Whatever the outcome may be, it seems obvious that, from a Palestinian point of view at least, the process of reconciliation is a good thing. One might think that this even applies to more radical Islamic groups in the Gaza Strip. Sure, these groups don’t exactly like Hamas and they probably hate the secular Fatah even more, but you might think that even they would agree that Palestinian infighting serves no purpose and that a united opposition against Israel is certainly better. Well, think again. In this post, I will look at a document called Palestinian National Reconciliation in the Balance of the Islamic Shari’a, prepared by the Shari’a Council of the Jama’at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad – Bayt al-Maqdis, one of the radical groups in Gaza.

Qur’an and Sunna

While the authors of the document acknowledge that division and conflict is bad and reconciliation and unity is commendable in Islamic tradition, they state that it should happen on certain conditions. One of these is that any reconciliation should conform to the Qur’an and the Sunna (the example of the Prophet Muhammad). Citing verses (Arberry’s translation) Q. 4: 59 (“[...] If you should quarrel on anything, refer it to God and the Messenger [...]“), Q. 4: 65 (“But no, by thy Lord! they will not believe till they make thee the judge regarding the disagreement between them [...]“) and Q. 42: 10 (“And whatever you are at variance on, the judgment thereof belongs to God”), the authors state that the Qur’an itself calls on Muslims to appeal to God and the Prophet for mediation. Instead, the document claims, Fatah and Hamas base their reconciliation on “man-made law” (qanun wad’iyya) and future “polytheistic elections” (intikhabat shirkiyya), which shows that their efforts are born in sin.

Legislation

This issue of “man-made laws” and elections is taken a step further by the authors, who point to the desired results of the Palestinian reconciliation: forming a new parliament and a government that “judges according something else than what God has sent down”. Citing Q. 42: 21 (“Or have they associates who have laid down for them as religion that for which God gave not leave?”) and Q. 5: 50 (“Is it the judgment of pagandom then that they are seeking? Yet who is fairer in judgment than God, for a people having a sure faith?”), the authors equate such “un-Islamic” legislation with the yasiq, the Mongol system of legislation that combined Islamic, Mongol and other laws–a system Ibn Taymiyya condemned in his day. The authors, unsurprisingly, condemn such a system of laws as “clear unbelief”.

Another bone of contention related to legislation is the authors’ claim that the Palestinian reconciliation is based on international laws and treaties that have been drawn up by international organisations such as the United Nations and the Arab League. Since these are, in the authors’ view, “infidel” organisations themselves, they are not to be followed. Moreover, isn’t the United Nations the organisation that has adopted a string of resolutions “that have destroyed Palestine and have allowed crimes against the Muslims, their houses and their possessions”? The international and regional support this reconciliation enjoys, the document suggests, shows you that it’s utterly wrong.

Recognition

The final obstacle that the authors discern in the Palestinian reconcilliation is the implicit recognition of Israel that it entails. They point out that Muslim scholars agree that jihad is an individual duty (fard ‘ayn) if a non-Muslim enemy occupies as much as an inch of Muslim land. Nevertheless, the authors state, Fatah is not ashamed to proclaim openly that they accept and recognise Israel’s right to exist and its right to live in freedom and security on “the lands occupied in 1948″. This is bad enough to the authors, of course, but Fatah’s reconciliation with Hamas at least implies that the latter will go along with this. Didn’t Hamas’s Khalid Mish’al himself talk about cooperating with Fatah “to realise the shared national goal”, which he mentioned as being the founding of “a free Palestinian state and complete self-determination on the land of the [West] Bank and the [Gaza] Strip with Jerusalem as its capital without any settler”? The authors seem to assume that this is not only a shared goal between Fatah and Hamas but also the latter’s final goal. If it is, the author’s suggest, Hamas is openly violating its duty to wage jihad against Israel.

What is interesting in all of this is the important role legislation plays. Many of the arguments (no recourse to Islamic law in reconciliation, no government on this basis, reliance on international law, support from regimes and organisations that apply “man-made laws”) focus on this issue and only one argument points to Fatah’s more conciliatory stance towards Israel. Only as an afterthought do the authors add the alleged betrayal of Palestinian President ‘Abbas by supposedly encouraging Israel to wage war on Gaza in late 2008 and early 2009. This portrays the Jama’at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad – Bayt al-Maqdis as pious and very concerned with doctrine, even to the point of apparently attaching more value to it than to political reconciliation. Whether this is going to be a very popular stance among Palestinians in general is highly doubtful.

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The West

One member of al-Qaida Central who responds to the situation in Libya is, perhaps unsurprisingly since he is a Libyan himself, Abu Yahya al-Libi. His comments stress that the United States is “the idol (taghut) of the age” (i.e., the country that other countries “serve”) and “the source of terrorism”. He asks rhetorically: “Isn’t America the one who supported the regime of ‘Husni Barak’, the pharaoh of Egypt, but why is it that today it is singing the praises of the Egyptian people’s freedom?! Aren’t America and the governments of the West the ones who supported and [still] support the despotic regime of ‘Ali ‘Abdallah Salih [in Yemen]? Aren’t America and France the ones who totally supported the tyrannical regime of Zayn al-’Abidin [in Tunisia] that refused its people the least of their rights?! But why is it that afterwards they praise the people for obtaining their freedom?!”

Powerful stuff indeed. It is not entirely clear, however, how this is related to Libya, with which the United States has long been on very bad terms and for whose regime it therefore cannot really be blamed. The reason for al-Libi’s criticism of the US seems to be that the country has contributed to liberating Libya through NATO, for which many Libyans are supposedly quite grateful, and he may fear that this will lead to a positive image of the West among many Libyans.

NATO’s influence in Libya is also the subject of an “open letter to the Muslims in Libya” by Abu l-Hasan Rashid al-Bulaydi. The author emphasises that it is important to understand that “the Crusader NATO” is not out to help the Muslims but to “fight their religion”. “The Crusader West”, al-Bulaydi says, wants to serve its own interests and NATO aims to “contain your revolution”, give it “a secular identity and a Western spirit” and aim for “loyalty to the enemies of Islam and enmity and war against the jihadi trend”. He therefore advises Libyans to act with wisdom and “not to fear the power of the Crusader West, because God is more powerful”.

Continue fighting

Somewhat in line with the above, several scholars argue that the fighting in Libya may have stopped after the fall of the regime but that it should continue until the country is an Islamic state. The Jordanian radical scholar Abu Humam Bakr b. ‘Abd al-’Aziz al-Athari, in a short piece entitled “Oh people of success, have you already put down your weapons?”, states that Libyans should “fight for the sake of legislating the heavenly shari’a. That is the goal and for its sake does the upholder of the unity of God (muwahhid) fight till the end.” He cites a tradition about the life of the Prophet Muhammad in which the latter is said to have put down his weapons but was encouraged by the angel Jibril to fight on, which Muhammad subsequently did. This should serve as an example for Libyans today, whom Abu Humam advises not to listen to or try to satisfy NATO since “Jews and Christians will not be satisfied with you until you follow their religion” (Q. 2: 120).

Libya is ideally placed for a continuation of such a fight, argues Abu Sa’d al-’Amili in a treatise on the revolution in Libya, because the country has certain advantages for mujahidun. First of all, he says, Libyans are conservative people; secondly, it has a “noble jihadi history”; and, thirdly, the country is geographically close to Algeria, where al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM) has its base. Since Libya is part of the Islamic Maghrib and AQIM also has some Libyan leaders, Abu Sa’d writes, the revolution offers some excellent chances to link up with like-minded radicals in the rest of the region. The application of the shari’a should be the result of the jihad that Muslims in Libya have to wage. This is really necessary because the temporary leaders currently ruling Libya cannot be relied upon. “We cannot imagine”, Abu Sa’d states, “that these liberators [i.e. the revolutionaries who overthrew the regime] will give their loyalty to a gang of unknown secularists who follow the Crusader West to continue the occupation and exploitation of the country in the name of democracy.” NATO, the author writes, did not “participate in striking the military bases of al-Qadhafi to defend the honour of the Libyan people and to save thousands  of likely victims from the brutality of al-Qadhafi and his soldiers”. The West, he says, was involved to serve its own economic and security interests and actually “has a great fear of the Islamic tendency of the revolutionaries”. This, he says, is why there is a transitional council of secularists.

Reconciliation

An entirely different approach to the situation is taken by the Syrian-British Abu Basir al-Tartusi, who also had much to say about Syria. This time, however, we will look at what he wrote on the revolution in Libya. Although he obviously agrees that Libya should become an Islamic state with the shari’a as its only source of legislation, he stresses that the country should work on internal reconciliation. He states that all Libyans are Muslims who love God and the Prophet Muhammad and that jihadis should take care not to create a distance between themselves and the people by saying “these are with us and these are against us, these are with Islam and these are against Islam”. Also, he emphasises that the Libyan people have lived under a tyrannical and infidel leader for over forty years, which means that jihadis are likely to encounter tensions in society. Abu Basir advises jihadi to deal with these with friendliness and wisdom.

Interestingly, Abu Basir not only advises jihadis to take a friendly approach towards the Libyan people as a whole, but also towards the remnants of the regime. He mentions that most of those working for al-Qadhafi’s regime were probably ignorant, poor and forced to cooperate and that they should be dealt with in a spirit of justice and leniency. It is wrong, Abu Basir states, to treat your opponents with the mindset and law of a tyrant. In fact, and quite opposite to men such as Abu Humam al-Athari, Abu Basir advises that people should stop fighting once the regime has fallen and solve conflicts with words and through dialogue. The country is now entering the phase of rebuilding, which is more difficult than fighting. Jihadis therefore need all the wisdom they have to set up an Islamic state in Libya.

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Praise

One of the men “advising” the Syrians currently revolting against the regime of President al-Asad is Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current leader of al-Qaida. In an epistle meant solely to greet, encourage and heap praise on the people he is addressing, al-Zawahiri spends one of the first paragraphs of his letter saying “salamun ‘alaykum” to his audience no fewer than eight times. He addresses them as “the mujahidun who command good and forbid evil”. This seems to be an attempt to claim that al-Qaida-like people are the ones trying to overthrow the Syrian regime, which is a good thing from his point of view because it allows him to create the idea that his organisation is alive and kicking and busy overthrowing “infidel” rulers, as it should be. From the Syrian people’s point of view, however, it is doubtful whether this is going to do them any good. As radical scholar Abu l-Mundhir al-Shinqiti pointed out in a fatwa that I wrote about in a previous post, it may actually be more advisable for Syrian jihadis to lay low, not giving the regime any extra excuse to crack down on them with the argument that the demonstrators are, in fact, terrorists. Al-Zawahiri doesn’t seem to realise this, urging his audience to tell President al-Asad that he is “a partner in the war on Islam in the name of terrorism and a protector of the borders of Israel”. Even more explicitly – in a phrase that sounds better in Arabic than it does in English – he tells them to say to al-Asad: “We have broken the shackles of fear and smashed the prison of weakness. The free [men] of Syria and its mujahidun have decided that they will live as honourable people and die as martyrs (ya’ishu a’izza’ wa-yamutu shuhada’).”

Al-Zawahiri also keeps going on about the supposedly strong American ties to the Syrian regime. He states that “America, which has co-operated with Bashar al-Asad throughout his reign, now claims that it is on your side”. He advises the Syrian protestors to say to the U.S. and President Obama that “we are the sons of the conquerors, the offspring of the mujahidun and the heirs of the murabitun (fighters operating from garrison cities).” The battle fought against the Syrian regime, al-Zawahiri claims, will obviously continue until “we raise the banners of victorious jihad” over Jerusalem. How exactly this is to be achieved in the face of a brutal regime that is not afraid to kill thousands of its own people is not entirely clear.

Syrian sectarianism

A more rational and level-headed approach is taken in another document, this one by Abu Basir al-Tartusi, a scholar living in London who is in no way part of the core leadership of al-Qaida but is one of the major thinkers reponsible for the organisation’s ideology. The originally-Syrian Abu Basir is churning out writings on Syria faster than you can say “the people want to topple the regime”, which may force me to dedicate another post to this country. In any case, Abu Basir wouldn’t be a true Salafi if he didn’t start by criticising the sect of the al-Asad family, the ‘Alawites, which Salafis (and, to a lesser extent, Sunnis in general) view as deviant or even infidel. He claims that they – among other things – are batinis (i.e. people who believe the Qur’an has an inner, esoteric meaning apart from its outer, exoteric meaning), idol worshippers and people who claim that caliph ‘Ali b. Abi Talib is God.

These ‘Alawites, Abu Basir claims, do not care about their homeland, or about its citizens. They have never amounted to anything and have never given any thought to what the people need. Abu Basir claims that the Syrian sectarian system is largely to blame for this, probably because the large number of sects and the differences between them encourage their members to act only on behalf of their own group, at the expense of loyalty to the country and the people as a whole. As a result, this regime has only brought awful things such as destruction, division and poverty. Surprisingly, however, given Abu Basir’s views of ‘Alawites in general, his approach is nuanced enough to distinguish between ‘Alawites who are part of the governing circle of President al-Asad and the majority of ‘Alawites, who suffer from poverty just like other Syrians. His wrath is therefore directed towards the regime and he thus advises the Syrian people to unite and express only one demand: the fall of the regime. Raising any other demand, Abu Basir claims, would be quite unwise, presumably because he realises that Syrians are not united enough to form a coalition on the basis of any demand other than the fall of the regime.

Practical advice

In two other writings (here and here), Abu Basir continues about the situation in Syria and stresses the need for peaceful resistance but also the legitimacy of self-defence. The regime, he says, has killed or wounded tens of thousands of people and the latter should therefore learn how to protect themselves by setting up security committees that can defend the protestors. These committees, he states, should not participate in demonstrations or in any peaceful activities, so as not to give the regime an extra reason to crack down on protestors. Abu Basir also wants “the noble free officers” (i.e. the ones that abandoned the regime’s army) to increase in number, expand their military activities and co-ordinate them with the aforementioned security committees.

Apart from advising the Syrian people on using non-peaceful methods, he tries to convince them that violence is justified. While he keeps stressing that peaceful resistance is good and commendable, he fails to see its use after so much bloodshed and scolds Syrians for refusing even to take violent means into consideration after it has become clear that sit-ins and other peaceful means have proved useless. He encourages the people to obtain arms and even quotes a verse from the Qur’an about military preparedness to underline the legitimacy of the use of violence. After having compared the Syrian regime with the French colonialism of the past, he wonders what the difference between the two of them really is and calls on the remnants of the army to fear God and take their responsibility towards Syria and its people by defending them and their honour “against the imperialism of the sectarian regime of al-Asad”.

If and how this advice is accepted by Syrians in general and jihadis in particular is unclear. What is clear from Abu Basir’s writings, however, is that he obviously cares about Syria. The tone of his work here is not one of fighting against “infidel” rulers who fail to apply the shari’a but much more one of concern for his native land, which he even refers to as “the beloved Syria”. Whether this is also the case with other commentators “advising” demonstrators in other countries is something I intend to explore in future posts.

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Unsurprisingly, the council rules that it is forbidden for Muslims to participate in a parliamentary system, even if it is to make the constitution more Islamic (the reasons are the same as those outlined in my Foreign Affairs article). It also enjoins Muslims to focus on fighting in “lands of jihad,” which is somewhat at odds with al-Shinqiti’s earlier ruling that mujahids should stay and fight in Egypt.

Of more interest than the council’s ruling is the question to which it responds. It gives a sense of the misgivings some jihadis have about their leaderships’ hard-line stance when there are real opportunities to advance their agenda to create an Islamic state. It is also an astute take on the political maneuverings of some Salafis in Egypt. Finally, it shows how the loyalties of some jihadis are split between Salafi and jihadi scholars:

Some of our noble shaykhs who have educated us have conducted ijtihad on this issue and sanctioned participation in the Egyptian legislative council (parliament) for a single term. That will be the term in which the new positive constitution for the country will be written for the coming period. They have sanctioned this for the sake of drafting legal material that is closer to Islam than secularism, although they recognize that participating here [Egypt] means the entry of some monotheists into elections and not just voting (although some differ on this matter).

What is your opinion? Do we agree or disagree with their ijtihad?

What is your opinion on the question of participating in the new political parties that they are presently establishing in the country, especially the Light Party and the Virtue Party, which are aligned with the well-known salafi mission in this country and are famous throughout the land?

What is your opinion on how we participate in the political movement after the election, knowing that the former regime used to imprison for years anyone it suspected of loving or supporting the mujahids or those who held their pure beliefs?

Or do we limit our goals to only seeking a way to go to the land of jihad?

I urge you to reply quickly since events are developing rapidly.

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• The open source case for Awlaki’s role as head of foreign ops and the case against.
• The impact of Awlaki’s death. Big Deal (here, here, here, here, here, and here). No big deal (here, here, here, and here). Counterproductive (here). Mix of all three (here).
• The legal case for killing Awlaki (here, here, here, and here). Case against (here, here, and here).

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Michelle’s account puts a human face on the knotty legal, ethical, and political problems the United States and its allies have grappled with as they tried to stop al-Qaeda and its supporters: torture for information, overthrowing stable governments who might align with terrorist groups, rendition, entrapment, collateral damage, and indefinite detention. There are also the less “kinetic” but  no-less-knotty problems like countering radicalization online in multi-cultural societies that value free speech.

What struck me most about Michelle’s account was her juxtaposition of violence and inanity. Hassan Aweys, the head of a group allied with al-Shabab in Somalia, covets Michelle’s boots. Hamid Gul, the former head of Pakistan’s ISI and sponsor of some of the United States’ worst enemies in the region, does not know who Tony Soprano is but, upon being told, empathizes with his bifurcated psyche. The white-polo-and-khaki-wearing Abu Jandal, UBL’s chief bodygaurd, is gracious to Western journalists while explaining that Bin Laden didn’t target the civilians in September. “He simply hit targets, and civilians happened to be around.” Kitch and karaoke permeate Guantanamo, along with euphemisms to describe poor detainee treatment.

Wisely, Michelle does not try to resolve the contradictions or unravel the knots. But she is hopeful that the Arab Spring and the death of bin Laden will take the wind out of the sails of the global jihadi movement and help the United States and its allies put the threat in perspective so they can abandon some of their worst counterterrorism tools. Me too.

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Interestingly, one of the things Abu al-Walid mentions as – unfortunately – being an impossibility is expanding his activities to the Sinai desert in order to give his organization more strategic depth. This is the case because of “the heavy security oppression on everyone who is thought to have even the slightest link to Jihadi-Salafism” (question no. 16). Recent attacks on Israel possibly coming from this area suggest that this situation may have changed. The revolution in Egypt has made the security situation in the Sinai desert less strict, perhaps allowing groups such as Abu al-Walid’s to obtain the breathing space they so desperately need. When answering his readers’ questions in late 2010, however, none of this had occurred yet. Nevertheless, they provide context for the group’s actions today:

Unity (again)

In Part 1 of this series, we saw that the lack of unity among Palestinian jihadi groups, despite their many similarities in background, goals, and ideology, worried several questioners. As the book in which their questions are asked progresses, some of the concerns about this issue become more explicit. In question no. 40, for example, Abu al-Walid is told (not asked): “You need to unify [with other jihadi groups], even if this leads to concessions on some issues.” Abu al-Walid’s answer is less than convincing: “May God bless you for your advice regarding unity. Rest assured, we are prepared to make concessions towards our brothers regarding many – not just some – issues.” Another questioner asks whether it would be possible to organize a major attack with other al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, perhaps boosting their popularity. Despite Abu al-Walid’s claims of weakness and a difficult security situation, he states that such an attack is nevertheless not too far away (question no. 59).

Abu al-Walid’s discussion of the lack of unity and, especially, its underlying causes takes on a new dimension when questioners start offering him their help. Several questioners (for example nos. 29, 90 and 181) ask whether outsiders can come to the Gaza Strip, presumably to assist the Jama’at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad in its activities. Others either explicitly offer their services as foreign jihad fighters  (no. 85), want to leave the Saraya al-Quds (the military wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad) in order to join Abu al-Walid and his men (no. 154), or simply ask: “The Jama’at [al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad] in the Gaza Strip faces a number of challenges and we are your brothers. What can we do for you?” (no. 102)

Impatience

If the organization headed by Abu al-Walid al-Maqdisi is, as he argues, weak because of the security measures of Hamas and the Israeli army and is not able to unify with other jihadi groups, one might wonder what the Jama’at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad is planning to do. “The organization’s call to Islam (da’wa) and its sons”, Abu al-Walid assures his readers, “are spread across all districts [in the Gaza Strip].” Their “strategic plan” focuses on “the Islamically legitimate” preparation of the organization’s members, “making our da’wa reach whomever we can from among the ordinary people” and “military preparation” for “action against the Jews and preparation for any war from their side” (questions no. 44-45).

The group, in other words, is “in the foundational phase”. Abu al-Walid admits that this phase has already lasted several years but claims that “several years in the life of groups amount to nothing. The groups in Gaza are still working on strengthening their power” (question no. 65). All of this sounds fair enough and possibly suggests that the group just wants to be well prepared and not rush into anything. However, the repeated questions about when the group will start attacking Hamas or Israel seem to suggest that many readers have little patience with the group’s careful approach.

Too many enemies

While it may not be his intention, Abu al-Walid actually seems to be fanning the flames of his readers’ impatience by taking every opportunity to lash out against the group’s real and perceived enemies. Obviously, Israel is seen as the most important foe but Hamas, as we saw in my previous post, is also accused of unbelief. Nor does it stop there. Abu al-Walid accuses Hasan Nasrallah, the leader of the Lebanese Shiite Hizbullah movement, of “trying to play the role of a jihad fighter that protects the Lebanese and shows enmity to the Jews but, by the grace of God, his true nature has started to become apparent. Many have been shown that he and his party are only protecting the borders of the Jews from the pure Sunni jihad fighters.” He similarly accuses the (Shiite) Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad of pretending to be “the leader of the resistance to the Jews and the Americans, while he and his regime are waging a ruthless war (harb bila hawada) against the Sunni jihad fighters in the states neighbouring Iran” (question no. 189).

That his anti-Shiite feelings are not limited to the leaders of organizations and/or countries is made clear in his answer to question no. 206, where he speaks at some length about the “Shiite danger,” equating it with polytheism (shirk) and, in his reply to question no. 279, refers to Shiites as “a greater danger to [Sunni] Muslims than the danger of the Jews and the Christians”.

None of these statements are uncommon among Salafi groups such as Abu al-Walid’s, who often have very negative views of Shiites (and Sufis, as does Abu al-Walid himself in response to question 208). The difference with many other Salafis is obviously that they, unlike Abu al-Walid, mostly either do not show outright hostility towards these “deviants” or have the military prowess to back up their threats. Abu al-Walid, on the other hand, challenges Hamas, wants to confront Israel, and has a strong desire to resist Shiites but his organization can do none of these things. He seems to have taken on too many enemies to handle and ends up defending what must seem to many as a failure in Gaza. While this need not necessarily be the case since Abu al-Walid can perhaps rightly claim to take a slow and careful approach, many of his readers may simply conclude that he and his group have bitten off more than they can chew.

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The newest issue of Foreign Affairs on the ten-year anniversary of 9/11 includes an essay by me (free registration required) on the history of al-Qaeda and its prospects after the Arab Spring. The essay covers the reasons for al-Qaeda’s founding, its targeting of the United States, its strategic thinking under Zawahiri’s leadership, its concept of an Islamic state, and its enduring problem with Islamist parliamentary politics.

Regular readers of Jihadica will find much that is familiar but the essay makes one point I have not seen elsewhere: al-Qaeda is not against democratic elections, just parliamentary politics. The misperception that it is against democratic elections arises from a general ignorance of al-Qaeda’s thought on Islamic states and statecraft, a subject I also treat in the essay. Islamic states, not the caliphate, are central to al-Qaeda’s strategic planning and its interpretation of the aftermath of the Arab Spring.

I look forward to your comments. Original Arabic for the passages I translated in the article are below the fold.

• Update 1: My postscript for Foreign Affairs on the death of Atiyya.
• Update 2: I give some As to the Qs of Foreign Affairs.
• Update 3: Foreign Affairs has published “Al Qaeda’s Challenge” in its 9/11 Ten Year Anniversary ebook. Brynjar’s article on Bin Laden’s death is in there too.

Page 2 (of the online version):

Al Qaeda, which was created in 1988, grew out of those camps. Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian Islamist who merged his organization, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, with al Qaeda in 2001, explained al Qaeda’s mission in 2010 as providing a “base for indoctrination, training, and incitement that gathered the capabilities of the ummah [universal Islamic community], trained them, raised their consciousness, improved their abilities, and gave them confidence in their religion and themselves.” This base, Zawahiri said, involved “large amounts of participation in jihad, bearing the worries of theummah, and seizing the initiative in the most urgent calamities confronting the ummah.” In other words, al Qaeda envisioned itself as a revolutionary vanguard and special operations unit working to defend the Muslim world.

ولم يصل المجاهدون للنجاح بسهولة ويسر، ولا مضوا إليه على طريق مفروش بالورود، بل مروا بمراحل كثيرة من التدريب والإعداد وتجهيز الوثائق وتمويه الرحلات والصبر والترقب والقلق، ثم كل هذا المجهود الجبار كان لا بد له من قاعدة دعوية تدريبية تحريضية، تجمع كفاءات الأمة، وتدربها، وتوعيها، وترفع من قدراتها، وتغرس في نفسها الثقة بدينها وأمتها، ثم تختار منها العناصر الصالحة لكل مهمة.

وهذه القاعدة التدريبية الدعوية التحريضية استغرقت سنيناً طويلة من والإعداد والدعوة والاتصالات والعلاقات وتنمية الثقة المتبادلة بين الحلفاء وبين القيادة والقاعدة، وهي أيضاً ثقة تنبني على رصيد ضخم من المشاركة في الجهاد وحمل هموم الأمة، والمبادرة للصف الأول عند كل ملمة تلم بالأمة

Zawahiri, Fursan, 2nd ed., 220-21

Page 2:

Bin Laden later described these attacks in his will and testament as the second of three “escalating strikes” against the United States — the first being Hezbollah’s bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983 and the third being 9/11 — all of which would “lead to the withdrawal [from the Middle East] of the United States and the infidel West, even if after dozens of years.”

وقفة نيويورك وواشنطن الضربة الثالثة من الضربات المتصاعدة التي تلقتها اميركا أولاها تفجير المارينز في لبنان وثانيتها تفجير سفارة اميركا في نيروبي التي انطلق منها الغزو الاميركي للصومال حيث قتل من اخواننا 31 ألفا تحت راية الأمم المتحدة، رغم النكسة التي ابتلانا بها الله سبحانه وتعالى ستؤدي هذه الموقعة الى زوال أميركا والغرب الكافر ولو بعد عشرات السنين

Bin Ladin, Wasiyyat Bin Ladin

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Just as victory is not achieved for an army unless its foot soldiers occupy land, the mujahid Islamic movement will not achieve victory against the global infidel alliance unless it possesses a base in the heart of the Islamic world. Every plan and method we consider to rally and mobilize the ummah will be hanging in the air with no concrete result or tangible return unless it leads to the establishment of the caliphal state in the heart of the Islamic world.

ولا بد أن تبني الحركة الجهادية خطتها على أساس السيطرة على بقعة من الأرض في قلب العالم الإسلامي تقيم دولة الإسلام فيها وتستطيع حمايتها وتخوض منها معركتها لإعادة الخلافة الراشدة على منهاج النبوة. فكما أن النصر لا يتحقق للجيوش إلا باحتلال المشاة للأرض، فكذلك النصر للحركة الإسلامية المجاهدة لن يتحقق ضد التحالف العالمي الكفري إلا بامتلاكها لقاعدة في قلب العالم الإسلامي، وكل ما استعرضناه من وسائل وخطط لحشد الأمة وتجييشها سيظل معلقا في الهواء دون نتيجة ملموسة وعائد مشاهد ما لم يؤد إلى إنشاء دولة الخلافة في قلب العالم الإسلامي

Zawahiri, Fursan, 1st ed., 237

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It is not possible to incite a conflict for the establishment of a Muslim state if it is a regional conflict. . . . The international Jewish-Crusader alliance, led by America, will not allow any Muslim force to obtain power in any of the Muslim lands. . . . It will impose sanctions on whomever helps it, even if it does not declare war against them altogether. Therefore, to adjust to this new reality, we must prepare ourselves for a battle that is not confined to a single region but rather includes the apostate domestic enemy and the Jewish-Crusader external enemy.

لا يمكن خوض الصراع من أجل إقامة الدولة المسلمة على أنه صراع إقليمي

فقد اتضح مما سبق أن التحالف الصليبي اليهودي الدولي بزعامة أمريكا لن يسمح لأية قوة مسلمة بالوصول للحكم في أي من بلاد المسلمين، وأنه سيحشد كل طاقاته لضربها وإزالتها من الحكم إن تمكنت من الوصول، وأنه تحقيقا لذلك سيفتح عليها ميدانا للمعركة يشمل العالم كله، بل وسيفرض على كل من يساعدها العقوبات هذا إن لم يشن عليهم الحرب، ولذا فإننا تكيفا مع هذا الوضع الجديد يجب أن نعد أنفسنا لمعركة لا تقتصر على إقليم واحد بل تشتمل العدو الداخلي المرتد والعدو الخارجي الصليبي اليهودي

Zawahiri, Fursan, 1st ed., 241

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“Any government established on the basis of a constitution that is secular, atheist, or contradictory to Islam cannot be a respected government because it is un-Islamic and not according to sharia,” he wrote in a revision of Knights published in 2010. “It is unacceptable that a leader in the Brotherhood evinces respect for such a government, even if it comes about through fair elections.”

وأية حكومة تقوم على دستور علماني أو إلحادي أو مخالف للإسلام لا يمكن أن تكون حكومة محترمة لأنها حكومة غير شرعية جاهلية. ولا يمكن أن يقبل أن يعطيها قيادي في الإخوان شهادة احترام، حتى وإن جاءت بانتخابات صحيحة

Zawahiri, Fursan, 2nd ed., 373

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We demand . . . the government of the rightly guiding caliphate, which is established on the basis of the sovereignty of sharia and not on the whims of the majority. Its ummah chooses its rulers. . . . If they deviate, the ummah brings them to account and removes them. The ummah participates in producing that government’s decisions and determining its direction. . . . [The caliphal state] commands the right and forbids the wrong and engages in jihad to liberate Muslim lands and to free all humanity from all oppression and ignorance.

إن الحكومة التي نطالب بها ليست حكومة البابوات، ولا حكومة الولي الفقيه، الذي يتحدث باسم الإمام الغائب في السرداب، ولكنها حكومة الخلافة الراشدة، التي تقوم على حاكمية الشريعة، وليس على هوى الأغلبية، والتي تختار الأمة فيها حكامها، الذين لا يتمتعون بأية عصمة أو قداسة، وتحاسبهم، وتعزلهم إن انحرفوا، وتشارك في صنع قراراتها وتحديد مصيرها في ضوء الشرع وفي هدي الكتاب والسنة

Zawahiri, Fursan, 2nd ed., 441

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Unity

The book has about 160 pages (there’s no pagination) and contains 292 questions. What is interesting is that a large number of them refer to the unity (or, rather, the lack thereof) among jihadi groups in the Gaza Strip; in fact, the very first question deals with this. Abu l-Walid doesn’t really get much further than saying there are efforts to unify groups from Gaza and that this has been discussed a lot. He stresses that jihadis in Gaza are suffering from a difficult security environment – presumably because of both Hamas and Israel – and that this hampers efforts to unify the groups.  Abu l-Walid might be right that the “servants of God” are weak because of the repression by “the enemies of God from among the Jews, the lords of secularism and the propagandists of democracy” (response to question no. 9), but it does not explain why jihadi groups are still working separately. Abu l-Walid later adds (in response to question no. 7) that the reasons for this lack of unity among jihadi groups in Gaza has nothing to do with major differences in ideology, and he even admits that there is no real Islamic legal obstacle that prevents them from uniting. They just have legitimate differences that keep them separate.

The fact that this question is repeated so often – with Abu l-Walid repeatedly referring back to his previous two answers – indicates that many questioners have strong feelings about it and are perhaps frustrated that the different groups have not united. One can hardly blame them. Apart from general factors, such as belonging to the same people and speaking the same language, the different jihadi groups operate in a relatively small piece of territory that they necessarily have to share; they have two common enemies (Israel and Hamas); and they share the same ideology. Given these circumstances, it is easy to see why many questioners are apparently frustrated at the lack of unity among them.

Hamas

Things are not looking up vis-à-vis Hamas, the ruling power in the Gaza Strip, either. Abu l-Walid states that cooperation between Hamas and Fatah can only increase the security pressure on jihadi groups since Fatah is experienced in cracking down on organizations and has the power and the means to do it (question no. 11).

Considering the jihadis’ apparent lack of fighting against Israel (see Will’s post again), one might assume that Abu l-Walid is a strong advocate of fighting Hamas, but he’s not. In response to a questioner asking why there are no military operations against the Hamas government, “knowing that most Salafi movements excommunicate this government,” Abu l-Walid states that the time is not ripe for that yet, given the weakness of the jihadi groups at the moment (question 14).

Beyond Gaza

The weakness argument is used often by Abu l-Walid, including to defend his group’s decision not to engage in activities beyond the Gaza Strip. He describes his group as “small” (question no. 18) and states that the security situation on the West Bank is difficult because of the “coalition” between “the [Palestinian] Authority and the Jews” (question no. 19).

One reader nevertheless advises Abu l-Walid to leave Gaza altogether: “Don’t you agree with me”, this questioner asks, “that Palestine has never been liberated throughout history except from the outside and not from within?” Abu l-Walid retorts that it is indeed difficult but not impossible and that patience, preparation, education, mobilizing people’s efforts, and setting up cadres are needed to make it work (question no. 35).

Whether these defensive answers are enough to satisfy Abu l-Walid’s readers is what we will see in the next installment of this series.

To be continued…

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There is no doubt that al-Qaeda is incapable of undertaking a single operation in the land controlled by the Israeli enemy. The mujahids of al-Qaeda are not even able to pay for a single shot or assassinate a single Jewish person in the land of Palestine. What is the reason for this utter failure? The reality is there is no reason behind it worth mentioning other than that the premise is faulty. It is not possible to defend a faulty premise other than by first critiquing it and moderating it then base it upon reality.

Qandil says he has heard this faulty premise over and over but has not felt safe enough to respond to it in public or private. He believes he is safe enough to respond on the forums.

The reality, Qandil argues, is that al-Qaeda wants to carry out operations in Palestine but the circumstances aren’t right. The Salafi-Jihadi movements are weak and fragmented, so al-Qaeda is taking its time to study and plan. The key is to end Western support for Israel, which will make the state vulnerable to a local challenge. Reducing American support is particularly vital. Until then, any terrorist attacks on Israel will be futile.

Can this be done? Qandil says yes:

The Great Powrs do not have enemies or friends. They only have interests. If the United States of America comes to believe that the Zionist Entity is becoming a dangerous and strategic burden to its interests and its existence, it will abandon this “Zionist leech” without the least hesitation.

Qandil believes it is only a matter of time before this happens. The key is to continue to bleed the United States economically.

There is a strong realist streak in jihadi thinking, which is what Qandil is drawing on to explain why al-Qaeda has chosen to focus on the far enemy of the United States rather than the near enemy of Israel. But as his frustration suggests, it is a tough sell.

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