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      <title>Wiley: International Studies Review: Table of Contents</title>
      <description>Table of Contents for International Studies Review. List of articles from both the latest and EarlyView issues.</description>
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      <dc:title>Wiley: International Studies Review: Table of Contents</dc:title>
      <dc:publisher>Wiley</dc:publisher>
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      <title>International Studies Review</title>
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      <title>Reviews</title>
      <dc:description>
Books reviewed in this article:
Alexander J. Motyl, Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires
Richard Saull, Rethinking Theory and History in the Cold War: The State, Military Power and Social Revolution
Takashi Inoguchi, Global Change: A Japanese Perspective
Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat
Robert Drinan, The Mobilization of Shame: A Worldview of Human Rights
William F. Schulz, In Our Own Best Interest: How Defending Human Rights Benefits Us All
Robin M. Dawes, Everyday Irrationality: How Pseudo–Scientists, Lunatics, and the Rest of Us Systematically Fail to Think Rationally
Michael Jonathan Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power
Geoffrey R. Berridge, Maurice Keens–Soper, and Thomas G. Otte (eds.), Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger
Geoffrey R. Berridge and Alan James, A Dictionary of Diplomacy
Igor A. Zevelev, Russia and Its New Diasporas
Lyn Schumaker, Africanizing Anthropology: Fieldwork, Networks, and the Making of Cultural Knowledge in Central Africa
Ahmed Rashid, The Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia
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      <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.d01-59?af=R</link>
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&lt;p&gt;Books reviewed in this article:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Alexander J. Motyl, &lt;i&gt;Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Richard Saull, &lt;i&gt;Rethinking Theory and History in the Cold War: The State, Military Power and Social Revolution&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Takashi Inoguchi, &lt;i&gt;Global Change: A Japanese Perspective&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Wesley K. Clark, &lt;i&gt;Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Robert Drinan, &lt;i&gt;The Mobilization of Shame: A Worldview of Human Rights&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;William F. Schulz, &lt;i&gt;In Our Own Best Interest: How Defending Human Rights Benefits Us All&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Robin M. Dawes, &lt;i&gt;Everyday Irrationality: How Pseudo–Scientists, Lunatics, and the Rest of Us Systematically Fail to Think Rationally&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Michael Jonathan Green, &lt;i&gt;Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Geoffrey R. Berridge, Maurice Keens–Soper, and Thomas G. Otte (eds.), &lt;i&gt;Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Geoffrey R. Berridge and Alan James, &lt;i&gt;A Dictionary of Diplomacy&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Igor A. Zevelev, &lt;i&gt;Russia and Its New Diasporas&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Lyn Schumaker, &lt;i&gt;Africanizing Anthropology: Fieldwork, Networks, and the Making of Cultural Knowledge in Central Africa&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ahmed Rashid, &lt;i&gt;The Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
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      <description>International Studies Review, Volume 4, Issue 3, Page 183-226, December 2002. </description>
      <dc:title>Reviews</dc:title>
      <dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/1521-9488.d01-59</dc:identifier>
      <dc:source>International Studies Review</dc:source>
      <dc:date>2008-06-28T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
      <prism:publicationName>International Studies Review</prism:publicationName>
      <prism:volume>4</prism:volume>
      <prism:number>3</prism:number>
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   <item rdf:about="/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.d01-61?af=R">
      <title>Errata</title>
      <dc:description/>
      <dc:creator/>
      <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.d01-61?af=R</link>
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      <description>International Studies Review, Volume 4, Issue 3, Page 235-235, December 2002. </description>
      <dc:title>Errata</dc:title>
      <dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/1521-9488.d01-61</dc:identifier>
      <dc:source>International Studies Review</dc:source>
      <dc:date>2008-06-28T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
      <prism:publicationName>International Studies Review</prism:publicationName>
      <prism:volume>4</prism:volume>
      <prism:number>3</prism:number>
      <prism:coverDate>2002-12-01T08:00:00Z</prism:coverDate>
      <prism:coverDisplayDate>2002-12-01T08:00:00Z</prism:coverDisplayDate>
      <prism:doi>10.1111/1521-9488.d01-61</prism:doi>
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   <item rdf:about="/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.00272?af=R">
      <title>Limiting the Social: Constructivism and Social Knowledge in International Relations</title>
      <dc:description/>
      <dc:creator>
Javier Lezaun
</dc:creator>
      <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.00272?af=R</link>
      <content:encoded/>
      <description>International Studies Review, Volume 4, Issue 3, Page 229-234, December 2002. </description>
      <dc:title>Limiting the Social: Constructivism and Social Knowledge in International Relations</dc:title>
      <dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/1521-9488.00272</dc:identifier>
      <dc:source>International Studies Review</dc:source>
      <dc:date>2003-06-13T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
      <prism:publicationName>International Studies Review</prism:publicationName>
      <prism:volume>4</prism:volume>
      <prism:number>3</prism:number>
      <prism:coverDate>2002-12-01T08:00:00Z</prism:coverDate>
      <prism:coverDisplayDate>2002-12-01T08:00:00Z</prism:coverDisplayDate>
      <prism:doi>10.1111/1521-9488.00272</prism:doi>
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   <item rdf:about="/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.00261?af=R">
      <title>Promises Kept</title>
      <dc:description/>
      <dc:creator>
Linda B. Miller
</dc:creator>
      <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.00261?af=R</link>
      <content:encoded/>
      <description>International Studies Review, Volume 4, Issue 3, Page xv-xvi, December 2002. </description>
      <dc:title>Promises Kept</dc:title>
      <dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/1521-9488.00261</dc:identifier>
      <dc:source>International Studies Review</dc:source>
      <dc:date>2003-06-13T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
      <prism:publicationName>International Studies Review</prism:publicationName>
      <prism:volume>4</prism:volume>
      <prism:number>3</prism:number>
      <prism:coverDate>2002-12-01T08:00:00Z</prism:coverDate>
      <prism:coverDisplayDate>2002-12-01T08:00:00Z</prism:coverDisplayDate>
      <prism:doi>10.1111/1521-9488.00261</prism:doi>
      <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.00261?af=R</prism:url>
      <prism:copyright/>
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   </item>
   <item rdf:about="/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.t01-1-00261?af=R">
      <title>Justice and Moral Regeneration: Lessons from the Treaty of Versailles</title>
      <dc:description>
The Treaty of Versailles, which concluded World War I, aimed to establish a “peace of justice”; sadly, it only seemed to pave the way to a second, more devastating world war. What lessons about justice and reconciliation can we learn from the treaty and its apparent failure? Some scholars argue that the fault of the treaty lay in its preoccupation with retributive justice, undermining prospects for reconciliation. Rather than positing justice and reconciliation as inherently conflictual moral values or goals, both need to be conceived as part of the project of moral regeneration. Such a multidimensional project requires a certain kind of justice and reconciliation, founded on mutual respect for the humanity and equality of others.
An assessment of the relationship among truth, justice, and reconciliation in the framework of moral regeneration indicates that the most grievous moral fault of the Treaty of Versailles lay in its process, which facilitated neither a truthful accounting of the war's causes and consequences, nor the affirmation of moral truths by victors or vanquished. The lack of an authoritative and public moral accounting of the Great War undermined both justice and reconciliation in international society.
</dc:description>
      <dc:creator>
Catherine Lu
</dc:creator>
      <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.t01-1-00261?af=R</link>
      <content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;The Treaty of Versailles, which concluded World War I, aimed to establish a “peace of justice”; sadly, it only seemed to pave the way to a second, more devastating world war. What lessons about justice and reconciliation can we learn from the treaty and its apparent failure? Some scholars argue that the fault of the treaty lay in its preoccupation with retributive justice, undermining prospects for reconciliation. Rather than positing justice and reconciliation as inherently conflictual moral values or goals, both need to be conceived as part of the project of moral regeneration. Such a multidimensional project requires a certain kind of justice and reconciliation, founded on mutual respect for the humanity and equality of others.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An assessment of the relationship among truth, justice, and reconciliation in the framework of moral regeneration indicates that the most grievous moral fault of the Treaty of Versailles lay in its process, which facilitated neither a truthful accounting of the war's causes and consequences, nor the affirmation of moral truths by victors or vanquished. The lack of an authoritative and public moral accounting of the Great War undermined both justice and reconciliation in international society.&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
      <description>International Studies Review, Volume 4, Issue 3, Page 3-25, December 2002. </description>
      <dc:title>Justice and Moral Regeneration: Lessons from the Treaty of Versailles</dc:title>
      <dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/1521-9488.t01-1-00261</dc:identifier>
      <dc:source>International Studies Review</dc:source>
      <dc:date>2003-06-13T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
      <prism:publicationName>International Studies Review</prism:publicationName>
      <prism:volume>4</prism:volume>
      <prism:number>3</prism:number>
      <prism:coverDate>2002-12-01T08:00:00Z</prism:coverDate>
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      <prism:doi>10.1111/1521-9488.t01-1-00261</prism:doi>
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      <prism:copyright/>
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   </item>
   <item rdf:about="/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.00263?af=R">
      <title>Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism</title>
      <dc:description>
I argue that the dominant paradigms in IR fail to explain adequately two of the central issues in the international system: the origins of the majority of conflicts and the behavior of the majority of states. These paradigms fail because they formulate generalizations from data drawn from a restricted universe and because they lack historical depth. Both these flaws are related to inequality in the arena of the production of knowledge in IR, which in turn is a function of the inequality in material capabilities in the international system.
A supplementary, if not alternative, perspective is needed to correct this situation and fill this gap. We can fashion such a perspective by drawing upon classical realist thought, the historical sociology of state formation, and the normative perspicacity of the English School. Combining their insights and applying them to the analysis of Third World conflict patterns and the external and domestic behavior of Third World states is likely to provide more satisfactory explanations for the origins of the majority of contemporary conflicts.
Such an exercise will also shed light on the crucial variables that determine the behavior of the majority of states in the Third World. Moving postcolonial states into the mainstream of theorizing in IR will also help reduce the impact of inequality on the field and open new vistas for theoretically informed scholarly research. I also call for pluralism in international relations theorizing rather than a search for universally applicable law–like generalizations divorced from historical and social contexts.
</dc:description>
      <dc:creator>
Mohammed Ayoob
</dc:creator>
      <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.00263?af=R</link>
      <content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;I argue that the dominant paradigms in IR fail to explain adequately two of the central issues in the international system: the origins of the majority of conflicts and the behavior of the majority of states. These paradigms fail because they formulate generalizations from data drawn from a restricted universe and because they lack historical depth. Both these flaws are related to inequality in the arena of the production of knowledge in IR, which in turn is a function of the inequality in material capabilities in the international system.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A supplementary, if not alternative, perspective is needed to correct this situation and fill this gap. We can fashion such a perspective by drawing upon classical realist thought, the historical sociology of state formation, and the normative perspicacity of the English School. Combining their insights and applying them to the analysis of Third World conflict patterns and the external and domestic behavior of Third World states is likely to provide more satisfactory explanations for the origins of the majority of contemporary conflicts.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Such an exercise will also shed light on the crucial variables that determine the behavior of the majority of states in the Third World. Moving postcolonial states into the mainstream of theorizing in IR will also help reduce the impact of inequality on the field and open new vistas for theoretically informed scholarly research. I also call for pluralism in international relations theorizing rather than a search for universally applicable law–like generalizations divorced from historical and social contexts.&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
      <description>International Studies Review, Volume 4, Issue 3, Page 27-48, December 2002. </description>
      <dc:title>Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for Subaltern Realism</dc:title>
      <dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/1521-9488.00263</dc:identifier>
      <dc:source>International Studies Review</dc:source>
      <dc:date>2003-06-13T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
      <prism:publicationName>International Studies Review</prism:publicationName>
      <prism:volume>4</prism:volume>
      <prism:number>3</prism:number>
      <prism:coverDate>2002-12-01T08:00:00Z</prism:coverDate>
      <prism:coverDisplayDate>2002-12-01T08:00:00Z</prism:coverDisplayDate>
      <prism:doi>10.1111/1521-9488.00263</prism:doi>
      <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.00263?af=R</prism:url>
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   </item>
   <item rdf:about="/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.00264?af=R">
      <title>Radical Chic? Subaltern Realism: A Rejoinder</title>
      <dc:description>
Mohammed Ayoob offers his subaltern realism as a defense against the theoretical imperialism of the “mainstream” and as a superior theory of international order and Third World security. There is much to like about this approach, especially its insistence on taking seriously international history and that the Third World is prime territory for theory building. I raise four concerns. First, Ayoob needs to undertake a fuller survey of the discipline, a move that would allow him to reassess the strength of the “mainstream” and to build on the important contributions raised by fellow theoretical travelers. Second, he fails to demonstrate his claim that subaltern realism represents a superior theory for understanding Third World security. Third, he cleaves to a statism that ironically reproduces the very disciplinary boundaries that he aspires to break down. Finally, he champions state sovereignty at all costs and to the point that he defends authoritarian states. I worry that Ayoob's “radical” statement is a prime candidate for the theoretical and political mainstream that he aspires to assail.
</dc:description>
      <dc:creator>
Michael Barnett
</dc:creator>
      <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.00264?af=R</link>
      <content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;Mohammed Ayoob offers his subaltern realism as a defense against the theoretical imperialism of the “mainstream” and as a superior theory of international order and Third World security. There is much to like about this approach, especially its insistence on taking seriously international history and that the Third World is prime territory for theory building. I raise four concerns. First, Ayoob needs to undertake a fuller survey of the discipline, a move that would allow him to reassess the strength of the “mainstream” and to build on the important contributions raised by fellow theoretical travelers. Second, he fails to demonstrate his claim that subaltern realism represents a superior theory for understanding Third World security. Third, he cleaves to a statism that ironically reproduces the very disciplinary boundaries that he aspires to break down. Finally, he champions state sovereignty at all costs and to the point that he defends authoritarian states. I worry that Ayoob's “radical” statement is a prime candidate for the theoretical and political mainstream that he aspires to assail.&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
      <description>International Studies Review, Volume 4, Issue 3, Page 49-62, December 2002. </description>
      <dc:title>Radical Chic? Subaltern Realism: A Rejoinder</dc:title>
      <dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/1521-9488.00264</dc:identifier>
      <dc:source>International Studies Review</dc:source>
      <dc:date>2003-06-13T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
      <prism:publicationName>International Studies Review</prism:publicationName>
      <prism:volume>4</prism:volume>
      <prism:number>3</prism:number>
      <prism:coverDate>2002-12-01T08:00:00Z</prism:coverDate>
      <prism:coverDisplayDate>2002-12-01T08:00:00Z</prism:coverDisplayDate>
      <prism:doi>10.1111/1521-9488.00264</prism:doi>
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   </item>
   <item rdf:about="/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.00265?af=R">
      <title>Overlooking the Obvious: Bringing International Politics Back into Ethnic Conflict Management</title>
      <dc:description>
Scholars generally have ignored the difficulty of convincing states to cooperate when advocating particular methods to address ethnic conflicts. Instead, they assume that states want to end the conflict in question, and then propose various solutions that largely depend on international cooperation. I consider the importance of international support for conflict prevention, the use of force, security guarantees, and partition. The success of each of these strategies crucially depends on what outside actors do, revealing the need for scholars to consider why states behave toward ethnic conflicts as they do.
I then address three sets of explanations of the international relations of ethnic conflict: the possible impact of norms, realist explanations, and arguments focused on domestic politics. “Domestic” refers to two sets of approaches that focus on the interests of leaders: ethnic politics and casualty aversion. States may disagree about which norms (self determination vs. territorial integrity) to apply and take opposite sides.
Realist arguments suggest that cooperation will be difficult as states may take conflicting sides. Ethnic politics suggests that states take sides based on the ethnic identities of the actors in the conflict and their ties to outsiders. Casualty aversion considers the limits placed on intervention since leaders desire not to risk the lives of the soldiers.
I conclude by considering strategies for managing ethnic conflict that take into account the difficulties of cooperation: minilateralism, subcontracting, and the strategic manipulation of identity.
</dc:description>
      <dc:creator>
Stephen M. Saideman
</dc:creator>
      <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.00265?af=R</link>
      <content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;Scholars generally have ignored the difficulty of convincing states to cooperate when advocating particular methods to address ethnic conflicts. Instead, they assume that states want to end the conflict in question, and then propose various solutions that largely depend on international cooperation. I consider the importance of international support for conflict prevention, the use of force, security guarantees, and partition. The success of each of these strategies crucially depends on what outside actors do, revealing the need for scholars to consider why states behave toward ethnic conflicts as they do.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I then address three sets of explanations of the international relations of ethnic conflict: the possible impact of norms, realist explanations, and arguments focused on domestic politics. “Domestic” refers to two sets of approaches that focus on the interests of leaders: ethnic politics and casualty aversion. States may disagree about which norms (self determination vs. territorial integrity) to apply and take opposite sides.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Realist arguments suggest that cooperation will be difficult as states may take conflicting sides. Ethnic politics suggests that states take sides based on the ethnic identities of the actors in the conflict and their ties to outsiders. Casualty aversion considers the limits placed on intervention since leaders desire not to risk the lives of the soldiers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I conclude by considering strategies for managing ethnic conflict that take into account the difficulties of cooperation: minilateralism, subcontracting, and the strategic manipulation of identity.&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
      <description>International Studies Review, Volume 4, Issue 3, Page 63-86, December 2002. </description>
      <dc:title>Overlooking the Obvious: Bringing International Politics Back into Ethnic Conflict Management</dc:title>
      <dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/1521-9488.00265</dc:identifier>
      <dc:source>International Studies Review</dc:source>
      <dc:date>2003-06-13T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
      <prism:publicationName>International Studies Review</prism:publicationName>
      <prism:volume>4</prism:volume>
      <prism:number>3</prism:number>
      <prism:coverDate>2002-12-01T08:00:00Z</prism:coverDate>
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   <item rdf:about="/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.t01-1-00266?af=R">
      <title>Strategic Culture and National Security Policy</title>
      <dc:description>
Once considered academically unfashionable, studies of the importance of culture and ideas have gained greater attention in the post–Cold War era. Particularly surprising has been the emerging consensus in national security policy studies that culture may significantly affect grand strategy and state behavior. I chart the development of these ideas through several generations of scholarship, both inside and outside the discipline, and explore contemporary arguments about strategic culture and state behavior like theories of the cultural determinants of German and Japanese security policy behavior, constructivist models of the ideational foundations of state behavior, and related work on the “clash of civilizations.”
Key questions include: Do cultural theories, newly inspired by constructivism, provide strong explanations of national security policy in the post–Cold War era? Is strategic culture really “semipermanent,” as most of its supporters suggest, or does it evolve over time? I conclude that while there are some compelling arguments about the ideational foundations of national security policy behavior, constructivism poses interesting questions about how much leaders may become strategic users of culture to achieve their policy goals. Finally, I identify several avenues for a progressive research agenda on the link between culture and national security policy in the twenty–first century.
</dc:description>
      <dc:creator>
Jeffrey S. Lantis
</dc:creator>
      <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.t01-1-00266?af=R</link>
      <content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;Once considered academically unfashionable, studies of the importance of culture and ideas have gained greater attention in the post–Cold War era. Particularly surprising has been the emerging consensus in national security policy studies that culture may significantly affect grand strategy and state behavior. I chart the development of these ideas through several generations of scholarship, both inside and outside the discipline, and explore contemporary arguments about strategic culture and state behavior like theories of the cultural determinants of German and Japanese security policy behavior, constructivist models of the ideational foundations of state behavior, and related work on the “clash of civilizations.”&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Key questions include: Do cultural theories, newly inspired by constructivism, provide strong explanations of national security policy in the post–Cold War era? Is strategic culture really “semipermanent,” as most of its supporters suggest, or does it evolve over time? I conclude that while there are some compelling arguments about the ideational foundations of national security policy behavior, constructivism poses interesting questions about how much leaders may become strategic users of culture to achieve their policy goals. Finally, I identify several avenues for a progressive research agenda on the link between culture and national security policy in the twenty–first century.&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
      <description>International Studies Review, Volume 4, Issue 3, Page 87-113, December 2002. </description>
      <dc:title>Strategic Culture and National Security Policy</dc:title>
      <dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/1521-9488.t01-1-00266</dc:identifier>
      <dc:source>International Studies Review</dc:source>
      <dc:date>2003-06-13T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
      <prism:publicationName>International Studies Review</prism:publicationName>
      <prism:volume>4</prism:volume>
      <prism:number>3</prism:number>
      <prism:coverDate>2002-12-01T08:00:00Z</prism:coverDate>
      <prism:coverDisplayDate>2002-12-01T08:00:00Z</prism:coverDisplayDate>
      <prism:doi>10.1111/1521-9488.t01-1-00266</prism:doi>
      <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.t01-1-00266?af=R</prism:url>
      <prism:copyright/>
      <prism:section/>
   </item>
   <item rdf:about="/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.00267?af=R">
      <title>A Social Theory of Trade Regime Change: GATT to WTO</title>
      <dc:description>
Traditional approaches to regimes generally understand them to be linked to the material powers of the states that create them. In contradistinction, I use a synthesis of constructivist and material theory to analyze the changing role of developing countries during the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. Employing a structurationist insight, I note that states (agents) and trading regimes (social structures) are reflexively constructed. In this context, all states have the potential to influence the meanings that constitute power in trade negotiations. Although developing countries previously had established a role as the protectionist Other, they reversed their role during the Uruguay Round. They supported a stronger, rules–based regime and the creation of the World Trade Organization. In forming part of a new collective identity of “reciprocal trader,” developing countries helped change the culture and distribution of influence in the trading regime.
</dc:description>
      <dc:creator>
Jane Ford
</dc:creator>
      <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.00267?af=R</link>
      <content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;Traditional approaches to regimes generally understand them to be linked to the material powers of the states that create them. In contradistinction, I use a synthesis of constructivist and material theory to analyze the changing role of developing countries during the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. Employing a structurationist insight, I note that states (agents) and trading regimes (social structures) are reflexively constructed. In this context, all states have the potential to influence the meanings that constitute power in trade negotiations. Although developing countries previously had established a role as the protectionist Other, they reversed their role during the Uruguay Round. They supported a stronger, rules–based regime and the creation of the World Trade Organization. In forming part of a new collective identity of “reciprocal trader,” developing countries helped change the culture and distribution of influence in the trading regime.&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
      <description>International Studies Review, Volume 4, Issue 3, Page 115-138, December 2002. </description>
      <dc:title>A Social Theory of Trade Regime Change: GATT to WTO</dc:title>
      <dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/1521-9488.00267</dc:identifier>
      <dc:source>International Studies Review</dc:source>
      <dc:date>2003-06-13T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
      <prism:publicationName>International Studies Review</prism:publicationName>
      <prism:volume>4</prism:volume>
      <prism:number>3</prism:number>
      <prism:coverDate>2002-12-01T08:00:00Z</prism:coverDate>
      <prism:coverDisplayDate>2002-12-01T08:00:00Z</prism:coverDisplayDate>
      <prism:doi>10.1111/1521-9488.00267</prism:doi>
      <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.00267?af=R</prism:url>
      <prism:copyright/>
      <prism:section/>
   </item>
   <item rdf:about="/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.00268?af=R">
      <title>Recovering the Classical Approach</title>
      <dc:description>
Books reviewed in this article:
Kai Alderson and Andrew Hurrell (eds.), Hedley Bull on International Society
Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States
Martin Shaw, Theory of the Global State: Globality as an Unfinished Revolution
</dc:description>
      <dc:creator>
Sasson Sofer
</dc:creator>
      <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.00268?af=R</link>
      <content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;Books reviewed in this article:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Kai Alderson and Andrew Hurrell (eds.), &lt;i&gt;Hedley Bull on International Society&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Robert Jackson, &lt;i&gt;The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Martin Shaw, &lt;i&gt;Theory of the Global State: Globality as an Unfinished Revolution&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
      <description>International Studies Review, Volume 4, Issue 3, Page 141-151, December 2002. </description>
      <dc:title>Recovering the Classical Approach</dc:title>
      <dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/1521-9488.00268</dc:identifier>
      <dc:source>International Studies Review</dc:source>
      <dc:date>2003-06-13T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
      <prism:publicationName>International Studies Review</prism:publicationName>
      <prism:volume>4</prism:volume>
      <prism:number>3</prism:number>
      <prism:coverDate>2002-12-01T08:00:00Z</prism:coverDate>
      <prism:coverDisplayDate>2002-12-01T08:00:00Z</prism:coverDisplayDate>
      <prism:doi>10.1111/1521-9488.00268</prism:doi>
      <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.00268?af=R</prism:url>
      <prism:copyright/>
      <prism:section/>
   </item>
   <item rdf:about="/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.00269?af=R">
      <title>Gender Theory in World Politics: Contributions of a Nonfeminist Standpoint?</title>
      <dc:description>
Books reviewed in this article:
J. Ann Tickner, Gendering World Politics
Caroline O. N. Moser and Fiona C. Clark (eds.), Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence
Joshua Goldstein, War and Gender: How Gender Affects the War System and Vice–Versa
</dc:description>
      <dc:creator>
R. Charli Carpenter
</dc:creator>
      <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.00269?af=R</link>
      <content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;Books reviewed in this article:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;J. Ann Tickner, &lt;i&gt;Gendering World Politics&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Caroline O. N. Moser and Fiona C. Clark (eds.), &lt;i&gt;Victims, Perpetrators or Actors? Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Joshua Goldstein, &lt;i&gt;War and Gender: How Gender Affects the War System and Vice–Versa&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
      <description>International Studies Review, Volume 4, Issue 3, Page 153-165, December 2002. </description>
      <dc:title>Gender Theory in World Politics: Contributions of a Nonfeminist Standpoint?</dc:title>
      <dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/1521-9488.00269</dc:identifier>
      <dc:source>International Studies Review</dc:source>
      <dc:date>2003-06-13T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
      <prism:publicationName>International Studies Review</prism:publicationName>
      <prism:volume>4</prism:volume>
      <prism:number>3</prism:number>
      <prism:coverDate>2002-12-01T08:00:00Z</prism:coverDate>
      <prism:coverDisplayDate>2002-12-01T08:00:00Z</prism:coverDisplayDate>
      <prism:doi>10.1111/1521-9488.00269</prism:doi>
      <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.00269?af=R</prism:url>
      <prism:copyright/>
      <prism:section/>
   </item>
   <item rdf:about="/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.00270?af=R">
      <title>From Communism to Capitalism: Liberalization, Learning, and the Long Road</title>
      <dc:description>
Books reviewed in this article:
Zoltan Barany and Robert G. Moser (eds.), Russian Politics: Challenges of Democratization
John K. Glenn III, Framing Democracy: Civil Society and Civic Movements in Eastern Europe
Christopher Marsh, Russia at the Polls: Voters, Elections, and Democratization
Mitchell A. Orenstein, Out of the Red: Building Capitalism and Democracy in Postcommunist Europe
</dc:description>
      <dc:creator>
Troy McGrath
</dc:creator>
      <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.00270?af=R</link>
      <content:encoded>
&lt;p&gt;Books reviewed in this article:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Zoltan Barany and Robert G. Moser (eds.), &lt;i&gt;Russian Politics: Challenges of Democratization&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;John K. Glenn III, &lt;i&gt;Framing Democracy: Civil Society and Civic Movements in Eastern Europe&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Christopher Marsh, &lt;i&gt;Russia at the Polls: Voters, Elections, and Democratization&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Mitchell A. Orenstein, &lt;i&gt;Out of the Red: Building Capitalism and Democracy in Postcommunist Europe&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
</content:encoded>
      <description>International Studies Review, Volume 4, Issue 3, Page 167-179, December 2002. </description>
      <dc:title>From Communism to Capitalism: Liberalization, Learning, and the Long Road</dc:title>
      <dc:identifier>doi:10.1111/1521-9488.00270</dc:identifier>
      <dc:source>International Studies Review</dc:source>
      <dc:date>2003-06-13T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
      <prism:publicationName>International Studies Review</prism:publicationName>
      <prism:volume>4</prism:volume>
      <prism:number>3</prism:number>
      <prism:coverDate>2002-12-01T08:00:00Z</prism:coverDate>
      <prism:coverDisplayDate>2002-12-01T08:00:00Z</prism:coverDisplayDate>
      <prism:doi>10.1111/1521-9488.00270</prism:doi>
      <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1521-9488.00270?af=R</prism:url>
      <prism:copyright/>
      <prism:section/>
   </item>
</rdf:RDF>
