Information Dissemination

PLAN conventional submarine fleet update

noreply@blogger.com (Feng) — Sat, 11 Feb 2012 06:11:00 +0000

About a year ago, I wrote an entry on the Chinese submarine fleet. In that article, I talked about the different submarine classes in service with PLAN and a little bit on their history. When it comes to the development of new submarine classes, China typically follows the line of building one experiment boat of that class, followed by 3 or more boats that fixed the problems found in the first of the class and follows up with a slightly modified variant that gets mass produced. The change from the first unit and the 2nd batch is normally quite significant. The change from the 2nd batch and the third batch is generally quite minor from the outside, but more significant on the inside (improvements in sonar, combat system, fire control system and such). A lot of times we see two programs going on at the same time where one class is getting mass produced at the same time a follow-on class's first experimental boat is getting tested out. This development process has allowed PLAN's submarine fleet modernize at a faster rate than any other arm of PLAN (with the exception of Fast Attack Crafts).

A few years ago, most of the China threat group was alarmed at China's emerging force of conventional submarines. That has changed in the recent years as the ASBM project, the carrier project and nuclear submarines have really shifted their attention. At the same time, the growing fleet of 054As and larger surface ships like Type 071 and No. 866 hospital ship have also garnered a lot of attention. For PLAN followers like myself, it's easy to get drawn to the monthly updates of photos coming out of HD, JP and JN shipyard. Since most of submarines are produced at WuChang shipyard, we don't get as many submarine photos during production or during service. Since most of the pictures we get of conventional submarines don't have number painted on them, it's also hard for someone like myself to keep track of their numbers and their deployment. All of this leads to less attention paid to the conventional submarine program by everyone. Needless to say, the modernization of conventional sub force has not stopped in the process. So, this entry will look at some of the changes we have seen in the last couple of years.

First, I want to take a look at the structure of the conventional submarine force. There are 6 submarine flotilla split among the 3 fleets. The 2nd and 12th flotilla belong to the North Sea Fleet, 22nd and 42nd belong to the East Sea Fleet, whereas 32nd and 72nd belong to the South Sea Fleet. There is also a hierarchy within PLAN over the disbursement of the submarines. Due to its proximity to Taiwan and the proximity of the first chain of islands, East Sea Fleet is normally the first force that gets the new submarines. At the moment, all of the active submarines in ESF are what I call the 3rd generation submarines (either Song, Yuan or Kilo). All of the recent submarines from WuChang also gets tested out in one of the East Sea Fleet naval bases near Shanghai before they get commissioned. The South Sea Fleet seems to be next fleet in line. Back in the 90s, South Sea Fleet's submarine fleet was probably the weakness of the three fleets. At the time, the 52nd submarine flotilla had disbanded and SSF was left with just the 32nd submarine flotilla. This decision was probably made due to the many years of reduction in China's defense budget. The weakness of SSF's submarine fleet was one of the reasons that Vietnam was able to occupy some of the spratly islands. PLAN realized that it made a big mistake and established the 72nd submarine flotilla early in the 2000s along with the 31st nuclear submarine flotilla. The Ming class submarines from 32nd flotilla was transferred to the 72nd flotilla while it received the newer Song and Kilo class submarines. The North Sea Fleet is probably the weakest of the three fleets. For the longest time, NSF was the only fleet that had nuclear submarines, so it was always left to receive the oldest conventional submarines. With the recently modernization efforts, the 2nd flotilla is now almost completely equipped with Song class submarines. Although, the 12th flotilla probably still consists of the earliest variant of Ming class. These submarines are vastly outclassed by their Japanese or Korean counterparts.

Now, I want to look at the orbat changes in the last few years and the expected changes in the future. From what I can tell, the two flotilla of SSF has not changed recently. The 32nd flotilla consists of 4 Song and 4 Kilos, whereas the 72nd flotilla consists of 8 improved ming class submarines. The 42nd flotilla of ESF also has not changed, since the kilo submarines are still front line submarines. As Yuan class submarines have started joining the 22nd flotilla of ESF, the Song class submarines were getting transferred to NSF. The first four Yuan submarines (330 to 333) were transferred by 2009. Over the past year, there have probably been 3 or 4 more Yuans (334 to 337??) that have joined. At the current time, this flotilla has 2 song submarines and 7 or 8 Yuan submarines. By this point, the 2nd flotilla has already received 7 Song submarines. Obviously, the last 2 song will be transferred out to the 2nd flotilla at some point. One of the questions is what happened to the submarines that were previously there. It seems like PLAN has been fairly reluctant to just retire the old submarines. Some of the 033 submarines have been kept around for training purposes, but they will obviously have to start decommissioning the older 035s and 033s very soon. I think PLAN is unlikely to form a new conventional submarine flotilla, so the overall number of active submarines will be kept around 48. At current time, they have 12 kilos + 13 Songs + 8 Yuan = 33 submarines that would be considered as fairly new. If we discount the first experimental Song that was launched in 1994, they still only have to replace another 16 submarines before the Ming class submarines will all need to be retired. While up to 5 conventional submarines can be produced every year at the two shipyards, we will most likely see 3 submarines getting produced every year (due to budgetary constraints). At this pace, the replacement will be done by late this decade. The ming class submarines in 72nd flotilla were produced from 1994 to 2001. If they get replaced by 2020, they would've only been in service for 20 years. It's really hard to see PLAN take something that's only 20 years old out of service, even if it's obsolete. So, I wonder what will happen to them.

Thirdly, I want to look at what kind of threats each fleet are facing and whether the fleet that they have is suited for that task. The East Sea Fleet will continue to be opposite to Taiwan, so it will need to be prepared to be a deterrent against possible US intervention. As such, the most modern conventional submarines will be placed in ESF for anti-shipping missions and also ASW missions. It will likely continue to receive the newest conventional submarines. At the same time, the natural barrier of the first chain island and surrounding naval forces traps in the ESF, so ESF is unlikely to have nuclear submarine fleet in the future. The North Sea Fleet is surrounded by the much superior Japanese and Korean submarine fleet. It is also trapped by the extremely well equipped and trained Japanese ASW units. I think NSF is currently woefully equipped considering it's conditions. Like the rest of the fleet, the submarine flotillas have been the last to receive the Song submarines. And even when it does receive them, it gets the submarines that ESF no longer needs. For the longest time, this was balanced by the fact that NSF was the only one that had nuclear submarines, but that's no longer the case. Going forward, it's hard to see the newer nuclear submarines getting deployed here when it is completely surrounded by Japan and South Korea. For the next decade, this situation is unlikely to change, so NSF will continue to be inadequately equipped to handle possible threats. Finally, South Sea Fleet probably faces the weakest of surrounding navies. Even the Ming class submarines are capable of handling the threats from Vietnam and Phillipines. South Sea Fleet continues to be the main blue water fleet in PLAN, so one would expect that more nuclear submarines will be deployed here. Also compared to the other two fleets, conventional submarines in SSF are not trapped by first chain of island and foreign naval force, so the current conventional fleet is actually already suitable for the threats in its area. Due to the growing influence of SSF, I think it will get newer submarines before NSF even though NSF has much greater needs for those boats.

Overall, it's to see that the modernization of PLAN's conventional submarine fleet is still going very rapidly. It will most likely complete ahead of other part of PLAN's fleet. The submarines are deployed in a very unusual manner where the elite flotillas continue to get upgraded to newer submarines while the other flotilla pick up the scraps. From the service, this seems like something that will be problematic in the future. It will probably create resentment within PLAN toward the elite flotilla, although that might be an accepted practice of PLA. The more concerning part is that different flotilla will be continually trained for newer submarines. Rather than serving 20 years on the same boat, the sailors in the 22nd flotilla are probably changing to new submarines every 10 years. When I think about the time that it takes to properly train sailors to operate a new submarine, that seems to leave not much time for routine trainings and patrols. As mentioned previously, some of the Ming submarines may be removed from active duty after less than 20 years of service. What will happen to these submarines once this happens? As we move forward, the Song submarines are still relatively loud even though they are modern by Chinese standards. Even the latest submarine that we saw out of WuChang shipyard is still behind the acoustic levels of the most advanced conventional submarines around the world. What will the next generation of Chinese submarines look like? As PLAN becomes more of a blue water fleet and expands its nuclear submarine force, what kind of roles will the conventional submarines play? Will Chinese submarines become bigger players in the export market? These are all things that I'm looking forward to see.

Foreign Entaglements IV

noreply@blogger.com (Robert Farley) — Sat, 11 Feb 2012 01:48:00 +0000

Matt Duss and Jamie Fly debate an attack on Iran, with particular attention to the question of regime change:

I am... skeptical of the idea that regime change could be executed solely through air attacks. You should be too.

This week's WPR column considered the ongoing saga of the A-10 Warthog. I hope we can all agree that the Navy is remarkably fortunate that the USAAF gave up the mission of aerial ASW back in World War II. Otherwise, ASW might be in the same mess as CAS.

Wicked Coolness

noreply@blogger.com (The Conservative Wahoo) — Fri, 10 Feb 2012 11:27:00 +0000

I realize that neither of these two links have much -- if anything -- to do with things maritime, but they show coolness that must be widely shared.

And this:

System D at Sea

noreply@blogger.com (Chris Rawley) — Thu, 09 Feb 2012 00:18:00 +0000

At its core, Seapower involves the defense of economies - large and small. But not all markets work the way we might assume. Journalist Robert Neuwirth describes the $10 trillion globalized black market economy as System D. The concept is worth examining from a maritime perspective, if not for its size and rate of growth alone. The first point to understand is that there is a thin gray line between the informal System D economy and criminal activities. System D maritime businesses include local fishing, oil bunkering (especially in West Africa), and unregistered vessels moving goods and people to undeveloped ports. System D also includes some forms of smuggling at sea, but not obvious maritime crime such as illicit trafficking in narcotics, weapons, or piracy. Perhaps the way one defines System D depends on the scale of the activity. For example, illegal fishing is a 23.5 billion dollar global industry. Clearly, not all of this economic activity is “lost” especially to the persons profiting from it and fishermen selling their catches in local markets.

For an interesting example of System D in action, watch the “River kids” risking their lives trying to make a living in Amazonia. The first two minutes will give you the idea, but the entire story is worth watching.

Budding entrepreneurs or pirates in the making?

Why is it important for naval professionals to understand System D? First World Sailors might view these activities as unusual, but the fact is, paying customs fees, registering motor vessels, licensed and regulated fishing, and other rule of law issues we take for granted are anomalies for most of the world's population.

Modern navies operate around System D whether or not they realize it. MCAST Sailors or Coast Guardsmen working to develop nascent navies must understand that in many cases their counterparts are underpaid by their governments and feed their families by their activities in the shadow economy. They may even use government owned (and even US tax-payer funded…) naval vessels to support their System D businesses. In addition to patrolling coasts and rivers, small craft may be used to catch fish, smuggle goods, or provide private security. Moreover, practically every US Sailor making a port call abroad has participated in System D buying goods from street vendors; some of whom sell licit locally-produced merchandise, while others hawk pirated or counterfeit knock-offs.

In his book, Stealth of Nations: The Global Rise of the Informal Economy, Neuwirth argues that instead of attempting the impossible – to close down these informal economies – that the developed world should co-opt them. Rather than judging the débrouillards making their livings by First World standards, we should realize that the informal economy on the world's waterways is vibrant, necessary, and not going away any time soon.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Africa Maritime IW Potpourri

noreply@blogger.com (Chris Rawley) — Tue, 07 Feb 2012 23:15:00 +0000

AQIM Maritime Terror Plot Disrupted: Algerian officials recently detained three terrorists from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb plotting a COLE-like attack against U.S. or European ships in the Med. Had this attack been executed, it would have represented a significant escalation in AQIM’s tactics, which thus far have been mostly focused on kidnapping Westerners for ransom and smaller local bombings.

al Shabaab Flees to Sea: Numerous reports have discussed al Shabaab's use of the sea as a means of travel both up and down Somalia's long coast and to and from Yemen. These stories demonstrate al Qaeda's continued interest in maritime attacks and the sea as a means for movement and support. They also reflect AQ's strategic shift out of the FATA into Africa as drone strikes have successfully hammered the networks's core leadership in Pakistan.

Also from East Africa:
Pirate/Human Smuggler Nexus: This is an interesting twist on the Pirate/al Shabaab nexus and demonstrates the extent that pirates have entrenched themselves into Somalia's illicit economy.

Finally, some new news on Africa's river wars: “A new 2010 Cooperative Framework Agreement, now signed by most of the key upstream abutters, would give all riparian states (including the Congo, where a stream that flows into Lake Tanganyika is the acknowledged Nile source) equal access to the resources of the river. That would give preference to large scale upstream energy and industrial, as well as long-time agricultural and irrigation uses.

Egypt and Sudan have refused to sign the new agreement, despite years of discussions and many heated meetings. Given climate change, the drying up of water sources everywhere in Africa and the world, Egypt, which is guaranteed 56 billion of the annual flow of 84 billion cubic meters of Nile water each year, hardly wants to lose even a drop of its allocation. Nor does Sudan, guaranteed 15 billion cubic meters.”

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

Three Bits

noreply@blogger.com (Robert Farley) — Fri, 03 Feb 2012 16:29:00 +0000

1. My book manuscript is finished (for better or worse), so I soon hope to be using the space that Galrahn has graciously granted for something more than self-promotion. In particular, I plan to return to the idea of writing a series on seapower in fiction. However, also expect some more book reviews, mostly associated with recent work on the airpower manuscript.

2. Until then, self-promotion #1: I jabber about airpower and Syria with Heather Hurlburt of the National Security Network, in Episode III of Foreign Entanglements: If you're interested, you can also "Like" Foreign Entanglements on Facebook.

3. Self-promotion #2: In this week's WPR column, I think about how a 1947-style restructuring of the national security bureaucracy might go down:

Most of the time, when confronted with the clear shortcomings of the system in place, we choose to muddle through. Since 1947, the United States has undertaken a series of minor revisions to the national security bureaucracy. The most significant change came with the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, which affirmed the value of jointness and attempted to remedy the problems of inter-service conflict created by the National Security Act. After Sept. 11, the United States tweaked its intelligence bureaucracy by creating the position of Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Homeland Security, although these latter reforms represented more an effort to create cover for the intelligence failures associated with Sept. 11 than a genuine reform. On rare occasions, however, we have the opportunity to revisit national values and to redesign the institutions that constrain our policy choices. These contingent moments come when the accumulated weight of years of muddling, combined with geopolitical and technological changes, leave us with institutions fundamentally out of sync with the strategic environment the nation faces. There is reason to believe that the United States now faces such a moment. The strategic, political and technological challenges facing the Obama administration -- and potentially a successor Romney administration -- differ so dramatically from the environment that faced Harry Truman and Acheson at the time of the “creation” that they now risk pulling the national security bureaucracy out of shape.

UAV Swarms Will Change Warfare Forever

noreply@blogger.com (Chris Rawley) — Thu, 02 Feb 2012 01:09:00 +0000

Those who aren't convinced that UAS will change warfare permanently need to watch this video, posted yesterday:

Pardon the cliche, but this technology is truly transformational. For some interesting commentary on swarms, check out John Robb.

The naval applications are there, too. How could AEGIS, RAM, ESSM, CIWS, or any other envisioned air defense system defend against a lethal "suicide" drone swarm aimed at a ship, especially when they come in from all directions and mass before attack? Jamming might work to some degree, but there are countermeasures for countermeasures. What about swarming surface or undersea weapons? The fact that this technology was developed by a university, not by DARPA, NAVSEA, or a major defense contractor, demonstrates that open source systems such as these will soon be available to non-state actors, some of them with malevolent intent.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

UK Libya Lessons Observed & Sea-based ISR

noreply@blogger.com (Chris Rawley) — Mon, 30 Jan 2012 23:05:00 +0000

From Think Defense , a discussion of UK lessons from Libya and a detailed run down of some possible solutions to fill the gaps: two things the UK effort lacked was organic shipboard unmanned ISR and precision land attack. We've discussed the US shortages of those assets here and several times previously. As acquisition choices are made on platforms such as the F-35C versus say the Sea Avenger or other strike-capable ISR aircraft, it would be wise to heed these observations as well as our own recent combat experiences in Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. We cannot kill what we can't find, and scouting in modern warfare -- IW and otherwise --is about finding discrete targets that are positioned in a way to exacerbate collateral damage and use our ROE against us. The global instantaneous news cycle permits little leeway from this truth. Targets hiding in plain sight in urban environments or among fishing fleets are now the norm as are those that do not otherwise seem as they appear (decoys and military units disguised as civilian platforms). High value targets in future asymmetric fights against state or non-state actors are as likely to be key individuals or civilian looking maritime collection platforms as they are tank divisions and enemy capital ships.

The way to overcome these challenges is through persistent stare intelligence -- and fast moving TACAIR just doesn't provide it. The foregoing isn't intended to come across as as an anti-CVN position. It is however, an indictment of the acquisition of new sea-based TACAIR for the mid-to-long term.

As we've noted before, these sorts of capabilities enable even smaller ships to participate in a larger fight by extending the range of sensors and an ability to engage what they find. As the author notes:

The need to extend the reach of surface vessels, I carefully avoid the use of the term major combatant because vessels lower down the flightiness ladder can equally benefit, with both ISTAR and attack capabilities is obvious.

We could still deliver improved land attack capabilities without an investment in maritime UAV’s because target identification and guidance can come from other ‘platforms’ but the availability of an organic UAV would greatly enhance the ability of a frigate or destroyer without requiring others or relying on a manned helicopter where it might be difficult to deploy.

The past decade of combat has created an insatiable demand for persistent ISR by our ground commanders. In a war at sea scenario, the demand for these platforms will be equal, if not greater due to the vast distances involved. We should err on the side of acquiring as many of these scouting platforms as we can afford, even if it means trade-offs such as buying fewer BMD platforms and more smaller, cheaper ships to house the UAVs, or eliminating other high ticket programs such as the F-35C.

The opinions and views expressed in this post are those of the author alone and are presented in his personal capacity. They do not necessarily represent the views of U.S. Department of Defense, the US Navy, or any other agency.

H/T Lee

Foreign Entanglements Episode II, and Airpower

noreply@blogger.com (Robert Farley) — Sun, 29 Jan 2012 02:08:00 +0000

A couple of quick notes. First, episode 2 of Foreign Entanglements is up; this episode feature Matthew Duss of the Center for American Progress against Daveed Gartenstein-Ross of FPI: Not much maritime content, but certainly some national security talk. In the near future I hope that have a more maritime-themed episode. Second, my WPR column last week was yet another unhinged screed against airpower. Check it out.

The Proof Is In The Pudding

noreply@blogger.com (The Conservative Wahoo) — Fri, 27 Jan 2012 13:17:00 +0000

The details of the FY13 budget are beginning to drift out, and it seems that the much ballyhooed "pivot" to Asia--and by inference, to Naval and Aerospace power--is more heat than light. As I discussed on last week's Midrats internet radio show, there are two ways to demonstrate budget emphasis. One is to spend more on something, and the other is to spend less, but have the magnitude of the cut be less than other priorities, creating an "emphasis by subtraction". This is what it appears to have occurred in the FY13 budget.

News reports and Pentagon statements indicate that the Navy will retire 7 cruisers and 2 LSD's early, while cutting its shipbuilding totals 28% from the FY12 estimate for 2013-2017 (57 ships) to 41 ships in the same period with this budget. Retiring assets early from a Fleet already stressed to meet its commitments, and then eating your shipbuilding "seed corn", strike me as odd ways to demonstrate an emphasis on Seapower. I've talked to some in the Navy who suggest that under the new plan, we'll be able to field as many ships in 2020 as we do now, which is put forward as evidence of great progress and victories within the Pentagon bureaucracy. How this reconciles with the fact that the Fleet we have NOW does not meet the needs of the COCOMS--let alone the Fleet some project to be necessary to underwrite East Asian security in the face of Chinese expansion and modernization--evades me.

For navalists, the current Republican Presidential primary has included several references to Fleet size, some of which have had issue taken with them in the press (NOTE: I am actively supporting Mitt Romney for President). In this one, Walter Pincus seizes upon what he believes is a lack of detail among the candidates when discussing the Fleet. His suggestion that Romney's use of "9 ships is a year out of date" (to summarize yearly shipbuilding levels) ignores the basic fact that in the last year in which we have complete information (FY11), the Navy procured only 9 ships. He then goes on to point to an erroneous figure of 55 ships over the next five years (the number in the FY12 budget was 57), while hedging his criticism by saying "...the fiscal 2013 budget due shortly could change things....". Indeed it has, again, by dramatically cutting the number of ships to be built, by retiring useful ships early, and by deferring the acquisition of critical submarines. This again--in a strategy emphasizing an immense maritime theater and the Seapower and Aerospace power necessary to dominate it.

Clearly, the number of hulls as a measure of Naval power ain't what it used to be. However, the suggestion that networks and precision guided munitions make hull counts unimportant points again to the basic physics problem that Naval planners have faced since the Phoenicians--a ship can only be in one place at a time. Quantity does have a quality all its own, and as I've advocated many times on this site, networks and PGM's are of incalculable value when the Navy is fighting; however they are less important when the Navy is doing what it does the vast majority of the time--deterring and assuring. We are sliding into the trap of sizing our Navy to fight and win wars only, de-emphasizing the critical role of what Tom Barnett has termed "system maintenance". The more we move toward a force designed ONLY to fight wars, the more likely such a Fleet will be to become a magnificent anachronism--powerful, networked, and top-notch--but operating largely in the Virginia Capes and San Diego opareas.

Bryan McGrath

Costa Concordia Reconstruction

noreply@blogger.com (Robert Farley) — Thu, 26 Jan 2012 18:52:00 +0000

For those interested in the seamanship aspects of the Costa Concordia disaster, this may be interesting:

Reconstruction of the Costa Concordia Tragedy, Narration by John Konrad from gCaptain.com on Vimeo.

Narration by John Konrad, CEO gCaptain.com and USCG Licensed Master Mariner Unlimited.

McGrath Guest on MIDRATS Internet Radio Show

noreply@blogger.com (The Conservative Wahoo) — Mon, 23 Jan 2012 15:14:00 +0000

While most of you were watching the Pats/Ravens game last evening, Sal and Eagle1 were kind enough to have me on their Internet Radio Show "Midrats" for the full hour. We cover a lot of ground here, and I hope you find the dialogue useful.

Bryan McGrath

DOT&E FY2011 Annual Report

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Thu, 19 Jan 2012 15:30:00 +0000

The DOT&E FY2011 Annual Report (PDF) is out, and I noted that Wired is focused on the LCS report (PDF). The reason the Wired article on LCS reads like it's reaching for straws to find news in the LCS report is because the DOT&E FY2011 Annual Report on LCS lacks new information. The DOT&E report basically details exactly what ADM Pandolfe told everyone at Surface Navy Association conference - in January of last year (in 2011). Hard to get worked up about issues openly discussed over a year ago.

What I did find interesting about the report is that the report heavily focuses on the MIW module problems, but only one aspect of the module - the airborne pieces expected to be used on the MH-60R helicopter (AN/AQS-20A and ALMDS). Does that mean the rest of the MIW module is doing well? I don't know what the absence of concerns for the SUW and ASW modules means either. Does that mean the program components of those modules aren't mature enough to evaluate, or does it mean they don't have any concerns right now with those components? I don't know.

About the only thing I learned in the LCS DOT&E report is that DOT&E is still actively sounding the bell on the survivability issues of LCS, and the Navy is still not ready to discuss that issue about LCS with anyone. Everything else in the DOT&E report reads like first in class ship stuff. I still think Austal should have seen the corrosion issue coming, and I don't like that there has already been a crack in LCS1, but these are issues where Navy folks involved appear comfortable with the corrections made to address those issues.

While LCS is likely to get lots of attention early (the program is the Navy's attention whore these days), there really isn't much in the DOT&E report on LCS that was new, and certainly nothing worth getting worked up about.

If you want to see what a truly damning report in the DOT&E FY2011 Annual Review looks like, check out LPD-17 (PDF). The report uses several hundred words to detail how the class is "assessed as capable of conducting amphibious operations in a benign environment, but not operationally effective, suitable, or survivable in a hostile environment due to significant reliability deficiencies on major systems affecting communications, propulsion, and self defense."

LCS has nothing even remotely close to damning as that assessment.

Another Dutch Sub To Horn Of Africa

noreply@blogger.com (GvG) — Wed, 18 Jan 2012 19:38:00 +0000

In 2010 the Dutch deployed a submarine to the Horn Of Africa after a request from NATO. And while most newspapers focused on the lack of Dutch surface vessels around the Horn of Africa, after HNLMS Zuiderkruis left for retirement (the next surface vessel to go is HNLMS Van Amstel), there is a Dutch vessel in the area: HNLMS Dolfijn, join operation Ocean Shield.

In 2010 the Dutch sub was 4 months away from her homeport, this time the sub will stay for 8 months. After 4 months the Dutch will rotate crews.

This means the Dutch should have 3 vessels in the area in May: HNLMS Dolfijn, HNLMS Van Amstel and HNLMS Tromp.

And while the sub will gather important information, it is general a very boring operation for the crew. Lying a couple of miles from the Somali cost, watching through a periscope, for days on is more like a police stake out and not as exciting as trying to sneak past enemy warships.

Highlight for the crew the last time a Dutch sub was off the Somali coast was seeing a vessel leave for the sea, after which HMS Montrose sent a Lynx to stop the suspected pirates.

And the information gathered is important in two ways: for operation Ocean Shield and EU Navfor on one side, and for the Dutch on the other.
It is important for the Dutch, because they can trade their intelligence with others who have intelligence they want. In 2010 they did an intellegence exchange with the USA. The USA got intelligence on Somalia, we got intelligence on Afghanistan.

And only recently the Dutch and Germans formed a Joint Investigation Team to tackle the problem of piracy in the HoA.

The old saying is still true: there is no such thing as a free lunch.

Dutch VPD vs. Somali Pirates

noreply@blogger.com (GvG) — Wed, 18 Jan 2012 18:51:00 +0000

Yesterday around 6.00 CET pirates in a fishing vessel attacked the MV Flintstone 93NM north east of the island of Socotra.
The pirates in their dhow where seen coming and the crew of the Flintstone went into hid in a special compartment of the ship. Meanwhile the Dutch Vessel Protection Detachment, consisting of marines, prepared for the arrival of the skiff that came from the dhow, that was being used as a mother ship.

At first the VPD fired flares at the coming ship, in which they could see several weapons including a RPG. When this RPG was aimed at the Flintstone the marines answered with direct fire, forcing the skiff to return to the dhow.

What I don't understand is the choice of the pirates to attack the MV Flinstone. Their intelligence must be lacking.

After the report of the Wijkerslooth Commission, the Dutch decided to make 50 VPDs available to protect vulnerable, Dutch owned, vessels.
And they sometimes announce names of ships which will have a VPD on board. And yes, from 2 weeks ago: the Flintstone will have a VPD on board.

SOPA

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Wed, 18 Jan 2012 17:00:00 +0000

If you don't know, you need to start learning about it. This is one law that I strongly believe Congress will screw up in a big way, and I'm not going to sit quietly like I did with the Patriot Act. I'm almost convinced that only people who have indifference or contempt for American ideals like liberty and freedom would support this law.

Go to Wikipedia today, you will be given information how to contact your political leaders. Speak out, before you are silenced.

Update from PLAN land

noreply@blogger.com (Feng) — Wed, 18 Jan 2012 03:24:00 +0000

Every year, Chinese shipyards around the country stops working around Chinese New Year. Since Chinese New Year is less than a week away, we got some last minute photos from the Chinese shipyards.

First of all, we see the first two 056 class ships from HuDong shipyard. Now, there is also 056 under construction in HP shipyard, but these ones are more prominent and seem to be further along. There is still a debate on why PLAN even needs these ships, but that's a discussion for another day.

Secondly, we the work on 054As at HP shipyard continues to be extremely fast paced. The fifth ship (548) came back for work in HP shipyard.

The 7th one was launched a while ago.

The 8th one is amazingly far along considering the 6th 054A at HD shipyard just got launched a short while ago.

Finally, we got some new and interesting photos out of JN shipyard.
It looks like the 5th 052C just got launched very recently. The 3rd one has made a return to the shipyard after all the sea trials. I thought it was already commissioned. The next 3 photos show them from different angles. The 3rd one is definitely joining the navy soon. The 4th one has quite a bit to go before being ready to conduct sea trials. The 5th one looks to be slightly less finished than the 3rd and 4th one when they were launched. My feeling is that it was launched at this point because they needed the spaces in the dry dock halls for new ships.

We see below two new ships going into the dry docks and they appear to be the 6th and 7th 052C. I'm not sure if both of them will be 052C, because the rumour is that 7th ship would be in the 052D series.

So, there is a lot of activity going on in the Chinese shipyard. The work will probably stop a month, so we won't have much to see for a while.

Introducing Foreign Entanglements

noreply@blogger.com (Robert Farley) — Tue, 17 Jan 2012 20:40:00 +0000

The Powers That Be over at Bloggingheads have decided to hand Matt Duss and myself the keys to a new, weekly foreign policy show which we've decided to call Foreign Entanglements. Announcement and discussion here:

This is a very interesting opportunity, and Matt and I hope to make the most of it by continuing to include many of the contributors who have long been involved in Bloggingheads, as well as new contributors who speak on different subjects and to different interests. Feedback regarding potential contributors (or favorite past contributors) is very welcome. For my own part, I hope to have more conversations with folks like those who appear on this and other defense policy blogs. We'll see how it all works out.

America's New Asiatic Fleet

noreply@blogger.com (The Conservative Wahoo) — Tue, 17 Jan 2012 18:52:00 +0000

Professor James Holmes has a piece online today in which he calls himself a "reluctant convert" to the idea of stationing LCS's in Singapore and according to Holmes, perhaps in the Philippines. Here's a key thought from Holmes: "The LCS, then, may be the right ship for the Southeast Asian theater while drawing the venom from Chinese rhetoric. In some ways, an LCS squadron would constitute a throwback to the U.S. Asiatic Fleet, which anchored the US presence in Asia until crushed by Japan early in World War II. The Asiatic Fleet was a light force, not a battle fleet. Its chief purpose was diplomacy." I think Dr. Holmes' conversion is a good thing, and the strategic thinking behind it should be more closely examined.

Holmes points to remarks made by the new OPNAV Director of Surface Warfare (N86), RADM Thomas Rowden at the recent Surface Navy Symposium (Galrahn cited his speech here), which included the line “aggressively fielding the LCS fleet in order to meet our vital war-fighting gaps and forward-deploy additional American flags on LCS halyards.” What both Holmes and Rowden are pointing to is that in the great game of "assurance", numbers matter, and what are friends and allies in the South China Sea need from us right now is assurance. Assurance that our fiscal problems aren't going to cause us to look irredeemably inward, leaving them to make unsavory choices about whether to strike security bargains with the Chinese or to arm up themselves, and assurance that their sovereignty--including their rights in disputed areas--will not be subject to a Chinese fait accompli.

Rowden's got it right--flags on halyards make a difference. It should be our aim to present the extended Chinese maritime fleet with the reality of seeing American flags flying from naval ships wherever they find themselves throughout the South China Sea littoral. Forward deploying LCS is a great first step, one enabled by the innovative crewing scheme under consideration for their employment. But LCS is just a first step.

The Navy should begin to consider the design of a fleet of fast patrol boats, our own Houbei's if you will. These would be fast, lightly armored but well armed patrol boats, networked, equipped with integrated topside guns and an over the horizon surface to surface missile capability. These boats would be built in numbers, and offered IMMEDIATELY for export to partners throughout the region. Crewed rotationally like LCS, these boats could operate in composite squadrons alongside partner nations manning the same platforms--bringing interoperability to its most basic level. In essence--a new Asiatic Fleet.

Why would we do this? Flags on halyards. Our friends and allies would be more aware than ever of our light but persistent presence, as would those who might seek to disturb the peace. These are clearly not envisioned as "war winning" vessels. They are conceived of as "war avoiding" vessels. Their presence--and the promise they represent of more powerful force over the horizon adds a deterrent component to their assurance role.

But please note that I did not say we should "build" these vessels; just design them for now--perhaps begin to offer them for export. But not for us, at least not yet. Not in this environment. As long as the Navy force structure is likely to take a hit and shipbuilding is likely to decline, we cannot afford to build ships of this nature. But we should be ready to. We should be ready to when either the economy improves and additional resources flow to defense, or if the defense budget does eventually become "imbalanced" in other than superficial ways, devoting a higher share of resources to shipbuilding. The Asiatic Fleet was a good idea then, and it is a good idea now.

Bryan McGrath

Boondoggle

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Tue, 17 Jan 2012 15:30:00 +0000

This article from blog friend Eric Palmer on F-16.net last week has been picking up some traction, with a story picked up in The Telegraph yesterday, and even on the CNN blog. Apparently Lockheed Martin forgot to design the tailhook on the F-35C correctly, and the aircraft cannot land on aircraft carriers. From Eric Palmer's original article:

a November 2011 U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) quick-look report relating to engineering challenges arising from what is being called “concurrency issues” revealed that all eight run-in/rolling tests undertaken at NAS Lakehurst in August 2011 to see if the F-35C CV JSF could catch a wire with the tail hook have failed.

The report also mentions that the tail hook on the F-35C CV JSF is attached improperly to the aircraft. The distance from the hook to the main landing gear is so short that it is unlikely the aircraft will catch the landing wires on a ship's deck. This graphic from the review explains part of the problem. It illustrates the distance between the main landing gear and the tail hook of previous warplanes qualified to operate from aircraft carriers and compares these distances with that found on the F-35C CV JSF. In this regard, the report refers to the F-35C CV JSF as “an outlier”.

An industry expert who is a graduate Flight Test Engineer (FTE) of the U.S. Naval Test Pilot School (USNTPS), Peter Goon, stated that, "Given the limited amount of suitable structure at the back end of the JSF variants, due primarily to the commonality that was being sought between the three variant designs and the fact that the STOVL F-35B JSF is the baseline design, there was always going to be high risk associated with meeting the carrier suitability requirements."

The F-35C program no longer makes any sense at all to me. The extra cost of the F-35C over the F-18 Superbug all drive towards capabilities in the strike role; specifically stealth and range. Considering the strike role for naval aircraft is in decline over other alternatives (like submarine and surface launched cruise missiles), I can no longer support the Navy down the F-35C road. I still believe the F-35B is important, but I have no idea if the Marine Corps can afford it.

There are many reasons why the US Navy needs credible fixed-wing manned aircraft, but the strike role appears to be the primary reason for fixed-wing aircraft the naval aviation community is focused on, when in fact fleet defense, early warning, electronic warfare, and battlespace information dominance (among many others) is where fixed wing naval aviation is required. Is the JSF a good interceptor? Maybe, and maybe that is the reason to buy a few, but certainly F-35C is not an optimal intercept fighter and I have serious questions if the F-35C cost difference represents a meaningful value advantage in capability for intercept relative to the Superbug.

I have read a lot of procrastination following SNA regarding the challenges facing the Navy and some have even severely elevated the importance of certain shipbuilding programs like LCS to the level that it's success or failure will somehow make or break the the surface force. That sounds like some ignorant hot air and nonsense to me, because the future of the surface force depends on the high end capabilities, not LCS. The LCS program is no longer discussed publicly with any attempt towards objectivity in perspective - by the Navy, by LCS supporters, or by the LCS critics.

So here is some perspective for why I think the LCS criticism is a complete distraction from serious challenges facing the Navy today. The program of record that is killing the US Navy budget and - in my opinion, causing severe damage to the future of US naval aviation - is the Joint Strike Fighter program. For even bigger context, keep in mind the cost growth of just the first Ford class aircraft carrier is already greater than the cost growth of the entire Littoral Combat Ship program to date. Some have suggested LCS is too big to fail. What utter nonsense; in context of the Navy's budget, LCS really is too small to matter.

The JSF is the program apparently too big to fail, at least in the mind of some, and all evidence suggests failure is the rule rather than the exception. Lockheed Martin has made a mess of JSF, and there is no evidence things are getting better despite the actions taken to date regarding program management and leadership. I believe the Ford class still makes sense with or without JSF, and even if some roles of naval aviation are in decline relative to alternative methods for conducting those roles, but the naval aviation community does not appear to believe that. How the JSF has survived this long is a mystery to me, but in my opinion, it is past time for the naval aviation community to evolve past F-35C.

A Potential Plan B for Seabasing

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Tue, 17 Jan 2012 14:30:00 +0000

This is a very interesting read. Based on everything I am hearing from Bold Alligator, this might be a better option today than just 2 weeks ago.

Spring 2012

noreply@blogger.com (Robert Farley) — Sun, 15 Jan 2012 15:32:00 +0000

Spring semester 2012 at the Patterson School is upon us. My Defense Statecraft syllabus more or less done, my Airpower syllabus pretty much done, podcasts up and running, the blog could use an update, but you go into battle with the website you have, not the website you want et al. Twenty students in the former course, seven in latter. Ready to close with the enemy...

Small Steps

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Fri, 13 Jan 2012 15:00:00 +0000

An interesting comment about LCS from SNA reported by DoD Buzz.

Starting with LCS 5, the Milwaukee, the design for the class is “done, locked and stable,” said Lockheed’s VP for ships, Joe North. So the design changes that plagued the Freedom as it was being built should theoretically be a thing of the past. “From 5 on … these ships are cookie cutter,” North said. Lockheed hopes the shipyard in Marinette, Wisc., should be able to get into a rhythm and just start cranking them out, increasing the company’s margin with each saved dollar and each day less than the ship before.

If this turns out to be true, the blue and gold crews and officers of USS Freedom (LCS 1) deserve a lot of credit. It would also explain, for example, why all the COs from LCS 1 to date are getting promoted and assigned a major command. Indeed, one of the fastest ways to move up as a SWO right now appears to be via LCS. Less competition? Absolutely, but still worth noting as as LCS continues to be the Navy's least popular surface ship program.

If you read the DoD Buzz article, you'll also note how many moving parts there are to the entire LCS program. In many ways, LCS is an example how not to run a major shipbuilding program, because the prime contractor is - apparently - not really a prime contractor at all, or at least doesn't appear to carry any of the risk one would expect a prime contractor to assume in a major program. That tells me that even as the risk is reduced in one aspect of the LCS program, the LCS program itself still carries very high risk until all the parts of stable.

The New Tone, or an Admiral Off Pitch?

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Fri, 13 Jan 2012 14:30:00 +0000

DoDBuzz has a great deal of coverage from SNA this week. I'm hoping, like last year, they put the videos up for all of us to see. SNA is always interesting to me, because in the past we have been able to evaluate point in time for many issues related to surface warfare.

My impression so far is that the same can be said of SNA this year. While the first day focused primarily of professional issues specific to the SWO community, stuff I find interesting but also find myself hardly qualified to discuss, the rest of the week has also produced some interesting content.

I thought Phil Ewing did a great job with this article on Tuesday, because he made sure to highlight these very interesting and damn near unique (for an Admiral) comments.

Rear Adm. Thomas Rowden, the Navy’s brand-new boss of requirements for surface warfare, said one of its most important abilities was to show “American flags on halyards” atop Navy warships...

“That means aggressively fielding the LCS fleet in order to meet our vital war-fighting gaps and forward-deploy additional American flags on LCS halyards,” Rowden said. “We must we must bring LCS into the fleet. We must control cost and build them in numbers.”

Not only could LCSes compose as much as half of the future surface force, making the program critical based on numbers alone, the smaller ships’ value in alliances only raises the stakes, Rowden said.

“LCS will be ships with which our partners will be comfortable operating … We have a number of ships that are simply overwhelming to friends and potential friends,” – as in, the blue water Cold War-era fleet. “LCS allows us the flexibility to begin working with friends, partner nations and potential friends on their terms – in the end, their terms must be considered if we’re to work with them...”

“There’ll always be a requirement for ships suited to intense phases,” he said – as in, full-scale war. “But we must have ships that can be adapted as the future transitions into the present.”

Whoa, did a SWO with a star at SNA really just talk up the importance of small naval warships in the US Navy? My first guess is this guy spent a lot of time in 7th Fleet, and not 2nd or 3rd Fleet. A peek at his resume reveals that assumption is true.

While this may or may not be a good argument for LCS, it is clearly a valid and very strong strategic argument for the utility of smaller naval vessels. While the strategic value of large warships is often highlighted in the context of warfighting capability, what is often missed is the strategic value of smaller vessels in the context of developing partnerships that are both strong can capable should the warfighting moment ever come. The comments by Rear Adm. Thomas Rowden strike me as the first time in a very long time an Admiral with solid SWO credentials has made a Navy force structure argument in favor of smaller warships.

Admiral Greenert's Navy is clearly different than Admiral Roughead's Navy. Time will tell if this is a new tone for force structure discussions by Navy leaders in public, or simply an Admiral who went off pitch and will inadvertently now become the black sheep of the choir. In the Roughead Navy, this guy would be labeled a black sheep, and would be accused of not being a 'team' player.

A 2012 DoD Definition of Redundancy

noreply@blogger.com (Galrahn) — Thu, 12 Jan 2012 14:00:00 +0000

Happy New Year! I am not up on current events, so expect my posting over the next very many days to be of stuff that is not always fresh (as in current events), but fresh as in something I finally read. With a hat tip to Pete Speer for emailing me this article, lets start the 2012 conversation already!

So I'm reading this article by Bill Sweetman and Paul McLeary from Aviation Week dated Jan 6, 2012, and it starts off informative enough, but I have highlighted for the audience in bold where the discussion becomes something that is really enlightening, I think...

“We have run out of money, so now we must think,” remarked U.S. Air Force Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Philip Breedlove during a presentation on the emerging Air/Sea Battle concept in July. It’s becoming a common saying. The military is not in its current predicament by accident. Poor performance—programs years or decades behind schedule, costing too much to acquire and costing far too much to operate—has helped drive almost every military in the world to make pious sounds about “doing more with less” while doing exactly the opposite.

For the first time in a decade, the Pentagon is going to have to budget, rather than just spend. This not only means some programs will have to be removed from the procurement ledger, but new weapons programs will have to cap development—and perhaps more importantly, sustainment costs—significantly.

At the Credit Suisse/Aviation Week 2011 Aerospace and Defense Conference in New York in December, Shay Assad, the Pentagon’s director of defense pricing and acquisition policy, tried to assuage some fears defense contractors have vocalized about their potential profits now that the Pentagon is going on a diet. Assad said the Pentagon is making an effort to use the promise of profitability “to motivate contractors to reduce their cost structures.” To track this effort the Defense Contract Management Agency is adding more than 350 experts in cost estimating: If costs can be more accurately predicted up front, everyone will enter an agreement with the same realistic expectations.

Wow! Where the hell is the pride in ones work? WHAT THE *^%*! That folks, is an issue of military integrity, and it highlights that the Pentagon is unable to do this work effectively themselves. Why? I think civilian and uniform leadership needs to answer that question, and I for one would love to hear the answer.

So the Pentagon apparently can't do this part of their job, but no worries, they will now go hire 350 private sector experts. The DoD might as well have hung a huge banner outside their building that reads...

"We suck at our jobs, so we're hiring others to do it for us!"

And yes, this is a military integrity issue. Why can't you do your job effectively? What prevents you from doing your job accurately? Did you or did you not get trained to do you job... at taxpayers expense? 350 private sector experts, all of which will be 100K+ jobs if they are actually "experts", means we need to spend at least $35 million to hire private sector experts to do the jobs of public sector employees that apparently can't do the jobs they were hired and trained to do. It's 2012, and money is tight. The nation can no longer afford ineffective civilian and military leadership doing contracting for the Defense Department.

This is, unquestionably, a leadership issue and one that raises serious questions about the integrity of the military. Accountability? Prove it. Based on everything in testimony and media reporting lately, the entire concept of 'accounting' in any context fled the DoD long ago.

....

By the way.... hey Bill, Paul, why the picture of the DDG-1000 with the article? Looks like an editorial mistake to me, because you highlighted a picture of one of the few good programs while discussing the problems other programs are having. Not cool boys, you guys are much smarter than that, unless the cheap shot at the Navy was intentional.