North Korea, one of the closest allies of Russia, already possesses enough nuclear warheads and delivery systems to potentially breach US missile defense and carry out a limited strike, according to reporting by Bloomberg citing South Korean President Lee Jae-myung. 

He stated that Pyongyang is capable of producing enough fissile material each year to build up to 20 nuclear warheads, indicating a rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal.

Rapid nuclear buildup and long-term parity risks

At the current pace, North Korea’s arsenal could, within the next decade, approach the scale of countries like France. If production capacity continues to grow, the number of warheads could increase even faster.

Missile systems capable of penetrating US defenses

North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) family, including Hwasong-15, Hwasong-17, Hwasong-18, and Hwasong-19, is considered capable of penetrating US missile defense systems.

In addition, Pyongyang maintains a large inventory of shorter-range missiles capable of striking US allies in Asia and American military bases, including the strategic island of Guam.

Experts warn of rising nuclear threat

Analysts argue that North Korea is no longer merely issuing nuclear threats but may now possess the capability to act on them.

“They have more experience stewarding their nuclear forces; they have far greater confidence in their delivery systems,” Ankit Panda, expert from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, says. 

Earlier US intelligence assessments estimated North Korea had around 10 missiles capable of reaching US territory. However, independent experts now suggest the country may possess up to 50 launchers, indicating significantly greater capability than previously assessed.

Every time that the Lukashenka regime releases some of its many hundreds political prisoners, we witness scenes of jubiliation, of course. In Belarus, you can land in prison for decades just for carrying the wrong flag or poster.

But we rarely hear about the other side of the coin, the hidden costs of the US making such deals with the Belarusian dictator, who has already been in power for more than 30 years. All of such deals are based on a cynical bribe of the regime, namely the softening of the sanctions in return for geopolitical influence.

Since September, the US has four times softening its sanctions against Belarus, the latest round was on 28 April.

Today, in exclusive interviews with Euromaidan Press, Belpol, a group of former Belarusian security officers who defected after the 2020 crackdown, explains that sanctions relief "is a direct investment in the production of ammunition flying across the border." Lukashenka is getting back the financial tools he needs to sustain both his own system—and his contribution to Russia’s war effort.

What has been lifted, and when

In September 2025, Washington lifted sanctions on the Belarusian state airline Belavia. Minsk released 52 political prisoners. Trump's envoy John Coale, during his first trip to Minsk, told reporters that Washington wanted to "normalize relations" and that the move was "only the beginning."

In December 2025, the US granted limited sanctions relief to three Belarusian potash producers. Belarus released 123 prisoners, including Nobel Peace Prize laureate Ales Bialiatski, opposition figure Maria Kalesnikava, and former presidential candidate Viktar Babaryka.

Potash, a potassium-based fertiliser, is one of Belarus’s most important exports. Belarus produces around 20% of the global production of potash. Before sanctions, it generated three billions in revenue - amounting to no less than 4% of GDP - and was shipped through the Lithuanian port of Klaipėda on the Baltic Sea. With the sanctions, That route was cut off in 2022, forcing Belarus to rely on longer, more expensive routes through Russian ports.

Potash and its importance for Belarus (and Lukashenka)

Potash: the irreplaceable mineral behind Belarus’s prisoner deals

In March 2026, the biggest round yet: the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control fully removed Belaruskali, the Belarusian Potash Company, and their Ukrainian subsidiary Agrorozkvit from the sanctions list, and authorized transactions with Belinvestbank and its affiliates. The Development Bank of Belarus and the Belarusian Finance Ministry came off the sanctions list as well. Minsk released 250 prisoners, including journalist Katsyaryna Andreyeva.

Trump's envoy John Coale called it "a significant humanitarian milestone." Belarusian self-proclaimed president Aliaksandr Lukashenka called it part of a "big deal" still being negotiated, which he said may include a $3 billion mine sale to US investors and a visit to Washington.

Explore further

250 Belarusians freed after Washington lifts sanctions on banks and potash – regime calls it “humanitarian”

Roughly 875 political prisoners remain behind bars in Belarus, according to human rights group Viasna. New arrests continue.

What Lukashenka gains

Igor Kuley, a journalist with the Belarusian Investigative Center, told Euromaidan Press the regime's gains come on several tracks at once.

The first is diplomatic: the restoration of Lukashenka as someone Washington talks to. After five years of near-total isolation following the fraudulent 2020 election, the self-proclaimed president is again receiving US envoys, proposing bilateral deals, and being quoted in the American press.

Each round reinforces that pattern. Kuley describes the US approach as a deliberate drip-feed:

"The lifting of sanctions is like a part of a puzzle. The US wants to stay in the negotiation process so that Lukashenka doesn't get everything all at once and wouldn't lose his interest in further negotiations."

The second track is operational. A team member from Belpol, a group of former Belarusian security officers who defected after the 2020 crackdown, explained in a written interview with Euromaidan Press that removing restrictions on the Finance Ministry and state banks frees resources the regime previously spent on grey-scheme workarounds.

"Huge expenses on circumvention manoeuvres in settlements" disappear, the Belpol representative wrote; the released capacity then goes to "both its own survival and help to the partner-neighbour — the Russian Federation, which is solving its tasks on our territory, including military ones."

The third track is export revenue. The US removal of Belaruskali and the Belarusian Potash Company from the sanctions list does not automatically restore Belarus's largest pre-war export outlet — EU sanctions remain in force, and Lithuania has not reopened the port of Klaipėda — but it changes the economics of trade with buyers in Brazil, China, and India.

Those countries are already Belarus's biggest remaining customers, but have extracted steep discounts over the past three years as compensation for secondary-sanctions risk. With that risk gone, Belpol argues, the discounts vanish.

Kuley notes that transhipment through Russian ports such as St. Petersburg and Ust-Luga still eats up "almost all the profit" because of distance and what he called corruption in Russian ports; nitrogen fertiliser trade through these routes, he said, has been running at an overall loss.

However, Belpol emphasizes that the price recovery more than covers the higher transport costs. The RFE/RL assessment of the March round reached a similar conclusion to Belpol: US markets are only theoretically open to Belarusian potash, but existing buyers can now pay market price.

The bank that helps finance Russia's shells

One of the institutions benefiting from sanctions relief is Belinvestbank—a state bank now able to operate with far fewer restrictions after being covered by a US Treasury general license in March. According to an investigation by Belpol, the bank plays a direct role in financing companies linked to Russia’s war effort.

It has provided loans to Belarusian state enterprises producing components for 152mm artillery shells and 122mm rockets—the same types of munitions Russian forces use daily against Ukraine.

Belpol says a Belarusian government document lists multiple companies receiving this financing. Among them are industrial firms such as Legmash, the Minsk Bearing Plant, and the Minsk Tractor Works. The document reportedly details both the scale of funding and how it is distributed.

The bank is also linked to a newer ammunition facility near the town of Slutsk, whose primary market, according to its own loan records, is Russia. In addition, Belinvestbank finances the microelectronics company Integral, a supplier to dozens of Russian defence enterprises. Chips produced by Integral have been found in Russian cruise missiles used in strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure.

Kuley framed what the bank's delisting means for Ukrainian targets:

"The lifting of these sanctions against Belinvestbank would make it easier for Belarus to make payments for certain components. Belarus is very engaged in providing weapons to Russia."

The Odesa scenario

Since Lithuania shut down transit through the Baltic port of Klaipėda in 2022, Belarus has been forced to reroute shipments through Russian ports—an option that is slower, more expensive, and far less profitable. Finding an alternative has become a priority for Minsk—and increasingly, for Washington as well.

US envoy John Coale has urged Lithuania to reopen talks with Aliaksandr Lukashenka and restore transit. Vilnius has refused.

A second option is being floated quietly: transit through the Ukrainian Black Sea port of Odesa. Kuley told Euromaidan Press he considers the possibility real:

"It wouldn't be difficult for the Americans to agree with the Ukrainians for transhipment to go through, say, the port of Odesa. Everyone would be interested in this, especially if, as rumours say, the Americans acquire Nezhinsky GOK — the second-largest potash enterprise in Belarus."

Lithuanian analyst Vytis Jurkonis reached the same conclusion in December, telling LRT that Odesa transit could align US, Belarusian, and Ukrainian interests — revenue for Kyiv, an American stake in port security, an export outlet for Minsk.

What makes it far-fetched is the politics, not the geography. Ukraine spent February 2026 expanding sanctions on Lukashenka and his inner circle over Belarus's role hosting Russian Shahed drone relays used to strike Ukrainian cities. Asking Kyiv to open its largest Black Sea port to the same regime's fertiliser exports would be a reversal.

Ukraine has not indicated it is considering it. The question is whether it will be asked to.

Lukashenka still firmly on Russia’s side

Nothing in the three rounds of relief has touched the elements of Belarusian policy that actually affect Ukraine on the battlefield.

Belarus still hosts Russian Shahed drone relays. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, announcing Ukraine's February sanctions package, said these relays "correct and coordinate attacks" on Ukrainian energy infrastructure and civilian targets. Russia deployed the Oreshnik intermediate-range missile system on Belarusian soil in November 2025. Belarusian territory continues to host Russian tactical nuclear warheads, the first such deployment outside Russia since the Cold War.

The Lithuanian Defence Ministry's 2026 annual threat assessment concluded that Belarus uses prisoner releases to charm the West while acting as a Russian tool of intimidation against European states. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the exiled opposition leader, told the AP after the December round that Lukashenka "hasn't changed his policies, his crackdown continues, and he keeps on supporting Russia's war against Ukraine."

What this means for Ukraine

The US strategy appears to be based on a simple calculation: limited concessions can produce tangible humanitarian results. Prisoner releases are politically visible, immediate, and measurable. Sanctions relief is gradual and reversible. By keeping the process incremental, Washington may hope to maintain leverage over Minsk and prevent Belarus from moving even closer to Moscow. But the approach also carries risks.

A Belarusian state bank documented as funding shell and missile-component production can now clear dollar transactions without compliance friction. Components from Southeast Asia needed for drone guidance systems become cheaper to procure. A state whose territory Russia uses as a launchpad for daily strikes on Ukraine gains renewed hard currency. The Finance Ministry, no longer under US restrictions, can allocate that currency without detours.

Each round of sanction relief signals to Minsk — and to Moscow — that the strategy of trading prisoners for resources works, and that incremental concessions can extract progressively larger packages. The Belpol representative described what this means operationally:

"Access to finance allows faster modernisation of the shops of Belarusian factories, where chassis for Russian missile systems are assembled. The Ministry of Finance gets the chance to patch budget holes without cutting spending on the punitive apparatus and logistical support for Russian troops."

The people freed in recent months should never have been jailed. Their release is real and significant. But so is the trade behind it.

With each round of sanctions relief, Belarus regains part of the financial system it needs to function—and to support Russia’s war. The fighting hasn’t changed. What has changed is how easy it is to finance it.

Belarus released three Polish nationals and two Moldovans at the border on 28 April. Russia got back Alexander Butyagin, the archaeologist Ukraine had charged with looting Crimea—six weeks before he was due in a Ukrainian courtroom.

The five freed include Andrzej Poczobut, the Gazeta Wyborcza journalist held more than 1,800 days in Lukashenka's prisons, and Grzegorz Gaweł, a 27-year-old Polish Carmelite monk who faced up to 15 years on espionage charges over Belarus's Zapad-2025 nuclear war games. The five sent the other way include Alexander Butyagin, the Hermitage Museum archaeologist; Nina Popova, a Russian citizen Moldova said had been acting against it; and—from a parallel Moldova-Russia trade—a former deputy head of Moldova's intelligence service convicted of selling state secrets to the Belarusian KGB.

Poczobut: 1,800 days for "inciting ethnic hostility"

Poczobut, a Gazeta Wyborcza correspondent and a leading voice for Belarus's Polish minority, was arrested in March 2021 amid the crackdown that followed the 2020 protests. A court sentenced him to eight years in 2023 for "inciting ethnic hostility" and "undermining national security"—charges Poland, the EU, and human rights groups called politically motivated. The European Parliament awarded him the 2025 Sakharov Prize.

"Andrzej Poczobut is free! Welcome to your Polish home, my friend", Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk wrote on X.

He called the swap "the finale of a two-year-long intricate diplomatic game, full of dramatic twists" and credited Polish services, diplomats, and prosecutors "as well as the tremendous help from our American, Romanian, and Moldovan friends."

Gaweł: a monk, the KGB, and the Zapad-2025 nuclear war games

Belarusian KGB officers detained Gaweł, a Krakow-based Carmelite monk who had taken his perpetual vows just months earlier, in the town of Lepel on 4 September 2025. State television aired footage of the arrest and accused him of obtaining a copy of a classified document about "Zapad-2025"—the joint Russian-Belarusian exercises that include the Russian nuclear weapons now stationed on Belarusian soil. He was charged under Article 358, which carries up to 15 years; because the alleged material concerned nuclear deployments, human rights groups raised the prospect that the death penalty was theoretically available. He had been held incommunicado, without confirmed access to a lawyer or to Polish consular staff. Belarus's Viasna human rights centre recognised him as a political prisoner. Polish authorities called the case a fabricated provocation.

Ukraine criticizes release of Butyagin

Butyagin headed the Hermitage Museum's Northern Black Sea Region Classical Archaeology Sector. From 2014 onward—after Russia annexed Crimea—he led the Myrmekion expedition near Kerch every year, digs Ukrainian prosecutors say lacked permits from Kyiv. His teams stripped roughly two metres of the cultural layer at the site: the stratified soil that holds artefacts and evidence of ancient habitation. Ukraine's Security Service estimated the damage at over $4.8 million.

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Poland extends detention of Hermitage archaeologist wanted by Ukraine for Crimea looting

Polish security agents detained him at a Warsaw hotel in December 2025 as he passed through after a lecture in the Netherlands. The Warsaw District Court approved his extradition to Ukraine on 18 March. Ukraine's Foreign Ministry welcomed the ruling. His lawyer appealed.

Ukraine reacted with regret to the decision of Poland to release Butyagin.

"Ukraine has learned with regret that, despite a previous entirely fair ruling by a Polish court, Russian citizen Alexander Butyagin, who is reasonably suspected of committing a crime on Ukrainian territory—in particular, removing cultural valuables from Crimea—was ultimately not extradited to Ukraine," Foreign Ministry spokesman Heorhii Tykhyi told journalists.

"It is obvious that the Russian side will cynically use this political and legal episode to justify the occupation of Crimea and the exploitation of Ukraine's temporarily occupied territory by Russian citizens," Tykhyi added.

Butyagin is far from a unique case. A May 2025 human rights report identified seven Hermitage employees conducting unauthorised excavations across occupied Crimea, including at the UNESCO site of Chersonesos and the Genoese fortress at Balaklava. Russia's Foreign Ministry called the case against Butyagin "absurd" and demanded his return.

A second trade sends a former Moldovan intelligence chief to Belarus

Running alongside the Polish-Belarusian exchange was a parallel two-for-two trade. Two officers of Moldova's Intelligence and Security Service (SIS), held in Russia, came home. In return, President Maia Sandu pardoned Alexandru Bălan, a former deputy SIS director extradited from Romania to Moldova in April and convicted of treason for selling state secrets to the Belarusian KGB. Bălan is now on his way to Belarus. From 2016 to 2019—before he was allegedly recruited—he had served as Moldova's liaison officer at Ukraine's General Staff.

Romanian prosecutors had separately charged Bălan with meeting Belarusian intelligence officers in Budapest in 2024 and 2025, part of what the Czech intelligence service BIS describes as a Belarusian KGB network running through central Europe.

The fifth person sent east was Nina Popova, a Russian citizen Sandu said had been "acting against the Republic of Moldova." Russia's FSB confirmed her release alongside Butyagin's and described her as the wife of a Russian soldier serving with Moscow's forces in Transnistria—the breakaway sliver of Moldova where Russian troops have been stationed since 1992.

"For our country this is a gain that cannot be measured by a simple mathematical equation," Sandu wrote. "We brought home two citizens who work for the Republic of Moldova, in exchange for two detainees who worked against it."

Five Coale swaps in a year. Each paired with US sanctions relief.

This is at least the fifth Belarus swap Trump's special envoy John Coale has brokered with Lukashenka in twelve months. Each was paired with a US sanctions concession or a step toward normalisation.

Coale framed today's deal as evidence "we are not always at war, as the world thinks." He said in a statement on X that the United States would not stop "until we get every last one" of the roughly 800 to 900 political prisoners still held in Belarus, and thanked Lukashenka for his "willingness to pursue constructive engagement with the United States."

It remains to be seen whether any sanctions are going to be lifted as part of this prisoner swap.

The Lukashenka regime is still arresting dissidents

The broader pattern is hard to ignore. While individual prisoners regain their freedom, the system that put them behind bars remains firmly in place. Belarus continues to host Russian forces and missile systems, and arrests of regime critics have not stopped.

Human rights groups report hundreds still imprisoned on political charges, with new sentences handed down even as high-profile swaps unfold. For Lukashenka, these exchanges appear less a sign of change than a calculated tool—trading human lives for diplomatic concessions while maintaining the same repressive course at home and strategic alignment with Moscow.

Ukraine is drafting sanctions on transporters and buyers of Russian-stolen Ukrainian grain after a second vessel was allowed to reach Israel in two weeks, with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy putting the diplomatic blame on the buyer state

"In any normal country, purchasing stolen goods is an act that entails legal liability," Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy posted on social media on 28 April. "This applies, in particular, to grain stolen by Russia. Another vessel carrying such grain has arrived at a port in Israel and is preparing to unload. This is not — and cannot be — legitimate business."

The statement followed the arrival in the Haifa Bay of the Panormitis, the second Russian-stolen-grain vessel allowed to reach Israel, which Ukraine has protested in two weeks.

"The Israeli authorities cannot be unaware"

Russia is "systematically seizing grain on temporarily occupied Ukrainian land and organizing its export through individuals linked to the occupiers," Zelenskyy said.

"Such schemes violate the laws of the State of Israel itself."

He added that the Israeli authorities "cannot be unaware of which ships are arriving at the country's ports and what cargo they are carrying," and said Ukraine had taken all necessary diplomatic steps to prevent the incident.

Sanctions package coming, EU coordination next

"Based on information from our intelligence services, Ukraine is preparing a relevant sanctions package that will cover both those directly transporting this grain and the individuals and legal entities attempting to profit from this criminal scheme," Zelenskyy said.

Kyiv will also coordinate with European partners to get the same individuals included in EU sanctions regimes, he added. The EU's 20th sanctions package, adopted on 23 April, already restricts four foreign institutions accused of helping Moscow bypass sanctions and targets entities in third countries supporting Russia's war.

Haaretz: EU mulls Israeli listings

The European Union is mulling sanctions on Israeli individuals and entities aiding Russia in circumventing international sanctions and demanding information from Israel on the Russian-stolen Ukrainian wheat being imported, EU foreign affairs spokesman Anouar El Anouni told Haaretz on 27 April, according to the outlet's report following its own Sunday investigation into the trade.

The EU "has taken note of the reports that a Russian shadow fleet vessel carrying stolen Ukrainian grain has been allowed to unload at Haifa port in Israel, and that despite previous contacts of Ukraine with Israeli authorities on the subject," Anouni said. He added that the bloc is requesting additional information from Israeli authorities and is ready to list individuals and entities in third countries if necessary.

The diplomatic exchange

On 27 April, Israel's Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar earlier rebuffed the diplomatic protest of his Ukrainian counterpart Andrii Sybiha on X, writing that "diplomatic relations, especially between friendly nations, are not conducted on Twitter or in the media" and that "allegations are not evidence." 

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Ukraine summons Israeli ambassador — for second Russian stolen-grain vessel to reach Haifa

The Ukrainian MFA released a chronology that contradicts Sa'ar's "no request for legal assistance" line, documenting over a month of Ukrainian appeals — ambassador-level notes, a minister-to-minister call, and a 15 April formal request for international legal assistance with a court decision on a preventive measure against the Abinsk — that Israel ignored, finishing the Abinsk unloading ahead of schedule that same day and waving through the Panormitis approach two weeks later.

Russian mercenaries from Moscow's Africa Corps abandoned their base in the northern Malian city of Kidal on 26 April, leaving under escort by the Tuareg-led rebels they had been deployed to fight. Russian and Malian forces set fire to the runway and buildings of the former UN peacekeeping camp before departing.

Wagner Group fighters helped Mali's army capture Kidal in November 2023, in what the junta called a strategic turning point. The Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) fighters who took the city back over the weekend are the same Tuareg rebels Mali accused Ukraine of backing in August 2024, when Bamako severed diplomatic ties with Kyiv over alleged "support for terrorism."

What happened in Kidal

The withdrawal followed two days of intense fighting that began on 25 April, when FLA fighters and JNIM, the al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, launched coordinated strikes on Malian military positions in Bamako, Kati, Gao, Sevare, Mopti, and Kidal. It was the most synchronized rebel offensive against the junta since the military seized power in 2021.

Mali's defense minister, Sadio Camara, was killed in an attack on his home, the government confirmed on state television. The FLA took the streets of Kidal within hours and surrounded a camp where Africa Corps personnel and Malian soldiers had taken position. By the morning of 26 April, the Russians were "holed up" inside the perimeter, an FLA official told AFP.

Then came the deal.

"An accord has been reached permitting the Malian army and its African Corps allies to leave Camp 2, where they were holed up since yesterday," the Tuareg official said.

A convoy assembled at the camp gate and departed under FLA escort. As they left, Russian and Malian forces torched the camp and its airstrip. Footage documented by the Ukrainian military news outlet Militarnyi suggests the destruction was meant to deny the rebels weapons and infrastructure. FLA spokesperson Mohamed El Maouloud Ramadan declared the city "free."

Hardware Russia lost

During the two-day battle, the Africa Corps lost a BTR-82A armored personnel carrier, a Chinese-made VP-11 armored vehicle, and had a Tornado-U armored vehicle captured by the rebels, according to Russian and Ukrainian military channels aggregated by Militarnyi.

The mercenaries deployed BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, Spartak armored vehicles, and Tigr-M vehicles fitted with Arbalet-DM combat modules. Three Russian helicopters were reported patrolling above Bamako's airport during the fighting, where Africa Corps personnel were also engaged.

This is hardware drawn from the same Russian defense ministry inventory that supplies the war in Ukraine. Africa Corps is the state-controlled successor to Yevgeny Prigozhin's Wagner Group, formed in late 2023 after he died in a plane crash that August.

It operates under the direct command of the defense ministry.

Pattern, not incident

Kidal is the second catastrophic reversal for Russia's Sahel mercenary project in less than two years.

In July 2024, Tuareg fighters and JNIM ambushed a Wagner column near Tinzaouatin, killing dozens of mercenaries in what pro-Russian military bloggers acknowledged as the worst single loss Russia's African operation had suffered.

The Tinzaouatin defeat triggered Mali's diplomatic break with Ukraine. In the days after the ambush, a spokesperson for Ukraine's military intelligence (HUR) made remarks that the junta interpreted as Ukrainian acknowledgment of contact with the Tuareg fighters. Bamako severed relations with Kyiv. Niger followed within days. The two juntas, joined by Burkina Faso, jointly accused Ukraine of "terrorism support" in a letter to the UN. Ukraine denied the allegations and said no evidence had been provided.

In March 2026, Africa Corps fighters were killed in another Mali ambush amid accusations of civilian killings by Russian-backed forces. Late that same month, Tuareg drones and artillery struck a Russian base near Anafif. Now Kidal has fallen.

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Russia’s Africa Corps fighters killed in Mali ambush amid accusations of civilian killings

What it means for Ukraine

The Sahel juntas—Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—turned away from France and the UN after their respective coups and contracted Russia to fill the security gap. The pitch was straightforward: Moscow's mercenaries would do what Western forces had failed to do, without the human-rights conditions or political pressure that came with Western partnership.

What the juntas got was a force that lost Kidal in two days and negotiated its way out under enemy escort.

Russia's offer to authoritarian governments worldwide protection in exchange for resources and political alignment rests on a claim of effectiveness.

The FLA on Sunday called on Russia to "reconsider its support for the military junta in Bamako, whose actions have contributed to the suffering of the civilian population"—a direct invitation for Moscow to abandon its African client. Ulf Laessing of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation told Arab News this week that "the attacks are a major blow to Russia… they were unable to protect major cities."

Africa Corps personnel, BMP-3s, BTR-82As, Tigr-M crews, and the helicopters reportedly involved in fighting near Bamako's airport are not available for the front in Ukraine. Russia's defense ministry maintains parallel commitments, and those commitments now include a Sahel theater that requires reinforcement, not drawdown.

The juntas that broke with Ukraine in 2024 over the Tuareg ambush did so on the assumption that aligning with Russia would deliver security. The assumption has now been tested twice and has failed each time. Whether Bamako, Niamey, and Ouagadougou reconsider that alignment is an open question. The cost of it is now visible.

What comes next

Witnesses confirmed the Malian flag no longer flies over Kidal. Fighting was reported to continue in Sevare and Kati, where the junta's main military base sits on the outskirts of Bamako. ECOWAS, the regional bloc that Mali has rejected, condemned the attacks and called for a coordinated response, though it has limited leverage over a junta that has departed the bloc.

A "fragile calm" was reported in Gao and Sevare on 26 April. The Africa Corps convoy that left Kidal was last seen heading toward Gao under FLA escort. An FLA field commander told the BBC the alliance had been preparing for the offensive "for months" and that the next target is Gao. After Gao, he said, "Timbuktu will be easy to fall."

Russia seeks to reclaim territories that once belonged to the Soviet Union, a strategy that creates a real risk of new wars, says NATO Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone. Thus, Moscow remains a key threat to the Alliance, according to RBC-Ukraine.

Russia will seek to restore past and is expanding its list of potential targets

“Russia will seek to regain what it once possessed… so you can draw your own conclusions about who may become a target," said Cavo Dragone. 

When asked specifically about the Baltic states, he stressed that the risk is not limited to them, broadening the potential danger zone.

NATO prepares for full-spectrum defense from Arctic to South

Dragone emphasized that the Alliance is focused on deterrence, self-defense, and 360-degree security, and that it is strengthening its presence across key regions, from the Arctic to the eastern flank and the southern direction.

At the same time, he noted assessments from the Baltic countries themselves, which currently do not see an immediate threat.

According to the admiral, these states have the most accurate understanding of the situation, as they are effectively on the frontline of security monitoring.

Recently, concerns have risen over a potential operation against Estonia, as a recent investigation found social media accounts that promote the idea of a “Narva People’s Republic”, a separatist project aimed at detaching parts of northeastern Estonia bordering Russia.

This could evolve into a Donetsk and Luhansk illegal entities playbook, which used the pretext of its "protection of Russian speakers" as justification for military intervention.

Meanwhile, Russia deployed a nuclear-capable Oreshnik intercontinental ballistic missile system to Belarus, which can reach any European city within minutes. It is almost impossible to intercept, and it has six warheads that fall on targets separately. 

This week’s EU summit in Cyprus took place in a noticeably calmer atmosphere without Viktor Orbán, who is set to leave office after losing the election. For 16 years, he had been one of the main sources of tension within the European Union, Politico reports. 

However, his absence did not resolve underlying issues — if anything, it exposed them.

Europe without “convenient scapegoat”

Diplomats at the summit acknowledged behind the scenes that Orbán had long served as a kind of scapegoat for internal conflicts.

Now, without him, the EU is forced to confront its differences more openly and honestly.

Ukraine: fast-track membership or cautious realism

One of the first major divisions emerged over Ukraine’s EU membership. Some leaders support accelerating Kyiv’s integration, while others urge caution.

Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković, speaking in the presence of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, emphasized the need to consider “realities”, a signal that consensus remains out of reach.

Energy under pressure: sanctions or economic survival

Another sharp debate focused on energy policy. Europe faces a dual challenge:

• fuel shortages amid escalating tensions around Iran
• the need to maintain and strengthen sanctions against Russia

This creates a direct dilemma between economic stability and political commitments.

Endless debates: budget, strategy, and future of EU

Even without Orbán, EU leaders continued lengthy discussions over budget priorities, development strategy, and the Union’s long-term direction.

In effect, the summit demonstrated that the EU’s core problem is not individual politicians, but deeper structural divisions among member states.

Russia plays its violin at the Cyprus meeting 

Earlier, the Center for Countering Disinformation reported that Russia is attempting to organize staged protests in Cyprus aimed against EU policy, the decision to allocate a €90 billion loan to Ukraine, and to discredit President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

The “protests” are reportedly planned to run through 25 April under the guise of anti-war slogans. However, this reflects a typical Russian tactic of shifting responsibility for the war onto Ukraine, the EU, and NATO. The central message is expected to demand an “immediate halt to EU funding of the war in Ukraine.”

Through such provocative actions, the Kremlin seeks to undermine support for Ukraine and trigger divisions within the European Union.

Russia is laying informational groundwork for potential military action against NATO's Baltic members by accusing Lithuania and the alliance of threatening Kaliningrad Oblast, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reports, citing two separate Russian government statements issued on 23 April.

The Russian Security Council accused Lithuanian authorities of creating a "hotbed of tension" near the border with Kaliningrad Oblast, according to ISW. The body also charged that Vilnius is militarizing the country under the pretext of a "Russian threat."

On the same day, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko told Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti that NATO's Joint Expeditionary Force exercises are practicing scenarios for a naval blockade and the seizure of Kaliningrad Oblast, ISW reports. Grushko accused the alliance of purposefully "intensifying confrontation" with Russia.

ISW: Part of a long-running information operation

ISW assesses that these statements belong to the Kremlin's ongoing cognitive warfare narrative, which falsely frames NATO as the aggressor in response to Russia's military aggression in Ukraine and its long-term posturing. According to ISW, Moscow has been advancing several information operations targeting the Baltic states to set long-term informational conditions that could justify future military action. The Kremlin has been using its control of Kaliningrad Oblast in particular to construct justifications for potential aggression against the Baltic states or Poland under the guise of defending the exclave, ISW reports.

Dutch intelligence: concrete preparations underway

While Russia continues to fight in Ukraine, a conventional war against NATO is "virtually ruled out," the Dutch service writes. At the same time, "Russia is already taking concrete preparatory steps for a possible conflict with NATO," according to the MIVD.

The objective of such a conflict, the service writes, would not be to defeat NATO militarily. Moscow would instead aim to use limited territorial gains to pull the alliance apart politically — "if necessary under the threat of nuclear weapons use."

The MIVD frames the war in Ukraine as part of a long-standing Russian effort to reshape Europe's security architecture and the international legal order. The service states the war has an existential character for the Russian regime, being not only about territory but above all about Russia's position in the world and the future of the Russian nation, culture and what it calls "appropriated traditional values."

European consensus on the timeline

The MIVD's assessment is consistent with a broader European intelligence consensus. Germany's BND and Bundeswehr have reported that Moscow is preparing for a potential "large-scale conventional war" with NATO by the end of the decade, with Defence Minister Boris Pistorius citing 2028–2029 as a possible timeline. Denmark's Defence Intelligence Service (FE) has warned that Russia could be ready for a regional war against the Baltic states within two years of Ukraine hostilities ending, and a large-scale European war within five. Estonia's Foreign Intelligence Service assesses no attack is intended in 2026 but flags long-term force reconstitution, mass drone integration, and expanded troop deployments along NATO's eastern flank.

Unlike the Cold War, the MIVD adds, the factors that once dampened great-power confrontation — a manageable bipolar order, a functioning arms-control architecture, shared understanding of strategic deterrence, and formal and informal channels for dialogue — are largely absent, creating "a real risk of unintended, and therefore hard-to-control, escalation."

Russia is sharing intelligence on US military positions with Iran and advising Tehran on drone tactics Moscow developed against Ukraine. An Iranian drone killed six US soldiers at Port Shuaiba, Kuwait, on 1 March. The US–Israeli war on Iran has shut the Strait of Hormuz and pushed global oil prices above $100.

To cool the resulting price spike, Washington has twice eased sanctions on Russian oil in the past six weeks. Moscow is now earning an estimated $150 million a day in extra revenue—money it uses to strike Ukraine and to keep supplying Iran.

Senator Chris Coons of Delaware walked Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent through it on Wednesday. Over a 30-day waiver, that $150 million a day becomes $4.5 billion. Bessent disputed the logic. He did not dispute the number.

The hearing

On 17 April, the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued a waiver allowing countries to buy Russian oil already loaded on tankers until 16 May. It was the second such license in six weeks.

Two days earlier, Bessent had told reporters Washington would not renew it. On 22 April, he had to explain the reversal to the Senate Appropriations Committee.

Coons pushed back. “Your Treasury Department lifted sanctions on Russian oil, giving them an extra $150 million a day in revenue,” he told Bessent. “And those funds are going not just to kill Ukrainians—Russia’s using its profits to support Iran with drones and intelligence to kill our troops.”

A parallel waiver on Iranian oil, calculated by NBC News at more than $14 billion in crude sold since March, has handed Tehran nearly nine times what it received under the 2015 nuclear deal Trump has repeatedly called a scandal.

Bessent’s counter was arithmetic. Treasury, he told the committee, put “more than 250 million barrels on the water.” Without the waiver, crude would be at $150, not $100. Russian oil still sells at a discount: “100% of 100 is less than 80% of 150.” The American consumer, he argued, is better off.

What the American consumer is paying

The national average gasoline price was $2.94 a gallon in late February, before the war with Iran began. By 16 April, it had reached $4.09, according to AAA—a jump of more than 30% since the US and Israel struck Iran. “Well—look, the folks in Delaware are buying $4 a gallon gas today,” Coons told Bessent.

Russian crude had been trading at a $28-per-barrel discount to the global price in February, the penalty Western sanctions built in. By mid-March, under the first waiver, that discount had collapsed to $4.80. Moscow was selling the same barrels to the same buyers for $23 more each.

What the numbers show

The Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), a Finland-based tracker of Russian fossil fuel exports, reported on 17 April that Moscow’s fossil fuel revenues jumped 52% month-on-month in March, reaching €713 million ($834 million) per day—the highest level in two years.

Seaborne crude revenues alone rose 115%. Russian budget revenues from oil reached an estimated €7.4 billion ($8.7 billion) for the month.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy wrote on X on 19 April that more than 110 shadow-fleet tankers were at sea carrying over 12 million tonnes of Russian crude—about $10 billion of oil that can now be sold without consequences.

The rationale that changed

The first waiver, issued on 12 March, was framed as an emergency response to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The emergency rationale expired with the ceasefire. The waiver didn’t.

Bessent told the committee he had been approached at the IMF and World Bank spring meetings by finance ministers from “more than ten of the most vulnerable and poorest countries in terms of energy.” Washington moved past the Iran emergency to a humanitarian rationale with no sunset.

Two days after his X post, Zelenskyy wrote on Telegram that “the reduction in sanctions and political pressure on the aggressor from our partners has produced a partial resurgence of Russian military ambitions.”

Bessent was asked whether he would rule out another extension on 16 May. He did not. The next 30 days will cost Russia’s war chest roughly $4.5 billion more—paid, in effect, at American gas pumps.

Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico told the independent Slovak outlet Denník N on 22 April that he will not attend Russia's military parade in Moscow on 9 May, but he is not cancelling the trip.

Fico still plans to be in Moscow on 9 May to lay flowers at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier—the same ceremony he performed last year standing beside Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, as the only EU leader at Vladimir Putin's 80th anniversary celebrations. What changed between this year and last is the packaging. On 6 or 7 May, Fico now says, he will travel to Munich and to the former Dachau concentration camp. He also hopes to stop in Normandy to honour Allied soldiers. He calls it a "pilgrimage for peace."

The decision to skip the parade itself—not the country, not the date, not the Kremlin wreath—arrives three days after Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia again closed their airspace to his government plane, and after Bratislava asked Poland for transit permission instead.

What actually changed

Last year, Fico took the southern route when the Baltics blocked him: Hungary, Romania, the Black Sea, Georgia, Russia. He arrived the evening of 8 May. He watched the parade on the Red Square, met Putin and laid a wreath. Fico was, along with Vučić, the only European head of government there.

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This year, Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna said the Baltic position is unchanged: "Fico will not be granted permission to use Estonian airspace for a flight to the May 9 parade in Moscow this year either, a parade whose purpose is to glorify the aggressor."

The parade is off Fico's schedule. Moscow on 9 May isn't. Slovak Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Robert Kaliňák confirmed to Slovak media that Fico will fly to Russia even if Poland denies the request, and that he himself will not accompany the prime minister this time.

The isolation is new; the pattern isn't

When Fico arrived in Moscow last May, he had support inside the EU. Hungary's Viktor Orbán stayed home but coordinated politically—both leaders had blamed Ukraine for Druzhba pipeline damage, echoed Moscow's messaging, and threatened veto power inside the bloc.

Orbán lost Hungary's 12 April election to Péter Magyar. Fico is now the EU's lone openly pro-Russian head of government, three weeks before his second consecutive 9 May trip to the Kremlin.

His rhetoric has been consistent. In August 2023, campaigning in his hometown of Topoľčany, Fico told supporters:

"The war in Ukraine didn't start yesterday or last year. It began in 2014, when the Ukrainian Nazis and fascists started to murder the Russian citizens in Donbas and Luhansk."

Since taking office that October, he has halted Slovakia's military aid to Ukraine, opposed sanctions, met Putin in Moscow in December 2024 and again in September 2025, and threatened to block the next EU sanctions package unless Moscow's oil transit through Druzhba to Slovakia is restored.

In December 2025, he told European Council President António Costa that he would not support the EU's €210 billion loan to Ukraine backed by frozen Russian assets, calling the bloc's strategy "nothing but senseless killing." He invoked Donald Trump's peace efforts as grounds for his veto.

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What Kyiv and the Baltics are reading

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha thanked Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania on 20 April: "Let's make up for the lack of consciousness with a lack of air routes." He called on other countries to follow.

Poland is still reviewing Bratislava's transit request. If Warsaw refuses, Fico will take last year's southern route—Hungary, Romania, the Black Sea, Georgia, Russia. Either way, he will be at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier on 9 May. Same day, same city, same wreath. Only the parade has been cut.

Russia's Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu threatened Moldova with intervention over its measures against Transnistria — a Russian-occupied breakaway strip of Moldovan territory — comparing Chișinău's actions to Ukraine's alleged treatment of Donbas after 2014, in an interview with Komsomolskaya Pravda cited by The Moscow Times. 

Shoigu's threats and the Donbas comparison

Shoigu, Russia's former defense minister, claimed Moldova, "with Ukraine's participation," had imposed a "blockade" on Transnistria, creating "trade, banking, and transport barriers" and worsening conditions for residents. 

"Movement restrictions, illegal customs duties, arbitrary deprivation of citizenship... the situation, frankly, is serious," he claimed. "Key enterprises are not functioning or are working intermittently, and there is a chronic shortage of energy resources."

He then invoked the language Russia used before its 2014 and 2022 invasions of Ukraine. Moldova's rhetoric toward Transnistria, Shoigu claimed, "increasingly resembles the statements of Ukrainian authorities toward the Donbas after 2014."

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The threat followed directly: 

"More than 220,000 Russian citizens live in Transnistria, whose interests and security — due to the mindless and irresponsible actions of Kyiv and Chișinău — are now under threat. And if necessary, Russia will take all necessary steps and use all available methods to protect them."

Shoigu also accused Moldova of trying to "squeeze out" the Russian military contingent from Transnistria, noting that on 17 April Moldova declared the contingent's commanders persona non grata — effectively barring them from entering Moldovan-controlled territory. He claimed this "unambiguously confirms Chișinău's firm intention to further escalate the situation."

An empty threat Russia cannot easily deliver

What Shoigu did not address is that Russia has no land route to Transnistria. Ukraine lies between Russia and the breakaway region.

Russia's Operational Group of Russian Forces — around 1,500 of the so-called "peacekeeping" troops descended from the Soviet 14th Army, which supported separatist forces in the 1990s conflict — has been stationed in Transnistria since then, with no resupply land corridor and no mechanism for reinforcement or withdrawal. A Ukrainian defense official said in April that Russia lacked the forces to execute its intentions to create a buffer zone within Ukraine near Transnistria.

Shoigu added that Russia had "repeatedly warned at all levels" that any attempt to resolve Transnistria by military force, or to replace Russian troops with a "Western contingent," would "provoke negative consequences for Moldova and the entire region."

Russia is manipulating economic data to conceal the true economic state and to create the impression that sanctions are having little effect, according to Swedish intelligence. The report also suggests signs of an emerging banking crisis.

Despite significant economic challenges, Russia continues to sustain its war in Ukraine and carry out hybrid activities in EU and NATO countries. At the same time, priority is being given to expanding military capabilities in close proximity to Sweden.

“Economic difficulties and other costs of the war have not affected Russia’s war objectives in Ukraine or its stance toward NATO and EU countries,” said Thomas Nilsson, head of Sweden’s military intelligence service.

However, sanctions and financial constraints are affecting the type of military capability Russia can obtain and how quickly it can develop it.

Russia’s war machine sustains despite economic pressure

Official Russian data points to negative economic trends, including a decline in GDP and weak industrial production. Swedish intelligence also assesses that Russia is manipulating economic statistics to appear more resilient than it actually is.

Even though recent high oil prices have boosted revenues, crude prices above $100 per barrel would be required for a full year to correct Russia’s budget deficit.

Economic strain has also spread to the defense sector, which is described as loss-making, corruption-prone, and heavily dependent on state funding.

“There is a structural flaw in Russia’s system. Producing military equipment that is immediately destroyed on the battlefield is not a sustainable growth model,” Nilsson said.

He assessed that the real situation in Russia is worse than officially reported, with higher inflation and a larger budget deficit.

Economic weakness does not change Russia’s strategic goals

Still, analysts do not expect Russia’s economic problems to alter its geopolitical or military objectives toward Ukraine, the EU, or NATO.

“A weak economy does not change strategic goals. Russia will remain a threat actor for the armed forces, even if its economy continues to deteriorate,” Nilsson said.

However, a weaker economy may influence how Russia can implement its plans, including how much military capability it can produce, how advanced it can be, and how quickly it can scale it for the war in Ukraine and for potential pressure against Sweden.

Pro-Russian forces are gaining momentum in Lithuania and attempting to influence the country’s defense policy. Political analyst Vytautas Bruveris told this to RBC-Ukraine. 

He noted that after a relative lull in 2022, this segment of the political spectrum has become active again. Moreover, the party Dawn of Nemunas has entered the ruling coalition, creating a new dynamic in the country’s domestic politics.

“This is an unprecedented situation in Lithuania’s history. Openly pro-Russian, anti-Western, and anti-Ukrainian narratives have effectively been legitimized,” Bruveris said.

Opposition to military projects impacts defense infrastructure

One of the key examples of such influence is the debate over the construction of a new military training ground near Kapčiamiestis, located in the strategically important Suwalki Corridor.

It is the land link between Kaliningrad and Belarus — the most strategically sensitive part of NATO's geography. 

The party opposes the project, citing environmental concerns and potential land expropriation from local residents. Blocking such initiatives directly affects the pace of strengthening the country’s defense infrastructure.

Regional vulnerability in the Baltics amid internal divisions

Bruveris also pointed to the situation in Latvia, which he described as more vulnerable to external influence. Compared to Lithuania, which is actively increasing its military presence, Latvia has fewer resources and weaker political consolidation on defense issues.

In particular, the Latgale region shows persistent skepticism toward NATO-related spending and retains sympathy for pro-Russian narratives, creating additional risks for regional security.

Earlier, Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service Head Sergey Naryshkin warned that Poland and the Baltic states would be the first to suffer in the event of a war between Moscow and NATO, accusing the Alliance of escalating military activity near Russia’s borders.

Bulgaria holds its eighth parliamentary election in five years today, with the frontrunner being a politician whose record on Ukraine raises significant concerns, RBC-Ukraine analyzed. Rumen Radev — former president and founder of the new Progressive Bulgaria coalition — leads polls at 29–31%, but his ability to translate that into governing power remains highly uncertain.

Radev and the race

Radev resigned as Bulgaria's president in January — the first such resignation in the country's post-communist history — and founded Progressive Bulgaria, a left-leaning coalition of three parties, quickly building it into the election's frontrunner.

His main rival is the right-wing GERB-SDS bloc led by former prime minister Boyko Borisov at around 20%. Other significant contenders include the pro-European Continue the Change–Democratic Bulgaria (PP-DB) at 10%, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms linked to oligarch Delyan Peevski sanctioned by the US and UK, the openly pro-Russian Revival party, and the Bulgarian Socialist Party.

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Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic — its government, not its president, holds the most power. During the political crisis of recent years, Radev remained formally outside the fray while serving as head of state, RBC-Ukraine noted.

Radev's record on Ukraine

As president, Radev opposed military assistance to Ukraine, arguing that Bulgarian weapons deliveries would not change the battlefield situation. He also criticized the 10-year security agreement with Ukraine that Bulgaria's caretaker government signed in March 2026 — a deal Radev had blocked throughout his presidency. He also opposes Bulgaria's integration into the eurozone and has declared his intention to restore relations with Moscow.

Radev withheld his signature from the October 2022 Bucharest Nine declaration over language on Ukraine’s future NATO membership, while backing its other provisions, and in December threatened to block a new EU sanctions package over nuclear fuel restrictions and called for ceasefire talks, but ultimately supported the final text, according to RBC-Ukraine.

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Whether Radev can govern

Even 30% of the vote — what polls currently project — does not give Radev enough mandates to form a government alone. Both GERB-SDS and PP-DB have said they will not form a coalition with Progressive Bulgaria. If they eventually did, Radev would likely avoid the Ukraine issue to prevent tensions with coalition partners, RBC-Ukraine assessed.

Radev could in theory seek a coalition with Revival and the socialists, but RBC-Ukraine sees that as unlikely because of Revival’s toxicity, while the pro-European parties remain too divided to unite, making another failed mandate and a new caretaker government before fresh snap elections the most likely outcome.

In the US, the Lower-Tier Future Interceptor (LTFI) program is effectively being scaled back for the second time. The initiative aimed to develop a next-generation surface-to-air interceptor missile for the Patriot air defense system, Defense Express has reported.

These improvements are intended to enhance performance not only against ballistic targets but also against aerodynamic threats.

Formally, the shift is linked to Congress not allocating funding for the program in the 2026 budget. The required amount was relatively modest — around $8 million — making the decision more of a political and conceptual signal than a purely financial constraint.

The experts note that this is already the second attempt to cancel or freeze the LTFI program. It was previously suspended and partially reinstated, but it never progressed to full deployment. Its future now remains uncertain, with no clear signs of stable funding.

Shift toward modernization rather than new missile development

Instead, the US is focusing on improving existing interceptors, particularly the PAC-3 MSE missile. This system has already demonstrated effectiveness in real combat conditions against complex threats, including Russian “Iskander” and “Kinzhal” missiles, and is therefore viewed as a core component of future air defense architecture.

The underlying logic of this shift is to prioritize incremental upgrades to proven systems rather than investing in high-risk new developments.

Separately, conceptual adjustments to Patriot system employment are being discussed, including efforts to increase launcher flexibility. Previously, interception required the system to be oriented toward a specific threat direction, which limited effectiveness in dynamic combat conditions. The US has considered ways to mitigate this limitation.

Production constraints outweigh technological breakthroughs

At the same time, the main challenge for US air defense is not technological capability but production capacity. As a result, the strategic focus is shifting to significantly increasing PAC-3 MSE output by approximately 3 times over 7 years.

Current production rates are already considered insufficient to meet domestic demand, let alone allied requirements. This pushes the Pentagon toward scaling existing systems rather than introducing new platforms.

In parallel, the US is shaping a massive defense budget of approximately $1.5 trillion. It includes large-scale procurement of missiles and munitions, as well as long-term contracts with defense contractors such as Lockheed Martin, the primary manufacturer of Patriot systems and related components.

The United States has once again temporarily eased sanctions on Russian oil, issuing a new exception that allows the delivery and sale of certain shipments already at sea. The decision was made by the US Treasury Department at a time when Washington publicly insists it continues to pressure the Kremlin.

The Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) on 17 April published General License 134B, which authorizes operations involving Russian crude oil and petroleum products loaded onto vessels as of that date. The exception is valid until 16 May and replaces a previous license that expired on 11 April.

A narrow carve-out with broader implications

The updated license is narrow in scope — it applies only to oil already loaded onto ships — but critics say the repeated use of such exceptions risks undermining the broader sanctions regime imposed after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Leading Senate Democrats, including Chuck Schumer, Elizabeth Warren, and Jeanne Shaheen, condemned the decision as a "180-degree reversal," arguing that it sends a mixed signal at a time when Russia continues its military campaign against Ukraine.

"This decision is shameful," they said in a joint statement, pointing to ongoing Russian attacks on Ukraine and warning that easing sanctions could prolong the war.

Mixed signals from the administration

The new license appears to sit uneasily alongside recent statements from senior officials. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said on 15 April that Washington would not extend waivers that had allowed the purchase of Iranian and Russian oil without the application of US sanctions.

Earlier, US President Donald Trump extended for another year the state of emergency introduced in response to Russia's actions, which restricts the movement and docking of Russian vessels in American ports. This was stated in an official White House notice published in the Federal Register on 17 April.

Port ban on Russian vessels extended

The United States has extended the ban on Russian vessels docking in its ports for another year. The regime was first introduced by 46th US President Joe Biden on 21 April 2022 through Proclamation 10371, citing the threat to US international relations posed by Russia. At that time, the Secretary of Homeland Security was granted authority to regulate the movement and docking of Russia-linked vessels in American ports.

The new document states that the actions of the Russian government continue to pose a threat, and therefore the grounds for the state of emergency remain in force, according to the White House notice sent to Congress.

Austria has joined the coalition supporting the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine, bringing the total number of participating states to 20—19 of them Council of Europe members—Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha said.

Sybiha thanked Austrian Foreign Minister Beate Meinl-Reisinger directly.

"I am grateful to Austria and my colleague [Beate Meinl-Reisinger] for once again proving that neutrality does not mean indifference. To the contrary, accountability is critical to ensure a lasting peace on our continent," he wrote on X.

The move comes one day after Iceland and Poland joined the coalition, hitting the threshold of 17 states—the minimum needed for a formal vote on the tribunal's activation. Austria's accession pushes the count to 20, widening the political base as the body moves from paper to operation.

The function of the Special Tribunal

The Special Tribunal was established by agreement between Ukraine and the Council of Europe, signed by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on 25 June 2025 and ratified by Parliament on 15 July. It fills a gap left by the International Criminal Court, which can prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide—but not the crime of aggression itself, because neither Russia nor Ukraine had ratified the Rome Statute when the war began.

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The tribunal can investigate and try senior Russian and Belarusian officials, potentially in absentia. Its reach has limits: under current international law, sitting heads of state enjoy immunity, meaning Putin cannot be tried while in office. The body nonetheless advances Ukraine's broader strategy of legal pressure, placing accountability on a formal international footing rather than leaving it to political declarations.

Russia has threatened every country that joins the coalition with "restrictive measures," calling accession a "hostile move." Austria's decision, from a position of formal neutrality, directly tests that threat.

Austria's broader support for Ukraine

Austria's tribunal accession reflects a wider shift in Vienna's posture. Since Russia's full-scale invasion began in February 2022, Austria has mobilized over €320 million in bilateral financial and humanitarian aid.

In February 2026, Austria allocated €14.1 million specifically for humanitarian demining and reconstruction support. Meinl-Reisinger also indicated that Austria is ready to host one of the upcoming Ukraine reconstruction conferences in Vienna.

Each new accession narrows the space for states that have not yet joined to remain on the sidelines. Sybiha noted that every additional participant "confirms that justice for the crime of aggression against Ukraine is inevitable."

Russian Security Council Secretary Sergey Shoigu has stated that Russia “will defend itself” in response to Ukrainian drone attacks. According to Moscow’s version, these drones may be based on the territory of Finland and the Baltic states, TASS reports.

He presented two possible interpretations of the drones’ origin: either Russia’s air defense is ineffective, or neighboring countries’ airspace is allegedly being used for the attacks.

Which of these variants is most likely? He did not tell. However, such statements could be regarded as a threat. 

Reference to Article 51 of UN Charter

The Secretary of the Russian Security Council emphasized that if the second scenario is true, then Article 51 of the UN Charter applies, which enshrines the inherent right of states to individual or collective self-defense in the event of an armed attack.

“According to international law, Article 51 of the UN Charter on the inherent right of self-defense in case of armed attack comes into force,” Shoigu said.

In 2025, Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service Head Sergey Naryshkin accused NATO of escalating military activity near Russia’s borders. He warned that Poland and the Baltic states would be the first to suffer in the event of a war between Moscow and the Alliance. 

He claimed that Poland and the Baltic countries are displaying particular aggressiveness. As an example, he cited Warsaw’s alleged plan to deploy around two million anti-tank mines along its borders with Belarus and Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast. 

Moldova has designated the command of the Operational Group of Russian Forces (OGRF) stationed in Transnistria as undesirable persons. The decision includes a ban on entry and stay in the country for a number of officials, according to TV8.md.

The list includes OGRF commander Dmitry Zelenkov and his deputies — Dmitry Opalev, Sergey Mashenko, and Sergey Shirshov. Similar restrictions were imposed on Chief of Staff Marat Yarulin and Alexey Bogomolov.

The measure effectively blocks their movement and envisions expulsion if they attempt to enter Moldovan territory, followed by a permanent entry ban.

OGRF as legacy of Soviet 14th Army

The Operational Group of Russian Forces was formed from the remnants of the Soviet 14th Army. During the Dniester conflict, its units supported separatist forces.

Today, the contingent is estimated at around 1,200 troops. For years, Chișinău has consistently demanded their full withdrawal and the removal of ammunition, calling their presence a violation of national sovereignty.

Long-running dispute over Transnistria’s status

The presence of Russian troops remains a major point of tension in Moldova–Russia relations. Chișinău considers the contingent illegal and a threat to its state control over its territory.

Earlier, Moldova took a formal step toward leaving the Russia-led Commonwealth of Independent States or CIS, with President Maia Sandu signing decrees to withdraw from the bloc’s founding agreements.

The CIS is a loose regional grouping created after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, bringing together several former Soviet republics. The bloc has long been criticized as a Russia-dominated structure with limited practical integration.

Slovenia's new parliament speaker, Zoran Stevanović, plans to visit Moscow and hold a referendum on NATO's exit, RTV Slovenija (RTV SLO) reported. His Resni.ca party holds five of the National Assembly's 90 seats but won the speakership with 48 cross-party votes. The announcements came on 13 April, one day after Hungarian voters removed pro-Russian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in a landslide.

Moscow trip, NATO referendum, and sanctions rollback

Slovenia held parliamentary elections on 22 March 2026. PM Robert Golob's Freedom Movement won a narrow plurality over Janez Janša's SDS — 29 seats to 28 — but neither bloc secured a governing majority, producing a deadlock.

Stevanović confirmed the Moscow plan in a 13 April interview with Slovenian public broadcaster Radio Prvi. He said he wants to build bridges with all countries, regardless of the "wall built between West and East." 

"I plan in the near future to also visit Moscow," he said. 

He also confirmed Resni.ca's pre-election promise on NATO. 

"We promised the people a referendum on NATO exit and we will conduct it," he said. 

Slovenia joined NATO in 2004 after 66% of voters backed membership in a referendum. It has since maintained a consistently pro-Western foreign policy.

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Stevanović also stated earlier that "the policy of sanctions against Russia turned out to be an own goal of the European Union."

"No pro-Russian views — only pro-Slovenian ones"

Despite his evidently pro-Russian stance, Stevanović rejected the label outright. 

"I have no pro-Russian views, only pro-Slovenian ones," he claimed. "We maintain that Slovenia must conduct its policy independently, sovereignly." He added that Slovenia would "absolutely oppose interference in foreign military and diplomatic disputes."

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Stevanović's background

Stevanović built his political following during the COVID-19 protests against government restrictions. Resni.ca is a right-wing populist, eurosceptic, anti-vaccine party. It holds the smallest faction in Slovenia's parliament.

Stevanović rules out leaving the EU, saying Slovenia benefits from membership. He holds a prior criminal conviction for attempted insurance fraud. A court fined him 800 EUR for the offense. He was around 20 at the time, approximately 25 years ago.

European officials are quietly advancing contingency plans for a "European NATO" that could maintain deterrence against Russia even if the US withdraws troops, withholds support, or refuses to invoke Article 5, the Wall Street Journal reported. Germany's historic reversal on European defense sovereignty has unlocked broader support from the UK, France, Poland, the Nordic countries, and Canada.

Germany's reversal is the decisive factor

For decades, Germany blocked French-led calls for greater European defense autonomy, preferring to keep America as the ultimate guarantor of European security. That changed under Chancellor Friedrich Merz late last year, according to people familiar with his thinking cited by the WSJ.

Merz concluded that Trump was ready to abandon Ukraine and had confused the victim with the aggressor. He no longer saw clear values guiding US policy in NATO, but thought publicly questioning the alliance would be dangerous. Instead, Europe had to take on more while keeping the US formally inside. Germany’s shift brought in the UK, France, Poland, the Nordics, and Canada, framing the effort as a coalition of like-minded allies working inside NATO's existing structures.

"NATO must become more European in order to remain transatlantic," German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said.

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The plans are advancing informally through side talks around NATO — aimed not at replacing the alliance but at maintaining deterrence, preserving command continuity, and preserving nuclear credibility if Washington steps back.

Officials are now working through who would take over air and missile defense, reinforcement routes, logistics, and major exercises, while leaders such as Finland’s Alexander Stubb argue that reinstating compulsory military service will be essential as Europe takes on more responsibility for its own defense.

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The hardest gaps to fill

• The challenge is structural. NATO was designed around American leadership at its core — from intelligence and logistics to the supreme military command that Washington has made clear it will not vacate. 
• The hardest gap is strategic intelligence. France and Britain face growing pressure to expand their nuclear and surveillance roles because US satellite and missile-warning networks underpin NATO's credibility in ways no troop reallocation can replicate.
• The most sensitive element is nuclear deterrence. Trump's Greenland threat pushed Merz and Macron into talks about bringing France's nuclear umbrella over Germany and other European countries.

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What triggered the acceleration

The plans date to last year but moved faster after Trump's Greenland threat — and took on new urgency when the Iran war standoff deepened the rift between Washington and its European allies. Trump branded the Europeans "cowards," called NATO a "paper tiger," and said his threat to leave the alliance was "beyond reconsideration." Trump himself identified the turning point: "It all began with, if you want to know the truth, Greenland."

"A burden shifting from the US toward Europe is ongoing, and it will continue as part of the US defense and national security strategy," Stubb said.

Following his party's defeat, Orbán's exit from the EU Council opens a vacancy his allies and successors are already lining up to fill, Politico analyzed on 15 April. The outlet identified five leaders most likely to pick up his role as the bloc's chief obstructionist on Ukraine funding and Russia sanctions — with Slovakia's Fico the most immediate threat.

Fico: the most dangerous successor

Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico stands alone as the Kremlin's closest — and perhaps last — remaining friend inside the EU now that Orbán is gone. He explicitly threatened in March to take Hungary's place blocking Ukraine's €90 billion EU loan if Orbán lost the election. Orbán has now lost.

The key question, Politico said, is whether Fico follows through. The Slovak PM has previously always backed down on sanctions and joined EU joint statements supporting Ukraine. But his March threat was unusually explicit, and the pipeline dispute between Kyiv and Budapest-Bratislava — which Fico used as a pretext for the threatened veto — remains unresolved. Ukraine's President Zelenskyy said the Druzhba pipeline would not be repaired until the end of April.

The other four

Politico identified four more potential disruptors:

Czech PM Andrej Babiš — dubbed the "Czech Trump" — was the only EU leader besides Orbán and Fico to demand a carveout from the €90 billion Ukraine loan, and has called for scaling back support to Kyiv, though he stopped short of scrapping Czechia's ammunition initiative.

Bulgaria's Rumen Radev, Politico's wildcard, declared Ukraine "doomed" in 2025 and blamed European leaders for encouraging the counteroffensive, earning a televised rebuke from Zelenskyy in 2023. His new party leads Bulgarian polls ahead of Sunday's elections.

Slovenia's former PM Janez Janša — who came second by one seat in last month's election and may yet form a government — is a right-wing Trump admirer who could add to the EU's populist bloc — but notably differs from Orbán on Ukraine, having visited Kyiv in 2022 and championed its EU membership. Whether he forms a government remains unclear after a one-seat margin in last month's election.

Italian PM Giorgia Meloni has avoided outright obstruction but told EU leaders at the March summit that she "understood" Orbán's position on the Ukraine loan. An EU diplomat told Politico there is an "ideological link" between Meloni and Orbán that should not be dismissed.

Brussels is cautious

"My impression is that the political business model of being a systemic and structural disrupter broke down with Fidesz's severe election defeat," one EU diplomat told Politico. 

But another warned the right-wing leaders would be "difficult on certain items" — especially when "compared to mainstream thinking among other European leaders."

President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen moved quickly after Orbán's defeat to push for qualified majority voting in EU foreign policy, removing the unanimity requirement that gave one member state veto power. But any such change would require agreement from the very governments most likely to resist it.

Estonia is rapidly reshaping its military strategy, redirecting hundreds of millions toward air defense, drones, and long-range strike capabilities. The country is reallocating €500 million from its defense budget, scaling back some traditional procurement programs in favor of air defense systems, UAVs, and deep-strike capabilities, Army Recognition reports.

The decision, made in early April 2026, reflects the Baltic states' adaptation to the realities of full-scale war in Ukraine.

From armored vehicles to air defense and drones

Estonia’s Minister of Defense, Hanno Pevkur, confirmed that the government is suspending the procurement of new infantry fighting vehicles.

Resources are being redirected toward layered air defense systems and unmanned technologies, prioritizing solutions that can quickly counter modern threats, especially mass drone attacks, which have become a defining feature of contemporary warfare.

Long-range strike as deterrence tool

At the same time, Estonia is strengthening its deep-strike capabilities. The country has already acquired M142 HIMARS systems, capable of firing guided rockets with a range of 70–80 km, as well as MGM-140 ATACMS missiles with a range of up to 300 km.

Additionally, Tallinn is procuring K239 Chunmoo systems — modular launch platforms with digital fire control designed for rapid response in dynamic battlefield conditions.

Defense autonomy as a survival strategy

Estonia is also investing around $11 million into domestic maintenance capabilities to reduce reliance on external logistics chains.

At the same time, it is expanding surveillance networks and integrated detection systems, forming the backbone of a modern multi-layered defense architecture.

The country aims to accelerate all major procurements and deployments by 2027, signaling a shift toward a high-speed military adaptation model driven by lessons from the war next door.

The Russian State Duma has passed a bill in the first reading that expands the president's powers to deploy troops abroad under the pretext of protecting Russian citizens, Interfax reports.

The bill was advanced amid concerns over a potential operation against Estonia, as an investigation found social media accounts that promote the idea of a “Narva People’s Republic”, a separatist project aimed at detaching parts of northeastern Estonia bordering Russia.

Repeating scenario for Ukraine 

The term “People’s Republic” is closely associated with Russian-backed separatist movements in the post-Soviet space, including the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics in eastern Ukraine.

By using such terminology alongside state symbols — flags, coats of arms, and military insignia — these channels portray the Narva movement as a quasi-state, repeating tactics Russia has previously used to justify territorial claims and military intervention in Ukraine.

Russia used “People’s Republic” branding to precede occupation in Ukraine. Now it’s appearing in NATO-member Estonia.

“Protection of citizens” as universal trigger for war

The explanatory note to the bill states the need to respond in cases of arrests, detentions, or criminal prosecutions of Russian citizens based on foreign court decisions.

Andrey Kartapolov, head of the State Duma Defense Committee, stated that the measure is intended to protect citizens’ rights and counter what Moscow describes as “Russophobia,” which it claims is a systematic Western campaign.

Parallel escalation rhetoric

In 2025, the head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, Sergey Naryshkin, accused NATO of escalating military activity near Russia’s borders. He warned that Poland and the Baltic states would be the first to suffer in the event of a war between Moscow and the Alliance.

He claimed that Poland and the Baltic states were showing particular aggressiveness. As an example, he cited an alleged plan by Warsaw to deploy about two million anti-tank mines along its borders with Belarus and Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast.

Estonia's internal security service concluded in its 2026 annual report that the Estonian Christian Orthodox Church (ECOC) remains under Russian control despite formally declaring independence and changing its name — while seven of its clergy were banned from the country over two years for supporting Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine.

Independence in name only

The ECOC, formerly the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, adopted a new name in 2025 and introduced statutory amendments to present itself as self-governing. Estonia's security service assessed the changes as cosmetic. 

Real guidance and coordination continue to flow from two Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) bodies operating in the name of Patriarch Vladimir Gundyayev (Patriarch Kirill): the Department for External Church Relations and the Administration for the Affairs of Dioceses in the Near Abroad. The latter was established on 24 March 2022 — one month after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Its existence, the report notes, reflects Moscow's continued view that the Baltic states belong to Russia's so-called "near abroad."

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The church's formal head, Metropolitan Yevgeny, was forced to leave Estonia in February 2024 after authorities declined to renew his residence permit on security grounds. He never resigned. The ECOC continues to be led remotely from Russia by Yevgeny, who had repeatedly refused Estonian government requests to distance himself from Patriarch Kirill's war-justifying rhetoric. 

Estonia's parliament designated the Moscow Patriarchate a sponsor of Russian aggression in May 2024.

Clergy banned, nuns collecting weapons

Estonia imposed Schengen or national entry bans on six ECOC-linked clergy in 2025 and one more in February 2026. All were found to support Russia's war effort or pose a security threat.

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Two banned nuns came from the Exaltation of the Cross Jerusalem Stavropegial Convent near Moscow and were employed by the ECOC. The report says the convent supports Russia’s war by collecting supplies for troops, visiting wounded soldiers, and sending aid to occupied Ukrainian territories. It also works with the All-Russia People’s Front under Sergei Kiriyenko and treats Patriarch Kirill’s appeal as “an order from a commander-in-chief.”

The report highlights Dmitri Burov, known as monk-priest Daniil, who left Estonia in February 2026. Before arriving in 2017, he led an ROC department working with Russia’s military and law enforcement. In Estonia, he and another ROC cleric filmed the Kuperjanov Battalion’s barracks in Võru. He later refused to answer Estonian questions about Russian intelligence and the war against Ukraine.

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Russia's SVR weighs in

The report flags a statement issued by Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) on 12 January 2026 claiming to defend Orthodoxy in the Baltic states from the activities of the "anti-Christ" — cited alongside the clergy bans and weapons deliveries as evidence of what the report calls "the close interweaving of state power, intelligence services and the ROC."

The Constitution Protection Bureau (SAB) — Latvia's spy agency — has released an intelligence-based report showing that Western sanctions have already inflicted hundreds of billions of dollars in losses on Russia's economy, according to Russia's own internal estimates obtained by SAB. The report, published last week, combines intercepted Russian institutional forecasts with SAB's own analysis — and concludes the real damage is larger than Russia's internal numbers suggest.

Russia's own economists count the damage

Latvia's SAB published internal estimates produced by several Russian institutions — documents created for domestic planning, not public consumption. Those estimates confirm that between 2022 and 2025, Russia spent approximately $130 billion extra — $32.5 billion annually — to buy sanctioned Western goods through intermediaries at inflated prices. The figure excludes cases where Russia found no substitute for a particular Western product at all.

Russia's own forecasts project at least $136 billion in further losses by 2030 from Western restrictions — part of a total $175.5 billion in projected foreign trade losses that Russian planners are now factoring into their medium-term economic models. The largest single risk, at $136 billion, comes from the combination of direct sanctions, secondary sanctions on Russia's trade partners, and Western trade embargos, and US trade tariffs.

Even the pullback by Russia's so-called "friendly countries" is factored into the internal estimates: Moscow privately acknowledges that many non-Western trade partners now regard Russia as a toxic counterpart, amplifying its losses beyond what sanctions alone would produce, according to the report.

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Export markets have taken a structural hit. Comparing 2021 and 2025 data from the full report, Russia's iron ore exports fell by 40%, iron and steel by 20%, chemical products by 35%, and timber and cellulose by around 50%. Russian internal forecasts indicate the country will not recover these markets within the next five years — contradicting Moscow's public claims of successful trade reorientation.

The energy sector carries the steepest potential exposure. If the EU implements a full energy embargo and countries like China, India, and Türkiye reduce their Russian oil and gas imports, Russia's own institutional estimates project losses of approximately $216.5 billion in the energy sector alone over five years — $43.3 billion annually. SAB notes that this energy estimate alone exceeds Russia's total forecast of foreign trade losses, confirming that the overall projection is conservative.

Russia's bureaucrats know, Putin probably doesn't

SAB assesses that Russia's own internal damage estimates are themselves undercounts. They typically cover only direct sectoral effects and exclude indirect costs, such as higher import and logistics prices, lower tax revenues, and higher prices for the Russian population.

More consequentially, SAB assessed that Putin himself likely receives a sanitized version of these reports — one that leads with propaganda narratives about successful adaptation rather than the loss figures his own economists are documenting. Internal reports routinely open with formulations like "Russia's economy is successfully overcoming sanctions" and "Russia has effectively re-oriented its trade from the West to friendly countries."

That gap between what Russian economists calculate and what Putin is apparently told makes it highly unlikely, in SAB's view, that economic pressure alone will change his course — even if Russia's economic crisis deepens.

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What lifting sanctions would actually mean

Russia has been working through diplomatic channels, including peace negotiations over Ukraine, to secure sanctions relief. SAB warns that lifting sanctions — even partially — would not lead Russia to address domestic economic problems. The freed resources would, it assesses, accelerate military rearmament, fund influence operations globally, and increase support for Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, Cuba, and paramilitary groups in Africa.

"Russia’s own estimates prove that Western sanctions and other economic restrictions are an effective tool for constraining Russia," the report reads.

The report's bottom line is calibrated: sanctions will not force Russia to end its war against Ukraine in the short term. But they are already cutting the financial capacity Russia needs to sustain that war and rearm for future conflicts — including against NATO. The full potential of the sanctions has not yet been realized, and they can be extended further still.

Péter Magyar's Tisza party won Hungary's parliamentary election on 12 April 2026 in a landslide, ending Viktor Orbán's 16-year rule and stripping Putin of his most reliable ally within the EU. The result — a two-thirds supermajority for Tisza — carries potentially far-reaching consequences for Ukraine, the European Union, and the global far right that had championed Orbán as its model.

Landslide on record turnout

With nearly 99% of ballots counted in the early hours of 13 April, Tisza secured 138 seats in Hungary's 199-seat parliament, against 55 for Orbán's Fidesz-KDNP alliance and 6 for the far-right Mi Hazánk Mozgalom. The result gives Magyar a constitutional supermajority — enough to amend the basic law Orbán rewrote in his own image after his first two-thirds win in 2010. Turnout reached nearly 80%, the highest in Hungary's post-communist history.

Shortly after the vote counting started yesterday, Orbán conceded defeat and called the result "painful" but "clear," congratulating Magyar directly. Speaking to tens of thousands of supporters on the bank of the Danube, with Hungary's parliament building lit up across the river, Magyar promised to bring Hungary back into the European mainstream and pledged a pro-EU, pro-NATO course after years of isolation. He compared Orbán's ouster to Hungary's 1848 revolution and the 1956 uprising against Soviet rule.

At opposition events, including the victory rally, one of the popular chants was "Russians go home."

What Orbán's campaign was actually about

Magyar ran on fighting corruption and domestic reform — Hungary's stagnating economy, its deteriorating healthcare, and its gutted judicial system.

Orbán ran on fear. His campaign centered on false allegations against Ukraine and Zelenskyy personally, depicting Hungary as one step away from being dragged into the war. He denigrated EU leadership as "Brusselians" and championed continued purchases of Russian gas, deepening an energy dependency his government had spent years building.

The BBC noted the central contradiction of his rule: Orbán "painted himself as the champion of national sovereignty, but refused to stand up for Ukrainian sovereignty against Russia. He railed against immigration, but quietly encouraged immigration to build his new factories."

Magyar himself was not an outsider. He served as a foreign affairs official in Orbán's 2010 administration before resigning from Fidesz in 2024 over a presidential pardons scandal.

Trump, Vance, and silence from Washington

US President Donald Trump publicly endorsed Orbán and told Hungarians to vote for him. Vice President JD Vance flew to Budapest on 7 April, held a bilateral meeting with Orbán, called him "one of the only true statesmen in Europe," and appeared at a campaign rally where he said: 

"We've got to get Viktor Orbán re-elected as prime minister of Hungary, don't we?" 

Neither Trump nor Vance had commented on their ally's defeat by Monday morning.

When asked about Orbán's defeat, Trump ignored the question and just walked away from the reporters:

EU, Ukraine react

EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen wrote: 

"Europe's heart is beating stronger in Hungary tonight," and later added: "Hungary has chosen Europe. Europe has always chosen Hungary. A country reclaims its European path. The Union grows stronger." 

Leaders from across EU member states congratulated Magyar.

Zelenskyy welcomed the result directly: 

"Congratulations to Péter Magyar and the Tisza party on their resounding victory. Ukraine has always sought good-neighbourly relations with everyone in Europe and we are ready to advance our cooperation with Hungary."

The implications for Ukraine could be substantial. Orbán had vetoed the EU's 20th sanctions package against Russia and a €90 billion loan to Ukraine on the eve of the war's fourth anniversary, breaking a pledge made at the December EU summit.