Blog of the International Relations and Affairs Group (BIRAG)

Predicting Syria

noreply@blogger.com (International Relations and Affairs Group) — Wed, 25 Jul 2012 14:48:00 +0000

Teddy Lishan Desta, PhD

As the Arab Spring - the popular uprising for democratic rights in the Middles East is commonly known- gathered momentum in early 2011; Syria was not exempted from the political ferment rattling the region. After 17 months of sustained popular uprising and armed struggle, an estimated 15,000 Syrians have lost their lives, thousands more have been maimed, and still many more have left their country to take refuge in neighboring countries.

On one side, there is the opposition made of civilians and army deserters, and these are drawn mostly from the Sunni community who make up the majority of the population of Syria. And there is the regime, on the other side, battling the opposition using the Syrian army and the so-called militias (known as the Shabbia). As the elite army forces and the Shabbia are drawn from the ruling Alawite sect and the opposition is mainly driven by Sunnis, this gives a sectarian aspect to the ongoing armed conflict in Syria. Basically, the majority Sunnis are rising against the minority Alawite ruling class.

Since the start of the street protests back in March 2011, there has been no let down on the opposition side to give up on its demands for regime change and little sign of relenting on the government part in its heavy-handed crackdowns. The month of July has witnessed the escalation of the conflict taking the battle right to the capital city, Damascus, and right to the very power corridors of the Assad government. As the result, there have been reports of running battles in some quarters of Damascus between the armed and well-organized opposition on one hand and the Syrian army on the other. On July 18, the opposition succeeded in infiltrating even the inner most circle of the regime, inflicting one of its most deadly attacks against it. On that day, using an apparent suicide attack, the opposition succeeded in killing a few of the most senior government officials tied to national security, including the defense minister.

Now almost everyone believes that Syria is in a virtual civil war. But the question is given the grim developments in Syria is whether all these were predictable from March 2011 when the uprising started. Did anyone foresee the country dragging itself into a long-drawn apparent civil war? Here is one example of an exercise in predictive politics done in the early months of the Syrian uprising. The pieces were written mostly between June and November, 2011.

The predictive-cum-scenario analysis exercise starts by commenting (c. June 2011) on the question of how much loyalty the Syrian army will owe to regime. The analysis began by asking if the Syrian top brass would act like the Tunisian and Egyptian generals where in those countries the army removed its loyalty to the state leader and sided with populace crying out for political change. Hence the question on Syria was the following:

Will the regime crack? Will the army begin to split in its loyalty to Assad? Will there be a sustained uprising by the Sunnis, turning their localities into ungovernable areas?

However, foreseeing a prolonged period of conflict unless the regime deeply compromised with the opposition, the following idea was proposed. The proposal was made in the hope that the Syrian leaders would learn some lessons from the Tunisian and Egyptian experiences. Would the Syrian leaders be forced to recognize that they would no longer be able to suppress the growing protest movement even if they tried hard?

I believe in a phased and negotiated transition. It is less disruptive and if managed correctly leads to a stable future. The Syrian opposition should negotiate with the old guard so that the present leaders relinquish power peacefully. I hope the old guard understands that its days are numbered or that it can no longer govern in the same manner any longer. They may be looking for a fair chance to bow out of power in grace. A negotiated transition will give them the rare chance to retire in peace. That is what made Latin America's and SSA's transition to democracy less disruptive.

I think convening a constituent assembly and writing a constitution while still the old guard is around will make for a "peaceful" transition in Syria. But trying to sweep away the old regime all together is messy and a long-term threat to stability of Syria and the whole region.

Subsequently, I wrote,

If they [i.e., Syrian leaders] cannot see the writing on the wall, bad for them. By now they should have learned the Biblical lesson that "a crown will not last forever." I hope they heard or read somewhere that "those who refuse to learn from history, will be condemned to repeat its mistakes." And in history there have been plenty of fallen regimes to learn a lesson or two.”

Let us hope and pray that they will compromise in the true sense of the word, avoiding dragging their nation towards a long-drawn unrest.

Actually in the early months of the protest, there were a few positive signs where the Syrian president was prepared to make some concessions to the opposition promising to carry out some mollifying reforms. Had he persisted in making genuine reforms, I argued here, that he would have easily opened the flood gates and Syria would have easily embarked on the way to political reforms as demanded by the opposition. However, the government was violently suppressing peaceful street protests while it appeared to make some compromises. Therefore, I began to reason:

i).The Syrian regime is bringing out its worst form for all to see. Despite the suppression, the opposition has not given up hammering with determination. Yes, the regime is developing fissures. If the people keep the pressure, the regime wall will give in at its weakest points.

ii). The signs of the developing crack are visible now. These are mainly in the forms of concessions Assad has been offering to the opposition. It is probable that once the regime starts to make these types of concessions, it can enter a slippery slope situation. The regime may think it is in full control of everything, but it is an illusion of control. They cannot stop the' momentum of change that is born of decades of suppression. Whenever the people are dealing with a fascist regime, they may need to push the harder.

iii). Who said only the Ba’athists are nationalists? The opposition too are true Syrians. The accusation that the opposition is fighting to dismember Syria and sell its pieces on e-bay is dubious. The regime can accuse the opposition as thugs, saboteurs, and agents of foreign agents. But should we suspect them of base motives?”

I believed that Syria’s leaders will open up the political space quickly seeing the consequences of the democratic upheaval in the region. I desired to see a phased and well-managed transition in Syria, as has been the case with Tunisia and Egypt where old regime institutions (like the army and the court systems) played a critical part to ensure a less disruptive transition to a democratic rule. The signal from the opposition that it was ready to enter into negotiation on the primary condition that the Syrian leader steps down in favor of one his vice presidents give me some hope for a relative peaceful transition in Syria. Because according to news reports,

"The organizers of local and nationwide demonstrations say they won't participate in any national dialogue that would not have Bashar Al-Assad stepping down in favor of one of his vice-presidents, presumably the long-standing foreign affairs specialist Farouk Al-Sharaa..."

I tried my case for a phased transition, noting:

i). Rather than calling for the complete sweep away of the Ba'ath regime (which outcome has its own grave dangers), this phased-out approach to the Syrian crisis promises an orderly transition to the new era. When many are waiting in the wings to fish in troubled Syrian waters, at this stage, Syrians should be smart enough to avoid a regime collapse that could be followed by a civil war...

I hope the Syrian opposition residing in Turkey will tone down its rhetoric and adopt this approach.

ii). Once the above demand is granted, the demonstrators should go home to give the politicians some time to map out the transition period. A strong and stable government is needed in this transition period lest politics and economy further slide into the abyss. The people should let the politicians do their job.

There should be an element of continuity in any political change of this magnitude. Otherwise, we will be begging for a societal meltdown.

We cannot make the Alawites feel as if they are being swept out of power altogether. We cannot put other minorities on edge, making them fear of a coming tyranny of the majority. To fail to do that is to beg for endless crisis and even for a civil/ ethnic war.

In the cases of Egypt and Tunisia - it is the military generals (for the sake of state and national stability) who intervened and are currently mid-wife-ing the new political order of their countries. I call these generals (and top civil servants) elements of continuity because they belong to the outgoing regimes.

In the case of Syria, because there is a strong ethnic quality to the army top brass, perhaps the ruling party will find a way to negotiate the necessary change with opposition and civil society groups. The Ba'ath Party should quickly find a novel arrangement/ approach to ensure that element of continuity in the midst of great changes. An element of continuity - a phased transition - is necessary to help Syrians to avoid total regime collapse and an Alawite rout which both outcomes have immense economic, political and social consequences. I bet on Ba'ath party level-headed elements to recognize this need and steer Syria in the right direction.

Dissecting the Syrian Regime

I also did some regime analysis, trying to foresee how the Syrian regime might fall.

At that point in time, I still expected the Syrian regime to have learned a few lessons from the Tunisian, Libyan and Egyptian leaders’ experiences making small reforms that could snowball eventually. [1] Then I got pre-occupied studying regime collapse, wondering what takes a “security regime” like that of the Ba’ath regime in Syria to fall.

What is the lesson from history; what makes for the demise of fascist/ totalitarian regimes?

(i). When they get crushed by a foreign military power. Cases: Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Saddam's Iraq, etc.

(ii). When their army is overwhelmed by internal armed rebellion. Case: Mengistu's regime.

(iii). When a new leader starts to reform the system and that snowballs and leads to the end of the regime. Case: Gorbachev's USSR.

(iv). When the global (or regional) power structure changes, and no longer a Great Power supports the local autocratic regime. Case: Latin American dictatorships; East European communist regimes.

If Assad's Baath regime ever falls, by which of these ways will its fall come?

Given the internal line up of forces and the regional and global power support it garners now, the only and most likely way the regime can meet its demise is through a snowballing reform effort.

So the opposition through a combination intense pressure and negotiation can force the regime to move slowly to a point of cascading reforms. The tipping point comes the day a constituent assembly convenes and a new constitutions starts being written.

Then took a broader look at regime types to defend my position why the Syrian regime is autocratic and what that implies for its future.

How does the state manifest itself in a polity? Let us identify here at least three major types of state - society power relationships.

i). The leader is supreme: The political leader is supreme over all, over the state and over the nation. Everything revolves around him and almost everything emanates from him. As the famous declaration of Louis XIV put it, "l'Etat c'est moi." It is very hard to distinguish between the will and actions of the supreme leader and that of the state. Historical cases give indications that the people and the state exist for/ because of the leader. But we hasten to note that "l'Etat c'est moi" could be of two kinds; the supreme leader can be outright dictatorial, or paternalistic.

ii). The people are supreme: This is the case of democratic or pluralistic societies. Here The government (rulers) and the state exist and function because the people willed them into existence and operation through popular consent. The people have the power to change any aspect of the nature and structure of the government or the state through rules prescribed by the constitution. Policies designed and implement by the state generally reflect the will of the people.

iii). The state is supreme: Here the party rules making obedience to the state as the supreme ideal of the polity. An ideology of statism, as for example espoused by Italian fascism, holds that: Sovereignty is vested not in the people but in the national state, and that all individuals and associations exist only to enhance the power, the prestige, and the well-being of the state. The concept of statism, which is seen as synonymous with the concept of nation, and corporatism repudiates individualism and exalts the nation as an organic body headed by the Supreme Leader and nurtured by unity, force, and discipline of the political party. [2]It is to this category that Ba'ath party states like that of Syria historically belong.

Under statism people's "consent" (acquiesce) to the state comes from either out of fear, or from the economic or security (stability) benefit the people think the State ensures them. But differences and tensions between the State and the people arise whenever the people demand for individual liberties, or for share in the running of the government through their directly elected representatives, or for regional autonomy (or group rights). Statist leaders (as fascist/ Ba'athist leaders are) believe only in the utter submission of the people to the will of the State, and they go over time to suppress the peoples' demands. Bloody crackdowns will become the order of the day as the fascist state tries to inculcate the fear element on the people.

This is Syria's current experience - a popular uprising trying to move the polity to a pluralistic society and a fascist state which tries its best to keep the status quo.

Two things are quite noticeable in the Syrian crisis. The people have broken the fear factor through which fascist leaders keep the existing order. The next step will be for the people to form parallel (shadow) state/ government institutions. These institutions will gradually undermine the monopoly of state power and functions held by the fascist state. As the Syrian people withdraw their "consent" from the Ba'ath fascist state, they will effectively leave the political leaders few subjects to control/ govern. As the result the Ba'ath state will gradually wither away. It will enter obsolescence because now the people are building their own state institutions which are based on popular consent. The more the Ba'ath state becomes irrelevant and redundant, the more the people will get closer to achieving their freedom. The international community should understand this dynamic to encourage and support the effort of the Syrian people in this direction.

Civil War is Coming!

By summer, it became clear to me that Syria was headed into a civil war and that there was a degree of inevitability to it. I worried army desertions would grow to give the opposition a more experienced fighting force.

Unlike most interstate wars, civil wars do not begin with a "declaration of war." A country simply slides into civil war imperceptibility, with a clash here and a clash there, and with a now-on and a then-off style of armed confrontations. Given the way the Syrian regime uses its army today - in brutally suppressing the popular uprising - the regime is unwittingly creating the conditions for desertions within the army. It will not be lost for long on the minds of the young soldiers that who is being cut down by the Syrian army machine guns and tanks are not foreign soldiers, but Syrians - their own family and kin. If this keeps going on, then the cracks will widen in the Syrian army, resulting in an irreparable breach in its ranks. That the Sunnis make up the majority in the rebellion camp as well as in the army that composition makes that danger of army desertions a high possibility. It is this danger that the regime should fear most now.

And added these in subsequent posts.

Defection from the Syrian army is growing and the deserters are organizing and fighting back pro-regime forces. The trickle yet will become a flood taking Syria down the road of a bloody civil war.

The country could slide into a civil war. At some point the people could rise up in arms and resist the regime forces (soldiers and militias), saying "enough is enough; we are not going take this anymore lying down." The Syrian government is forcing the people in that sad direction. It appears to be just a matter of time before we see these peaceful demonstrations turning into insurgencies. First it will be here and there as isolated incidents; but later these fires will join to become a major conflagration of armed conflict of national span.

Let us not forget the foot soldiers are predominantly Sunni, so are the protesters too. As the regime persists with its brutal suppression of the uprising, eventually, the Alawi commanders could be left with their few special forces or even a phantom army to lead.

The trickle of defection could gather speed. The soldiers may no longer tolerate to see the carnage of their own kin or remain deaf to any call by their people to come and stand by them. The voice of a mother or a father could be more compelling than that of the commanding officer.

So as a the Syrian social fabric gets torn and as the communal fissures widen and economic class interests polarize, then the various sectarian and economic interests will align according to their status quo/ outcome preferences. Then the battle lines will become more clear, but nastier.

Building Scenarios

Soon I began to wonder about likely outcomes in the Syrian crisis. I tried to predict the likely directions events could lead the country. I played with a few probable scenarios, but my bet was on an incipient civil war engulfing the country. This was written in summer 2011.

What are the possible scenarios for the Syrian crisis unfolding in the near future? Here are a few possibilities.

i). Scenario A: The Syrian leadership will heed the advice of the UN, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and all these emissaries. It will stop its bloody crackdown and it will begin to make concessions to the opposition camp. The regime will likely enter the negotiation with the opposition camp from a "position of strength". The government will make and follow through with meaningful reforms based on a realistic timetable. As the result, slowly Syria will return to normalcy.

What is the chance that al-Assad will listen to the advice of outsiders and enact meaningful reforms? I give it a chance of only one out of ten.

ii). Scenario B: The Syrian leaders will persist in their violent crackdown in the belief that they can permanently quash the uprising. On the other hand, the people will refuse to be silenced rather choosing to stand up and challenge the regime for many days to come.

As the more this continues - the killings and demonstrations - Syria will slide more into economic and social chaos. And slowly the country will start to fragment and pockets of armed resistance groups will pop up throughout the country. These groups will draw followers along sectarian lines. And as a virtual civil war emerges, the Syrian army cracks and fragments along confessional lines, and its ranks thin out due to desertions.

This scenario precludes foreign powers intervening directly supporting one side.

The chance of this scenario transpiring is quite high. I can give it a chance of four out of ten.

iii). Scenario C: The more the Syrian leadership persist in its killings, the more it will earn the opprobrium of the rest of the world, where concerned countries and international bodies will keep on delivering advice, rebuke and sanction to the Syrian leadership. To prevent a worse massacre from taking place, or to prevent the collapse of the whole country, or to deliver their co-coreligionists from the harsh measures of a minority sectarian government, particularly regional countries may feel the need for "military" intervention.

The military intervention will not be of the Libyan or Bosnian kind, but of a limited and of a different kind. Regional countries like Turkey (and remotely Saudi Arabia) may be likely candidates for such a "limited" military intervention. For example, Turkey has already suggested it may enter Syrian territory to set up a buffer zone. Turkey's excuse is to provide Syrian refugees a safe shelter in case the Syrian government attacks a major city like Hama with disproportional force. And more recently, Turkey has indicated that it will begin to regard the Syrian crisis as its own internal crisis, because the two countries share 800-miles long border!

Here, there is precedence to drawn upon. In the 1980s, in the height of Lebanon's civil war, Syrian forces entered that country to keep peace in Lebanon. The Syrians entered Lebanon with the tacit approval of the Saudis, the US, and even Israel. The Syrians stayed in Lebanon for many years. But today, the Syrians themselves may be on the receiving end. Turkey may likely enter Syrian territory with the approval of other major countries. Turkish forces showing up at their common border, may force the Syrian government to consider its bare-knuckle behavior towards its civilian population. Such intervention by outsiders may weaken the Syrian leadership prowess and make it to negotiate with the opposition in earnest.

What is the chance that outside forces like Turkey's will show up on Syrian territory to make the Syrian army behave humanly? I give that a chance of two out of ten.

At some point, I added,

Last time I commented on the Syrian scenario, I gave the prospect of armed civil conflict odds of 4 to 10. Now I will like to raise it to 6 to 10. Why? (i) the chances of a negotiated settlement grows dimmer by the day as both sides seem to dig in their respective positions, (ii) the likelihood of Assad's rule being replaced by a more accommodating regime as by coup d'etat looks unlikely, (iii) the opposition is quite determined to keep protesting despite the mounting cost they are paying at the hands of the pro-regime forces, (iv) the level of political violence on both sides is rising, involving high profile killings, (v) the Syrian regime support from other countries is dwindling, giving heart to the oppositions forces to stand firm their ground, etc.

If his interview with British journal, the Daily Telegraph,[i] says anything, President al-Assad is quite determined to 'wage war" against his opponents. However, they too are determined to resists his efforts and fight on - the very recipe for a protracted armed civil conflict in Syria.

At the same time, I was mapping out what would and should happen on the opposition side. The opposition was relentless in its defiance against a regime which was showing little qualms in using strong tactics to suppress the uprising:

What does the future entail for Syria? Neither the Syrian government nor the people seem to back-down from their convictions that have set them on a collision course from the outset. The discipline and the determination the masses have shown and the sacrifices they have made so far gives all the indications that the people are in it until the bitter end. However, for the opposition to achieve their objective of replacing a Ba'ath party with pluralistic democracy there should be some re-thinking to be done in terms of tactics.*

It is one thing to stand up bravely and be gunned down for one's belief; but it is another thing to do the fighting in a smart way to quicken the demise of one's opponent.

These are just three suggestions made by way of hastening the victory of the people.

i) Organization: At the top, opposition parties should get themselves an umbrella type organization to coordinate the revolution. The opposition speaking and acting as one body, will seriously threaten the regime. And at the grassroots level, there should appear, throughout the country, secretive cells or revolutionary councils that should coordinate the uprising and pressure the regime. These secretive councils would also function as parallel (shadow) local "governments", where they will gradually undermine and curtail the administrative reaches of the government. They will serve as vehicles by which eventually transfer of allegiance and authority to new sets of institutions will take place. These types of local councils will make Syria ungovernable, literally making the country out of the reaches of the regime.

ii). Propaganda: There is a need to create alternative media sources, which will effectively counter the regime's mass media - national tv, radio and print media. There should be an information war to be waged as much as street-level uprising and international sanctions.

Alternate media sources will have multiple objectives. They will further galvanize the people, provide the uprising with critical information for the day-to-day struggle, spur the yet-not-mobilized sections of the population to join the revolution, and effectively and permanently de-legitimize the regime in the eyes of the masses, and introduce the masses to new political ideals and their possible future leaders. The international community can help the opposition to set up tv and radio stations in nearby places like Turkey, or do it through satellite streaming. On the other hand, setting up underground newspapers within Syria can be a relatively easier task given the level of popular resistance to the current regime.

iii). Infiltrating the ranks of the security forces should be another area of focus for the opposition. Making contacts with sympathetic elements within the security forces (army, police and secrete service, etc) could serve a double purposes: (a) vital source of information related to regime's plans and operations, and (b) planting the idea of change within the ranks of the security establishment. These institutions thus can be undermined from within, making them to crumble eventually.

The international community need give the nudge and support to the opposition in these additional and very critical forms of struggle.

In due course the prognosis got grim, as I to give up all hope in the Syrian government to show reasonable attitude to compromise.

What will be the outcome of this unrest in Syria? The Syrian state will decay; its feared army will dissolve and disintegrate. Syria will empty out, as the educated and business elite leave the country for the safety of other nations. Why, because the regime is committing suicide by falling on its own sword. Its appearance to fight on will only prolong Syria's unhinging.

Foreign Interference

I also entertained ideas wondering which regional powers could be involved in the Syrian crisis and why.

At this point it may be safe to assume that the power struggle in Syria involves only two clear-cut major groupings - the dictatorial Ba’athist regime and its allies on one side, and the opposition, which has an aspiration for a pluralistic society, on the other side. By assuming this likely power alignment to persist in the future, we can begin to investigate the likely role of outside powers in trying to influence the outcome of the Syrian power struggle. Among all regional and world powers, I predict, the major tussle to influence Syrian affairs will be between Turkey and Iran.

(i). Turkey will side with the opposition and will plan for a post-Assad Syria. Turkey may see the current Syrian unrest as an opportunity to get greater leverage in Syria at the expense of Iran and Russia. Turkey as a secular (or moderate islamist) democracy may hold great attraction to Syrian opposition figures. For Turkey to win Syria will be a sign of its growing clout in the region.

(ii). Iran will try its best to keep intact its influence with the Assad regime as long as it can. Therefore, Iran may collaborate with the Syrian regime to crash the rebellion against Assad. Iran may not even hesitate to use Lebanon's Hezbollah as its proxy to assist in order to preserve Iranian influence in Syria. And if push comes to shove, Iran may even unleash Hezbollah into Syria's domestic turmoil. Simply put, Iran cannot afford to lose Syria - Iran's closest ally in the region and its gateway to Lebanon - to Turkey or to anyone else.

(iii). Another regional power which like to be involved in Syrian affairs might be the other regional power, Saudi Arabia. The problem with Saudi Arabia is that it does not have a horse to back in Syria yet. Because Saudi Arabia is a monarchy, it is not a popular figure with the Syrian opposition. And Assad's Ba’athist regime is no friend of Arab monarchies, either. Moreover, Assad may not want to damage its useful relationship with Iran by siding with the Saudis now. So for the moment the Saudis (despite their wealth which they can throw around to buy friends) are sitting idly by on the sidelines.

(iv). Other regional powers, namely Israel and Egypt are out of the Syrian question for the moment. For obvious reasons, it is very hard to imagine Israel being involved in shaping Syria's politics; and Egypt is too busy running its own revolution. [Next I will try to examine what role the Great Powers may play in Syria's turmoil to determine its future.] “

And I also wrote:

But Damascus by taking steps which makes it look like that it is not listening, what is it thinking?

A). The uprising is controllable; it is just a matter of time before the regime can bring everything under control. Al-Assad thinks time is on its side as the "majority" of Syrians, particularly the middle class the security branches of the state. For many , stability under al-Assad trumps democracy and the likely chaos attendant transition.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/MH13Ak01.html

But the idea that the uprising will die down could back fire. The whole country will be up in revolt gradually. This could lead to:

i). regime fractures, leading to the rise of a new leadership

ii). a civil war

B). The whole thing will remain a Syrian internal affair; no one will dare to interfere. But the idea that no one will dare to interfere from outside could also backfire:

a). The UN could bless the effort to de-legitimize the Syrian regime.

b). Turkey may send her troops to the Syrian border to put pressure on Damascus.

c). Foreign powers could engineer a coup d'etat, if possible.

It was the last point of a possible coup which I again took up in July 2012.

There is some interesting aspect to the Syrian political crisis, the lessons it teaches us about the right or wrongness of foreign intervention in the midst of a popular uprising and a repressive regime. What the unfolding Syrian civil war is showing is what Libya would have become if the Western nations had not intervened directly to support the Libyan opposition. The barely armed Libyan opposition fighters were no matches to the heavily armed Gaddafi’s regime. But it does not mean that Gaddafi would have easily wiped out the uprising, which had every sign of continuing at least in the eastern provinces which had always felt neglected and left out.

The Syrian story equally would have been the story line of Iraq if Saddam Hussein had been left in power, which he could easily have done so given his security Ba’ath state. However, his fate would have been determined by the Arab Spring, a popular uprising for democratic rights staged across the region which he could not have easily thwarted. Iraq’s fate would have resembled Syria’s for the major reason that Iraq’s power distribution parallels that of Syria in many ways. In both countries a very repressive Ba’ath regime has been in power, with a very personal as well as ethnic element in the power structure. Compared to Syria, in Iraq the ethnic balance of power has reversed. Unlike in Syria, the Sunnis in Iraq are a minority population making only about 20% of the population. However, Saddam’s co-ethnics, the Sunnis though a minority group had dominated Iraqi politics for long years. On the other hand Iraq’s majority population the Shiite, which made up to 60% of the population, chafed under Sunni dominated Ba’ath misrule. Equally, the Kurds, a sizable Iraqi minority group, also had suffered immensely under the hands of Saddam. Therefore, the arrival of the Arab Spring at the doorsteps of Iraq under Saddam would easily have given us the civil war scenario unfolding before our own very eyes in Syria today.

Russia and Iran to the Rescue?

At last, sometime in mid 2012, Russia started to show some signs of cooperating with the West to ease al-Assad out of power and create in anew transitional government. In July 2012, I wrote,

Russia is finally recognizing that supporting the Baath regime is no longer sustainable. Russia is finally seeing that its obduracy to frustrate any effort at "regime change" in Syria is a losing game than a winning one.
Therefore, Russia is finally acting in her best geo-strategic interest in Syria. What Russia is trying to do now can be described as a push for a "soft coup" in Syria. This can likely save Russia some foothold in the new Syria to be born.

On the other hand, the Iranians all along were wiser than the Russians when it comes to the Syrian crisis. From the outset they were advising Bashir al-Assad to listen to the people. Of course, the Iranians will also play a strong "behind the scene" role to press the Syrian regime to make realistic concessions to the opposition. So through whatever left of the old regime, Iran too will be able to keep some of her influence in the new Syria. Hence, the "soft coup" will be in the interest of Iran as much as that of Russia.

This was besides my expectations; from the earliest day, that at least Turkey will set up a safe haven inside Syria to protect civilians from Syrian government slaughters. I relied on new reports much on this possibility. [3]

Conclusion

As things stand in the last week of July, the much emboldened armed opposition is taking the Syrian army face to face in battles in cities and in rural areas. Some parts of the outlying regions and border areas, like the Kurdish region and the Syrian – Iraqi border area are virtually out of the hands of government forces. In short, Syria is engulfed in civil war, and as some say it is a matter of time before the regime falls and Syria enters a very uncertain political future. In the midst of the bitter struggle for power in Syria, some worrying questions are:

- Will the civil war prolong as the regime and the Alawi choose to fight to the bitter end, or will the opposition succeed to score a quicker victory in easing out president al-Assad from power and succeed in forming a national unity government that will save Syria from further bloodshed?

- Will Syria fragment into fiefdoms, where the country virtually breaks up into Sunni, Alawi and Kurdish areas with attendant ethnic cleansing?

- Will Syria become a theater of regional and global rivalry? Will Russia, Iran and Hezbollah stand by the Syrian government side and Western nations and Middle-East Sunni stalwarts like Saudi Arabia and Qatar side with the opposition, making the Syrian crisis more than a civil war but a proxy war?

Sources

My discussion of the Syrian crisis can be found in the following LinkedIn posts.

http://www.linkedin.com/groupItem?view=&gid=108552&type=member&item=94601203&trk=group_search_item_list-0-b-cmr&goback=.gna_108552

http://www.linkedin.com/groupItem?view=&gid=108552&type=member&item=72955013&trk=group_search_item_list-0-b-cmr&goback=.gna_108552

http://www.linkedin.com/groupItem?view=&gid=108552&type=member&item=65311378&trk=group_search_item_list-0-b-cmr&goback=.gna_108552

http://www.linkedin.com/groupAnswers?viewQuestionAndAnswers=&discussionID=112959614&gid=4417659&commentID=87576010&goback=.gmr_4417659.amf_4417659_106697219&trk=NUS_DISC_Q-subject#commentID_87576010

[1] Note: I called the Syrian Ba’athist regime statist, something bordering on a fascist state, for want of a better term then.

[2] See - en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statism.

[3] http://www.economist.com/node/21556605

[i] http://news.yahoo.com/syrias-assad-warns-earthquake-west-intervenes-report-211626083.html

Quo Vadis Somalia?

noreply@blogger.com (International Relations and Affairs Group) — Sat, 14 Jan 2012 16:37:00 +0000

Teddy Lishan Desta, PhD

Teddy is an Associate Editor for the Journal of the International Relations and Affairs Group (JIRAG). He has lectured at colleges and universities on International Affairs. He holds a PhD in International Relations from The University of Texas at Dallas, a Master of Science in Economics degree from Baylor University. He specializes in International Relations Theory, International Trade, Economics and the International Political Economy.

Since 1991, Somalia has been synonymous with chaos and anarchy. For the last two decades the country has seen endless civil-wars as various forces battled each other for the control of central power in Mogadishu. In recent years, the appearance and operations of pirates off the coast of Somalia, and the emergence a group with suspected links with al-Qaeda, known as al-Shabab have all exacerbated the security situation within Somalia, in the regional countries, and the maritime sea lanes in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. All these effects arising from chaotic Somalia have caused alarm bells to ring in regional capitals, and in many other which are concerned with regional security, international terrorism, maritime trade, humanitarian crisis.

The security implications of the long-standing crisis in Somalia are manifold. Not only Somalis within are affected by the crisis, but the turmoil in Somalia has also become a threat to regional stability, global security, and international maritime trade.

First, there is the case of the threat to human security. After the collapse of the central government in 1991, Somalis could not lead a normal life. Besides the hundred thousands who have lost their lives, millions of Somalis have been displaced internally and externally. In 2010, Somalia began to suffer its worst drought in 60 years. The crisis fully erupted in July, when the worsening humanitarian crisis reached a tipping point and the UN announced famine conditions across parts of southern Somalia. Hundreds of thousands of Somalis in famine-stricken areas fled to the capital, Mogadishu, and Kenya in search of aid. The famine crisis has been made worse when in 2009 al Shabab banned almost all international aid agencies, claiming that they were Western spies and that their food assistance was a conspiracy to drive Somali farmers out of business. The group not only prevented aid distribution but also forbade famine victims from fleeing to Kenya, even going so far as to deny the existence of a famine.[1]

Second, Somali pirates have become a major threat to maritime trade, their threat expanding as far as the Persian Gulf. For example, in 2010, pirates took 1,181 people hostage off the Somali coast. About half were released after the payment of ransoms; a few have died of abuse or neglect. Often hijacked vessels are employed as mother-ships from which the pirates stage further raids. The problem has worsened sharply in recent years. There were 219 attacks in 2010 compared with 35 in 2005. Ransoms paid in 2010 climbed to $238m, an average of $5.4m per ship, compared with $150,000 in 2005. On UN report estimates the economic cost of piracy at $5 billion-7 billion a year. Currently many countries have stationed part of their navies in the Gulf of Aden and the environs of the Indian Ocean off the coasts of Somalia to thwart any sea piracy.[2]

Third, the other major concern is the regional threat the instability in Somalia poses to neighboring countries. On July 11, 2010, the Somali terrorist group Al-Shabaab carried out multiple suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda. An estimated 76 people, including one American, were killed and more than 80 injured. Units from the Kenyan army crossed into Somalia in October to create a buffer zone against al-Shabab, following a series of kidnappings by the militia in northern Kenya.[3] The US is also active in the affairs of Somalia, both in fighting the danger of terrorism and in averting humanitarian crisis. The US has launched attacks by unmanned drones and special forces looking for suspects of transnational terrorism hiding with al-Shabab. On May 1, 2008, American war planes reportedly killed Aden Hashi Ayro, the former leader of al-Shabaab. The U.S. backs the TFG, and supplies weapons and support to the AMISOM forces.[4] (CFR, 2011)

Just due to recent developments in Somalia, the lives of millions of Somalis have been endangered, international maritime commerce threatened, and the peace and security of regional countries severely rattled. In order to contain the security condition fast deteriorating in Somalia, regional countries and the international community have doubled their efforts to do something to realize a turnaround. For example, some regional countries have sent their armies into the south –western half of Somalia to fight on behalf of the weak transitional federal government (TFG). For the armies of Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Ethiopia, and now Djibouti (some of which are fighting under the AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia) their main target is the al-Shabab group which has been threatening the internationally recognized, but weak, transitional federal government of Somalia. What makes these countries and the rest of the world jittery about al-Shahab is its known links with al-Qaeda.

Turning a Corner?

Since January 2011, the TFG and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have intensified their attacks against Al-Shabaab forces in Mogadishu and southern Somalia. As of June 2011, Al-Shabaab forces had lost a number of districts in Mogadishu to TFG and AMISOM forces. A number of Al-Shabaab fighters have defected to the TFG and a number of their senior commanders have been killed. In early August 2011, Al-Shabaab forces pulled out of Mogadishu.[5]

The military interventions by the regional countries, whether operating under the umbrella of the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom) or acting independently, are greatly changing the military and political dynamics of Somalia. For the first time since its formation in 2006, the al-Shabab group seems on the verge of defeat. The group which has been in control of much of Somalia, even with a strong presence in the capital city, Mogadishu, now appears to be on the run as it comes under sustained pressure from the armies of the regional countries and the anti-terrorism and anti-piracy operations of countries such as the USA and France.

So what is the future for Somalia? Here, I entertain one scenario.

One Economist report gives the impression that Somalia is headed towards a new form of political arrangement.[6] That is the possible prospect that (Mogadishu-) Somalia could be carved up into sphere of influences by three regional powers - Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia.(1) Each of these countries could likely end up setting up their "protectorates" inside Somalia. Each countries' efforts is expected to be helped by the cooperation and tacit acquiesce of local tribes and tribal leaders. These will likely lend their support because they are tired of civil conflict and all its attendant evils. It is also likely that regional bodies like IGAAD and the AU, and world organizations like UN will also support these interventions under the rubric of regional peace-keeping or fighting terrorism.

How does this scenario play out? At least, the resulting protectorates (mini-states) will serve each of the regional countries as buffer zones against classical chaos, or as control mechanism for the much feared regional jihadism of al-Shabab. If these "protectorates" succeed in providing safe havens for Somalis who have suffered depredation under warlordism, lawlessness, and al-Shabab's austere laws, then the rest of the world will be happy to lend its material support to the regional countries so that they could assist in the rehabilitation of the areas they have pacified.

However, any promise of support from the outside world would come under the tacit assumption that these "protectorates" will later be joined together to form a larger Somalia, a Somalia which will be at peace with itself and with its neighbors. Of course, this type of outside support for the regional countries subsumes the repeat of the German story at the end of WW II. This is the scenario where soon after end of WW II, the western allied powers pacified, stabilized and lent support for the reconstruction of the zones they controlled. Within a few years the allied forces have combined their respective spheres of occupied Germany into the W. German state. A German nation pacified and integrated into Europe came about only through the sacrifices and efforts of other great powers.

Such a rosy and probable outcome the world could expect from the African nations' foray into Somalia could be marred also by other efforts which support elements who oppose the presence of these regional countries in Somalia. For example other regional powers like Eritrea will attempt to have its own sphere of influence in Somalia through its alleged support for al-Shabab. Al-Qaeda as an organization with a deep going interest in Somalia will also do its best to thwart such an effort. Equally there may other Somalis which could oppose the idea of sphere of influence by the regional countries just for the sake of hard-core Somali nationalism.

However, there are a few major reasons to view the presence of the regional countries in Somalia with a positive light. If these the regional countries commit the necessary resources and implicitly work under the oversight of the international community, and work hard to win the trust of the local people, this scenario could prove to be a turning point for Somalia. The worst fear expressed has been that these countries as agents of their own national interests or as participants to some western imperialist conspiracy will remain in Somalia for many years or dismember the remaining part of Somalia for ever. [7]But such a fear is quite misplaced, because:

i). There is little to keep these countries in Somalia except the overriding interest to bring stability to it lest they themselves become destabilized by spill-over effect from Somalia's unending turmoil.

ii). Long-term occupation (beyond pacification) of some other country's territory is not a sustainable proposition for these countries from the viewpoint of their own economic capability, their domestic politics, international opinion, and the backlash from Somali nationalism.

iii). The presence of armies from neighboring countries in a civil war-torn African country is not the first to happen. Based on the record we have, such presence has never mutated into a permanent occupation, or led to the dismemberment of the "occupied" country.

Somalia's greatest assets are its very resourceful people who will not need many years to build their country into a hub of economic activity and innovation once they are provided with peace conditions or economic assistance, or both thru the support of the international community. I choose to view the presence of east African armies in Somalia as part of this effort. Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, and Ethiopia's armies in Somalia should be viewed as necessary evil to bring long due pacification to Somalia. It should be seen as part of the effort to bring desired stability, and yes even ultimately that united Somalia.

Somalia will not be the first country where neighbors' showed up to extinguish a fire that is consuming the country and is also threatening their own survival. In all cases (I can recall) all these small countries go back to where they come from either successfully extinguishing the fire or reducing it to a very manageable level.

One thing the presence of the regional countries can take advantage of in the case of recent developments in Somalia is the appearance of mini-state like political entities which are trying to take shape in areas vacated by al-Shabab. The appearance of such autonomous zones should not be viewed with undue alarm, but taken as an opportunity to create order out of chaos. These newly appearing cantons (mini-"states"), if handled correctly, can serve as critical stepping stones to pacify, build, and ultimately unite Somalia. However, this idea, if expected to work, has to fulfill a few key assumptions:

(i). No canton will have the motivation nor the power to try to dominate another mini-“state.”

(ii). Each of these cantons are the largest logical governance blocks that can hold and sustain on their own. Because of cultural and historical reasons - related to clan affinity and the bad experience the region has since 1991 – conditions make clan-based cantons fit for the political ecology of Somalia.

(iii). Regional powers exercising power within their respective spheres of influence will keep the balance of power among these cantons. The regional powers will thereby prevent any type of predatory or dominance-oriented activity arising from any of these cantons to succeed.

(iv). Another role of the regional countries will be to encourage good governance and normal economic activity in each canton. They will oversee the emergence and consolidation of a responsible leadership and normal economic activity in each of the autonomous zones they each control. They will censure among the canton leaders any tendency towards pillage, warlordism or the ideological dominance of other cantons. The local leadership will mentor and supported to focus on peace, stability and reconstruction of the zone under its management.

(v). Regional countries will empower the local population in grassroots democracy (a system to be rooted in the traditional culture) so that a leadership that does not perform as expected will be weeded out and replaced with an energetic and visionary leadership.

Hence, it is not a far-fetched idea to contemplate the emergence and sustenance clan-based cantons as the groundwork for the reconstitution of Somalia. One big reason in this regard is that these mini-"states" will be small and weak that they will be quite amenable to outside pressure and incentive to go in the direction mapped out for them. If there be a time where the adage of "divide and rule" could apply for positive results, then it must be now in a place called Mogadishu-Somalia.

As for the rest of the international community, it should exercise first oversight and secondly provide logistical support to make the regional countries as responsible agents to pacify, stabilize, and ultimately put together Somalia.

Moving Forward in Somalia
Today the momentum in Somalia favors the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) than its opponents, represented mainly by al-Shabab.

Since January 2011, the TFG and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have intensified their attacks against Al-Shabaab forces in Mogadishu and southern Somalia. As of June 2011, Al-Shabaab forces had lost a number of districts in Mogadishu to TFG and AMISOM forces. A number of Al-Shabaab fighters have defected to the TFG and a number of their senior commanders have been killed. [8]

Facilitated by the UN mission in Somalia, currently there is a concerted effort to give Somalia an elected parliament and broadly-based government by late 2012. In September 2011, Somali political leaders agreed a "road map" for the formation of a government to replace the TFG by August 2012. The adoption of the plan, which is based on four major benchmarks -security, the constitution, political outreach, and reconciliation and good governance -was the culmination of a three-day consultative meeting on ending the transition in Somalia. The “roadmap” was signed by the TFG, the Federal Transitional Parliament (FTP), the two autonomous regions, Puntland and Galmudug, and the pro-TFG Islamist militia, Ahlu Sunnah.[9]

Another new development on the Somalia political scene is the active interventionist role regional countries are playing to help pacify Somalia. And secondly, al-Shabab is showing signs of degenerating from its high-ground ideological and nationalist "purity" and military strength into becoming a band of predatory and criminal organization. These rapidly evolving changes call for a new assessment of the political and security situation of Somalia. One key step in such re-assessment will be to identify and categorize the major role players in the politics and security of Somalia. It is only from such understanding (and knowing the objectives of each major role player) that any meaningful analysis and recommendation can arise.

(i). Internal forces
These forces are purely of Somalia in origin and operate fully within. Some have international and regional legitimacy; some do not. Some are fully political; others are quasi-political tending on the criminal. Some have a pan-national objective; others are more local actors.

The variation in the internal forces ranges, say from the transitional government to the remnant of the "old-style" warlord type to al-Shabab to a band of pirates. Therefore, there is a need to create sub-categories in the rank of internal forces.

(ii). Internal-external forces
These political and social forces are Somali in origin, but reside or operate outside the country. These play a role in Somali politics by the kind of hard and soft support they provide or even deny to the various Somali internal forces active in Somalia. There is one additional fact why these forces are quite important in the dynamics of Somalia. These forces are indispensable to the international community which tries to bring order to Somalia through reconciliation or the setting up of a national government.

(iii). External-internal forces
These are regional countries and other organizations which have made their foot-prints in Somalia. Some are there under the umbrella of the AU peacekeeping forces (Uganda, Burundi, and now Djibouti), and others have made incursions into Somalia to prevent spill-over effect (Kenya and Ethiopia). Currently, the number and clout of these regional countries in the affairs of Somalia has grown proportionally.

(iv). External forces
These are outsides forces, countries or organizations, with minimal political or military physical presence in Somalia. But they show attention and engagement with the local situations not to be considered or ignored. Their actions clearly show that they have some stake or interest in the present and future state of Somalia.

Some of the external forces lend support to the transitional government, and a few others to al-Shabab. Some are key because their diplomatic, financial and material clout is immense; they can bestow or deny international legitimacy to any of the forces operating within Somalia. Some others make a military impact; they either engage some of the internal forces militarily on occasional basis, or supply arms and others logistics to Somali combatants.

The identity and objectives each the major external force (i.e., what kind of Somalia they want to see emerge from the ashes) should be identified and understood for correct analysis of the situation, and even for seeking solution.

Simply put the politics of Somalia has many moving parts which each needs ample attention in order to the fix the broken place. In my opinion, today there is a shift that is developing in the affairs of Mogadishu-Somalia which if handed carefully could lead to positive results to pacify, stabilize and restore the place. Here are some reasons:

a). In the case where at least five regional countries (Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti) have made their presence felt in Somalia, it is quite difficult for any local Somali force to get the upper hand over its power competitors without the support of these countries.

Given there fire-power, resources and support they have from the international community, the role these countries could play in the political dynamics of Somalia, as by tilting the balance of power in favor of some of the internal forces, is quite immense. In this regard the probable winner seems to be the transitional federal government (TFG), at present whose power barely extends beyond the capital city, Mogadishu. Therefore, the fate of Somalia will highly depend what these countries will end up doing in the country.

b). In the case where al-Shabab because of its misdeeds and missteps is fast losing even its ideological justification and the nationalist mantle, it is proving itself as a less and less an attractive option even for its original Somali supporters. On top of the support it is fast losing within the areas it operates in, al-Shabab is coming under immense military pressure from the armies of the regional countries now operating in Somalia (as well as the direct military hits it is taking from other external forces). Therefore, al-Shabab is fast disintegrating; hence it is no longer able the feared unified armed organization threatening to take power in Mogadishu any time soon.

c). In the case where small bands of vice-based bands of operators (pirates, etc.) do not have any sort of political vision for Somalia, these could survive for some time until the place gets a normal life and economy. Of course, in this regard things could get a little worse before it gets any better. That is because as al-Shabab splinters and disintegrates, it will inevitably swell the ranks of small groups of “bandits” whose primary objective will be sowing chaos and earning a living from extortion.

d). In the case where mini-state-like zones are emerging in the spaces vacated by al-Shabab these developments allow for traditional Somali governance to take root among the people. These mini political entities will provide their local communities with a modicum of governance working as functional cantons, as they will be sensitive to their community needs, amenable to international community influence and incentives, and adverse to destructive forces. These even though they may look for autonomy as much as possible from the center, may not want to challenge the legitimacy of the transitional government as the war-lords or USC or al-Shabab did.

Carving a Role for the Somali Diaspora
Today millions of Somalis reside outside their country, and most of these have been forced to leave their native land due to the insecurity that engulfed Somalia after the fall of the Said Barre regime in 1991. Many of these have taken refuge in neighboring countries like Ethiopia and Kenya, and many others have settled as far away in the Middle East, Europe, North America and Australia. Wherever they may be, most of the Somali Diaspora maintains a very keen interest in what is going on in their native land, socially, economically and politically. For example, the remittances the Diaspora send home provides as a lifeline that sustains many families through the chaos and the hardship caused by the civil war and by famine conditions as the one which hit the country most recently. Remittances from the Somali Diaspora are forecast to remain steady at around US$1bn a year in 2012-13, as the impact of weak growth and the risk of another recession in the developed world is countered by improvements in money transfer technology.[10]

Politically, the Somali Diaspora has played a key a role in post-1991 Somali politics in the form of hard and soft support they provide (or deny) to the various groups operating within Somalia. The Diaspora has also been one indispensable pool of human resource wherever the international community plans any form of political or humanitarian intervention in Somalia. In many instances exile Somali groups have been the main power brokers in the various efforts in peace negotiation among the warring factions, or in the attempts to give Somalia a central government. Such a close engagement is equally illustrated by the fact that the last two prime ministers, a host of members of parliament, and cabinet ministers hold dual US-Somali nationality.

Now as explained above the political and security dynamics of Somalia is entering a new phase where things are evolving very rapidly. So it is important to assess what role the Somali Diaspora play in order to capitalize on the developing situation, thereby assisting the long-term vision of stabilizing and returning Somalia to a normal life. What can actually the Diaspora do to help the forces of national and regional peace?

At this juncture the Somali Disapora has two main choices:
(i). Reject the intervention of the regional countries seeing it as a conspiracy to dismember Somalia. In this case the Diaspora will either back al-Shabab and reform it, accepting it as a nationalist block, or lend support to one or some of the canton leaders which may try to play the nationalist card more than any of their peers. Or, the Diaspora may come together to form a new nationalist party that will try to coordinate efforts to kick out the invaders from Somalia. This scenario looks unlikely at the moment though given that the Diaspora want to see a semblance of stability in Somalia, at least the Ethiopian and Kenyan armies have been given the benefit of the doubt but things might change in the future of these armies do not stabilize Somalia.

(ii). Accept the regional countries armies in Somalia as a necessary evil meant to bring peace and stability to the endless civil war that have wracked Somalia since 1991. In this scenario, the Diaspora will quickly recognize the regional intervention as a positive development and proceed to organize a committee that will allow the Diaspora to play its historic part in bringing stability to Somalia. . The London Conference on Somalia organized by the UK government could be a starting point for such an initiative and the UK based Diaspora which is already engaged in various initiatives can take the lead.

The Diaspora committee may need to make initial contacts with the TFG, regional and world organizations, and the rest of the international community, including some of the great powers in order to be accepted as a role player in the new effort to stabilize Somalia. The committee could easily be accepted by others because there are a few quite critical tasks it can realize. First, the committee can recognize and enhance the TFG, thereby giving it a broader legitimacy among all Somalis. Second, it can begin to provide the TFG with the critical manpower which can help the TFG run the country. Third, the committee can provide experienced interlocutors and diplomats for the TFG to represent the Somali interest abroad. Fourth, by working hand in hand with regional and world bodies, the Diaspora committee exercise oversight over the regional countries militarily active in Somalia. By ensuring the work of the regional countries in Somalia as a short-time mission, the Diaspora can minimize the risk of any Somali nationalist backlash against these countries. Fifth, by working the Somali community channels, inside and outside Somalia, the Diaspora committee can bring pressure on Somali forces working in the piracy, jihad or other forms of evil enterprise. And finally, the Diaspora can invest in development projects and social infrastructure in Somalia to foster a return to normal economic activities and to lay the groundwork for development projects and foreign direct investment by multi-national Corporation.

In short, the Diaspora committee can function as a complement to the TFG, by working as a shadow government from outside. Its endeavors will be directed towards supporting and enhancing the TFG work inside the country. The committee will also act as the diplomatic arm of the TFG, representing the Somali interest outside the country.

In all these, one big question remains to be answered: Will the Somali Diaspora view the military presence of neighboring countries as a colonial enterprise and a conspiracy to dismember Somalia, or as a golden opportunity to pacify the country? If the Diaspora chooses to ally itself solidly behind the regional and international forces, then the prospect of peace in Somalia will be brighter than ever. However, if the Diaspora chooses to reject the current regional and international effort, then Somalia will be destined for another cycle of violence. The future of Somalia heavily depends on the answer the Somali Diaspora will give to this important question. In all these indications are the majority of the Somali Diaspora are more involved in making the TFG work than supporting the al-Shabaab.

References

1). Foreign armies in Somalia and the appearance of state-like entities in Somalia.
http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2011/11/ethiopia-kenya-and-somalia
http://somalilandpress.com/the-end-of-somalia-scenario-of-partition-25321
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/10/world/africa/10somalia.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1&ref=africa
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15499534
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16156157

2). How history affects the relationship between Ethiopians and Somalis
http://news.yahoo.com/troubled-ethiopia-somalia-history-haunts-horn-africa-114234432.html

3). Al-Shabab becomes a danger to Somali culture
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/28/world/africa/somalia-faces-alarming-rise-in-rapes-of-women-and-girls.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1&ref=world&src=me

4). Sea Piracy
http://www.economist.com/node/18070160

5). USA fights against terrorists and pirates in Somalia
http://www.cfr.org/somalia/terrorism-havens-somalia/p9366?breadcrumb=%2Fregion%2F196%2Fsomalia

6). Famine in Somalia
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68221/ken-menkhaus/somalias-starvation

7). Country Report
Economist Intelligence Unit (2011). Country Report: Somalia.
Congressional Research Service (2011): http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33911.pdf
___________________________________________

[1] Ken Menkhaus (2011). Somalia’s Starvation. Foreign Affairs. Available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68221/ken-menkhaus/somalias-starvation

[2] Economist (2011). At Sea. Feb. 3, 2011. Print. Available at: http://www.economist.com/node/18070160

[3] Economist Intelligence Unit (2011). Country Report: Somalia.
[4] Julia Hunt (2011). Terrorism Havens: Somalia. Available at: http://www.cfr.org/somalia/terrorism-havens-somalia/p9366?breadcrumb=%2Fregion%2F196%2Fsomalia

[5] Ted Dagne (2010). Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33911.pdf

[6] http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2011/11/ethiopia-kenya-and-somalia

[7]Abdishakur Jowhar (2011). The End of Somalia: Scenario of Partition. Available at: http://somalilandpress.com/the-end-of-somalia-scenario-of-partition-25321

[8] Ted Dagne (2010). Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33911.pdf

[9] Economist Intelligence Unit (2011). Country Report: Somalia.
[10] Economist Intelligence Unit (2011). Country Report: Somalia.

Containing Iran: the Saudi Approach

noreply@blogger.com (International Relations and Affairs Group) — Fri, 23 Dec 2011 18:41:00 +0000

Teddy Lishan Desta, PhD

Teddy is an Associate Editor for the Journal of the International Relations and Affairs Group (JIRAG). He has lectured at colleges and universities on International Affairs, and is also a Teaching Assistant at Florida International University. He holds a PhD in International Relations from The University of Texas at Dallas, a Master of Science in Economics degree from Baylor University. He specializes in International Relations Theory, International Trade, Economics and the International Political Economy.

Saudi Arabia’s approach to contain revolutionary Iran is of a different make. The Saudis rather chose and implemented an ideological/ religious strategy to hinder the spread of Iranian influence. In order to deter what they considered the fundamentalist rhetoric and revolutionary zeal of Shiism , the Saudi’s promoted their own firebrand form of Sunni Islam called Wahhabism.

Some of the notable outcomes of the Saudis effort in contain Iran included the sponsorship of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan and the backing of a growing Sunni fundamentalist influence in Pakistani politics. In doing these two things, the Saudi’s successfully implanted bastions of Sunni Islam on the eastern doorsteps of Iran. Moreover, to counter the spread of radical Shiism worldwide, the Saudis committed large amount of resources to the establishment of Sunni mosques and madrassas around the world.

The primary struggle between Shiism and Sunnism was for the hearts and minds of the restive youth of the Islamic world. This competition was fought on two arenas - which side could exhibit the greatest fundamentalist views and which side could inflict the greatest pain on the so called infidels. As radical Shiism and jihadist Wahhabism fiercely competed worldwide for the mantle of assertive and defiant Islam, one result has been the flare up of instability and much bloodshed in many parts of the world. The two sides’ competition to outdo each other in inflicting pain on which they considered the historic enemies of Islam was often reckless and bloody.

The rise of al-Qaeda - with all its evil consequences - is one outcome of this type of ideological competition between firebrand version of Sunni Islam (Salfist/ Wahhabi school ) promoted by Saudi Arabia and the radical Shiism promoted by Iran. It was the rise and terrorist operations of al-Qaeda in the West which later became the main justification to draw the USA and the rest of West to war in Afghanistan and in Iraq. These two wars, as we examine next, were not without their immense consequences in the shifting balance of power between Shi’ias and Sunnis.

When the USA military stepped into Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), its official intentions were to fight terrorists. But soon followed some unintended consequences from these interventions, wherein the dynamics of the ongoing rivalry between radical Shi’ias and fundamentalist Sunnis in the region changed radically.

Firstly, in just a space of two years, the US removed from power the two enemies of Iran – on one hand the secular-nationalist-Iran-hating regime of Saddam Hussein, and on the other hand the radical Wahhabist regime of the Taliban in Afghanistan. For the Saudis, therefore, the coming of America in war to the greater Middle East faced them with a double loss. The Taliban they supported got chased from power in Afghanistan, and their co-religionists and co-ethnics the Sunnis got deposed in Iraq. So the USA - the Saudis’ long standing ally in the region - unintentionally tilted the regional balance of power in favor of Iran. The Saudis then has to look around helplessly as Iran became less constrained to throw her weight around the region and the rest of the world seeking more political influence.

Secondly, America’s presence in Iraq re-ignited a fratricide between Sunnis and Shi’ias that had died over long time. America’s effort to democratize Iraq demoted the once powerful minority group, the Sunnis, and enthroned the once oppressed majority group, the Shi’ias. As Iraq straddles the major fault line in the Shi’ ia and Sunni divide in the Middle East, the sectarian violence between the two groups was bitter and brutal. Fundamentalist and nationalist elements from both sides pitted it out to the bitter end in a power and religious struggle for dominance. So Iraq for almost five years (2003 - 2008) was not only a theater of conflict where natives fought occupiers, but the cosmic battlefield in a round- two of a ‘system-level’ clash between Sunnis and Shi’ia. It was inventible that the two giants, Saudi Arabia and Iran, should be interested in Iraq during this time. As expected, each supported its own co-religionists in the strife, the Iranians more openly than the Saudis. But increasingly it became clear that the Shi’ia’s of Iraq were getting the upper hand, and this shift of power clearly has benefitted Iran in its geopolitical rivalry with Saudi Arabia.

Third, one outcome of the West’s military presence in the greater Middle-East has been to sap the rage and impetus of radical Islam. Since, at some point, the Afghan and Iraq wars were the cause célèbre for worldwide jihadi forces many of them have rushed to these war fronts seeking exploits and martyrdom; but as the West stood its ground, it has succeeded, to a great extent, to sap the rage of the jihadi forces and to deplete their organizational resources. Probably as the result of this effort, today the expression of the competition between radicals of Sunnis and Shi’ias has entered a new phase. The new form of competition between the two sides is not as such new, as it is the old fashioned state-to-state (or state vs. quasi-state) arms racing. For example, Iran has begun to aspire to nuclear power status, and has taken massive efforts to build the military capabilities of its allies in the region. And the Saudis have followed a two pronged response to this challenge. On one side they have begun to build up their own conventional arms arsenal, and on the other they have started to seek for a creative solution to Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Fourth, USA’s experience in Iraq gave the Iranians almost a first hand experience to the limits of American power. Because America apparently bogged down in an asymmetrical warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan, the perceived weakness of the USA has emboldened the Iranians to act more defiantly on the world stage. One outcome of the renewed assertiveness of Iran has been its decision to re-initiate its nuclear program. Though Iran may have its own strategic reasons to seek to acquire nuclear power status, the very possibility of a nuclear armed Iran has set-off the alarms in many Middle-Eastern capitals, most notably in Riyadh and Tel Aviv. The Saudis have clearly seen the added strategic advantage a nuke would bestow on Iran – it would lift up Iran higher in the eyes of the Muslim world, thereby eroding the commanding status the Saudis have; and more immediately, a nuke armed Iran would feel less obliged to consult with others before it threw its weight around in regional disputes, even in places where the Saudis have vital interests. Therefore, to the Saudis preventing their mortal enemy Iran from possessing a nuclear power has become an overriding security concern.

If the Saudis were not to follow Iran down the road of nuclear arms racing, they knew that they should begin to search for an alternative solution. At least they recognized that they could no longer rely on their accustomed ideological skirmishes with Iran, as this approach is no longer deemed sufficient to the new challenge. So, they have to seek for a creative solution. One smart solution has been for the Saudis to look towards Washington and Tel Aviv in search of a possible deterrent response to the Iranian nuclear ambition. In Saudis’ thinking, perhaps - Given that the mullahs long-standing hatred of the USA and Israel would not either Tel Aviv or Washington see the Iranian ambition for what it is and take the appropriate action? As strange as it seems, in the Saudi’s eyes, it is going to be the relationship Iran and Saudi Arabia respectively have with Israel and the USA that would be the deciding factor in curbing Iran’s nuke ambitions, and perhaps permanently settling the power struggle between the two Islamic giants in its favor.

To conclude, where do all these leave Saudi Arabia, which among other Gulf States looks upon the rise of Iran with deep alarm?

· Saudi Arabia has one of the largest rates of increase in military expenditure (63%) from 2001 – 2010. In 2010, Saudi Arabia spent approximately US $45 billions of dollars on defense. Saudi’s defense allocation which is about 10.4% of its GDP is one of the highest in the world. This is mainly born of the Iranian threat, which is the only regional power Saudi Arabia feels a threat from. (1). Saudi Arabia will continue to build its arsenal of conventional weapons to build deterrence against the ambitions of Iran. (2)

· Saudi Arabia shows readiness to go beyond the accumulation of conventional modern weaponry to seek to develop its own nuclear arsenal. According to Prince Turki al-Faisal, one of the most senior princes associated with Saudi security and foreign policy, said at a recent Gulf States forum that an Iranian quest for nuclear weapons and Israel’s presumed nuclear arsenal might force Saudi Arabia to follow suit. (3)

· Since long-standing Middle-East geopolitics will not allow Saudi Arabia to form any meaningful alliance with the sole regional nuclear power, Israel, Saudi Arabia may be forced by circumstances to look to another nearby nuclear power country; namely, Pakistan. In a time where the USA seems in a long process of disengaging from the turbulent Middle-East region and looking to the Asia-Pacific region as its future, Saudi Arabia may be forced to look for a replacement for USA strong presence in the region. (4) By choosing from any of the other existing great powers, because of religious or historical reasons, Saudi Arabia cannot easily tie a knot of security alliance with any of them. Therefore, Saudi Arabia has to look for a regional power country that is its natural complement. Because Pakistan shares the same type of religious faith with eth Saudis and since the two nations have history of cooperation along religious and security lines, the Saudis will find Pakistan a very viable security option as a military ally in its rivalry with Iran. The Saudi’s will not find it very difficult to grow the existing relationship to a deeper level where the Saudis will get Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella in exchange for Saudi’s largess to subsidize the cash strapped Pakistani army and government. It is possible that Saudi Arabia can lease one or two nukes from Pakistan and allow a few thousands of Pakistani soldiers and ace pilots to deploy in the country in order to send Iran a strong deterrent signal. Since Saudi Arabia and Pakistan has a long history of security cooperation and religious affinity, this could be easily realized as needed by the two countries. As much as Pakistan is quite a part of Saudi’s domestic and regional security strategy, we should expect such a relationship to grow deeper. (5)

· Saudi Arabia could have a hidden agenda to see the Taliban come to power in Afghanistan. The Since Taliban leaders, many whom were educated in Pakistani madrassas sponsored by Saudi Wahhabi circles, a Taliban ruled Afghanistan will provide security threat to the south-eastern borders of Iran. The extent Pakistan and Saudi Arabia succeed to re-install the Taliban in power in Afghanistan and exercise influence on its foreign and domestic affairs, they will succeed in harassing Iran on its eastern frontiers.

· Today Iranian influence in the Middle-East stretches like a crescent from the Persian Gulf to the south-western shores of the Mediterranean coastlines. Iran’s political and security clout reaches all the way to the borders of Egypt, crossing Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Gaza. If the Arab Spring helps to consolidate the cropping Islamist governments in North Africa, that in turn will further grow Iranian influence in the Arab world to the dismay of Saudi Arabia. On its part, given its history, Saudi Arabia will not rest quietly as Iran expands its influence over the region. For example, the current turmoil in Syria provides Saudi Arabia with a chance to take Syria permanently out of the sphere of Iran. Saudi Arabia, by working unilaterally and multi-laterally can strengthen the Syrian opposition forces and at the same time weaken the pro-Iran Bashir al-Assad regime. By the same token, Saudi Arabia can buttress moderate political parties in Lebanon to check-mate Iran’s trusted ally in Lebanon, the powerful Hezbollah party, and in the case of Palestinian politics support the moderate PA against the Iran allied Hamas.

References

1). Background paper on SIPRI military expenditure data, 2010. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Retrieved from: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/factsheet2010

2). The New Cold War. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704116404576262744106483816.html?mod=wsj_share_linkedin&goback=%2Egna_2163586

3). Prince Hints Saudi Arabia May Join Nuclear Arms Race. The New York Times. Retrieved from:

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/07/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-may-seek-nuclear-weapons-prince-says.html?_r=1&scp=4&sq=saudi%20arabia%20and%20Iran%20&st=cse

4).The wretched Middle East: A region that an American presidency turns away from at its peril. The Economist. Retrieved from: http://www.economist.com/node/21541397

5). Is Pakistan helping the Saudis with a nuclear deterrent? Rediff News. Retrieved from: http://www.rediff.com/news/special/is-pakistan-helping-the-saudis-with-a-nuclear-deterrent/20111004.htm

Understanding Iran

noreply@blogger.com (International Relations and Affairs Group) — Thu, 15 Dec 2011 16:57:00 +0000

Teddy Lishan Desta, PhD

Understanding Iran

Teddy Lishan Desta, PhD

The late 1970s ushered the world into a transformative moment. Within a few years from each other, two ancient civilization states passed through massive domestic and international policy change. These two countries are China and Iran. Following the transformations China under Deng Xiao-Ping and Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini , and given the heavyweight these two countries lift in the regional and international arena, world politics has not been the same ever since. However the trajectories of change each country has followed, at least in the international relations context, is starkly contrasted. China abandoned its 40 years old left-wing anti-capitalist rant and joined the capitalist world with gusto. China courted and engaged the west for its capital investments and export market, while it master planned its revival as a true great power. On the other hand, Iran abandoned its alliance with the west, became antagonistic with western powers, and embraced a very combative nationalist and Islamic ideology as a way to regional and world significance.

It is important to recognize that both China and Iran have a great power status ambition. The way they have been building up their military forces and have been extending their ideological, political and economic influences in their respective regions and in the rest of the world give China and Iran a revisionist state status. Revisionist state because both seek for the redistribution of global power and influence to advantage their interests. Of course, the redistribution of regional and global power comes at the expense of the USA which has been left as the sole superpower in the post-Cold War world. What is quite surprising is that we see these two ancient civilization states trying to recover their past glories, but each following a very contrasting path. China has chosen very quiet and unassuming manners while it has been building its economic and military power by engaging the west in a most lucrative economic relationship. Until very recently China took extra care not to ruffle anyone’s feathers as it sought for the extension or protection of its economic and political interests regionally.

In contrast, Iran has adopted a very adversarial stance from the very outset of its revolution. Iran’s ideological and military behavior has irked regional as well as global powers from the very beginning. Iran has not failed to challenge or undermine the great powers of the Middle-East region, namely Iraq under Saddam, Saudi Arabia, Israel and the USA. Iran had a the dream to unseat Saddam Hussein and overshadow Iraq Gulf’s most important regional power ,of replacing Saudi Arabia as the great influence in the Islamic world, of destroying the state of Israel thereby removing from the scene the Middle East’s sole nuclear power, and of eventually edging the global power, the USA, altogether from the region.

Since Iran has begun reviving its nuclear power program and by the degree its leaders have continued to speak in defiant language about their determination to push forward with their nuclear power ambitions, the fear of the USA, Israel and Saudi Arabia that Iran is headed to developing a nuclear bomb have grown apace. These countries most fear once Iran becomes the owner of an atomic bomb its defiant behavior will grow more and that it will be tempted to launch adventurous military and political actions that further disturb the volatile Middle East region. At the moment, the Middle East is set on edge because of the stand-off between Iran on one hand and the three countries on the other. Even Israel continually threatens to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities to stop Tehran from acquiring the bomb.

We see China cultivating its political and economic influence and growing its military might without garnering any punitive measures from the rest of the world. While China’s rise is quiet and seems to last for long, why is Iran’s ambitions to great power are so noisy and potentially brittle? What is Iran’s leaders’ calculus to maintain a very combative stance and a defiant tone, even in the face of economic sanctions and the threat of military actions against their country’s nuclear program? Are Iranian leaders rational actors when deciding to turn their back on the west and in keeping challenging the west’s presence in the Middle East, in threatening and in working for the dismantling of Israel as a state, and in attempting to overshadow Saudi Arabia as Muslims’ most important religious state? What kind of tangible gain Iranian leaders expect from their international policy positions, which in the eyes of many are risky undertakings? Here I list a few reasons why the actions of Iran’s leaders can be viewed rational (albeit, risky). The rationality of Iranian actions could be analyzed by taking a few major goals they will like to achieve; namely:

1). Great power status

Iranian ambition as a great power is primarily focused on the Middle East region. This ambition has three pronged strategy; namely, challenging other regional great powers and building its own military capabilities. Revolutionary Iran’s strategy is geared towards mainly challenging and diminishing the powers and influences of other major regional powers it considers as its enemies. These enemies primarily are the USA and Israel which Iran likes to daub, as “the Great Satan” and “the little Satan”, respectively. For example, the Iranian revolution severed ties with the USA and Israel right away after the revolution. The new rulers ensured that the USA should no longer have a trusted ally in Iran that it can use for its strategic purposes in the region. Second, in 1982, Iran financed and trained radical Shi’ia groups drove the USA marine force presence out of Lebanon. Due to growing political and military influence of such Shi’ia groups in Lebanon, the influence of the USA in Lebanese affairs is much curtailed. Third, Iran through the pressure it has been exerting, directly and indirectly, through its Iraqi ally, the Mehadi Army, it has succeeded to cut very short the days the USA military planned to stay in Iraq. Fourth, Iran works tirelessly to delegitimize and dismantle the state of Israel. Iran does not only see the state of Israel as another great power standing in its path of regional supremacy, but also as an alien entity planted as an American or western bridgehead to control Islamic Middle East. So destroying the state of Israel is tantamount to destroying a bastion of USA presence in the region. Fifth, Iran views the Arab Spring in favorable eyes as it topples in many places western friendly autocrats and brings to power islamists, which it hopes can easily identify with Iran’s defiant foreign policies. Sixth, there is also Iran’s nuclear power ambition. This ambition is of a tactical nature; where Iran surmises that if it becomes a nuclear power, it thinks that it can permanently take away any advantage the state of Israel has in this regard, or it can deter any other power’s desire to force to change it its policies.

2). Ideological leadership of the Islamic world

In contrast to the Chinese experience in the late 1970s, the Iranians were in the grip of launching an ideology, which some call fundamental or political Islam. The Muslim high clerics who took power in Iran their political agenda was not merely overthrowing an age-old monarchy and replacing it with a populist revolutionary government, but also launching an Islamic revolution which they believe will restore the political importance of their religion to billions of Muslims world-wide. The way the Iranian leaders were deploying religion to attack powerful global, regional and domestic forces were winning admirers and imitators around the Muslim world who were either chafing under autocratic leaders, or not were not happy in USA role in the Middle East, or Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians, etc. Undoubtedly, the popularity of Iran in the Arab street grew apace the more defiant it became to the west and challenged Israel indirectly through its allies like Hamas and Hezbollah.

Iranian leaders as astute power players, approach the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a tactical opportunity in their strategic maneuvering to be the leader of the Islamic world. Since the Palestinian issue is the major cause célèbre among the Arab people, Iran wants to exploit this issue to the fullest extent to its advantage. Iranian leaders calculate that whoever champions the Palestinian cause or brings down the Jewish state to its knees will get the accolades of the Sunni Arabs and easily be crowned as the undisputed political and moral leader of the wider Islamic world. To this end Iran finances, trains and arms at least two sworn enemies of Israel – Hamas and Hezbollah. Iran has placed Hamas and Hezbollah as nooses around the neck of Israel and believes that it is a matter of time before Israel gets asphyxiated by these two forces.

3). National liberation

Iran’s 1979 revolution gave Iranian nationalists the chance to take political power, retain it, and begin the work of national liberation. This is not a national liberation of the classical kind of overthrowing a colonial yoke, but the psychological liberation from great power domination. In the eyes of Iranian nationalists, since the turn of 1900s, Iran has suffered a series of humiliations in the forms of economic concessions (i.e., “capitulations”), and great power political interference as when the USA coordinated the overthrow of the democratically elected nationalist government of Mossasedgh in 1953. For many Iranians, after his restoration in 1953, the Shah’s government got too close to and very compliant to USA interests, thereby undermining Iranian sovereignty.

After coming to power, Iranian nationalists showed extra zeal to cleanse the soul of the nation from its history of “capitulation” and compliance with America’s economic and political interests. So, the behavior of Iranian leaders in maintaining a very strident antipathy towards the west and maintain a very independent direction of policy it is because of this hidden need of restoring the honor of Iran, a historically great power which should not play second fiddle to anybody. We cannot fully understand the defiance and rhetoric of Iranian leaders without taking into consideration their struggle for recovery of national honor which they feel has been trampled underfoot through use of mishandling by imperial powers, such as Russia, Britain and the US.

4). Building a national economy

There is a hidden rationality in Iranian leaders’ choice of de-associating from the mainstream global economic integration. They more or less follow a ‘let-us-do-it-ourselves approach to develop a strong national economy that is mainly geared towards developing the skills sets of its people. Rather than choosing to be a part of economic globalization, where like many developing countries, Iran becomes an export oriented-economy of low end manufactured or assembled products, Iran followed a different path. Iran followed a very nationalist economic development method, even leaving many sectors of the economy in the hands of the Revolutionary Guard. Iran engaged in military technology development that included its long-range missile and nuclear program. Iranians became masters of reverse engineering as they chose to learn techniques of modern manufacturing management the hard way. Iran’s Resistant Economy carries its own rationality as Iran attempts a self-sustaining economy

Is the Rwandan Genocide and Conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nagorno-Karabakh the same Categorization of Conflict?

noreply@blogger.com (International Relations and Affairs Group) — Tue, 13 Dec 2011 17:31:00 +0000

The quote by Mahmood Mamdani "...there are three types of explanation of the [Rwandan] genocide - political, economic, and cultural" is a good generalization for explaining the violence that happened in Rwanda. The Rwandan Genocide resulted in over a million deaths and much of this conflict was around 1959-1994. It was not an ethnic conflict, though it was perceived as such by many observers. The violence was between the Hutu and the Tutsi; both groups practiced the same religion, language and participated in government; the difference in the two was a caste system instead of an ethnic difference as most ethnographers pointed out. The caste system considered farmers Hutu and herdsman Tutsi. Some views were that the Hutu were descendants of “a primitive race” while Tutsi were from “the best blood of Abyssinia”. In 1959 the Rwandan king died under “mysterious circumstances” and many Tutsi feared it was a plot by the Hutu to gain power. The beginnings of the genocide killed up to 200,000 people prior to 1994 the escalation in 1994 resulted in the deaths of almost 800,000 people (Fornace, 2009). Several “political and ethnic killings” such as UNAMIR peacekeepers, the Prime Minister, and several cabinet members happened during the conflict in Rwanda. The Tutsi and “moderate Hutus” were the main targets and their killings were, for the most part, conducted by the military, the youth militia, and presidential guard. All in all, it is believed that around 800,000 people were killed (UNAMIR, 2001)

The factors the Mamdani suggested explained the conflict in Rwanda, political, economic and cultural are able to form a basic construct for much of the violence in Rwanda. However, the violence in Liberia and Sierra Leone includes the economic aspect and some of the political aspect; the cultural aspect is not as applicable. While there have been cultural aspects such as ethnic conflict, a majority of the conflicts have been regarding economic and political gains from diamond mining. Sierra Leone is thought to have a number of causes for the conflict, but much of it has to do with greed. Other factors thought to be contributory to the violence are negligence with financial decisions, corruption, lack of development and opportunities. Economic gains from diamond mining account for much of the corruption. A large portion of the country’s foreign export and GDP is also based on them. Diamond smuggling and other exploitations of resources have added to the conflict. Even now it is thought that the government still does not regulate the diamonds properly is filled with corruption. The continuance of illegal smuggling only adds to the conflict (Freeman, 2008).

The violence is continued by what is referred to as “blood diamonds”; these diamonds are used to finance the rebel group’s militant activities. The Revolutionary United Front or RUF leads the violence within Sierra Leone (De Koning, 2008). The RUF was backed by the Liberian government of Charles Taylor, who had the plan that he would force the Sierra Leone government with the RUF to forfeit from ECOMOG or the Economic Community of West African States Military Observer Group. Taylor used ethnic agitation as a method for the division of people in Sierra Leone (TED, 2000). The RUF caused millions of internally displaced people, committed acts of genocide and tortured victims by cutting off their hands and other body parts and took over the capital of Sierra Leone, Freetown. Originally the RUF was able to fight ECOMOG but eventually they were able to drive the RUF out of Freetown and regaining control. Though this would not be the last of the RUF with their "Operation No Living Thing" even though they were not the force they once were the instability of it was able to inflict much damage on ECOMOG and any civilians they encountered.

In 1999 the UN Mission in Sierra Leone or UNAMSIL replaced ECOMOG and worked to enforce the Lome Accord, a peace agreement signed on July 7th by the RUF and government of Sierra Leone. However, the peace was short lived and the RUF was able to use this as a way to gain for weapons (Adebajo, 2002). The United Kingdom came in to assist and the RUF was again slightly taken out of commission but they regrouped and gained many of the mining areas where they are able to maintain some power because of the exploitation of the “blood diamonds.” While there are several other variables that go into the escalation of violence in Sierra Leone and the perpetuation of the RUF, much of this is because of exploitations of natural resources. The small country of Sierra Leone has many great natural resources but not a lot of infrastructure that is capable of containing much of the turmoil along with the lack of development of other aspects in the economy aid in the recruitment of youth into the RUF and other similar rebel groups (TED, 2000).

Chester Crocker has a little more complex way of explaining conflict other than Mamdani’s idea of political, economic, and cultural as the reasons for conflicts. Chester Crocker suggests that conflicts that cannot be solved or be solved in a reasonable manner are intractable conflicts and they can also be when the parties involved in the conflict decide it cannot be mediated and any attempt to do so will not be able to end the conflict. These conflicts are longstanding, but not all of them, and these conflicts can be initiated by many different variables such as religion, economic, cultural, and political differences to name a few. Other variables causing the escalation of conflicts have to do with leaders that result in political gains from the continuation of conflicts. It does not have to be just leadership that wants the continuation of the conflict but others that have a stake in the continued escalation of the conflict, these parties are known as spoilers. There are many cases around the world that can be labeled intractable conflicts. The basic characteristics of an intractable conflict are (1) typically long standing (2)the remain unresolved (3) continuation of violence (4) there are vested interests by parties involved in the conflict (Crocker, 2004).

Another conflict to look at would be the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. It is not formally recognized by any government, and this long standing conflict has remained unresolved. Nagorno-Karabakh is an autonomous region created by the Soviet Union in 1924 and 94 percent of this region was Armenia. Until the fall of the former Soviet Union the region was mainly peaceful but after the fall of USSR conflicts began to erupt and escalate. Prior to the fall of the Soviet Union the region of Nagorno-Karabakh was on its way of perusing the “spirit of Perestroika” when the Armenians of that region did not want to be under control of the Azerbaijanis. This movement turned into a political organization that was known as “the Karabakh Committee” which was against communism and for democracy, and national sovereignty. The December 1988 Earthquake devastated much of the region, and at the time the Soviet Leaders decided to arrest many members of the committee and thought that by doing this it would keep the election in March of 1989 intact without problems. However, this backfired, and only worsened things within the region to the point of generating massive demonstrations, which resulted in the release of committee members after the election (Global Security, 2009).

Similarities to the conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone have to do with economic stakes such as oil and natural gas. Azerbaijan has a blockade that does not allow Armenia proper fuel supplies and offered in exchange for the occupied land back a pipeline that would go through Armenia so it could go to Turkey. The exchange would allow Armenia to also make transit revenues from the pipeline but Armenia has decided that they would not accept (Lalazarian, 1997). The impacts of this have resulted into a bloody conflict for control of the region. The fighting has been between the ethnic Armenians and ethnic Azerbaijanis with the result of the ethnic Azerbaijanis being drove out of the region and displaced. There was finally a cease-fire in May of 1994, and it has been in place since then but there has not been a decisive negotiation to this date and the immense amount of displaced people remains over a million; while direct violence is calmed down there is was and still is a continuation of violence (Global Security, 2009). However, while the ethnicities continue to fight it seem to be other variables causing the escalation of conflicts such as leaders that would like political gains from the continuation of conflicts. There has been constant mediation from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) but this conflict has remained in dispute (CIA World Factbook, 2009).

Upon the determination that there is a conflict and the UN is planning a peace keeping operation there needs to be a way of dealing with it. Even using the basic troop leading procedures, such as, what the US Army follows the UN could be more effective: (1) receive the mission, (2) issue a warning order; (3) make a tentative plan; (4) start necessary movement; (5) conduct reconnaissance; (6) complete the plan; (7) issue a complete order; (8) supervise and refine (Army Study Guide, 1999). While those procedures may not actually be able to explain a construct they can be used in the planning phase once an operation in place. If enough information is available to make a hasty operations order it will help evaluate several factors. In looking at a construct, there must be a more effective process in the implementation of a plan such as using several variables. The situation in Liberia and Sierra Leone is both simplistic and extremely complex at the same time. Much of the violence has to do with gains and much of the violence, though some of it is not based on ethnicity but on collective group gains and political gains by officials prompting groups like this. The UN needs to have concrete standard operations procedures (SOP's) when conducting peace keeping operations. They needed to have a standard procedure to use as a framework for operations, the five basic paragraphs of the operations order the US Army uses on a day to day basis is: Situation, Mission, Execution, Service and Support, Command and Signal could be used to incorporate a way to build a construct (Army Study Guide, 1999). Proper planning in this format makes it easy to plug in information and build a model. Conflicts on the group may change, but the more prepared a peace keeping force is with internal SOP's on the group the more likely they can be effective.

The conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone have much to do with politics and economics. Ethnicity may not be perfect but it is not a major factor in most of the violence. Crocker’s idea that that intractable conflicts are: (1) typically long standing (2)they remain unresolved (3) there is a continuation of violence (4) and there are vested interests by parties involved in the conflict fits into the framework of a construct. From Mamdani there is his idea of the political and economical aspect and an emphasis from Crocker’s idea that vested interests by parties involved in the conflict continues the violence. Forming a construct into the vested interests by parties involved in the conflict aid in the political and economic exploitation of these countries. The other variables of the conflict are important to address but these are the major parts of the construct; the rest are supplementary factors. The construct implementing the five basic paragraphs of the operations order as a basic framework, the troop leading procedures during for the planning of the construct and the new construct: the vested interests by parties involved in the conflict aid in the political and economic exploitation of these countries will give a easier way to look at the conflict and the ability to deal with them quicker because much of the planning is incorporated in the building phase of the construct.

References

Adebajo, A. (2002). Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. Lynne rienner publishers. Retrieved from http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7i4a11.htm

Army Study Guide (1999). Sample 5 Paragraph Operations Order; updated November 22, 2005. Retrieved from http://www.armystudyguide.com/content/Leadersbook_information/leadersbook_items/sample-5-paragraph-operat-2.shtml

Army Study Guide (1999). Troop Leading Procedures; updated December 10, 2005. Retrieved from http://www.armystudyguide.com/content/army_board_study_guide_topics/survival/troop-leading-procedures-3.shtml

CIA World Factbook (2009) Armenia. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/am.html

Crocker, C., Hampson, & Aall, P. (2004). Taming Intractable Conflicts: Mediation in the Hardest Cases. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

De Koning, R. (2008). Resource–conflict links in Sierr a Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Sip ri insights on peace and security. Retrieved from http://books.sipri.org/files/insight/SIPRIInsight0802.pdf

Fornace, K. (2009). The Rwandan Genocide Retrieved from http://crinfo.beyondintractability.org/case_studies/rwandan_genocide.jsp?nid=6815

Freeman, C. (2008). The Failures of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Sierra Leone and the Threat to Peace. Beyond intractability. Retrieved from http://www.beyondintractability.org/case_studies/reconstruction_sierra_leone.jsp?nid=6811

Global Security (2009) Nagorno-Karabakh. Retrieved from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/nagorno-karabakh.htm

Lalazarian, K. (1997). Nagorno War. Ice case studies. Retrieved from http://www1.american.edu/TED/ice/NAGORNO.HTM

TED, (2000). Diamond Trade in Sierra Leone. Ice case studies. Retrieved from http://www1.american.edu/TED/ice/diamond.htm

United Nations: UNAMIR (2001). UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (October 1993-March 1996). Retrieved from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unamir.htm

Roles and Responsibilities of the Former Position of DCI (prior to post 9/11 changes) and the Current Position of the DNI

noreply@blogger.com (International Relations and Affairs Group) — Fri, 25 Nov 2011 17:59:00 +0000

There were three functions of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI): head of the CIA, chief intelligence advisor for the president, and director of the IC. The DCI reported directly to the president and through the national security advisor. The DCI gave the president the annual IC budget called the National Foreign Intelligence Program. As head of the IC the DCI had the responsibility to direct and coordinate national foreign intelligence activities, but was only directly in charge of the CIA, and its staff organizations (Best, Cumming & Masse, 2005). The DCI had two advisory boards, the National Foreign Intelligence Board and the Intelligence Community Executive Committee. The IC/EXCOM advised the DCI on national intelligence policy and resources, stuff related to the IC budget, establishment of needs and priorities, evaluation of intelligence activities, and formulation and implementation of intelligence policy (FAS, 1996).

The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) is a national security expert; is appointed by and reports to the president, but is not located in the White House and is not in charge of the CIA or member agencies. The two main responsibilities of the DNI are (1) “overseeing national intelligence centers” and (2) “managing the National Intelligence Program” (Richelson, 2008 p 454). Other duties are serving as head of the IC, and advising the White House on intelligence matters. The DNI took over the DCI’s community role, with additional authority (CIA, 2007). A separate official is the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and reports to the DNI. The head of CIA now only has provision of the overall direction and coordination of national intelligence abroad by human sources, and under the DNI’s direction, coordination of the relationships between US intelligence agencies and the intelligence or security services of foreign governments or international organizations (CIA, 2007).

Budgetary authority of the DNI is stronger than the DCI. The DNI develops and determines the NIP and guarantees successful execution of the community budget. Community member organizations give the DNI information necessary to create a consolidated NIP; the DNI manages NIP appropriations, directs allotment and allocation via department heads. With the structuring of the NIP, the DNI gets the guidance of the Joint Intelligence Community Council and reports to the President and Congress the inability of departmental comptrollers that fail to follow their instructions in the implementation of all components of the NIP (Best, Cumming & Masse, 2005).

The DNI’s works with the secretary of defense to direct and watch over funds, and recommendations, in agreement, or the consultation of the appointment of some agency heads. The DNI also has the ability to approve budgetary reprogramming and transfers that are within certain restrictions. Additional tasks concerning establishing direction, determining requirements and priorities, are comparable that of the DCI. The office of the DNI contains a principal deputy, the NIC, a general counsel, a director of science and technology, the national counterintelligence executive, about 500 new positions and about 100 rotational posts giving the DNI staff more manpower than the DCI (FAS, 1996).

Does the DNI has enough authority to fix the problems that were the catalyst for the formation of that position?

The DNI has changed many of the aspects of the former DCI. While the DNI seems to have more authority and additional duties, there is now the problem that the DNI may have too many jobs and responsibilities. The DNI may have recreated many of the same dilemmas the 9/11 commission pointed out, such as giving too many jobs to the DNI. Certain things will probably be the same as they were with the DCI, such as the relationship with the secretary of defense. There is the possibility of improving the coordination of foreign and domestic intelligence, considering it has been suggested as one of the most difficult tasks of the DNI (Best, Cumming & Masse, 2005).

There are still many uncertainties with the DNI. The disconnection of the DNI from significant agency capabilities will possibly make it appear to control the IC; however, it will essentially be disengaged with modest contribution (CIA, 2007). There is also the possibility that it gave the same, if not worse disparity of power and accountability former DCIs had in the past. Another problem is that the public may assume that the DNI will totally fix the problems in the intelligence community. However, it is too early to tell if the president will support the DNI when tough choices are made or imposed. Congress may now have a larger role in intelligence affairs, bringing in the interference of politics into national security matters that the executive branch should be taking care of (CIA, 2007).

However, it looks as if the main positive that will come from the DNI is that it might bridge the foreign and domestic separation and give more leadership with planning and a better incorporation of intelligence efforts. While the DNI has greater budgetary authority and a larger staff this could take away from its function of supervising the NIP and the supervision of intelligence centers and turn it into a similar bureaucracy that is seen in other organizations (Best, Cumming & Masse, 2005).

The DNI now has the authority over budget, reprogramming, personnel transfer, appointments, acquisitions, tasking, and authority over the National Counterterrorism Center (Best, Cumming & Masse, 2005). This gives DNI more authority to fix problems, but it seems like too many jobs, which was one of the problems there was supposed to be remedied. Authority is good but the more the DNI has the more problems that could also me created because of it.

References

Best, R. Cumming A. & Masse T. (2005). Director of National Intelligence: Statutory Authorities. CRS Report for Congress. Retrieved February 20, 2010 from: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RS22112.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency (2007). Chapter 15: Porter Goss: The Last DCI. Retrieved February 20, 2010 from https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/directors-of-central-intelligence-as-leaders-of-the-u-s-intelligence-community/chapter_15.htm

FAS (1996). An Overview of the Intelligence Community. Retrieved February 20, 2010 from http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/int023.html

Religion: Does it help or hinder peace?

noreply@blogger.com (International Relations and Affairs Group) — Tue, 15 Nov 2011 16:26:00 +0000

Religion is perceived differently in many societies. The political evolution in Western political thought led to a secular state. The Islamic tradition, on the other hand, has a different view of religion and political governance. The question is if religion is an agent of peace or if it perpetuates conflict in the international system. Some scholars view religion as having the ability to connect different faiths and it has a significant role in the peace process. It is believed that this will also be a way of integrating values of the particular culture and it will possibly lead to a resolution of the conflict. It is also thought that religion also can view how families interact and this can be used as a metaphor for dealing with conflict on a larger scale. It is also thought that considering there are many myths about religion this also plays a factor in dealing with the resolution of the conflict but by studying religion it can also show ways of how to deal with more complex problems and aid in the resolution process. Viewing the peace process from the vantage point of religion can bring about better cultural understanding and help engage with adversaries during meetings (Gopin, 2002). However, much of these like many potential negotiations for conflict depend on the willingness of the two parties to decide to learn the cultures and religions of the enemy and also respect them in the mediation process. Religion also brings to fruition both positive and negative myths about culture and if the parties decide to concentrate on the negative issues associated with a particular religion than this can be destructive to the peace making process. There must be separations of positive and negative myths but either way both of them should be acknowledged. If myths can be understood to be myths then there can be a critical look into more underlying issues such as apologizing for each side’s wrong doings and try to understand the goals and values of the individual cultures and people involved in the negotiation process, without this, then negotiations the take place will only be concerned with only the obvious issues (Gopin, 2002).

Peace treaties should focus on religion, culture, symbolic gestures, moral commitments, and transformation of relationships. If these factors are not addressed and they are only focused on the political gains and outcomes than there is a possibility that it is going to be a clash in religious and cultural ideologies and the end result would ultimately end in failure. Talcott Parsons who elucidated systems theory believes that action between an individual and actor constitutes “action systems.” His systems places people in the role of “subjects” and “objects” and he also explains that at any given time people are members of several other action systems such as family, religious and nation-state. Parsons states that the three subsystems are (1) the personality system (2) the social system (3) the cultural system. They are interconnected through the action system. If there is a change in one of the subsystems it will affect another in turn affecting the entire action system. The systems theory “assumes the interdependence of parts in determinate relationships, which impose order on the components of the system.” “Social systems are characterized by a multiple-equilibrium process because social systems have many subsystems, each of which must remain in equilibrium in the larger system is to maintain equilibrium” (Dougherty, 115-116). Keeping this in mind and incorporated into religion with regards to peace building and sustainability of that the same method could be used in the planning process. The interconnectedness of religion into culture is a factor than can be more substantial then the political gains of reaching peace.

The understanding of religion aids in the understandings of culture and how it impacts negotiations. Regardless of the context, culture impacts negotiations in two ways (1) cultural similarities or differences can affect the attitudes of the parties toward each other and (2) cultural similarities or differences can affect their ability to communicate effectively with each other (Regan & Leng, 2008). Religion along with other variables are fundamentals that can be used to guide this in negotiations, while there are other variables religion and culture can be intertwined(Regan & Leng, 2008). While it is true that the success in negotiations and mediation between states can be dependant of democratic cultures, religion can be the outlier that ensures the success or failure of them. Religion can add to the cultural variables that make it difficult for effective communication between parties including. When mixed signals are sent to opposing sides the intended interpretation is not received. Many times countries with the same religion have similar ideologies and this can assist in the negotiation process and speed up the negotiations but the lack of societal and local culture and vastly different religious ideologies can prevent the success of negotiations (Regan & Leng, 2008).

If looking at the correlation of culture and religion on negations then Iran could be looked at. The languages of the two countries are not the same; the United States is primarily English, while Iran is primarily Persian. Religions of the two states are different and social and political cultures are completely different. Iran suggests to its people that there should be a theoretical understanding of Islamic ideology and it believes that the citizens are Islamicized (CIA Factbook, 2009). The history of Iran and the study of the Islamic revolution from Iran’s point of view portray the clergy as being very influential in the movement and the changing of the society. The current regime paints the former regime as being oppressive and immoral to the populace and suggests that they had to be liberated and saved by the Islamic Republic (Almond, 2008 p 583). This is based on the idea that the Pahlavi monarchy allowed, women to be unveiled, and other things that were against proper cultural norms. However with all the religious control that the Islamic Republic conveys onto its people several students still mock social morés and policies about male and female relationships and other aspects of the controlling religious state (Almond, 2008 pp 583-584). The highest offices in Iran are held by followers of Shiite Islam and this is a factor that should be addressed in negotiations (CIA Factbook, 2009). Another variable that should be addressed with regards to Iran is that most view themselves as religious and being Muslim with higher accords than they view nationalism of the state; this is not the case with the United States and this should be addressed in preplanning and meetings. While there are several other reasons as to why there has been failed meetings and negotiations between the United States and Iran, religion does play a part in the reason for there not being successful diplomacy between the two countries. The United States is still viewed by Iran as the “great Satan” and the mistrust is not just rooted in political differences but has strong roots in the opposing religious ideologies and public policies of the two nations (Almond, 2008 p 587).

Religious communities do not deal with “moral failure” the same way as political communities do; religious communities usually focus on variables such as atonement, request for forgiveness, and they suggest forgiveness (Gopin, 2002). With regards to the peace process forgiveness is a key variable and without it there will not actually be true peace. While neither side wants to admit that they are part of the blame there is faults on both sides and the correlation with religion to accept these wrongs and forgive the wrongs of others could be a huge factor in the conflict resolution process. Forgiveness is a factor in most religions and it can be used to forge new relationships and the ability to build trust even if there is still not an acceptance of all ideologies. Verbal and nonverbal communications with regards to religion can also be taken the wrong way. While many negotiators focus on these subtleties if they do not understand the religious connotation of gestures and other verbal and nonverbal communications it can be detrimental to the peace process and alienate the situation even more; especially if a miscalculation on a gesture is seen as disrespect (Gopin, 2002).

Religion is an obstacle in the peace making process and much of this based off the internal culture of countries with regards to religion. It is very clear that culture and the understanding of it has been an obstacle in the negotiation and mediation process for many countries. While the causes of conflicts may center on factors such as ethnicity, race, ideology, and other factors, to resolve them there must be careful attention in not missing the role that religion has on all of these variables. The history of the intractable conflict between the countries can also create its own culture other then the internal culture of each country and this has put yet another variable that must be dealt with (Gopin, 2002). Variables that can continually come up have to do with the mistrust between the countries, language, verbal and nonverbal communications, perceptions of the world and how each country sees themselves, and political and social cultures but many times it stems from religious ideologies and the understandings of them. It is not impossible for countries to communicate and a lot of it has to do with the degree of commitment by each nation. If countries want to come to terms they must both step outside of the box and respect the culture and religion of one another whether they necessarily like it or not. There are several cultural differences between countries but religion can be a tool used to get past most cultural difference but stubbornness of countries and neither side wanting to be the one the compromises first will destroy the peace making process in any negotiation (Gopin, 2002).

References

Almond, G.A., Powell Jr., G.B., Dalton, R.J.,& Strom, K. (2008). Comparative Politics Today: A World View. 9th Edition. United Sates: Pearson-Longman

Dougherty, J. E., & Pfaltzgraff, Jr., R. L. (2001). Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, Fifth Edition. New York: Addison Wesley Longman, Inc.

Gopin, M. (2002). Holy War, Holy Peace: How Religion Can Bring Peace to the Middle East. New York, NY: Oxford University Press

Regan, P, & Leng, R. (2008). Culture and Negotiations between Rival States. Workshop on Culture and Conflict, Binghamton University. Retrieved (2009, October 20) from http://evolution.binghamton.edu/evos/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/Regan-Leng.pdf

Brief Overview of the Strengths and Weaknesses of IMINT, HUMINT, SIGINT, and MASINT in Intelligence Collection

noreply@blogger.com (International Relations and Affairs Group) — Tue, 25 Oct 2011 21:28:00 +0000

IMINT uses satellites and aerial photography to collect information for intelligence. Strengths are it mitigates the loss of human life and detection during collection. Advents of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and better aircraft, gives advantages over satellites because the information is quicker and pictures are more detailed, dispatched relatively easy, and put directly over targets (Richelson, 2008). Disadvantage of satellite imagery is the delay in information; images can be old and targets no longer in that position; UAV’s can be shot down easily. Sometimes leadership that should be able to read and interpret images is not able to do so, resulting in improper placing of troops and equipment (Richelson, 2008).

SIGINT incorporates space and signal intelligence. It is thought to be important and at the same time sensitive. Strengths of SIGINT provide crucial functions such as “diplomatic, military, scientific, and economic capabilities and plans of nations” (Richelson, 2008). It is also used for detecting the activities of terrorist organizations and rogue groups (Richelson, 2008). Disadvantages are human error, generally during the translation stages. Diplomatic signals can be misinterpreted, due to cultural misunderstandings or translation error. Interpretation has a human element and cultural implications impede in analysis.

HUMINT is based off of interpersonal communications and observations for intelligence gathering. Strengths are also some of the weaknesses. Informants can give false information and be friendly, hostile, and sometimes neutral. There is some kind of bias and the more information is passed the more it can be altered. It is valuable in proving real world views of situations and cultural interaction aids in the ability to look at intelligence from an applied perspective (Richelson, 2008).

MASINT is incorporation of “distinct collection activities” (Richelson, 2008). It is a more technical and scientific approach good for both “strategic and tactical” applications and uses sensors. It is able to build models for analysis as it is less on the collection of intelligence. It is able to put collected intelligence into categories. Disadvantages of MASINT are the collection process is limited and is hard to take this technical data and apply so it can be used (Richelson, 2008).

What are the advantages and disadvantages of IMINT, SIGINT, MASINT, and HUMINT in supporting intelligence objectives? This is how each of these disciplines complements the other in support of intelligence efforts; and the role that OSINT plays in this mix.

IMINT, SIGINT, MASINT, and HUMINT complement each other in support of intelligence efforts. The images used from IMINT from satellites and aerial photography are able to give a picture of the operation. If IMINT is used in conjunction with SIGINT aids in the ability to also hear what on the ground and may mitigate the delay in information that IMINT sometimes does with newer images. The interceptions of these diplomatic and military capabilities through SIGINT help build a stronger model for detection. These two disciplines together with HUMINT also can put names and faces together along with the interpersonal aspect that cannot be seen or heard from a distance but aid in the human element in supporting intelligence efforts.

The validity of HUMINT collection can sometimes be verified for truth with the efforts from IMINT and SIGINT and this aid in getting a clearer and more accurate picture and the ability to whittle it down for a better understanding. With the technical aspects that are gained from the MASINT efforts the other disciplines can help fill in the gaps and holes in the categories that MASINT has created. OSINT uses a lot of geospatial elements that are readily available such as GIS software, maps, map sites, magazines, networking sites, and many others. This information in conjunction with the rest of the intelligence efforts better shapes and tells a story. It also compares and contrasts the readily available public data and sees what inferences are very similar and dissimilar (Richelson, 2008).

This is only a brief overview of the strengths and weaknesses of IMINT, HUMINT, SIGINT, and MASINT in intelligence collection. Obviously, there are many aspects that were not included, but this should aid in enough information to refine your understanding of how they are used in collection.

References

Richelson, J. (2008). The US Intelligence Community. Westview Press, Boulder, CO: Print

The Historical Development of International Relations and the State of it Today

noreply@blogger.com (International Relations and Affairs Group) — Fri, 14 Oct 2011 19:40:00 +0000

Daniel J. Evans is the Executive Director and Editor in Chief of the International Relations and Affairs Group. He has experience analyzing how crises unfold and evaluating contingencies for dealing with complications as they arise. His specialties are foreign affairs research, International Relations Theory, Systems Theory, Globalization, Geopolitics, Intelligence Analysis and Homeland Security. His training deals with assessing transorganizational structures for the management of Homeland Security and developing plans for coordinating networked Homeland Security organizations.

Recently, there has been a growing interest in the field of International Relations and Affairs. However, in conversations and discussions there seems to be a debate between where the field is going and where it came from. The historical development of the International Relations field has always had an emphasis on dominant theoretical perspectives and paradigms. I decided to assess the state of IR today, as well as, where it came from. I also looked at the driving questions and controversies and the crises of thought and of theory.

The historical development of the field of international relations can be traced back for centuries but much of what is thought of as that actual field of study is mainly thought to have emerged in the beginnings of the twentieth century. There are many paradigms and theoretical perspective that have shaped and molded the field, as well as the ever changing international system. In the changing system many new questions have arisen and many controversies from contending theories, and possible lack of theory, have caused this field to become even more vibrant today than it was in its inception. The treaty of Westphalia first discussed the nation state. Prior to Westphalia and the idea of the “nation state,” there existed tribes and ethnicities. In the manner of tribes, the most dominant tribe would dominate the others. International relations theory, especially throughout the late 1940’s and the 1960’s, had a huge interest in theoretical analysis weaving together insights from biology, psychology, anthropology, sociology, economics and the behavioral sciences; it started to give shape an explanation for international politics. The approaches even then were focused on (a) ecological factors and the individual relationships between humans and their milieu (b) functionalism and regional integration (c) systems theory (d) the causes of war (f) arms race (g) decision making (h) games and theory and (i) related subjects in foreign policy and international relations (Dougherty, 16-19).

Idealism/Wilsonian-Idealism
Woodrow Wilson had the idea that WWI was so horrific that it would be the war that “would end all wars”. Wilson is seen more as an idealist and although idealism has been taught in academia the processes have never seriously been implemented, and most of these liberal reforms have been attained. (Kegley, 34-35). Woodrow Wilson’s perspectives incorporated what he called the fourteen point program. He wanted to have relationships between the great powers after World War I. Wilson thought that there should be “open covenants of peace, openly arrived at” instead of treaties that many countries had kept in secret; he believed that the secrecy between nations was part of the cause of the war. Much of this prompted leaders and academics of countries to study international relations. Wilson was able to do many things that the field of international relations has learned from. There was the inception of the League of Nations which wanted to focus on a peaceful world without war and greater cooperation between nations. Much of this perpetuation of international relations happened between the two world wars and by the 1930’s the League of Nations was already breaking down and leaders were looking at other ways in which conflicts could be created and how to conduct foreign affairs. Idealism comes from liberal thought process. Idealism serves a purpose and it is obviously something that in a perfect world could transform the world into world peace. However much of international relations has been dominated by the realist school of thought – realist theory, neo-realist theory, and neo-classical theory (Dougherty, 65-67).

Realism
Realism has been a major influence in the field of international relations. The realist schools of thought incorporate realist theory, neo-realist theory, and neo-classical realist theory. Realest theory centers on the international systems level of analysis, and the state or unit actor. The balance of power is the main theme, and the nation-state is the primary actor. Power, a key concept is derived from either military prowess or economic power. A notable contributor to realist theory was Hans J. Morgenthau. Morgenthau’s six basic principles were: (1) “political relationships are governed by objective rules deeply rooted in human nature;” (2), political leaders “think in terms of interest defined by political power;” (3), “the meaning of interest defined as power is not easily determined;” (4), “universal moral principles cannot be applied to their actions of states in their abstract, universal formulation, but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place;” (5), political realism does not identify the “moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe;” and (6 the “autonomy of the political sphere” (Dougherty, 14, 16).

Neo-realist theory uses an approach known as “constellation analysis” which is a “multi-method system of inquiry.” This consists of (1) system design (2) perception and reality (3) interest and power (4) norm and advantage (5) structure of independence and (6) cooperation and conflict. Neo-realist theory uses the bases of realism but adds factors such as “cross cultural comparative analysis.” Neo-realism tries to broaden and deepen realism. A major contributor of Neo-realism was Kenneth Waltz who spoke of “structural realism”, and “power remains a key variable”. Others such as Gottfried-Karl Kindermann stated power is not always the primary factor in politics.

Neo-classical realist builds a link between international and domestic politics; it suggests that leaders seek to control resources to advance international and domestic agendas and seek economic and technological wealth. It speaks of external extraction: actors will access resources beyond their borders to achieve domestic and international status or power. External validation: leaders seek authoritative status in the international community so they can enhance their domestic image. Charles Glaser, an influence on neo-classical realism came up with contingent realism: when states enter into escalations, such as arms races, they may enter into a self-help system, because they have seen the benefit versus the cost of making such an agreement; or they have weighed out the consequences (Dougherty, 88-89).

Marxism Feminism & Liberalism
Other theories of international relations are Marxism and Feminism. Marxists focus on the problems in the world as a result of the imperialistic agendas of capitalism and the inability to co-exist which each other. They believe that capitalism wanted to create “surpluses” overseas and the imperialist forces would colonize countries in order to accomplish this. Once this was achieved they would then take materials from those countries to continue the aggressive drive of capitalism. Feminism focuses on the unequal treatment of woman, injustices, and other prejudices. Feminists believe that decision making in foreign policy is influenced by gender-identity (Kegley, 46). The Marxist-Feminist approach focuses on the idea that capitalism oppresses woman. This theory does not focus on power such as in the realist approach. Feminism believes that male driven theories are “inadequate if not misleading” (Kegley, 101, 143, 404). Liberalism or Idealism is much the same thing. There is the belief that negations and agreements, international laws, international organizations, collaboration of states and integration, and ethical principles are the way to establish international relations; not a quest for more power. The theorists of liberalism/Idealism believe in achieving peace through diplomacy, without resorting to war. There is also the belief that much of this is done through the regulation of state behavior along with international organizations, systems, and institutions (Dougherty 65, 419-420).

Constructivism & Postmodernism
There are also other theories such as constructivism, postmodernism and critical theory that have emerged in the field of international relations. These theories are considered to be the Post-positivist era. Feminism can also be incorporated into the post-positivist era. Constructivism started to emerge in the later part of the 20th century and has become in influence on the study of international relations. They believe that “intersubjective consensus” meaning that all institutions are socially constructed to include the state. This also stems from political science and the idea of shared social beliefs, values, and behaviors. Constructivists believe that policy making is derived from individual members and other actors. They believe that this is how decisions of going to war and peace are concluded and what perpetuates cooperation or conflict. Constructivism also incorporates some feminist thought believing that even gender is socially constructed. Postmodernism consists of explaining reality as a condition or state of being. It is said to mainly be a reaction to modernism and against assumed theories. Postmodernism attempts to explain the constantly changing international system and institutions through demonstrating how bodies of knowledge are constructed; this is opposed to relying upon already existing explanations. And though postmodern thought takes the context of culture, gender, history, etc. into account when looking for explanations, it also looks to not be bound by those systems when constructing meaning. Critical theory comes from the 1920’s from the Frankfurt School and is defined as “theory which can provide the analytical and ethical foundation needed to uncover the structure of underlying social practices and to reveal the possible distortion of social life embodied in them” (Dougherty, 38-40, 477-478).

Democratic Peace, Core & Gap
Other smaller theories of international relations are the Democratic Peace which states that “democracies are less likely to fight wars with each other”. This theory is rooted in liberalism and is another critic of realism (Appendix C). Thomas Barnett’s “Core and Gap” model has had both criticism and favorable impressions. The model states that there is a core made up of inter-connected states which are technologically, economically, socially advanced and the Gap is composed of isolated less developed or failed states. While the Democratic Peace is much more of a model derived from liberalism the Core and gap model derives much of itself from realism perpetuating the balance of power idea. However, what is shown from the field of international relations is that there are both ideas still being stemmed from realism and liberalism (Barnett).

Wallerstein’s Contribution
Immanuel Wallerstein had a major influence on the study of international relations and more importantly he is known for world systems theory more specifically the capitalist world-system, core/periphery and semi-periphery states. He discussed the rise and hegemonic fall of agrarian, industrial, and financial powers from core states to peripheral areas, as cyclical systemic phenomenon (Dougherty, 137-140). Giving the examples of the Netherlands, Great Britain, and the United States, he demonstrated how power is both gained and then diffused. This perspective has validity and can be applied to recent events with the example of the fall of Communism in the Soviet Union. During the 1980’s the Cold War and arms race was a systemic escalation between the United States and the Soviet Union that could have ended in a cataclysmic war. However, the hegemonic power of the Soviet Union was diffused. With regards to cycles that may be unfolding, if we look to past cycles we see that many cultures when they reach their peak, the next step is that they fall – such as Rome, or Peloponnesians. They do this through becoming over-extended in their resources, through cultural divisions from within, such as the greater division we are now having between liberals and conservatives, as one of many examples (Dougherty, 137-140).

The Cold-War
The Cold-War had a showdown between the United States and the Soviet Union. This may or may not be viewed as a Just War from one of several normative approaches to it: such as applying a qualitative sense of traditional values, in addition to a quantitative analysis of behavior; or even through the application of principles of modern pacifist theory because of economic emphasis of free trade and peace; or any one of the older theories, which could be used to explain, in essence, a traditional concept of war centering it around the nation-state. However, with the end of the Cold War and the beginnings of the Global War on Terrorism the nation-state finds itself no longer engaging with uniformed military. And the military targets themselves and their objectives are no longer clear. It more so finds itself with the nation-state on both a defensive and offensive stance having to be flexible with changing missions and priorities during a conflict, fighting the same local tribes it just trained and at times struggling to trust allies it may have just made (Dougherty 627-630).

The Global War on Terrorism
The Global War on Terrorism has modified many theories such as traditional concepts of war centered on the nation-state. This new phenomenon has several variables including geopolitical emphases that non-state actors have on nation-states themselves, instability of host nation states to combat host non-nation-states, the inability to identify non-state actors in a nation state, non-state actors that work for the nation-state and non-state group, as well as several other factors that ultimately modify the traditional concept of war. Traditional concepts of war could almost describe the nation-state as adversary against adversary and could even be thought of as something as simple as the fairy tale knight fighting the dragon. Both are very distinctive in conflict and there is no misunderstanding as to who is fighting who and ultimately what the demise would be to either of them. An analogy of United States fighting in the global war on Terrorism with the knight could be as such. The knight (US) in The Global War on Terrorism has not slayed the dragon (foe nation-state) and finds himself with no clear adversary. However, there are clearly groups that do not share the same principles as the knight. Whereas before the dragon was easy to identify, but now it is not dragons that the knight is fighting, it is multiple serpents that he is fighting (Drinkwine, 2009). One or two bites from a serpent is not going to effect the knight it a mortal way but if the knight is bit from several different directions and many times eventually it is going to wear down the knight and eventually could be his demise. Al-Qaida could be thought of as the serpent. The group will continue to hide itself and camouflage itself within the geopolitical environments that it now operates. In the age of the Global War on Terrorism technological advances and new tactics will allow nation-states to operate in environments where they are not engaging with a uniformed army and they will continue to have to draw on lessons learned from past wars as well as global histories of wars (Drinkwine, 2009). Adapting the traditional theories of war could require countries like the US, which is the last superpower, to operate more like a “police state” dealing with “criminals” in a non-nation state fight that could cross several geopolitical boundaries (Buck-Morss, 2003). In essence a lot of the fundamentals of theories of war can still be used. The major differences being non-state actors do not have to be part of a nation-state and operate independently not necessarily condoned by the nation-state that they are in.

Integration/Disintegration, Systems, & Structural-Functionalism
Integration and disintegration are becoming key components in the study of international relations. For example, there is integration of the European Union and World Trade Organization and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. Traditional theory has not caught up with much of the current phenomenons. Integration is not necessarily a new concept. Talcott Parsons, a major contributor to systems theory, wrote about integration. Joseph Nye also had perceptions of integration which were slightly different than Parsons. Parsons believes that action between an individual and actor; action in a “societal context” called “action systems.” His systems place people in the role of subjects and objects. He also explains that at any given time people are members of several other action systems such as family, employer and nation-state. Parsons states that the three subsystems are 1) the personality system 2) the social system 3) the cultural system. They are interconnected through the action system. If there is a change in one of the subsystems it will affect another in turn affecting the entire action system. The systems theory “assumes the interdependence of parts in determinate relationships, which impose order on the components of the system.” “Social systems are characterized by a multiple-equilibrium process because social systems have many subsystems, each of which must remain in equilibrium in the larger system is to maintain equilibrium” (Dougherty 115-116).

Causes of disintegration, from Parsons point of view, explicates how the systems deal with stress. Parson’s four functional conditions are prerequisite: 1) Pattern Maintenance 2) adaptation (to the environment) 3) goal attainment 4) Integration (of the different functions and the subsystems into a cohesive, coordinated whole. “The integrative function is fulfilled by the cultural subsystems the serve the function of pattern maintenance.” “According to Parsons, the formulation of common values that cut across national boundaries is essential to international order.” If you look at the EU this is in place and happening very clearly but looking at the former USSR states it can be seen that several of these factors are not taking place and only a handful are fairly being used (Dougherty 115-116). The conditions of integration that Joseph S. Nye explains are what the EU follows: (1) Politicization (2) Redistribution (3) Reduction of Alternatives (4) Externalization. In short the EU has a common interest to have a closer knit Europe, a single currency to allow for less exchange rate processes, the states involved have a parliament that is able to discuss sovereign alternatives, and they seek to not bring in external forces to control the general premise of the EU. This can be very attractive to many countries and membership into the EU could perpetuate them more in the global market where they once had trouble competing (Nye & Dougherty 515-519).

The former Soviet Union continues to be a place of study in the field of international relations. Even after the 1917 revolution, when communism ushered into the country to modern day with the fall of the former USSR and the forces of disintegration. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union which has several implications as to why it did not work and why there is a lack of integration between the former members. The Soviet Union itself integrated was a single party regime that controlled everything and dictated the actions of its members. Of course this ultimately failed and a lot of the factors may not be simply human nature and the inability to completely be socialist because of greed and other factors that influence behaviors (Riasononovsky & Steinberg). Factors that caused the disintegration of the Former Soviet union include nationalism inside former states splitting into separate states along with ethnic disputes, ideological conflicts, competing economic factors that include raising prices higher than market conditions, and several other factors. The disintegration has also caused some states to become Isolationists, such as Russia because of several reasons but a major point being the idea that they had been taken advantage of economically (Dougherty 93 & 106).

Failure to acclimatize to the new systems or not keep up and will be much like indigenous tribes that become extinct because of lack of flexibility. The EU has become very flexible and adaptable to many market conditions. The EU’s inception, whether acknowledged or not, is to knock the US down from being an economic superpower. There is no doubt that the EU supports democracy and capitalism, however its focus may have to become broader as the economies change over time as of right now its flexibility lean towards the idea it will continue to prevail. However, to compare the EU with the US the Structural-Functional approach could be used. It has the ability to view political systems individually as well as compare vastly different political systems to each other. There are two main points with the structural-functionalist approach. (1) “In different countries, the same structure may perform different functions” (2) “institutions often do not have a monopoly on any given function”. This tells us that there are factors that work as a cause and effect type model and derives much of this from systems theory itself (Almond, 33).

The International Political Economy & Globalization
The international political economy has also become a subset of study in international relations. Politics and Economics have intermingled since the existence of one another and most intellectuals acknowledge their relationship but have been studied separately instead of the relations ship between them. In the later part of the 20th century international relations has studies the two together. Capitalism is defined as “an economic system characterized by private or corporate ownership of capital goods, by investments that are determined by private decision, and by prices, production, and the distribution of goods that are determined mainly by competition in a free market” (Webster). Democracy is a “government by the people ; especially : rule of the majority b: a government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation usually involving periodically held free elections” (Webster). Free countries follow a capitalist market system in which they are able to establish profit for goods and services allowing the seller to make a profit. This is thought to establish and allow economic growth. While these concepts are basic there are economic factors that influence political decisions. The understanding that politics and the economy are nothing new, Adam Smith, David Ricardo and many other dominate historical figures spoke of it but much of the earlier work is thought to be mercantilist and followed: (1) states cannot remain powerful in an anarchic setting without a strong economy (2) economic strength must be preserved by protecting key industries and jobs (3) such protectionism may require tariffs and governmental subsidies (4) low-priced imports may threaten domestic jobs and industry, (5) the state can and should remain sovereign in economic matters and (6) membership in international economic organizations may have adverse consequences for national strength. More contemporary approaches follow economic liberalism and believe that markets need to operate free from government intervention (Dougherty, 416-419).

Globalization has become a huge topic of study for international relations. Instead of just focusing in the nation state there are many more actors than there was before including everything from IGO’s, MNC’s, NGO’s, terrorist groups, rouge states and other actors. Wars are no longer always fought against uniformed armies there is now the clash of ideologies and nation states versus non-nation states such as the United States and the war on terrorism. Many nations feel they must form alliances with one another to combat many of the current problems such as terrorism and rogue nations. The fact that they are surrendering some of its authority to an international organization once again the benefits of protection and collaboration seem to outweigh the costs (Dougherty, 559, 631-632).Globalization and the forces of disintegration and economic integration are changing the field of international relations. The EU is lessoning on countries nationalism and a buy in of economic collectivism because of the common currency and the fact that the economies of these nations are now much stronger and can more easily compete against the United States and now have more clout and purchasing power. However with this there is less patriotism of the individual state and more value for the bigger economy. The loss of group identity in a globalizing world is a contributing factor for the rise of nationalist movements redefining the borders of nation-states but as long as the economies are strong it is almost definite that this is not going to happen as much until a true recession hits hard to drive it home for the individual states (Bhagwati).

The field of international relations has many more actors than is had before. There are Intergovernmental Organizations or IGO’s like NATO that is usually an organization set up so that two or more nations can form treaties and accomplish common interests. The other type of International Organization is a Nongovernmental Organization or NGO. NGO’s are very different from IGO’s in the fact they do not have to “operate in a vacuum” basically meaning they can operate independently from a governments and intergovernmental organizations. However, both IGO’s and NGO’s play an important role in dealing with conflicts and disasters. In essence they are specialists and perform essential tasks that many time governments simply cannot perform. The economy is definitely shaping into more of a global economy than it been. There will always a place for the nation state; however, there are many more actors than there was before including everything from NGO’s, terrorist groups, and rouge states. Wars are no longer always fought against uniformed armies there is now the clash of ideologies and nation states versus non-nation states such as the United States and the war on terrorism. Along with IGO’s and NGO’s there are also multinational corporations or MNC’s that can have immense influence on countries there enter. MNC’s can play much of a role in passing certain conditions for workers and several other factors because of the impact they have on a countries economy especially in the third world (Bhagwati , Dougherty & Bennett).

Conclusion
International relations theory must catch up to modern conditions. Currently there is disconnect with terminology in international relations about modern phenomena, but there is plenty of theory in place to build upon to develop new theory and explain conditions. The end of the Cold War leaves Russia as a superpower no longer, and it has been proven that communism does not work. Now the factor is the disintegration of the former USSR. Russia believes they have been betrayed by the same countries they once supported and kept going economically. There are several parts of theories that can explain some of what is going on such as systems theory, however there is no theory in place the fully explains the disintegration. Like many countries such as in the Middle East there are ethnic disputes and clashes from religious affiliations, but nothing completely like what has happened in the former USSR. If anything it seems to be several factors with several different variables happening simultaneously. The state of international relations is changing and theories that once seemed to be able to explain much of the world are no longer viable. With the ever-changing global climate the field of international relations is probably going to stay exciting and like the rest of the world, students, like countries that do not keep up, will be left in the dust.

References

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