InformNapalm.org (English)

The Use of FPV Drones in Modern Warfare: A New Level of Reconnaissance and Tactics

Falcon Born — Fri, 15 Mar 2024 14:06:52 +0000

FPV (First Person View) drones are becoming a decisive factor on the battlefield, showcasing how technological progress is changing the face of modern warfare. The unique ability to control the drone in real-time from a first-person perspective opens new horizons for reconnaissance missions and precision strikes.

Maneuverability and Stealth: Thanks to their compactness and high maneuverability, FPV drones can penetrate hard-to-reach and risky areas, gathering crucial reconnaissance information without significant risk to operators.

Tactical Advantages: The use of FPV drones allows military forces to execute precise strikes on enemy targets, minimizing civilian casualties and damage. They can be effectively used for ground operation coordination, giving military forces an advantage with up-to-date information on enemy locations.

Challenges and Threats: Despite numerous advantages, the use of FPV drones also faces challenges, particularly the need for constant technical improvement to counteract enemy electronic warfare capabilities.

Technical Advancement: The development of anti-drone technologies and defense systems against FPV drones is critically important for maintaining technological superiority on the battlefield.

FPV drones play a key role in the modernization of military operations, emphasizing the importance of innovation in conducting modern warfare. Their capability for deep reconnaissance and precise strikes makes them an indispensable tool on the battlefield.

John Vidisch specially for InformNapalm

Data leakage from the Kremlin administration – what lies ahead for Russia after the elections?

ninja — Fri, 15 Mar 2024 07:28:37 +0000

Ukrainian Hacktivists from the Cyber Resistance team, known for their numerous successful high-profile hacks, provided InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community with a cache of exclusive documents. These documents, personally signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin, detail plans for the socio-political transformation of the Russian Federation after the upcoming elections. The leaked documents unequivocally reveal Russia’s preparations for a global conflict, signaling that the state’s internal control measures will only escalate, tightening their grip even further.

INION

The Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences (INION) is a Russian research center whose activities are rather poorly covered in open sources. One could easily mistake it for just another post-Soviet research institute, where elderly employees idly bide their time until retirement. For a long time, the Institute being located in Moscow appeared to be its sole noteworthy feature. However, there was an incident that occurred one day in 2015 and changed this perception somehow.

INION seized the spotlight of Russia’s leading media in 2015, yet not for the achievements of its scientists, but rather due to a massive blaze that swept through its premises. The event was deemed so remarkable that it merited a dedicated article in the Russian-language Wikipedia.

This reaction is easily understandable, given the inherent intrigue surrounding every substantial fire near Moscow’s center, coupled with the almost detective-like nature of the event. INION is one of Russia’s and the world’s largest libraries with a rich history spanning over a century, which houses a collection of rather valuable printed publications. The headlines of the time suggested that the fire might have been a convenient cover-up for shortages or theft.

The library has been and continues to be the key resource for INION. Established in 1918, the Fundamental Library of Social Sciences predates the Institute by a considerable margin. INION was created half a century later, essentially as an administrative extension of the library. Following the 2015 fire, INION caught the eye of Russia’s highest-ranking officials, who emphasized the urgent need for the institution’s reconstruction. The reconstruction evolved beyond a mere political endeavor, transforming into a substantial business project. The Russian government allocated about 7 billion rubles for the purpose. Oversight of the reconstruction (that was completed in 2022) fell under the purview of the Integrated Construction Customer Public-Law Company, managed by Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin (notably, this company now manages contracts for the so-called ‘reconstruction’ of occupied Mariupol).

Simultaneously, there were changes in the institution’s leadership. Between the fire and 2019, the institution saw four different directors. Alexey Kuznetsov, a graduate of the prestigious Moscow State Institute of International Relations, became the fifth director. Prior to his new appointment, Kuznetsov served as deputy director of the influential Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), a leading think tank instrumental in shaping Russian international policy. Kuznetsov has managed to maintain his directorship at INION to date.

The Cyber Resistance team hacked the e-mail account of Kuznetsov’s aide Roman Seytkaliev.

While formally holding the position of a research assistant, Seytkaliev’s email exchanges suggest a role more akin to Kuznetsov’s personal secretary. Seytkaliev’s inbox handles numerous documents related to both administrative and scientific activities of the Institute’s director and staff. Kuznetsov entrusts him even with personal documents.

LETTER TO PUTIN

One could assume that the email account of the INION director’s aide would not contain anything of much interest. However, the correspondence of Roman Seitkaliev, the director’s trusted associate, contained an interesting letter addressed to Yuri Pushchaev, a Doctor of Philosophy and senior researcher at INION. The latter even authored an article about himself on Wikipedia, identifying himself as “a specialist in Soviet-era philosophy and the philosophy of Russian conservatism”. He is science editor of Orthodox scientific journal Orthodoxy and was an editor at Questions of Philosophy magazine and a columnist for Foma magazine and online portal Pravoslavie.ru.

In his email, Seitkaliev congratulates Pushchaev saying that Puschaev “has achieved something truly remarkable” and that the results of his work have been “endorsed at the highest echelons of authority.”

There are three documents attached to the mail:

Pushchaev’s article The War in Ukraine and De-Westernization as a Historical Task: Opportunities and Limits from the 2023 almanac Notebooks of Conservatism;
A letter from INION Director Kuznetsov to Vyacheslav Volodin, the Chairman of the Russian State Duma, proposing to review the analysis of the socio-political situation in the Russian Federation prepared by INION specialists.
Volodin’s letter to President Putin proposing to implement the concept of “de-Westernization” in the Russian Federation after the elections.

Here is the letter from the Chairman of the State Duma:

Volodin’s letter clearly shows that there is no doubt within Russia’s ruling circles regarding Putin’s re-election, with plans for the post-election period being devised by the Russian authorities as early as November-December of the previous year. The letter, dated November 30, 2023, suggests that Putin reviewed it on December 12, 2023, as evidenced by his endorsement “I agree”.

He signed quite a few laws on that day, among them amendments to the Criminal Code, extending the time served before release on parole, and bolstering Internet control measures.

Putting aside the overarching schizophrenic lament about “the neo-colonialism of the West and the denazification of the Kiev regime,” the letter highlights the urgency for Russia to undergo reforms and enact strategies to enhance its resilience against the impeding challenges. Namely, there is a proposal of something called “de-Westernization”, entailing:

– further nationalizing the economy to transfer all raw material industries into state ownership;

– sovereignization [sic] of science, culture, and art, further asserting the role of the state over them;

– bolstering censorship, especially concerning television and the Internet;

– resolving the issue of opposition movements;

– expanding the role of religion in the society.

Volodin says that these measures aim to “reshape the society and facilitate rapid mobilization following the elections“, with the Duma committees prepared to support the initiative and promptly begin drafting the necessary legislation.

According to the document, the concept had already received approval from Sergey Kiriyenko, First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration of Russia. It is Kiriyenko who oversees the entire domestic political sphere, including elections at all levels, engagement with political parties, public organizations, and youth policies. Kiriyenko oversees the departments of domestic policy and public projects, Internet publications and social media. So, the proposed measures fall within his sphere of interest, except, perhaps, for the nationalization of the economy. However, achieving this would require political will and parliamentary endorsement, emphasizing the need for support from policymakers on domestic issues.

So, we can assume that the document was agreed upon with Kiriyenko. Also, at the bottom of the document there is a signature dated December 06, 2023, similar to Kiriyenko’s signature made in the visitors’ book at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station during his visit to the occupied Energodar in October last year.

INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION

Volodin’s letter does not detail the motives guiding the Russian side, a gap that the document prepared by INION addresses in greater detail. At first glance, this is a rather strange concept statement. More precisely, it is not a concept statement but rather a pseudo-scientific summary of Russian propaganda narratives, amalgamating the ideas of Dugin and Surkov with quotes from Ivan Ilyin. Something akin to Putin’s interview with Tucker Carlson.

Rather than being a concept or a strategy, it is more of a propaganda piece outlining Russia’s domestic problems and grievances with the West. The first chapter, titled General Background, asserts that the challenges confronting Russia are “similar to those of the Great Patriotic War.” It elaborates on how the West’s backing of Ukraine is impeding the rapid conclusion of the “special military operation,” suggesting that the West regards Ukraine as a major investment, with significant financial resources already committed. Consequently, the West is portrayed as unlikely to withdraw its support. The researchers additionally point out internal challenges within Russia, such as war-traumatized individuals returning from the frontlines, an uptick in the retirement age, stagnant wages and pensions, and escalated expenditures on the “special military operation.” The researchers highlight that these factors contribute to a rise in social tensions within Russia and reach a conclusion closely resembling the rhetoric of Putin’s former aide, Vladislav Surkov, before the full-scale invasion (archive):

“[Social tension – author’s note] is the so-called social entropy, which is essentially chaos.

Thus, to address the issue of social entropy within such a system of social relations, the most obvious solution would be to continue the policy of exporting chaos abroad – essentially alleviating domestic tensions through international expansion.

In the historical context, Russia’s relinquishment of territories following the disgraceful Brest Peace, as well as after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, provides ample justification for spilling social tensions abroad for the purpose of internal consolidation.

Hence, following the completion of the special military operation in Ukraine and the downfall of the Kiev regime, the confrontation between Russia and the West will not cease but rather escalate. In fact, we are witnessing the initial phase of the transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world, characterized by the emergence of various centers of influence and the demise of the West. Russia’s pursuit of its interests, however, will not proceed without impediment, given the centuries of the West’s colonial legacy.”

In essence, it is a tacit acknowledgment of the inevitability of a new world war and the expansion of Russian aggression into the Baltic States and Poland. It is noteworthy that a recent article in German newspaper Bild depicts a scenario of potential Russian aggression towards the Baltic States.

The second chapter of the “concept” draws on narratives similar to those presented in Pushchaev’s article The War in Ukraine and De-Westernization as a Historical Task: Opportunities and Limits.” The chapter outlines the concept of “Westernization” and explains the need for Russia to undergo “de-Westernization.”

Here is the text of the “concept”:

And here is Pushchaev’s article. Just compare the texts:

The full documents can be found at the links provided below:

concept [ PDF ]
article [ PDF ]
letter to Putin [ PDF ]

The only difference between Pushchaev’s article, the concept and the letter to Putin is the inclusion of one additional point in both the concept and in the letter to Putin, particularly the “resolving the issue of opposition movements.” Notably absent in Pushchaev’s article, this element is explicitly outlined in the concept. The motivation of these “researchers” – whether they acted upon directives from the authorities or just wanted to suck up to them – remains unclear. However, Navalny’s sudden death before the elections implies that Russia may have already begun to implement the relevant methods and strategies.

NEW KREMLIN ANALYSTS

It is evident from the email that Kuznetsov had initiated substantial reforms at the Institute to ensure that it wouldn’t be associated exclusively with the library. The essence of these changes closely mirrors the policy statements he made upon assuming office.

Almost immediately after assuming office, he founded the Center for Interdisciplinary Research to engage partners for diverse projects. In particular, from the political elite. As an experienced functionary, Kuznetsov has sensed the significant shifts in the political climate, prompting him to redirect his attention from Western Europe (in the early 2000s, he even completed an internship at the University of Marburg in Germany, furthering his interest in the EU economies and politics) to the “Global South”, potentially much more “lucrative” in Russia’s current circumstances. For example, now the Institute’s employees engage in activities akin to those detailed in the aforementioned document.

The documents further indicate that INION collaborates with the Eurasian Economic Commission and actively pursues engagement in initiatives related to the “global repositioning of Russia” and the “establishment of a new world order,” in line with Kremlin strategies.

In general, Kuznetsov’s vision for the revitalized INION involves turning the institution from a mere repository of knowledge into a comprehensive think tank capable of securing funding for projects (while funds will be directed through Kuznetsov’s relatively autonomous Center for Interdisciplinary Research, a pleasant perk). Therefore, Kuznetsov is trying to engage the employees of his institution across various areas of activity. This major research facility paired with the central humanities library is sure to find the relevant specialists who possess the necessary knowledge and expertise among its staff. INION is currently conducting research on entrepreneurship, copyright issues, and the development of domestic politics in the Russian Federation.

CONCLUSION

On March 7, Russian news agency RIA Novosti published an article by Alexander Dugin titled Russia Needs Total Militarization (archive). The narratives outlined by this pseudo-philosopher closely align with the content of the document signed by Putin.

Dugin writes: “To achieve victory in such a fundamental confrontation, the imperative is to transform Russia into a state of war.” In addition to transitioning the economy to a war footing, he emphasizes the need to develop a new military ideology in Russia. To achieve this, political directorates (such as the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army) must be reinstated, political and civil rights curtailed, and culture militarized. And, of course, the Orthodox jihad calls for a rise in the birth rate: “The catastrophic decline in birth rates must be reversed through extraordinary measures.”

None of these measures can be implemented without upholding traditional Russian values, such as absolute control by the secret services and a culture of snitching. Dugin wants to revive SMERSH.

According to historian Timothy Snyder, the Russian Federation is a fascist state that embraces politics of “eternity” – an unyielding attachment to a mythical “great” past rooted in an ugly amalgamation of reverence for the imperial era, the crimes of communism, and Orthodox fundamentalism. In this state, the main “thinkers” shaping the Russian ideology of the twenty-first century are Dugin and Prokhanov who are, in essence, fascists calling themselves anti-fascists. They brand everyone around them as fascists (a traditional tactic, where the perpetrator vociferously shifts blame onto others, diverting attention from their own misdeeds).

This strategy, termed “schizofascism” by Snyder, refers to fascists who, despite openly advocating fascist policies, call themselves anti-fascists.

In addition to the familiar figures like Dugin and Prokhanov, other schizofascist “researchers” from INION are gaining influence, despite not yet achieving the same level of recognition.

Russia is gearing up for an even bigger war. Schizofascism has escalated to the point when strategies to “tighten the screws” and gear Russia up for a new world war are no longer concealed. The concept and the letter described in this article are not classified documents, and Putin’s endorsement – “I agree” – serves as further evidence of his absolute authority.

Full e-mail dump of the INION staff member is available for download at this link (20 GB): https://cloud.informnapalm.org/INION.zip

LETTER TO PUTIN

One could assume that the email account of the INION director’s aide would not contain anything of much interest. However, the correspondence of Roman Seitkaliev, the director’s trusted associate, contained an interesting letter addressed to Yuri Pushchaev, a Doctor of Philosophy and senior researcher at INION. The latter even authored an article about himself on Wikipedia, identifying himself as “a specialist in Soviet-era philosophy and the philosophy of Russian conservatism”. He is science editor of Orthodox scientific journal Orthodoxy and was an editor at Questions of Philosophy magazine and a columnist for Foma magazine and online portal Pravoslavie.ru.

There are three documents attached to the mail:

Pushchaev’s article The War in Ukraine and De-Westernization as a Historical Task: Opportunities and Limits from the 2023 almanac Notebooks of Conservatism;
A letter from INION Director Kuznetsov to Vyacheslav Volodin, the Chairman of the Russian State Duma, proposing to review the analysis of the socio-political situation in the Russian Federation prepared by INION specialists.
Volodin’s letter to President Putin proposing to implement the concept of “de-Westernization” in the Russian Federation after the elections.

Here is the letter from the Chairman of the State Duma:

He signed quite a few laws on that day, among them amendments to the Criminal Code, extending the time served before release on parole, and bolstering Internet control measures.

– further nationalizing the economy to transfer all raw material industries into state ownership;

– sovereignization [sic] of science, culture, and art, further asserting the role of the state over them;

– bolstering censorship, especially concerning television and the Internet;

– resolving the issue of opposition movements;

– expanding the role of religion in the society.

INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION

“[Social tension – author’s note] is the so-called social entropy, which is essentially chaos.

Here is the text of the “concept”:

And here is Pushchaev’s article. Just compare the texts:

The full documents can be found at the links provided below:

concept [ PDF ]
article [ PDF ]
letter to Putin [ PDF ]

NEW KREMLIN ANALYSTS

Майже одразу в “ИНИОН” відкрили анонсований Центр міждисциплінарних досліджень (ЦМД), який залучає партнерів до різних проектів. Зокрема, і з боку політичної верхівки. Кузнєцов, як хороший апаратник, схоже відчув серйозні зміни політичної погоди і змінив сферу своїх «наукових інтересів» із країн Західної Європи (на початку 2000-х він навіть проходив стажування у Марбурзькому університеті Німеччини, а далі цікавився економікою та політикою в ЄС) на потенційно більш прибутковий у нинішніх російських реаліях «Глобальний південь». Наприклад, зараз працівники інституту проводять заходи на зразок описаного у наведеному документі.

CONCLUSION

None of these measures can be implemented without upholding traditional Russian values, such as absolute control by the secret services and a culture of snitching. Dugin wants to revive SMERSH.

This strategy, termed “schizofascism” by Snyder, refers to fascists who, despite openly advocating fascist policies, call themselves anti-fascists.

In addition to the familiar figures like Dugin and Prokhanov, other schizofascist “researchers” from INION are gaining influence, despite not yet achieving the same level of recognition.

Full e-mail dump of the INION staff member is available for download at this link (20 GB): https://cloud.informnapalm.org/INION.zip

Website networks in Europe used as tools for Russian information warfare — OSINT-investigation InformNapalm & Insight News

Falcon Born — Fri, 08 Mar 2024 11:22:17 +0000

The interactive infographic shows websites that have a lot in common: the topics of articles that are critical of the West and Ukraine but loyal to Russia, mutual citations, and referral traffic between them. International intelligence community InformNapalm, in collaboration with journalists from Insight News, conducted a study to identify Russian propaganda and disinformation, as well as the network that disseminates it.

The Putin regime conducts large-scale propaganda not only through its state media but also through “useful idiots,” who focus on demonizing the US, EU, and NATO and have right- or left-wing views. New “multilingual international media” have emerged that write in a way that suits the Kremlin and spread pro-Russian narratives and disinformation, replacing Russia Today and Sputnik, which have received a ban in Europe.

To analyze the data, we received professional consulting from companies that specialize in web analytics and search engine marketing. Researchers using specialized programs (SimilarWeb, Seranking) helped identify websites with pro-Russian narratives linked by similarity of content, mutual citations, and referral traffic. They range from criticizing the West and Ukraine to spreading outright Russian fake news and conspiracy theories.

The screenshots demonstrate how SimilarWeb identifies websites with similar content.

Such sites are most active in Germany and France. The most aggressive and radical of them praise Russia and Putin, justifying Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, calling for an end to support for Ukraine, and spreading Kremlin fakes. They also criticize the West and encourage protest moods in Europe, spreading conspiracy theories and supporting anti-Western and Eurosceptic views.

Almost all of these pro-Russian outlets have a standard set of narratives: positive coverage of Russia, justification of its full-scale invasion and war against Ukraine by Kremlin propaganda and fake news, “Nazis in Ukraine,” “bombing of Donbas,” and “self-defense” against “NATO’s eastward expansion.” Most of them claim that Russia will inevitably win and defeat Ukraine.

In order to increase Moscow’s chances of success in the war of aggression, Putin’s supporters criticize the provision of weapons to Ukraine, without which the Russian invaders would have captured even more Ukrainian cities and villages. Such websites, on the other hand, regularly criticize the West, the US, the EU, and their own governments, while also positively covering and even encouraging protest moods in Europe.

Such authors blame the West and NATO for all the troubles, often promoting conspiracy theories and disseminating the opinions of “pseudo-experts” about the decline and imminent fall of the United States, the European Union, and the Western world. Such authors must praise former US President Donald Trump, who is striving to reclaim power and making controversial statements that align with the Kremlin’s interests.

As a result, there is a whole network of pro-Russian and anti-Western media outlets in Europe that act as Russian agents of influence and try to influence Europeans’ opinions. Such media often describe themselves as free and independent, and the information they provide is “alternative.”

They criticize the mainstream media in an attempt to justify their right to “other information,” which is often disinformation. This supposed alternative consistently involves vilifying the EU, US, and NATO while promoting the Putin regime as an alternative, which is, in fact, responsible for initiating Europe’s biggest war since World War II and engaging in blatant information warfare against Europe.

For the Putin regime, it makes little difference whether a website or politician is far-right or far-left; the main thing for Russia is to push its narratives and disinformation to Europe. The Kremlin considers the media and politicians from both camps to be “useful idiots.” They help spread disinformation and division in European society, as well as spreading Russian influence for free (some may not).

Among the journalists and authors of these publications, we found people not only with pro-Russian views but also with direct ties to Russia, some of whom have moved there. This deep infiltration into the structure and politics of editorial offices points to the potentially malicious role of some media outlets in promoting the Kremlin’s agenda and undermining trust in European governments and all democratic institutions.

On this screenshot, Seranking was used to detect massive links and quotes between pro-Russian websites

The methodology for identifying such sites included web analytics and keyword analysis to identify similar content and mutual citations, helping to identify networks with anti-Western and pro-Russian publications. In addition, detailed content analysis, including news, analysis, and commentary, helped to identify regular pro-Russian publications as well.

Identification of referral traffic through SimilarWeb confirmed that these sites share a common audience with anti-Western and Eurosceptic sentiments. Users follow links from one site to another.

And when all three factors come together—websites have similar content, rank for the same search terms (which hint at a pro-Russian narrative), and link and quote each other—there is no doubt that they share common goals.

SimilarWeb detects referral traffic between sites from the identified network.

Flourish Studio tools visualized the investigation results, providing an insightful representation of the collected data. Each website’s size depends on its monthly traffic, and lines depict the connections (links, citations, and referral traffic) between sites, with arrows indicating the cited site.

The thicker the line, the more citations and links there are. This visualization demonstrates that pro-Russian and anti-Western news websites form a network, as well as how the Russian propaganda machine uses European media, including “useful idiots,” to spread its narratives, disinformation, and instigate divisions inside a united Europe.

Why is it important to know about the connections between pro-Russian and anti-Western websites?

To understand how online media can operate in an organized and purposeful manner in the information field to support Russia’s efforts in its full-scale war against Ukraine and its campaign of disinformation targeting Europe, aiming to sway public opinion, weaken governmental authority, and spread despair and chaos. Moscow’s goal would be to bring radical forces, with whom it has warm relations, to power. This issue has become especially relevant a few months before the European Parliament elections.

Such sites exert a much greater influence than the network of pro-Russian sites featuring the Russian word “pravda” in their domain names or the network of fake pages and Kremlin bots on social media that were recently uncovered. After all, these networks either had a short period of existence, reached only a small audience, or were not credible in themselves. Many people already view Russian state media as compromised and untrustworthy propaganda outlets. Instead, websites that have been publishing for many years, with a specific audience and a format that resembles other Western media, are able to convince more readers of their narratives.

Experts and EU states should monitor the activities of such sites, and readers should question such content because efforts that favor Russia in the information field in times of geopolitical confrontation play into the hands of the Putin regime and are harmful to Europe. After all, Russia has demonstrated that it is waging not only a war on the battlefield to destroy Ukraine, but also an information war to break up the United Europe.

Hacktivists uncovered new classified documents from STC, Russian manufacturer of Orlan-10 drones

ninja — Wed, 28 Feb 2024 14:34:23 +0000

At the end of January, Ukrainian hacktivists of the Cyber Resistance team handed over to InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community a new portion of information retrieved from the hacked email correspondence containing documentation from the Russian company Special Technology Center LLC (STC). This information reveals new details of the foreign components procurement process for the production of Russian weapons and military equipment bypassing Western sanctions.

Let us recall that on January 12, 2024 we published the first part of the CYBINT investigation into STC which was translated into 8 languages. The investigation noted how Russian sanctioned companies circumvent Western sanctions and obtain foreign equipment, spare parts and components. Three days after the publication of this data in the media and amid the ensuing outcry, the German company Rohde & Schwarz whose products are frequently mentioned in the STC documentation, and are indispensable for the production of electronic warfare equipment, made a public statement on its Facebook and X pages, claiming that that they fully adhere to Western sanctions. The company publicly promised to review its own business processes to identify critical problems associated with the sale by intermediaries of their products that end up in production facilities in Russia.

The next day, on January 16, Bloomberg reported, citing its own sources, that Chinese state banks decided to tighten the conditions for providing services to Russian clients after the United States threatened to hit violators of anti-Russian sanctions with secondary restrictions.

Thus, at least two large Chinese banks in recent weeks have begun auditing their business with the Russian Federation, primarily cross-border transactions and funding of the Russian clients. Based on the results of the audit, banks must stop servicing the companies on the sanctions lists and no longer provide financial services to the Russian military-industrial complex, regardless of the currency and jurisdiction of the transactions in question. The audits also affect non-Russian companies doing business in Russia or supplying goods to Russia through third countries.

Considering that STC receives most of its goods through China, we decided to publish the second part of our CYBINT investigation, taking a closer look at the list of intermediaries and documents connected to other types of Russian electronic warfare systems. We will also disclose the data of a leading specialist at STC, who helped the hacktivists obtain internal documents of this company.

The Florinsky effect

An important, although not the only, role in obtaining the information by the hactivists was played by Andrey Pavlovich Florinsky, who was responsible for procurement for the research and development department of the STC. Florinsky’s email dump can be downloaded here: flor82@inbox.ru).

Florinsky used his email account as a notepad, periodically writing messages to himself. One of the examples contains fields with additional employee data.

Later, Florinsky even complained to a friend that he had been hacked.

In one of the screenshots of his messaging on VK we see a vestige of his high working morale and motivation: “Rotting at work from 8:30 to 19:30“. So much for Florinsky’s job attitude. However, over the past 10 months he has become a valuable source of information for Ukrainian hacktivists. The data received from him about the STC operations were transferred to Ukrainian intelligence services and foreign partners in order to strengthen the sanctions regime. Therefore, his “rotting at work” yielded some truly useful “fertilizer” for us. And it brought fruit.

Components supplied through China

Florinsky’s information shows that Russians are increasingly purchasing equipment through China, paying in the Chinese currency. Apparently, all parties working to circumvent sanctions are perfectly aware of what they are doing and invest themselves in the outcome. Contractors understand that they are purchasing foreign products in violation of sanctions, as do those who are selling to them.

Here is a scanned copy of the commercial offer dated February 2023. The amount is indicated in RMB and Euro.

The same message contains another interesting attachment – a table indicating specific projects this equipment is needed for. Please note that no one is hiding the Swiss components.

As to the settlements in RMB, here is a commercial offer from March 2023.

And here is a more recent commercial offer dated December 20, 2023 for the Rohde & Schwarz spectrum analyzer, already familiar to our readers from the previous publication.

It is worth noting that most Russian intermediaries do not even hide the fact that they purchase products from China. Here is an offer from another company Delasia LLC, offering “turnkey procurement operations” of the necessary products to STC.

Since STC is involved in the implementation of the state defense order, it is serviced by the Russian PJSC Promsvyazbank, which is closely connected with the defense industrial sector of the Russian Federation. The financial rules of the defense order mandate the contractor to open accounts in the same bank. STC sends out two reminders to all contractors about the contracting specifics and international currency payments.

The first contains the account details and mandatory contractual wordings for the state defense order.

And the second is an explanation of how to deal with foreign contractors.

AXIS

Documents from Florinsky’s mail show STC’s constant demand for video cameras from the Swedish company Axis.

These data were for August 2023. If we compare against the STC orders a year earlier, in September 2022, we can say that the quantities have decreased slightly, but the flow was not completely blocked.

Here is Marina Andreyeva from Soft-Tronic LLC (the company’s website says that they are an official distributor of AXIS equipment) promises to deliver 75 cameras in 20 weeks.

At the same time, the information provided by Florinsky suggests that cameras are used not only in UAVs. AXIS cameras were also critical for the Russian RB-333A Svirel system.

Actually, STC works with a large number of front companies acting as procurement intermediaries. Here is a list of such front companies detected in Florinsky’s email dump:

RADIOLINE LLC [Rus.: ООО “РАДИОЛАЙН”] (OGRN 1117746143228, TIN 7718837905);
PROTECH LLC [Rus.: ООО “ПРОТЕХ”] (OGRN 1077761186381, TIN 7701748975);
OBORON HOLDING LLC [Rus.: ООО “ОБОРОН ХОЛДИНГ”] (OGRN 1157746688879, TIN 9701002563);
IP Resheniya LLC [Rus.: ООО “Ай Пи Решения”] (OGRN 1107847302441, TIN 7810800625);
TehSpetsKomplekt LLC [Rus.: ООО “ТехСпецКомплект”] (OGRN 1077847031118, TIN 7810090372);
HV Devices LLC [Rus.: ООО “Эйч Ви Девайсес”] (OGRN 1177746955220, TIN 7731383288);
ST NETWORKING LLC [Rus.: ООО “СТ НЕТВОРКИНГ”] (TIN: 7719727292, OGRN: 1097746408100);
JSC NPF Dipol [Rus.: АО “НПФ “Диполь”] (OGRN 1027802497656, TIN 7804137537);
ELPROM LLC [Rus. ООО “ЭЛПРОМ”] (OGRN 1127847332007, TIN 7805592546);
DELASIA LLC [Rus.: ООО “ДЕЛАЗИЯ”] (TIN 7810778923, OGRN 1197847214685);
and dozens of other companies.

Unfortunately, on this very incomplete list, only ELPROM LLC is under sanctions. Others are not yet. But it is important to note that front companies are quickly formed and take advantage of the loopholes in the sanctions mechanisms. Therefore, until sanctions become more stringent, this flow will not stop. Of course, restrictions on Chinese banks on conducting transactions for sanctioned Russian companies could change the situation.

By the way, as it turned out, this Russian manufacturer prefers British-made fabrics for its Orlans. For those interested, we suggest that you familiarize yourself with this document.

FABRIC UAV rolls [XLS]

Florinsky’s mail dump contains a large number of similar interesting documents, dating not only from the period of the full-scale invasion, but also before it. Cyber Resistance hacktivists have made it available for free viewing and downloading via this link.

We can make public only a fraction of the data available to us. But even this array contains enough evidence for several more OSINT investigations into the STC operations since 2014. The publication of this information is critically important for maintaining and strengthening sanctions pressure on the Russian Federation and its collaborators.

Hacking assistant to vice-speaker of the Russian State Duma: agents of influence in Serbia and media campaigns in the EU

ninja — Mon, 22 Jan 2024 07:23:20 +0000

InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community has a new CYBINT investigation based on data from the correspondence between Russian politicians and their assistants, exposing sensitive facts about international economic relations between Russia and Serbia, as well as other aspects of international politics, corruption and energy (in)security. The materials were obtained by InformNapalm from the Ukrainian hacktivists of the Cyber Resistance group, the findings were verified and supplemented with video evidence presented in this publication.

Who is who? Foreword.

Evgeny Zobnin is not a public person. There is not much information about him on the web. Cyber Resistance activists first noticed his name while researching the mail dumps for #BabakovLeaks from the hacked email of Alexander Babakov, vice-speaker of the Russian State Duma. Then it became clear that Zobnin, officially a mere volunteer assistant to a member of parliament, performs highly sensitive tasks for Babakov requiring a great degree of trust. For example, helping his boss to evade taxes or accompanying him on visits abroad. Cyber Resistance suspected that Zobnin may be the vice-speaker’s fixer, and therefore a keeper of important information about the affairs of Putin’s special representative for interaction with the Russian organizations abroad (one of Babakov’s long-standing positions). This prompted the team to take the next step and gain access to Zobnin’s mailbox (an e-mail dump zhzobnin@mail.ru).

In this dispatch, we will look into the scale of Russian penetration into the energy industry and politics of Serbia; watch the double games played by the adviser to the President of Serbia Dragutin Matanovic, refresh the story about Russian $300 million used to influence politics in a number of states, and demonstrate how this worked using one scenario as an example. We will wrap up by showing to which use a former Hollywood star could be put in the Russian political circus.

The Belgrade Insider

Russian gas supplies to Europe after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine slumped, but did not dry up altogether. In addition to the flow of the Russian liquefied gas, two pipeline gas supply routes to Europe through Ukraine and Turkey are still operating. Both lines stretch to the center and south of Europe. Namely, to Hungary, Austria and Serbia, Gazprom’s most loyal clients still remaining on the continent.

Russia’s ability to use gas as a weapon is shrinking, but the case of Serbia demonstrates how dangerous and pervasive Russian penetration into the energy sector can still be. Part of the correspondence in Zobnin’s mailbox gives us the inside view the scope and details of the Russian influence operations in the European energy sector. It’s time to meet another character.

Dragutin Matanovic. Photo by: Profimedia

This is Dragutin Matanovic. In Serbian media, he is most often referred to as an adviser to Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić. However, Matanovic is not on the official list of advisers on the Serbian president’s website. This does not prevent him from using the badge of Vučić’s adviser and making comments about certain current events to the media, including Russian outlets. Since 2019, Matanovic has been officially sitting on the Board of Directors of NIS (Naftna Industrija Srbije), chairing the appointments commission.

NIS, once state-owned oil company of Serbia, today is engaged in crude oil production, energy generation and fuel retail through its own chain of gas stations. NIS has recently expanded in the markets of neighboring countries – Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Slovenia. Since 2012, its majority shareholder is the Russian Gazprom, with a stake of more than 50%. The Serbian government continues to own about 30% of the shares.

As for Matanovic, his political trademark is emotional diatribes, often bordering on rudeness, about the Serbian opposition or any opponents of the current government in Belgrade.

Matanovic is also a fierce opinion journalist, writing emotionally and expansively. His letters, with comments on certain aspects of NIS activities or Serbian-Russian relations in general, occupy a significant part of Zobnin’s mail dump, at least from mid-2014 to mid-2023 (this is the period that Cyber Resistance hacktivists managed to gain access to).

Some of these letters are simply copied press reports with statements from the Serbian authorities about certain events affecting the interests of the Russian Federation. For example, the screencast below contains a message with the reactions of the Serbian press to the speech of the Russian UN envoy Vasily Nebenzya regarding the crisis in Kosovo at the end of 2022.

https://informnapalm.org/ua/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2024/01/nebenzja.mp4

And here is a translation of President Vučić’s comments regarding Yevgeny Prigozhin’s march on Moscow in the summer of 2023.

https://informnapalm.org/ua/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2024/01/prigozhin.mp4

In principle, the very fact that an adviser to the president of an independent European nation (albeit unofficial) monitors media for the assistant to the vice-speaker of the Russian parliament is very telling. However, this is trivial in comparison to other findings made upon a more careful look into the correspondence between Matanovic and Zobnin.

In mid-2022, the key topic of Russian-Serbian relations was the new gas supply contract, which was supposed to substitute for previous contract concluded 10 years before. Serbian Prime Minister Ana Brnabic is preparing a letter to Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller on the appointment of a negotiating group, which should be headed by Ivica Kojić, Chief of Staff to the President of Serbia. But before this letter is sent through official channels, its draft pops up in Zobnin’s mailbox on April 14, literally on the day the Serbian government is scheduled to meet to make the official decision on the negotiating group.

https://informnapalm.org/ua/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2024/01/lyst.mp4

Once again: the adviser to the president of a European nation e-mails a draft letter signed by the prime minister of that state to a Russian parliamentarian assistant, accompanied with an instruction to show it to a certain “AM” so that he could “supplement or amend” the text.

The mysterious “AM”, who is supposed to edit for Brnabic, is Babakov, whose first name and patronymic are “Alexander Mikhailovich.” Matanovic often uses such abbreviations in his correspondence.

A little more than a month passes since then, and the Kremlin media report about a telephone conversation between Vučić and Putin on May 29, 2022. Based on the results of the conversation, Russia would continue to supply gas to Serbia. However, the Kremlin is informed in advance of the call of what the head of Serbia would insist on during the conversation with Putin, because Matanovic had leaked the negotiating position of his own president in a letter “for AM” back on May 24.

https://informnapalm.org/ua/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2024/01/peremovyny.mp4

In short, in the above letter, Matanovic says that “AV” (Vučić) in negotiations with “VVP” (Putin) will insist on applying the “Moldovan formula” for gas pricing for his country (i.e. 70% based on the price of oil and 30% on the market price of gas), and on fixed volumes.

Matanovic’s e-mails are not always directly related to politics. They often discuss business projects of interest to Russia. But even in those, Matanovic acts, as a Russian insider in the administration of the Serbian president. For example, the screencast below from 2020 describes “A’s” (Vučić’s) dissatisfaction with the implementation of the high-speed railway project in Serbia. It’s a usual story: Russians take on a project promising something, and then it turns out that they do not have the necessary technology. The Chinese can help, but it is not clear whether their technology meets European standards. Other persons mentioned in the text include one Mr Pavlov (most likely Sergey Pavlov, deputy director of Russian Railways) and “the idiot Zorana.” Obviously, the latter is how Matanovic refers to the current Deputy Prime Minister and concurrently Minister of Energy and Mining Industry of Serbia Zorana Mihajlović. At the time of writing, she also held the position of the Minister of Transport and Infrastructure.

https://informnapalm.org/ua/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2024/01/rzd.mp4

Short and vindictive

The real pearl in Matanovic’s epistolary output is the polemical letter dated April 8, 2021 about the inner workings of the NIS oil company. As is often the case with great literary works, its title is mysterious and laconic: “АМ 08.04.2021”. We are publishing here the uncut original.

https://informnapalm.org/ua/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2024/01/nis.mp4

This reading merits a few comments. The addressee of the “AM” letter is Babakov again. And here is some background regarding other persons mentioned in the text: Kirill Tyurdenev is the current CEO of NIS and the son of a high-ranking Russian diplomat. The other Kirill, Kravchenko, is the former CEO of NIS, removed from his position in 2017. In essence, Matanovic is talking about the multimillion-dollar corruption and eyewashing, customary for Russian top managers; about actual national chauvinism and segregation, as Russians receive disproportionately higher salaries in comparison to Serbian personnel; about the mass dismissals of Serbs from the once Serbian state company. At the end, there is also a mention of “irreparable environmental damage in Vojvodina” as a result of the company’s economic activities. In short, the Russian managers brought with them the “Russian world.”

The text also mentions “Alexandar” and “short and vindictive Alexey.” The second page of the letter clearly indicates that there’s no love lost between Aleksandar Vučić and Gazprom CEO Alexey Miller. According to Matanovic, this is because Vučić had the imprudence to draw Miller’s attention to the corruption among Russians. Matanovic has no other explanation for the fact that Russia offered lower gas prices to Serbia during the tenure of Boris Tadic (Vučić’s predecessor).

Aleksandr Vorobev is another man of mystery from Matanovic’s letter who deserves a special clarification.

Media influence campaigns in the EU

In September 2022, the world’s media was full of reports about Russia spending $300 million since 2014 to influence politics and government officials in more than two dozen countries. The US State Department’s press release was sent to the editors of leading publications, but details were scarce. From the few available details, journalists were able to establish that it concerned the countries of the Balkans, Africa and South America. In the context of this story, two people were mentioned above all: Evgeny Prigozhin and Alexander Babakov.

Back in April 2022, the United States Indicted Babakov with essentially attempting to interfere in American politics. The official wording of the US Department of Justice, in addition to Babakov, mentions two more people and one organization.

“As alleged in the indictment, Babakov, a member of the Russian legislature, Vorobev, his Chief of Staff, and Plisyuk, another member of Babakov’s staff, used a nonprofit organization based in Russia, the Institute for International Integration Studies, as a front for this global foreign influence campaign to advance Russia’s foreign policy objectives. Through these operations aimed at influencing the course of international affairs, the defendants worked to weaken U.S. partnerships with European allies, undermine Western sanctions and promote Russia’s illicit actions designed to destroy the sovereignty of Ukraine,” the text says.

Vorobev mentioned here is the same Vorobev on Matanovic’s letter. From Babakov’s dump, we still have his diplomatic passport.

It is not surprising that Vorobev is one of Zobnin’s “pen pals”. A person with the name “Alexander Vorobev” both writes and receives mail using several email addresses, but let’s focus on one of them: vrbv@ininins.com.

The domain @ininins.com leads to the website of the Institute for International Integration Studies, the same institution mentioned in the US Department of Justice indictment against Babakov. On its website, the institute openly states that it is engaged in lobbying activities, helping businesses to expand their activities in certain countries.

The correspondence between Vorobev and Zobnin shows that behind any such business there is solely the interest of the Kremlin. And lobbying activities mean the buy-up of experts, journalists and politicians in the target country in order to sway its public opinion in favor of the Russian interests. As an example, we are publishing a document detailing a media campaign plan in the EU to promote Russian pipeline gas. This document gives us a visual on how the mentioned $300 million were spent on Russian soft power abroad.

https://informnapalm.org/ua/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2024/01/media.mp4

The plan provides a typical list of the Kremlin’s talking points for discussing gas issues: intimidation, manipulations about the transit through Ukraine issue, threats of shortages. And these talking points are to be voiced not by Russian officials, but by Russian agents of influence in the EU. Among them are “a member of the European Parliament, a member of parliament of a European country, a market expert, and a specialized journalist.” The participation of “executive branch representatives” at the level of ministers or deputy ministers of energy is also expected.

Seagal relief fund

Cyber Resistance hacktivists found many scanned documents in Zobnin’s mail. The presence of most of them is easy to explain, e.g., the passports of Zobnin himself and his family members or the passports of his boss, Babakov.

We have already published passports, driver’s licenses, and State Duma IDs in our investigation into Babakov. However, in that article we only shortly mentioned Babakov’s congratulatory telegrams addressed to Steven Seagal, a faded Hollywood star, and now a fan of Putin. Back then, we only noted that Babakov approached Alexey Miller with a request to provide the Steven Seagal Cinema Support Fund with 1 billion rubles.

However, Zobnin’s mail revealed new details of their relationship.

In fact, Seagal plays the role of a figurehead in a number of Babakov’s money laundromats. For example, Seagal is the owner of a 26% stake in Gorki Holding Company LLC, proxy-owned by Babakov. It is known from the Russian press that this company is engaged in development of the luxury Rublyovka neighborhood near Moscow.

And the following document clearly shows that Zobnin gave an interest-free loan to the Seagal fund. Remember the letter to Gazprom? It is dated December 2021. That is, at the time of the funding request to Gazprom, the fund had a debt to Zobnin. It looks like a scheme for the withdrawal and laundering of Gazprom’s assets. This was probably the way to pay Babkov for his services.

If you have at your disposal, albeit a faded, but still a Hollywood star, then it would be a sin to use him exclusively off-record. Obviously, Babakov thought so too, and decided to use Seagal during public events.

In 2020, the election campaign to the State Duma was just starting in Russia. Babakov sets up his own pet party For Truth and recruits a considerable number of Russian stars to popularize it. The frontmen were the writer and militant Zakhar Prilepin, the actor and propagandist Ivan Okhlobystin and a number of other well-known jingoist characters in Russia. The party subsequently entered the Duma in alliance with another “political party” – A Just Russia.

There was also a place for Seagal. Zobnin’s mail dump contains many materials relating to the activities of the party. In particular, even scenarios for party events. According to one of them, Seagal was supposed to go on stage and talk “about the fight for peace (2 minutes).”

InformNapalm found a video of that speech. Apparently, Steven lacks imagination and preparation to last for two minutes. Or maybe they just took away his passport, and are making him work for food…

CYBINT investigation: how the Orlan-10 manufacturer imports parts bypassing sanctions

ninja — Fri, 12 Jan 2024 07:14:12 +0000

In November 2023, Ukrainian hacktivists of the Cyber Resistance group handed over to InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community internal documentation of the sanctioned Russian Special Technological Center LLC (STC), known in particular for the production of the Russian Orlan-10 UAVs. The documents provided by the hacktivists for our analysis directly confirm that a network of front companies continues to import equipment and parts produced by European, American and Asian companies into Russia. These supplies are mission-critical for the Russian production of weapons and military equipment.

STC: ORLANS AND MORE

SPECIAL TECHNOLOGICAL CENTER (STC) [Rus.: ООО “СПЕЦИАЛЬНЫЙ ТЕХНОЛОГИЧЕСКИЙ ЦЕНТР”] is based in St. Petersburg, registered at 21 Gzhatskaya str., bldg. B, office 53.

This enterprise plays an important role in supporting the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. According to the official website of the National Agency on Corruption Prevention of Ukraine, sanctions have already been imposed on this organization by the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Switzerland, Japan, EU member countries and Ukraine.

Interestingly, one of the relatively new employees of STC is a Russian military hacker who is wanted by the FBI for interfering in the American elections. Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Morgachev, the focus of an earlier CYBINT study published by InformNapalm has been working there since September 2022.

In general, STC is producing a fairly wide range of telecommunications equipment.

They make no secret that they also make special military equipment, mentioning it on their own website. This fact is corroborated by both satellite images and data from the documentation obtained by the hacktivists.

For example, contracts for the supply of components directly contain the notice about STC taking part in the implementation of the state defense order. Accordingly, everything is financed by the aggressor state, so suppliers need to open separate bank accounts, as is usually the case with budget financing.

STC production facilities are located at: 150 Piskarevsky prospect, building 5, St. Petersburg, Russia. Satellite images show military vehicles in the parking lot of this building.

The photo which was obtained directly inside the premises shows that these vehicles are Russian electronic warfare systems RB-341V Leer-3. These systems were also repeatedly detected by InformNapalm in eastern Ukraine even before the full-scale invasion.

The Leer-3 system was developed and produced by STC, and it includes three Orlan-10 UAVs.

The company also owns a number of other premises. For example, warehouses at 17 Nepokorennykh Ave, St. Petersburg, Russia.

In the first year of a full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian youtubers mocked the “ingenuity” of Russian designers, when an autopsy of a downed Orlan-10 revealed that the UAV used a simple plastic bottle instead of a fuel tank, and the optics were Canon cameras. However, the damage done by these mass-produced UAVs in the frontline is no laughing matter.

It looks like Canon cameras were used on the Orlans before the full-scale invasion.

The hacktivists also retrieved photos from STC, documenting the process of returning Canon cameras with packaging damaged during delivery.

Despite the sanctions, STC continues and even ramps up production by obtaining components through front companies.

HOW SANCTIONS ARE BYPASSED

STC needs a lot of foreign-made components to run its production smoothly. Let’s look at one of its simplest products – a cargo hexacopter supplied to the 8th Field Army of the Russian Armed Forces.

The propellers and engines are produced by the Chinese company T-Motor. The flight controllers and GPS modules are produced by the Chinese Radiolink Electronic Limited. Laptops are from Lenovo and cameras are from Sony. Components and spare parts enter Russia without any difficulties. The Russians are focusing their procuring effort on Chinese products – there are fewer problems with them, especially given that China is quietly helping along in every possible way. However, the retrieved documents reflecting STC’s orders clearly show that the company also imports components, parts and equipment made in the USA, Germany, Spain, Austria, Great Britain, Switzerland, etc.

The supply scheme is “parallel imports”, a primitive but reliable way to circumvent sanctions much-loved by Russian. The chain looks like this:

manufacturing company (in the USA, Asia, Europe);
distributor (usually in the production country);
intermediary front company (mainly companies from China, but we also saw companies from Turkey, UAE, Serbia, etc.);
Russian supplier company;
Russian military-industrial complex factory (in our case STC).

The analysis of the STC documents allowed us to track a number of Russian private legal entities that continued to import various equipment for the STC during 2022 and 2023.

In particular, these are:

RADIOLINE LLC [Rus.: ООО “РАДИОЛАЙН”] (OGRN 1117746143228, IPN 7718837905, KPP 772301001);
PROTECH LLC [Rus.: ООО “ПРОТЕХ”] (OGRN 1077761186381, IPN 7701748975, KPP 772801001);
PT Electronic [Rus.: ООО “ПТ Электроник”] (OGRN 1167847490524, IPN 7802606871, KPP 780201001);
and dozens of other companies.

Cyber Resistance group provided InformNapalm with copies of commercial proposals, contracts, annexes, invoices and waybills confirming the supply of equipment from the above-mentioned legal entities to STC. Payments were mainly made in US dollars and euros, with Chinese renminbi payments also becoming more frequent.

Here are examples of some retrieved documents.

A commercial offer from PT Electronic LLC, dated March 2023, containing equipment manufactured by Rohde & Schwarz GmbH. The German company specializes in the production of radio electronics and is headquartered in Munich, with divisions in the United States (DC, Howard County, Maryland) and Singapore.

Apparently, without these components (spectrum analyzers) it is impossible to assemble Leer-3. Therefore, Russians constantly purchase these items. However, the intermediary smuggler offers this product with up to 16 weeks of wait.

Naturally, a huge amount of equipment, electronics, and components are specifically ordered from Chinese producers (e.g. CEYEAR).

From the documentation received, it is obvious that the Russians are especially interested in CMOS sensors produced by the Chinese company GPIXEL.

According to the company’s website, “GMAX is Gpixel’s global shutter sensor family, designed to take full advantage of high-speed industrial camera interfaces while providing the performance and features required for imaging-as-measurement applications like factory inspection, automation, traffic monitoring and aerial mapping.” That is, these sensors are excellent for aerial photography and mapping from Orlans.

The Cyber Resistance group gained access to the email of a Gpixel representative in the Russian Federation and found there the correspondence with STC. The context of the letters suggests that Gpixel has official steady partners supplying Chinese components to the Russian military-industrial complex.

Interestingly, the data obtained by the hacktivists contains confidential technical certificates for these sensors. We invite everyone interested to look into these documents.

GMAX4002_Pre_Datasheet_V0.3.2_20231109 [PDF]

Documents below show the entire chain for sourcing the foreign components through Radioline LLC – from contracting to the transfer of the products to the STC warehouses.

Radioline contract No. 23.06.08-28 dated 06/08/2023 [PDF]
Binding invoice No. 74 dated 09/05/2023 [PDF]
UPD 49 [PDF]

Our HUMINT sources helped us to establish that Radioline is a long-term partner of STC supplying electronic components, measuring and laboratory equipment worth millions of dollars from various manufacturers, such as the American Keysight, the already mentioned German Rhode & Schwarz, the Chinese Ceyear, etc.

Since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022 until recently, Radioline has carried out more than 50 separate customs clearance operations for shipments from various suppliers in multiple countries. Just like another STC partner, Protech LLC, which completed more than 90 customs clearance operations for imports of goods from different countries.

To understand the scale of STC’s needs for foreign components, we invite you to study the so-called. internal “procurement plan” of STC, obtained by Cyber Resistance. It indicates quite a lot of other potential foreign suppliers whose products are being chased by the STC management.

STC procurement plan [XLSX]

To show the scope of foreign components procurement, our analysts made a summary table of purchased equipment with the country of origin, intended purpose of the product and information about its importer in the Russian Federation. But this is just the tip of the iceberg. More data obtained by the hacktivists was transferred to the relevant authorities and intelligence services in order to increase sanctions pressure on the aggressor state.

List of suppliers [XLSX]

All these documents evidence that, albeit through roundabout routes and with considerable delays, Western components nevertheless reach Russia. Sooner or later, they end up in the weapons used to wage aggressive, unlawful and unjust war unleashed by the Russian Federation.

Can this be stopped? Definitely. Through publicity, increased sanctions pressure and tighter controls over the supply of dual-use goods to Russia.

European sanctions disrupt state contract of Russian MOD to supply Granat-4 UAV system

Falcon Born — Mon, 04 Dec 2023 07:56:06 +0000

InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community received from the Cyber Resistance hacktivist group unique documents showing that European sanctions are disrupting a state contract of the Russian Ministry of Defense for the supply of the Granat-4 UAV system. The contract was awarded to Izhevsk Unmanned Systems Research and Production Association LLC (NPO IZHBS) in June 2023. The contract expires on December 15, 2023, but it is already known that the contractor would default because it cannot source components from the EU.

Public information

In September 2023, The Insider, with reference to the Telegram channel of the public movement Udmurtia Against Corruption, reported that the third shopping center in Izhevsk was being closed and floors being taken away from lease holders in order to house the production of military drones for the Russian Army.

At the same time, it was reported that NPO IZHBS, a subsidiary of the Kalashnikov Group relocated to the Novy Dom shopping center. In September, the company called for a recruitment of design and process engineers, as well as workers. Their newly minted social media page on VK (started in August) announced the development of the Granat-4 drone.

The news did not go unnoticed in Ukraine and was interpreted by many analysts as a sign of a dramatic increase in drone production by Russia, supported at the state level.

Russian government is certainly making large-scale efforts to provide its armed forces with an uninterrupted supply of drones. At the same time, the media and propaganda are publicly claiming that sanctions cannot impede this process in any way, and the import substitution policies help to successfully bypass the sanctions.

We know from the open sources that Izhevsk Unmanned Systems Research And Production Associated LLC [Rus: ООО «НПО Ижевские беспилотные системы»] was legally registered in 2006 at the following legal address: Moscow, 2a Trofimova st., room. 221. Mikhail Korchigin [Rus.: Корчигин Михаил Михайлович] has been the CEO of the company since May 15, 2023.

The official website of the Ukrainian National Agency on Corruption Prevention sanctions.nazk.gov.ua lists NPO IZHBS as subject to sanctions from the UK, USA, Canada, Switzerland, Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Ukraine.

This open-source information will be useful for analyzing the documents not available to the public.

Restricted information and documents

The public information suggests that sanctions do not work, since the company continues its activities and entire shopping centers are being vacated for the sake of its expansion in Izhevsk.

However, the real state of affairs looks very different if we analyze the non-public documents.

In the array of documents exclusively obtained from Cyber Resistance hackivists, InformNapalm analysts found an interesting correspondence about government military contracts. We will not disclose the source email addresses, as the work on the data array continues, and hacktivists continue to control the hacked source systems. However, we can show a document that is of purely analytical interest and has no operational significance. The document answers the question “how do European sanctions actually work?” That is why we decided to make it public (PDF).

This is a response dated October 16, 2023 from the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Udmurt Republic to the force-majeure application of NPO IZHBS ref. No. 525/k dated October 09, 2023, referring to the impossibility of performing a state contract with the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (dated 06/06/2023, No. 2323187940521412466233133) for the manufacture and supply of an unmanned aerial vehicle system Granat-4, equipped with a gyro-stabilized optical-electronic target designation and surveillance system. The contract expires on December 15, 2023.

Further, the official letter provides an extensive list of sanctions and restrictions preventing NPO IZHBS from purchasing components in the EU which is affecting the performance of the contract. The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Udmurt Republic concludes that these circumstances give grounds to amend the terms or cancel the contract.

Conclusions

It is obvious that, contrary to the claims of Russian propaganda about “import substitution”, sanctions against the supply of components and dual-use goods are working and disrupting military contracts. They slow down the Russian military-industrial complex and effectively impede the rapid increase in the supply of weapons and advanced technology to the Russian army which is waging a war of aggression and occupation against Ukraine.

However, Russia is constantly looking for new ways to circumvent sanctions, requiring constant monitoring and introduction of new effective restrictions from the United States, the EU and other countries. Sanctions give Ukraine and EU time to build up their own forces and equipment to repel Russian aggression.

But sanctions alone do not cover the urgent need to supply weapons and hardware to increase the capabilities of the Ukrainian army. In Ukraine, after almost two years of full-scale war, factories and shopping centers are still not being switched to a war footing to organize the mass production of drones.

The political leadership and government of Ukraine should adapt the legislation in order to quickly increase capabilities in the production of drones for the Ukrainian army, deregulate, facilitate and thus speed up the supply of components. The precious time bought for Ukraine by European sanctions must be multiplied by efficiency, and not divided by endless bureaucracy.

Hacking the Infocomms Department of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Katyusha and the secrets of General Konashenkov

ninja — Mon, 27 Nov 2023 06:44:13 +0000

Ukrainian hacktivists of the Cyber Resistance group penetrated the Department of Information and Mass Communications of the Russian Ministry of Defense (DIMC) and handed over unique internal documentation and provided access to the software used by Russian military propagandists to InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community.

The DIMC is the realm of the notorious Igor Konashenkov, the spokesperson who is daily voicing Russian reports from the combat zone. In the Ukrainian eyes, Igor Konashenkov has long become a walking meme, as it was, he who day after day rattled out the phrase “there are no losses” during the first weeks of the invasion and claimed thousands of destroyed Ukrainian tanks – more than Ukraine had before the invasion.

But such a contrived parallel reality created by reports from the Russian Defense Ministry, is not a figment of Konashenkov’s imagination alone. The retrieved documentation makes it clear how removed from the real state of affairs the entire Information Department of the Russian Defense Ministry is.

Employees of the department and the press services of the Russian military districts and fleets under its control constantly analyze the Russian information space. Everything that is directly or indirectly related to news about the activities of the Russian Armed Forces is reflected in various reports. Moreover, publications in foreign media are analyzed separately.

This is what the daily media review looks like:

Daily media review (11/13/2023). [PDF RUS]

Here is an overview of how the aggressor army is covered in the foreign media:

Russian Armed Forces in foreign media 2023-11-13. [PDF RUS]

The department also prepares detailed daily reports with transcripts of all propaganda reports for the day:

Media review (digest) 2023-11-13. [PDF RUS]

We wonder who proofreads all this, because at times the texts look really cringy. It seems that Russian propagandists themselves do not read very closely into what they write. For example, they call their military personnel “military prisoners” [E.g.: “военнопленные” instead of “военнослужащие”].

Every week, Colonel Kochetkov submits a report on the scope of materials released and the reaching of targets to Konashenkov for approval.

Report for the November 11, 2023 meeting. [DOCX RUS]

And later, another clerk of this department, Sergei Tovpeko, sends out this document along with the planned information events in the Russian Armed Forces for the next week and a weekly report on the print media to all the heads of press services of the military districts, service branches, fleets, etc.

Print media from November 4 to 10, 2023. [DOCX RUS]
Main_topics_in the Russian Armed Forces from November 13 to 19. [DOCX RUS]

Special software suite KATYUSHA

It is no secret that Russia has total control over its information space. Such control needs constant monitoring. And as we see in the reports produced by the DIMC, they sift through colossal amounts of information. Therefore, they use special software to collect media data for their reporting.

This software is the information and analytical system for online media monitoring KATYUSHA.

Cyber Resistance hacktivists gained access to this system and were able to study its features.

Katyusha is a Russian counterpart of SemanticForce media monitoring system.

It was developed by the private company M13. They claim to specialize in information technology in the field of media monitoring, offering three systems: ARSENAL, ARENA and KATUSHA. Their software is used by the Russian presidential administration, the government, federal ministries and departments, regional government executive agencies, commercial companies and public organizations. In 2021, the Russian Ministry of Defense bought a license to use Katyusha, allocating 320 million rubles for this until 2023 inclusive.

What does Katyusha offer?

Media monitoring 24/7. According to the developer, the database covers 40,000 sources: Russian federal and regional media, Russian-language and “key” media abroad,
options to sort information by time, topics, headings, named objects and types of media,
assessment of information based on sentiment and audience coverage,
monitoring of key Russian print media,
monitoring of both traditional and new (social) media,
displaying the main information events of the day, week or selected period,
detection of coordinated information attacks.

This is what the developer declares. However, the research of Katyusha by hackers showed its true capabilities. The system displays events and messages by category (at the top), for example, for Zvezda, the media company of the Russian army:

Or foreign media writing about the Russian army:

Weekly and monthly reports are uploaded by the system:

The circulations of the largest Russian print media are added to the system daily:

The first tab “Russian Armed Forces” has richer options for analysis, and messages are immediately marked by sentiment – positive (green), negative (red), neutral (yellow). Here, it is possible to view relevant publications and events (i.e. news with the highest citation index), make searches by persons and organizations (the system pulls in related news reports).

Of course, Russians pay special attention to social media. The system pulls in posts published on Telegram, VK, OK, LiveJournal and the like in real time. Facebook and Instagram also have a presence, although insignificant. YouTube videos are also pulled in. We have also noticed some Ukrainian channels there, which were earmarked by the Russian system.

The system also has an interesting tab with an analysis of popular Russian Telegram channels. They are explicitly sorted into positive and negative. Why this has been done will be discussed later.

The system also runs statistics on publications and mentions of individuals and organizations for the selected period.

However, analyzing this system, we came to the conclusion that Katyusha is a kind of window dressing tool. Obviously, the DIMC uses it for reporting. Even so, the system clearly misrepresents the sentiment. Negative reports about the Russian army, military and political leadership of the Russian Federation are either disregarded or marked as neutral. The system is programmed to whitewash the reality – no negative reporting about Putin or the army, no failures. A kind of digital Konashenkov – “there are no losses.”

The system analyzes mainly the Russian information space. Western and Ukrainian media are present in the database, but they must be searched manually. They do not affect the overall picture. Any analysis is predominantly based on the Russian sources, which are subject to censorship and self-censorship. Accordingly, the value of such a system is in reflecting the state of the Russian information space: an extensive network of controlled media, coordinated media campaigns, total censorship (and even more self-censorship). In short, mapping a parallel self-congratulatory reality constructed by the domestic media.

Yes, the system also sees negative news reports. However, for one “negative” report, the extensive Russian propaganda machine throws in dozens of “positive” ones, effectively switching attention and shifting emphasis. After the successful Ukrainian strike on the headquarters of the Russian Black Sea Fleet on September 22, we personally watched online how the Russian propaganda machine quickly reacted, adapted on the fly and then totally twisted the meaning of the event.

KONASHENKOV LETTER

Cyber Resistance hacktivists also found and handed over to InformNapalm an interesting document – a letter from Konashenkov to Shestakov, Deputy General Director of All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (Russia-1, Russia-24 TV channels).

This letter is interesting because it mentions some “unreliable” Russian Telegram channels. Unfortunately, the hacktivists could not obtain the attachment with the list of these channels. However, another look into Katyusha gives us a good idea of what Konashenkov’s list was.

As evidenced by the internal system of the DIMC, military propagandists of the Russian Ministry of Defense are already distinguishing between reliable and unreliable channels on Telegram. And there is certain logic to it. Both groups contain mostly pro-war channels, but some are more loyal to the Russian political leadership, some are less, and uniformed propagandists are taking notice of the rift. For example, on November 16, Putin awarded the founder of the Rybar Telegram channel, Mikhail Zvinchuk, the Russian Order For Merit to the Fatherland, II class. The Rybar channel is well regarded as “reliable” by the Russian propaganda machine and is listed in the system accordingly.

As reported by the Russian “opposition” media, in October 2022, at the request of Valeriy Gerasimov, Roskomnadzor and Russian law enforcement agencies began checking the content of the Russian war correspondents for “fakes” and “discrediting” the Russian army. This was followed by the arrest of Igor Girkin who had become a vocal critic of the Russian political leadership for its insufficiently hardline approach to the war.

It looks like now, in the run-up to Putin’s elections, Russian law enforcement agencies are beginning the last wave of purging Telegram of any disloyalty to the Kremlin.

On November 13, we all observed strange convulsions in the Russian media with the statement of the Dnieper group of Russian forces about another “goodwill gesture” (aka retreat) in the Kherson Oblast. Leading Russian media published and then a few minutes later “annulled” the relevant news report (another example of the Russian newspeak). Then dozens of experts and analysts puzzled over what had just happened. The Ukrainian side then stated that this was a Russian PSYOP, and there was no evidence of any preparations by the Russians to retreat.

We tend to share this opinion with only one reservation. This special operation was not aimed against the Ukrainian side as such. On the contrary, it was an attempt by the Russian Ministry of Defense to draw out disloyal Telegram channels tending towards critical coverage. The likes of the Two Majors channel, where it is easy to find critical content. Despite being another war propaganda outlet, it is listed under “unreliable” in the Katyusha system.

If you look at Konashenkov’s letter, it is dated November 14. The outlandish statement about the retreat of the Dnieper group of forces was published and “annulled” on November 13. What is this if not a provocation? Nothing and no one can stop Putin from triumphantly winning elections in silence. Dictatorships do not tolerate dissent.

Therefore, already on November 17, Russia is strengthening control over the Internet, which, according to the ISW analysts, is another manifestation of censorship and an attempt to limit free access to information in a bid to “control” Putin’s elections. And later ISW opined that Shoigu’s statement at the Defense Ministry meeting on November 21 is believed to be an attempt to downplay the concerns of some Russian milbloggers about Russia’s inability to decisively repel Ukrainian attacks on the east bank of the Dnipro river. Analysts, however, doubt that these statements will quell the complaints spreading in the Russian information space.

Of course, we would all like to believe in the retreat of the Russians on the east bank. But we definitely don’t want to be part of their information games. So, let them squabble among themselves. In the meantime, the Ukrainian army is fighting valiantly to bring closer the real retreat of the Russians from the occupied territories of the Kherson Oblast, whereas Ukrainian hacktivists, having penetrated Konashenkov’s propaganda systems, promise many more surprises.

Hacked: Russian pilot reveals schemes of weapons supply from Iran, South Africa and Mali to Russia

Falcon Born — Mon, 20 Nov 2023 07:05:40 +0000

Ukrainian hacktivists of the Cyber Resistance group handed over to InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community exclusive data from the mailbox of Maxim Okss, a former air force officer and now a “civilian” pilot in command of the Ilyushin IL-76 transport aircraft of the sanctioned Aviacon Zitotrans airline. The contents of his mailbox reveal information about Russian airlines operating airlifts of weapons, ammunition and sanctioned goods from Iran, South Africa, and Mali to Russia.

COMMANDER OF MILITARY UNIT 41495

Okss Maxim Igorevich [Rus.: Окcс Максим Игоревич], born July 18, 1977, domestic passport # 45 21 705316, issued on August 10, 2022, TIN: 370201681553. Registered at: Moscow city, 11 Sinyavinskaya st., building 9, apt. 93.

He was born in Dresden, studied in Russia, but in all the documents requiring the ethnicity he indicates it as “Ukrainian”. The retrieved data makes it clear that this ethnic Ukrainian contributes to the continued Russian aggression against his historical homeland.

His military career does not merit a detailed description. He served in military transport aviation, rose through the ranks to become the commander of the 566th Separate Military Transport Aviation Regiment, military unit 41495, stationed in the town of Seshcha, Bryansk Oblast.

Comrade Colonel did not distinguish himself with anything noteworthy there. Interestingly, his mail dump contained building layouts for his new country house with a stand-alone sauna, alongside with the results of an internal audit of his military unit, which recorded facts of inventory shortages and theft.

In 2018, Colonel Okss was transferred to the position of a chief of service – senior inspector-pilot of the flight safety service of the of the Military Transport Aviation Command Headquarters (Staff), military unit 25969 (Moscow, Matrosskaya Tishina-10). But he did not last long there and was dismissed from office with the following wording: “Not fit for the position held. It is not advisable to appoint for flight operations.”

Colonel Okss left the military service and, having experience in piloting IL-76 transport aircraft, went into civil aviation.

“HUMANITARIAN AID” FROM IRAN

Okss’s first civilian employment was at ALROSA Airlines, but in May 2021 he switched to the Aviation Rescue Company of the Ministry of Emercom of Russia.

This state-owned aviation enterprise does not exclusively do rescue operations, but offers a wider range of services. VIP and corporate transportation of passengers is very relevant for remote rotational camps in Russia, as is sanitary evacuation from the taiga or permafrost areas. However, this company also carries out freight transportation.

Among a bunch of technical documentation, hacktivists found data about a flight operated by this airline on February 6, 2023 on the route Moscow (Zhukovsky Airport) – Urmia (Iran).

Urmia is the capital of the Iranian of West Azerbaijan province. Tellingly, just a week before this flight, there were media reports about an attack by the Israeli army on Iranian weapons factories. Thus, explosions were reported in the Shahid Salimi industrial zone in the neighboring province of East Azerbaijan. According to the map, this industrial zone is only an hour and a half drive from Urmia where the Russian freighter landed.

What kind of cargo did the Russians take there? Documents from ex-colonel’s mail indicate that it was definitely not “humanitarian” in nature, as indicated on the flight summary.

Also, thanks to the pilot duty rosters, we know that the IL-76 aircraft of this airline operated flights to Africa and Syria.

With Syria, everything is obvious – there were flights to Latakia and the Russian Khmeimim airbase to transport cargo for Russian troops there. All flights to Syrian bases are highlighted in gray in the roster, indicating a government order. For example, in February 2023 alone there were 13 such flights to Syria.

There are also commercial flights to Bamako, the capital of Mali, on the flight rosters. It is well known that there is a significant Russian presence in Mali, notably of the former Wagner Group. Apparently, it was the Wagner PMC that was the “commercial” customer. It’s no surprise that the number of flights to Bamako went through the roof in June 2023. There is a separate document in the mail dump with flight routings and aircraft loading.

Thus, from June 21 to 22, a number of flights were made along the route Ramenskoye – Krasnodar – Latakia – Bamako – Latakia – Bamako – Latakia – Bamako – Latakia – Krasnodar – Ramenskoye. Such an increase in activity is quite an interesting coincidence, given that Prigozhin’s putsch took place on June 23 and 24, 2023.

Somewhere in August or September, Okss transferred to the private sanctioned cargo airline Aviacon Zitotrans, which carried out cargo transportation for sanctioned Russian military industry companies. As indicated in the register of sanctioned legal entities and individuals on the website of the NAPC of Ukraine, Aviacon Zitotrans delivers military materiel such as missiles, warheads and helicopter parts around the world. For example, Aviacon Zitotrans delivered military cargoes to Africa, Venezuela, and other countries. As an example of their efforts, as of September 2022, Aviacon Zitotrans was attempting to use a Turkish company and Turkish diplomats to facilitate the sale of Russian military equipment abroad on behalf of OJSC Rosoboronexport, a state-owned Russian military industry company sanctioned by the United States.

Therefore, Okss’ flight roster is interrupted in August. However, we detected the flight of another crew on August 03, 2023 to Cape Town.

And already in September, South African President Ramaphosa stated that an independent expert group had found no evidence that any Russian ship was transporting weapons from South Africa for Russia in May 2023. This may well be true, because the weapons were delivered not by sea, but by air. With transport airplanes of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Russian Federation.

The Cyber Resistance group handed over documents with the cargo specification to the competent authorities; this information is not yet subject to publication. The contents of the Okss’ mailbox once again prove that Russia is not only ramping up its own weapons production, but also sourcing the weapons from all over the world to pursue its criminal war of attrition against Ukraine.

Russia is a proven international aggressor with a track record of attacking several countries, unlikely to stop with Ukraine. Therefore, the issue of support for Ukraine by the West with weapons and ammunition, aircraft and tanks, missiles and drones, is a matter of security for the whole democratic world.

Cuban mercenaries continue to join the ranks of the Russian Armed Forces. Evidence of new recruitments of Cuban citizens

ninja — Wed, 25 Oct 2023 07:41:19 +0000

Ukrainian hacktivists of the Cyber Resistance group collected new evidence of the arrival of Cuban mercenaries signing contracts with the Russian Army. These facts refute the statements of the Cuban authorities about the “blocking” of the channel trafficking mercenaries to the Russian Federation, following the scandal that erupted after the release of our previous investigation.

Let us recall that on September 6, the website of InformNapalm community published the results of an important investigation based on materials provided by Cyber Resistance hacktivist group about the participation of two hundred Cuban mercenaries in the war against Ukraine. They were recruited into the ranks of the Russian Army by the Tula draft officer Anton Perevozchikov.

The feature was translated by our volunteers into 5 languages, and caused an extraordinary outcry. A large number of international media referred to this information.

The Cuban authorities could not ignore the scandal. Therefore, on September 8, the Cuban Foreign Ministry announced that 17 people had been arrested on suspicion of participation in human trafficking. Those arrested face up to 30 years in prison for facilitating mercenarism, which is prohibited by the Cuban law.

With these arrests, the Cuban authorities tried to quell the scandal and claim that the channel trafficking mercenaries to Russia has been blocked. However, Cuban officials began to make contradicting statements on the participation of the Cuban mercenaries in the war in Ukraine. On September 14, the Cuban ambassador in Moscow stated that his government does not object to its citizens serving in the Russian Army if it is “legal.” However, just a few hours later, Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez said the exact opposite – that his country prohibits “the participation of Cuban citizens in conflicts of any kind and opposes mercenarism.” This begs a question – which of these two statements should we believe? And aren’t the Cuban authorities trying to sit on two chairs?

Hacktivists intercepted new data on the recruitment of Cubans into the Russian Army

Cyber Resistance obtained new passport photos of at least 59 more Cubans who arrived in the Russian city of Tula between August 25 and September 29 to sign a contract. Photo copies of all passports of the new group of Cuban mercenaries have been collected into a PDF-file.

At least 11 of them passed through the Tula military registration and enlistment office after the Cuban authorities announced the arrest of participants in the scheme and the “blocking” of the mercenary trafficking channel.

However, it is worth noting that an analysis of the arrival routes of new mercenaries revealed that not all of them came directly from Cuba. For example, Yannier Hernandez received a passport in 2017 and had been staying in the Russian Federation since at least June 2021.

Just like Jorge Francisco Yusto who was already living in Russia at least two weeks before the full-scale invasion.

But there is another example – the case of young Yaser Alejandro Paneque Lopez which clearly proves that Cuba has not stopped the flow of mercenaries arriving in the Russian Federation and signing contracts with the Russian Army. This 19-year-old guy dreamed of becoming a photographer, however, the prospect of the Russian citizenship and the illusory, crazy (for a Cuban) earnings promised by Russia for participation in the war against Ukraine turned him into a mercenary.

On September 21, on his Instagram page, he posted a boarding pass for the flight No. 556 on the route Varadero (Cuba) – Sheremetyevo, Moscow of the Russian airline Nordwind Airlines.

Aeroflot and Nordwind have been operating regular flights on this route since July 2023.

Yasser Lopez loves to take pictures and shoot videos on his phone. Therefore, in addition to the data of his passport, he also posted his Cuban ID document to the public.

We hope that Yasser will not forget about his calling and will take detailed photos from the training camp and permanent deployment point of the 106th Airborne Division of the Russian Armed Forces where recruited Cubans are now serving.

After all, the 106th Airborne Division is gradually turning into the Russian “international legion” of sorts. Back in summer, information was spread in the media that Russia was also actively recruiting Serbs into the Tula division. Russia is apparently running out of paratroopers, and now this division is gradually becoming a hodgepodge of Serbs and Cubans.

From the last recorded group of Cubans, the hacktivists obtained confirmations that at least 3 new mercenaries are already in service. The rest may still be going through final registration and are at the stage of signing contracts.

Yainer Labrada, born January 25, 1985 arrived in Russia no later than September 2, and on September 26 he already published a photo in the Russian military uniform.

Jaime Castillo, born September 17, 1985, showing on his social media pages how Russian elite units are turning into mercenary squads.

On September 22, he published a photo in a paratrooper’s telnyashka and in new military high-top boots.

Likewise, the photo of Barbaro Aties, born December 04, 1990, lying on a bunk bed in military barracks, spots an airborne vest hanging in the upper right corner, and part of camouflage gear, visible in the lower left corner.

The flow of mercenaries is not interrupted, so the statements of the Cuban authorities are clearly not sufficient

Based on the above facts, the Cuban government’s statements about “ending human trafficking” and condemning mercenaries are not sufficient. Yes, there is a criminal case, 17 people were allegedly arrested. However, we still don’t know who these people are and what role they played in the entire scheme of trafficking mercenaries to the Russian army.

At the same time, we know for sure that Cuban citizens continue to arrive in the Russian Federation. We see that this flow has not been stopped.

So far, no real attempts have been recorded by the Cuban authorities to repatriate at least those Cubans whose data was identified and featured in numerous publications in foreign media. For example, Yaser Lopez who published his own passport details.

We do not see any meaningful steps taken by the Cuban government to actually fight against mercenarism and attempts to bring participants to justice. Cuba does not even block the channels for transferring funds from identified mercenaries.

There is also no evidence yet that Cuba has initiated criminal proceedings against already identified mercenaries. Accordingly, when the Cuban ambassador in Moscow said that his government does not object to the participation of its citizens in the war against Ukraine, he was probably more sincere than the Cuban Foreign Ministry, which hastened to refute this statement.

But any political decisions must have consequences, and if Cuba does not block the flow of mercenaries to Russia who sign contracts with the Russian Army in order to fight against Ukraine, then there must be a reaction from the international community. Therefore, we draw attention to these latest facts and evidence of the recruitment of Cubans into the ranks of the Russian Army.

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Hacked: Russian pilot reveals schemes of weapons supply from Iran, South Africa and Mali to Russia

COMMANDER OF MILITARY UNIT 41495

“HUMANITARIAN AID” FROM IRAN

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Cuban mercenaries continue to join the ranks of the Russian Armed Forces. Evidence of new recruitments of Cuban citizens

Hacktivists intercepted new data on the recruitment of Cubans into the Russian Army

The flow of mercenaries is not interrupted, so the statements of the Cuban authorities are clearly not sufficient

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Distribution and reprint with reference to the source is welcome! (Creative Commons – Attribution 4.0 International – CC BY 4.0) InformNapalm social media pages: Facebook / Тwitter / Telegram / Slate (Sl8).