Wiley: Journal of Religious Ethics: Table of Contents

Issue Information

Fri, 29 May 2026 20:57:19 -0700

Journal of Religious Ethics, Volume 54, Issue 2, Page 101-105, June 2026.

Engaging with Babanzâde and Kant on the Relationship Between Religion and Ethics

M. Selim Altınpınar — Fri, 29 May 2026 20:57:19 -0700

ABSTRACT

Babanzâde Ahmed Naim, a philosophy professor during the late Ottoman Empire and early Republic of Turkey era, was an influential Muslim thinker known for his defense of the significance of religion in various contexts, notably in relation to Immanuel Kant's moral philosophy, which he considered the Western moral framework most akin to Islam. While Babanzâde praised Kant's work and its foundation in rational reflection, he criticized Kant's moral philosophy for its perceived lack of attention to the relationship between religion and ethics. Yet Kant's philosophy does provide an account of this relationship. In this paper, I present Babanzâde's examination and critique of Kant's moral philosophy from his Islamic perspective. I then outline Kant's philosophy of religion and explore his account of the relationship between religion and ethics, with which Babanzâde was likely unfamiliar. I argue that, despite several important differences, their views on the relationship between religion and ethics converge in three significant respects.

Rebirth and Perfection in Ordinary Lives: Biographical Writing and Vernacular Religious Ethics in Twentieth‐Century Myanmar

M. K. Long — Fri, 29 May 2026 20:57:19 -0700

ABSTRACT

This article investigates stories of rebirth and ascriptions of pāramī, ethical perfection, in a 1982 biography of the Buddhist nun Daw Gunawati (1890-1991) of Khemethaka nunnery in Sagaing Hills, Myanmar. In this and other contemporary biographical narratives, the cosmic timescale of Buddhist ethical cultivation protects and authorizes girls and women who wish to circumvent social expectations of marriage in order to initiate as nuns. In conversation with Leela Prasad's concept of “ethical resonance,” I examine pāramī as an idiom of Buddhist authority through which women reconstruct family relationships and reimagine monastic belonging. I propose new interpretive strategies that center vernacular theorists and affective registers of personal encounter in the study of Buddhist ethics, with further implications for the inclusion of vernacular, non-canonical textuality in studies of religious ethics.

Orthodox Moral Theology and Shared Metanorms: A Philosophical‐Theological Reading of the Social Ethos Document

Alexander Kriebitz, Stefanos Athanasiou — Fri, 29 May 2026 20:57:19 -0700

ABSTRACT

In recent years, Orthodox Christianity has gained increasing visibility in global discussions on social ethics, encompassing issues such as climate change, environmental protection, peace, and human rights. The following paper examines the underlying metaethical framework of the Ecumenical Patriarchate's Social Ethos Document, analyzing how it can contribute to contemporary discourses on shared metanorms and values. Through close textual analysis, it investigates the metaethical assumptions of the document and its articulation of a theologically grounded anthropology. Special attention is given to the engagement of the document with human rights, which is a historically contested theme within Orthodox moral theology. Drawing on the concepts of divine likeness, theosis, and the personal understanding of ethos in Eastern Orthodoxy, this paper argues that the Social Ethos Document advances an integrative normative approach that bridges theological social ethics and secular human rights.

Daoist Humility: How Ancient Chinese Wisdom and Modern Psychology are Telling Us to Be Natural by Going Against the Flow

Benjamin Birkenstock — Fri, 29 May 2026 20:57:19 -0700

ABSTRACT

The concept of humility has a long history of paradoxicality. From denoting a lowly social status—to becoming one of the highest Christian virtues—to falling under the critique of the liberators of the Enlightenment—to experiencing an upsurge of philosophical and psychological interest in recent years, the value of acknowledging one's least valued traits remains hard to define and defend. Recent definitions of humility as accurate intra- and interpersonal awareness have successfully severed the connection between humility and harmful self-deprecation; however, in the process, they have sidestepped the question of whether intentional self-lowering can, for some persons and purposes, be beneficial. Self-lowering as self-beneficial is a common theme in ancient Chinese thought. The Daodejing, especially, provides an insightful approach to this practice. When effort, ambition, and desire for social approval are taken too far, they give rise to destructive fixations and thereby become counterproductive. One way to disrupt such fixations is to embrace conditions and personal qualities that we and others perceive to be socially unacceptable and even humiliating. Rather than showing subservience to existing power structures, Daoist humility involves voluntarily doing menial tasks and exposing parts of ourselves that we view as shameful so as, ironically, to loosen the hold of our obsessions, increase our equanimity, and, by extension, reduce social conflict and oppression. I support and expand on this approach via recent scholarship from feminist and antiracist philosophers as well as psychological studies suggesting that cognitive control is limited, and embracing the very compulsions that we usually try to avoid can weaken their power.