International News, Latest World News - Euromaidan Press

Russia maintains military presence in post-Assad Syria – but Damascus now holds leverage

Benjamin Murdoch — Sat, 16 May 2026 15:31:50 +0000

New satellite imagery appears to show renewed Russian military-linked deliveries to Syria months after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, according to a joint investigation by OSINT groups GeoInsider and SONARROW.

The reported deliveries come amid uncertainty over Moscow’s future access to Syrian military facilities following the collapse of Assad’s government, with analysts closely watching whether Russia can preserve its Mediterranean foothold under Syria’s new political order.

Russia has maintained a military presence in Syria throughout the civil war, building long-term naval and air infrastructure at Tartus and Hmeimim that supported its intervention in support of Assad’s government and secured a permanent Mediterranean logistics hub.

At its peak, Moscow operated across roughly 90 sites in Syria. Current reporting suggests that footprint has now contracted sharply, with Russian activity increasingly concentrated around Tartus and Hmeimim.

Contents

Cargo convoy spotted unloading in Tartus

Cargo convoy spotted unloading in Tartus

The analysis identifies the Russian cargo ship SPARTA unloading equipment at the port of Tartus on 11 May, accompanied by naval escort vessels.

Researchers say the exact cargo remains unclear, but assess it likely included military or dual-use equipment tied to ongoing negotiations over Russia’s future access to military infrastructure in Syria.

EXCLUSIVE: First visual proof of renewed Russian weapons deliveries to Syria after Assad’s fall. In a joint investigation by @InsiderGeo × @SONARROW_OSINT , we identified the Russian cargo ship SPARTA and two escort vessels in Tartus on May 11 imagery. pic.twitter.com/e6MM30xqQF
— GeoInsider (@InsiderGeo) May 13, 2026

Syria reassesses Russia’s military access after Assad

The reported shipment comes as Syria’s new leadership reassesses the terms of Russia’s long-standing military presence in the country. Syrian Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra said in 2025 that Russia could retain access to its bases “if Syria gets benefits,” adding that “in politics, there are no permanent enemies.”

On 1 April 2026, Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa announced plans to convert former Russian facilities into “National Training Centers” for the Syrian Army. The previous 49-year Russian basing agreement is now reportedly suspended or under renegotiation.

Damascus uses Russian bases as leverage in post-Assad negotiations

Regional reporting and diplomatic sources cited by GeoInsider suggest Damascus is using the threat of terminating Russian basing rights as leverage in wider negotiations, including discussions around Syrian debt, Assad family assets, and transitional justice measures.

Moscow, meanwhile, is reportedly offering technical assistance, construction materials, and logistical support in exchange for preserving at least a limited military foothold in Syria.

GeoInsider says the negotiations mark a reversal from the Assad era, when Russia operated in Syria as the dominant external power rather than a state bargaining to preserve reduced access.

9/ The Tartus convoy reflects a major strategic reversal.
Russia is no longer operating in Syria as the dominant external power. Moscow is now negotiating to preserve a minimal military foothold, while Damascus increasingly dictates the terms of Russian presence.
— GeoInsider (@InsiderGeo) May 13, 2026

Russian warships escorted convoy into Syria

According to the investigation, the cargo operation was accompanied by unusually tight naval security measures.

Satellite imagery and vessel tracking data reportedly show the frigate Admiral Flota Kasatonov positioned near Tartus during the unloading operation, while the corvette Stoykiy moved ahead of the convoy to help secure the maritime approach corridor.

The escort pattern suggests the shipment was considered operationally sensitive, the analysts said.

Ships reportedly used deception measures during transit

GeoInsider said all vessels involved in the convoy disabled their AIS transponders shortly after passing Gibraltar and remained electronically dark until reaching Syria.

The investigators also said at least two ships broadcast false positions in the Baltic Sea in what they described as an apparent attempt to complicate open-source tracking efforts.

Despite the spoofing measures, the convoy was tracked to Tartus using satellite imagery and maritime monitoring data, according to the report.

A shifting balance of dependence and leverage between Damascus and Moscow

Syria’s political transition after the fall of Bashar al-Assad has not produced a clean break with Russia, despite Moscow and Damascus having been on opposing sides of the war’s final phase.

While the new leadership has signaled a shift toward engagement with Western and regional partners, ties with Russia continue in areas tied to energy and military infrastructure, even as their terms are being reassessed.

Russia continues to supply a significant share of Syria’s oil imports, reflecting the constraints facing Damascus after years of war, damaged domestic production, and limited access to alternative suppliers.

The situation reflects mutual limitation: Syria’s constrained economy and infrastructure reduce its options, while Russia’s reduced military footprint and changing political environment limit its previous dominance.

At the same time, Moscow retains leverage through established bases and maritime access in the eastern Mediterranean, though these positions are now subject to negotiation rather than guaranteed control.

The result is not continuity of the Assad-era alignment, but a transitional arrangement: ongoing practical cooperation in specific sectors alongside a broader shift in bargaining power between Damascus and Moscow.

Russia fast-tracks citizenship for Moldova’s occupied Transnistria – a familiar playbook returns

Benjamin Murdoch — Sat, 16 May 2026 11:09:50 +0000

Russian president Vladimir Putin has signed a decree introducing a simplified procedure for residents of Transnistria, a breakaway region of Moldova, to obtain Russian citizenship, according to Russian state media RIA Novosti.

The move is framed by Moscow as a humanitarian step, but it comes in a long-running pattern where Russia expands citizenship access in territories outside the control of internationally recognized states. Such policies are often viewed as a tool for strengthening political leverage over contested areas.

Contents

Decree removes standard citizenship requirements and expands fast-track access

Decree removes standard citizenship requirements and expands fast-track access

The decree applies to adult foreign citizens and stateless persons living in the territory and removes standard requirements such as residence in Russia, Russian language proficiency, and knowledge of Russian law and history. Moscow says the measure is aimed at “protecting rights and freedoms.”

Russia has repeatedly used the claim of “protecting its citizens” as a political justification for intervention in neighboring states. This framework has been cited in the lead-up to or during military actions, including in Ukraine, allowing Moscow to argue that it is acting to defend Russian nationals even in areas that are internationally recognized as part of other sovereign countries.

Russian troops stationed in Transnistria, Moldova. Photo: novostipmr.com

Transnistria remains outside Moldova’s control since early 1990s conflict

Transnistria is a narrow strip of land in eastern Moldova, along the border with Ukraine. It declared independence in 1990 during the collapse of the Soviet Union, but it is not recognized by any UN member state and is considered internationally to be part of Moldova.

A short war in the early 1990s left the region outside Chisinau’s control. The conflict involved separatist forces backed by Russian troops already stationed in the area, after which Moldova lost effective control over the territory.

Since then, Transnistria has functioned as a de facto separatist entity with its own authorities, security forces, and administrative structures. Its economy and political system remain closely tied to Russia, and Russian citizenship has been widely distributed among residents over the years.

The region is often described as a frozen conflict zone, with Russian military personnel still present as part of a long-standing “peacekeeping” mission. The new decree further deepens Moscow’s legal and political links with the population living there.

Similar passportization policy used in Ukraine’s Donbas

Russia also introduced simplified citizenship procedures for residents of the occupied parts of Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts prior to the full-scale invasion in 2022. This was expanded after the full-scale invasion, when Moscow accelerated mass passport distribution in occupied Ukrainian territories.

The policy allowed residents to obtain Russian citizenship without meeting standard requirements such as long-term residence in Russia or language exams. In practice, it created a large population of dual-status residents in areas not controlled by Kyiv, with Russian-issued documents used for administration, military mobilization, and political integration.

Internationally, these measures have been widely viewed as part of Russia’s broader strategy of embedding legal and political control in territories it occupies or influences, rather than as neutral citizenship policy.

Don’t sign what Bosnia signed, a Bosnian journalist tells Ukraine

Alya Shandra — Sat, 16 May 2026 08:57:14 +0000

Euromaidan Press is a media partner of Lviv Media Forum 2026. Over the coming days we will bring you selected thoughts and dispatches from speakers across journalism, security, and democratic resilience.

When Russia attacked Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the phones started ringing at Al Jazeera Balkans' office in Sarajevo. The callers were not asking about Kyiv. They were asking about bunkers.

What is the state of Sarajevo's underground bunkers and shelters, they wanted to know. Can they be used?

The fear underneath the question was specific: if Russia attacked Ukraine, what if the Serbs attack us again?

This is what 30 years of "peace" feels like from inside Bosnia and Herzegovina. The war ended in 1995, on paper. The fear of it never did. And the Bosnian journalist who fielded those calls—Harun Karčić, a longtime Al Jazeera Balkans correspondent who was eight years old and a refugee himself when his war began—was in Lviv this week to tell Ukrainians, with what he called "blunt" candor, exactly why.

"The mistake we made was that we accepted a peace agreement in 1995 which gave Serb rebels 49% of our country," Karčić told the panel "Handle the Truth in the Age of Crises" at Lviv Media Forum 2026.

"This would be equivalent to you Ukrainians signing any peace agreement which would give Russian separatists in the east a say in your government. Whatever you do, don't accept such peace agreements—because they will continue blocking your country, obstructing your progress and, excuse my bluntness, screwing you for the next 30 to 40 years."

Contents

What Dayton was, and what it produced

What Dayton was, and what it produced

Seated from left to right: Slobodan Milošević, Alija Izetbegović, Franjo Tuđman initialling the Dayton Peace Accords at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base on 21 November 1995. Photo: Wikimedia commons

The deal Karčić is referring to—the Dayton Accords, signed under US pressure in November 1995—ended the Bosnian war by formally keeping Bosnia as one country while splitting it into two entities. The Bosniak-Croat Federation got 51% of the territory. Republika Srpska—the entity led by the Bosnian Serb forces who had spent three and a half years trying to destroy Bosnia, and whose army committed the Srebrenica genocide—got the remaining 49%, plus veto power over state-level decisions in Sarajevo.

In other words: the rebels who lost the war were given a permanent seat at the table they had tried to demolish. That seat has been used ever since to block every step Bosnia has tried to take toward Europe.

Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Dayton accords. Map: Encyclopedia Britannica

Thirty years later, the bill is in. Bosnia has no realistic path to NATO membership. Its EU accession is frozen. Its central government can be paralyzed by Republika Srpska whenever Belgrade or Moscow find it convenient. Corruption is endemic. Tens of thousands of young Bosnians emigrate every year.

Russia Today and Sputnik run offices and studios in Belgrade and Banja Luka—Republika Srpska's de facto capital—pumping out free Russian-language content that local outlets, starved for funding, copy-paste into Bosnia's information space. The two halves of the country now live in literally parallel realities. When Russia invaded Ukraine, Karčić noted, the headlines in Republika Srpska read: "Ukraine Attacks Russia." "NATO Places Biological Weapons on Ukraine's Border." "NATO Wants to Use Russia."

Children in Mostar are still educated in segregated schools—the so-called "two schools under one roof"—and many never cross the city's famous bridge to make a friend on the other side.

Harun Karčić speaks at the Lviv Media Forum, 15 May 2026. Photo: LMF

The trap, regardless of shape

Karčić's analogy—Russian separatists with a say in Ukraine's government—describes the Republika Srpska model literally. It also describes what Russia spent 2014–2022 trying to install in Ukraine through the Minsk agreements: a frozen Donbas held by Russian proxies with permanent veto rights over Ukrainian foreign policy, defense, and language law. Ukraine refused to implement those provisions, and the war went total.

The 28-point peace plan circulating since November 2025 has taken a different shape.

Not a Republika Srpska inside Ukraine, but the formal amputation of Ukraine's east and south. Recognition of Crimea, Luhansk and the entirety of Donetsk Oblast as de facto Russian—including the roughly 25% of Donetsk Oblast currently under Ukrainian control. A freeze of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts along the line of contact. Ukrainian withdrawal from the parts of Donetsk it still holds, with that withdrawal zone reclassified as an internationally recognized "demilitarized buffer zone" belonging to the Russian Federation. A cap on the Armed Forces of Ukraine at 600,000 personnel. No NATO, vague US security guarantees that would lapse if Ukraine were judged to have provoked renewed Russian aggression.

A map of what Ukrainian territory would be recognized as Russian within Trump's 28-point plan

No internal Russian veto. Just Russia keeping what it took, plus binding limits on what Ukraine could do to defend itself afterwards.

The mechanism is different. The trap Bosnia describes is the same. Any peace deal that rewards the aggressor—whether with a seat at the domestic table or with a slice of stolen territory—and that constrains the victim's future capacity to integrate westward or defend itself, produces the same end state: a frozen conflict, blocked EU and NATO accession, ongoing destabilization, and a country that spends the next 30 years running interference against the power that tried to destroy it.

Bosnia got the entity-veto version. Ukraine is being offered the territorial-amputation version. The architecture differs. The frozen-conflict end-state is identical. And Bosnia's Russian-backed Serb leader Milorad Dodik is threatening secession right now—proof that 30 years of "peace" still ends with the same gun on the same table.

Karčić is not the first Bosnian voice to make this case. His compatriot Hamza Karčić, a political scientist at the University of Sarajevo, wrote in Al Jazeera in November 2022 that a Dayton-style settlement would render Ukraine, like Bosnia, "deeply dysfunctional"—exploited by Russia through a local client. Three and a half years on, with the 28-point plan in active negotiation, that warning has only sharpened.

Explore further

America’s new Ukraine map looks like Putin drew it himself

"The 'international community' is a vague term, almost non-existent"

Karčić was equally pointed about the actors who would broker any such deal. "We placed too much trust in the international community thinking that they will solve our problems without us taking the initiative to do the same thing," he said. "Now, with the United States pulling out of Europe generally, the EU is lost. They have no common policy. They don't know where they're heading. They have no common approach to the Balkans at all, nor to Ukraine."

His verdict on the phrase itself was unsparing: "The 'international community' is a very vague term, almost non-existent."

For Ukrainians watching the same Western capitals that once promised "as long as it takes" pivot toward "a deal," that line lands differently than it does in Sarajevo. It lands as recognition.

What Bosnia did not have

There is one thing Bosnia did not have in 1995, however, that Ukraine still does.

"I'm fascinated by what Ukraine does, in the sense that it accepts support from the West, it knows exactly what it wants to achieve, but it has maintained its own agency in dealing with its enemy and the perpetrators of this war," Karčić told the room.

"It hasn't allowed international actors to direct or dictate where it wants to head, or [actors] who would have different competing agendas which may not always be in the best interests of this country."

In 1995, Bosnia did not have that latitude. Its capital had been under siege for nearly four years. Its army was outgunned. Srebrenica had fallen four months before Dayton, and more than 8,000 Bosniak men and boys had been murdered by forces that would, weeks later, sit across a negotiating table in Ohio and receive their entity as a reward.

Explore further

Ukraine’s victory plan is dead, killed by Russian nuclear mind games

The Bosnian government signed because US negotiator Richard Holbrooke offered it a choice between bad and worse.

Ukraine in 2026 is not in that position. It still controls its capital. Its army has held back—and in many places pushed back—the largest land army in Europe for four years. It still chooses its own ministers, sets its own war aims, and decides what it will and will not accept. Whatever pressure now comes from Washington or Brussels, that latitude is what makes Karčić's warning useful rather than retrospective.

Bosnia could not refuse. Ukraine still can.

Hungary’s new government summons Russian envoy after strike on Zakarpattia

Alexander Moisseenko — Wed, 13 May 2026 19:33:34 +0000

Hungary will summon Russia's ambassador on 14 May over the previous day's drone strikes on Zakarpattia Oblast, Prime Minister Péter Magyar announced after the first meeting of his new government on 13 May.

This is the first time a Hungarian government has called in Russia's envoy over an attack on Zakarpattia—the Ukrainian region bordering Hungary. Under Viktor Orbán's foreign minister Péter Szijjártó, the previous government stayed silent through earlier Russian strikes near the Hungarian border, drawing repeated criticism from independent Hungarian outlets.

Russian drones hit five targets across the oblast. They damaged a transformer and a railway station in Svaliava and an industrial facility in Uzhhorod, Foreign Minister Anita Orbán reported. The ambassador is due at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 14 May.

Explore further

Russia is hitting Ukraine’s Zakarpattia Oblast, bordering Hungary with drones, for first time. Expert says this is linked to end of Orbán’s era

"The Hungarian government strongly condemns the Russian attack on Zakarpattia Oblast," Magyar said.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha thanked Anita Orbán for the speed of her condemnation.

Magyar identified Russia as the aggressor throughout his campaign, breaking with Orbán's pro-Kremlin rhetoric. He traveled to Kyiv in July 2024 to deliver humanitarian aid after Russia struck the Okhmatdyt children's hospital, and before April's election he sent an open letter to Moscow's ambassador in Budapest invoking Hungary's 1956 uprising against Soviet rule, after his party accused Russian operatives of interfering in the campaign. He has pledged to end Hungary's veto on the EU's €90 billion Ukraine aid package, while ruling out Hungarian weapons transfers and opposing Kyiv's fast-tracked EU accession.

Ukrainian analysts linked the timing of Russia's Zakarpattia strikes to the end of Orbán's era—a message from Moscow that the protection no longer applies. Magyar answered with his first foreign-policy act in office. The ambassador he is summoning is the same one he wrote to in opposition.

The Zakarpattia oblast holds Ukraine's largest ethnic Hungarian community—roughly 150,000 people whose defense Orbán made central to Hungarian foreign policy for sixteen years. At 11:30 on Thursday, the Russian ambassador will hear what Magyar's government has to say about them.

BBC: 184 sanctioned Russian tankers made 238 journeys through UK waters since the PM’s March intercept threat

Yuri Zoria — Tue, 12 May 2026 14:13:21 +0000

Sanctioned Russian shadow tankers continue transiting UK waters despite Britain's March threat to intercept them, BBC Verify found. No boardings have been publicly confirmed by British forces. A former Royal Navy commander described the inaction as "pathetic."

Russia's shadow fleet has tripled since 2022, now transporting most of Russia's seaborne oil exports, according to Ukrainian intelligence. With international sanctions not covering all of the fleet, Ukraine has resorted to occasional "kinetic sanctions" — direct naval drone strikes on shadow fleet tankers — where Western legal frameworks fail.

Contents

184 vessels, 238 journeys, 94 crossings into territorial waters

184 vessels, 238 journeys, 94 crossings into territorial waters

BBC Verify tracked all 184 vessels using MarineTraffic data between 25 March and 11 May. In at least 94 instances, ships briefly crossed into UK territorial waters within 12 nautical miles of the coast. All 238 journeys took place inside the UK's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which extends up to 200 nautical miles. The vessels included 173 oil tankers, 10 liquified natural gas (LNG) tankers, and one multipurpose offshore vessel. Most journeys passed through the English Channel.

All 184 ships appear on the Foreign Office sanctions list for links to Russia. The sanctions ban the vessels from UK ports and bar British firms from providing financial, insurance, or brokerage services. They do not, however, bar the ships from passing through UK waters.

A Russian warship appears to have escorted the sanctioned oil tanker Universal through UK waters, satellite imagery shows. Intelligence firm MAIAR identified the warship as highly likely the Russian frigate Admiral Grigorovich. The tanker entered UK waters in the early hours of 8 April before transiting the Channel.

The route of the Universal tanker and Russian frigate Admiral Grigorovich through the UK's Exclusive Economic Zone, 7-8 April 2026. Map: BBC Verify

MoD says it is "disrupting and deterring"

BBC Verify asked the Ministry of Defence (MoD) whether British forces had intercepted any sanctioned vessels since 25 March. The MoD did not directly answer. It said it was "disrupting and deterring" shadow fleet vessels. It had also "challenged" more than 700 suspected ships since October 2024. The MoD declined to specify what "challenging" means or to comment on specific operations.

Explore further

EU’s 21st Russia sanctions package will target the shadow fleet, banks, and firms selling stolen Ukrainian grain—Politico

Former Royal Navy warship commander Tom Sharpe called the lack of boardings "utterly confusing" and "pathetic." "We have the military capability, whether that's warships, boarding teams, Customs and Excise," Sharpe said. "We've got no maritime spine in us."

Shadow fleet

Russia gathered the shadow fleet after the 2022 full-scale invasion to bypass G7 oil price caps and other Western sanctions. The fleet now exceeds 1,100 tankers, according to Ukrainian data. Most vessels are aging tankers operating under flags of convenience, with hidden ownership chains and frequent AIS tracking shutdowns. Russia uses them to move over 60% of its seaborne oil exports, Kyiv assessed.

Explore further

“Kinetic sanctions” in action: Two more Russian shadow fleet tankers hit at Novorossiysk — the second naval drone strike in five days

International sanctions have tried to keep pace. The EU's 20th package, adopted in April, added 46 vessels to its blacklist, bringing the total to 632 ships. The EU's 21st package, expected in June or July, will further target the fleet. Ukraine itself sanctioned 656 vessels in a single December 2025 decree, the largest single package on record.

Ukraine has also resorted to direct action. Naval and aerial drones have struck shadow fleet tankers in the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and off the Senegal coast. Kyiv calls these "kinetic sanctions." War-risk insurance for shadow fleet vessels has tripled following the strikes.

What it means when Russia starts picking the EU’s negotiator—and what Brussels said back

Peeter Helme — Mon, 11 May 2026 13:04:37 +0000

Russia has begun negotiating about who negotiates. Moscow has spent years demanding Ukraine give up land its army has failed to take. Now it is also trying to pick who sits across the table from it. On Sunday, the EU said no.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, speaking to reporters in Brussels on 11 May, rejected Vladimir Putin’s proposal to install former German chancellor Gerhard Schröder as Europe’s negotiator with Moscow. Schröder, she said, had been “a high-ranking lobbyist for Russian state companies.”

After the 9 May Victory Day parade, Putin floated Schröder’s name.

If he negotiated for the EU, he would “sit on both sides of the table.” Letting Russia name the EU’s negotiator, she added, would be “not very wise.”

The proposal had come from a Red Square podium two days earlier. After the 9 May Victory Day parade, Putin floated Schröder’s name, saying Europe should send a negotiator who “didn’t say nasty things” about Russia.

Explore further

Contents

Slovak Prime Minister: Zelenskyy should call Putin if he wants a meeting

Slovak Prime Minister: Zelenskyy should call Putin if he wants a meeting

Schröder—personal friend of Putin, former chair of Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2 boards, former Rosneft board member until 2022—fit the description. His post-chancellorship career on the boards of Russian state companies became so emblematic of Russian elite capture that commentators coined a term for it: Schröderization.

Russia negotiates about who negotiates

Opponents don’t usually pick each other’s negotiators. Russia is testing whether it can.

Schröder is not the first name Moscow has tried to place at the table. In February, Russia sent Vladimir Medinsky to Geneva—a historian-ideologue whose role, British analysts argued, was designed to make Ukrainian and Western counterparts walk away so Russia could blame them for the collapse.

The Schröder proposal extends the same playbook from the opposite direction. If Russia cannot dictate the demands, it can try to shape the room.

Eight dates that turned Gerhard Schröder’s name into shorthand for Russian elite capture—and explain why Kallas refused to let Moscow pick Europe’s negotiator on 11 May. Chart: Euromaidan Press, Tagesspiegel, DW, Reuters, Der Spiegel. Made with Claude

Berlin said no. Then floated a duo.

The German government rejected Schröder before Kallas did. Berlin called the proposal a Scheinangebot—a sham offer.

Then Tagesspiegel reported the SPD–CDU/CSU ruling coalition was discussing a “Schröder-Steinmeier duo,” pairing the ex-chancellor with sitting Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who, as foreign minister during the Minsk years, faced his own criticism for accommodation toward Moscow. Berlin’s view: Schröder could not handle the role alone, but with Steinmeier it might be “an interesting option.”

“If one of the conditions is the participation of a former chancellor, this should be carefully examined.”

SPD foreign policy spokesman Adis Ahmetović was the dissenter: “Our goal must be to sit at the negotiating table. If one of the conditions is the participation of a former chancellor, this should be carefully examined.”

Steinmeier’s term as president expires in early 2027. A short runway, if it goes anywhere.

The pressure goes one way

Kallas’ rejection lands as Putin’s aide Yuri Ushakov told state TV that US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner would visit Moscow “soon enough” to continue the dialogue.

Ushakov also restated Moscow’s core demand: Ukrainian withdrawal from the parts of Donetsk Oblast its army has failed to take, including Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. “Until Ukraine takes that step, we can hold several more rounds, dozens of rounds of negotiations, but we’ll be stuck in the same place,” he said.

Every move in the talks is tactical, not transformative.

Mediators describe a moment of ripeness—the point at which battlefield or economic pressure forces a real shift in position. Russia has not reached one. Until it does, every move in the talks is tactical, not transformative. Including, now, the move to nominate who should sit on the other side.

Portugal just hit highest defense-industry growth since 1986. Its defense minister links boom to Russia’s war

Olena Mukhina — Mon, 11 May 2026 12:18:09 +0000

Portugal’s defense sector is rapidly expanding, Wiedomostri reports. According to estimates from the Ministry of Defense, Defense Minister Nuno Melo links the sharp growth of the industry to the war in Ukraine and to the increasing security risks to the EU posed by Russia.

Portugal has been an ally of Ukraine since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion and confirms its full support for the country’s path toward the EU. Lisbon also contributes to the PURL mechanism that facilitates arms purchases from the US for Ukraine.

Between January 2025 and April 2026, nearly 100 new companies related to the arms industry were created in the country. In total, their number has reached around 450. It's the highest level since Portugal joined the EU in 1986.

Contents

Record budget includes +€3.8 billion and a 23% increase in spending

Record budget includes +€3.8 billion and a 23% increase in spending

In October last year, the Portuguese government, led by Prime Minister Luís Montenegro, announced a record increase in military spending for 2026.

The defense budget rose by nearly €3.8 billion, representing a 23.2% increase compared to 2025.

New EU defense market: Portuguese companies involved in 17 European projects

Portuguese defense companies are currently participating in 17 projects developed by the European Union in the field of armaments. This is another signal of growing activity by national enterprises in EU-level defense initiatives

“These projects include, among others, drones, combat systems, and airspace technologies,” wrote Expresso.

Expresso also noted that of the 450 entities operating directly in Portugal’s defense sector, the vast majority are small and medium-sized enterprises. The weekly publication added that only in the first quarter of 2026 did several new companies enter the sector.

Earlier, Portugal hosted the REPMUS/Dynamic Messenger 25 exercises. Ukraine also participated in the drills, serving as the Opposing Force (OPFOR).

Not just participants — Ukraine commands NATO’s simulated enemy for first time in history at Portugal naval drills

The Ukrainian combat system DELTA served as the exercise management platform, integrating participants’ efforts and ensuring effective coordination across joint operations. It managed over 100 sea, underwater, land, and aerial drones.

Trump’s State Department refused to recognize Lukashenka in 2020. Today he’s a “friend.”

Alexander Moisseenko — Mon, 11 May 2026 11:14:28 +0000

US President Donald Trump publicly called Aliaksandr Lukashenka his "friend" on Sunday, thanking the Belarusian dictator after a multi-country deal freed three Polish citizens from Belarusian detention and two Moldovans from Russian detention. Among those released was journalist Andrzej Poczobut, holder of the European Union's top human rights honor.

"Thank you to President Aliaksandr Lukashenka for his cooperation and friendship. So nice!" Trump wrote on Truth Social, crediting his Special Envoy John Coale.

The friendship language tracks a year-long pattern. Roughly 500 prisoners have walked out of Belarusian jails since the Trump administration opened talks with Minsk. Several rounds of US sanctions relief have put Belarus's state airline, potash giants, and most of its financial system back in the dollar economy — including, in March, a state bank that Belarusian defectors have documented as financing the 152mm artillery shells Russia fires at Ukraine.

The greeting also marks an escalation in tone. When Trump first called Lukashenka in August 2025 — only the second time in 31 years of his rule that the Belarusian leader had spoken to an American president — he described him as "the highly respected President." Nine months later, "highly respected" has become "friend."

Contents

Who walked out

Who walked out

Poczobut, a correspondent for the Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza and a leader of Belarus's Polish minority, had been serving an eight-year sentence since 2021 on charges widely seen as politically motivated. He was awarded the Sakharov Prize, the EU's top human rights honor, while in prison. Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski described him as a symbol of the Belarusian fight for freedom.

The deal also freed Grzegorz Gawel, a Carmelite friar from Kraków, and a Belarusian national who had worked with Polish intelligence services. Polish officials did not publicly identify the intelligence officer. Poland sent three people in the other direction as part of the arrangement, foreign-ministry officials told reporters. Two Moldovan citizens were released alongside them — from Russian, not Belarusian, prisons. That is the part of the announcement that suggests Lukashenka is now functioning as Moscow's broker as well as his own.

According to the human rights group Viasna, 848 political prisoners remained in Belarusian jails as of 7 May, before Sunday's release. New arrests continue: Viasna recognized 51 additional people as political prisoners in January 2026 alone.

Explore further

The Hermitage archaeologist Ukraine wanted to try is back in Russia—Kyiv calls it a propaganda gift to Moscow

The White House offer

A meeting with Trump is on the table. Coale told the Financial Times in March that internal discussions about inviting Lukashenka to the White House or to Mar-a-Lago had been ongoing "for several months." Lukashenka himself said Trump had invited him to Florida. No date is set.

If it happens, it would be Lukashenka's first official US visit and a diplomatic prize the 71-year-old has chased for decades — particularly since the fraud-marred 2020 election that the previous Trump administration refused to recognize.

What three rounds did not touch

Since September 2025, the US and Belarus have engaged in a series of prisoner-for-sanctions exchanges in which Washington gradually eased sanctions in return for the release of political prisoners. None of the sanctions rollbacks have affected the Belarusian conduct most directly tied to the war in Ukraine.

Belarus still hosts Russian Shahed drone relays. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, announcing Ukraine's February sanctions package against Lukashenka's inner circle, said the relays "correct and coordinate" attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Russian tactical nuclear weapons remain on Belarusian soil — the first such deployment outside Russia since the Cold War. In December 2025, Russia stationed its Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile system at the Krichev-6 base in eastern Belarus, putting most of Europe within strike range from launchers under Russian command.

And then there is Belinvestbank.

The state bank, freed by US Treasury general license in March, has — according to an investigation by the Belarusian defectors group Belpol — provided loans to Belarusian state enterprises producing components for 152mm artillery shells and 122mm rockets. These are the rounds Russian forces use daily against Ukraine. The same bank, Belpol documented, finances Integral, a microelectronics maker whose chips have been pulled from Russian cruise missiles striking Ukrainian power infrastructure. It also finances a newer ammunition facility near Slutsk whose own loan records list Russia as the primary market.

Explore further

“A direct investment in ammunition flying across the border”: Belarusian defectors warn US sanctions relief is funding Russia’s war

The charm offensive

Lithuania's defense ministry, in its 2026 annual threat assessment, concluded that Belarus uses prisoner releases to charm the West while continuing to act as a Russian instrument of intimidation against neighboring states. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the exiled opposition leader who won the 2020 election by every credible independent count and lost it by Lukashenka's official one, said in December that the dictator "hasn't changed his policies, his crackdown continues, and he keeps on supporting Russia's war against Ukraine."

The Carnegie Endowment's Belarus analysts noted after Trump's first call with Lukashenka that the Belarusian leader appears to be playing some sort of intermediary role between Trump and Putin — Coale himself said the US had used Lukashenka to convey messages to Moscow. Trump's August call came hours before his summit with Putin in Alaska. Sunday's deal — in which Moldovans walked out of Russian detention as part of a Lukashenka-brokered exchange — suggests the channel is still live.

What "friend" buys

Around 500 political prisoners were released over the past year. A Sakharov laureate at home with his family in Poland. These are real outcomes, and the Belarusian opposition has thanked the Coale team for the work.

Andrei Padniabenny and Valiantsin Shtermer will not be in the next batch. The two political prisoners died in Belarusian custody in 2025 of unknown causes, according to Human Rights Watch. Pastor Aleh Loika, still in prison, is in deteriorating health. The bank that funds the shells is back online.

So is the friendship.

France arrests Russia’s war criminal who ran torture at “Donetsk Dachau” and has been living under refugee status for years

Olena Mukhina — Sat, 09 May 2026 21:03:04 +0000

France has detained a member of the Donetsk People's Republic, a pro-Russian terrorist organization, acting in Ukraine's eastern regions. Ukraine's Security Service and the Office of the Prosecutor General assisted in the operation.

According to investigators, he is implicated in torture carried out in the illegal Donetsk detention facility “Izolyatsiya.” Ukrainian law enforcement agencies reported this.

“Izolyatsiya” is a notorious prison facility in Donetsk, where people are tortured simply for being Ukrainian. Journalist Stanislav Aseyev, who survived imprisonment there, described it as “a threshold beyond which a person feels like God while behaving like the devil.”

Aseyev also referred to “Izolyatsiya” as a concentration camp, a “Donetsk Dachau,” and claimed that in occupied Donetsk, there were at least ten additional unofficial places of detention.

Contents

Assistant to “Izolyatsiya” leadership: torture, coercion, and forced confessions

Assistant to “Izolyatsiya” leadership: torture, coercion, and forced confessions

The investigation established that in 2017–2019, the suspect voluntarily cooperated with representatives of the pro-Russian illegal entity and served as an assistant to the leadership of the illegal prison in occupied Donetsk.

He participated in torture, cruel treatment of detainees, psychological pressure, and forcing “required” confessions. At least nine victims have currently been documented.

Escape to EU and international investigation: France opens its own case

In 2021, after the Security Service completed its investigation and transferred the case to court, the accused left Ukraine and traveled to France, where he attempted to obtain refugee status.

Following appeals from Ukrainian prosecutors and human rights organizations, including Truth Hounds, French law enforcement opened its own criminal proceedings.

Arrest and war crimes charges: case under Paris court supervision

As part of a joint investigation by Ukrainian and French investigators, the man was arrested. By decision of the French National Anti-Terrorism Prosecutor’s Office, he was taken into custody and charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity. The investigation is ongoing under the supervision of a specialized unit of the Paris court.

300 defense factories, 500,000 workers: North Korea’s arms industry reaches records amid Russia’s demand for shells in war

Olena Mukhina — Sat, 09 May 2026 13:49:29 +0000

North Korea has announced a sharp increase in artillery ammunition production amid large-scale arms supplies to Russia for its war against Ukraine, according to Defense Express.

Pyongyang claims that current shell output has reached the highest level in the country’s history.

This was reported by the state-run Korean Central News Agency following a visit by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to one of the country’s defense factories.

Contents

Official claims from Pyongyang tell record shell production

Official claims from Pyongyang tell record shell production

North Korean authorities claim the factory has doubled its previous ammunition production record and that current output is four times the average.

They also announced a large-scale modernization of the defense industry and an acceleration of military-sector development. However, analysts note that these figures are part of official state propaganda and are difficult to verify independently.

1 and 6 million shells and rockets to Russia

Despite doubts about exact production volumes, the fact of active weapons supplies from North Korea to Russia is confirmed by both Western and Ukrainian assessments.

According to available data, between September 2023 and April 2025, North Korea may have transferred between 1 and 6 million shells and rockets to Russia. Some of these supplies came from stockpiles, while Pyongyang is also simultaneously expanding its own production capacity.

Analysts note that the term “ammunition” may include not only artillery shells, but also mortar rounds, multiple rocket launcher (MLRS) rockets, and other types of munitions.

300 defense factories may be operating in North Korea

Experts estimate that around 300 defense factories may be operating in North Korea, employing approximately 500,000 people.

In addition to ammunition, North Korea is also supplying Russia with artillery systems and missile weapons, including M-1989 self-propelled artillery units, multiple launch rocket systems, ballistic missiles, and anti-tank systems.

Earlier, North Korean troops took part in the military parade on Red Square in Moscow for the first time on 9 May.

They marched as a separate column, becoming one of the most notable signals of this year’s event.

Bulgaria approves new cabinet led by Rumen Radev — the ex-president who called Crimea Russian

Maria Tril — Fri, 08 May 2026 09:05:06 +0000

The Bulgarian parliament on 8 May approved the structure and lineup of a new cabinet headed by Rumen Radev, the former president known for pro-Russian statements, Nova.bg reports.

A total of 124 lawmakers — all from Progressive Bulgaria — backed Radev's candidacy and the proposed structure of the Council of Ministers. Seventy voted against, and 36 abstained. The newly elected prime minister, deputy prime ministers, and ministers were sworn in inside the parliament chamber shortly after the vote.

The candidacy was presented by the head of the Progressive Bulgaria parliamentary faction, Petar Vitanov, who delivered an emotional speech arguing that Radev's appointment marks the return of "normality in Bulgarian politics," together with the values of valor, honor, trust, and solidarity.

Velislava Petrova-Chamova was confirmed as foreign minister in the new cabinet, while Dimitar Stoyanov takes over the defense portfolio.

Presidential elections

This was Bulgaria's eighth parliamentary election in five years and the latest snap poll in a prolonged political crisis that has produced a series of short-lived governments. The vote followed mass protests in December 2025 — described by the BBC as the largest demonstrations in a decade — directed against corruption, demanding the restoration of the rule of law, and rejecting a draft budget that envisaged tax increases. The protests brought down the GERB government of Rosen Zhelyazkov.

Radev, 62, a former MiG-29 pilot and commander-in-chief of the Bulgarian Air Force, served as president from 2017 until January 2026, when he resigned to lead the new left-leaning grouping Progressive Bulgaria. The BBC has described him as "a pragmatic, somewhat pro-Russian leader, who has criticised EU sanctions, and called for constructive dialogue with the Kremlin."

Since 2022, Radev has repeatedly opposed the sale of Bulgaria's Soviet-era weapons stockpiles to Ukraine, arguing that such transfers prolong a war Ukraine cannot win. In the summer of 2023, he said Ukraine was insisting on continuing the war while "the bills for it are being paid by all of Europe," and later described a Ukrainian victory over Russia as impossible.

After casting his ballot in Sofia on 19 April, Radev called for "a democratic, modern, European Bulgaria" and said he hoped for "practical relations with Russia, based on mutual respect and equal treatment." In his victory speech, as reported by The Guardian, he said Progressive Bulgaria had achieved "an indisputable victory — a victory of hope over distrust, a victory of freedom over fear," adding that "Europe has become a victim of its own ambitions to be a moral leader in the world with new rules."

Radev's victory came one week after Hungary's 12 April election ended the 16-year rule of another EU opponent of Ukraine, Viktor Orbán. In early April, Politico reported that Bulgaria had asked the European Union for help countering Russian interference ahead of the vote.

Bulgaria has been an important supplier of ammunition and explosives to Ukraine via third countries, particularly neighboring Romania. In October 2025, Germany's Rheinmetall announced a €1 billion joint venture with the VMZ plant in Sopot to produce up to 100,000 155mm artillery shells a year, with a separate gunpowder plant also planned at the site; Rheinmetall holds a 51% stake. Radev took credit for inviting Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger to Bulgaria in March 2025. On a visit to the company's headquarters in Unterlüss in August 2025, he said: "Bulgaria is becoming part of the European defence ecosystem."

A 26-year-old Russian flew into Argentina to break Milei. He’s not flying out

Alexander Moisseenko — Thu, 07 May 2026 12:39:38 +0000

Argentine intelligence agents arrested 26-year-old Russian Dmitry Novikov they describe as a senior figure in "La Compañía"—the Kremlin-linked influence network that spent $283,000 in 2024 placing fabricated stories against President Javier Milei in retaliation for his support of Ukraine.

Novikov's arrest is the first physical capture of a senior figure in Russia's Wagner-successor influence apparatus, and the clearest window yet into what Kremlin retaliation against pro-Ukraine governments now looks like: paid articles, fabricated scandals, and mobile operatives circulating through allied territory.

A joint operation by the Federal Police, the State Intelligence Secretariat (SIDE), and the National Migration Directorate seized Dmitry Novikov on 1 May at a house in Lanús, a southern suburb of Buenos Aires, after monitoring him for roughly two weeks. He had entered the country on 12 April from Istanbul, listed as a tourist. Buenos Aires had publicly exposed the network's local cell in June 2025, naming Russian residents Lev Andriashvili and Irina Yakovenko as its operators, as Euromaidan Press reported at the time. A leaked archive of 76 internal documents published in April 2026 by openDemocracy, Filtraleaks, and partner outlets then showed how the operation worked: La Compañía paid for at least 250 articles across more than 20 Argentine digital outlets between June and October 2024—making Argentina its single largest target across Africa and Latin America during August 2024.

Contents

Caught in Lanús

Caught in Lanús

Security Minister Alejandra Monteoliva announced the arrest in a video posted on social media, calling Novikov "a threat to the democratic order" who "came to operate, destabilize, and attack our institutions." Federal Judge Julián Ercolini of Federal Criminal and Correctional Court No. 12 ordered preventive detention pending deportation, citing flight risk and national-security concerns. Migration officials cancelled Novikov's transit residency, ordered his expulsion, and imposed a permanent re-entry ban, finding he had "denatured the reasons that justified his entry."

He had originally booked a return flight to Brazil one week after arrival. He never used it, instead extending his stay in Lanús for nearly three weeks. Argentine intelligence had been tracking him since mid-April, when his presence was linked to the La Compañía structure.

A traveling operative

Explore further

Argentina uncovers suspected Russian spy network linked to disinformation efforts

Novikov was born in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, in Russia's Far East, and received both his Russian passports in the Moscow region—in 2019 and 2022. Over the past two years he has cycled through Chile, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Panama, and Brazil. The Dominican Republic deported him in September 2025, with that country's prosecutor general saying Novikov ran "a cyber-influence network linked to the Lakhta or La Compañía project, based in Russia and dedicated to creating and spreading digital content focused on political disinformation campaigns."

Ukraine's Center for Countering Disinformation, citing the Netherlands' Military Intelligence and Security Service, tied Novikov's network to Russian intelligence services and to the Wagner private military company.

From Africa to Argentina

La Compañía—"The Company"—is the post-Prigozhin successor to Wagner's information arm. It is associated with Lakhta, is the same structure US prosecutors named in the 2018 indictments over interference in the 2016 US election. Argentina's intelligence service detected the local cell in 2024 and referred the case to the judiciary in October 2025.

The leaked April 2026 archive—76 Russian-language documents totaling 1,431 pages, obtained by the African outlet The Continent and analyzed by a consortium that included openDemocracy, iStories, the Dossier Center, Forbidden Stories, and Argentina's Filtraleaks—showed how the campaign ran. Between June and October 2024, La Compañía spent at least $283,100 placing more than 250 articles in 23 Argentine digital outlets, paying between $350 and $3,100 per article. The content blended real grievances about Milei's austerity cuts with fabricated stories. One planted piece claimed Milei had sent a sabotage team to attack a Chilean gas pipeline. Another accused him of buying $64,000 worth of Cartier collars for his cloned dogs in the United States.

Many articles carried no byline. Some appeared under fictitious identities with AI-generated photos. Most editors at the targeted outlets denied receiving any payment; intermediaries told reporters the money came from Argentine businesspeople "worried about national industry."

Why Argentina, why Milei

The campaign's timing tracks Milei's Ukraine policy. The Argentine president took office in December 2023 with Volodymyr Zelenskyy at his inauguration, joined the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, and called off Argentina's planned BRICS accession—moves Euromaidan Press covered at the time. La Compañía launched its Argentine workstream in April 2024. August 2024 became the operation's biggest spending month anywhere, bigger than any African target.

The leaked materials show La Compañía also analyzed Argentina's military-industrial complex, mapped its Antarctic oil resources, profiled opposition figures, and drew up plans to support opposition candidates in Argentina's 2025 legislative elections. One workstream pushed legislation aimed at blocking Argentina's adhesion to the Ukraine Defense Contact Group.

The campaign appears to have wound down after January 2025, when the second Trump administration distanced Washington from Kyiv and Argentina abstained from a UN resolution demanding Russian withdrawal. The Kremlin's most expensive Latin American operation got what it paid for. None of its local operators have stood trial.

A widening front

Ukraine's Center for Countering Disinformation framed Novikov's arrest as confirmation that Moscow is extending its information war into every region where governments side with Kyiv, using shadow structures and manipulated public opinion. The detention itself confirms what the leaked documents implied—La Compañía's expansion into Latin America in 2024 was systematic, well-funded, and run by mobile operatives. Novikov passed through at least five Latin American countries in two years before being expelled from one and arrested in the next.

Russia's embassy in Buenos Aires has called the openDemocracy investigation "anti-Russian material" and rejected the disinformation accusations.

The bilateral relationship still allows Russian citizens visa-free entry to Argentina under a 2009 agreement that remains in force. Novikov used it.

Russia is waging a long war against the West. Switzerland’s spies say it is escalating.

Maria Tril — Wed, 06 May 2026 16:07:19 +0000

Switzerland's Federal Intelligence Service (NDB) has named Russia the biggest threat to security, stability, and peace in Europe, with ambitions extending well beyond Ukraine, Yevropeiska Pravda reports, citing the agency's annual report and the Swiss government's accompanying assessment.

The report states that Switzerland's security situation has deteriorated significantly in recent years, and again over the past year.

Contents

Hybrid campaign against the West

Hybrid campaign against the West

According to the Swiss government, Moscow is waging a broad and long-term confrontation with the West using hybrid means. Russia, Bern says, "seeks to restore its influence in Eastern Europe and as a global player, as well as to establish itself as a great power."

The NDB assesses that this confrontation is intensifying. Sabotage, influence operations, propaganda, and disinformation are listed among the instruments Moscow employs.

The report describes how Switzerland itself is exposed: "Switzerland is directly affected primarily by cyberattacks, prohibited intelligence activity, weapons proliferation efforts, as well as influence and disinformation activity." According to the document, Russia has developed a comprehensive strategy to circumvent the sanctions imposed on it by Western states.

The report also addresses Russia's revisionist intentions, its war economy, mass rearmament, and the threat it poses to Europe.

Doubts about US commitment

The Swiss government notes that since the administration of US President Donald Trump took office last year, it is no longer certain that the United States will continue to defend Europe's security and defense. Many European states are now seeking to strengthen the continent's defense capabilities, the assessment continues, but it remains unclear whether this will be sufficient for deterrence and self-defense.

Beyond Russia, the document points to the threat of terrorism, which the NDB says still emanates primarily from jihadists — particularly individuals or small cells capable of attacking civilians with simple means.

A wider European intelligence consensus

Bern's assessment lines up with a broader picture from European intelligence services. The Netherlands' Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) reports in its 2025 annual report, published on 21 April 2026, that Russia could generate enough combat power to initiate a regional conflict against NATO within a year of the end of hostilities in Ukraine, under circumstances most favorable to Moscow.

While Russia continues to fight in Ukraine, a conventional war against NATO is "virtually ruled out," the Dutch service writes. At the same time, "Russia is already taking concrete preparatory steps for a possible conflict with NATO," according to the MIVD.

The objective of such a conflict, the report says, would not be to defeat NATO militarily. The MIVD states that Moscow would aim to use limited territorial gains to pull NATO apart politically — "if necessary under the threat of nuclear weapons use."

Germany's BND and Bundeswehr have reported that Moscow is preparing for a potential "large-scale conventional war" with NATO by the end of the decade, with Defense Minister Boris Pistorius citing 2028–2029 as a possible timeline. Denmark's FE has warned that Russia could be ready for a regional war against the Baltic states within two years of Ukraine hostilities ending, and a large-scale European war within five. Estonia's Foreign Intelligence Service notes that no attack is intended in 2026 but flags long-term force reconstitution, mass drone integration, and expanded troop deployments along NATO's eastern flank. The commander of the Estonian Armed Forces, Andrus Merilo, has named 2027 as the nearest horizon at which Russia could be ready for new aggression after a potential end to the Russo-Ukrainian war.

Why the Kremlin sees the war as existential

The MIVD frames the war in Ukraine as part of a long-standing Russian effort to fundamentally reshape Europe's security architecture and the international legal order. According to the service, the war has an existential character for the Russian regime: the report states it is not only about territory, but above all about Russia's position in the world and the future of the Russian nation, culture, and what the MIVD calls "appropriated traditional values."

Internal and external security of the Russian state are described by the MIVD as inseparable, with the liberal-democratic value system presented by Moscow as a threat to internal stability and to the leadership's grip on power

Europe spent two years waiting for US Tomahawks. Ukraine spent them building its own.

Peeter Helme — Tue, 05 May 2026 16:36:54 +0000

Donald Trump just scrapped Europe’s Tomahawk deployment in Germany. The only producer in Europe with comparable long-range strike capability is the country bombed every night by Russia. Estonia’s former defense chief, MEP Riho Terras, said it on national radio on 5 May: stop blaming Washington and look at Kyiv for a solution.

Stop blaming Washington and look at Kyiv for a solution.

The Pentagon’s withdrawal of 5,000 US troops from Germany, announced on 1 May with deeper cuts threatened in Italy and Spain, was the headline blow. The bigger one came alongside it: the cancellation of a planned US Tomahawk battalion that Joe Biden and then-chancellor Olaf Scholz had announced for 2027 as a temporary bridge until Europe could field its own systems. Defense Minister Boris Pistorius has now publicly admitted the cancellation “tears this capability gap open again.”

Contents

An obvious answer

An obvious answer

Riho Terras at the European Parliament during a joint debate on defense, 10 March 2026. Photo: Philippe Buissin / © European Union 2026.

That gap, Terras told Vikerraadio, has an obvious answer few in Brussels will say out loud.

“Attention should be turned to Ukraine, which… is slowly but surely developing such a long-range capability, as we see from fires in various energy centers in Russia,” he said.

Ukraine’s domestically built Flamingo and Long Neptune cruise missiles have hit Russian oil refineries and ammunition depots 1,000 km behind the front line.

Explore further

Frontline report: Ukraine’s missile production surge tears through Russian strategic targets

And Kyiv just opened formal arms exports under a “Drone Deals” framework—with joint production lines in Denmark, Finland, and Slovakia, export offices in Berlin and Copenhagen, and 10-year defense deals with three Gulf states.

Giving the cards away

The canceled Tomahawks, Terras said, are exactly what Vladimir Putin has been demanding throughout US-Russia negotiations. By scrapping the deployment, “Trump is giving away one of his cards”—far worse, in Terras’s view, than the troop pullout itself.

If Europe wants long-range deterrence against Russia, the production lines are already running.

European governments accusing Washington of “all the sins of the world,” he argued, should commit at least 3% to 5% of GDP to defense before lecturing the United States, which still provides roughly half of NATO’s military power.

For a former chief of the Estonian Defense Forces, the logic is simple: if Europe wants long-range deterrence against Russia, the production lines are already running—and the export door is open—in Ukraine.

Europe’s defenses arrive in 2030. Putin’s window opens now

Alexander Moisseenko — Mon, 04 May 2026 14:57:46 +0000

On 30 April, the US announced it was withdrawing 5,000 troops from Germany. US President Donald Trump threatened the same for Italy and Spain. Meanwhile, European defense officials and lawmakers say the next year or two, while the bloc is still rearming and Trump is in the White House, is when they expect Russia to test the alliance, according to Politico.

European officials have warned for two years that Russia could test NATO before the bloc finishes rearming. The US troop withdrawal and 2030 EU readiness target make that window present, not future.

"Something could happen very soon—there is a Russian window of opportunity," Mika Aaltola, a Finnish center-right MEP on the European Parliament's foreign affairs committee, told the publication.

The EU's Defense Readiness Roadmap aims for 2030. That's four years away. The two timelines don't match. They haven't matched for some time.

What ran in Politico this week is the loudest the room has been about it. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned on X that the greatest threat to the transatlantic community is not its external enemies, but "the ongoing disintegration of our alliance."

"We must all do what it takes to reverse this disastrous trend", he said.

Contents

Two years of warnings
Russia built while Europe planned
Not invasion. Test
Where allies disagree
What calendar says
1. Russian documents show 2030 NATO war plans — rehearsed at Zapad-2025 drills in Belarus
2. Ukraine and NATO are building new kind of wartime procurement

Two years of warnings

The Politico reporting did not arrive in a vacuum. It is the latest entry in a sustained public warning from European intelligence services, defense ministers, and military chiefs. The dates form their own pattern.

In February 2024, Lithuania's then-foreign minister Gabrielius Landsbergis told German broadcaster Tagesschau that NATO could not "wait for our Pearl Harbor moment."

That same month, Estonia's Foreign Intelligence Service warned that Russia was preparing for a "long-term confrontation" with the West. The agency also said that Moscow intended to double its troop presence along the borders with Finland and the Baltics, increasing total armed forces from 1.15 million to 1.5 million by 2026. Denmark's defense minister told Reuters Russia could attack a NATO country within three to five years.

In March 2024, ex-Polish President Andrzej Duda told CNBC that "as early as perhaps 2026 or 2027, Putin, by putting his economy on a war footing, will have such military might that he will be able to attack NATO." That was the former Polish leader, citing German analyst forecasts, naming the same window European officials are now describing as open.

In June 2024, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius told the German parliament the army must be kriegstüchtig—war-ready—by 2029.

"Putin's war economy is working toward another conflict," he said.

Norway's chief of defense, General Eirik Kristoffersen, told Bloomberg that NATO had a two- to three-year window before Russia could rebuild its conventional attack capability.

In October 2024, BND chief Bruno Kahl said in a Bundestag hearing that "in terms of personnel and material, Russian armed forces are likely to be capable of carrying out an attack against NATO by the end of the decade at the latest."

A direct confrontation, he said, was "becoming an option for Russia." Two months later, Russia's own defense minister, Andrei Belousov, publicly told a defense ministry meeting that Moscow must "be prepared for any development, including a possible military conflict with NATO in Europe in the next decade."

In February 2025, Latvia's Constitution Protection Bureau warned in an unclassified report that any "frozen" war in Ukraine would allow Moscow to "increase its military presence next to NATO's northeastern flank, including the Baltic, within the next five years."

Three weeks earlier, Trump had announced peace talks with Putin. The Danish Defense Intelligence Service, that same month, said Russia could be ready to wage a "large-scale war" in Europe within five years.

In March 2026, the chief of the Czech General Staff, Karel Řehka, said most NATO defense leaders believe Russia could attempt to attack alliance territory by 2029.

The dates are a chorus. The melody hasn't changed.

Russia built while Europe planned

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Russia's military spending in 2024, adjusted for purchasing power parity, reached $462 billion, surpassing the combined defense budgets of the EU and the UK by roughly $5 billion. Russia has tripled its defense spending since 2021. In 2025, the figure climbed to 7.3% of GDP and roughly 40% of federal spending, the IISS found in February.

European defense spending has risen as well. The continental average reached 2.16% of GDP in 2025, with Germany and Poland accounting for most of the growth, and Latvia now at 4.91%. Production capacity is being added in Germany and elsewhere.

But the EU's own Defense Readiness Roadmap does not aim for the bloc to be ready to "credibly deter its adversaries and respond to any aggression" until 2030. Bastian Giegerich, IISS director-general, said there is "little indication" that Russia's ability to fight a fifth year in Ukraine has diminished, and that the country's threat to Europe is growing.

The question European officials are now asking is not whether Russia could mount a full conventional invasion of a NATO state, almost no one in the discussion suggests it could right now, but whether Russia might attempt something smaller, calibrated, and ambiguous.

Not invasion. Test

That smaller form is what most senior European defense voices are now describing.

"It could be a drone operation, it could be a Baltic Sea operation. It could be something in the Arctic, targeting small islands," Aaltola told Politico.

Russia has a shadow fleet that is already partly militarized.

"A drone attack doesn't require troops, it doesn't require crossing the border," he said.

The strategic logic is that an attack designed to create ambiguity around Article 5—NATO's mutual defense clause—would test the alliance's political unity rather than its military strength. If member states cannot agree that an incident crossed the threshold, Article 5 doesn't get invoked. Trump has already publicly called NATO "a paper tiger." Bruno Kahl noted in November 2024 that German intelligence assessments suggested Russian defense ministry chiefs themselves doubted Article 5 would in fact be invoked in case of an attack on a member.

In September and October 2025, Russian aircraft and drones brushed Estonia's borders, briefly crossed into Romania, and violated Polish airspace. Each incident, taken alone, could be dismissed as a navigational error or military bravado. Together, the European Council on Foreign Relations wrote in January 2026, the incursions "seem to many in Europe like probes: a deliberate attempt by Russia to test NATO's resolve."

Ukraine's foreign minister Andrii Sybiha framed the recent pattern in similar terms. "The Russians are sending a signal" by accusing the Baltics of allowing Ukrainian drones to use their airspace, he told reporters. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy suggested in a TV interview that Russia could be gearing up to make a move on "one of the Baltics, for example."

Landsbergis, who has warned about Putin's window for two years, put it to Politico this way: Putin could "escalate horizontally against another neighbor, trying to avoid a humiliating negotiation with Ukraine." That framing fits something Latvian intelligence flagged 14 months ago. A frozen war doesn't end the threat. It releases the troops.

Where allies disagree

Not everyone reads the room the same way. Estonian President Alar Karis said he found the prospect of a Russian attack on the Baltics "highly unlikely", as Russia is "very busy in Ukraine" and lacks the capacity. The senior NATO diplomat the publication quoted called it "highly unlikely" too, saying Putin's "suicidal trend has its limits, especially when there is no apparent evident and immediate gain."

A second senior European defense official told the journalists that while Russia "sees itself in a long-term confrontation with the West... we currently maintain our assessment that there is no short-term military threat to NATO due to Russia's engagement in Ukraine."

The disagreement is not new. Estonia's foreign intelligence director, Kaupo Rosin, told public broadcaster ERR in December 2025 that there is "no indication" Putin is planning to attack the Baltics or NATO.

"So far, it's still clear that Russia respects NATO and is currently trying to avoid any open conflict," he stressed.

Aaltola argues the cautious assessment carries its own risk. A false sense of security, he said, "is actually the worst thing you can create" in democratic countries.

"We need to allocate resources, and if there's a false sense of security, then resources are not allocated to defense," Aaltola said.

Karis ended his comments to Politico by acknowledging the limits of any assessment. "You never know. And nobody was expecting the war in Ukraine."

What calendar says

The 2030 readiness target was set when European officials still assumed they had time. The cumulative public warnings from intelligence services and defense ministers across nine countries say the time may have run shorter than the plan accounts for. The US troop withdrawal from Germany announced last Friday is the most concrete signal, yet that the political environment Aaltola described with Trump in the White House, transatlantic relations strained, EU not ready, is not a forecast. It's the present.

European defense spending has grown. Production is scaling. Finland and Sweden joined the alliance. Poland is at 5% of GDP. Latvia has reached nearly 5%. None of that is finished.

Whether the chorus that has been singing for two years is now being heard in the ministries that write budget timelines, or whether the 2030 calendar will remain the binding document until something happens that overrides it, is a question this week's news did not answer.

Post-Assad Syria still dependent on Russian oil despite shift to the West – Reuters

Benjamin Murdoch — Fri, 01 May 2026 20:48:00 +0000

Syria has become increasingly reliant on Russian oil imports despite its new government’s stated pivot toward the West and the collapse of the Russia-backed Bashar al-Assad regime, according to reporting by Reuters.

Russia now supplies the majority of Syria’s crude needs, with shipments rising sharply this year even as Damascus seeks to reposition itself diplomatically after years of civil war and international isolation.

According to calculations based on official announcements and vessel-tracking data cited by Reuters, Russian oil flows to Syria have increased by around 75% in 2026 to roughly 60,000 barrels per day.

That makes Russia the country’s dominant external supplier of crude, replacing Iran, which had previously filled that role under Assad.

Contents

Post-Assad political shift does not alter energy reliance

Post-Assad political shift does not alter energy reliance

The shift is particularly striking given the political realignment in Damascus following Assad’s overthrow in late 2024 by forces that had fought against his Russia-backed government.

Despite that break with the previous regime, Syria’s energy system remains heavily dependent on external suppliers, with domestic production far below demand.

Persistent energy gap and constrained options

Reuters reports that Syria’s daily oil needs are estimated at 120,000 to 150,000 barrels, while local output remains at only a fraction of pre-war levels. That gap has left the country reliant on imported fuel, including Russian shipments and smaller volumes arriving through regional channels.

Officials and analysts cited by Reuters said the continued reliance on Moscow reflects both economic constraint and limited access to global markets, even after the formal lifting of many Western sanctions last year.

They also noted that Russia retains strategic leverage through its military presence in Syria, including long-standing naval and air bases.

Shadow fleet, limited alternatives, and structural dependence

The reporting highlights that Russian-linked tanker networks (the so-called “shadow fleet”) are now central to Syria’s imports, with many shipments involving sanctioned vessels and complex maritime transfer routes. This has raised concerns among analysts about the transparency and long-term stability of the supply chain.

While Syria has explored alternative suppliers, including outreach to Türkiye and Gulf producers, Reuters notes that these efforts have so far not replaced Russian volumes at scale. Damascus has also acknowledged internal constraints, including weak purchasing power and limited integration into the global financial system.

The reliance on Russian oil underscores how Syria’s post-war reconstruction and political realignment remain constrained by structural economic dependence, even after the formal end of the Assad era.

Russia’s state-run doping program racks up 302 WADA sanctions — weightlifters and runners caught the most

Yuri Zoria — Fri, 01 May 2026 12:01:26 +0000

The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) closed its eight-year hunt of Russia's state-run doping program with 291 Russian athletes sanctioned across 22 sports, the agency announced on 30 April. The investigation, known as Operation LIMS, produced 302 sanctions in total — with 11 athletes sanctioned twice for separate violations — and rests on 24 terabytes of data WADA's investigators retrieved from the Moscow Anti-Doping Laboratory in 2019. WADA's president called it the most successful investigation in the history of anti-doping.

The Russian anti-doping agency RUSADA has been non-compliant with the world anti-doping code since 2015, briefly reinstated in 2018, and ruled non-compliant again in December 2019 after WADA found Russia had manipulated the Moscow lab data. Moscow uses sport as a tool of state propaganda. Russia's doping practices trace back to the Soviet era, while broader bans on Russian athletes from international competition came only after the all-out invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Contents

Eight years, 22 sports, and a deleted-then-recovered database

Eight years, 22 sports, and a deleted-then-recovered database

WADA confirmed on 30 April that all Operation LIMS cases have now been investigated. The 302 sanctions were imposed by 23 anti-doping organizations, with four additional cases charged but not yet resolved.

Most cases concentrated in two sports: weightlifting accounted for 107 sanctioned athletes and athletics for 93. Wrestling produced 19 sanctions and volleyball eight. Smaller numbers came from biathlon, bobsleigh and skeleton, boxing, canoe, football, ice hockey, judo, powerlifting, rowing, skating, taekwondo, archery, kettlebell, pentathlon, sambo, skiing, triathlon and aquatics.

Explore further

Ukraine’s athletes report systematic pressure at 2026 Paralympic Games after Russia’s return to competition

WADA President Witold Bańka said Operation LIMS is the most successful investigation in anti-doping history. He said an incredible 302 sanctions have now been imposed in the wake of Russia's institutionalized doping scheme. He credited the work to WADA's intelligence, investigations, and legal departments alongside partner anti-doping organizations.

How the Moscow lab data left Russia

WADA first ruled RUSADA non-compliant with the World Anti-Doping Code in 2015 after uncovering widespread institutionalized doping in Russian sport. In September 2018, WADA's Executive Committee voted to reinstate RUSADA subject to strict conditions — a move that was opposed by a vocal minority at the time. Bańka said that decision was made precisely to get to the truth and that without it WADA would never have secured the Moscow Laboratory evidence the cases were built on.

A protest for Ukrainian athletes killed in Russia's war held in Paris on 17 July 2024. Photo: Karim Lounici/FB

The reinstatement opened the door for WADA's missions to Russia in January 2019 and April 2019, which retrieved 24 terabytes of data from the Moscow Anti-Doping Laboratory's information-management system, plus a number of samples. The agency notes that 24 terabytes is roughly equivalent to about 8,000 HD movies.

WADA says investigators found during authentication that parts of the data had been altered, prompting WADA to bring a new compliance case against RUSADA.The Court of Arbitration for Sport in December 2020 backed WADA's case but ordered milder consequences than the agency had sought, lasting two years instead of four. Forensic recovery of the deleted and manipulated data underpinned hundreds of cases against athletes tied to Russia's doping program.

Explore further

“I felt disgusted”: Ukrainian chess champion on FIDE welcoming Russia back while missiles still fall

RUSADA still non-compliant

To this day, RUSADA still has not been restored to compliance and must meet all the reinstatement conditions set by the December 2020 CAS ruling. An in-person WADA audit team is required to verify compliance, but the ongoing geopolitical situation has blocked the visit. CAS is also considering a separate WADA compliance case over inconsistencies in Russian sports legislation.

The 302-sanction milestone lands at a moment when Russian athletes are quietly being readmitted to international competition under "neutral" status by an expanding list of federations, while the International Olympic Committee disqualified Ukrainian flag bearer Vladyslav Heraskevych from the 2026 Winter Olympics in February for refusing to remove a helmet honoring 22 Ukrainian athletes killed by Russian forces. The Russians have killed 660 Ukrainian athletes and coaches and destroyed more than 800 sports facilities since the start of the all-out invasion.

Venice Biennale jury walks out in full — Russia and Israel return to award contention

Maria Tril — Thu, 30 Apr 2026 19:09:11 +0000

The international jury of the 61st Venice Biennale resigned in full on 30 April 2026, prompting organizers to scrap the traditional awards and hand voting to the public — a procedural rewrite that returns Russia and Israel, both ruled ineligible by the now-departed jury, to prize contention. La Biennale di Venezia announced the changes in a statement the same day.

According to the official statement, the decision was taken "with regard to the resignation of the international jury" and "the exceptional nature of the current international geopolitical situation." Organizers noted that a similar postponement was used during the 2021 Architecture Biennale because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Contents

What replaces the jury awards

What replaces the jury awards

The traditional jury-decided Golden Lions are out. In their place, the Biennale has introduced two new awards — the so-called Visitors' Lions: one for the best participant in the main exhibition, "In Minor Keys," and one for the best national participation.

Ticket-holders who visit both exhibition locations between 9 May and 22 November will be eligible to vote, with one ballot per category per visitor. The mechanism for collecting and counting those votes has not yet been disclosed.

Organizers stressed that all national pavilions are admitted to the running "on the basis of inclusivity and equal treatment," and that the Biennale must remain "a space of openness, dialogue and the absence of censorship."

Why the jury resigned

The five-member jury was selected by the late artistic director Koyo Kouoh, who died in May 2025. Its members — Solange Oliveira Farkas, founder of Videobrasil; Zoe Butt, a curator of contemporary Southeast Asian art; Elvira Dyangani Ose, director of MACBA in Barcelona; Marta Kuzma, dean of the School of the Art Institute of Chicago; and art historian and curator Giovanna Zapperi — announced their collective resignation in a joint statement on 30 April.

"On 30 April 2026, we, the international jury chosen by Koyo Kouoh, artistic director of the 61st La Biennale di Venezia 'In Minor Keys,' have resigned," the statement reads. The jurors said the decision followed from their earlier "statement of intent," published on 22 April 2026.

In that earlier document, the jury said it would not consider for awards national pavilions of countries whose political leaders have been charged by the International Criminal Court with war crimes or crimes against humanity. Media reports linked the move primarily to Russia and Israel.

Israel's foreign ministry rejected the position. In a post on X, the ministry said the jury had "turned the Biennale from an open artistic space […] into a spectacle of anti-Israeli political indoctrination."

The Biennale leadership had distanced itself from the jury's position before the resignation, saying the jurors acted autonomously and had full freedom in determining laureates, while reiterating its opposition to "any form of censorship or exclusion of art and culture." With the jury gone and the vote handed to visitors, those eligibility limits no longer apply.

How the Russian pavilion will operate

Russia's pavilion at the 61st Biennale will be physically open for only four days — from 5 to 8 May, during the preview shows reserved for industry professionals, Artslooker reports. During those days, performances will take place under the project title "The Tree Is Rooted In the Sky."

From 9 May until the close of the exhibition on 22 November, the building will be shut to the public. Recordings of the performances and additional documentation will be projected onto screens placed in the pavilion's windows, with no artists physically present.

According to correspondence obtained by the Italian outlet Open, that format was the result of negotiations between the Biennale's leadership and Anastasia Karneeva, the commissioner of the Russian pavilion. Karneeva, appointed in 2021 to an eight-year term, had written to Biennale director Andrea Del Mercato in 2025 requesting invitation letters to ease visa procedures for Russian artists. Del Mercato, per the same correspondence, assured her of "maximum readiness and attention."

Earlier in 2026, Karneeva submitted a detailed pavilion project, catalog texts, and a request to restore the Russian pavilion's listing on the Biennale website and exhibition map, where it had been marked as Bolivia — the country to which the building had been leased in 2024. Open suggests that the pavilion's return was lobbied directly by Biennale president Pietrangelo Buttafuoco, citing a letter of thanks Karneeva sent to the foundation.

International reaction

EU Culture Commissioner Glenn Micallef will not attend the opening on 9 May, citing the Russian pavilion. Italian Culture Minister Alessandro Giuli has likewise declined, opting instead to travel to Lviv. Latvia has said it will boycott the opening, and Finland has indicated it will limit its participation if Russia is admitted.

The culture and foreign ministers of 22 countries have signed a joint protest against Russia's participation. Seventy-one delegates from 29 countries to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe have called for the Russian pavilion to be cancelled, and more than 70 participating artists have written to the Biennale leadership opposing the participation of Russia, Israel, and the United States.

Ukraine's foreign minister, Andrii Sybiha, has asked Italy not to issue visas to Russian participants. Ukraine has imposed sanctions on individuals involved in organizing the Russian pavilion and is awaiting Italian decisions on the matter.

The European Commission has begun a procedure to freeze or cancel its grant funding to the Biennale. If Russia's participation goes ahead unchanged, the Biennale risks losing a €2 million grant earmarked for the period through 2028.

The Biennale, replying to Minister Giuli, said there had been "no violation of the rules" in admitting Russia and that "the sanctions against the Russian Federation were fully observed." Italian Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini criticized the position taken by Brussels and did not object to Russia's participation. Veneto regional president Alberto Stefani called the EU's actions "unacceptable," arguing that art should "facilitate moments of cultural dialogue, which can become opportunities to forge connections, especially when official diplomacy cannot find solutions."

Background

Russia has been a regular Venice Biennale participant since establishing its pavilion in 1914. Its planned exhibition at the 59th Biennale was cancelled on 27 February 2022, three days after the start of Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine. In 2024, Russia did not participate; the building was used to host an exhibition of South American artists organized by Bolivia's Ministry of Culture, Decolonization and Depatriarchalization. On 4 March 2026, the Biennale published the participants list for this year's edition, and Russia was on it.

The main exhibition, "In Minor Keys," will open on 9 May as originally planned. It will be realized by five collaborators chosen by Kouoh herself before her death — curators Gabe Beckhurst Feijoo, Marie-Hélène Pereira, and Rasha Salti, critic Siddhartha Mitter, and assistant Rory Tsapayi — with the family's approval.

Ukraine has participated in Venice since 2001. Its 2026 project, "Security Guarantees," is centered on a sculpture by Zhanna Kadyrova titled "Origami Deer," which will be displayed in public space — mounted on a truck crane on the lagoon embankment.

Russia’s close ally now has enough nuclear warheads and delivery systems to breach US missile defense

Olena Mukhina — Thu, 30 Apr 2026 12:25:16 +0000

North Korea, one of the closest allies of Russia, already possesses enough nuclear warheads and delivery systems to potentially breach US missile defense and carry out a limited strike, according to reporting by Bloomberg citing South Korean President Lee Jae-myung.

Recently, Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov visited North Korea, where both sides signed a new defense treaty, effective until 2031. Pyongyang has been supplying Russia with ammunition for its war against Ukraine. In return, Russia is assisting North Korea with food supplies as well as support for its missile program, per CNN.

He stated that Pyongyang is capable of producing enough fissile material each year to build up to 20 nuclear warheads, indicating a rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal.

Contents

Rapid nuclear buildup and long-term parity risks

Rapid nuclear buildup and long-term parity risks

At the current pace, North Korea’s arsenal could, within the next decade, approach the scale of countries like France. If production capacity continues to grow, the number of warheads could increase even faster.

Missile systems capable of penetrating US defenses

North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) family, including Hwasong-15, Hwasong-17, Hwasong-18, and Hwasong-19, is considered capable of penetrating US missile defense systems.

In addition, Pyongyang maintains a large inventory of shorter-range missiles capable of striking US allies in Asia and American military bases, including the strategic island of Guam.

Experts warn of rising nuclear threat

Analysts argue that North Korea is no longer merely issuing nuclear threats but may now possess the capability to act on them.

“They have more experience stewarding their nuclear forces; they have far greater confidence in their delivery systems,” Ankit Panda, expert from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, says.

Earlier US intelligence assessments estimated North Korea had around 10 missiles capable of reaching US territory. However, independent experts now suggest the country may possess up to 50 launchers, indicating significantly greater capability than previously assessed.

“A direct investment in ammunition flying across the border”: Belarusian defectors warn US sanctions relief is funding Russia’s war

Alexander Moisseenko — Thu, 30 Apr 2026 10:31:21 +0000

Every time that the Lukashenka regime releases some of its many hundreds political prisoners, we witness scenes of jubiliation, of course. In Belarus, you can land in prison for decades just for carrying the wrong flag or poster.

But we rarely hear about the other side of the coin, the hidden costs of the US making such deals with the Belarusian dictator, who has already been in power for more than 30 years. All of such deals are based on a cynical bribe of the regime, namely the softening of the sanctions in return for geopolitical influence.

Since September, the US has four times softening its sanctions against Belarus, the latest round was on 28 April.

Today, in exclusive interviews with Euromaidan Press, Belpol, a group of former Belarusian security officers who defected after the 2020 crackdown, explains that sanctions relief "is a direct investment in the production of ammunition flying across the border." Lukashenka is getting back the financial tools he needs to sustain both his own system—and his contribution to Russia’s war effort.

Contents

As Western unity cracks, Ukraine fights to keep Russia sanctions alive
1. Sanctions on Russia: Do they work? Why? Why not? Blame? Changes?
2. What has been lifted, and when
  - Potash: the irreplaceable mineral behind Belarus’s prisoner deals
  - 250 Belarusians freed after Washington lifts sanctions on banks and potash – regime calls it “humanitarian”
What Lukashenka gains

Read our four years of sanctions series

What has been lifted, and when

In September 2025, Washington lifted sanctions on the Belarusian state airline Belavia. Minsk released 52 political prisoners. Trump's envoy John Coale, during his first trip to Minsk, told reporters that Washington wanted to "normalize relations" and that the move was "only the beginning."

In December 2025, the US granted limited sanctions relief to three Belarusian potash producers. Belarus released 123 prisoners, including Nobel Peace Prize laureate Ales Bialiatski, opposition figure Maria Kalesnikava, and former presidential candidate Viktar Babaryka.

Political prisoner Maria Kalesnikova shows a heart, the Belarusian opposition’s signature gesture in 2020, as she is transported by bus with other released prisoners. Photo: Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate

Potash, a potassium-based fertiliser, is one of Belarus’s most important exports. Belarus produces around 20% of the global production of potash. Before sanctions, it generated three billions in revenue - amounting to no less than 4% of GDP - and was shipped through the Lithuanian port of Klaipėda on the Baltic Sea. With the sanctions, That route was cut off in 2022, forcing Belarus to rely on longer, more expensive routes through Russian ports.

Potash and its importance for Belarus (and Lukashenka)

Potash: the irreplaceable mineral behind Belarus’s prisoner deals

In March 2026, the biggest round yet: the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control fully removed Belaruskali, the Belarusian Potash Company, and their Ukrainian subsidiary Agrorozkvit from the sanctions list, and authorized transactions with Belinvestbank and its affiliates. The Development Bank of Belarus and the Belarusian Finance Ministry came off the sanctions list as well. Minsk released 250 prisoners, including journalist Katsyaryna Andreyeva.

Trump's envoy John Coale called it "a significant humanitarian milestone." Belarusian self-proclaimed president Aliaksandr Lukashenka called it part of a "big deal" still being negotiated, which he said may include a $3 billion mine sale to US investors and a visit to Washington.

Explore further

250 Belarusians freed after Washington lifts sanctions on banks and potash – regime calls it “humanitarian”

Roughly 838 political prisoners remain behind bars in Belarus, according to human rights group Viasna. New arrests continue.

What Lukashenka gains

Igor Kuley, a journalist with the Belarusian Investigative Center, told Euromaidan Press the regime's gains come on several tracks at once.

The first is diplomatic: the restoration of Lukashenka as someone Washington talks to. After five years of near-total isolation following the fraudulent 2020 election, the self-proclaimed president is again receiving US envoys, proposing bilateral deals, and being quoted in the American press.

Each round reinforces that pattern. Kuley describes the US approach as a deliberate drip-feed:

"The lifting of sanctions is like a part of a puzzle. The US wants to stay in the negotiation process so that Lukashenka doesn't get everything all at once and wouldn't lose his interest in further negotiations."

The second track is operational. A team member from Belpol, a group of former Belarusian security officers who defected after the 2020 crackdown, explained in a written interview with Euromaidan Press that removing restrictions on the Finance Ministry and state banks frees resources the regime previously spent on grey-scheme workarounds.

"Huge expenses on circumvention manoeuvres in settlements" disappear, the Belpol representative wrote; the released capacity then goes to "both its own survival and help to the partner-neighbour — the Russian Federation, which is solving its tasks on our territory, including military ones."

The third track is export revenue. The US removal of Belaruskali and the Belarusian Potash Company from the sanctions list does not automatically restore Belarus's largest pre-war export outlet — EU sanctions remain in force, and Lithuania has not reopened the port of Klaipėda — but it changes the economics of trade with buyers in Brazil, China, and India.

Those countries are already Belarus's biggest remaining customers, but have extracted steep discounts over the past three years as compensation for secondary-sanctions risk. With that risk gone, Belpol argues, the discounts vanish.

A stockpile of potash fertilizer, a sector central to the economy of Belarus and affected by international sanctions. Photo: Belarusian Potash Company (BPC)

Kuley notes that transhipment through Russian ports such as St. Petersburg and Ust-Luga still eats up "almost all the profit" because of distance and what he called corruption in Russian ports; nitrogen fertiliser trade through these routes, he said, has been running at an overall loss.

However, Belpol emphasizes that the price recovery more than covers the higher transport costs. The RFE/RL assessment of the March round reached a similar conclusion to Belpol: US markets are only theoretically open to Belarusian potash, but existing buyers can now pay market price.

The bank that helps finance Russia's shells

One of the institutions benefiting from sanctions relief is Belinvestbank—a state bank now able to operate with far fewer restrictions after being covered by a US Treasury general license in March. According to an investigation by Belpol, the bank plays a direct role in financing companies linked to Russia’s war effort.

It has provided loans to Belarusian state enterprises producing components for 152mm artillery shells and 122mm rockets—the same types of munitions Russian forces use daily against Ukraine.

Belpol says a Belarusian government document lists multiple companies receiving this financing. Among them are industrial firms such as Legmash, the Minsk Bearing Plant, and the Minsk Tractor Works. The document reportedly details both the scale of funding and how it is distributed.

Microchips of the Integral company found in a Russian X-69 rocket. The company has been financed by Belinvestbank. Photo: Belpol

The bank is also linked to a newer ammunition facility near the town of Slutsk, whose primary market, according to its own loan records, is Russia. In addition, Belinvestbank finances the microelectronics company Integral, a supplier to dozens of Russian defence enterprises. Chips produced by Integral have been found in Russian cruise missiles used in strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure.

Kuley framed what the bank's delisting means for Ukrainian targets:

"The lifting of these sanctions against Belinvestbank would make it easier for Belarus to make payments for certain components. Belarus is very engaged in providing weapons to Russia."

The Odesa scenario

Since Lithuania shut down transit through the Baltic port of Klaipėda in 2022, Belarus has been forced to reroute shipments through Russian ports—an option that is slower, more expensive, and far less profitable. Finding an alternative has become a priority for Minsk—and increasingly, for Washington as well.

The port of the Lithuanian city of Klaipėda. It has been closed for Belarusian potash. Since then, Belarusian exports were redirected to Russian ports. Photo: Lettered / Wikimedia Commons

US envoy John Coale has urged Lithuania to reopen talks with Aliaksandr Lukashenka and restore transit. Vilnius has refused.

A second option is being floated quietly: transit through the Ukrainian Black Sea port of Odesa. Kuley told Euromaidan Press he considers the possibility real:

"It wouldn't be difficult for the Americans to agree with the Ukrainians for transhipment to go through, say, the port of Odesa. Everyone would be interested in this, especially if, as rumours say, the Americans acquire Nezhinsky GOK — the second-largest potash enterprise in Belarus."

Lithuanian analyst Vytis Jurkonis reached the same conclusion in December, telling LRT that Odesa transit could align US, Belarusian, and Ukrainian interests — revenue for Kyiv, an American stake in port security, an export outlet for Minsk.

What makes it far-fetched is the politics, not the geography. Ukraine spent February 2026 expanding sanctions on Lukashenka and his inner circle over Belarus's role hosting Russian Shahed drone relays used to strike Ukrainian cities. Asking Kyiv to open its largest Black Sea port to the same regime's fertiliser exports would be a reversal.

Ukraine has not indicated it is considering it. The question is whether it will be asked to.

Lukashenka still firmly on Russia’s side

Nothing in the three rounds of relief has touched the elements of Belarusian policy that actually affect Ukraine on the battlefield.

Belarus still hosts Russian Shahed drone relays. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, announcing Ukraine's February sanctions package, said these relays "correct and coordinate attacks" on Ukrainian energy infrastructure and civilian targets. Russia deployed the Oreshnik intermediate-range missile system on Belarusian soil in November 2025. Belarusian territory continues to host Russian tactical nuclear warheads, the first such deployment outside Russia since the Cold War.

The Lithuanian Defence Ministry's 2026 annual threat assessment concluded that Belarus uses prisoner releases to charm the West while acting as a Russian tool of intimidation against European states. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the exiled opposition leader, told the AP after the December round that Lukashenka "hasn't changed his policies, his crackdown continues, and he keeps on supporting Russia's war against Ukraine."

What this means for Ukraine

The US strategy appears to be based on a simple calculation: limited concessions can produce tangible humanitarian results. Prisoner releases are politically visible, immediate, and measurable. Sanctions relief is gradual and reversible. By keeping the process incremental, Washington may hope to maintain leverage over Minsk and prevent Belarus from moving even closer to Moscow. But the approach also carries risks.

A Belarusian state bank documented as funding shell and missile-component production can now clear dollar transactions without compliance friction. Components from Southeast Asia needed for drone guidance systems become cheaper to procure. A state whose territory Russia uses as a launchpad for daily strikes on Ukraine gains renewed hard currency. The Finance Ministry, no longer under US restrictions, can allocate that currency without detours.

Each round of sanction relief signals to Minsk — and to Moscow — that the strategy of trading prisoners for resources works, and that incremental concessions can extract progressively larger packages. The Belpol representative described what this means operationally:

"Access to finance allows faster modernisation of the shops of Belarusian factories, where chassis for Russian missile systems are assembled. The Ministry of Finance gets the chance to patch budget holes without cutting spending on the punitive apparatus and logistical support for Russian troops."

The people freed in recent months should never have been jailed. Their release is real and significant. But so is the trade behind it.

With each round of sanctions relief, Belarus regains part of the financial system it needs to function—and to support Russia’s war. The fighting hasn’t changed. What has changed is how easy it is to finance it.

Russia’s “Russo-Balt” just unveiled almost-identical Tesla Cybertruck clone

Olena Mukhina — Wed, 29 Apr 2026 17:42:32 +0000

Russian company Russo-Balt has revealed details of its new electric model, the C55, including specifications, features, and an estimated price. Alongside the announcement, the company published renders that immediately drew attention.

In the images, the vehicle appears almost identical to the Tesla Cybertruck, replicating its angular design, sharp body lines, and distinctive front lighting.

Russian clone mirrors design and targets Tesla competition

The new C55 will feature all-wheel drive with dual electric motors, while its stainless-steel body closely echoes the Tesla Cybertruck concept. It is expected to accelerate from 0 to 100 km/h in about 6 seconds and accommodate five passengers.

The model measures 5250 mm in length, 2120 mm in width, and 1800 mm in height, delivering 550 horsepower, a top speed of 210 km/h, and a range of up to 500 km, supported by a 110 kWh battery.

In its base configuration, the vehicle comes equipped with a 15-inch touchscreen, a 360-degree camera system, an audio system with eight speakers and a subwoofer, and heated and ventilated leather seats.

Four-motor version boosts output to 1000 hp

An optional version with four electric motors will increase total output to 1000 horsepower. The official presentation of the model is scheduled for summer 2026.

The base price of the C55 is expected to be around $106,000. For comparison, the Tesla Cybertruck starts at approximately $60,000. The vehicle is expected to enter the market in 2027.

Earlier, all Starlink satellite communications systems in and around Ukraine were limited only to registered users, largely stopping Russian use of the systems. Before that, Moscow depended on Kyiv's terminals during the attacks on Ukrainian cities, using the connection that the country had.

SpaceX updated a "whitelist" of approved and verified Ukrainian terminals, while unapproved Russian systems were blocked. Currently, Russia lacks a satellite internet system that matches Starlink's speed, coverage, and ease of deployment. The only alternative it presents is the Yamal satellite network.

The Hermitage archaeologist Ukraine wanted to try is back in Russia—Kyiv calls it a propaganda gift to Moscow

Alexander Moisseenko — Tue, 28 Apr 2026 17:21:29 +0000

Belarus released three Polish nationals and two Moldovans at the border on 28 April. Russia got back Alexander Butyagin, the archaeologist Ukraine had charged with looting Crimea—six weeks before he was due in a Ukrainian courtroom.

The five freed include Andrzej Poczobut, the Gazeta Wyborcza journalist held more than 1,800 days in Lukashenka's prisons, and Grzegorz Gaweł, a 27-year-old Polish Carmelite monk who faced up to 15 years on espionage charges over Belarus's Zapad-2025 nuclear war games. The five sent the other way include Alexander Butyagin, the Hermitage Museum archaeologist; Nina Popova, a Russian citizen Moldova said had been acting against it; and—from a parallel Moldova-Russia trade—a former deputy head of Moldova's intelligence service convicted of selling state secrets to the Belarusian KGB.

Contents

Poczobut: 1,800 days for "inciting ethnic hostility"
Gaweł: a monk, the KGB, and the Zapad-2025 nuclear war games
Ukraine criticizes release of Butyagin
- Poland extends detention of Hermitage archaeologist wanted by Ukraine for Crimea looting
A second trade sends a former Moldovan intelligence chief to Belarus
Five Coale swaps in a year. Each paired with US sanctions relief.
The Lukashenka regime is still arresting dissidents
1. US lifts sanctions on Belarusian airline in exchange for prisoner releases, wants to “normalize relations”
2. Nobel laureate, top opposition figures freed as Belarus trades prisoners for US sanctions relief

Poczobut: 1,800 days for "inciting ethnic hostility"

Polish PM Donald Tusk meets released political prisoner Andrzej Poczobut. Photo: Donald Tusk/x.com

Poczobut, a Gazeta Wyborcza correspondent and a leading voice for Belarus's Polish minority, was arrested in March 2021 amid the crackdown that followed the 2020 protests. A court sentenced him to eight years in 2023 for "inciting ethnic hostility" and "undermining national security"—charges Poland, the EU, and human rights groups called politically motivated. The European Parliament awarded him the 2025 Sakharov Prize.

"Andrzej Poczobut is free! Welcome to your Polish home, my friend", Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk wrote on X.

He called the swap "the finale of a two-year-long intricate diplomatic game, full of dramatic twists" and credited Polish services, diplomats, and prosecutors "as well as the tremendous help from our American, Romanian, and Moldovan friends."

Gaweł: a monk, the KGB, and the Zapad-2025 nuclear war games

Released political prisoner Grzegorz Gaweł during his arrest. Photo: News.by

Belarusian KGB officers detained Gaweł, a Krakow-based Carmelite monk who had taken his perpetual vows just months earlier, in the town of Lepel on 4 September 2025. State television aired footage of the arrest and accused him of obtaining a copy of a classified document about "Zapad-2025"—the joint Russian-Belarusian exercises that include the Russian nuclear weapons now stationed on Belarusian soil. He was charged under Article 358, which carries up to 15 years; because the alleged material concerned nuclear deployments, human rights groups raised the prospect that the death penalty was theoretically available. He had been held incommunicado, without confirmed access to a lawyer or to Polish consular staff. Belarus's Viasna human rights centre recognised him as a political prisoner. Polish authorities called the case a fabricated provocation.

Ukraine criticizes release of Butyagin

Butyagin headed the Hermitage Museum's Northern Black Sea Region Classical Archaeology Sector. From 2014 onward—after Russia annexed Crimea—he led the Myrmekion expedition near Kerch every year, digs Ukrainian prosecutors say lacked permits from Kyiv. His teams stripped roughly two metres of the cultural layer at the site: the stratified soil that holds artefacts and evidence of ancient habitation. Ukraine's Security Service estimated the damage at over $4.8 million.

Explore further

Poland extends detention of Hermitage archaeologist wanted by Ukraine for Crimea looting

Polish security agents detained him at a Warsaw hotel in December 2025 as he passed through after a lecture in the Netherlands. The Warsaw District Court approved his extradition to Ukraine on 18 March. Ukraine's Foreign Ministry welcomed the ruling. His lawyer appealed.

Ukraine reacted with regret to the decision of Poland to release Butyagin.

"Ukraine has learned with regret that, despite a previous entirely fair ruling by a Polish court, Russian citizen Alexander Butyagin, who is reasonably suspected of committing a crime on Ukrainian territory—in particular, removing cultural valuables from Crimea—was ultimately not extradited to Ukraine," Foreign Ministry spokesman Heorhii Tykhyi told journalists.

"It is obvious that the Russian side will cynically use this political and legal episode to justify the occupation of Crimea and the exploitation of Ukraine's temporarily occupied territory by Russian citizens," Tykhyi added.

Butyagin is far from a unique case. A May 2025 human rights report identified seven Hermitage employees conducting unauthorised excavations across occupied Crimea, including at the UNESCO site of Chersonesos and the Genoese fortress at Balaklava. Russia's Foreign Ministry called the case against Butyagin "absurd" and demanded his return.

A second trade sends a former Moldovan intelligence chief to Belarus

Running alongside the Polish-Belarusian exchange was a parallel two-for-two trade. Two officers of Moldova's Intelligence and Security Service (SIS), held in Russia, came home. In return, President Maia Sandu pardoned Alexandru Bălan, a former deputy SIS director extradited from Romania to Moldova in April and convicted of treason for selling state secrets to the Belarusian KGB. Bălan is now on his way to Belarus. From 2016 to 2019—before he was allegedly recruited—he had served as Moldova's liaison officer at Ukraine's General Staff.

Romanian prosecutors had separately charged Bălan with meeting Belarusian intelligence officers in Budapest in 2024 and 2025, part of what the Czech intelligence service BIS describes as a Belarusian KGB network running through central Europe.

The fifth person sent east was Nina Popova, a Russian citizen Sandu said had been "acting against the Republic of Moldova." Russia's FSB confirmed her release alongside Butyagin's and described her as the wife of a Russian soldier serving with Moscow's forces in Transnistria—the breakaway sliver of Moldova where Russian troops have been stationed since 1992.

"For our country this is a gain that cannot be measured by a simple mathematical equation," Sandu wrote. "We brought home two citizens who work for the Republic of Moldova, in exchange for two detainees who worked against it."

Five Coale swaps in a year. Each paired with US sanctions relief.

US Special Envoy for Belarus John Coale meets self-proclaimed president Aliaksandr Lukashenka. Photo: BelTA

This is at least the fifth Belarus swap Trump's special envoy John Coale has brokered with Lukashenka in twelve months. Each was paired with a US sanctions concession or a step toward normalisation.

Coale framed today's deal as evidence "we are not always at war, as the world thinks." He said in a statement on X that the United States would not stop "until we get every last one" of the roughly 800 to 900 political prisoners still held in Belarus, and thanked Lukashenka for his "willingness to pursue constructive engagement with the United States."

It remains to be seen whether any sanctions are going to be lifted as part of this prisoner swap.

The Lukashenka regime is still arresting dissidents

The broader pattern is hard to ignore. While individual prisoners regain their freedom, the system that put them behind bars remains firmly in place. Belarus continues to host Russian forces and missile systems, and arrests of regime critics have not stopped.

Human rights groups report hundreds still imprisoned on political charges, with new sentences handed down even as high-profile swaps unfold. For Lukashenka, these exchanges appear less a sign of change than a calculated tool—trading human lives for diplomatic concessions while maintaining the same repressive course at home and strategic alignment with Moscow.

“In any normal country” buying stolen goods is a crime, Zelenskyy says — Ukraine readies sanctions over Russian-stolen grain unloaded in Israel

Yuri Zoria — Tue, 28 Apr 2026 14:49:18 +0000

Ukraine is drafting sanctions on transporters and buyers of Russian-stolen Ukrainian grain after a second vessel was allowed to reach Israel in two weeks, with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy putting the diplomatic blame on the buyer state

"In any normal country, purchasing stolen goods is an act that entails legal liability," Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy posted on social media on 28 April. "This applies, in particular, to grain stolen by Russia. Another vessel carrying such grain has arrived at a port in Israel and is preparing to unload. This is not — and cannot be — legitimate business."

The statement followed the arrival in the Haifa Bay of the Panormitis, the second Russian-stolen-grain vessel allowed to reach Israel, which Ukraine has protested in two weeks.

Russia occupies roughly a fifth of Ukraine, plundering resources in the occupied areas. It exported over 2 million tons of Ukrainian grain in 2025 alone, disguised as Russian produce, Ukraine's foreign intelligence service reported in January, and the Russian shadow fleet moving the cargo runs to over 1,000 vessels using flags of convenience to obscure the cargo's occupied-territory origin.

Contents

"The Israeli authorities cannot be unaware"

"The Israeli authorities cannot be unaware"

Russia is "systematically seizing grain on temporarily occupied Ukrainian land and organizing its export through individuals linked to the occupiers," Zelenskyy said.

"Such schemes violate the laws of the State of Israel itself."

He added that the Israeli authorities "cannot be unaware of which ships are arriving at the country's ports and what cargo they are carrying," and said Ukraine had taken all necessary diplomatic steps to prevent the incident.

MarineTraffic map showing the route of the Russian bulk carrier Abinsk from Kerch in occupied Crimea through the Bosphorus and the Mediterranean to Haifa, 12 April 2026. Map: Kateryna Yaresko/Facebook

Sanctions package coming, EU coordination next

"Based on information from our intelligence services, Ukraine is preparing a relevant sanctions package that will cover both those directly transporting this grain and the individuals and legal entities attempting to profit from this criminal scheme," Zelenskyy said.

Kyiv will also coordinate with European partners to get the same individuals included in EU sanctions regimes, he added. The EU's 20th sanctions package, adopted on 23 April, already restricts four foreign institutions accused of helping Moscow bypass sanctions and targets entities in third countries supporting Russia's war.

On 28 April, Israel's ambassador to Ukraine Michael Brodsky received Ukraine's protest note at the Foreign Ministry demanding immediate Israeli measures to stop the import of stolen Ukrainian grain and prevent its unloading in Israeli ports, MFA spokesman Heorhii Tykhyi said.

Haaretz: EU mulls Israeli listings

The European Union is mulling sanctions on Israeli individuals and entities aiding Russia in circumventing international sanctions and demanding information from Israel on the Russian-stolen Ukrainian wheat being imported, EU foreign affairs spokesman Anouar El Anouni told Haaretz on 27 April, according to the outlet's report following its own Sunday investigation into the trade.

The Russian bulk carrier Abinsk transiting the Bosphorus Strait, loaded with stolen Ukrainian grain bound for Israel, 19 March 2026. Photo: Yörük Işık via Haaretz

The EU "has taken note of the reports that a Russian shadow fleet vessel carrying stolen Ukrainian grain has been allowed to unload at Haifa port in Israel, and that despite previous contacts of Ukraine with Israeli authorities on the subject," Anouni said. He added that the bloc is requesting additional information from Israeli authorities and is ready to list individuals and entities in third countries if necessary.

Haaretz documented over 30 shipments of stolen goods listed in internal logs from Russian-occupied Ukrainian ports with Israel as their destination. According to its sources, four shipments of Ukrainian grain stolen by Russia have already been unloaded in Israel this year.

The diplomatic exchange

On 27 April, Israel's Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar earlier rebuffed the diplomatic protest of his Ukrainian counterpart Andrii Sybiha on X, writing that "diplomatic relations, especially between friendly nations, are not conducted on Twitter or in the media" and that "allegations are not evidence."

Explore further

Ukraine summons Israeli ambassador — for second Russian stolen-grain vessel to reach Haifa

The Ukrainian MFA released a chronology that contradicts Sa'ar's "no request for legal assistance" line, documenting over a month of Ukrainian appeals — ambassador-level notes, a minister-to-minister call, and a 15 April formal request for international legal assistance with a court decision on a preventive measure against the Abinsk — that Israel ignored, finishing the Abinsk unloading ahead of schedule that same day and waving through the Panormitis approach two weeks later.

Russia’s mercenaries left Malian city under escort by rebels they came to fight

Alexander Moisseenko — Mon, 27 Apr 2026 17:38:05 +0000

Russian mercenaries from Moscow's Africa Corps abandoned their base in the northern Malian city of Kidal on 26 April, leaving under escort by the Tuareg-led rebels they had been deployed to fight. Russian and Malian forces set fire to the runway and buildings of the former UN peacekeeping camp before departing.

Wagner Group fighters helped Mali's army capture Kidal in November 2023, in what the junta called a strategic turning point. The Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) fighters who took the city back over the weekend are the same Tuareg rebels Mali accused Ukraine of backing in August 2024, when Bamako severed diplomatic ties with Kyiv over alleged "support for terrorism."

Contents

What happened in Kidal

What happened in Kidal

The withdrawal followed two days of intense fighting that began on 25 April, when FLA fighters and JNIM, the al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, launched coordinated strikes on Malian military positions in Bamako, Kati, Gao, Sevare, Mopti, and Kidal. It was the most synchronized rebel offensive against the junta since the military seized power in 2021.

Mali's defense minister, Sadio Camara, was killed in an attack on his home, the government confirmed on state television. The FLA took the streets of Kidal within hours and surrounded a camp where Africa Corps personnel and Malian soldiers had taken position. By the morning of 26 April, the Russians were "holed up" inside the perimeter, an FLA official told AFP.

Then came the deal.

"An accord has been reached permitting the Malian army and its African Corps allies to leave Camp 2, where they were holed up since yesterday," the Tuareg official said.

A convoy assembled at the camp gate and departed under FLA escort. As they left, Russian and Malian forces torched the camp and its airstrip. Footage documented by the Ukrainian military news outlet Militarnyi suggests the destruction was meant to deny the rebels weapons and infrastructure. FLA spokesperson Mohamed El Maouloud Ramadan declared the city "free."

Russian Africa Corps personnel have started pulling out of a military base in Kidal, northern Mali. A member of the FLA is seen mocking the Russians by wearing the Russian flag removed from the base on his tagelmust. Video: NEXTA

Hardware Russia lost

During the two-day battle, the Africa Corps lost a BTR-82A armored personnel carrier, a Chinese-made VP-11 armored vehicle, and had a Tornado-U armored vehicle captured by the rebels, according to Russian and Ukrainian military channels aggregated by Militarnyi.

The mercenaries deployed BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, Spartak armored vehicles, and Tigr-M vehicles fitted with Arbalet-DM combat modules. Three Russian helicopters were reported patrolling above Bamako's airport during the fighting, where Africa Corps personnel were also engaged.

This is hardware drawn from the same Russian defense ministry inventory that supplies the war in Ukraine. Africa Corps is the state-controlled successor to Yevgeny Prigozhin's Wagner Group, formed in late 2023 after he died in a plane crash that August.

It operates under the direct command of the defense ministry.

Pattern, not incident

Kidal is the second catastrophic reversal for Russia's Sahel mercenary project in less than two years.

In July 2024, Tuareg fighters and JNIM ambushed a Wagner column near Tinzaouatin, killing dozens of mercenaries in what pro-Russian military bloggers acknowledged as the worst single loss Russia's African operation had suffered.

The Tinzaouatin defeat triggered Mali's diplomatic break with Ukraine. In the days after the ambush, a spokesperson for Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR) made remarks that the junta interpreted as Ukrainian acknowledgment of contact with the Tuareg fighters. Bamako severed relations with Kyiv. Niger followed within days. The two juntas, joined by Burkina Faso, jointly accused Ukraine of "terrorism support" in a letter to the UN. Ukraine denied the allegations and said no evidence had been provided.

In March 2026, Africa Corps fighters were killed in another Mali ambush amid accusations of civilian killings by Russian-backed forces. Late that same month, Tuareg drones and artillery struck a Russian base near Anafif. Now Kidal has fallen.

Explore further

Russia’s Africa Corps fighters killed in Mali ambush amid accusations of civilian killings

What it means for Ukraine

The Sahel juntas—Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—turned away from France and the UN after their respective coups and contracted Russia to fill the security gap. The pitch was straightforward: Moscow's mercenaries would do what Western forces had failed to do, without the human-rights conditions or political pressure that came with Western partnership.

What the juntas got was a force that lost Kidal in two days and negotiated its way out under enemy escort.

Russia's offer to authoritarian governments worldwide protection in exchange for resources and political alignment rests on a claim of effectiveness.

The FLA on Sunday called on Russia to "reconsider its support for the military junta in Bamako, whose actions have contributed to the suffering of the civilian population"—a direct invitation for Moscow to abandon its African client. Ulf Laessing of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation told Arab News this week that "the attacks are a major blow to Russia… they were unable to protect major cities."

Africa Corps personnel, BMP-3s, BTR-82As, Tigr-M crews, and the helicopters reportedly involved in fighting near Bamako's airport are not available for the front in Ukraine. Russia's defense ministry maintains parallel commitments, and those commitments now include a Sahel theater that requires reinforcement, not drawdown.

The juntas that broke with Ukraine in 2024 over the Tuareg ambush did so on the assumption that aligning with Russia would deliver security. The assumption has now been tested twice and has failed each time. Whether Bamako, Niamey, and Ouagadougou reconsider that alignment is an open question. The cost of it is now visible.

What comes next

Witnesses confirmed the Malian flag no longer flies over Kidal. Fighting was reported to continue in Sevare and Kati, where the junta's main military base sits on the outskirts of Bamako. ECOWAS, the regional bloc that Mali has rejected, condemned the attacks and called for a coordinated response, though it has limited leverage over a junta that has departed the bloc.

A "fragile calm" was reported in Gao and Sevare on 26 April. The Africa Corps convoy that left Kidal was last seen heading toward Gao under FLA escort. An FLA field commander told the BBC the alliance had been preparing for the offensive "for months" and that the next target is Gao. After Gao, he said, "Timbuktu will be easy to fall."

NATO’s top military officer: Russia is trying to reclaim Soviet territory, and threat extends beyond Baltics

Olena Mukhina — Mon, 27 Apr 2026 15:06:08 +0000

Russia seeks to reclaim territories that once belonged to the Soviet Union, a strategy that creates a real risk of new wars, says NATO Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone. Thus, Moscow remains a key threat to the Alliance, according to RBC-Ukraine.

The same views hold sources familiar with US intelligence assessments. The findings reportedly concern territories of former Soviet bloc countries. Among them are three Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Albania, and Slovakia.

Russia will seek to restore past and is expanding its list of potential targets

Responding to a question about a possible repetition of a 2022-style invasion scenario, the admiral emphasized that hybrid and unconventional threats are already ongoing and will only intensify.

“Russia will seek to regain what it once possessed… so you can draw your own conclusions about who may become a target," said Cavo Dragone.

When asked specifically about the Baltic states, he stressed that the risk is not limited to them, broadening the potential danger zone.

NATO prepares for full-spectrum defense from Arctic to South

Dragone emphasized that the Alliance is focused on deterrence, self-defense, and 360-degree security, and that it is strengthening its presence across key regions, from the Arctic to the eastern flank and the southern direction.

At the same time, he noted assessments from the Baltic countries themselves, which currently do not see an immediate threat.

According to the admiral, these states have the most accurate understanding of the situation, as they are effectively on the frontline of security monitoring.

Recently, concerns have risen over a potential operation against Estonia, as a recent investigation found social media accounts that promote the idea of a “Narva People’s Republic”, a separatist project aimed at detaching parts of northeastern Estonia bordering Russia.

This could evolve into a Donetsk and Luhansk illegal entities playbook, which used the pretext of its "protection of Russian speakers" as justification for military intervention.

Meanwhile, Russia deployed a nuclear-capable Oreshnik intercontinental ballistic missile system to Belarus, which can reach any European city within minutes. It is almost impossible to intercept, and it has six warheads that fall on targets separately.

EU just held its first summit without Orbán, and discovered his obstruction was covering deeper divisions

Olena Mukhina — Fri, 24 Apr 2026 20:17:04 +0000

This week’s EU summit in Cyprus took place in a noticeably calmer atmosphere without Viktor Orbán, who is set to leave office after losing the election. For 16 years, he had been one of the main sources of tension within the European Union, Politico reports.

However, his absence did not resolve underlying issues — if anything, it exposed them.

Contents

Europe without “convenient scapegoat”

Europe without “convenient scapegoat”

Diplomats at the summit acknowledged behind the scenes that Orbán had long served as a kind of scapegoat for internal conflicts.

Now, without him, the EU is forced to confront its differences more openly and honestly.

Ukraine: fast-track membership or cautious realism

One of the first major divisions emerged over Ukraine’s EU membership. Some leaders support accelerating Kyiv’s integration, while others urge caution.

Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković, speaking in the presence of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, emphasized the need to consider “realities”, a signal that consensus remains out of reach.

Energy under pressure: sanctions or economic survival

Another sharp debate focused on energy policy. Europe faces a dual challenge:

fuel shortages amid escalating tensions around Iran
the need to maintain and strengthen sanctions against Russia

This creates a direct dilemma between economic stability and political commitments.

Endless debates: budget, strategy, and future of EU

Even without Orbán, EU leaders continued lengthy discussions over budget priorities, development strategy, and the Union’s long-term direction.

In effect, the summit demonstrated that the EU’s core problem is not individual politicians, but deeper structural divisions among member states.

Russia plays its violin at the Cyprus meeting

Earlier, the Center for Countering Disinformation reported that Russia is attempting to organize staged protests in Cyprus aimed against EU policy, the decision to allocate a €90 billion loan to Ukraine, and to discredit President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

The “protests” are reportedly planned to run through 25 April under the guise of anti-war slogans. However, this reflects a typical Russian tactic of shifting responsibility for the war onto Ukraine, the EU, and NATO. The central message is expected to demand an “immediate halt to EU funding of the war in Ukraine.”

Through such provocative actions, the Kremlin seeks to undermine support for Ukraine and trigger divisions within the European Union.

Kremlin builds “hotbed of tension” narrative against Lithuania — ISW warns of groundwork for Baltic aggression

Maria Tril — Fri, 24 Apr 2026 09:49:03 +0000

Russia is laying informational groundwork for potential military action against NATO's Baltic members by accusing Lithuania and the alliance of threatening Kaliningrad Oblast, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reports, citing two separate Russian government statements issued on 23 April.

The Russian Security Council accused Lithuanian authorities of creating a "hotbed of tension" near the border with Kaliningrad Oblast, according to ISW. The body also charged that Vilnius is militarizing the country under the pretext of a "Russian threat."

On the same day, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko told Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti that NATO's Joint Expeditionary Force exercises are practicing scenarios for a naval blockade and the seizure of Kaliningrad Oblast, ISW reports. Grushko accused the alliance of purposefully "intensifying confrontation" with Russia.

Contents

ISW: Part of a long-running information operation

ISW: Part of a long-running information operation

ISW assesses that these statements belong to the Kremlin's ongoing cognitive warfare narrative, which falsely frames NATO as the aggressor in response to Russia's military aggression in Ukraine and its long-term posturing. According to ISW, Moscow has been advancing several information operations targeting the Baltic states to set long-term informational conditions that could justify future military action. The Kremlin has been using its control of Kaliningrad Oblast in particular to construct justifications for potential aggression against the Baltic states or Poland under the guise of defending the exclave, ISW reports.

Dutch intelligence: concrete preparations underway

The objective of such a conflict, the service writes, would not be to defeat NATO militarily. Moscow would instead aim to use limited territorial gains to pull the alliance apart politically — "if necessary under the threat of nuclear weapons use."

The MIVD frames the war in Ukraine as part of a long-standing Russian effort to reshape Europe's security architecture and the international legal order. The service states the war has an existential character for the Russian regime, being not only about territory but above all about Russia's position in the world and the future of the Russian nation, culture and what it calls "appropriated traditional values."

European consensus on the timeline

The MIVD's assessment is consistent with a broader European intelligence consensus. Germany's BND and Bundeswehr have reported that Moscow is preparing for a potential "large-scale conventional war" with NATO by the end of the decade, with Defence Minister Boris Pistorius citing 2028–2029 as a possible timeline. Denmark's Defence Intelligence Service (FE) has warned that Russia could be ready for a regional war against the Baltic states within two years of Ukraine hostilities ending, and a large-scale European war within five. Estonia's Foreign Intelligence Service assesses no attack is intended in 2026 but flags long-term force reconstitution, mass drone integration, and expanded troop deployments along NATO's eastern flank.

Unlike the Cold War, the MIVD adds, the factors that once dampened great-power confrontation — a manageable bipolar order, a functioning arms-control architecture, shared understanding of strategic deterrence, and formal and informal channels for dialogue — are largely absent, creating "a real risk of unintended, and therefore hard-to-control, escalation."

Senate Democrats challenge Russian oil waiver—Moscow revenues hit two-year high

Peeter Helme — Thu, 23 Apr 2026 13:28:12 +0000

Russia is sharing intelligence on US military positions with Iran and advising Tehran on drone tactics Moscow developed against Ukraine. An Iranian drone killed six US soldiers at Port Shuaiba, Kuwait, on 1 March. The US–Israeli war on Iran has shut the Strait of Hormuz and pushed global oil prices above $100.

Moscow is now earning an estimated $150 million a day in extra revenue.

To cool the resulting price spike, Washington has twice eased sanctions on Russian oil in the past six weeks. Moscow is now earning an estimated $150 million a day in extra revenue—money it uses to strike Ukraine and to keep supplying Iran.

Senator Chris Coons of Delaware walked Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent through it on Wednesday. Over a 30-day waiver, that $150 million a day becomes $4.5 billion. Bessent disputed the logic. He did not dispute the number.

Contents

The hearing

The hearing

On 17 April, the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued a waiver allowing countries to buy Russian oil already loaded on tankers until 16 May. It was the second such license in six weeks.

Two days earlier, Bessent had told reporters Washington would not renew it. On 22 April, he had to explain the reversal to the Senate Appropriations Committee.

“Russia’s using its profits to support Iran with drones and intelligence to kill our troops.”

Coons pushed back. “Your Treasury Department lifted sanctions on Russian oil, giving them an extra $150 million a day in revenue,” he told Bessent. “And those funds are going not just to kill Ukrainians—Russia’s using its profits to support Iran with drones and intelligence to kill our troops.”

A parallel waiver on Iranian oil, calculated by NBC News at more than $14 billion in crude sold since March, has handed Tehran nearly nine times what it received under the 2015 nuclear deal Trump has repeatedly called a scandal.

Without the waiver, crude would be at $150, not $100.

Bessent’s counter was arithmetic. Treasury, he told the committee, put “more than 250 million barrels on the water.” Without the waiver, crude would be at $150, not $100. Russian oil still sells at a discount: “100% of 100 is less than 80% of 150.” The American consumer, he argued, is better off.

What the American consumer is paying

The national average gasoline price was $2.94 a gallon in late February, before the war with Iran began. By 16 April, it had reached $4.09, according to AAA—a jump of more than 30% since the US and Israel struck Iran. “Well—look, the folks in Delaware are buying $4 a gallon gas today,” Coons told Bessent.

By mid-March, under the first waiver, that discount had collapsed to $4.80.

Russian crude had been trading at a $28-per-barrel discount to the global price in February, the penalty Western sanctions built in. By mid-March, under the first waiver, that discount had collapsed to $4.80. Moscow was selling the same barrels to the same buyers for $23 more each.

What the numbers show

The Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), a Finland-based tracker of Russian fossil fuel exports, reported on 17 April that Moscow’s fossil fuel revenues jumped 52% month-on-month in March, reaching €713 million ($834 million) per day—the highest level in two years.

More than 110 shadow-fleet tankers were at sea carrying over 12 million tonnes of Russian crude.

Seaborne crude revenues alone rose 115%. Russian budget revenues from oil reached an estimated €7.4 billion ($8.7 billion) for the month.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy wrote on X on 19 April that more than 110 shadow-fleet tankers were at sea carrying over 12 million tonnes of Russian crude—about $10 billion of oil that can now be sold without consequences.

The rationale that changed

The first waiver, issued on 12 March, was framed as an emergency response to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The emergency rationale expired with the ceasefire. The waiver didn’t.

Bessent told the committee he had been approached at the IMF and World Bank spring meetings by finance ministers from “more than ten of the most vulnerable and poorest countries in terms of energy.” Washington moved past the Iran emergency to a humanitarian rationale with no sunset.

“The reduction in sanctions and political pressure on the aggressor from our partners has produced a partial resurgence of Russian military ambitions.”

Two days after his X post, Zelenskyy wrote on Telegram that “the reduction in sanctions and political pressure on the aggressor from our partners has produced a partial resurgence of Russian military ambitions.”

Bessent was asked whether he would rule out another extension on 16 May. He did not. The next 30 days will cost Russia’s war chest roughly $4.5 billion more—paid, in effect, at American gas pumps.

Slovakia’s Fico will skip Moscow’s parade but still lay flowers in the Kremlin

Alexander Moisseenko — Thu, 23 Apr 2026 13:00:43 +0000

Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico told the independent Slovak outlet Denník N on 22 April that he will not attend Russia's military parade in Moscow on 9 May, but he is not cancelling the trip.

Fico still plans to be in Moscow on 9 May to lay flowers at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier—the same ceremony he performed last year standing beside Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, as the only EU leader at Vladimir Putin's 80th anniversary celebrations. What changed between this year and last is the packaging. On 6 or 7 May, Fico now says, he will travel to Munich and to the former Dachau concentration camp. He also hopes to stop in Normandy to honour Allied soldiers. He calls it a "pilgrimage for peace."

The decision to skip the parade itself—not the country, not the date, not the Kremlin wreath—arrives three days after Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia again closed their airspace to his government plane, and after Bratislava asked Poland for transit permission instead.

Contents

What actually changed

What actually changed

Last year, Fico took the southern route when the Baltics blocked him: Hungary, Romania, the Black Sea, Georgia, Russia. He arrived the evening of 8 May. He watched the parade on the Red Square, met Putin and laid a wreath. Fico was, along with Vučić, the only European head of government there.

Explore further

Pro-Russian Fico complains Latvia and Lithuania blocked his flight to Moscow for Putin’s 9 May parade (updated)

This year, Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna said the Baltic position is unchanged: "Fico will not be granted permission to use Estonian airspace for a flight to the May 9 parade in Moscow this year either, a parade whose purpose is to glorify the aggressor."

The parade is off Fico's schedule. Moscow on 9 May isn't. Slovak Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Robert Kaliňák confirmed to Slovak media that Fico will fly to Russia even if Poland denies the request, and that he himself will not accompany the prime minister this time.

The isolation is new; the pattern isn't

When Fico arrived in Moscow last May, he had support inside the EU. Hungary's Viktor Orbán stayed home but coordinated politically—both leaders had blamed Ukraine for Druzhba pipeline damage, echoed Moscow's messaging, and threatened veto power inside the bloc.

Orbán lost Hungary's 12 April election to Péter Magyar. Fico is now the EU's lone openly pro-Russian head of government, three weeks before his second consecutive 9 May trip to the Kremlin.

His rhetoric has been consistent. In August 2023, campaigning in his hometown of Topoľčany, Fico told supporters:

"The war in Ukraine didn't start yesterday or last year. It began in 2014, when the Ukrainian Nazis and fascists started to murder the Russian citizens in Donbas and Luhansk."

Since taking office that October, he has halted Slovakia's military aid to Ukraine, opposed sanctions, met Putin in Moscow in December 2024 and again in September 2025, and threatened to block the next EU sanctions package unless Moscow's oil transit through Druzhba to Slovakia is restored.

In December 2025, he told European Council President António Costa that he would not support the EU's €210 billion loan to Ukraine backed by frozen Russian assets, calling the bloc's strategy "nothing but senseless killing." He invoked Donald Trump's peace efforts as grounds for his veto.

Explore further

Politico: Fico is first in line for Orbán’s disruptor crown — but Brussels has four more leaders to worry about

What Kyiv and the Baltics are reading

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha thanked Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania on 20 April: "Let's make up for the lack of consciousness with a lack of air routes." He called on other countries to follow.

Poland is still reviewing Bratislava's transit request. If Warsaw refuses, Fico will take last year's southern route—Hungary, Romania, the Black Sea, Georgia, Russia. Either way, he will be at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier on 9 May. Same day, same city, same wreath. Only the parade has been cut.

International News, Latest World News - Euromaidan Press

Russia maintains military presence in post-Assad Syria – but Damascus now holds leverage

Cargo convoy spotted unloading in Tartus

Syria reassesses Russia’s military access after Assad

Damascus uses Russian bases as leverage in post-Assad negotiations

Russian warships escorted convoy into Syria

Ships reportedly used deception measures during transit

A shifting balance of dependence and leverage between Damascus and Moscow

Read also

Post-Assad Syria still dependent on Russian oil despite shift to the West – Reuters

Ukraine and Syria show interest in sharing military experience as Zelenskyy makes first Damascus visit

Russia reactivates Syrian airbase in high-stakes gamble on post-Assad leadership

Russia fast-tracks citizenship for Moldova’s occupied Transnistria – a familiar playbook returns

Decree removes standard citizenship requirements and expands fast-track access

Transnistria remains outside Moldova’s control since early 1990s conflict

Similar passportization policy used in Ukraine’s Donbas

Read also

“We will use all available methods” — Shoigu threatened Moldova over Transnistria. Available methods are limited: Ukraine is in the way

Russia’s buffer zone wishlist now includes Vinnytsia — via Moldova’s Transnistria, Ukrainian official says

Moldova’s plan for Russian-controlled Transnistria: squeeze it economically, replace the separatist regime with an international administration

Don’t sign what Bosnia signed, a Bosnian journalist tells Ukraine

What Dayton was, and what it produced

The trap, regardless of shape

America’s new Ukraine map looks like Putin drew it himself

"The 'international community' is a vague term, almost non-existent"

What Bosnia did not have

Ukraine’s victory plan is dead, killed by Russian nuclear mind games

More from Lviv Media Forum:

Ukraine wants the playbook of the German newsroom Russia banned

Russia is fighting for a world that strips you of freedom, agency, and humanity

Russia hits Taiwan too—and three democracies are comparing notes on public media

Hungary’s new government summons Russian envoy after strike on Zakarpattia

Russia is hitting Ukraine’s Zakarpattia Oblast, bordering Hungary with drones, for first time. Expert says this is linked to end of Orbán’s era

Read also

Berehove’s mayor tells Magyar what Ukraine actually provides its Hungarian community

BBC: 184 sanctioned Russian tankers made 238 journeys through UK waters since the PM’s March intercept threat

184 vessels, 238 journeys, 94 crossings into territorial waters

MoD says it is "disrupting and deterring"

EU’s 21st Russia sanctions package will target the shadow fleet, banks, and firms selling stolen Ukrainian grain—Politico

Shadow fleet

“Kinetic sanctions” in action: Two more Russian shadow fleet tankers hit at Novorossiysk — the second naval drone strike in five days

Read also

As Western unity cracks, Ukraine fights to keep Russia sanctions alive

Sea drones hit Russian shadow fleet tanker as it waited for an at-sea oil rendezvous off Russia’s Black Sea coast

Russia’s shadow fleet is moving billion in oil right now — that’s budget for next week’s attacks on Ukraine

What it means when Russia starts picking the EU’s negotiator—and what Brussels said back

Slovak Prime Minister: Zelenskyy should call Putin if he wants a meeting

Russia negotiates about who negotiates

Berlin said no. Then floated a duo.

The pressure goes one way

Read also

NYT: Lost Starlink, throttled Telegram, missed recruits — Russia’s worst battlefield year since 2023

Talks continue on Trump-brokered prisoner exchange with Russia after Putin claimed that Kyiv was not ready for swap

ISW: Russia’s “Victory Day ceasefire” reduced combat but didn’t stop it

Portugal just hit highest defense-industry growth since 1986. Its defense minister links boom to Russia’s war

Record budget includes +€3.8 billion and a 23% increase in spending

New EU defense market: Portuguese companies involved in 17 European projects

Read also

Portugal pledges million for Ukraine arms via US purchase mechanism

“Special significance”: Portuguese PM makes first Kyiv visit, offers troops and drone partnership

Trump’s State Department refused to recognize Lukashenka in 2020. Today he’s a “friend.”

Who walked out

The Hermitage archaeologist Ukraine wanted to try is back in Russia—Kyiv calls it a propaganda gift to Moscow

The White House offer

What three rounds did not touch

“A direct investment in ammunition flying across the border”: Belarusian defectors warn US sanctions relief is funding Russia’s war

The charm offensive

What "friend" buys

Read also

Belarus uses prisoner release to charm West, not for democratization. Lukashenka stands with Russia anyway, says defense report

“This will affect not only Lukashenka, but also his inner circle, his sons”: Ukraine promises further actions against Belarus for drone relays

France arrests Russia’s war criminal who ran torture at “Donetsk Dachau” and has been living under refugee status for years

Assistant to “Izolyatsiya” leadership: torture, coercion, and forced confessions

Escape to EU and international investigation: France opens its own case

Arrest and war crimes charges: case under Paris court supervision

Read also

Putin’s worst torture camp couldn’t break him. Now he exposes Assad’s

Ukrainian journalist missing in occupied Donetsk, illegal arrest suspected

300 defense factories, 500,000 workers: North Korea’s arms industry reaches records amid Russia’s demand for shells in war

Official claims from Pyongyang tell record shell production