, nothing cosmic here, but I thought that these two ideas, popping out at me from the pages of history, were worth a second look; at least they might stimulate some good dialogue.

1970s: Evolution

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Thu, 06 Jun 2013 04:00:00 +0000

Slides from Strategic Concepts of the US Navy under CNO Holloway.

Over the course of his career as a flag officer, Holloway consolidated the air wing into one multi-purpose model and consolidated aircraft carriers to the big deck, removing the smaller carriers from the fleet as a cost saving effort. CNO Holloway is why the United States Navy has one type of aircraft carrier today, CVNs, and was who began the process of making all carrier air wings of standard configuration. This consolidation of CVNs and CVWs has given naval aviation remarkable efficiency and has saved the Navy a lot of money in a post cold war world.

Nothing can be said here that isn't said better in U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s: Selected Documents, edited by John Hattendorf (2007) (PDF)

There are plenty more slides available in The U.S. Navy in the World (1970-1980): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts and U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts (1970-1980): Strategy, Policy, Concept, and Vision Documents that add significant detail to the ones I have cherry picked.

It is noteworthy The Future of U.S. Sea Power influenced the Carter administration, not aligned when written but influential over time. This upward push towards attempting to influence administration thinking was tried with the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, and wasn't anywhere near as successful.

Note also how The Future of US Sea Power favors quality platforms over quantity. That's pretty much the story of US Navy fleet design through today. But something has changed from then and now. I am not sure the US Navy today thinks in terms of offensive ops/systems and defensive ops/systems anymore in force design. I think part of that is because seas today are not contested, and haven't been for many decades. I think another part of that is that the Navy looks at information capabilities as an important offensive function in the 21st century, and it counts ISR as an offensive function.

Remembering a Time When CNO's Championed Maritime Strategy...

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Wed, 05 Jun 2013 04:00:00 +0000

When I designed the logo for Information Dissemination, the graphic above was my inspiration. Many probably could have guessed that. Originally, I tried to write Sea Control, Naval Presence, and Projection of Power on the arrows in the Information Dissemination logo. It was ugly, and in the end I went a different direction. For those who don't know, this graphic was first produced (or at least the only place I have ever seen it) in Missions of the U.S. Navy written by Stansfield Turner in the Mar-Apr 1974 edition of the Naval War College Review (PDF). Missions of the U.S. Navy is my favorite article published by the Naval War College Review during the cold war, and if you have never read it I highly encourage you to do so.

It is so good in fact that you can download it in three different places on the Naval War College website. The link above is a copy of the original full Mar-Apr 1974 edition of the Naval War College Review. It was reprinted in full again in the Winter 1998 edition of the Naval War College Review (PDF). Finally, even though the link is broken in the Newport Papers section of their website, John Hattendor's brilliant assembly of 1970s publications in Newport Paper #30 related to the work of Peter Swartz can be downloaded by direct link: U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s, Selected Documents (PDF).

But before Stansfield Turner wrote Missions of the U.S. Navy in 1974, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt became CNO in 1970 and went right to work, and within three months he had personally been heavily involved in producing the first of 5 major documents we will look at: Project SIXTY.

Whenever I study naval history of a time period, as I did with this particular Capstone Strategies examination when putting together the content for this month, I always start with people first. The 1970s, to me, is about 5 very strong leaders who came from the greatest generation. All five had a unique style of leadership, were well spoken in public, were leaders both in thought and deed within their own communities in the Navy, and what makes them completely foreign to naval leaders today - they competed with each other publicly - respectful of one another in disagreement - to the benefit of the Navy. None of them were afraid to speak their mind, and that did bring controversy, but it was always personal controversy as opposed to the kind of controversy that was detrimental to the Navy as an organization.

I am speaking specifically about Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, Admiral James Holloway, Admiral Thomas Hayward, and Admiral Hyman Rickover. The most remarkable thing to me though is that Zumwalt, Holloway, and Hayward were CNOs, leading from the front with the best ideas of the day.

These were hugely influential debates and discussions often framed in competition with one another in public even though they were complimentary capabilities of naval power. CNO Elmo Zumwalt is the champion of naval presence and sea control. His Vice CNO - who also became the next CNO - James Holloway is the champion of power projection. Hymen Rickover is the champion of strategic deterrence in his role as nuclear power czar. Stansfield Turner is President of the Naval War College and ties Sea Control, Naval Presence, Strategic Deterrence, and Power Projection together in a strategic concept that aligns policy with strategy with tactics.

At the end of the decade, at the end of CNO Holloway's time as CNO, the Navy has built up a collection of study groups engaged in the development of Sea Plan 2000 and various other force structure studies. These groups have people you may have heard of, Captain John McCain, a young Marine LT named Bing West, oh and there was this 32 year old Navy consultant, LCDR in the Navy Reserve, or Corporation President - however you'd like to describe him - named John Lehman designing the future force structure of the Navy. These activities were being developed with Admiral Hayward, who subsequently followed Holloway as CNO in July 1978.

CNO Hayward organized the concepts of CNO Zumwalt and CNO Holloway, the efforts of ADM Rickover, and the conceptual framework of VADM Turner, then rebranded those ideas with a new typology for the Navy a strategic document called The Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979), which was described at the time as the "Fundamental principles of naval strategy." That document formed the strategic foundation for the concept of maritime supremacy evolving the strategy of the US Navy towards the 1980s 600-ship force goal.

Three very smart, very stubborn CNOs publicly arguing and writing about strategy, plus Rickover which is a redundant way of saying smart and stubborn, plus Stansfield Turner - also a very smart and stubborn leader in his own right; all competing the best and brightest strategic concepts in their own words; all doing so publicly and privately; all competing the priority of Sea Control and Power Projection in defensive and offensive force postures against one another; all while linking policy to strategy to doctrine and tactics...

All three CNOs led the debates and discussion publicly and privately on the most important strategic issues of their era. The Navy benefited greatly from it.

Lets compare then and now. CNO Greenert is championing the issue of electronic warfare today, CNO Roughead championed what was new in the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower - namely maritime security and humanitarian response/disaster recovery, while Admiral Mullen was the champion of Maritime Domain Awareness.

Hmm.

Insert facepalm

The Opportunties of Yesterday and Tomorrow

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Tue, 04 Jun 2013 04:00:00 +0000

The following slides come from The U.S. Navy in the World (1970-1980): Context for U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts Swartz, Peter M., with Karin Duggan, December 2011 pages 19-20.

This slide describing the 1970s might as well be describing today. Build up and rely more on alliances and partners? Check. Accept less than victory in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? Check. Avoid "another Iraq" or "another Afghanistan?" Check. Deter and plan against North Korean attack on South Korea? Check. Maintain Arab-Israeli Middle East peace while balancing our support for Israel and key Arab states? Check. Ensure western access to oil? Check.

Noteworthy the US role regarding stability in the Gulf is different today. Stability at sea? Check. Stability in the Gulf states? Hmm. Constraining the influence of radical extremists in the Middle East and Africa? Lets be honest, we are not doing very well in that regard. Prevent spillover into Latin America? The convergence threat between radical extremist groups and narcotics traffickers is an issue SOUTHCOM is monitoring every day. The leaders of Greece and Turkey are dealing with so many internal problems today they don't really have time to worry too much about the other right now.

Equivalent shares among the services (“1/3-1/3-1/3”). Sad to say, but that's the only defense strategy the United States military has derived from evolving national security policy over the last 4 decades. The socialist model for redistribution of resources conquered the Pentagon long before the Communists fell in the cold war. When your national defense strategy is based on a fraction, of course you are going to accept less than victory in war. One might even observe that when defense strategy starts with a fraction, the result might end with a fraction - for example a nation might do strategically questionable things like fight a land war in Asia in pursuit of questionable strategic objectives for over 2/5s of the last half century.

And yet, in the 1970s, when the nation was struggling with economic issues related to energy costs and other factors, while the Soviet Navy was increasing in capability and strength, while the military was suffering a post-Vietnam decline in both force and resource allocation, and despite little interest in naval power at the higher levels of defense as the focus shifted towards the Red Army in Europe scenario of war planning...

The Navy developed a few new toys.

Nimitz class aircraft carriers, Ohio class ballistic missile submarines, AEGIS surface combatants, F-18s, H-60s, the Trident missile, the Tomahwak cruise missile, VLS, LCAC...

In other words, despite major funding cuts by Congress - a process of cutting defense that was done much smarter than today's Congress that leverages sequestration - the US Navy developed the capabilities that remain - 3 decades later - the foundation of American seapower.

Here is what is even more interesting. If the President can actually step up (very unclear) and get Congress to manage defense more responsibly (just as unclear), the list one might create based on current plans for the decade 2011-2020 will look something like this:

MLP, AFSB, LSD(X), SSBN(X), Virginia class SSN, UCLASS, EMALS, AMDR, Ford-class CVNs, DDG-1000s, LCS-1s, LCS-2s, DDG-51s, LPD-17s, LHA(X), LH(X), F-18E/F, F-35B, F-35C, EA-18G.

With a miracle... and by that I mean somehow government leaders fix the sequestration mess we are in, the Navy may also field Rail Guns, LDUUVs, and Lasers, but honestly none of that is not likely to happen this decade. I have hopes the LCS MIW mission module works out well enough it would get included on the list, but time will tell.

That's really not a bad decade if you think about it. Sequestration obviously makes the current plan the list above is based upon very uncertain. What is certain is that with 7 years of the decade remaining, things can still get better or worse, and my glass is half full.

First Four Thoughts

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Mon, 03 Jun 2013 14:00:00 +0000

I recommend taking a look at all 33 slides in this document, but these four in particular stood out to me.

The 1970 list above doesn't count China, and as such 8 of the top 10 nation defense spenders in 1970 were treaty allies of the United States. In 1980, only 4 of the top 10 defense spenders were treaty allies. In 1990 and 2000 six of the top 10 nations are treaty allies of the US, but by 2010 the number is back down to 5.

Noteworthy, 2010 is the only year listed above where 2 of the top 10 national defense spenders in the world aren't facing off against each other in a power struggle. In 1970, 1980, and 1990 above the US and Soviet Union could be suggested to be in such a struggle, and in 2000 China and Taiwan were. In 2010 the closest to anything like that is Japan and China, and it would be a stretch to call their relationship in 2010 or even 2013 a cold war.

What will that chart look like in 2020? I wonder where the EU block will rank relative to rising nations. I also wonder if Japan will still pace China, because I won't be surprised if they do, even though nobody sees that possibility in June of 2013.

The US Navy hasn't claimed to need more than 375 ships since the end of the cold war, but never dipped below the stated requirement for total ships until until Admiral Clark revised the total force requirement up in 2002. Ironically, it was under CNO Admiral Clark's watch the Navy dipped below 300 ships, and to this day the Navy still lacks a credible plan to actually get back to 300 ships.

Worth noting, over the last 4 decades, the only time the Navy fleet has increased significantly, and by that I mean by more than 10 ships to the total force number, it involved a political partnership between DoD and Navy civilian leaders. Until the day the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy are speaking about increasing ship force totals together, there is no reason to believe the number of Navy ships will go up. That is basically what history tells us. Over the last four decades, it appears the CNO has very little influence on whether the fleet size increases, the CNO only decides how it increases, or more commonly... decreases.

I found this slide to be one of the most interesting in the entire series, because it demonstrates in decent detail why 2001-2010 is the worst decade in US naval history. How many times have you heard someone in the Navy decry the decade of the 1990s? Play with the numbers between 1991-2000 and 2001-2010, and explain to me how the post-cold war decline was managed worse than the first decade of the 21st century, at a time the nation was at war.

What is the most remarkable thing about this slide is that it notes how much efficiency was gained within the Navy's various communities, and yet how badly the Navy was also managed. The entire air wing was consolidated around the F-18 platform, Navy RW was consolidated around the H-60 platform. Every new submarine funded in the decade was a Virginia class. The Navy funded the second pair of Littoral Combat Ships and all 3 DDG-1000s with the SCN budget for decade 2001-2010, and the rest of the surface combatants built were the efficient cost DDG-51s. Noteworthy, the first two of each LCS design was not funded with the SCN, but is counted in the chart above anyway.

This slide reveals how even though the Navy was achieving remarkable efficiency within the various communities of the Navy, and even though the budget for the 2001-2010 decade was significantly higher than 1991-2000 decade, the Navy ultimately built fewer ships in the 2001-2010 decade than the 1991-2000 decade. To add insult to injury, factor in the Balisle report on surface force readiness that declined significantly over the decade.

The decade 2001-2010 featured six first in class designs: Ford class nuclear powered aircraft carriers, Zumwalt class destroyers, San Antonio class Landing Platform Dock, Freedom class Littoral Combat Ships, Independence class Littoral Combat Ships, and Lewis and Clark class dry cargo ship.

The Lewis and Clark class dry cargo ships were the only programs to stay on cost and schedule. The success stories of 2001-2010, like the Arleigh Burke class multi-year procurement and the Virginia class submarine program plan, were products of the previous decade.

ID's 6th Anniversary - CNA's U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Mon, 03 Jun 2013 04:00:00 +0000

June 20, 2000 -- The Abraham Lincoln Battle Group along with ships from Australia, Chile, Japan, Canada, and Korea steam alongside one another for a Battle Group Photo during RIMPAC 2000. (U.S. Navy photo by PH2 Gabriel Wilson.) Click image for 1280x818 resolution.

June is the anniversary month for Information Dissemination, with 2013 marking the sixth anniversary. Starting last year I decided I was going to commit the month of June every year to something I am interested in. Last year I was able to convince (without bribes) several individuals who have heavily influenced my thinking over the past several years to each answer a question for me. If you didn't read the responses provided by last years contributors, those essay's from some of the most influential leaders in the broad Navy community today are well worth reading.

This year I decided to do something a little different. On June 4, 2012 my good friend Peter Swartz sent me an email asking me to look at a series on U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies that he and Karin Duggan had produced for CNA. The series was originally released in December 2011, and while I had looked at several of the documents individually, I had not looked at the entire set as one collection until his email.

CNA's U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies publications analyze the three dozen or so Navy capstone documents published between 1970-2010 (with a short discussion of what came before and an even shorter post-script covering 2011). They do not include the actual texts of those documents, which can be found in the Naval War College Press’s Newport Papers series – the brainchildren of Carnes Lord and John Hattendorf. The U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies publications also outline the context within which Navy strategy documents were written.

I knew as soon as I read the first document of the series, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategy, Policy, Vision and Concept Documents: What to consider before you write one that I was going to write about this material. What I didn't realize at the time was how the series was going to impact me, change the way I think about naval strategy, and shape my time as it has over the last year and half. Many long time blog readers have undoubtedly noticed that over the past 18 months, I have written less on the blog even as I seem to talk just as much over email, Twitter, or other forums. Ironically, I do not feel less engaged from the Navy conversation, but I do feel less productive as a writer. In truth I still write a lot, just not on my own blog.

Where my time has really been focused is on reading, and listening. For someone like me who wants to fully understand the issues facing the US Navy today, loves reading about the history of naval affairs, and commits a lot of time to serious thought about naval strategy (as opposed to tactics or operations, which is what naval officers do) I personally found the CNA U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies series to be an excellent foundation by which to recommit myself in researching modern naval affairs and recent naval history. While the series does focus on the capstone documents specifically, the context of those documents, and the concepts that circulated within the Navy conversation at the time; for me what the U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies series did was inform me what I should be reading and why I should be reading it. In going through the series a decade at a time, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, I quickly realized I had never read some of the most influencial books that even to this day still apply significant influence on concepts, culture, and starting assumptions of the modern US Navy.

Over the next four weeks I intend to step through each of the four decades as outlined in the series and highlight a few of the topics that jumped out to me, and what I believe is relevant today. The centerpiece of the next four weeks is the work of Peter Swartz at CNA, and my thoughts along the way are far from comprehensive, but I do hope they inspire some conversations and debate.

UCLASS--Don't Get Your Hopes Up

noreply@blogger.com (The Conservative Wahoo) — Sat, 01 Jun 2013 19:31:00 +0000

UCAS, not UCLASS

A few weeks ago, I wrote a blog post about the imagination capturing events pertaining to the launch of the UCAS X-47B off the deck of an aircraft carrier. Like many others, I saw this as a watershed event, a serious moment in naval history. I went as far in that piece to render honor unto the Secretary of the Navy for his steadfast stewardship of unmanned systems throughout his tenure in office. Little did I know that only a few weeks later, I'd be urging him not to go "wobbly" on us when it comes to unmanned aviation.

The pictures of the UCAS showed us a "planform" clearly aiming at some level of stealth in order to eventually get us to what UCLASS is designed to do--remember, UCLASS means "Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike" System. UCLASS is supposed to have two broad missions--and ISR mission AND strike. But conversations I've had recently with knowledgeable people lead me to believe that 1) the strike (s) in UCLASS is being radically diminished in the emerging requirement and 2) we should expect to see UCLASS develop in a way that is nothing like the stealthy-er planform of the X-47B--rather, the requirement emerging will almost certainly drive toward a UAV that looks much more like the Predator, and act more like the Predator than a vehicle that would threaten adversary interests. Put another way, UCLASS seems to be developing in a manner that would suggest that it would add little to the Carrier-Air Wing's ability to operate in CONTESTED airspace. Rather, it seems optimized for scouting and ISR, something we seem to have a plethora of aircraft--manned and unmanned--to do already.

What are the possible explanations for this half-measure approach on UCLASS? A couple suggest themselves.

1. Money--A true unmanned surveillance and strike platform would surely be more expensive than a glorified carrier based Predator. It would have to have some level of stealth. It would have to be able to operate in contested environments. In this fiscal downturn, there may be a sense that we need to take an appetite suppressant on what UCLASS can do. I disagree--now is the time to put the hammer down on getting to a more capable system.

2. JSF--could a more capable UCLASS threaten JSF to a degree some find troubling?

3. Culture--unmanned CV-based strike is a threat to the culture of Naval Aviation like nothing before it. Could antibodies be developing in both the active duty and the retired Naval Aviator community to slow down progress? Are capabilities that would move UCLASS away from the rear-facing prop UAV's we now see, the first to be trimmed away when money gets tight?

I believe that unmanned strike aviation is the only thing standing between long-term aircraft carrier relevance and Jerry Hendrix's view of a world without a dominant American CVN force. Going gently on UCLASS is a recipe for hastening that diminishment.

A very simple question needs to be asked of Navy leaders: Exactly how will UCLASS contribute to operations in the kinds of contested airspace that AirSea Battle assures us will exist? If the answer is not "powerfully", then we are headed in the wrong direction.

Bryan McGrath

Foreign Entanglements: Able Archer 83

noreply@blogger.com (Robert Farley) — Sat, 01 Jun 2013 01:19:00 +0000

On this week's episode of Foreign Entanglements, Nate Jones and I go over the latest from National Security Archive...

For more on maritime aspects of the exercise, see here.

A Bad Morality and a Bad Philosophy

noreply@blogger.com (Robert Farley) — Wed, 29 May 2013 13:06:00 +0000

This is fascinating stuff, as much for the blood and gore of Age of Sail naval warfare as for the legal complications associated with impressed Americans in the War of 1812:

At Plymouth we heard some vague rumors of a declaration of war against America. More than this, we could not learn, since the utmost care was taken to prevent our being fully informed. The reason of this secrecy was, probably, because we had several Americans in our crew, most of whom were pressed men, as before stated. These men, had they been certain that war had broken out, would have given themselves up as prisoners of war, and claimed exemption from that unjust service, which compelled them to act with the enemies of their country. This was a privilege which the magnanimity of our officers ought to have offered them. They had already perpetrated a grievous wrong upon them in impressing them; it was adding cruelty to injustice to compel their service in a war against their own nation.

But the difficulty with naval officers is, that they do not treat with a sailor as with a man. They know what is fitting between each other as officers; but they treat their crews on another principle; they are apt to look at them as pieces of living mechanism, born to serve, to obey their orders, and administer to their wishes without complaint. This is alike a bad morality and a bad philosophy.

Long Range Navy ISR - Smart Choices

noreply@blogger.com (Chris Rawley) — Fri, 24 May 2013 01:38:00 +0000

General Atomics Mariner

I had started a reply to a comment from Hokie_1997 in Galrahn's post below, but it became too long, so I'm using the blogger's prerogative to reply here.

The Triton's flight is a very positive development towards filling current and projected gaps in long range Navy scouting. That said, despite the significant money and time the Navy has put into this program, I'm not sure it's the right choice. Here are the 4 primary reasons I like a maritime variant of the MQ-9 over the Triton:
1) Capability - The range delta between the Reaper and Guardian is fairly significant, but the MQ-9 is no slouch; compare about 4,000 NM/20 hrs endurance for the MQ-9 vs. 11,000 NM/31 hrs for Triton. At one point, General Atomics was developing an even longer-ranged maritime variant for the Navy's BAMS competition that had a 49 hour endurance.

Hokie pointed out that extreme range was imperative for operating in the Pacific. Yes that ocean is vast, but between Japan, Guam, Hawaii, Midway, Australia etc. we have enough friendly airfields to cover that water with the shorter-ranged platform (not that the mid-Pacific is very important in any sort of foreseeable fight). Moreover, pure range/endurance isn't necessarily the most desire trait for maritime ISR (see #4). In addition to an acceptable range for most maritime ISR scenarios, Reaper has about twice the payload, including:
2) Weaponization - Finding a target in the middle of the open ocean is great. But during combat, if we don't have enough ships, subs and long range missiles to engage the target the Triton finds (and we don't), then so what? The Reaper can find, fix, and finish a maritime target with one platform. The ability to drop a dozen Hellfires or 2 ship-killing 500 lb precision guide munitions would be of value in both low and high end war-at-sea scenarios.
3) Compatibility - The military has so many combat-proven General Atomics planes flying now that we have developed a huge supporting infrastructure. In addition to just platform acquisition costs, for any given beyond-line-of site unmanned aircraft system, there are costs associated with satellite bandwidth, ground control stations, launch and recovery elements, maintenance, and associated processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) systems for the intelligence the aircraft collects. Furthermore, the Reaper is a much more tactically friendly aircraft able to beam down full motion video and other sensor data to distributed tactical forces, performing much more like a current P-3 is able to tie a theater asset to tactical surface/ground units. The Tritons are designed to provide ISR collection to theater and higher level staffs, but don't do much for individual ships at sea and Marines operating far ashore.
4) Maybe the most important attribute for any program these days: Cost - the Navy can buy more than ten MQ-9s for the cost of one MQ-4C. Capability is one thing, but one airframe can only do one patrol at a time. We can cover more ISR orbits while achieving efficiencies in training, PED infrastructure, and maintenance with more vehicles. Interestingly, the Eurohawk project was recently canceled for cost reasons.

Bottom line: I hope Triton is a success, and I hope we don't bust the airborne ISR budget in the process of acquiring it. But if the program falters technically or runs over budget, the Navy should quickly shift fire to a marinized MQ-9B or C. As an added bonus, the Sea Avenger is designed to be operated from the land or carriers (it's one of the contenders in the Navy's UCLASS competition). The Navy is essentially broke and it's time to make tough, smart choices with positive long term consequences. I'm just not sure the Triton passes that test.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Camo Gray and Never Underway

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Thu, 23 May 2013 06:00:00 +0000

USS Freedom (LCS 1) in what is becoming a rare sight - somewhere besides a pier or dry dock.

On May 21, 2013 USS Freedom (LCS 1) got underway from Singapore but was forced to return to Changi Naval Base approximately eight hours later due to an engineering casualty.

The new casualty is related to the incident in late April when ship's force detected a seawater intrusion in the port combining gear. Ship's force suspected a failed reduction gear seawater cooler as the source of the intrusion. At that time the ship had requested that an outside activity (shipyard) be made available to inspect and repair the port combining gear lube oil seawater cooler and either repair or replace the seawater cooler tube bundle.

On Tuesday evening ship's force inspection revealed rust on two of the reduction gear casings. Bearing temperatures remained normal, and downstream lube oil samples remained clear during system operations. The Navy is working to re-clean the sumps with hot oil, replenish filters, and resume operations.

When I heard about the first problem back on April 29th, it was suggested I should probably consult EN 1&C. Good advice, from 4-3 here (PDF).

EFFECTS OF WATER AND ACID IN OIL.—Water in the oil is extremely harmful. Even small amounts soon cause pitting and corrosion of the teeth. Acid can cause even more serious problems. The oil must be tested frequently for water, and periodic tests should be made for acid content. Immediate corrective measures must be taken when saltwater is found in the reduction gear lubricating oil system.

Occasionally gross contamination of the oil by saltwater occurs when a cooler leaks or when leaks develop in a sump. The immediate location and sealing of the leak is not enough. Additional steps must be taken to remove the contaminated oil from all steel parts. Several instances are known when, because such treatment was postponed—sometimes for a week or less—gears, journals, and couplings became so badly corroded and pitted that it was necessary to remove the gears and recondition the teeth and journals. Saltwater contamination of the lubricating oil may also cause bearing burnout.

Water, in small amounts, is always present within the lubrication system as a result of condensation. Air which enters the units contains moisture. This moisture condenses into water when it strikes a cooler surface and subsequently mixes with the oil. The water displaces the oil from the metal surfaces and causes rusting. Water
mixed with oil also reduces the lubricating value of the oil itself.

When the main engines are secured, the oil should be circulated until the temperature of the oil and that of the reduction gear casing approximate the engine room temperature. While the oil is being circulated, the cooler should be operated and the gear should be jacked continuously. The purifier should also be operated to renovate the oil while the oil is being circulated and after the oil circulation is stopped until water is no longer discharged from the purifier. This procedure eliminates condensation from the interior of the main reduction gear casing and reduces rusting in the upper gear case and gears.

Generally, lubricating oil will be maintained in good condition if proper use is made of the purifier and settling tanks. However, if the purifier does not operate satisfactorily and does not have the correct water seal, it will not separate the water from the oil. You can check for the presence of water by taking small samples of oil in bottles, and allowing the samples to settle. These samples should be taken from a low point in the lube oil system.

Samples of lubricating oil should be tested at every opportunity for acid, water, and sediment content at a naval shipyard (or other similar activity). With continuous use, lube oil increases in acidity, and free fatty acids form a mineral soap which reacts with the oil to form an emulsion. As the oil emulsifies, it loses its lubricating quality. Once the oil has emulsified, the removal of water and other impurities becomes increasingly difficult. When the formation of a proper oil film is rendered impossible, the oil must be renovated.

Sometimes, when a ship from the reserve fleet is placed back in commission, the rust preventive compound is not removed completely. The residue of this compound may cause serious emulsification of the lubricating oil. Operating with emulsified oil may result in damage to the bearings or the reduction gears. Since it is extremely difficult aboard ship to destroy emulsions by heating, settling, and centrifuging, you must make sure that emulsions do not occur. At the first indication of an emulsion, the plant should be stopped and the oil renovated.

Finally, because all I can do is laugh, or cry, at this point, the following talking points on the USS Freedom (LCS 1) deployment to date have been provided by a friend whom shall remain nameless.

"Due to her reliance on contractor maintenance, combined with additional and unexpected opportunities to repair equipment well before the expected maintenance intervals, FREEDOM is actually stimulating the American marine repair industry. Further, due to the travel costs involved with sending technical support teams from the United States, FREEDOM is further supporting the American airline industry. I don't like to think of things breaking as a bad thing - but rather as an opportunity to support our partners in industry and the American economy writ large."

It is going to be very difficult for LCS to prove itself in an overseas deployment if the ship can't get off the bleeping pier.

MQ-4C Triton Takes Flight

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Thu, 23 May 2013 05:00:00 +0000

ALMDALE, Calif. (May 21, 2013) Two Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton unmanned aerial vehicles are seen on the tarmac at a Northrop Grumman test facility in Palmdale, Calif. Triton is undergoing flight testing as an unmanned maritime surveillance vehicle. (U.S. Navy photo courtesy of Northrop Grumman by Chad Slattery/Released)

From Danger Room.

The MQ-4C Triton took off today for the first time from a Palmdale, California airfield, a major step in the Navy’s Broad Area Maritime Surveillance program. Northrop Grumman, which manufactured the 130.9-foot-wingspan drone, said the maiden voyage lasted an hour and a half. The Navy even announced it via Twitter.

“First flight represents a critical step in maturing Triton’s systems before operationally supporting the Navy’s maritime surveillance mission around the world,” Capt. James Hoke, Triton’s program manager, said in a statement.

If the Triton looks familiar, it should. It’s a souped-up version of the Air Force’s old reliable spy drone, Northrop Grumman’s Global Hawk. The Navy’s made some modifications to the airframe and the sensors it carries to ensure it can spy on vast swaths of ocean, from great height. (It’s unarmed, if you were wondering.)

The idea is for the Triton to achieve altitudes of nearly 53,000 feet — that’s 10 miles up — where it will scan 2,000 nautical miles at a single robotic blink. (Notice that wingspan is bigger than a 737's.) Its sensors, Northrop boasts, will “detect and automatically classify” ships, giving captains a much broader view of what’s on the water than radar, sonar and manned aircraft provide. Not only that, Triton is a flying communications relay station, bouncing “airborne communications and information sharing capabilities” between ships. And it can fly about 11,500 miles without refueling.

Read the rest at Danger Room.

The Navy has taken a very patient approach to large unmanned systems, too slow for some. With the MQ-4C Triton the Navy decided to go with a mature hardware design and take on the risk with the software. Despite the June 2012 crash in Maryland of a Global Hawk used for developing the Triton, I think everyone can agree the Navy has done a great job with the BAMS program.

Some will cite how the US Air Force has stepped back from the Global Hawk in favor of the U-2. That makes sense when the vast majority of US Air Force Global Hawk missions were being flown in dedicated missions to monitor specific targets, something the U-2 has been doing effectively for decades - and is still capable of doing at less cost. But over vast oceans, that 11,500 mile range at ten miles up role is much better suited for an unmanned aircraft because the platform's role is constant surveillance of a broad area, not dedicated surveillance of a specific area.

Thus the name: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS).

Between X-47B carrier launch and MQ-4C Triton, the US Navy has achieved major successes with two of the most important new Navy programs being worked on today in a span of just over a week. Northrop Grumman is having a good month.

When you count the first vertical takeoff of the F-35B earlier this week, the Department of the Navy is having a good month too.

House FY14 Mark

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Wed, 22 May 2013 04:00:00 +0000

From here.

Congressman J. Randy Forbes (VA-04), Chairman of the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, released today the legislative language of the Seapower Subcommittee’s mark of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). Chairman Forbes and Ranking Member Mike McIntyre (NC) led the Seapower Subcommittee in producing a mark (PDF) which designates essential funding and sets priorities for the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force.

Everyone in the news is probably going to talk about the CVN part of the mark. I'll be focusing on a few other highlights that caught my attention.

Page 8: Multiyear procurement authority for E-2D aircraft program. This is a pretty big deal, and a good deal for everyone. The big five programs in Naval Aviation today that give the United States the big jump on the rest of the world are, in order, the EA-18G, the E-2D, P-8, MH/SH-60, and UCLASS. I believe the US Navy can screw up everything else in naval aviation, but if they get these five programs right, naval aviation will own the future.

Page 12: Annual Comptroller General Report on the Amphibious Combat Vehicle Acquisition Program. I had the opportunity a few years ago to really get to know the EFV up close and personal. No question, it is the most amazing piece of ground equipment ever built for the Marine Corps. It was also completely unaffordable. With that history in mind, having the GAO watch the new program like a hawk with an annual report is likely a very healthy thing for the program and for the Marine Corps. Marines don't like publicity, but respond well to it. The GAO will serve as a useful public spotlight for this program.

Page 15: Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstration Testing Requirement. Basically Congress is making a law that forces the Navy to conduct an inflight refueling of the X-47B from a tanker aircraft. With all due respect to Congress and the Senate, but if you seriously have to write this into law, isn't it time to be a bit more diligent with your responsibilities when it comes time to approving Flag Officer promotions? Seems to me there are other, more effective ways, to send a clear message to the naval aviation community. Naval aviation leadership must be running a shit show when Congress has to use direct language to tell that community how to test their most promising technology.

Page 16: Limitation on Milestone A Activities for Unmanned Carrier-Launched Surveillance and Strike System Program. Quoted in full:

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics may not award a Milestone A technology development contract with respect to the Unmanned Carrier-launched Surveillance and Strike system program until a period of 30 days has elapsed following the date on which the Under Secretary certifies to the congressional defense committees that the software and system engineering designs for the control system and connectivity and aircraft carrier segments of such program can achieve, with low level of integration risk, successful compatibility and interoperability with the air vehicle segment selected for contract award with respect to such program.

This is such a big topic. I really need to write about this topic.

Items of Special Interest

These are some of the general issue requests included in the Mark. Some are very interesting.

Air and Missile Defense Radar deployment on naval vessels

The Navy has reported that the Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) suite is being developed to fulfill Integrated Air and Missile Defense requirements for multiple ship classes. This suite consists of an S-band radar (AMDR-S), an X-band radar and a Radar Suite Controller. AMDR would provide multi-mission capabilities, simultaneously supporting long-range, exoatmospheric detection, tracking and discrimination of ballistic missiles, as well as Area and Self Defense against air and surface threats. For the ballistic missile defense capability, increased radar sensitivity and bandwidth over current radar systems are needed to detect, track, and support engagements of advanced ballistic missile threats at the required ranges, concurrent with Area and Self Defense against Air and Surface threats. For the Area Air Defense and Self Defense capability, increased sensitivity and clutter capability is needed to detect, react to, and engage stressing Very Low Observable/Very Low Flyer threats in the presence of heavy land, sea, and rain
clutter.

According to the Government Accountability Office report “Assessments of Selected Weapons Programs" (GAO-13-294SP) from March 2013, “the Navy plans to install a 14-foot variant of AMDR on Flight III DDG 51s starting in 2019. According to draft AMDR documents, a 14-foot radar is needed to meet threshold requirements, but an over 20-foot radar is required to fully meet the Navy's desired integrated air and missile defense needs.”

The committee supports the continued development of the AMDR capability, but is concerned about the physical limitations associated with the future deployment of this capability on the Arleigh Burke-class Destroyer Flight III. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the congressional defense committees by March 1, 2014, that addresses the following:

The capability requirements associated with the AMDR;

Required space, cooling and electrical distribution upgrades necessary to support AMDR on the Arleigh Burke-class Destroyer Flight III;

An assessment as to whether the limitations associated with the Arleigh Burke-class Destroyer Flight III will negatively impact the deployment on AMDR;

An assessment of the deployment of AMDR on other naval platforms including the San Antonio-class Amphibious Transport Dock; and

An assessment of the expansion capacity of the Arleigh Burke-class Destroyer Flight III to support further spiral development associated with future weapons.

What a great idea. Congress is basically saying they see that there appears to be some disagreement on how to proceed with AMDR, and is basically telling the Navy to make their case for the platform they want to field AMDR. Very smart - pass the popcorn. The thing is, and it is apparent someone in Congress must know this already, the Navy has actually been doing these assessments regularly, and those assessments are critical of DDG-51 Flight III as the way ahead. Bottom line, Navy needs a roadmap for a new major surface combatant. Everyone knows this. SWO leadership is worried about this though, because a new design is expensive, and would likely end up reducing the total ship numbers at the high end of surface warfare.

Littoral Combat Ship radar capabilities

The committee is concerned that the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) radars are not being optimally used to provide maximum protection. The USS Independence variant’s radar can rapidly and accurately detect and track small, fast moving targets at all altitudes; small surface targets in severe clutter; and rockets, artillery, and mortars launched from shore-based threats. The radar also can perform air and surface surveillance, target identification for weapon systems, and high-resolution splash spotting. The radar has successfully demonstrated simultaneous detection and tracking of air, surface (swarming small boats) and mortar targets in the world’s most challenging littoral environments. To ensure that the LCS program fully leverages the various capabilities of its modern radar technologies to protect this new class of ship, the committee encourages the Department of the Navy to fully utilize the capabilities provided by the current LCS radar suite and ensure that the embarked crew is fully trained on the radar's capabilities. Furthermore, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a report to the congressional defense committees by March 3, 2014, on the steps the Navy has taken to enhance LCS sailors’ training on the radars full range of capabilities.

The radar in question here is made by SaaB North America. This looks and smells like a lobbyist has told Congressman Dan Maffei to add this nonsense into the mark.

Saab North America has a problem. They supposedly have this really great radar - just ask Congressman Maffei, but it really doesn't matter. The problem isn't the radar, the problem is the radar is tied to the combat system on the Austal variant of the LCS, and that combat system has a fatal flaw typical of software development in government. The UI is terrible.

The idea this is some training problem for the Navy is a hilarious load of lobbyist spin. The surface warfare community has a user interface into the combat system that is standard across the entire AEGIS line of warships. The Freedom class version has a combat system that uses a very similar interface to that of AEGIS, so when a sailor comfortable with the AEGIS system goes to work on a Freedom class ship, they pick up the combat system without any problems. But when a sailor goes to work on the combat system of an Independence class LCS, the combat system user interface is completely different. The DDG-1000 has a similar problem (but it's actually much worse!). Instead of making the combat system user interface look and feel like every other combat system in the fleet at the User Interface level, the LCS-2 combat system insists their user interface is better.

If I was the EADS lobbyist, I would meet with Dan Maffei's and deliver the fastest desktop, fastest laptop, and fastest smart phone on the market, but instead of mainstream operating systems - and the good Congressman is probably very comfortable with Windows XP or Windows 7, all those super awesome machines should all be loaded with Ubuntu OS. I would bet Congressman Maffei would decide to go back to his old computers before the meeting was over, because UI matters to users. Just like combat system UI matters to sailors.

AEGIS is government owned. These folks who complain about Lockheed Martin's monopoly in the Navy on the combat system are given chance after chance to compete, but they fail every time because no matter how good the technology is under the covers - and sometimes it is really fantastic - they lose to Lockheed Martin because they refuse to imitate the user experience of AEGIS that every sailor in the Navy is comfortable with. As an IT guy who develops enterprise systems for government, I laugh when observing a classic mistake contractors do far too often, and all I can say is these companies get exactly what they deserve when they get nothing. It isn't the Saab North American radar. That radar might be legitimately great, but it doesn't matter at all. The real problem is the software folks who insist their way of doing user interfaces for the US Navy is better than the way everyone in the US Navy does it. That's just stupid!

OK, so that is likely NOT what the Navy's report will say, but it is the real background on what this item in the Mark is all about. If you want confirmation, all you have to do is talk to the SWOs who have worked on combat systems on AEGIS ships and have seen both LCS combat systems. While there is supposedly a competition between the two combat systems, the Navy would be crazy to pick the combat system on the Austal version of LCS, because the UI has nothing in common with the UI of the combat systems used throughout the rest of the fleet. The capabilities are relatively the same, but the UI is not.

As a New Yorker, I was very amused when I saw this in the mark, because to be honest very smart politicians like Dan Maffei are exactly the kind of politicians we like, but in this case his constituent is trapped in a software nightmare scenario because the SaaB radar is integrated with the wrong combat system. Training issue? You bet, but it isn't the Navy who needs the training, it's the IT contractors responsible for UI of any combat system that wants to compete with Lockheed Martin who need training.

Long-range plan for the construction of naval vessels

Pursuant to section 231 of title 10, United States Code, the Secretary of Defense provided the annual long-range plan for the construction of naval vessels on May 10, 2013, as informed by the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) for fiscal years 2014-18. The Secretary also indicated that a force structure of “about 300 ships” would be necessary to support ongoing naval operations. The Secretary further highlights the “resourcing challenges outside the FYDP largely due to investment requirements associated with the SSBN(X) program”. The Secretary acknowledges that these ship construction pressures will precipitate higher fiscal requirements in the mid-term planning period (fiscal years 2024-33) requiring an annual investment of $19.8 billion per year in fiscal year 2013 constant dollars.

The committee believes that there will be significant pressures on the ship construction accounts that will result from the Ohio-class replacement ballistic missile submarine program, while concurrently supporting the balance of ship construction requirements. The committee also believes that a significant increase to the ship construction accounts is unsustainable in times of budget challenges. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the average ship construction investment over the last 30 years, in current dollars, is $16.0 billion. Therefore, to better understand the significance associated with even sustaining the current ship construction investment throughout the long-range plan, the committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to provide a report to the congressional defense committee by March 1, 2014, that provides an update to the long plan for the construction of naval vessels based on $16.0 billion across the entirety of the long-range plan and to assess the corresponding reductions in the shipbuilding plan. The Secretary of the Navy should also provide an assessment of this investment in terms of the health associated with the industrial base.

This is another very smart idea. Basically, the House is taking Eric Labs $16 billion shipbuilding budget average and telling the Navy to deliver a theoretical shipbuilding plan using that number and include everything the Navy thinks they need.

Bob Work's probably sitting in his new CNAS office wondering why the House never gave him this opportunity! In all seriousness, every think tank with an interest in US naval power in Washington, DC should put together a report based on this request. Why not? If you read Ronald O'Rourke's shipbuilding reports for CRS, you would know he loves including those kind of reports for data point comparisons. On that note, maybe Bryan and I should write our own report too. Anyone seriously interesting in sponsoring that can send me an email.

Integration of high-energy laser weapons on surface combatants

The committee supports the Navy’s ongoing efforts to develop and field a high-energy laser weapon for surface ships, but is aware of significant challenges presented by integration of such a weapon into a surface combatant because of power and space limitations. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Navy to provide a report to the congressional defense committees by March 1, 2014, on the Navy’s plan for addressing the challenges of power generation, storage, and delivery associated with the integration of high-energy lasers, electro-magnetic rail guns, high-power radars, electronic warfare systems, and other such energy-intensive technologies.

Vice Admiral Hunt once suggested to me he believes LCS is an interesting candidate for fielding a laser or rail gun because of the power that can be generated by the turbines while the ship was underway on diesel engines. Now, LCS isn't exactly designed for that, and I don't know how either variant would redirect that power to a weapon system, but I wouldn't be surprised if both Austal and Lockheed Martin haven't thought about it. Seems to me that both companies would find a way to have their ship represented in this report, if indeed leveraging that turbine power for weapons systems is in fact feasible from a small design change perspective.

A Fleet Design in Decline

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Tue, 21 May 2013 13:00:00 +0000

Following the release of the Maritime Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, the Navy almost immediately tied budgets to strategy when John Morgan, as part of telling the story of 21st Century Seapower, claimed every budget is a strategy. Six years later under CNO Roughead and now CNO Greenert, it should be fairly obvious to everyone that strategic thinking in regards to Naval force structure is almost exclusively a military political strategy for dollar and industry share. Strategic guidance and thinking manifest as plans towards what a community can buy to build upon what a community already has.

I'm sure there is a sophisticated process behind how the Navy designs the future US Navy, but I'm also convinced that sophisticated process wouldn't survive a single debate with many competitors outside of OPNAV. If one stays with the same plan long enough expecting a different result, even a layman will eventually be able to point out the problems. In the case of the Navy's current fleet design under the plan released with this years budget, the math and real numbers suggest to this layman that the fleet as designed has peaked and is now in decline, indeed the Navy's own numbers highlight this very well.

I don't care about 30 year projections when it comes to shipbuilding. Short, Medium, and Long term trends and activities to me are measured in 5 years, 10 years, or 15 years respectively. Anything projected beyond 10 years is probably unreliable, and anything projected beyond 15 years except for ship retirements is surely fiction. For those playing at home, Military Times has all the PDFs you need to see the Navy's new plans. As I look at the new plan I am primarily focused on the next ten years and the last ten years, since the fleet numbered 297 ships in 2003 and is expected to number 297 ships in 2023 based on the Navy's own plan. I will also look at retirements beyond 10 years where applicable. As of May 20, 2013 the US Navy has 284 ships.

This link is the USN Plan for FY2014 (PDF), and this link has all the slides nice and neat (PDF). A lot of what I am about to discuss can be found there, with the rest of the details explain in future blog posts over the next few days.

The US Navy's Big Plan FY2014

The Navy makes clear the following planning assumptions.

Battle force inventory of the "2012 Navy FSA" will remain the objective of this plan.*
In the near term, the Annual budget for Navy shipbuilding will be sustained at the levels of the FY14 President's Budget (PB14) through the Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP). In the mid-term, annual budget will remain at appropriate (higher) levels,; and in the far term, be sustained at appropriate levels (slightly higher than current historical average).
All battle force ships serve to the end of their planned or extended service lives. **
The DoN will continue to acquire and build ships in the most affordable manner.

* FSA means Force Structure Assessment.
** Except for those that don't

I cannot explain the third point, except to say it is insulting. How can all battle force ships serve to the end of their planned or extended service lives when the Navy, down on page 21 of the same report, retires 7 CGs and 2 LSDs before their service lives are up? Glad you asked. Basically the Navy is moving these ships to a reserve status so the Navy can say those ships aren't technically retired early.

The unspoken planning assumption is that the President's budget completely ignores sequestration. We'll see how that turns out.

By 2023 the fleet will look different than today

The fleet increases the number of CVNs. The Navy had 12 CV/CVNs in 2003, has 10 CVNs today, and will have 12 CVNs in 2023. The Navy is sending a clear signal with this budget that the Navy will field 11 aircraft carriers (which is the legal requirement) until at least 2040 under current plans. I personally found it just a little ironic that the 11 aircraft carrier law is just about the only law that the Navy actually seems to care about in the entire shipbuilding plan.

The fleet increases the number of large surface combatants from 85 today to 87 in 2023, but by replacing CG53s with DDG51s, the overall number of VLS cells drops by over 500 by 2023. Even as the numbers of large surface combatants remain relatively constant throughout the 2020s, the number of total VLS cells will decline by 880 throughout the entire fleet by 2028. It is also worth noting all the DDG-51 Flight Is and Flight IIs that make up the bulk of the current ballistic missile defense fleet of the US Navy will apparently be retired from 2028-2034. To sustain this, the Navy expects to build either 2 or 3 DDGs at the cost of a DDG-51 Flight IIA ship from FY15 until forever.

The fleet decreases the number of attack submarines from 55 today to 48 in 2023. The total will actually fall to 42 by 2029 and never recovers to above 50 throughout the rest of the plan, and the plan never reaches the requirement of 52. The VLS payload module for Virginia class SSNs is not included in the budget, and will cost about $400 million per submarine. The SSGNs will retire without replacement in 2027 resulting in a total loss of VLS capacity of over 600 from the submarine force.

The fleet of 31 amphibious ships today will decline over the next few years but recover to 31 by 2023. There are only three amphibious ships built over the next decade until 2023, 2 LH(X) and the LSD(X), meaning two first in class ships. Noteworthy the 31 ship amphibious force could legitimately be 33 ships if the 2 LSDs weren't placed in reserve in FY15. Also noteworthy that with the upcoming retirement of USS Denver (LPD 9) and USS Peleliu (LHA 5) the Navy has two legitimate chances to convert amphibious ships into more AFSBs of different types. If you add Ponce (AFSB1) that gives the Navy 36 amphibious ships plus the MLP squadron, which in my book is a legitimate 2 MEB force. But too much wishful thinking, because in the end it's only 31 amphibious ships according to the plan on paper.

The combat logistics force of 31 ships in 2013 will reduce to 29 ships from now until forever, and under current plans the combat logistics force will be the smallest it has been in about a century. I have never heard a compelling reason articulated why the Navy would shift to the Pacific Ocean, and in doing so would reduce the size of the combat logistics force. I am sure there is a complicated reason for this well beyond the understanding of this layman observer.

All of the frigates and dedicated mine ships either already have been or will be retired by 2023, and the featured new additions to the fleet since 2003 and until 2023 will be 38 Littoral Combat Ships.

And for the record unless all public data on the F-35C, including that of GAO and CBO, is wildly incorrect, there is no math on the planet that suggests the Navy can field 10 carrier air wings in 2023 that are identical with 10 F-35Cs squadrons and 30 F-18E/F squadrons unless naval aviation gets a considerable increase in funding. I haven't seen this discussed anywhere, but the numbers for a little basic math and historical comparison is there to do some estimating. The Navy is going to fall billions short, unless flight hours are going to be down considerably on existing Super Hornets (which may be the plan?).

The current US Navy plan narrative goes something like this.

Naval Aviation
The Navy will pay to maintain the 11 big deck carrier requirement. UCLASS will be ISR only through at least 2025, and as such has joined the E-2D and EA-18G in N2/N6. N98, with their current "all in" approach to the F-35C and "your out" approach to UCLASS, has effectively sucked all the money out of every other community in the Navy. The CVN carrier air wing is on the verge of remarkable cost efficiency with five different models of aircraft using only five different engines; specifically the F-35C, the F-18E/F and EF-18G, the E-2D, UCLASS, and the MH-60R and MH-60S helicopters. At the same time, the entire platform and system model has become so expensive that today the Navy can only fully maintain 7 carrier air wings, with 2 carrier air wings suffering from training restrictions - 9 total today. How the Navy ever expects to afford 10 identical carrier air wings for 11 aircraft carriers in the future is a feat of financial magic yet to be revealed, and will almost certainly require a significant increases in funding. It is hard to see a scenario where the CVN of the future will ever be as efficient as it has been over the last decade, because that simply isn't ever going to happen with F-35C. As a result, the CVN force will almost certainly decline in capability over the next ten years relative to today.

Submarines
The attack submarine force will decline to far below requirement just as the ballistic missile submarines are being built. The SSGNs will be retired without replacement resulting in a loss of over 600 VLS cells from our submarine force over the next ten years. The payload module for the Virginia class submarine is apparently not in the budget plan, meaning to sustain current VLS capacity in the submarine force the Navy will require a significant increase in funding per attack submarine to fill the gap. As a result, the SSN force will almost certainly decline in capability over the next ten years relative to today.

Large Surface Combatants
The retirement of the CGs and by replacing those large surface combatants with DDGs will result in a net loss of almost 900 VLS cells throughout the surface fleet over the next 10 years. All new construction DDGs are priced at the remarkably efficient price of the Flight IIA, despite the need to add the new AMDR radar and despite Sean Stackley all but conceding in testimony that all new DDGs in the Flight III configuration will lack the power necessary to field the advanced weapons like lasers and rail guns currently in development for the surface force without major modifications, indeed often coming at a trade off for even more VLS cells or hanger space. As a result, the major surface combatant will almost certainly decline in capability over the next 10 years relative to today.

Amphibious Ships
The fleet of 31 amphibious ships today will decline over the next few years but recover to 31 by 2023. By every standard the amphibious force of 2023 will be more advanced and more capable than the amphibious force of today, but just because the Navy gets the ship portion of the amphibious force right doesn't mean the Marine Corps will get the ship-to-shore connector part right. I am a believer that the F-35B and MV-22 is a legitimate 21st century capability, but this need for speed requirement in AAV replacements has me wondering if the Marine Corps is too stuck on old ideas to come up with a 21st century way of war from the sea. I've never heard of such a thing as littoral warfare without Marines, and yet instead of building 21st century capabilities on land and sea, the Marine Corps seems stuck on the idea of a 2 MEB Okinawa style invasion. The littoral property that is going to require a 21st century Marine Corps isn't the beach, it's the oil platform and the 300,000 ton VLCC that if sunk, instantly creates the 2nd largest environmental disaster in recorded human history in some neutral powers fishing spot. In 2023 the US will have a 21st century amphibious force, but it is still unclear if it will be fielded with a Marine Corps stuck in a 20th century mindset.

Mine Warfare and Small Vessels
Over the last ten years the Navy has retired 12 MCHs and over the next ten years the Navy will retire the rest of the original 14 MCMs. It could be suggested these 26 dedicated mine ships are being replaced by 24 Littoral Combat Ships with 24 MIW mission modules.When the latest SAR comes out (hopefully Thursday) we'll look at the lifecycle costs of this in detail, but until then I'd just point out that based on FY12 numbers it would appear the LCS + MIW module as a mine warfare replacement for these two vessels is going to cost the Navy almost $1 billion a year.

Now obviously the LCS + MIW module is not the same as coastal minehunters or minesweepers. LCS can sweep a larger minefield, can self-deploy to the minefield threat, is much better armed and defensible than mine ships, doesn't require sailors to be in a minefield, and in theory the ship can be used for something other than mine detection and clearance.

In 2023 the Navy will have 38 LCS, each with 2 crews and it is likely several of these ships will be forward deployed to Middle East and Pacific region areas. It is still very unclear how effective the LCS will be in any role, or what exactly the ship will bring to the fight. The LCS does not add combat power to the fleet, and the degree to which LCS is a legitimate networked sensor capability is still very unclear.

Theory Meets Reality
I see all the promise of increased capability in the FY14 Navy plan as evidence that the Navy plan is a theory of advancement that fails to cloak the reality of decline. In theory, mission modules are great. In reality, mission modules are still very far from a real capability today. In theory, UCLASS is the future of naval aviation strike and the savior of the CVN. In reality, UCLASS is in N2/N6 and isn't even seen by the N98 crowd as a naval aviation strike platform yet. In theory, Large Diameter UUVs will pick up the slack of the reduced SSN force and impending loss of SSGN strike capacity. In reality, LDUUV is a PPT slide. In theory, five engines for five platforms and EMALS and greater efficiency and stealthy F-35s all makes for a great CVN capability. In reality, if you buy 10 CVNs, the answer to how much the CVN capability costs is simple - the cost is ultimately less of everything else in every other Navy community from now until forever, and that is a neverending decline with no evidence anywhere the CVN is capable of picking up the slack of what is being lost. In theory the surface combatant force is getting better radars and better missiles and can shoot down ballistic missiles. In reality, fewer VLS means less offensive strike by the SWOs who are being relegated to defending HVUs, and in my read of naval warfare, playing defense at sea in the missile era is a long term loser.

In theory, everything in the Navy is great. In reality, the current fleet design has apparently peaked, and from here going forward everything under the current fleet design is more expensive. The Navy is trading advanced ISR capabilities for strike capabilities, and in fact every community is significantly increasing ISR while legitimately decreasing strike. It's the trend of the current fleet design, and only through PPT promises does that trend look any different at some distant future point.

Finishing the Kill Chain
The only areas the Navy Plan is actually advancing seapower is with total CVNs, overall amphibious force capability, and the Littoral Combat Ship. Unless the combined capability of the CVN in 2023 and the LCS in 2023 is superior to any combination of networked systems fielded today, this Navy Plan is a course towards irrelevance for the US Navy.

The proof is in the numbers. The proof is in the math. Ultimately, the proof is the plan provided by none other than the US Navy. This plan needs lots of money just to be executed as is, even more money to make the adjustments necessary to fix the obvious flaws, and in my opinion it needs lots of work and critical thought to fix some areas that are consuming limited resources with limited, marginal, or altogether unclear advantages.

The current fleet design is one of naval decline because it favors doing the same thing the same way and expecting better results after a decade period where efficiency in fielded capability peaked, and is now slowly declining with the addition of new evolved solutions. To make matters more complicated, all competitors to the US Navy are building capabilities that specifically attack the weak links of the current fleet design - weak links like the CVN which is numerically limited but consumes an overwhelming percentage of total fleet capabilities and investment, and weak links like a numerically challenged logistics force.

Less offensive capabilities on and under the sea has made the Navy even more reliant on the limited number of aircraft carriers, and can anyone in the Navy explain why the F-35C is the only platform in the 3 major communities that is adding a new strike capability to the fleet? The proposed Flight III sure doesn't advance the surface community towards the future, the payload module for Virginia is unfunded, the LCS surely isn't adding notable combat power, and the UCLASS is ISR only?

Sorry, but my read of Wayne Hughes is that we need to strike effectively first, and while I agree winning the information/communication battle in any environment is a critical enabler, it also means Navy must be capable of putting warheads on foreheads at the point of contact. That second part is not evident in the current fleet design based on what I see in the Navy's latest plan.

CNO and CSAF on Air-Sea Battle

noreply@blogger.com (The Conservative Wahoo) — Mon, 20 May 2013 13:17:00 +0000

The uniformed heads of the Navy and Air Force recently placed a piece in Foreign Policy entitled "Breaking the Kill Chain--How to Keep America in the Game When Our Enemies are Trying to Shut Us Out." I recommend reading it to gain additional understanding about what the two services mean (and don't mean) when they talk ASB. I don't know what General Welsh's long term plan is, but I do think we navalists are particularly fortunate that Admiral Greenert seems to like to put his thoughts on paper. I don't know CNO except by reputation and the company he keeps (Submariner). But I would not have predicted he would be so publicly engaged--it is a good decision and he is doing it well.

A few things about the piece:

1. It continues to boggle my mind that ASB has created the anti-bodies that it has, though I should not be surprised. We are become an expeditionary military, meaning that the preponderance of our war fighting force is and will be CONUS-based. When we need to protect far-flung interests, that power must be employed far from home, against capabilities that seek to deny us entry and freedom of maneuver (A2AD). If you don't get there, and if you can't maneuver there, if you can't project power from there, you can't win there. It really is that simple.

2. The fact that Greenert and Welsh acknowledge that A2AD threats are not new is notable. We cannot forget that during the time of our Superpower status, A2AD was the order of the day. The Soviets fielded a powerful array of capability that sought to deny us the ability to project power. We did not then cower from preparing to meet that challenge, nor should we now. It should be remembered that the Maritime Strategy of the 1980's took as an entering assumption that war with the Soviets would remain conventional, and that conventional strikes on the Soviet homeland (especially in the NW Pacific) would be pursued. Those who take to their sedan chairs with fear of nuclear conflict with rising powers, if we pursue options that include conventional strikes, do not remember their history.

3. Although I admire the thinking behind the highly networked force advocated in the article--and believe it should be pursued--I continue to believe every single exercise of note should contain significant operations in a comms denied/satellite denied environment, and long periods of emission control (EMCON) operations. Additionally, we should continue to work to field robust networks that are comm path agnostic, in order to quickly reconfigure from one pipe to another.

4. The best thing about ASB (to me) is that it seems to signal a Navy on the offense. I'd like to see this continue, and I'd like to see budgets that reinforce this. Keep the narrative focused on offense.

5. China. There, I've said it. I was in a session recently with one of the Deans of Modern Seapower who tried to make the case that the US was being insensitive (my word) to Chinese sensitivities in the way we talk about ASB. Two thoughts here: first, the Chinese are wont to take offense where none exists, so metering our policies and approaches against their institutional paranoia seems unwise to me. Secondly, we shouldn't forget that ASB is at least in part a counter to a military strategy pursued by the Chinese designed to keep us from defending Taiwan or interfering with any other matter the Chinese deem their business. We need to keep pointing this out.

Update: This just in....

Bryan McGrath

A Good Week for Navy

noreply@blogger.com (The Conservative Wahoo) — Thu, 16 May 2013 13:15:00 +0000

This week's launch of a UCAS demonstrator (X-47B) was a good week for the Navy--a really good week. To the extent that anyone pays attention to what the Navy does these days, this achievement has captured imaginations and has helped to reinforce the notion (fact) that the Navy is indeed moving forward with important technologies even in a time of scarcity. Whether this continues or not is an open question, but for the moment, we all have something to nod approvingly about.

Here's something you don't read often from me--I am going to give the Secretary of the Navy credit for something.

He has made investing in unmanned technologies a priority of his term from day 1. He has set aggressive--yet achievable--goals for integration of unmanned capability into the Carrier Air Wing. He has--through this prioritization--been able to fence off a number of important unmanned initiatives from cuts that some in the Navy would have gladly administered in order to keep their pet programs more fully funded. And while I remain convinced that he has squandered much of his term in the pursuit of side-shows that don't meaningfully contribute to American Seapower, his emphasis on unmanned systems in all domains will be something upon which he can stake a legacy someday.

Bryan McGrath

Land Power in the Asia Pacific

noreply@blogger.com (The Conservative Wahoo) — Tue, 14 May 2013 23:59:00 +0000

Spend a few moments with this piece from Armed Forces Journal entitled "Back to Reality: Why Land Power Trumps in the National Re-balance Toward Asia." Although I am not persuaded that the author makes the case for land power "trump"ing anything, there is a considerable amount of impressive thought here about the role of (U.S.) land power in Asia, and some really insightful thinking about AirSea Battle, conventional deterrence and escalation.

Anyone who thinks conflict with China in the Asia-Pacific will leave out ground forces is mistaken. If such a conflict comes, China will almost certainly seek to extend its defensive perimeter against U.S. power projection forces, and this will almost certainly involve the PLA seizing land from nations with which we have treaty obligations or with which we are increasingly friendly. Land power--and a lot of it--will be needed. But it won't get there unless the Navy and Air Force can create operational seams in the A2AD environment, and it won't survive long without the ability to neutralize PLA advantages in the missile bombardment campaign.

Major Chamberlain also is insightful about the role of land based air and missile defense forces in shaping the operational environment. I was particularly gratified to read his advocacy of increased air and missile defense force structure within the Army TOA. Hopefully this thinking will catch on.

Bryan McGrath