“The Ibn Taymiyya of Our Age”

This contrast says much about the nature of the Jihadi-Salafi community, where it is often independent writers and thinkers—more than the al-Qaeda leadership itself—who chart the ideological course of the movement. Al-Zawahiri himself has acknowledged his debt to al-Maqdisi, describing him as a “teeming ocean of knowledge and scholarship…and deep-rooted steadfastness in the face of the idolatrous rulers of the age.”

Even more flattering is a recent comparison with Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), the persecuted Hanbali scholar from Damascus whose writings, controversial in their day, now form the scholarly core of Salafi Islam. As one of his colleagues recently put it, al-Maqdisi has become “the Ibn Taymiyya of our age”: suffering abuse and ridicule and repeated terms of imprisonment, and standing accused of “extremism and deviancy” in religion. The passage of time, it is believed, will vindicate him.

The United States and (most) Arab governments hold a different view: that he is a terrorist agitator. His incarceration is counted a blessing. Last week the State Department issued a report praising Jordan as “a steadfast partner in counterterrorism” and summarizing (with a hint of approval) the charges brought against the Palestinian ideologue: “plotting unsanctioned acts that would subject the [Jordanian] kingdom to hostile acts, undermining Jordan’s relations with another country, and recruiting persons inside the kingdom to join armed terrorist groups and organizations.” Al-Maqdisi holds that his imprisonment is simply a function of his beliefs and writings.

Prison Life

The last three years have not been kind to Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. As Joas Wagemakers has noted, prison terms have previously been some of his most productive periods in terms of writing. Yet since this latest arrest almost no new writings of his have surfaced online. Meanwhile, he has suffered significant personal hardship: losing his wife and being denied permission to attend her funeral; enduring a hunger strike and being refused medical care; and undergoing 60 days of solitary confinement (beginning in March) for angrily destroying a telephone in the prison visitors’ area. In a more heroic account circulated on jihadi media, this punishment was meted out after a physical fight that al-Maqdisi instigated with six prison guards.

Jail time, al-Maqdisi has previously written, can be an opportunity or a danger for jihadis. In his words: “Prison is a trial—either fruitful, or destructive, or deranging.” Fruitful because it can offer one ample time to write; destructive because it can lead to “defections” from the jihadi methodology; and “deranging” because it can transform jihadis into radical takfiris (extremists in the excommunication of fellow Muslims). This may not be a fruitful prison term for al-Maqdisi. He does claim success, however, in indoctrinating fellow inmates in jihadi thinking. He has also managed to publish a small number of writings in recent months.

Toward an “Islamic Spring”

Since March, a trickle of essays, fatwas, and poems has appeared on al-Maqdisi’s website. These writings, dated between December 2012 and May of this year, offer advice and encouragement to the jihadi community as it grapples with the post-Arab Spring environment. The author, despite some criticisms, conveys an unbounded optimism. This is glimpsed in a poem describing a tree shooting up between the cement cracks of a prison courtyard, symbolizing for him “resolve, hope, and the power of the weak to triumph over the strong”:

Arise, o dawn light

for we desire brightness.

After darkness is not but

dawn light emergent.

Bloom, o spring of Islam,

fill the world with radiance…

Along these lines, al-Maqdisi’s writings outline a general strategy for transforming the Arab Spring into an “Islamic Spring.” In the following I draw on two essays in particular: “From Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi to His Monotheist Brothers” and “Dear Advice to the Supporters of the Lofty Shari‘a.”

Jihadi Unity

The first theme taken up in these essays is that of jihadi unity. Al-Maqdisi says it is a shame to see jihadis engaging in infighting while their enemies (secularists and others misguided) combine forces to thwart the advance of Islam. Unified leadership and coordination of efforts are needed.

Particularly distressing to him is reported infighting among jihadi scholars, an issue to which he devotes several pages. This is almost certainly a veiled reference (al-Maqdisi typically writes in an oblique manner) to the Mauritanian Abu al-Mundhir al-Shinqiti and his series of vicious attacks against the Syrian Abu Basir al-Tartusi. To remind readers, this dispute between the two jihadi ideologues peaked last year after Abu Basir criticized the al-Qaeda franchise Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria and endorsed voting in elections in limited circumstances—among other things seemingly unbecoming of a jihadi. Al-Shinqiti condemned him in several book-length monographs as having deviated from the jihadi methodology and called on his followers to abandon him.

Al-Maqdisi, without addressing the details of the debate or the names of the parties to it, plainly rebukes al-Shinqiti for causing a “distraction” that has threatened unity in jihadi ranks. Frustrated by the one who “exhausted paper and wrote pages and long refutations on the internet” against “our brothers,” blowing out of proportion “minor issues,” al-Maqdisi cautions the unnamed individual (al-Shinqiti) against divisive provocation. Dialogue among jihadis ought always to be elevating, he says, quoting the Prophet’s statement that “whoever believes in God and the Last Day should say something good or remain silent.” This is quite a strong refutation of the Mauritanian, who serves on the Shari‘a Council of al-Maqdisi’s website. Al-Shinqiti, who offered the generous comparison of al-Maqdisi to Ibn Taymiyya, seems to have desisted from his campaign to stigmatize Abu Basir.

Adapting to a New Reality

The new political situation in the Arab world, following the Arab Spring, is a welcome opportunity in al-Maqdisi’s view, entailing a change of emphasis in jihadi strategy. In countries such as Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia the appropriate strategy for the moment is not violent jihad against the new governments but rather da‘wa (peaceful propagation of Islam). This is not to say, he makes clear, that the new governments are led by legitimate Muslim rulers. They are not, for these new rulers do not rule according to God’s law and so may be deemed apostates. Nonetheless, he advises against violent confrontation with the powers that be for practical reasons.

The rise of Islamist governments in the wake of the Arab Spring is generally analogous, al-Maqdisi says, to the rise of Hamas rule in Gaza in 2007. Concerning Hamas, he previously advised that while the Hamas and Fatah governments may be equally unbelieving, this did not mean that it was suddenly appropriate to excommunicate the entirety of the greater Hamas movement. One was also to recognize that it was better to have Hamas in power than Fatah as a practical consideration. The appropriate strategy was not to fight Hamas—except in cases of self-defense—but rather to engage in “jihad with the tongue,” or da‘wa.

Such also applies to the post-revolutionary Arab states, where al-Maqdisi says it would be “politically stupid to open up battle fronts at this stage” with the rulers. Clashing with the governments and people will only put further distance between jihadis and the masses. Rather “patience and gradualism” (al-sabr wa-l-tadarruj) are in order as jihadis take advantage of this opportunity “to reorganize their ranks and instruct their brethren…and engage the masses by bringing them da‘wa, spreading tawhid (God’s unicity), and educating them in their religion,” in addition to engaging in charitable activities to earn their goodwill. In a sentence, al-Maqdisi summarizes the logic of this strategy: “As long as the supporters of tawhid remain too weak to overthrow these regimes and seize the reins of power, then it is unwise for our brothers in Tunisia and Egypt and elsewhere to embroil themselves in fighting and clashing with these governments.”

Of course, al-Maqdisi is not the first jihadi to outline such a strategy. Al-Zawahiri, for example, does not call for revolution against Muhammad Mursi in Egypt. Al-Maqdisi’s strategy is rather the new jihadi orthodoxy represented by groups across the Arab world calling themselves Ansar al-Shari‘a (the Supporters of Shari‘a). Indeed, al-Maqdisi praises the proliferation of Ansar al-Shari‘a groups that have refrained from both violence and the temptation of participating in democracy. Wisely, he says, these groups have avoided using the unpopular and alienating al-Qaeda brand name.

Syria

In his commentary on the civil war in Syria, al-Maqdisi heaps praise on Syria’s al-Qaeda branch, Jabhat al-Nusra. The group in his view represents the maturity of jihadis and their ability to learn from previous missteps. He notes the group’s ingratiating approach to Syrian society—helping those in need, distributing food and clothes—and its wisdom in having a Syrian leadership. It would be a mistake, he says, for the mujahidin leadership of one country to come from another, even if in theory we refuse to recognize the Sykes-Picot boundaries that falsely distinguish between Islamic lands.

From these remarks one can assume that al-Maqdisi would have opposed the attempt by the Islamic State of Iraq’s Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to assert authority over Jabhat al-Nusra last April. Al-Maqdisi says he is opposed to founding separate emirates in jihad theaters, particularly when they are controlled by foreign jihadis. This type of activity only alienates the population that jihadis are trying to win over. He writes that after the fall of the Asad regime the real battle with the world (the United States and Europe) and neighboring states will begin, and that is why it is necessary to earn popular support now.

Gradualism

As he has before, al-Maqdisi emphasizes that it is the “near enemy”—regional tyrants—who ought to be the focus of jihadis’ attention. Even Syrian jihadis, observing the watchword of  “gradualism in jihad,” should avoid provoking or even speaking about “one of the greatest of our enemies”—Israel. At this stage jihadis must work within the parameters of the Sykes-Picot borders, which define the modern Arab states and Israel, even while the final stage envisions the erasure of such boundaries. Elsewhere, jihadis should know that this is not the time “to attack the world all at once, sending out threatening statements left and right.” They should avoid attracting negative attention with calls for “death to all the infidels” and provocative actions such as destroying shi‘i shrines. This is, for al-Maqdisi, more than ever before a campaign for hearts and minds.

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The memo is AQIM’s response to a letter sent by the Masked Brigade that criticized AQIM leadership and recommened a course correction. For AQIM’s leadership, the letter was a final act of insubordination in a long history of such behavior by Belmokhtar, which they recount in scathing detail.

Several things stood out:

• Belmokhtar wanted to sever his group from AQIM and pledge allegience directly to AQ Central. In addition to being a play for more autonomy, the move calls to mind the recent attempt of Nusra to get out from under AQ Iraq’s control and pledge allegience directly to Zawahiri. Combined with Shabab infighting over leadership and appeals to Zawahiri to intervene, the three episodes suggest that AQ Central does not have a firm hand on the reins.
• Zawahiri is hard to reach. In rebuffing Belmokhtar’s desire to pledge allegience directly to Zawahiri, AQIM’s leadership explains that it would do nothing to elicit more attention from AQ Central because the organization rarely communicates with AQIM as it is. AQIM states that they have received just a few letters from Bin Laden and Zawahiri and a handful from Atiyya and Abu Yahya al-Libi, “despite our multiple letters to them for them to deal with us effectively in managing jihad here.”
• Al-Qaeda is run like a business or government agency. As long-time AQ watchers know, Bin Laden established orderly administrative procedures for conducting the business of terror. AQIM’s memo is one more window into how the adminisrative machinery functions. The leadership gripes at Belmokhtar for not filing expense reports, not playing well with the other vice presidents (ie emirs) in the region, and not returning headquarter’s phone calls.
• Even if jihadis recognize Internet communication is compromised, they still do it. The memo from the Masked Brigade to AQIM reminds AQIM’s leaders that they should not try to communicate with their subordinates over the Internet, referencing a message from Zawahiri saying the same (anyone know if this letter was public?). AQIM’s leadership retorts by observing that Belmokhtar is the one who is carelessly communicating with Internet forum administrators (they mention Ansar al-Mujahideen forum in particular) and airing AQIM’s dirty laudry to the media.
• Spectacular attacks can be motivated by petty infighting. It is natural to look to a group’s ideology and strategy first when explaining a sudden change in attack patterns. This year’s attack on the gas fields in Algeria elicited just such commentary. While such explainations paint part of the picture, the AQIM memo suggests infighting can also be a big motivation for action and target selection. According to the memo, Belmokhtar criticized AQIM’s leadership for not carrying out any “spectacular military action” over the last decade despite having the resources and permission to do so. AQIM turns this charge back on Belmokhtar, saying that he was the one who was charged with carrying out such attacks. Belmokhtar answered by carrying out the spectacular attack on the Algerian gas field three months later.
• Something is brewing in Libya. AQIM and Belmokhtar trade barbs over who was the first to try and consolidate jihadi groups fighting in Libya. I’ll leave it to folks like Clint Watts and Andrew Lebovich to surmise how successful AQIM and Belmokhtar have been in that endeavor. I’d only note that in the midst of their success in Mali last year, AQIM was already looking over the horizon at Libya as the next theater. If the jihadis in Mali continue to be squeezed by the French and others, they may head northeast.

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This is, of course, a vast oversimplification, and I hope that the report I recently published for West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center will go some way towards exposing the most obviously untenable parts of this narrative. But as part of the research for this monograph, I have also found a primary source which upholds what I had long believed to be the most unlikely component of the accepted account of al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan: the idea that Usama bin Laden called Yunus Khalis a father.

The biographical material on Yunus Khalis is extensive and appears to be growing relatively rapidly. Some of his biographers, like Haji Din Muhammad, are still aligned with the government in Kabul and so have clear reasons for downplaying the connections between Yunus Khalis and the erstwhile al-Qa’ida leader. Other biographers,  like Puhnamal Ahmadzai, take a different approach by either ignoring the issue entirely or by actually playing up Khalis’s contact with Bin Laden for one political purpose or another. One of these latter biographers, ‘Abd al-Kabir Talai, states explicitly what has heretofore only been the subject of speculation and hearsay: that Usama bin Laden called Yunus Khalis “the Father Sheikh.”

Although this is so far the only known primary source that makes such an argument about the relationship between these two, Talai gives a clear and believable reason for why Usama bin Laden had such a warm view of Khalis. I encourage anyone interested in the specifics of this exchange to read my report, but for now I’ll simply say that apparently Bin Laden appreciated that Khalis was not a “fair weather friend.”

In any event, there was nothing particularly exceptional about someone calling Khalis by such a familiar name; the titles of two of his biographies refer to him as “Khalis Baba.”  In Pashto and Persian “baba” can be either “papa,” “granddad,” or simply a term of respect for an older man, and it is entirely possible that Bin Laden was just following the practice of Khalis’s Pashtun friends by using this term of endearment.

Although I was frankly surprised to find a confirmation of this particular historical tidbit about Bin Laden’s fondness for Yunus Khalis in my primary source research, there are a number of excellent reasons to believe Old Man Khalis was peripheral to the growth of al-Qa’ida as a major terrorist organization. So far there is every indication that Yunus Khalis was dismissive of Bin Laden’s calls for jihad against the American presence in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s. And in any event, by 1996 when the al-Qa’ida leadership returned to Afghanistan, Khalis was nearing the end of his productive working life.  Although he remained engaged in attempts to promote negotiations between the Taliban movement and various mujahidin factions, he would soon be too ill to have much effect on the operations of groups like al-Qa’ida even if he had wanted to.

The exciting thing about discovering these kinds of historical nuggets in the biographical material of mujahidin leaders like Yunus Khalis is that it reminds us how little we still know about both Khalis and other, much more famous people like Usama bin Laden. And as more sources become available in print, I suspect that we can look forward to all kinds of unexpected adjustments to the current mujahidin myth cycle.

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For the second installment of our Jihadi Twitter Activism series Ali Fisher and Nico Prucha explore data collected from Twitter related to the Syrian AQ branch Jabhat al-Nusra. This post identifies key ‘influence multipliers’ for Jabhat al-Nusra’s strategic communication and an overview of the content that these multipliers disseminate via Twitter.

To analyze jihadi social media networks, their sympathizers and followers we have used an interdisciplinary approach, which combines big data techniques, network analysis and the subsequent analysis of key users and content. In this post we present preliminary analysis of over 76,000 tweets relating to Jabhat al-Nusra collected over 50 days between January and March 2013.

To measure the dissemination of jihadi content and to gain greater insight into the hubs sharing jihadi propaganda, we measured the most mentioned and most active users. Furthermore, the results, along with calculations to establish the size and structure of the networks, allow us to find those at strategic positions within the networks sharing content relating to Jabhat al-Nusra.

To understand the resonance of jihadi propaganda, we identify and analyze the most shared links and the content to which those links lead. As we show, these links lead predominantly to YouTube clips and pictures. The advantage of using Twitter for link sharing is that the content can often be viewed directly without switching applications or copy and pasting, depending on the users’ Twitter client and device (computer, tablet, smartphone).

The links to YouTube have the dual strength of a rich media environment and the potential to draw the viewer into a densely interconnected cluster of mutually reinforcing video content. In some cases the users must be aware of current jihadi developments and trends to fully comprehend pictures that may appear odd to an uninitiated viewer. However, other videos are a clear and obvious part of the jihadi visual culture of martyrdom and advocate ideological harmony. Pictures of individual martyrs for example, are framed as part of the overall jihadi culture and are popular on Twitter (and Facebook) where they are commemorated and propagated as role models.

By understanding the most mentioned users within a sample, we can measure impact by analyzing who is retweeting jihadi content and who is retweeted. This is even more so relevant, when accounts have a greater number of followers and thus turn into vital hubs of re-dissemination. The most shared links, naturally, indicate what parts of the jihadi propaganda resonate most among its target, as well as ‘collateral’, audience (this will be at the center of our next posting).

The strategic communication of Jabhat al-Nusra

Newer groups, such as Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), have been using Twitter since its establishment in Syria. Their own forum is quite insignificant as all written statements and videos published by their media department al-Minarat al-Bayda are disseminated within the established authoritative jihadi forums. In addition to addressing jihadi sympathizers via these forums, JN use Twitter and Facebook to advance their strategic communication.

Twitter and Facebook are the natural choice for their strategic communication, and specifically their crowd-out strategies, as it facilitates a blend of audio-visual media interspersed with writings that further sanctions and explains specific ideological dimensions of JN activity. Whether via retweets on Twitter, posting comments on YouTube videos, or ‘likes’ on Facebook, by embracing the emergent behavior and ‘social search’ which sites such as Twitter and Facebook facilitate, JN can allow anyone to connect with and disseminate propaganda content outside of the ‘classical forums’.

Militants and hate groups of all colors and backgrounds use the Internet as a communication facility to lure consumers into their specific interpretation or world perception, trying to gain sympathy through modern, pop-cultural elements. Jihadists employ nasheed and huda (the marching part later in the video) in combination with appealing training, combat, or everyday aspects of the Mujahideen and use a powerful yet comprehensible rhetoric. The rhetoric is inseparable from the (audio-) visual content and enforces key elements such as grievances (for example) and the need to respond, usually framed as a “call” to arms (nafir). Early last year, Abu al-Mundhir al-Shanqithi issued such a nafir (here) to join JN, a general question also addressed by Abu Nur al-Filastini on the Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad fatwa forum.

On May 31 last year, one week after the massacre of al-Houla, the amir of JN, Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani issued a nafir stating, “the sons of Islam await the wrath by the soldiers of JN, responding to the massacre”. The nafir was published by al-Minarat al-Bayda’s official account in the regular jihadi forums. To highlight that the use of Twitter is an implicit part of the strategic communication strategy, the official statement includes hashtags suggestions to make sure that the message is framed and categorized properly when individuals tweet a link of the speech. The tags consist of (in English) “# syria # jihad # nosrah # islamicSpring # freedom”.

A subsequent video published and advertised in the al-Ansar forum shows the “liquidation of the Lieutenant Colonel, the commanding officer of the Shabiha, Mahmud Muhammad al-‘Ali” thought responsible for the massacre in al-Houla and Deir al-Zur. The video has about 500,000 views and went viral on the thawrat- almayadeen YouTube-channel.

Ecosystem around Jabhat al-Nusra on Twitter

Jabhat al-Nusra disseminates content using #جبهة_النصرة the original short version of the name in Arabic for which the group has become known. Through an analysis of the tweets containing the Arabic hashtag (#) for Jabhat al-Nusra the network sharing content via Twitter was identified. Analysis of the first two weeks of aggregated data identified a network of 12,253 connections between 7,051 accounts that were either actively sharing content via retweet or were mentioned in a tweet containing #جبهة_النصرة. 95% of the users formed a single interconnected information sharing network. Only 352 of the 7,051 users observed tweeting using #جبهة_النصرة did not interact with at least one member of this network.

Figure 1:Within the 7,051 accounts, there were some particularly active users producing a large amount of content.

Figure 2: The most mentioned users of the Jabhat al-Nusra Arabic account (click for large image)

Active users are those with a lot to say, however, it does not indicate whether anyone is listening or interested. To assess who the network considers influential, we look next at those who are most frequently mentioned in tweets containing #جبهة_النصرة. The graph above shows the most influential users based on the frequency which network members mention them or share their content.

Figure 3 Information flow of tweets using #جبهة_النصرة (click for full size)

Nodes in this network represent users. Users that retweet or @mention another user are connected by a line representing the flow of information.

While the structure of the network has 35 different clusters within the giant network, @jbhatalnusra is a focal point for the network as a whole. @jbhatalnusra, the ‘official’ JN account in Arabic, had as of April 3, 2013, a total of 44,941 followers and follows one user on Twitter. Although for unknown reasons the account has been quiet since April 10^th. As of May 7 the account still receives plenty of attention with 53,540 followers with its unchanged 257 tweets – a good ratio.

Another Arabic JN related account (@jabhat_alnusra) has also been inactive since April 10^th, while an English language Twitter account (@jabhatalnusrah) remains active (Check here for the date – may there be a communication ban until things with AQI are resolved? The last statement also just appeared April 8). Despite @jbhatalnusra becoming inactive, the Arabic hashtag is still used frequently and @jbhatalnusra is still mentioned by other Twitter users. The first month of aggregated data shows the network growing to 27,706 connections between 13,600 Twitter accounts. By March this had grown again to 20,459 users and 45,959 edges, 96.5% of the nodes were part of a single interconnected network. Within this network is a core of 551 users who were in reciprocal communication. A later post will cover this network in greater detail.

Case Studies of two prominent users

To begin the analysis, we shall have a brief look into the two most influential Twitter-accounts using the JN hashtag and being two of the most frequently mentioned users:

1. @wesal_TV, the “official account of the [Saudi] Wesal [satellite] Television Network.”

2. @jalaaad_alshi3a, who appears to be a radical al-Qa’ida follower probably based in northern Syria.

The data on information flow shows these two users are frequently mentioned and retweeted, indicating that their content resonates with their followers. The Saudi satellite TV station Wesal, a global television network with over 290,000 followers on Twitter, is essential for Jabhat al-Nusra propaganda-wise. @Wesal_TV actively addresses the ongoing fighting against the Assad regime, calling for financial, material, and personal support for the Sunnites in Syria.

Recruitment videos for the Free Syrian Army are aired on TV. Furthermore, individuals are promoted as role models via Twitter and the popular clips are also uploaded on YouTube by sympathizers and activists. Links to JN and other jihadi groups on YouTube are disseminated to those following @Wesal_TV. This further promotes the confessional war in Syria, the Sunnites cause in general and an open enmity to the Shiites in Iraq and Syria. This is emphasized by the Arabic hashtag for الرافضة (al-rafida), a negative term used by Wahhabis and jihadists alike to insult Shiites.

Figure 4: Focus on Wesal_TV (click for full size)

Wesal_TV is an important influence multiplier for @JbhatALnusra.

@Wesal_TV, however, is pro-active in promoting the Mujahid role model. Promoting YouTube links has a massive effect in terms of views. On April 3, 2013, for instance, @Wesal_TV tweeted:

“A heroic Mujahid throws a grenade at a tank of Assad’s [army]. While not succeeding to blow it up, he returns to throw another one, without any fear or hesitation. [Look at] 1 minute 15 seconds.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VoFRXks2X68.”

In the video, a man throws a hand grenade into the muzzle of a T-72 tank, but misses at first. Not discouraged, he returns and succeeds, resulting in an explosion inside the tank, destroying it by a massive burst of flames. The Mujahideen are introduced as part of the Katibat al-Hamza Asad Allah, or “Hamza Battalion Homs”, according to their Facebook group. The katiba is part of the Free Syrian Army, fighting in the vicinity of the city of Homs. The YouTube channel is part of a larger cluster belonging to the al-Dab’a Media Center with its Facebook-group. However, only the video promoted by @Wesal_TV has received attention, with close to 260,000 views as of April 5^th and 2,876 “likes”. The clip had been uploaded on April 1. On May 7, the video was viewed 365,000 times, with over 3,000 likes. The other videos on the YouTube channel are marginal, with mostly only having been viewed several hundred times at best.

@jalaaad_alshi3a, the second of our Twitter case studies, is one of the accounts most frequently mentioned in tweets containing #جبهة_النصرة. @jalaaad_alshi3a has 17,005 followers and has been industrious in producing 39,600 tweets as of April 3, 2013. As of May 9, only 500 more followers signed up with roughly 1,000 tweets posted. The account is a clearly a big fan of JN, as the profile picture outlines.

Figure 5: Focus on Jalaaad_alshi3a, one of the main promoters of JN (click for full size)

This user mostly shares videos, of YouTube, showing clips from various JN-affiliated brigades such as Haraka Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyya, but also links to videos on YouTube from the above-described satellite station Wesal, defaming the Shiites in general. This sentiment is emphasized by YouTube clips allegedly showing books promoting the Shiite creed in Syria found in army and Shabiha bases.

Other videos include clips of al-Malahem, the media department of the Yemeni-based AQ on the Arab Peninsula, videos published by the Ansar al-Mujahideen forum, promotional pictures of martyrs – past and present –as well as Shabiha accounts on Twitter, pointed out by @jalaaad_alshi3a. Sequences of international news outlets are also part of whats shared to underline the “treatment of Sunnis” inside Iraqi prisons run by the Shiite government of al-Maliki, in this case taken off the MBC.

In this post we have identified some of the most influential users, in addition to the most active, and mapped the flow of content in this jihadi ecosystem. In the next part we will provide readers with substantial analysis of what JN-related content was most frequently shared, the messages that content conveys and its resonance among the audience.

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Westerners are not the only ones who have discussed the issue of Khalis’s age at his second marriage (his first marriage occurred decades earlier); his tribute Facebook page has been home to some arguments about this issue, and there is a famously awful joke about Khalis and his young wife that is well-known among eastern Pashtuns. Please don’t ask about it in the comments below. If you want to ask a Pashtun, just remember that it involves the BBC.

Even though this topic is commented upon widely, Khalis’s biographies are mostly silent about the circumstances of Khalis’s second marriage. There are clear reasons for this: these biographies generally avoid discussing any of the women in Khalis’s family, and the controversial age-issue in the case of Khalis’s second wife seems to have discouraged his biographers from broaching the subject.  It is not uncommon for elderly men in the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan to marry young girls, but many members of the same frontier society have a negative view of the practice.

The air of indignation around Khalis’s marriage practices can be easily sensed by a quick perusal of some typical lines from recent western works:

• “It was owned by one of Bin Laden‘s old sponsors, Younis Khalis, an elderly warlord with a taste for teenage brides.” Wright 2007, 255.
• “Their most prominent patron from the anti-Soviet era was Younis Khalis, now an octogenarian who took teenage wives.” Coll 2004, 327.
• “He picked up his daughter and kissed her gently on the cheek. I was told he had recently married a 17-year-old girl. I didn’t like the fact that he had, essentially, stolen her life. There was nothing decent or noble in this.” Van Dyk 2006.
• “Khalis had a well-earned reputation for marrying young women. He took full advantage of Islam‘s allowance of four wives. In 1990, at age seventy, he married a teenager.” Tomsen 2011, 303.

But as it turns out, if Khalis was ashamed of himself, he went out of his way to hide his shame. Rather, he even went so far as to pen a poem under the title of “I am a Simple Man and…” which reads as a remarkably open and blunt love poem from him as an old man to a much younger woman. As a historian of the mujahidin movement I’m not interested in entering into polemics about the appropriateness of Khalis’s marriage in this kind of forum, but I do believe that it is worth treating these topics in a serious, and primary-source based manner. With that in mind, let’s turn to the poem.

Khalis’ poem is an odd piece, and for better or worse it will have to speak for itself. Even so, a few comments may assist in reading it clearly. The phrase “I will make you the flower in my turban” means something along the lines of “I will make you the apple of my eye” or the “jewel in my crown.” Additionally, Khalis often refers to himself in his poems as Nabi Khel, which is his sub-tribe within the larger Khugiani lineage. Finally Majnun and Farhad are famous male romantic icons from Persian literature.

I am a simple man …

Don’t run away, come, make up with me,
I’ll make you the flower in my turban, you’ll become my walking cane,
Don’t say “you’re old!” I’m 75 years old;
But now I have become young, and like you I am also a lover.
I am an expert in love, I am a scholar of the art of love,
If I’m not Majnun, well I’m not, but I am Farhad the Mountain-Striker.
Be a friend, be an acquaintance, I will become yours and you will become mine.
I’ll make you the flower in my turban, you’ll become my walking cane.
Ask the gardener; I am a nightingale and you the flower.
Upon the surface of calm waters you and I are forever together,
We are both one, there is no two, such that you could be one and I another.
Agree or disagree; I am yours and you are mine.
I’ll make you the flower in my turban, you’ll become my walking cane.
I’m dying sweetheart, hug me one more time!
I’ll make you the flower in my turban, you’ll become my walking cane.
Your rejection has broken my jaw and you laugh?
If this is your beauty mark on my chin, then you’ll pick them up and throw them down,
On this path of rejection you have broken the hopes of the lover’s heart.
I’m a simple man, you’re a little ahead,
Don’t run away from me, take some steps back.
I’ll make you the flower in my turban, you’ll become my walking cane.
I’m not a stutterer, I’m not mute, I am speaking your tongue.
When have you spoken that language with me?
At least make a promise to me today through someone else’s tongue,
And if it becomes tomorrow, you won’t have to explain.
Don’t reject me any more, become friends with Nabi Khel;
I’ll make you the flower in my turban, you’ll become my walking cane.

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An article recently released by EA Worldview claims to refute the widespread belief that Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) is an al-Qaeda affiliate; rather, it is a “local faction” in the Syrian insurgency that respects al-Qaeda but maintains its autonomy. According to EA Worldview, when JN’s leader, al-Golani, recently renewed his oath of allegiance (bay`a) to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri on April 10^th, it was merely a formal nod of respect without significance for command and control.

EA Worldview’s interpretation of Golani’s oath of allegiance is wrong & here’s why:

Late on 8 April, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) leader al-Baghdadi issued a statement in which he essentially claimed to subsume JN within his group’s existing Islamic State of Iraq (ISI, the AQI front group) structure, thereby forming the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (or al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fil-Iraq wal-Sham). In so doing, Baghdadi confirmed suspicions first formally raised by the US State Department in December 2012 when it claimed JN was actually AQI, and therefore an international terrorist organisation. In his statement, Baghdadi set forth a JN history that explicitly depicted JN as his creation. Baghdadi claimed that he personally “deputised” Golani – then a Syrian AQI commander active in Iraq – and “pushed” him along with several other AQI fighters to Syria. Baghdadi also claimed that “we laid plans for them and drew up for them the policy of work” and also provided them with financial and other strategic assistance. If Baghdadi’s history is right, his assertion that JN is part of an expanded ISI structure is a natural next step in the group’s evolution.

JN’s leader Golani didn’t perceive things in quite the same way. His statement, released a little over 24 hours later, not only expressed surprise at Baghdadi’s claim to have subsumed JN under his overall command, but clearly described a series of events where he – not Baghdadi – was the brains and engine behind JN’s formation: “[Baghdadi had agreed] to a project that we proposed to him.” Although Golani openly acknowledged his previous role in AQI and adopted the reverential title of “Sheikh” when referring to Baghdadi, he explicitly asserted that “the banner of the [Nusra] Front will stay as it is.” Golani then renewed his pledge of bay’a – an Islamic oath of allegiance – to Zawahiri and swore to listen to and obey all his orders no matter the circumstances. Golani closed his statement by assuring the Syrian people that “what you saw from JN in its defence of your religion, blood, and honour, and its good manners to you – the fighting faction will not change.”

There are several things to take away from this to-and-fro between Baghdadi and Golani:

• JN leader Golani renewed his pledge of bay’a to AQ leader Zawahiri.
  • The renewal indicates that he had previously pledged bay’a to Zawahiri as a member of AQI. In other words, JN was already AQ before the April statements from Baghdadi and Golani.
  • The swearing of bay’a to Zawahiri itself is as clear an indication of a group’s loyalty to AQ as you’re ever going to get.

• Golani wants JN to be recognized as an independent AQ affiliate and not a subsidiary of AQI or its front group, the Islamic State of Iraq. It also indicates an element of competition between Golani and Baghdadi to assume responsibility for JN’s comparative success in Syria.
  • This does not mean JN is an autonomous actor in Syria detached from AQ leadership in Af-Pak.

• It is extremely unlikely that JN’s original creation in Syria by senior members of AQI could have occurred without Zawahiri’s knowledge and permission. In fact, the first statement in which Zawahiri explicitly covered developments in the Syrian revolution came on 27^th July 2011 – the month when JN was actually created (although it formally announced its emergence in January 2012, several 2013 interviews with JN commanders indicate the group was created in July).
  • This suggests the continued leading role of the AQ’s Af-Pak-based senior leadership in directing core AQ policies and strategies in Syria and across the world.

• By stressing his intention to continue operations in Syria under the JN name and with the same “policies”, Golani is attempting to prevent the deleterious impact an affiliation with AQI might have on his group’s reputation amongst Syria’s civilian population (resulting from AQI’s history of brutality and subjugation of Iraq’s civilian population).
  • This does not mean he is separating himself from central AQ’s leadership command & orders.

In short: JN was AQ all along; it grew specifically out of AQI; has adopted a notably different strategy in terms of operating amongst the people; and seeks a place as a Syria-based separate AQ affiliate group.

Although Golani is adamant that JN is a locally-focused insurgent group, his oath of allegiance to Zawahiri means the group shares al-Qaeda’s vision of the global jihad, which extends far beyond the Syrian theatre. Golani’s emphasis on the local jihad should therefore be interpreted as an attempt to win over the Syrian public and not as evidence that the group has no aspirations beyond Syria’s borders. Similar strategies have been adopted by other local AQ affiliates around the world, most notably by Ansar al-Sharia in Yemen. So long as JN portrays itself as a group derived from local recruits fighting for local issues and devoted to a national cause, it may be able to sustain its largely positive reputation within the wider Syrian opposition movement. Much will depend on the nature of instruction the group receives from Zawahiri.

In many respects, Golani’s subtly terse reply to Baghdadi has at least temporarily saved his group’s operational reputation within the “Syrian” insurgency. JN has so far escaped any direct condemnation from the other insurgent groups, which is a testament to Golani’s ability to portray the group as a servant of the Syrian revolution and not the tool of AQ’s transnational agenda.

Since 10 April, the senior leaderships of both AQI and JN have failed to issue a single statement through any official media outlet. While it’s impossible to definitively attribute this anomaly to anything in particular, the most likely explanation is that Zawahiri has been faced with the tough diplomatic challenge of reasserting authority over both AQI and JN and fixing any damaged relations between Baghdadi and Golani. AQ has traditionally prided itself on political unanimity within its command and control structures. A critical reason for swearing bay’a is that it should – in theory – ensure that affiliate groups follow orders from the top. Clearly, Baghdadi spoke too soon, and the resulting very public disagreement has raised questions over Zawahiri’s ability to manage the AQ “organisation.”

Both groups are clearly still active though. AQI attacks continue in Baghdad and elsewhere. In Syria, several local and independent jihadi units have pledged allegiance to JN and reports of JN operations have continued to filter through unofficial channels and other groups’ Syrian sources. Yesterday morning morning, the Salafi militia Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiya claimed responsibility for a joint ambush with JN of a military convoy in Khan al-Sheikh outside Damascus. Whatever Zawahiri eventually decides, al-Qaeda’s presence in Syria will persist in one form or another.

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In his book, The Jihad of Images – al-Qaeda’s Prophecy of Martyrdom, Asiem analyses the visual communication strategy of contemporary jihadism along the iconography and overall narrative jihadists have successfully promoted in the recent years.  Asiem has been engaged in studying jihadists and their propaganda for several years and is a regular member at conferences (here and here).

Out of the range of Asiem’s recent publications, his study jihad.de is of particular interest (in German, click here).

Here is the English book description by the publisher (for French, click here):

“Without the creation of a highly complex propaganda strategy with videos as its most efficient weapons, Al-Qaeda and its Jihadi allies might already have ceased to exist. The Jihad of Images not only retraces the history of Al-Qaeda’s propaganda from its beginnings and the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan – thus offering a unique insight into the history of the Jihadi movement – it also analyses in detail the symbolism of Al-Qaeda’s revolutionary visual language in Islamic terms and the different genres of propaganda videos. Most importantly, the author illustrates that through its video production, Al-Qaeda hijacks the mythology of Islam and its symbols to create its own eschatological myth of martyrdom, presented as the sole path to salvation. This myth includes a cosmology in which leaders such as Osama bin Laden become prophets in Max Weber’s sense of the word, and the so-called “martyrs”, saints. In this way, Al-Qaeda qualifies as a sect. Yet despite its failure to mobilise the Muslim masses, Al-Qaeda, through its videos, has nevertheless succeeded in creating a culture of Jihad that is recognized by a considerable number of Muslims today and could inspire future generations. The research for this book was not only based on the screening of hundreds of Jihadi films but also on impressive field work including rare interviews with: leading Jihadi propagandists, Jihadi sympathisers, captives of jihadi groups as well as those engaged in the fight against global Jihad and its propaganda – from Afghanistan and Iraq to the United Kingdom and the United States.”

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Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the famous Egyptian Muslim scholar who’s often described as the most influential Sunni scholar alive, is well known for his comments on politics, society and other practical issues that believers have to deal with. Yesterday, I read in an article that he has added a new comment of that type to an already long list: he has called upon the United States to “hit” Syria. This may not come as a surprise to some, but it is nevertheless a position that is worth taking a closer look at.

“Please sir, I want some more”

In a recent Friday sermon delivered in the Qatari capital Doha, al-Qaradawi thanked the United States for giving 60 million dollars’ worth of weapons to the Syrian rebels fighting the regime of President Bashar al-Asad. This is remarkable enough in itself, but al-Qaradawi even added to that by asking for more help from the US.

Interestingly, after claiming that the US fears Israel and dreads the idea that Syrian rebels will cross the border into that country, he makes his request for more American aid to Syria quite explicit and asks: “Why hasn’t America acted [in Syria] the way it acted in Libya? America must defend the Syrians and adopt a position of masculinity (waqafat rujula), a position for God, what is good and what is just.”

Libya

As mentioned, it may not come as a surprise that al-Qaradawi takes this position. After all, the article states, al-Qaradawi had more or less the same view about Libya when that country’s leader, Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, was still in power and faced revolts against his rule: “Whoever can kill Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi”, al-Qaradawi is quoted from an earlier speech or sermon, “let him kill him. Whoever can shoot him, let him do it, so that the people and the umma are rid of the evil of this madman.”

Necessity

Like al-Qaradawi supported the call for (the “un-Islamic”) NATO to help the Muslims in Libya, so he now supports asking the Americans for aid in Syria. Apart from the Libyan case, such calls for non-Muslim help in conflict or even jihad are not without precedent. The most famous contemporary example of this is probably the Saudi King Fahd’s 1990 plea for American protection against a possible attack from Iraq, which had just invaded Kuwait at the time.

This decision to invite 500,000 US troops in 1990 was not only highly controversial in Saudi political circles, among the Saudi public and in the Middle East in general, but it was also a fiercely debated religious issue. The major Saudi scholars at the time legitimised their decision to allow the US troops to come by pointing to the necessity of keeping the country secure.

Asking unbelievers for help

Not everyone agreed with the decision of the major Saudi scholars, however. In fact, as I pointed out in an article published in the International Journal of Middle East Studies last year, this decision sparked a debate over whether it was allowed in general to ask unbelievers for help (al-isti’ana bi-l-kuffar) in conflicts, particularly when this help was directed against other Muslims.

The famous Salafi scholar Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani (1914-1999), argued that such calls for non-Muslim help were not allowed against other Muslims. Scholars stating that former Iraqi President Saddam Husayn was no longer a Muslim because he was a member of the socialist Ba’th Party were dismissed by al-Albani since the Iraqi army, which was going to do the actual fighting, did consist of mostly Muslim soldiers, he said.

The example of the Prophet

According to some Muslims, there are indications in the main sources of Islam – the Qur’an and the Sunna – that asking non-Muslims for help during conflicts is, in fact, not permissible. Q. 5: 51, for instance, says: “O believers, take not Jews and Christians as friends; they are friends of each other. Whoso of you makes them his friends is one of them.” Similar words are expressed in Q. 60: 1, although the statement there is more specific and clearly refers to a particular episode in Islamic history.

Perhaps more clearly military in nature are some sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, in which he rejected seeking assistance from unbelievers in certain battles. At the same time, however, one hadith does state that the Prophet sought help from the Jews of the Medinan tribe Banu Qaynuqa’ against another Jewish tribe, namely the Banu Qurayza.

Fighting against whom?

The above suggests that the sources may not be entirely clear on asking unbelievers for help against others, despite assertations by some Muslims to the contrary. The last example given above, however, deals with asking unbelievers for help in fighting against other unbelievers, not against fellow Muslims. This is obviously an important distinction and one that could explain why al-Qaradawi made his statement.

Bashar al-Asad, important parts of his regime and parts of his elite troops are ‘Alawi Muslims, who are often seen by Sunnis as being so heterodox that they are really not considered Muslims anymore. If al-Qaradawi agrees with this, asking American unbelievers for help against the Syrian regime is then, in his view at least, not directed against Muslims, but simply at other unbelievers. This, in turn, would justify making a theological distinction between asking the Americans for help in fighting, say, Iraqi soldiers and ‘Alawi special forces from Syria.

Of course, it has to be borne in mind that all of this theological reasoning may well act as nothing more than a religious justification ex post facto, rather than an actual reason for al-Qaradawi to make his call for American help in the first place. Al-Qaradawi may well have been inspired to call on the US to help by the killing which the Syrian regime is responsible for and nothing more. Still, his statements did provide me with an opportunity to expound on an important ideological issue among jihadis, which is never a bad thing I suppose.

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In future posts in the series, we will highlight and decipher some of the core content most often shared on Twitter, allowing conclusions to be drawn about the parts of jihadist propaganda which resonate with a wider audience (and hence shared over and over again).

Introducing the theme

The recent essay by Abu Sa‘d al-‘Amili on the state of global online jihad (discussed here) lamented a general decline in participation in jihadi online forums. Furthermore, al-‘Amili issued a “Call (nida’) to the Soldiers of the Jihadi Media” demanding that they “return to their frontiers (thughur)” elevating their status. Al-‘Amili himself is one of the high-profile clerics, a “prolific “Internet Shaykh” (Lia) on the forums, but is also quite active on twitter (@al3aamili).

Two interrelated causes identified by Abu Sa‘d al-‘Amili were the periods when forums were offline and the migration of users to social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook. This is exacerbated by the movement of “major [jihadi] writers and analysts” (kibar al-kuttab wa-l-muhallilin) from the forums to social media platforms. This has perhaps increased the momentum of members of tier-one jihad forums to expand onto twitter while twitter as a massive communication relay has become the basis for a new generation of sympathizers, posing another intersection. Twitter is a further medium of choice to (re-) disseminate propaganda material in general and is a platform where activists, sympathizers, and actual fighters upload audiovisual and other types into the jihadi hub.

Jihadists have aggressively expanded the use of twitter, in addition to Facebook and YouTube, especially since the outbreak of violence in Syria. During 2011 members of Jihadist forums issued media-strategies and advisory to fellow members prior, as for example is stated in this posting here of the al-Ansar forum. The posting, initiated by the member Istishhadiyya is basically a very elemental guide, comprehensive and for beginners, highlighting the effective and fast communication capability. The same posting was copy-and-pasted by Shumukh member Basha’ir shortly afterwards. A handbook, compiled by Twitter user @osamh ended up on the jihadi forums to further underline the importance of Twitter as well as its difference to Facebook, where jihadists already have a strong presence.

It took a while for jihadi activism to fully unravel on Twitter, and they have maintained a cohesive as well as detailed presence on this social media platform since the Syrian conflict turned violent in 2012.

Twitter, and as such social media in general, is in the meantime an integral part of jihadists’ media endeavors on the Internet, with the majority of jihadi forums having their official account advertised for on the main pages of the forums.

The role of the media activists, or in jihadist speak the “media mujahid” has since the death of Osama bin Laden in May of 2011 been promoted, highlighted and approved. AQ related documents have made this role model prominent. The role model of the “media martyr” any “media mujahid” can be become, is backed by the call to take the fight on a greater level on al channels online issued by al-Fajr in their response of the killing of bin Laden:

“The Internet is a battlefield for jihad, a place for missionary work, a field of confronting the enemies of God. It is upon any individual to consider himself as a media-mujahid, dedicating himself, his wealth and his time for God.” (Analysis here, Arabic original here)

At first, the strategies to promote Twitter among members of jihadi forums failed to develop substantial traction, but this changed drastically during 2012. When jihadists in and outside of Syria started to use and incorporate twitter as a medium to disseminate and re-post al-Qa’ida and other propaganda material.

Twitter activism and jihadi supporters

At first Syrian non-violent activists used, and continue to use, twitter as a medium to document human rights abuse and war crimes of the Assad regime, but jihadists quickly adapted that content and the platform for their propaganda.

Social-media smart and professional jihadists adopted this treasure grove for their propaganda. By rebranding and reframing the content created by civil society activists, jihadi propaganda used these grievances to support a key jihadist self-perception; the obligation to respond by force to defend and protect the Sunnites in Syria.

Due to the effect and success of the Syrian based Jihadi groups, other jihadi groups as well as the main forums are adopting the twitter activism, advertising official forum accounts on the main pages with users within the forums using twitter hashtags (#) or references to twitter users (for example: @al_nukhba). A list of “The most important jihadi and support sites for jihad and the mujahideen on Twitter’” was recently posted on the Shumukh al-Islam forum, allowing users to identify key accounts they might wish to follow.

Individual sympathizers and all those feeling inclined to contribute to the media jihad re-disseminate authoritative files of al-Qa’ida on twitter on a larger scale. Now all major jihadi media departments, part of militant networks, have their own channels on Twitter, linking to content from the jihadi forums and other social media platforms, primarily YouTube, Facebook, and pictures in general.

Twitter has turned into a primary hub for the distribution of jihadi agitprop files. These Jihadi information sharing networks using Twitter coexist, autonomously, with the classical forums. These networks carry, for example, samples of the wide range of jihadi propaganda files, in some cases placed first on Twitter, posted via mobile phones from the front lines. As a brief overview, a few samples consisting of:

• martyrs in general and martyrdom operatives (istishhadiyyun) announced and identified by their hashtag and Twitter account;
• calls for donations with phone numbers and social media contact information; taking care of the orphans of the martyrs among other civil elements;
• general material of incitement, and the impact of online attained propaganda files used offline are popular and gain plenty of traction,

What are they sharing?

In addition to disseminating their own propaganda, jihadi media activists repurpose content from social movements and non-jihadi groups for their own purposes, framing the non-jihadi actions or demonstrations as part of the global militant struggle. This has created another ‘grey area’ where analysts have to carefully monitor and decipher such content. The forum administrators and media-activists also are starting to incorporate and misuse Twitter for their purposes, in coordinated attempts to virtually infiltrate legitimate social movements by using the same hash tags and a similar rhetoric to create ideological cohesion – and placing extremist views and files in that virtual sphere while claiming to fight on the ground for the sake of the people.

To analyze jihadi media networks, their sympathizers and followers we have used a combined approach focused on a unique interdisciplinary analysis of the data acquired by technical means and the subsequent and immediate analytical process of its content.

Using these methods we have asked a range of questions, how have jihadi propagandists been able to gain traction and a foothold online? How do they disseminate propaganda content to a global, multilingual audience and what resonates most with that audience? What are the networks through which their content flows and what are the different roles users play within these networks? Ultimately do the different jihadi twitter accounts reach a range of different communities, or is it a small densely interconnected echo chamber?

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A commitment to global jihad

JN, according to al-Baghdadi, was from the first an “extension” and “part” of ISI. Providing little in the way of details, he explains rather matter-of-factly how ISI early on sent—“deputized”—Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, one of ISI’s “soldiers,” to Syria along with a number of foreign colleagues to establish JN and recruit local Syrians. Al-Baghdadi justifies not proclaiming the connection between ISI and JN until now out of fear that the media would engage in harmful “distortion.” It is unclear why he finds this particular moment so different.

What the announcement makes very clear is that the group once known as Jabhat al-Nusra ought to be seen as a jihadi-salafi organization distinct from its homespun salafi counterparts, such as the groups comprising the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF). While JN and the groups fighting under SIF have long campaigned together on various fronts in the Syrian civil war, and while they praise one another publicly, JN has always stood out for its secretive nature and lack of interest in adhering to the SIF command structure.

In his new report on “Syria’s Salafi Insurgents,” Aron Lund persuasively makes the case that JN is unique among Syria’s salafi warriors. Its leadership is “clearly part of the global salafi-jihadi trend” and sees “Syria as a front in [a] larger war against the West and Arab secularism.” This much is clear from how JN’s announcements and other literature are routinely posted to al-Qaeda-linked jihadi forums by the forums’ administrators. It has also been clear in the organizational distance between JN and the SIF, the latter of which has become a broad coalition of like-minded salafi fighting groups. JN, Lund confirms in communication with SIF leaders, was invited to help found SIF but wanted no part in it. Al-Baghdadi’s announcement yesterday makes clear why: JN’s objective is an Islamic state that includes Syria; the goal of the more nationalist-oriented SIF is an Islamic state within Syria.

An Islamic emirate foretold

The ISI’s announcement that its nominal authority now encompasses, by means of JN, the territory of modern Syria might strike some as surprising. Indeed JN has largely avoided violent excesses that alienated al-Qaeda in Iraq from the local population, as several commentators have pointed out. But JN was never truly meant to be, as its full name indicated, “the salvation front for the people of Syria, by the mujahidin of Syria.” The name was deceptive, as JN’s purpose was all along to enlarge the authority of ISI. While jihadi media did not state this purpose clearly, some jihadi writers, both on the fringes and in the mainstream, have consistently emphasized JN’s distinctiveness and priority among salafi fighters in Syria, sometimes even calling for an Islamic state.

In mid-March one jihadi author, an obscure Abu ‘Abd Allah Anis, explicitly called for founding an “Islamic emirate” in Syria in the jihadi magazine Majallat al-Balagh, a product of the media group Fursan al-Balagh. The author wrote (pg. 44): “We hope to witness [in Syria] in the near future an alliance of jihad powers and their establishment of a broad shura council leading to the announcement of an Islamic emirate.” He went on to talk about unifying all Islamic groups and battalions in this proposed alliance, which he saw as rightfully being led by JN. This vision of an Islamic emirate is certainly different from what al-Baghdadi announced yesterday, but it nonetheless captured the direction JN was headed.

Perhaps even more foretelling of the turn JN’s leadership would take was a fatwa issued back in February by the influential Mauritanian shaykh Abu al-Mundhir al-Shinqiti. Writing in his capacity as a member the Shari‘a Council of Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad, the website of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, al-Shinqiti strongly discouraged anyone interested in fighting jihad in Syria from forming or joining any group apart from JN. While he did not denounce or disparage other salafi groups fighting in Syria, he made it clear that he viewed their existence with skepticism. The mujahidin ought to “heed the command of God (who is exalted above all) to be one community, not separate communities; to fight under one banner, not different banners; to obey one commander, not multiple commanders; and to call themselves by one name, not by separate names.” It was therefore not appropriate to form or join a jihad group that did not pledge allegiance to JN’s leader.

The Islamic opposition at odds

It is as yet unclear what effect al-Baghdadi’s announcement of “the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria” will have on the armed Islamic opposition. Whether other salafi groups choose to distance themselves from ISIGS and its global scheme or not, it seems certain that ISIGS will henceforward more clearly emphasize its mission to achieve an Islamic state that exceeds the bounds of the Syrian nation.

Importantly, this mission includes an emphatic rejection of democracy in any form. In his statement al-Baghdadi warned the people of Syria not to “exchange these years of oppression for the religion of democracy, which the people of Iraq have preceded you [in accepting],” along with others in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. From the emphasis he lays on it, it seems that al-Baghdadi views democracy as al-Qaeda’s greatest threat in the near future, in Syria as elsewhere. Evidently he worries that salafi groups of more nationalist bent currently fighting the regime, like the SIF, could one day disarm and form political parties along the lines of Egypt’s salafi Nur Party. The difference that al-Baghdadi implicitly posits is one between salafis who adhere to the jihadi-salafi global mission of al-Qaeda (a minority) and those disposed to accept national affiliation—and possibly even to participate in a particular nation’s democracy.

It is noteworthy in this regard that the SIF leadership seems to hold a different outlook on democracy from that of JN (now ISIGS). As Lund points out, while SIF leaders have criticized the potential institutionalization of Western-style democracy in Syria, some of their statements exhibit tolerance for democratic practices such as voting and forming councils of elected officials. One informal Syrian adviser to the SIF, the prominent jihadi ideologue Abu Basir al-Tartusi, has intimated he would support the holding of elections in a post-Asad Syria. Al-Qaeda, on the other hand, along with al-Qaeda leaning ideologues like al-Shinqiti, condemns the very practices of democracy, including voting, as shirk, or polytheism. Whether or not al-Baghdadi’s announcement heralds a newfound rift in the Islamic opposition’s daily business of waging jihad, it certainly confirms the presence of an ideological rift between Syria’s salafis.

Update (10 April 2013): In the above I suggested that JN’s leadership played a role in the decision to announce the new Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria. Apparently this was not the case. In an audio message released today JN leader Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani claimed not to have had prior knowledge of the decision to scrap the JN and ISI labels in favor of the ISIGS; in fact he only learned of the decision from the media. While clearly unhappy at the way that this news reached him, al-Jawlani nevertheless agreed to “comply with al-Baghdadi’s request.” He then affirmed (and reaffirmed) his allegiance, and that of JN’s “children and their general leadership,” to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Yet it appears that al-Jawlani was not willing to comply fully with al-Baghdadi’s request, objecting to the instruction to dispense with the name Jabhat al-Nusra. He stated: “the banner of the Jabha (Front) will remain as it is with no changes.”

Apparently JN’s leader is concerned that too open an association with al-Qaeda could have a negative impact on JN’s reputation and perhaps alienate opposition allies. Al-Jawlani’s chosen solution seems to be to maintain the JN franchise name that has earned so much respect on the ground (encapsulated by the popular phrase “we are all Jabhat al-Nusra”) while professing allegiance to al-Qaeda and acceding (at least nominally) to the ISIGS. The message makes it unclear exactly what JN’s and the ISIGS’s next moves will be or what the operational linkages between the two (overlapping) groups really are.

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