While I am at it, I might as well mention my own completely unrelated CTC paper on the Failure of Jihad in Saudi Arabia.

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“This idiot confessed to me and told me, ‘if you go and kill any leader of the mujahidin, you’ll become a top man in Jordan, like my chief, Ali Burjaq’. According to Abu Zayd [Abu Dujana's handler], Ali Burjaq, Director of Jordanian counterterrorism, is the man responsible for the murder of the shahid, as we reckon him, shaykh Abdullah Azzam in Peshawar 20 years ago.”   (translation by Adam Gadahn)

As you know, Azzam’s assassins have never been identified, and numerous theories have been suggested (CIA, Mossad, Usama bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Khad, KGB to mention a few). However, I have not heard this particular claim before, despite having worked on a biography on Azzam for some time.

It’s hard to know what to make of it. Of course, Abu Dujana may have made it up to smear the Jordanian regime. But he could have made up worse things, and blaming Jordan exonerates the US, who usually takes the blame for Azzam’s death in the jihadi community. One might also ask why a handler would divulge such a secret to an asset he has only known for a few months. But Abu Dujana’s trajectory shows he clearly did inspire trust. The biggest problem I have with this claim is that I don’t see why Jordanian intelligence would have wanted to take out Azzam in 1989. Azzam neither organized nor called for militant activity against the Jordanian regime at the time.

Either the GID did the job for someone else, or Abu Dujana’s claim is false.

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(1)    To the female jihadis (murabitat and mujahidat - I shall return to these terms later) in the Islamic umma. She believes that like her, these women have sacrificed their all; and despite their loss of loved ones and separation from family, their situation is one of grace, for they are ‘content with the honors God has bestowed upon us; He elected us from among all his servants by blessing us with [being part of] jihad in His path to make His religion triumphant and make His word supreme.’ Umayma al-Zawahiri urges these female jihadis to remain steadfast on that same jihadi path, for ‘victory is near’. God, she assures them, is not about to forsake them and they shall either be rewarded with victory or martyrdom, ‘each is sweeter than the other.’ She reminds herself and her fellow female jihadis of the female Companions who fought alongside the Prophet Muhammad and showed more courage than many men at the time.

(2)    To the Muslim women who are imprisoned by the Pharaohs/despots (tawaghit), by which she means the regimes in the Arab and Islamic world. Umayma al-Zawahiri assures these women that they are always on the jihadis’ minds and that the mujahidin shall exert every effort to release them.

(3)    The bulk of Umayma al-Zawahiri’s missive is dedicated to all other Muslim women. To begin with, she calls on them to observe Islamic law, especially to maintain their commitment to donning the veil. The campaign against the veil, she explains, represents the most intense battle between Islam and unbelief (kufr). In her mind, abandoning the veil is the thin end of the wedge: ‘if a woman were to abandon [the modesty] of her appearance and covering herself, this is [necessarily] followed by a series of other [neglects] that push her away from her religion’ (this warning reminds me of that of a (French) nun: ‘qui prend la main, prend le bras; qui prend le bras, prend le tout!’).

Umayma al-Zawahiri urges these Muslim women to bring up their children on the love of jihad in God’s path, ‘to goad their brothers, husbands and sons to defend Muslims’ territories and properties … to assist the (male) jihadis with prayers and money.’ She is keen to emphasize that the role of the Muslim woman is critical, it is therefore important that she ‘should work alongside the man in defense of her religion, territory and to defend them in her person (tudafi‘ bi-nafsiha). If she cannot do so [by donating] her money, or if she cannot do so by way of reaching out to her Muslim sisters through missionary activities in mosques, schools, colleges and homes, she should do so through the Internet where she could write her religious mission, disseminate it and spread the mission of the jihadis.’

Does Umayma al-Zawahiri support military jihad for women? Her views on this question are open to interpretation. On the one hand, and in addressing this specific question, she says that ‘jihad [today] is an individual duty incumbent upon every Muslim man and woman, but the path of fighting is not easy for women, for it requires a male companion with whom it is lawful for a woman to be’. She adds that there are many other ways that women could fulfill their duty, ‘we put ourselves in the service of the jihadis, we carry out what they ask, whether in supporting them financially, serving their [practical] needs, supplying them with information, opinions, partaking in fighting or even [volunteering to carry out] a martyrdom operation.’ On the other hand, she argues that ‘our principal role … is to protect the jihadis [through] bringing up their children, [managing] their homes, and [keeping] their secrets.’

Women who wish to be guided by Umayma al-Zawhairi’s advice can therefore read into her missive both a military calling for themselves or a peaceful one that translates into supporting the jihadis from home. Leah Farrall observes that jihadi forums have recently ‘become quite an open and accepting platform for female supporters of the jihad to join in.’ Should we assume that Umayma al-Zawahiri’s statement signals a potential possibility that the jihadis would embrace an active military role for women on the battlefield? Jihadi ideologues have often used the term mujahidat to designate the wives, sisters and daughters of jihadis who do not necessarily take part in military jihad. But, to my knowledge, they do not use the term ‘murabitat’, which, I think, is significant.

The term ‘murabitat’ is the feminine active participle formed with the verb ‘rabata’ and shares the same root as the term ‘ribat.’ When used in a military context, the term ‘ribat’ designates a place on the frontier where the ‘murabitun’, military troops, assemble (historically on their horses) in preparation to fight the enemy. The term ‘murabitat’ is the feminine plural of ‘murabitun’ and therefore could be understood to designate female warriors. Jihadi literature is littered with the terms ‘murabitun’ and ‘ribat’, the latter, as Umayma al-Zawahiri states, designates places like Palestine, Iraq, Chechnya, Afghanistan and Somalia.

The jihadis do not have female ideologues of the stature that Zaynab al-Ghazali for instance represented for the Muslim Brotherhood. But it has to be said that jihadi ideologues and leaders have not been consistent or explicit on the question of whether women should take an active part in military jihad; in my view, this issue is the Achilles’ heel in their theory of jihad: when the jihadis argue that the classical/medieval defensive legal doctrine of jihad applies today, they generally present a plausible argument as to why jihad is the only viable path that could free them from their own ‘apostate’/unjust regimes and these regimes’ Western supporters. Despite their clarity and consensus on this point, the jihadis are quite ambiguous as to whether the classical defensive legal doctrine of jihad applies to women today, as the classical doctrine stipulates. In making their case for jihad, today’s jihadis are keen to cite the classical jurists who were in agreement that when the territory of Islam is invaded, jihad is considered to be a defensive warfare and it becomes ‘an individual duty (fard ‘ayn) incumbent upon each Muslim man and woman.’ Accordingly, in ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam’s words, ‘a boy is permitted to go out to fight without his father’s permission, a wife without her husband’s, and he who is in debt without his creditor’s’.  Yet ‘Azzam who was critical in making this defensive legal doctrine a cornerstone of the jihadis’ worldview, shied away from making the duty incumbent upon women, as the classical doctrine stipulates. In his Ilhaq bi-al-Qafila (Join the Caravan [of Jihad]) which he wrote to rally Arabs to join jihad in Afghanistan, he explicitly stated that ‘Arab women cannot take part in fighting, because Afghan women have not yet done so.’

In his al-‘Umda (p. 27),  Dr Fadl argues that women are to take up military jihad under one condition: only when the enemy invades Muslim territory and also comes into their homes. Since it is possible that the Muslim woman may have to defend herself under this specific circumstance, Dr Fadl argues that it is incumbent upon her to receive basic military training and learn how to use military equipments so that she can be ready to repel her attackers.

It is noteworthy that Ayman al-Zawahiri, Umayma’s husband, is not clear on this question either. When he was asked in his ‘Town Hall’ meeting in 2008, what is the highest rank occupied by a woman in al-Qa‘ida, he responded that there are no women in al-Qa‘ida, but ‘the mujahidat (female jihadis accompanying their husbands) are doing a heroic job watching over their homes and their children.’

As the jihadis admit, according to the classical defensive legal doctrine of jihad, Muslim women are under no obligation to seek anyone’s permission to fight. Why then do jihadi leaders and ideologues deny women the fulfillment of this individual duty? Based on the jihadi literature I have read, Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi (killed in 2006) is the most explicit and consistent on this issue. In one of his statements entitled ‘Ilhaq bi-al-Qafila’ (Join the Caravan [of Jihad] - the same title as ‘Azzam’s treatise cited above),  al-Zarqawi declares: ‘the war broke out … if you [Muslim men] are not going to be chivalrous knights in this war (fursan al-harb), make way for women to wage it… Yes, by God, men have lost their manhood.’

Was al-Zarqawi trying to shame those Muslim men who have not taken up jihad? No doubt. But he had no qualms adding his views as to the sort of women he wants to see on the battlefield: ‘we do not want men like Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, ‘Uthman, ‘Ali (i.e., the four Rightly Guided Caliphs), Sa’d, al-Miqdad, Talha and al-Zubayr (i.e., Companions of the Prophet) … instead we want men like Safiyya.’ By Safiyya, he meant Safiyya bt. ‘Abd al-Muttalib (paternal aunt of the Prophet). She is said to have taken part in the Battle of Badr and she was also wounded during the Battle of Uhud when she saved the Prophet’s life by taking a spear that was targeting him (see Amira Sonbol, Encyclopedia of Women and Islamic Cultures).

Umayma al-Zawahiri also cites Safiyya as a model to emulate; in addition, she cites Umm ‘Umara who is also said to have taken part in several military battles alongside the Prophet and was wounded during the Battle of Yamama. Is Umayma al-Zawahiri reclaiming for Muslim women their right and duty to take part in military jihad, as the classical defensive legal doctrine mandates? We must await further clarification from her on this question.

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Previously, numerous references have been made to the Aafia Siddiqui case by different jihadi groups, including  Jaish-e-Mohammad on their weekly online magazine, Al-Qalam. The “arrest/torture of our innocent, Muslim sister by the infidel” rhetoric plays on the honor code and anti-western sentiments of young Pakistani men whom militant leaders aim to attract and recruit. Siddiqui was brought up again in a recent joint interview by Hakimullah Mehsud and Wali-ur-Rehman in October 2009; the video ended with the question “who will rescue our sister Dr Aafia Siddiqui from these Christian barbarians?” That the new TTP leadership continues to use Siddiqui as subject matter to appeal to their audience shows the extent of her importance to the Pakistani jihadi propaganda mill.

In “Rescuing the Prisoners” Hamam builds on this propaganda by talking about the “thousands of Muslim sons and daughters rotting in infidel jails,” including Palestinians, Uzbeks, Russians and Pakistanis, and the religious duty of Muslims to save these prisoners.

Excerpts from the Quran and Hadith are used to this end; the Prophet Mohammad has apparently given unequivocal importance to this order when he stated that “whosoever rescues a prisoner from the infidel, I become that prisoner.” Further, “if a Muslim woman is arrested in the east, it is the duty of every Muslim in the west to save her.”

The author singles out Aafia Siddiqui, who has “her hopes hitched on us Muslims now.”  Examples are given of “Fatima and Noor” who in their letters from Abu Ghraib prison claimed: “every day 10 U.S. soldiers assault/abuse us at one time.”

The author ends by appealing to all Muslims to pursue jihad until “all Muslims brothers and sisters have been rescued from infidel jails, Muslims territories have been returned to us, countries who have shamed us have been avenged, and the name of Allah has been raised high throughout the world. “

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Takfir and takfiris

Takfir, as many readers will know, is the practice of excommunication, i.e. of declaring another Muslim to be an infidel (kafir). Traditionally, Muslim scholars have generally been careful to apply this concept in their dealings with other believers because of the drastic consequences it could have; according to the shari‘a (Islamic law), a Muslim who consciously and willingly abandons Islam or converts to a different religion may be killed. In recent times, many jihadis have argued in favour of a greater application of takfir, applying it to rulers of Muslim countries for not (fully) legislating on the basis of Islamic law. Since many (but certainly not all) jihadis claim applying the shari‘a is part and parcel of being a Muslim, they contend that rulers who refrain from doing so cease to be believers and are, in fact, infidels. Because of this, they subsequently claim that waging jihad against these rulers is legitimate.

According to most Muslim scholars (as well as probably the overwhelming majority of Muslims), this is a rather extreme application of takfir that will only bring about chaos and civil strife. Jihadis who apply takfir this way are therefore often referred to as takfiris or even extremists of takfir (ghulat al-takfir). These labels are fiercely rejected by many jihadis, however, who associate the term ghulat or ghulat al-takfir with Muslims who not only excommunicate political rulers for their failure to apply the shari‘a but also ordinary Muslims who have nothing to do with legislation whatsoever. In some cases, these ghulat even excommunicate entire societies. This latter group of Muslims (i.e. the ones who are willing to apply takfir to large groups of people) is referred to as “the extremists of takfir” even among jihadis and this is also how Nur al-Islam uses the term.

Annihilating global Jihadi-Salafism

One can justifiably wonder what on earth such extremists have to do with RAND. When I first read the title of this piece, I was rather hoping to find a highly intricate and complex reasoning that starts from a ridiculous premise but is nevertheless so logically argued that one is tempted to believe it all as the only possible outcome. This is often the case with jihadi writings, which are sometimes mistakenly dismissed as the rantings of crazy radicals but are actually often cleverly reasoned, despite their horrific message. Although this piece disappointed me in this respect, it is interesting nevertheless.

The author first gives the reader some general information about RAND and continues by stating that the enemy (i.e. RAND) wants to understand its enemy (i.e. jihadis) in order to fight them better. He then goes on, however, to claim that RAND has actively sought the help of other Muslims, including the scholars of al-Azhar in Cairo and the popular Egyptian preacher ‘Amr Khalid, to “annihilate global Jihadi-Salafism”. These were only second choices, however, since the author states that RAND had first asked other, non-violent Salafis to help them with this task but this had failed. He then asks whether RAND’s next step may be to asks extremists in takfir for their help in destroying (the less extreme and supposedly pure) Jihadi-Salafism. The author continues by pointing out that these extremists in takfir not only adhere to extremist teachings but have also done tremendous damage to Jihadi-Salafism by criticising scholars and activists who do stick to the true and correct teachings, like Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Ayman al-Zawahiri and others, including a surprising number of Jordanian Jihadi-Salafis.

Smear campaign

At this point, it becomes clear what the author’s real intention is. He is not at all trying to criticise RAND, as so many jihadis have done before. His real aim is to attack the people he calls extreme takfiris for their criticism of the Jordanian Jihadi-Salafi community supportive of al-Maqdisi. This has been done before, as I have pointed out elsewhere, but Nur al-Islam takes the charge of extreme takfiris to a new level. He claims that, just like RAND tries to destroy Jihadi-Salafism worldwide, so do the extreme takfiris. The author states that these ghulat al-takfir may or may not be aware of RAND’s plans “but unfortunately the result is, in any case, the same”, namely that both of them try to “bring down” Jihadi-Salafism and its leaders.

The author’s seemingly critical piece about RAND thus turns out to be little more than what may be the start of a larger smear campaign against al-Maqdisi’s jihadi enemies. By even suggesting that these supposedly extreme takfiris may possibly be working with the widely-hated RAND, the author tries to undermine their credibility. To me personally, this charge seems a bit too far-fetched to be taken entirely seriously and I therefore doubt whether the accusation will be picked up by like-minded jihadis to frame their opponents as being in bed with RAND. Still, it would be interesting to see if the already impressive array of labels Islamists use to discredit each other is soon going to be joined by another one: Randis.

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Azam Tariq mainly talks about the recent military operation in Waziristan and the complicity of Pakistani politicians and special forces (SFs) in importing and waging America´s war on Pakistani territory.

Like most TTP leaders, Azam underlines that theirs is a “defensive” jihad against the Pakistani regime.  The image created is that of a hapless group being provoked into fighting an unwanted jihad. That is, against its own volition, the TTP must fight the Pakistani state and army.

While the cardinal enemy, and “target of all jihadi struggles”, is the U.S. for it sits at the helm of all infidel nations, Pakistan´s “secular rulers” and their shameless submissiveness to the U.S. has left the TTP no choice but to fight the “domestic” infidels first.  The question, then, Azam sarcastically asks, is: “Where do the mujahidin find that elusive Aladin´s lamp which will enable them to ignore the infidel´s (U.S.) puppets in Pakistan and go straight after the beast itself?”

Azam explains that incriminating the Pakistani government and army are certain “ground realities,” encapsulated here as follows:

•    Drone strikes: Pakistani airspace for a long time has been give to the U.S. so to carry out such attacks.
•    Spies captured by the TTP have confessed to the involvement of Pakistani SFs in distributing SIM cards on ground. That is, the drone missile strikes would not be possible without the help of the Pakistani Army.
•    Americans are always landing at Islamabad airport with instructions/orders for the GoP.
•    Pak Army´s Military Intelligence (MI) spy service supports Blackwater, and “everyone knows” that Blackwater is behind the bomb attacks on bazaars, markets and the public.
•    Obama has clearly stated that America´s victory/defeat in Afhganistan depends heavily on Pakistan. Pakistani political parties – PPP, ANP, MQM – have all risen to the occasion, offering themselves up to the Americans.

Azam also denies claims pertaining to the “success” of military operation in Waziristan. He alleges that all areas to have been “cleared” by the Army, including Mehsud territory, are false. In fact, the mujahidin are engaged in a fierce battle with the SFs in those very areas, inflicting great damage on the latter. With regards to the “innumerable” mujahidin to have reportedly been killed, Azam claims that only 20 mujahidin have so far been “martyred.” The remaining victims, he writes, were “women, children and the elderly.”

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In the past, Will (here and here), Brynjar (here) and Thomas (here) have written excellent posts on Jihadica about the Jordanian ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s credibility problems. Just to refresh everyone’s memory: as a result of al-Maqdisi’s criticism of his former pupil Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi’s extreme use of violence in Iraq in 2004 and 2005, some fellow jihadis accused him of reneging on his earlier, supposedly more radical beliefs and of betraying the mujahidin. This criticism was expressed particularly fiercely on the Midad al-Suyuf forum by contributors such as al-Mihdar, Layth Makka and especially al-Zarqawi’s brother-in-law, Abu Qudama Salih al-Hami.

Abu Qudama, a journalist who worked in the AfPak region during the fighting there in the 1980s, is said to be close to many of the mujahidin who fought there and particularly al-Zarqawi. It therefore seemed safe to assume that the reason for his hostility was al-Maqdisi’s criticism of al-Zarqawi. Abu Qudama’s hostility was expressed in several books, including The Truth of the Conflict between Shaykh al-Maqdisi and the Heirs of al-Zarqawi is Jihad in the Way of God, which were also posted on the Midad al-Suyuf forum, as well as some others. Indeed, if one were to visit the Midad al-Suyuf forum today and go to the “al-Siyasa al-Shar‘iyya” section, it would be easy to find recent threads dedicated to anti-Maqdisi themes. These include threads with titles such as “Why does Abu Qatada remain in prison while al-Maqdisi is released?”, “Shaykh al-Maqdisi is a scholar with the people of ignorance”, “When is al-Maqdisi going to wake up?” and “Al-Maqdisi and the internet… The means to realise the agreed upon goal… or only for fame?” These and other threads are highly critical of al-Maqdisi and make Midad al-Suyuf look like it is obsessed with al-Maqdisi since he criticised al-Zarqawi and doesn’t seem to take him very seriously anymore no matter what he does. Indeed, al-Maqdisi himself has dedicated an article to addressing the hostility he encounters on this particular forum. They give the impression, in other words, of being sworn enemies over their dispute about al-Zarqawi.

This impression may be wrong, however. Strangely enough, as late as 2008 al-Maqdisi’s writings were sometimes posted on the Midad al-Suyuf forum without any commentary or accompanied by praise, occasionally even by people like al-Mihdar, who would later criticise him severely. This change of tone from neutrality or even support for al-Maqdisi to downright hostility cannot be explained by simply pointing to al-Maqdisi’s criticism of al-Zarqawi; after all, this was expressed in 2004 and 2005, implying that if this was the reason, the change in attitude towards al-Maqdisi would have taken place earlier. This raises the question: what caused this change?

Umm Mus‘ab

The reason why Midad al-Suyuf turned sour on al-Maqdisi has a lot to do with the writings by Abu Qudama, which seem to have given the contributors to the forum the information on which they base most of their hostility. In 2007, he wrote a book called Knights of the Absent Duty, in which he describes his experiences with the mujahidin and especially displays his knowledge of al-Zarqawi. In the book, however, he is not very negative about al-Maqdisi at all and even describes his endurance under torture in a Jordanian prison, although he does indicate the differences between al-Maqdisi and his hero al-Zarqawi. Significantly, however, Abu Qudama points out that al-Zarqawi was killed in 2006 by an American attack because the latter’s wife, Umm Mus‘ab, wrote letters to family and friends in either Iraq or Jordan without her husband’s knowledge. He suggests that through these letters, Umm Mus‘ab must have (inadvertently) betrayed al-Zarqawi’s whereabouts, leading the Americans to the place where he was hiding. He states that this is the only way they could have known about this.

This implicit accusation of Umm Mus‘ab was apparently so offensive to al-Maqdisi that he claims to have written a letter to Abu Qudama in which he tells him that he shouldn’t defame Umm Mus‘ab and that this whole story is a lie since al-Zarqawi’s wife was not even in Iraq at the time so she couldn’t have known about her husband’s hiding place. Although al-Maqdisi has several writings on his website that briefly refer to Abu Qudama’s accusation, in none of them does he mention what Abu Qudama actually accuses Umm Mus‘ab of. He states that he didn’t mention this because he didn’t want to defame her any more than Abu Qudama had already done. Perhaps for the same reason, al-Maqdisi’s letter to Abu Qudama is also absent from his website.

According to al-Maqdisi, Abu Qudama got so angry with him over this letter that he started writing books condemning al-Maqdisi. Although he doesn’t say so explicitly, al-Maqdisi may suggest that all of Abu Qudama’s anger towards him isn’t about his criticism of al-Zarqawi at all but simply about his own anger over being reprimanded for supposedly falsely accusing Umm Mus‘ab. Although this information should be treated carefully since I do not know how Abu Qudama feels about this issue, it would explain why the Midad al-Suyuf forum turned increasingly hostile to al-Maqdisi.

This story may come across as nothing more than jihadi gossip. There is, however, some significance to it. Firstly, it shows how much influence one author knowledgeable about jihadis can have on a forum that was initially not unfavourably disposed towards al-Maqdisi. Secondly, it also shows how a man widely viewed as one of the most important radical scholars alive can quickly fall from grace among a small but dedicated group of people if targeted in the right way. Perhaps surprisingly, it appears that for some zealous jihadis al-Maqdisi’s large number of books and his prison credibility seem to count for little.

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The Internet in Indonesia: Development and Impact of Radical Websites - Jennifer Yang Hui
Jihadi Operational Art: The Coming Wave of Jihadi Strategic Studies - Dima Adamsky

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The text has received surprisingly little media coverage so far. This is curious, not least considering the importance of ‘Abbud al-Zumar to the legacy of the Egyptian al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group). According to Muntasir al-Zayyat (one-time activist in al-Jama‘a and now a lawyer who specializes in defending Islamist activists - see his website), ‘Abbud was the military strategist of the group that was led by Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj, the author of al-Farida al-Gha’iba (The Forgotten Obligation) and the leader of the group that assassinated Anwar al-Sadat.

Following Faraj’s execution, a split among al-Jama‘a ensued and ‘Abbud became leader of the group’s wing Tanzim al-Jihad (the Jihad Organization), while Sheikh ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman (who is currently serving a prison sentence in the US for the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centre) became leader of the wing known as al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya (al-Zayyat, al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, p. 229).

It is worth noting that ‘Abbud and Tariq al-Zumar were not among the authors of the series of books published by al-Jama’a leaders since 1997 as part of the so-called ‘Mubadarat Waqf al-‘Unf’ (The Initiative of Halting Violence).

With al-Badil al-Thalith, ‘Abbud and Tariq al-Zumar have produced what they believe to be an initiative containing a domestic plan of action based on political, not military, reform for Egyptian Islamists; and a global road map for Islamists and jihadis, including al-Qa‘ida, designed to develop a strategy based on working with (not against) select Western forces for the purpose of advancing the Islamist cause worldwide.

Given that this initiative was authored behind bars, to what extent should we assume that this is a document that genuinely represents the authors’ convictions instead of the views their jailors want us to believe that al-Zumars now espouse? For obvious reasons, this legitimate concern cannot be fully resolved, but two important points should be noted in this respect: first, al-Shuruq obtained the rights to publish al-Badil al-Thalith from ‘Abbud’s parents and the publication does not appear to have been orchestrated by Egyptian authorities; second, the authors’ critical stance of the Egyptian regime, as will be discussed below, suggests that that the document has not been tampered with by the hands of the authorities, wallahu a‘alam.

The authors are aware of their readers’ dilemma. That is why they are keen to stress that the muraja‘at (‘revisions/re-examinations/recantations’) cannot achieve their objectives unless three conditions are met: (1) the release of all political prisoners; (2) the removal of all the obstacles facing the youth from taking part in public life; (3) the opportunity of making peaceful regime change feasible, through  finding ways of making leaders accountable and removing them when necessary.

It is within this framework that al-Zumars have put forward a new initiative, proposing an amnesty for all those who participated in the crimes of torture in Egyptian prisons. This, they believe, should be part of a national reconciliation that includes (1) amnesty and release of all political prisoners, (2) compensating the thousands of prisoners who have endured torture and (3) compensating the families of those whose loved ones lost their lives in the process.

What’s in it for the Egyptian government? Al-Zumars point out that it is necessary to end quickly the ‘torture file’ before international forces use it as an excuse to interfere in the domestic affairs of Egypt. They highlight that such an intervention could be either at the hands of foreign governments as well as NGOs that are concerned with violations of human rights around the world. In other words, Husni Mubarak’s regime has more to gain by professing a mea culpa on its own domestic terms instead of being forced to do so through external international legal bodies.

How should ending military struggle proceed?
Al-Zumars enumerate several conditions towards this end. These include a call for regional and international co-operation between Arab and Islamic states, including Iran; forging alliances with those seeking to reform the United Nations in an effort to guarantee the interests of politically marginalized nations and oppressed peoples. While they obviously want the government to govern on the basis of the creed of divine unity (tawhid), al-Zumars stress that the interest of the Islamic mission (al-da‘wa) may entail adopting a neutral stance vis-a-vis the authorities and avoiding confrontations with them.

Islamic movements, al-Zumars hold, should meet several critical challenges. Al-Zumars propose a nuanced approach to dealing with non-Muslims. To begin with, they call for devising a new comprehensive vision that defines the nature of the relationship with Western civilization, away from the ‘clash of civilization’ paradigm (Third Alternative, part 4). In their minds, the importance of forging political alliances cannot be understated and it does not contradict ‘aqidat al-wala’ wa-al-bara’ (i.e., the Islamic creed that provides guidelines related to Muslims’ obligations to associate with and support fellow Muslims and when to dissociate from non-Muslims). Al-Zumars remind their readers that the Prophet himself forged alliances with non-Muslims when the objective of these alliances was in the interest of repelling oppression, as in the case of hilf al-fudul (‘pact of chivalry’ – this pact antedates Islam; the Prophet took part in it when he was young and he is said to have maintained his commitment to its principles after he received the Revelations. In other words, hilf al-fudul is a product of the jahiliyya era, but its principles stand even after the advent of Islam).

Al-Zumars also highlight that the Prophet entered into alliances with non-Muslims when he deemed that such alliances were in the interests of Muslims, as in the case of the ‘constitution of Medina’ (an alliance that is said to have been between the Muslims who escaped Meccan persecution (al-Muhajirun), their supporters in Medina (al-Ansar) and the Jews of Medina). Accordingly, al-Zumars assert that ‘forging alliances and cooperating with non-Muslims is permitted so long as the objective behind these alliances is legitimate’; indeed ‘forging alliances may be an obligation (wajib) if the objective is to realize the freedom of propagating the Islamic mission or simply preserve the life and safety of its preachers.’

Working within this pragmatic framework, al-Zumars argue that co-operating with non-Muslims can be in the interest of effectively resisting occupation. ‘The military and political campaigns led by the US and its allies against the Islamic world’, they hold, ‘do not necessarily represent the will and visions of the American and European people. That is why it is necessary to devise a plan that deals with these campaigns based on differentiating between the leaders/elites and their peoples. For we continue to observe the opposition against the military campaign against Iraq mounted by the American and European peoples; opinion polls in Europe reveal a great sympathy with the Palestinian cause … for this reason, it is not sensible to direct our bombs against societies that are calling on their governments to stop their aggression against Iraq’ and support other Islamic causes (Third Alternative, part 5).

Al-Zumars do not appear to have given up entirely on the hope of the US government changing its policies towards the Islamic world. They remark that the election of Barack Obama represents a clear coup against the aggressive policies of George W. Bush’s administration. The Obama administration’s policies however remain subject to implementation, not least considering that Iraq is still occupied and preparations are underway to send more troops to Afghanistan (note that al-Badil al-Thalith was published before the troop increase in Afghanistan). Al-Zumars called on President Obama to translate his statements into positive practical measures, among them the release of Sheikh ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Rahman.

Al-Qa‘ida and Military Jihad
Despite al-Zumars’ new commitment to peaceful political reform, they do not reject military jihad without qualification nor do they condemn al-Qa‘ida outright. Instead, they state that with respect to al-Qa‘ida, ‘we declare our support for lawful jihad (al-jihad al-mashru‘) that al-Qa‘ida is mounting in those parts of the Islamic world that are subject to occupation or aggression; indeed, al-Qa‘ida’s jihad in this respect is esteemed and respected by all those who are sincere in the umma, and we are perfectly ready to pay with our lives as a price to defend this noble jihad.’  Al-Zumars however go on to call on the leaders of al-Qa‘ida to re-examine their strategies that seek to move military operations to the Islamic world; they hold that this strategy has breached many Islamic legal stipulations. They also call on al-Qa‘ida ‘to re-examine its legal opinion (fatwa) that makes it lawful to shed the blood of Western civilians, for it is not consistent with Islamic law’ (Third Alternative, part 8).

Undoubtedly, al-Badil al-Thalith represents a clear departure from the worldview al-Zumars once espoused. It is to be remembered that they, especially ‘Abbud, were once fully committed to the thesis Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salam Faraj advocated in his al-Farida al-Gha’iba. Faraj believed that only the path of military jihad could save Muslims in this world and the next and that jihad must be directed first and foremost against the near enemy, i.e., Muslim rulers who are in apostasy of Islam because they do not govern according to the justice Islam preaches.

Why then should al-Badil al-Thalith not receive the attention that other so-called muraja‘at of militant struggle through jihad have received, most notably, Dr Fadl’s Tarshid (2007) and his later response to Ayman al-Zawahiri’s (al-Ta‘riya li-Kitab al-Tabri’a), both of which have been covered here on Jihadica.

In his critique of al-Badil al-Thalith, Hani al-Siba‘i (a London-based Egyptian lawyer sympathetic with the strategy of military jihad and director of al-Maqrizi centre), remarked in a commentary that the reason why al-Zumars’ initiative has not received much media attention is due not just to its bad timing (it was released during Ramadan) but more importantly because its message did not win the approval of Egyptian authorities.

I suspect there is some truth to that. As al-Siba‘i remarks, unlike Dr Fadl who personalized his attacks against al-Qa‘ida and especially Ayman al-Zawahiri and therefore lost credibility, al-Zumars have refrained from polemical attacks.

There is more to this than al-Siba‘i is suggesting. From the Egyptian authorities’ point of view, Dr Fadl didn’t really present an alternative to Egyptians who might be sympathetic with al-Jama‘a, whereas al-Zumars are presenting a proactive alternative based on peaceful and political reform. While al-Badil al-Thalith is by no means a comprehensive plan, it nevertheless highlights basic and legitimate demands of the Egyptian government, most notably, accountability for the rulers and the freedom for all to partake in the political process.

Al-Badil al-Thalith presents yet another challenge to the Egyptian authorities, namely al-Zumars’ recognition of the efforts and sacrifices the Muslim Brotherhood has made to ‘open up channels for Islamic political engagement’ despite all the obstacles the government has placed in its way. Saluting the model of the Muslim Brotherhood could signal a potential problem for the Mubarak regime: a scenario whereby al-Jama‘a and al-Ikhwan could form an alliance and contest elections is not a prospect the Egyptian government is willing to entertain, especially with a Presidential election looming in 2011.

Will al-Badil al-Thalith make a dent in the jihadis’ global strategy? Probably not. Indeed, the jihadis are likely to point out that al-Zumars’ proposal has gone undebated not just in the Arab and Islamic world, but also in the West, which, in their minds, goes to prove that only polemical statements like those allegedly authored by Dr Fadl make it into the headlines. They are also likely to point out that Western analysts who rush to promote recantations such as those authored by Dr Fadl are wittingly or unwittingly doing the bidding of the Egyptian government. All this, they would say, proves why military jihad is the only path that could lead to genuine reform in the Islamic world.

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