KRIEGSPHILOSOPHIE: A WAR FOR YOUR MIND

ANDREI: ACADEMIA - THE TELNET PROTOCOL AND ZERO DAY ATTACKS: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE VAULT 7 CISCO EXPLOITS AND THE IMPLICATIONS THEREOF

2017-04-03T05:24:00.003-07:00

The Telnet Protocol and Zero Day Attacks: An Investigation Into the “Vault 7” Cisco Exploits And The Implications Thereof

Abstract

Control the routers, and you can control the Internet. Recent revelations of leaked material from the United States Central Intelligence Agency by Wikileaks, from the collection known as “Vault 7”, show that the agency was hoarding a plethora of so-called “zero day” exploits: undisclosed vulnerabilities that can exploit computer systems. CIA manuals indicated specific areas of the Cisco IOS code as being vulnerable, in particular the Cluster Management Protocol code. Cisco engineers found the potential to exploit the Telnet protocol, an unsecure Internet or LAN protocol that allows for virtual terminal connections. The exploit, labelled by Cisco as CVE-2017-3881, allowed for the remote and unfettered access of at least 300 different models of Cisco switches over the Internet, despite the access intending to be allowed only for LAN. There are broad implications from this discovery. One is that the continued use of the antiquated Telnet protocol is prone to broad digital attacks, such as the Mirai botnet which targeted Internet of Things or “IoT” devices. Two, as the largest networking company in the world, such a broad exploitation of Cisco devices compromises the Internet at its fundamental core. Three, the hoarding by intelligence agencies of these exploits is risky to the public at large, due to the potential for overlap discovery where other nefarious hackers discover the exploits or, as in the case of the Shadow Brokers leak in 2016, where NSA cyberweapons that also utilized zero day exploits, and happened to target Cisco, were released in the open. Lastly, the repeated aforementioned loss of these government hoarded secrets strongly suggests that the agencies cannot be trusted with legislated backdoors into digital security such as encryption.

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Control the routers, and you can control the Internet. On March 7^th, 2017, the largest publication of confidential documents from the United States Central Intelligence Agency was released by Wikileaks, known as “Vault 7” (Assange). Of particular interest to digital security specialists was how that the agency was hoarding a plethora of so-called “zero-day” exploits: undisclosed vulnerabilities that can exploit computer systems (Ulanoff). One exploit is alleged to make use of the Telnet protocol, an unsecure Internet or LAN protocol that allows for virtual terminal connections, in order to gain elevated access to Cisco’s routers and switches (Cimpanu). The exploit, labelled by Cisco as CVE-2017-3881, allowed for the remote and unfettered access to at least 300 different models of Cisco switches (Kennedy). As the largest networking company in the world, such a broad exploitation of Cisco devices compromises the Internet at its fundamental core. This paper will examine the history of the Telnet protocol and attacks upon it, Cisco switches, the recently revealed practice of intelligence agencies hoarding digital exploits, and the worldwide risk to digital security presented by this practice.

The Telnet protocol was first defined and used in 1969 (TELNET: The Mother of All Applications Protocols). The protocol predates the modern Internet and is the basis for many other protocols such as HTTP and FTP (Geerling). Telnet, short for either telecommunications network or terminal network, is considered by some to be the “original Internet” (Gil, Fisher). The protocol allows for plain text remote interfaces over TCP/IP networks, and was designed with the assumption of a high level of trust between client and mainframe computers (Gil). These client computers did not require powerful hardware – only a connection to the network and a text based interface to utilize Telnet (Geerling). Using these terminals boosted productivity and saved time for those at universities and enterprises that required multiple users accessing the mainframe at once, which could often also be very distant. As such, security steps such as encryption were not designed into the protocol nor perhaps were they even needed given its use for closed networks (Gil, Geerling). What this entails for the modern user is that data transmitted via Telnet can easily be read through network packet sniffing. For most of its purposes, Telnet was superseded later by the Secure Shell protocol, better known as SSH, in response to a password-sniffing attack on a university utilizing plain text communication (Geerling). Unlike Telnet, SSH utilizes encryption through different methods at various points in the transaction including symmetrical encryption, asymetrical encryption, and hashing (Ellingwood). Telnet is still utilized, however, for checking services on remote servers, devices through local serial connections, and some remote device configuration (Neagu). Telnet also had a popular use for searching through public access library catalogs in the early days of the Internet (Lavendar). Some of these online catalogs are still accessible, assumed to be Telnet daemons running on machines that also provide HTTP access or on antiquated, forgotten servers (Public Access Catalogue). The protocol has also been utilized for bulletin-board access along with text-videogames known as multi-user dungeons or MUDs, due to antiquated code bases for MUDs not supporting SSH (Why Do MUDs use Telnet?). However, the most risky use of the protocol – the risk most relevant to the topic – is the use of the protocol for remote configuration (Fisher).

Modern operating systems typically come with both the Telnet client and Telnet server disabled, and as of Windows Server 2016, the Telnet server itself is not included (Fisher, Gregory). The SANS Institute, a resource for information security training and security certification, warns that even the ability for a system to utilize Telnet increases risk (Zirkle). Since 1994, CERT – an cyber-security organization out of Carnegie Mellon University – has warned against the use of Telnet (Ongoing Network Monitoring Attacks). However, as demonstrated by recent attacks and potential exploits that made use of the Telnet protocol, there is still significant risk. To even summarize the large list of potential Telnet exploits in different systems is vastly beyond the scope of this paper, so only the most recent attacks that actually took place will be examined. First, the largest distributed denial of service attack ever recorded was done with the Mirai botnet (Mapping Mirai). Denial of service attacks are where systems all simultaneously make garbage communications attempts with an endpoint, such as a specific company’s Internet servers. In other words, it suffocates the connection through using available bandwidth (Popeskic). A botnet is a network of computers over the Internet that have been compromised in various degrees (Mapping Mirai). In the case of Mirai, the focus was on “Internet of Things” or IoT devices – so-called “smart” Internet connected devices such as fridges, toasters, CCTVs, baby-monitors, et cetera (Mapping Mirai). There are estimated to be over 15 million devices on the Internet that still actively use the Telnet protocol, and Mirai spread in large part through these (Mapping Mirai). Mirai utilized a bruteforce attack – typically, a systematic guessing of usernames and passwords based on dictionaries, but in Mirai’s case based on a list of factory defaults – against these devices, many of which lack bruteforce protection (Mapping Mirai).. Once infected, these devices continue to function, albeit sluggishly, and monitor to a command and control server which then indicates the target of a DDoS attack. Mirai is far from the only piece of malware to spread through Telnet, and segments of its source code have been utilized in other malware that infects Linux-based embedded devices through the use of default passwords and bruteforce attacking (Leyden). Of particular interest is the CVE-2017-3881 vulnerability in Cisco devices, which allowed for an unauthenticated, remote attacker to reload a targeted device or execute code with elevated privileges in over 300 types of Cisco switches. To understand the grave potential for this exploit, it is important to understand how Cisco switches operate and what the practical security aspects are of the CVE-2017-3881 vulnerability.

The actual code of the malware mentioned in Vault 7 has not yet been publicly disclosed, and it is entirely possible that the CVE-2017-3881 vulnerability is actually not the code affected. Nevertheless, according to Omar Santos and analysts with the Cisco Product Security Incident Response Team or PSIRT, they believe the CIA has access to malware that can target different families of Cisco devices, and that the malware can provide:

…Data collection, data exfiltration, command execution with administrative privileges (and without any logging of such commands ever been executed), HTML traffic redirection, manipulation and modification (insertion of HTML code on web pages, DNS poisoning, covert tunneling, and others. The authors have spent a significant amount of time making sure the tools, once installed, attempt to remain hidden from detection and forensic analysis on the device itself. It would also seem the malware author spends a significant amount of resources on quality assurance testing – in order, it seems, to make sure that once installed the malware will not cause the device to crash or misbehave.

Without immediate access to the code of the malware, Cisco was forced to audit the code based on clues from the Vault 7 leaks (Chirgwin). In the process, they found that the Cluster Management Protocol in the Cisco IOS and IOS XE Software could allow for a remote attack (Kovacs). The Cluster Management Protocol utilizes Telnet for signaling and command between cluster members. However, according to Cisco the vulnerability was due to two specific factors:

The failure to restrict the use of CMP-specific Telnet options only to internal, local communications between cluster members and instead accept and process such options over any Telnet connection to an affected device, and the incorrect processing of malformed CMP-specific Telnet options. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending malformed CMP-specific Telnet options while establishing a Telnet session with an affected Cisco device configured to accept Telnet connections. An exploit could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code and obtain full control of the device or cause a reload of the affected device.

In response, Cisco recommended the hardening of devices through disabling the ability for devices to accept Telnet connections, and later released software updates to address the specific vulnerability (Santos).

According to the International Data Corporation or “IDC”, Cisco makes up as of 2016 nearly 60% of the market share in routers and switches (Haranas). Given this as well as the use of proprietary, typically closed-source software such as IOS in their devices, this makes Cisco a particularly large target. While attacks like Mirai were impressive in the multitude of embedded devices that were affected and crippling in botnet attacks and the difficulty in responding, the stealth and range of damage that could be affected by outright “owning” routers and switches is far more compromising. For example, as an intelligence agency or a criminal enterprise – data collection on routers in the Internet can do raw packet dumps, unencrypted passwords, browsing behaviors, vulnerability assessment, and so on. Data exfiltration through redirecting TCP and UDP packets can subvert firewall protection. Command execution with administrative privileges bypasses system management and also has the potential to be non auditable – a router rootkit. The implications of HTML redirecting and the insertion of HTML code on webpages also have widespread implications: redirection could cause “phishing” attacks at otherwise authentic URLs. For example, a false login page on a mirrored and compromised website stealing one’s credentials while using the exact same URL as the authentic website.

Of note, the fact that this exploit utilizes the Telnet protocol means that it could stand to reason that the exploit is very old. This raises questions about the company’s own auditing process in their software. While Cisco claims there is no evidence of the exploit ever having been used, in the same breath they say there is no way to accurately audit the exploit (Chirgwin). Wikileaks claims that the CIA was exploiting the flaw, but it is unknown whether there is hard evidence of that or if it is an assumption by the organization (Kovacs). Ergo, it logically follows that there is no way to know from simply auditing their device logs.

The attacks uncovered by the Vault 7 leaks are not the first against Cisco by US intelligence agencies. In 2014, Edward Snowden through Wikileaks revealed that the National Security Agency or “NSA” had a practice of physically intercepting devices in transit and installing rootkits to monitor target companies (McElroy, Schneier). In 2013, the Shadow Brokers hacking group is believed to have compromised an NSA staging server, stealing the spy agency’s cyberweapons which made use of hoarded exploits. This was not revealed until 2016, potentially after elements had already been utilized and/or sold (Schneier). There is no indication the NSA was aware of the hack until 2016 (Whittaker). “When the NSA screws up, it’s US technology companies that have to bear the reputational costs,” says ACLU Chief Technologist Chris Soghoian. “The NSA gets to avoid all of the unpleasantness associated with its mistakes” (Brandom). Unlike the Wikileaks “Vault 7” leaks, Shadow Brokers released segments of the actual malware code to the public writ large, along with selling other tools on the black markets on the darknet, compromising Cisco equipment through dozens of different and previously unknown exploits. For instance, VPNs using IPsec internet key exchange with PIX firewalls below version 6 could be sent specially crafted packets to obtain the contents of the device memory. Other attacks included exploiting parsers through buffer overflow flaws, allowing remote SNMP code execution (Whittaker). The exploits are known as CVE-2016-6367 and CVE-2016-6366, or “EPICBANANA” and “EXTRABACON” per Omar Santos. According to Derek Kortepeter,

It is likely that we will hear of more patches being released from all companies exposed by this NSA leak. There is talk in the cybersecurity community now of how to best avoid incidents like this in the future. One of the most thrown-around suggestions is making sure the NSA is more diligent about disclosing vulnerabilities to vendors, rather than hoarding them. As we’ve seen, by hoarding all of this data, the NSA has made vendors’ jobs extremely difficult in regard to defending against cyber attacks.

Unlike the Shadow Brokers hacks, WikiLeaks has promised exclusivity in the direct binaries and some technical details with vendors affected by the Vault 7 leaks, including Apple, Microsoft, Google, Mozilla, and MicroTik. It is unclear whether this information has also been provided to Cisco, if the binaries are available to be provided at all, or if Cisco refuses to work with WikiLeaks. According to Eduard Kovacs, there could be legal repercussions for using any of the information obtained by WikiLeaks, as “classified files remain classified even if they are made public.” Looking at the segments of the publicly available leaks, they are more developer notes rather than program overviews – or even the programs themselves. Nevertheless, the CIA refuses to comment on the authenticity of the leaks, but given the exploits discovered, it seems obvious there is merit (Kovacs).

The CIA criticized the leaks as “such disclosures… equip our adversaries with tools and information to do us harm.” According to Wired writer Andy Greenberg, the real problem isn’t “someone in Langley is watching you through your hotel room’s TV. It’s the rest of the hacker world that the CIA has inadvertently empowered.” The vast amount of the zero-day stash revealed by the Vault 7 leaks suggests that it is not only the CIA that has access to these digital vulnerabilities, but theoretically foreign intelligence agencies and hacking syndicates may also have access. According to Kevin Bankston, director of the New America Foundation’s Open Technology Institute, “If the CIA can use it, so can the Russians, or the Chinese or organized crime. The lesson here, first off, is that stockpiling a bunch of vulnerabilities is bad for cybersecurity. And two, it means they’re likely going to get leaked by someone” (Greenberg). As the NSA cybertools were hacked by the Shadow Brokers group, according to WikiLeaks, the Vault 7 archive was circulated among US government contractors and paid, freelance hackers in an unauthorized manner, which raises the possibility of these leaks being the hands of nefarious hackers long before WikiLeaks’ publishing. The hoarding of these exploits also appears to contradict Obama administration policy. Again per Greenberg,

…the CIA appears to have kept the security flaws those techniques exploited secret. And the sheer number of those exploits suggests violations of the Vulnerabilities Equities Process, which the Obama administration created in 2010 to compel law enforcement and intelligence agencies to help fix those flaws, rather than exploit them whenever possible.

“Did CIA submit these exploits to the Vulnerabilities Equities Process?” asks Jason Healey, a director at the Atlantic Council.

If not, you can say that either the process is out of control or they’re subverting the president’s priorities… The deal we make in a democracy is that we understand we need military and intelligence services. But we want oversight in the executive branch and across the three branches of government. If the CIA says ‘we’re suppose to do this, but we’re just not going to,’ or ‘we’re going to do it just enough that the White House thinks we are,’ that starts to eat away at the fundamental oversight for which we have elected officials. (Greenberg)

There are thus large ethical dilemmas also raised by the compromise of digital security by US intelligence agencies. The implication that the CIA may have overstepped its legal boundaries through violation of the Vulnerabilities Equities Process implies that the agency operates as though it is beyond oversight, dangerously compromising the separation of powers inherent in the United States federal system of government.

When these secrets fall into the wrong hands, or even simply keeping them from vendors, compromises security not only for “targets” of the CIA but the worldwide digital infrastructure, affecting not only Americans. While these ethical and legal concerns are largely beyond the scope of this paper, they nevertheless deserve mentioning. It should not be considered disarmament for reasons that security expert Bruce Schneier raises,

The implications of US policy can be felt on a variety of levels. [Such] actions have resulted in a widespread mistrust of the security of US Internet products and services, greatly affecting American business. If we show that we're putting security ahead of surveillance, we can begin to restore that trust. And by making the decision process much more public than it is today, we can demonstrate both our trustworthiness and the value of open government. An unpatched vulnerability puts everyone at risk, but not to the same degree. The US and other Western countries are highly vulnerable, because of our critical electronic infrastructure, intellectual property, and personal wealth. Countries like China and Russia are less vulnerable -- North Korea much less -- so they have considerably less incentive to see vulnerabilities fixed.

The CIA’s security practice, ethics aside, also show a degree of irresponsibility in waging cyberwarfare. The act of buying exploits from so-called “blackhat” hackers on the dark web, hoarding those exploits, and then entrusting their portfolio to agency employees and contractors – one of whom is the source of the Vault 7 leaks – is according to some analysts, in many ways, the digital equivalent of sloppy nuclear arms dealing that one would expect from a failed state. Not all security analysts agree with this assessment, however. Rob Graham of Errata Security notes that the agency buys zero-day exploits in order to utilize them. Critics of the policy are thus asking the government to spend millions on vulnerabilities in order to disclose them (Leyden, CIA Hacking Dossier).

The inability for the agencies to keep this cache of malware and exploits secure is also particularly worrying in the wake of demand for government-legislated backdoors into devices. If these huge caches are so easily leaked, then certainly a “factory default” account or methodology for root access can also be leaked. FBI Director James Comey called for companies to intentionally build security flaws into their devices – a technical backdoor – in the wake of the San Bernardino shooting case (Hall). The FBI had also attempted to force Apple to provide access into the devices of the shooters, before dropping their request and settling on paying a hacker to do so (Nakashima).

More and more, there is a conflict between interest of security and privacy and intelligence aims of state actors. Companies like Cisco, who operate in the global market, have their reputations and products at risk when state actors are allowed to uncover or purchase and utilize vulnerabilities free of legal repercussion. This particularly becomes problematic when those caches are released into the public. Nevertheless, digital vendors also have a responsibility to continuously test and patch their own software. The use of Telnet, for instance, in any way shape or form – a protocol that has been warned against for over twenty years – is irresponsible. Why Cisco continues to permit the utilization of the protocol in modern switches and router is probably due to compatibility issues between cluster manager services. Nevertheless, such weak points in the technological foundations of the Internet are an Achilles’ heel. Worse still, intelligence agencies operating outside the bounds of their own regulation and will of the people are a weakness in the integrity of state apparatus.

References

Assange, J. (2017, March 7). Vault 7: CIA Hacking Tools Revealed. Retrieved April 01, 2017, from https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/

Brandom, R. (2016, August 19). After Shadow Brokers, should the NSA still be hoarding vulnerabilities? Retrieved April 01, 2017, from http://www.theverge.com/2016/8/19/12548462/shadow-brokers-nsa-vulnerability-disclosure-zero-day

Chirgwin, R. (2017, March 19). Cisco reports bug disclosed in WikiLeaks' Vault 7 CIA dump. Retrieved April 01, 2017, from https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/03/19/cisco_goes_public_with_its_first_vault7_response/

Cimpanu, C. (2017, March 20). Cisco's Investigation into Vault 7 Leak Uncovers 0-Day Affecting 318 Products. Retrieved April 01, 2017, from https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ciscos-investigation-into-vault-7-leak-uncovers-0-day-affecting-318-products/

Ellingwood, J. (2014, October 22). Understanding the SSH Encryption and Connection Process | DigitalOcean. Retrieved April 01, 2017, from https://www.digitalocean.com/community/tutorials/understanding-the-ssh-encryption-and-connection-process

Fisher, T. (2017, March 6). What is Telnet? (How to Use Telnet Client in Windows). Retrieved April 01, 2017, from https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-telnet-2626026

Geerling, J. (2014, April 15). A brief history of SSH and remote access. Retrieved April 01, 2017, from https://www.jeffgeerling.com/blog/brief-history-ssh-and-remote-access

Gil, P. (2017, March 19). What Exactly Is 'Telnet'? What Does Telnet Do? Retrieved April 01, 2017, from https://www.lifewire.com/what-does-telnet-do-2483642

Greenberg, A. (2017, March 08). How the CIA's Hacking Hoard Makes Everyone Less Secure. Retrieved April 01, 2017, from https://www.wired.com/2017/03/cias-hacking-hoard-makes-everyone-less-secure/

Gregory, K. (2016, October 14). Telnet Server Removed From Windows Server 2016. Retrieved April 01, 2017, from http://www.innovativeii.com/telnet-server-removed-windows-server-2016/

Hall, J. (2016, March 03). Issue Brief: A “Backdoor” to Encryption for Government Surveillance. Retrieved April 01, 2017, from https://cdt.org/insight/issue-brief-a-backdoor-to-encryption-for-government-surveillance/

Haranas, M. (2016, June 27). IDC: Cisco's Networking Market Share Dominance Slipping As It Battles HPE, Huawei. Retrieved April 01, 2017, from http://www.crn.com/slide-shows/networking/300081109/idc-ciscos-networking-market-share-dominance-slipping-as-it-battles-hpe-huawei.htm/pgno/0/1?itc=refresh

Kennedy, P. (2017, March 20). Cisco 0-day Unpatched Switch Telnet Vulnerability CVE-2017-3881. Retrieved April 01, 2017, from https://www.servethehome.com/cisco-0-day-unpatched-switch-telnet-vulnerability-cve-2017-3881/

Kortepeter, D. (2016, August 31). NSA hack: Cisco releases patches for exposed vulnerabilities. Retrieved April 01, 2017, from http://techgenix.com/nsa-hack-cisco-releases-patches/

Kovacs, E. (2017, March 20). Cisco Finds Zero-Day Vulnerability in 'Vault 7' Leak. Retrieved April 01, 2017, from http://www.securityweek.com/cisco-finds-zero-day-vulnerability-vault-7-leak

Lavender, C. (n.d.). Using Telnet and the WWW to Search Library Catalogs Online. Retrieved April 01, 2017, from https://csivc.csi.cuny.edu/history/files/lavender/library.html

Leyden, J. (2016, October 31). A successor to Mirai? Newly discovered malware aims to create fresh IoT botnet. Retrieved April 01, 2017, from https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/10/31/iot_botnet_wannabe/

Leyden, J. (2017, March 8). CIA hacking dossier leak reignites debate over vulnerability disclosure. Retrieved April 01, 2017, from https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/03/08/cia_hacking_tool_dump_vuln_disclosure_debate/

Mapping Mirai: A Botnet Case Study. (2016, October 05). Retrieved April 01, 2017, from https://www.malwaretech.com/2016/10/mapping-mirai-a-botnet-case-study.html

McElroy, R. (2017, March 22). Own the Routers. Own the Internet. Retrieved April 01, 2017, from https://www.carbonblack.com/2017/03/22/own-the-routers-own-the-internet/

Nakashima, E. (2016, April 12). FBI paid professional hackers one-time fee to crack San Bernardino iPhone. Retrieved April 01, 2017, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-paid-professional-hackers-one-time-fee-to-crack-san-bernardino-iphone/2016/04/12/5397814a-00de-11e6-9d36-33d198ea26c5_story.html?utm_term=.4552bedcd029

Neagu, C. (2015, October 06). Simple Questions: What Is Telnet & What Can It Still Be Used For? Retrieved April 01, 2017, from http://www.digitalcitizen.life/simple-questions-what-telnet-what-can-it-still-be-used

Ongoing Network Monitoring Attacks. (1994, February 3). Retrieved April 01, 2017, from http://www.cert.org/historical/advisories/CA-1994-01.cfm

Popeskic, V. (2015, September 14). Telnet Attacks – Ways to compromise remote connection. Retrieved April 01, 2017, from https://howdoesinternetwork.com/2011/telnet-attacks

Public access catalogue? r/telnet. (n.d.). Retrieved April 01, 2017, from https://www.reddit.com/r/telnet/comments/3n8ve4/public_access_catalogue/

Santos, O. (2016, August 17). The Shadow Brokers EPICBANANA and EXTRABACON Exploits. Retrieved April 01, 2017, from http://blogs.cisco.com/security/shadow-brokers

Santos, O. (2017, March 7). The Wikileaks Vault 7 Leak – What We Know So Far. Retrieved April 01, 2017, from http://blogs.cisco.com/security/the-wikileaks-vault-7-leak-what-we-know-so-far

Scheneier, B. (2014, May 22). Disclosing vs Hoarding Vulnerabilities. Retrieved April 01, 2017, from https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/05/disclosing_vs_h.html

TELNET: The Mother of All (Application) Protocols. (n.d.). Retrieved April 01, 2017, from http://www.ics.uci.edu/~rohit/IEEE-L7-v2.html

Ulanoff, L. (2017, March 08). This is why you should be terrified of the Wikileaks Vault 7 data dump. Retrieved April 01, 2017, from http://mashable.com/2017/03/08/what-wikileaks-vault7-reminds-us-about-iot/#EqlrKjWmu8qB

Whittaker, Z. (2016, August 18). Cisco, Fortinet patch flaws used by alleged NSA hacking group. Retrieved April 01, 2017, from http://www.zdnet.com/article/cisco-fortinet-patch-flaws-exposed-by-alleged-nsa-hacking-group/

Why do most MUDs use Telnet instead of SSH? r/MUD. (n.d.). Retrieved April 01, 2017, from https://www.reddit.com/r/MUD/comments/2qfu6q/why_do_most_muds_use_telnet_instead_of_ssh/

Zirkle, L. (n.d.). IDFAQ: Do telnet and rlogin increase the risk of compromise? Retrieved April 01, 2017, from https://www.sans.org/security-resources/idfaq/do-telnet-and-rlogin-increase-the-risk-of-compromise/7/2

ANDREI: ACADEMIA - BLEEDING GAGAUZIA: FOREIGN MEDDLING IN AN ETHNIC DIVIDE

2015-04-29T01:15:00.001-07:00

Bleeding Gagauzia: Foreign Meddling in an Ethnic Divide

In the increasingly European Union leaning country Moldova, the autonomous region of Gagauzia leans towards the opposite direction – its allegiance towards the East, looking at the Russian Customs Union as essential to its survival whereas Moldova seems more and more poised towards integration with the EU.[1] This was not the initial cause of Gagauzia’s asymmetrical autonomy; in the immediate fall of the Soviet Union, the regions of both Transnistria and Gagauzia – the latter, almost paradoxical given its rising nationalism – were opposed to leaving the Union. Unlike Transnistria, however, the Gagauz are not ethnically Slavic.[2] There are continued fears of becoming a powerless minority or of becoming assimilated and losing their cultural heritage in an independent Moldova, especially with the potential of Moldova and Romania unifying into a single nation state.

The Gagauz make up only 4% of Moldova’s total population, yet 80% of Gagauzia, numbering around 160,000. A Turkic – and, interestingly, commonly Christian – people, the Gagauz are significantly distinct within Moldova.[3] Even with autonomy, however, the Gagauz have had to endure costs brought on by Moldova’s association agreement with the European Union; Russian sanctions against the Moldovan economy directly harmed wine producers in Gagauzia despite exceptions aimed particularly at Gagauzia, and further closeness could crumble the already fragile economy.[4] Despite their Turkic ethnicity and language, most Gagauz speak Russian, and there are a plethora of Russian language schools. [5]

Once considered an example of a successful resolution of post-Soviet ethnic conflict, after having achieved autonomy in 1994 unlike its Transnistrian neighbor which remains a defacto independent state, Gagauzia’s importance as a geopolitical pressure point is once again apparent. Despite a guarantee of Gagauzia’s right to self-determination should Moldova’s status as an independent nation – referring then to the potential for unification with Romania – in the same 1994 law that granted it autonomy, there now seems to be significant rhetoric among the elites for secession if it means retaining close ties, or even closer ties, to Russia.[6] There is no readily apparent desire for equitable inclusion, and autonomy itself seems to no longer sate the Gagauz palette – perhaps aggravated by further Russian meddling in the wake of Euromaidan in Ukraine – despite the central Moldovan government funding at least half of Gagauzia’s budget.

The question is whether this is a result of a primordialist difference between Gagauz and Moldovan, or instead an instrumentalist interest by both Gagauz and Russians in more tangible factors, with ethnic differences playing only a superficial role. I take a constructivist approach. I argue that Gagauz nationalism does not fit the traditional triadic nexus. While there is a genuine nationalizing nation of Gagauz, and a significant difference between the Gagauz and the Moldovans – a difference which could be sorely exacerbated in a Moldovan-Romanian unification – the real source of the ethnic conflict stems from external influence by Russia, which has an ulterior geopolitical interest in utilizing Gagauzia’s position of autonomy to sway Moldovan politics towards federalism or limited EU ties – if not Gagauz secession entirely – rather than a purely ethnic mobilization from within Gagauzia. I further add that Turkey’s role as an external homeland for the Gagauz is limited and, to date, not politically relevant outside of language politics.

Methodology

Primordialist and instrumentalist factors will be evaluated and considered in this paper as a way of reviewing the legitimacy behind the Gagauz claim to autonomy, but also understanding the seemingly paradoxical allegiance to Russia which is ethnically dissimilar. The economy and language politics play the largest roles in the ethnic conflict, with external influence from both Turkey and Russia perpetuating separation between the Moldovans and Gagauz.

Instrumentalist Factors:

Economy

The dominant Gagauz narrative against the Moldovan-EU Association Agreement is the potential harm to the Gagauz economy. A 2014 non-binding resolution, deemed illegal by the Moldovan authorities but supported by Russia, showed that 98% of Gagauz voters preferred closer links with Russia’s Eurasian Customs Union, rather than the European Union.[7]

Wine accounts for 60% of Gagauzia’s industrial production, and 45% of Gagauz wine exports were sent to Russia in 2013, while Moldovan wine was banned from export to Russia as a result of sanctions imposed on Moldova as a warning for the Association Agreement with the EU. However, many Gagauz wineries were exempt, able to continue trade with Russia.[8] Additionally, many Gagauz fear that their products would not be competitive in the EU market if Moldova – and Gagauzia – were to integrate with the EU, as well as the possibility for having access to the Russian labor market blocked. [9]

Moldova is the poorest country in Europe, and Gagauzia is one of its poorest regions.[10] These high levels of poverty work in Russia’s favor, as has been seen in other regions pining for Russian dominance. Around 25,000 Gagauz work in Russia as migrant workers, a significant economic bargaining chip for Russia.[11]

Foreign Interest

Gagauzia is an important point of geopolitical pressure for Russia, given its ties to Russia and position in the Black Sea region. If Gagauzia was to abandon autonomy and become another “frozen conflict” rather than a recognized independent state, as has been the case with Transnistria, it would severely complicate Moldovan goals of joining the European Union. The recent referendum shows that Russia maintains a significant degree of influence in the region.

Russia has acted as an antagonizing external force in Gagauzia. The latest leader of Gagauzia is a Moscow financed, pro-Russian governor named Irina Vlah, who ran a decidedly pro-Russian campaign, such as utilizing a poster showing her under the colors of Russia’s flag with the motto “Russia is with us” and “Being alongside Russia is within our strength.”[12] These mottos were in Russian. [13] Russian television channels – seen in Gagauzia – gave biased pro-Vlah coverage. As the new baskhan of Gagauzia, she stated that Russia is “the guarantor of Moldova's statehood and of the autonomy of Gagauzia.” [14]

Furthermore, Vlah, unlike her predecessor Mikhail Formuzal, seems focused on Russia rather than the approach Formuzal undertook that sought investments from Russia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan.[15] According to analyst for the Jamestown Foundation, Dumitru Minzarari,

Moscow… could point to such regional referendums and demand that Chisinau listen to the popular will… armed with the ‘popular will’ argument, Russia could further explore it in its negotiations with the United States and the EU, claiming that the European integration agenda is being imposed on the Moldovan population by the West.[16]

Analyst Eric Jones adds,

Gagauzia is an important, if not very well known, point of pressure in the ongoing tug-of-war between the West and Russia. Influence campaigns and unforeseen events have the potential for great impact upon the future of security and stability in post-Soviet Eastern Europe. Gagauzia’s geographic location, its ethnic makeup, and its cultural, political, and economic ties to Russia make this unknown region a potential spark in the tinderbox of Eastern Europe.[17]

Primordialist Factors:

Language

Despite the existence and post-Soviet, perhaps Turkish-assisted resurgence of Gagauz as a language, Russian remains the dominant language in Gagauzia. Romanian, however, is the official language of Moldova, and a lack of knowledge in the language severely complicates employment prospects for Gagauz. Simultaneously, the continued use of Russian has allowed Gagauz to work as migrants in Russia.

Romanian is utilized primarily by Gagauz who choose to work in cities such as the Moldovan capital of Chisinau, as Romanian is the state language. But Gagauz is similar to Turkish, and Russian is widely spoken – if not moreso than even Gagauz – and these two languages allow for Gagauz to work in either Turkey or Russia without having to learn a third language. Additionally, most of the political elite in Gagauzia are Russian speakers. With Romanian utilized as the state language, and therefore used in examinations and state jobs, its lack of popularity amongst the Gagauz keeps them alienated from central Moldovan society. As Esman writes,

Rules established and enforced by the state determine the goals that ethnic communities may legitimately pursue and the strategies and tactics they may employ. State policies regulate access to and enjoyment of such material values as education, government, and private employment… They govern the use and status of languages in schools and universities, in public administration, and in official communication.[18]

Additionally, the lack of popularity of the Romanian language in Gagauzia is a structural issue in Russophone media dependence. Russian mass media bias penetrates the Gagauz media landscape, rebroadcast in Moldova, as Russian is spoken by 73% of the Gagauz population as a secondary language.[19] Despite Gagauz being taught as a language in the region, there is no school that teaches its entire curriculum in Gagauz, and the language of Comrat University is Russian. This may have political ramifications, such as the wide support for the Eurasian Customs Union and distrust of the European Union, according to some analysts.

However, it is ethnic pride that may play a significant role in resistance to the Romanian language. Beyond the tangible factors of alternative areas of employment and the difficulty in learning a third language, to learn Romanian would be to also to overcome the psychological factor of a different assortment of literature and social culture.

Nevertheless, there is the feeling by some Gagauz that Russian plays too important of a role in Gagauz society. According to Todur Zanet, editor of Ana Sozu, the Gagauz elite have failed to support the national language.

Our language isn’t needed… the leaders of Gagauzia do everything they can in order that the Gagauz language will disappear. Look around, everything is in Russian: all the websites, all the scandals, all the meetings… in the education law, there are no plans for the opening of Gagauz schools and kindergartens.[20]

Ethnicity

Unlike the Transnistrians, who are in large part of Ukrainian and Russian ethnic background, the Gagauz are as aforementioned of Turkic descent, having settled into the region around 1000 CE. The ethnogenesis of the Gagauz remains uncertain, and the Gagauz being of Orthodox Christianity has not been a significant cleavage. There are at least twenty different theories of their origin, but the Seljuk and Steppe hypotheses remain the most common.[21] The study of their origin is ultimately beyond the scope of this paper.

Turkey has provided some measure of support since 1991 to the region, arguably a utilization of soft power. One aspect of Turkish influence was a change in language politics. Despite a commonly pro-Russian stance in Gagauzia, there was a decision to change the Gagauz alphabet from Cyrillic to the Latin script, an alphabet shared with modern Turkish.[22] Nevertheless, as aforementioned, the Russian language remains dominant. Turkey has long acted in the role of an intermediary between Russia and Moldova. According to Marcin Kosienkowski and William Schreiber, then-Turkish President Suleyman Demirel “played a decisive role” in the initial Gagauz acceptance of regional autonomy, as well as making pledges of economic and structural investments.[23] “Demirel... repeatedly stressed that the Turkish role in Moldova and Gagauzia was by no means confrontational to Russia.” [24]Turkey’s temperance as a third party interest may have prevented a more extreme outcome in Gagauzia, as was seen in Transnistria. However, it can be argued that Turkey’s continued role in language politics and ethnic politics may exacerbate the divide between Moldovans and Gagauz. In 2000, both a representative office of Gagauzia was opened in Turkey and Gagauz residents no longer required visas to enter Turkey. Komrat University has partnerships with five Turkish universities, and Turkey finances the scholarships of around 60 students a year to study there. [25]

Unlike the European Union, Turkey has not undertaken policies and actions directly opposed to Russian influence, however, and so the two interests have yet to directly conflict. Nevertheless, to use Brubaker’s term, Turkey may be the “external homeland” in the actual ethnic sense for the Gagauz, but the Gagauz instead see Russia as their true protectorate.[26] Therefore, the Gagauz may be conflicted between two external homelands with which they share the language of both: one ethnic, one civic, given their nostalgia for the Soviet Union and attempts to remain as part of the Union before its breakup. According to Brubaker, “External national homelands are constructed through political action, not given by the facts of ethnic demography.”[27]

Cultural History

According to Ivan Katchanovski, in his comparison of Gagauz and Crimean Tatar political culture towards Russia, the Gagauz distaste for the possibility of a Moldovan-Romanian unification is historically grounded. During the Romanian rule of Moldova from 1918 to 1940 and 1941 to 1944, the Gagauz were not only repressed, but also “one of the least educated and impoverished groups in Moldova... After Moldova came under Soviet Rule as a result of World War II, a significant number of Gagauz benefited from the Soviet policy of mass education and economic development in the region.” [28]

Although Gagauzia did not exist with any separate privileges from the Moldovan SSR, Rather than assimilate into the Moldovan populace, Soviet policy – as Brubaker writes – pervasively institutionalized nationalism, as the Soviet Union encouraged the Gagauz to retain their culture or russify rather than merge with the Moldovans after the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia in 1940.[29] The Gagauz had legal privileges under both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, in contrast to facing assimilation with the Romanians. This history works in favor of the current Russian regime, where Moldova’s desire for closer EU-integration is seen as a potential forte into Romanian unification and assimilation.

The Turkish State’s interest in Gagauzia is seemingly a mostly modern phenomena in the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union. Like Crimea, Gagauzia is part of a region that was a spoil of war taken from the Ottoman Empire in the 1812 Treaty of Bucharest that resolved the Russo-Turkish War.[30] Some analysts believe that Turkey’s soft power plays are slowly usurping Russia in influence. Whereas its outreach is not yet anti-Russian, in contrast to outreach to the Crimean Tatars, there is a growing Turkish idea of a “united Turan, from Chukotka to the Balkans” that looks beyond the religious cleavage between Islam and Christianity.[31]

Conclusion

The heavy influence of Russia as an external influence on the Gagauz cannot be overstated, especially in the wake of increasing closeness between Moldova, Ukraine, and the European Union, particularly following the Russian seizure of Crimea. Russia has repeatedly utilized its diaspora in furthering frozen conflicts, but in Gagauzia the pro-Russian populace is not a diaspora, rather it is ethnically dissimilar. As aforementioned, even in Gagauzia it is even felt by some that Russia has coopted use of Gagauz autonomy for its own geopolitical interest, given a lack of importance of the Gagauz language and therefore diminishment of the culture – much of the original reason for the initial autonomy.

Economics does indeed play a large role – if not the dominant role – in the Gagauz desire to remain autonomous and perhaps even secede from Moldova if it means retaining ties to Russia. There is little question that the transition to the European Union would be a painful one, and given the importance of working abroad in Russia for the Gagauz economy, the Russians hold a significant “stick” coupled with the carrots of exceptions to their sanctions on Moldovan goods. However, whether economics is the sole reason for this allegiance or the continued attachment to the Russian language, rather than opining for the Soviet past or a renewed quasi-imperial Russian protectorate requires much more detailed research.

Bibliography

All Web Sources Last Accessed 29 April 2015.

Brubaker, Rogers. Nationalism Reframed. Cambridge Unviersity Press: New York, 1996.

Calus, Kamil. “Gagauzia: Growing Separatism in Moldova?” Osrodek Studiow Wschodnich. 10 Mar. 2014. < http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2014-03-10/gagauzia-growing-separatism-moldova>.

Coffey, Luke. “Is Gagauzia Next on Russia’s List?” Al-Jazeera. 21 Mar. 2015. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/03/gagauzia-russia-list-150318052557225.html>.

Esman, Milton. Ethnic Politics. Cornell University Press: New York, 1994.

Goble, Paul. “Growing Turkish Influence Among Gagauz Threatens Russian Interests.” Moldova.Org. 23 Dec. 2010. <http://www.moldova.org/growing-turkish-influence-among-gagauz-threatens-russian-interests-215182-eng/>.

Goble, Paul. “Moldova: Gagauz Leaders ‘More Russian than Gagauz.’ EuroMaidan Press. 20 Sep. 2014. <http://euromaidanpress.com/2014/09/20/moldova-gagauz-leaders-more-russian-than-gagauz/>.

Irina Vlah’s Political Platform. <http://vlah.md/index.php?do=static&page=predvybornaya-platforma>.

Jones, Eric. “Gagauzia: Strategic Point of Pressure.” Foreign-Intrigue. 31 Mar. 2015. <http://foreign-intrigue.com/2015/03/gagauzia-strategic-point-of-pressure/>.

Karlsson, Ingmarr. “The Gagauz, a Christian Turkic People.” Hurriyet. 17 Mar. 2006. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/the-gagauz-a-christian-turkic-people.aspx?pageID=438&n=the-gagauz-a-christian-turkic-people-2006-03-17>.

Katchanovski, Ivan. “Small Nations but Great Differences: Political Orientations and Cultures of the Crimean Tatars and the Gagauz.” Europe-Asia Studies (6 Sep. 2005): 57.6. pp. 890. <http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ivan_Katchanovski/publication/248965160_Small_Nations_but_Great_Differences_Political_Orientations_and_Cultures_of_the_Crimean_Tatars_and_the_Gagauz/links/0c9605225ea57964b4000000.pdf>.

Kohen, Sami. “Could Moldova’s Gagauzia Repeat Crimea Scenario?” Al-Monitor. 5 June 2014. <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2014/06/moldova-gagauz-secede-crimea-scenario-economy.html>.

Kosienkowski, Marcin and William Schreiber. Moldova: Arena of International Influences. <http://books.google.com/books?id=Uuw1kNq11YkC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false>.

Minzarari, Dumitru. “The Gagauz Referendum in Moldova: A Russian Political Weapon?” The Jamestown Foundation. 5 Feb. 2014. <http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41922#.VUCGdvlViko>.

Moldovan Politics. “Gagauz Elections: Is Russia Interfering in Moldova’s Internal Affairs?” 21 Mar. 2015. <http://moldovanpolitics.com/2015/03/21/gagauz-elections-is-russia-interfering-in-moldovas-internal-affairs/>.

Nationalia. “Pro-Russian Candidate Wins Gagauz Election, Demands Increased Autonomy from Moldova.” 24 Mar. 2015. <http://www.nationalia.info/en/news/2109>.

Noonan, Joshua. “Gagauzia under Russian Pressure.” Silk Road Reporters. 5 Apr. 2015. <http://www.silkroadreporters.com/2015/04/05/gagauzia-under-russian-pressure/>.

Rinna, Tony. “Moldova, the EU, and the Gagauzia Issue.” New Eastern Europe. 14 Feb. 2014. <http://neweasterneurope.eu/interviews/1097-moldova-the-eu-and-the-gagauzia-issue>.

Socor, Vladimir. “Russia Orchestrates Gagauz Election in Moldova, Ponders the Next Steps.” The Jamestown Foundation. 31 Mar. 2015. <http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43724&cHash=b9e211386ad234cc650d69902cae47d5#.VUCG1flViko>.

[1] Tony Rinna. “Moldova, the EU, and the Gagauzia Issue.” New Eastern Europe. 14 Feb. 2014.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Joshua Noonan. “Gagauzia Under Russian Pressure.” Silk Road Reporters. 5 Apr. 2015.

[4] Sami Kohen. “Could Moldova’s Gagauzia Repeat Crimea Scenario?” Al-Monitor. 5 June 2014.

[5] Kamil Calus. “Gagauzia: Growing Separatism in Moldova?” Osrodek Studiow Wschodnich. 10 Mar. 2014.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Nationalia. “Pro-Russian Candidate Wins Gagauz Election, Demands Increased Autonomy from Moldova.” 24 Mar. 2015.

[8] Eric Jones. “Gagauzia: Strategic Point of Pressure.” Foreign-Intrigue. 31 Mar. 2015.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Tony Rinna. “Moldova, the EU, and the Gagauzia Issue.” New Eastern Europe. 14 Feb. 2014.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Irina Vlah’s Political Platform. <http://vlah.md/index.php?do=static&page=predvybornaya-platforma>.

[14] Nationalia. “Pro-Russian Candidate Wins Gagauz Election, Demands Increased Autonomy from Moldova.” 24 Mar. 2015.

[15] Vladimir Socor. “Russia Orchestrates Gagauz Election in Moldova, Ponders the Next Steps.” The Jamestown Foundation. 31 Mar. 2015.

[16] Dumitru Minzarari. “The Gagauz Referendum in Moldova: A Russian Political Weapon?” The Jamestown Foundation. 5 Feb. 2014.

[17] Eric Jones. “Gagauzia: Strategic Point of Pressure.” Foreign-Intrigue. 31 Mar. 2015.

[18] Milton Esman. Ethnic Politics. Cornell University Press: New York, 1994. pp. 19.

[19] Moldovan Politics. “Gagauz Elections: Is Russia Interfering in Moldova’s Internal Affairs?” 21 Mar. 2015.

[20] Paul Goble. “Moldova: Gagauz Leaders ‘more Russian than Gagauz.’ EuroMaidan Press. 20 Sep. 2014.

[21] Ingmar Karlsson. “The Gagauz, a Christian Turkic People.” Hurriyet. 17 Mar. 2006.

[22] Paul Goble. “Growing Turkish Influence Among Gagauz Threatens Russian Interests.” Moldova.Org. 23 Dec. 2010.

[23] Marcin Kosienkowski and William Schreiber. Moldova: Arena of International Influences. pp. 208.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Paul Goble. “Growing Turkish Influence Among Gagauz Threatens Russian Interests.” Moldova.Org. 23 Dec. 2010.

[26] Rogers Brubaker. Nationalism Reframed. Cambridge Unviersity Press: New York, 1996. pp. 5.

[27] Rogers Brubaker. Nationalism Reframed. Cambridge Unviersity Press: New York, 1996. pp 58

[28] Ivan Katchanovski. “Small Nations but Great Differences: Political Orientations and Cultures of the Crimean Tatars and the Gagauz.” Europe-Asia Studies (6 Sep. 2005): 57.6. pp. 890.

[29] Rogers Brubaker. Nationalism Reframed. Cambridge Unviersity Press: New York, 1996. pp. 26.

[30] Luke Coffey. “Is Gagauzia Next on Russia’s List?” Al-Jazeera. 21 Mar. 2015.

[31] Paul Goble. “Growing Turkish Influence Among Gagauz Threatens Russian Interests.” Moldova.Org. 23 Dec. 2010.

ANDREI: ACADEMIA - THE POST SOVIET MEDIA LANDSCAPE, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION DE-DEMOCRATIZATION IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

2015-04-22T23:55:00.002-07:00

R. “Andrei” Pemberton

Dr. Bailey

POLI499

23 April 2015

The Post-Soviet Media Landscape:

A Comparative Analysis of Information De-Democratization in Russia and Ukraine

Abstract

This project seeks to analyze the structural, cultural, and rational aspects of media de-democratization in Russia and Ukraine after the fall of the Soviet Union. With heavy reliance on the pre-existing literature, I state that the lessening of press freedom is perhaps not only a symptom of de-democratization on a greater scale but also a cause through a microcosmic examination. Russia and Ukraine are two post-Soviet states that also share an older cultural relationship but have not had equivalent media nor democratic outcomes. The media has a key role to play in civil society – however, use of the media in the post-Soviet space has become perhaps a method of a decidedly un-civil society, due to a “reverse wave” of media democratization from the mid-1990s onwards. I argue that while there is a significant difference between Russian and Ukrainian cultures and their views towards civil society and professional journalism, the main difference is in the media ownership structure. Ukrainian media, unlike Russian media, are primarily owned by a variety of oligarchs who do not directly answer to a strong, centralized state. Furthermore, attempts at directly censoring Ukrainian media – such as during the regimes of Kuchma and Yanukovych – have been unsuccessful.

Introduction

In much of the scholarship on post-communism, there is a dialectical transitological approach to the study of the region. Many critics have taken particular issue with the teleological “assumption of a single endpoint to historical progression, namely, liberal democracy” of the transitological and modernization-theory approaches.[1] The dialectical approach has failed in that the post-Soviet space has gone astray from the dream of an ultimate destination of democracy. Instead, in many cases – particularly in Russia – it has backslid into so-called “hybrid authoritarian” regimes, blending elements of democracy and authoritarianism. Defining precisely what constitutes democracy is a worthwhile debate, but not the focus of this topic. Nevertheless, an operational definition is necessary for this argument. Analysis here will be based on Anthony Giddens three necessities, not as a line in the sand but instead to gauge if Russia and Ukraine are moving toward or away from:

A competitive multiparty system.
Free and legitimate elections.
An effective legal framework of civil liberties or human rights.[2]

Implicit in Giddens’ requirements, and the maintenance or progress towards them, is a free press as part of civil society. I will argue that after the 1990s there has been a reverse-wave of media democratization that, while perhaps most infamous in Russia, is wide-spread across the former Soviet Union. In order to fully understand its occurrence, other similar systems must be compared, notably the culturally similar Ukraine, which shares more than simply a communist past unlike many other former Soviet Republics.

The media are utilized to unduly influence elections in Russia, and quantitative evidence demonstrating the relationship between media and political choice. A major component of this is how the law is selectively applied, particularly against media outlets unfriendly to the regime. As early as 1999, Giddens noted that

In countries that are trying to make a transition to democracy (as I have defined it), Russia, for instance, you have a problematic and partial process of democratisation... there is the possibility of retrogression: maybe in 20 years’ time many democracies may have relapsed into authoritarian regimes. [3]

Indeed, Russia's democratization has evidently reversed, rather than continued sluggishly or even slowed, as judged by an examination of even media freedom – much sooner than the 20 year estimate. Giddens notes the importance of the media as implicit in democracy.

The media, particularly television, have a double relation to democracy. On the one hand, as I have stressed, the emergence of a global information society, is a powerful democratising force. Yet television, and the other media, tend to destroy the very public space of dialogue they open up, through a relentless trivialising, and personalising, of political issues. [4]

Richard Sakwa, writing in Putin Redux, theorizes on the operation of a “dual-state” contrasted between formal rules and informal practices – in many ways, a thin veneer of democratic institutions over quasi-legal and illegal acts performed by authoritarian elites, or dejure laws over defacto practices. Within the context of his work, he refers explicitly to the contradiction between formal constitutionalism and the informal practices of the administrative regime, contrasting Weberian rational-legal and personalist authority.[5] Additionally, legal guarantees to information and rules against censorship are superseded by a lack of access to information and a combination of methods of dubious legality to silence journalists. Information plurality in the media has gradually decreased, both by self-censorship and the purchase of media outlets by the state or state affiliated companies.

By Western standards, the question of whether Russia has a free press or not has already been heavily explored in the literature. Despite significant media variation, most scholars agree that there is no real media freedom or diversity – and what diversity exists is progressively narrowing.

It is important to conceptualize what constitutes media freedom. I will utilize a summarization of the conditions Denis McQuail set forth in Mass Communication Theory as:

Absence of censorship
Equal rights to information and communication
Freedom of the press to obtain relevant information
Transparency of media ownership and advertising
An active, critical editorial policy

Non-governmental organizations regularly rank press freedom in the region as poor, and these rankings are of some comparative use – even if one were to accept the idea, as some scholars propose, that their methodology is questionable. In 2002, shortly after Putin's rise to power and the earliest available report with the current methodology, Russia was ranked as “free”, coming in globally at 60 – a tie with a few other countries, including its neighbor Ukraine.[6] However, in 2013, Freedom House ranked Russian media as “not free,” coming in at 176^th in Global Press Freedom, placing it in the company of decidedly authoritarian countries such as Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, and Ethiopia.[7]

Freedom House Global Press Freedom Ranking 2013	Country
96 – Partly Free	Georgia
112 – Partly Free	Moldova
131 – Partly Free	Ukraine
158 – Not Free	Kyrgyzstan
172 – Not Free	Tajikistan
176 – Not Free	Russia
177 – Not Free	Azerbaijan
193 – Not Free	Belarus

Comparing with a most similar systems approach regionally, Russia is still on the low end, ranking at 24^th in Central and Eastern Europe / Eurasia. Its post-Soviet neighbors to the west: Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, were ranked “partly free” at 14^th, 18^th, and 20^th respectively. This placed Russia in between its post-Soviet Central Asian neighbors, all of which were ranked “not free,” with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan performing at 22^nd and 23^rd, and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan coming in last and beneath Russia at 26^th, 28^th, and 29^th.[8]

Russian media, however, is not shaped simply by edict or decree from the Kremlin. Unlike Ukraine, which had a combination of patrimonial and bureaucratic media interference along with direct censorship during Kuchma – which was much more direct of what to publish and what not to publish in the form of so-called temnyky – Russian censorship is generally self-censorship by media-outlets themselves fearful of either economic or physical retribution. While press freedom has demonstrably worsened under Putin's regime, as a result of, and contributing to, worsening democratization as a whole in Russia, some roots, as I will later demonstrate, go back to the Yeltsin era and others further still.

Ukraine’s own media development is similar to that of Russia’s. After the fall of the Soviet Union, there was an initial decade of fast growth in the media landscape. However, unlike Russia, Ukraine underwent a revolution at the dawn of the 21^st century again with the Orange Revolution of 2004 – and again in 2014. Journalists were openly confrontational with politicians immediately prior to the 2004 revolution, leading often to so-called “newsroom riots.”[9] Yet, unlike Putin’s regime, which had managed to consolidate state control of the media economically either directly or by proxy, private Ukrainian media remains under highly oligarchical control, despite legal guarantees of transparency and press freedom. Thus, there are two primary differences between the Russian and Ukrainian media landscapes: different “captors” of media, and a culture much more hostile to state control. I argue that presidential power in Ukraine with relevance to the media decreased in 2004, and then reversed course in 2010, following the elections of Yushenko and then Yanukovych, respectively.

The research question for this paper is how Russian media developed into tools of the state rather than elements of civil society, and how this has perpetuated Russia’s backsliding into authoritarianism, in comparison to Ukrainian media which have been much less successful as tools of the state. Building on my previous research in Dr. Huskey’s Russian Politics course and Dr. Nylen’s Comparative Politics course, I do not seek here to ask if the media in these two countries are unfree. The literature and data, as I will argue, shows that it is clearly the case and that there is wide agreement amongst political scientists that:

a) Press freedom is lacking in Russia in large part due to economic factors such as the state-business-media relationship and the contradiction between defacto practices and dejure law. Despite similar economic relationships, Ukrainian media remain freer as a result of more diversity and ironically a weaker state, but the media are not autonomous.

b) Both Russian and Ukrainian cultures have a history of viewing information as a commodity. However, there are significant cultural differences that play a role in how the two societies approach civil that have further widened their difference since the collapse of the Soviet Union, such as Russia’s engagement in the Chechen War and an increasingly liberalized western Ukraine.

c) The use of the media is politically efficacious in Russia, thus it is rational for elites to try and maintain control. That political efficacy is significantly more questionable in Ukraine, given past failures of state control, a culture swayed by media bias, and the dominance of different oligarchs.

Literature Review

What is Written Versus What is Done: “Managed Democracy” in Russia

The dominant theme in the recent literature is that the Russian state is neither democratic nor a “developing” democratic state, and that the state and role of mass media in Russia reflects this. The literature often does not operationalize the term “democracy”, nor does it necessarily accept a binary between democratic and authoritarian – but it does not seem farfetched to state Russia is simply not democratic. While different methods of gauging this are utilized by different authors, there is a common line: one manifestation of Russia’s hybrid authoritarian regime, so too is visible within the media, is a significant lack of integrity in the rule of law, and roots of backsliding into authoritarianism as early as Yeltsin but immediately strengthened with Putin. Richard Sakwa, a professor at the University of Kent, writing in his book Putin Redux, characterizes the regime as utilizing de facto practices and de jure laws. He argues that Putin’s hybrid-authoritarian system of rule – a term called “managed democracy” – is based in contradictory elements, which simultaneously allows for the consolidation of power while complicating modernization. As Sakwa writes, “A dual state in which the authoritarianism of the administrative regime is countered by the weak democracy of the constitutional state.”[10] His analysis is primarily qualitative; he does not necessarily make normative judgments of Putin’s regime, instead analyzing both successes and failures in an attempt to make sense of the contemporary situation. Sakwa writes that even under Yeltsin, the concept of “vlast” – a Russian word used to describe the political power system – grew in strength, where the state began to manage not only policy, but “political processes as a whole.”[11]

Despite the roots of vlast in the Yeltsin era, Putin thus as statebuilder increased its importance, especially in founding institutions that undermined the constitution and regular modifications, along with fostering a paternalistic image. [12] Still, as Sakwa accurately notes, Putin was no mere “agent” of the Russian security services. While the siloviki – the clan of current and former security service members – did significantly elevate, Putin was and is no simple KGB/FSB “stooge”, nor do the siloviki always get their way.

What is most relevant to the research topic, however, is what Sakwa lists as the sixth pillar of Putin’s system of power: complete and total dominance over the mass media, “above all television.” Sakwa states, as the data verifies, that the vast majority of Russians rely on television for information concerning public affairs. Sakwa notes the forcing out of then-NTV owner Vladimir Gusinsky soon after Putin’s 2000 inauguration, and the taming of media outlets thereafter. Additionally, Sakwa notes that 80 percent of airwave media – radio and television – are directly controlled by the state. While Putin and indeed United Russia are said to not express a coherent ideology, Sakwa nevertheless mentions Vyacheslav Volodin and his predecessor, Vladislav Surkov, as key figures in keeping the media under control as part of the implementation of “managed democracy.”[13] Sakwa also adds that recently, during the 2011 protest movements by Alexei Navalny, the state-owned media was used against Navalny to delegitimize the protests as a foreign state financed operation attempting to be a “color revolution” as had been seen in Ukraine and Georgia.[14]

Political Preference and Media Preference

Sarah Oates, a scholar in the field of political communication, has previously researched the relationship between media and democracy, whether subversive or supportive. Her article “The Neo-Soviet Model of the Media” qualitatively analyzes factors of what she labels the “neo-Soviet” model through examining flaws in media law, self-censorship, direct and indirect control, harassment, and the rejection of objectivity.[15] Moreover, beyond these structural elements Oates also examines the cultural element the continuity in audience reception from the Soviet to the “neo-Soviet” model, as well as a lack of journalistic professionalism.

Notably, Oates criticizes media freedom indexes as “a projection of a particular national tradition of the media (typically that of the United States) onto the media system in another country to see how it measures up.”[16] Thus, instead she proposes the utilization of media “models” to “assess the normative role of media across a range of politics.” She thus has ultimately two questions: does the Russian case fit in with the Western model, or moreso the Soviet model, and does the institution support or subvert democratic institutions?

Oates derives from Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm’s 1963 work on mass media four classical media models: libertarian, social responsibility, authoritarian, and soviet. The traits are something of a spectrum: libertarian is free to publish as they please; social responsibility has certain obligations to provide balance in partnership with the state; authoritarian media serves the needs of the state; Soviet serves the interests of the working class in theory, but ultimately in practice is controlled by the state as in the authoritarian model. She highlights the issues of media in a nation in transit; though media is important in the transmission of values, those values may place emphasis on values which divide rather than unite a populace, as well as “fail to foster civil society.” [17]

With previous research clearly in mind, Oates attempts to tackle other important questions related to media’s role in civil society, such as what even constitutes “education” and “propaganda.” Oates notes, however, that this differs not only between regime types, but even amongst countries similar in ideology. Oates goes on to analyze the responses of Russian focus group participants in 2000 and 2004 surveys which rejected the idea of media objectivity with Schudson’s argument from The Power of News in 1995: “what journalists ‘produce and reproduce is not information—if there is such a thing; it is what is recognized or accepted as public knowledge given certain political structures and traditions.”[18]

A question that has puzzled most researchers is that despite apparent diversity, there is not effective, independent political power in Russia. Oates tackles this, noting that despite the appearance of democratic institutions “in form”, they lack “democratic content.” This resembles Sakwa’s theorization of the dual-state. “As a result,” writes Oates, “much of the mass media simply repeat the fable of democratic interaction.”[19] Oates notes that despite the problems of bias during the Yeltsin era, serious attacks on media outlets began with the arrival of Putin.

There is a mix of both state and commercial ownership in Russian broadcasting and print, which will be later explored in depth with much owed to Oates’ own analysis of “following the money.” For example, Oates notes that only 51% of First Channel is owned by the Russian state, but much of the rest is owned by enterprises controlled indirectly by the Kremlin.[20]Additionally, unsure guarantees of legal protection through contradictory laws and a lack of integrity in the rule of law itself has caused media outlets to self-censor, and Oates lists several interviews throughout the 2000s with investigative journalists complaining of this.

The Information Climate

Hedwig de Smaele's research on the “information climate” of Russia is particularly focused on culture, as a method of explaining the difference in practices between lip service to formal rules while contradictory practices are in play. De Smaele assigns blame to Soviet heritage and the turbulence of the Yeltsin era for the continued weakness in journalistic professionalism. De Smaele attempts to perform an in-case comparison between Soviet Russia and contemporary Russia, along with examining the underlying societal values that may have caused the present attitude and resultant behavior. [21]

De Smaele notes that the Soviet Union was the “prototype of a closed society.”[22] Access to limited outside information was a privilege to the elites, which even they only received on a need to know basis. Thus, a limited flow of information was the norm during the Soviet era. By comparison, there is a clear de jure right to information in contemporary Russia. Here again, de Smaele points out the recurring theme that Sakwa and Oates noted: there is a fundamental contradiction between rights and practices.[23] Despite guarantees in Article 29 of the 1993 Constitution and Article 1 of the 1991 Russian Federation Law on Mass Media, restricted access to information continues.[24] De Smaele cites the IREX Panels, which will be examined independently as a primary source later in this research. Information on a much less grandiose scale remains a privilege of the elites.

De Smaele also further analyzes the new phenomena of “commercial secrets” in Russia, which violate the general rights to information. This so too is the case with state secrets; while certain data is “less” secret, signaling something of a break with its Soviet past, de Smaele criticizes what he sees as a clearly hierarchical system of information classification.[25]

De Smaele differs from Oates in the sense that, by his analysis, media freedom is curtailed in contemporary Russia not out of necessarily the preservation of power for power’s sake, but as a cultural difference: with societal goals taking precedence over individual rights – whether under the pretense of developing democracy under Yeltsin, or a strong Russia under Putin, as a symptom of particularism and collectivism. [26]

The Efficacy of Media Dominance in Russian Elections

A hybrid quantitative-qualitative survey-based approach by Stephen White, Sarah Oates, and Ian McAllister “Media Effects and Russian Elections, 1999-2000” finds that the “Unity” party owed its 1999 victory in large part to disproportionate media coverage favoring Putin, the then acting president who was closely associated with the Unity party.[27] According to the data, television was the main source of political information. However, this election may have set the stage for the reduction in media diversity, as a preference for commercial media was associated with preference for anti-Kremlin parties and candidates, despite a more balanced coverage on the part of the television channels. Indeed, more generally, the researchers propose

“The findings suggest that the state itself may exercise a disproportionate influence upon the electoral process in newly established systems in which social structures and political allegiances remain fluid.” [28]

White, et al’s research is highly quantitative. As the authors note, there was widespread belief that disproportionate coverage on Russian state media led to the victory of the Unity party and Putin, yet the empirical analysis was lacking. Thus, the researchers utilized the data of a national survey conducted in spring 2001, utilizing regression analysis taking into account reciprocal causation between media source and vote choice – indicating that the associations were not spurious.[29]

The literature they reviewed showed an uncertain effect of media coverage on political preference; in this field of quantitatively examining post-Soviet Russian media, the three were and still are pioneers. Even qualitatively, however, they found that media bias was not limited merely to unbalanced coverage, but also the use of компромат (kompromat) – compromising materials published with the aim to embarrass or reveal illicit activity on the part of the opposition.[30] Against private media unallied with the Kremlin, financial pressures such as the sudden collection of debt or increased broadcasting costs were utilized. When it came to the state-controlled media, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in OSCE concluded that the state media outlets “had failed to uphold the public trust by engaging in slanderous reporting, geared to preserve the advantage of the existing power structure and promoting a specific outcome.”[31]

Violence Against Journalists

Somewhat surprisingly, I was not able to find decidedly scholarly work on this topic for inclusion in the literature review. Although a wealth of non-academic research exists as published by organizations such as Freedom House and the Committee to Protect Journalists, the evidence utilized is often highly circumstantial and anecdotal. I will independently examine that research and secondary comments by academics in the body of this paper.

“The System Is Being Duped”

Daphne Skillen, writing in 2007 before Putin’s second term was ending, noted important problems with electoral structure as it relates to the media in “The Next General Elections in Russia: What Role for the Media?” Hers is primarily a qualitative analysis, focusing on much of what the literature had already covered, particularly within the legal sphere. Of interest, however, she notes a particular problem with candidate lists in the parliamentary system. For example, journalists’ provision of accurate information on candidates is suddenly complicated if a candidate rejects their seat in parliament, replaced instead with one who was ranked lower on the party list. The role of journalism is diminished, and in civil society terms, the voter is left “mystified.”[32]

Kuchma’s Censorship

Keeping Oates’ idea of media models in mind, the most noteworthy and similar case to compare Russia to is Ukraine. The amount of literature is significantly less on Ukraine, but a trend in backsliding seems to coincide with Russia’s own in the mid 90’s, owed in large part due to state-oligarch cooperation. Marta Dyczok in her article “Was Kuchma’s Censorship Effective? Mass Media in Ukraine Before 2004” examines the “media muzzling” in Ukraine. Dyczok argues that the Ukrainian censorship was motivated out of an interest in making private individuals disinterested in politics, thereby aiding the consolidation of power and minimizing criticism of the regime as a “zombie effect.”[33] Of course, as we see in hindsight it did not have the desired effect, given the Orange Revolution in 2004.

Dyczok claims that comparison with Russia is of limited value, due to a cultural difference between Ukrainians and Russians in trust of state media. I disagree, as this difference is not large enough to invalidate comparisons and may actually help to understand the difference in media between Russian and Ukraine. Additionally, Dyczok goes on to say that “Ukraine’s reform trajectory departed from that of countries of Eastern Europe which have successfully followed the ‘transition paradigm’ whereas Ukraine began backsliding around 1998.”[34] Unlike Dyczok, however, I argue there is significant value in understanding how Ukraine still backslid into authoritarianism, yet the state had limited political efficacy with media censorship, particularly given the similarities between Russia and Ukraine.

Dyczok notes that – contrariwise to what the literature states about Russia – the Internet quickly came to play an important role in Ukraine, along with cable and satellite television. [35] While Ukraine’s first president, Leonid Kravchuk, carried on reforms started in the Gorbachev era, Dyczok argues that this is more due to other more pressing issues such as economic reform and the place of Ukraine on the international scene.[36] Not all state media was sold off, and the state retained ownership of 10% of the radio and television channels after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, Dyczok is cautious to point out that this 10% figure is misleading. Many registered print outlets do not actually publish, and the state owned national television broadcaster reaches 97% of Ukrainian households.[37] Much like the Russian parliamentary and presidential elections of 1999 and 2000, Kuchma used his oligarch allies to influence media outlets that the state did not directly own as to unbalance coverage, particularly of the opposition. According to Dyczok, “their thinking about the role of the media remained very Soviet. They continued to view it as a tool which was theirs to use, an instrument of power, to subordinate and manipulate, as had been the case in the Soviet era.” [38]

Much like their Russian counterparts, Ukrainian media outlets would receive express directions on how to frame media reports – often called “spin” – known in Ukrainian as “temnyky.”[39] The censorship also concentrated on television, with less – but still prominent – restrictions against private newspapers, magazines, and radio stations, typically exercised through pressure or purchasing ownership. The Internet, by contrast as a form of contemporary samizdat or “self-published material”, while important as an emerging technology, went underneath the radar of the censors given its then low availability and importance to the business sector.[40]

Unlike in Russia, as previously mentioned, these similar methods were ultimately unsuccessful. Kuchma’s popularity remained low, and the establishment failed in elections. The implication of Kuchma’s involvement in the disappearance of an opposition journalist caused ostracization of Ukraine in the international community, and also delegitimized him at home.[41] Data from the Institute of Sociology at the national Academy of Sciences of Ukraine over a period of 11 years demonstrates growing distrust of the media with lessening approval of Kuchma.[42] Ultimately, Dyczok concludes, censorship was unsuccessful in Ukraine politically, but had the harmful effect of lessening public trust in it, thereby perhaps complicating civil society.

Media Capture, Media Ownership

Natalya Ryabinska, writing for the journal “Problems of Post Communism,” has authored several articles related to Ukrainian mass media. Most relevant for the purposes of this paper are her articles “Media Capture in Post-Communist Ukraine” and “The Media Market and Media Ownership in Post-Communist Ukraine.”

In “Media Capture...” Ryabinska looks at the “dual-state” phenomena as it applies to Ukraine, with high levels of corruption superseding rational-legal authority. As part of this corruption, there is “media capture: the situation in which the media has not managed to gain an autonomous position in society but is controlled ‘either directly by governments or by vested interests networked with politics.’”[43] Ryabinska goes on to say that “…[I]nformal rules and practices often subvert or undermine new formal regulations introduced after the abandonment of communism, thereby raising barriers to the rule of law and successful democratic reforms in general.”[44]

Ryabinska lists three particular oligarchs as being dominant players in the media market, tracing their political allegiances and their ownership of media outlets: Serhiy Kurchenko, Rinat Akhmetov, and Viktor Pinchuk. However, of note, these oligarchs do not hold the same sort of loyalty that Russian oligarchs to Putin do; they actively participate in politics, and have switched allegiances. [45]

“…Media outlets… do not remain loyal to particular political actors over the long term but shift their loyalties depending on economic support as well as general power shifts within a clientelistic system. This type of relationship between media and politics helps newspapers ensure their own survival and access to key political figures in political environments where the state is weak and divided against itself and rival power groups use the media in their political struggle.”[46]

Ryabinska also examines the issuance of temnyky, as Dyczok had previously. She also notes that the institutional design had changed significantly in 2004 after Yushenko came to power, only to be reversed to the “hypercentralized constitutional model that strongly empowers the president” upon Yanukovych’s accession to presidency.[47]

In “Media Market…” Ryabinska argues the most significant problem with the failure of mass media to be meaningful in civil society is its concentrated ownership by oligarchical interests that utilize it for political favor, rather than media outlets being able to survive on their own and thus remain politically independent.[48]

A Reverse Wave

Olga Nikolayenko in “Press Freedom during the 1994 and 1999 Presidential Elections in Ukraine” characterizes media democratization in Ukraine as “full of roadblocks and U-turns.” [49] Her research is framed in Samuel Huntington’s concept of a “reverse wave” of democratization, utilizing the media as a microcosm, much like this paper itself coincidentally does, whereas her use of McQuail’s conditions for freedom of mass communication did inspire the same use in my research. Her focus, however, is solely looking at two major time points in Ukraine – the 1994 and 1999 presidential elections.

Nikolayenko characterizes President Kravchuk of Ukraine as having been more interested in stabilizing relationships between Kyiv and Crimea, and thus focused on Russian media, rather than Ukrainian media – thus the relative freedom of regional media was not due to effort but rather apathy, up until 1994.[50] Kuchma, however, developed a system of bureaucratic nightmares through a multitude of councils and laws such as the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting which Kuchma could easily obstruct with friendly council members.

Beyond political censorship, however, Nikolayenko faults the “media ownership structure” in particular for a lack of media freedom, stating that “…many non-state media outlets were robbed of the freedom to craft their editorial policy independent from non-journalistic forces and were turned into mouthpieces of certain interest groups.”[51]

Nikolayenko lightly examines violence against journalists and the use of libel suits to silence investigative journalism, noting that televised media dwarfs print outlets, but the bulk of her research goes on to quantitatively analyze the prices of “hidden advertising” and kompromat in the two presidential elections as well as examining the extent of media bias. [52]

Methodology

The first sections will consist of structural analysis. The initial examination is the relationship between the media and the state. I will argue that whereas Russian media relies on the patronage of state sponsors and state-affiliated corporations, Ukrainian media instead is much less reliant on state sponsors but rather private oligarchical business interests that externally control the media and whose allegiance shifts dependent on clientelistic power structures. This inherently shapes the way coverage operates.

Additionally, in both Russia and Ukraine the dejure legal system is contradictory, with regional law often clashing with national law. [53] Those critical of the regime in Russia are open to selective enforcement of these aforementioned laws. In Ukraine, this was similarly the case except during a “golden age” after the Orange Revolution and during Yushenko’s administration. These legal ramifications are more often than not directed against the business elements of the media rather than journalists themselves. Still, editors have been “let go” sans explanation within a short time after the publication of unfavorable content, and Russia as well as Ukraine are infamously plagued by the mysterious murders of investigative journalists. This is a gross failure of Giddens' third requirement: an effective legal system guaranteeing human and civil rights.

Russia's information climate has also gradually moved from primarily print oriented to television oriented, and an underdeveloped infrastructure has prevented social media and the Internet from superseding this.

Secondly, the post-Soviet Russian and Ukrainian cultures regarding mass media will be examined. In Russia, the media is not only recognized as an instrument of the state – it is, in fact, expected to be so. This is not unique only to the elites, but by many Russians and indeed many reporters themselves. While this is a significant holdover from Soviet times, in many ways it is reflective of Russians' cynicism towards democracy before democratic institutions could ever truly rise. Additionally, the concept of journalistic professionalism is notably lacking. This inherently complicates horizontal accountability within civil society. Without a functional system of horizontal accountability vis a vis civil society, addressing corruption within the legal systems, fraud in elections and the disenfranchisement of opposition or minority parties relies on the vertical accountability of the state, run by elites which have – as O'Donnell and Schmitter analyze – lack a rational desire for democratization. There is the perception that this problem is significantly less so in Ukraine, especially in more recent years, given high participation in civil society on the part of Ukrainians. Even Russian journalists such as Masha Lipman seem to share this perception, as will be elaborated on later.

The final method will be a rationalist analysis behind the motive of media manipulation in Ukraine and Russia. In Russia, the elites under and compromised of both Yeltsin and Putin had, and continue to have, a demonstrable interest in influencing the media, given the quantifiable and significant role it plays in political choice. While there have been similar attempts in Ukraine, it is much less politically efficacious and decentralized, unlike in Russia. While media consolidation has the consequence of harming image abroad and lowering democratic quality, it has been an effective tool domestically for maintaining the power of elite cadres. Within the interest of maintaining power – and thus loyalty – of these cadres but also improving the state's own vertical authority, Putin has consolidated the media, and indeed the elites, to those loyal to his regime. As Giddens stated in 1999,

...When you have instantaneous communication in which television and other electronic media are the leading agencies it invades the texture of our experience. It changes aspects of sovereignty and politics and these are very visible. It's not too much to say that the decline and the fall of the Soviet Union was bound up with these transformations. [54]

Structural Analysis: Clientelism and Media Captors

In an interview with NBC News on 12 July 2006, Russian President Putin stated,

Concerning media freedom…we have more than 3,500 television and radio companies here in Russia… more than 40,000 [print] publications and we could not control them all even if we wanted to. [55]

To examine rationality within a vacuum would be mistaken, as choice does not occur within a vacuum; it is influenced by social relationships, both political and economic. Indeed, the practices of the Russian state regarding media control are not per se the micromanagement of supposedly rational political actors. To understand the relationship in Russia between the media and the state, the legal framework –one of Giddens' three necessities of a democratic system – must first be examined.

Article 29 of the Russian Constitution guarantees freedom of ideas and speech, as well as the right “to freely look for, receive, transmit, produce and distribute information by any legal way.”[56] In addition, Law 2124-1 of December 27, 1991 on Mass Media is the key guarantor of press freedom.[57] Nevertheless, the Russian Constitution stipulates that legally defined secrets may not be divulged under press freedom, and a law on state secrets was summarily implemented in on 21 July 1993, later amended in 1997.[58] The categories are not specifically defined, such as “science and technology” and “intelligence” thus subject to a large measure of control through diverging interpretations. According to de Smaele, “...on the basis of the president's list, ministries are permitted to restrict access to specific information under their control.” Correspondents note that the only way to overcome this is to maintain close personal connections with information sources.[59]

Olga Nikolayenko finds a similar system of secrets in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Rada amended their own Law on State Secrets in 2003 after a scandal involving then-President Kuchma, making him the “chief custodian” on state secrets. According to Nikolayenko, “Instead of protecting state secrets, the legal norm is twisted by the ruling elite to shield a corruption-ridden government from investigative reporting.” [60]

While by law the media is also equal, clientelism within the Russian system has allowed for, as Hedwig de Smaele calls them, “privileges” where some are “more equal than others.”[61] This did not start with Putin, but Yeltsin. Although as Sarah Oates states, the use of media in service of the state has markedly increased since President Putin was first elected, the groundwork, indeed the groundwork for the continued use of presidential power and de-democratization, already existed both legally and structurally.[62] According to Masha Lipman, “...although Yeltsin's government did not directly attack press freedom, the fundamental principles that make it possible – just like the principles of other democratic institutions – were compromised during his tenure before they had a chance to take root in the Russian soil.”[63]

As early as 1993, Yeltsin had attempted to constrain the media through official means through use of emergency power during the crisis with the Supreme Soviet in October. He abandoned this due to an incredibly negative reaction both in Russia and potentially through American pressure. Still, Yeltsin was not alone in this. Contrariwise to Putin's regime, which is characterized by the domination by the state over the elites, or a prioritization of coercion over money, Yeltsin had real opposition in the elites, particularly those operating through parliament. At the time, the Russian newspaper Izvestiya even succeeded in resisting Ruslan Khasbulatov’s attempts at turning it into a parliamentary mouthpiece.[64] Regardless of the rational-legal authority, however, the policy of patrimonialism exists, and existed, outside of legal formalities. Mikhail Gulyaev, writing in 1996, stated that the primary structural function of the media was thus:

The primary function of mass media in Russia is not yet to attract and hold large audiences for advertisers as in the West, although a strong tendency toward this exists, but to attract and hold large audiences for individual politicians who either already control or strive to control the mass media. Mediazation of Russian culture is highly appreciated by power holders and those who long to acquire political power. The politicians, the new economic elite and the journalists are mesmerized by the tremendous power they believe the mass media have. Three competing groups [aforementioned] look at the Russian media as an important tool to dominate the public discourse. [65]

In 1996, the media landscape was dominated by state controlled and commercial media owned by corporate and oligarchical interests. All national radio channels, the ORT and RTR TV channels, the MTK Television Company, and ITAR-TASS were directly owned. RIA-Novosti was in large part controlled by the state. Stations like Ekho Moskvy and NTV, which were formerly primarily commercially owned, switched from support to opposition during the Chechen War – earning and losing privileges as they did – and in the case of NTV did not survive. Media outlets, both in Russia and Ukraine, were not and typically are not independently profitable. In Russia, 90% of media outlets receive government subsidies; in fact, in Russia commercial media was even more subsidized than state run media.[66] On private outlets, advertisements were typically for the parent company or affiliates, rather than for any sort of monetary payment; instead, favorable coverage was and is the real commodity.[67] This financial dependence fundamentally shapes the way media can operate in Russia, and everything else follows.

In Ukraine, there is significantly more media diversity as well as less of an attachment to incumbent political regimes; important similarities remain. As in Russia, media outlets are not independently profitable. The Russian trend in the 1990s of oligarchs owning private media outlets for self-promotion and unfavorable coverage of opponents has continued, with a similar ownership structure of large corporate entities owning private media and interfering in editorial policy as patronage to their government allies. However, unlike Putin, Leonid Kuchma – the second president of Ukraine – was never able to consolidate control. His predecessor, Leonid Kravchuk, was more concerned with a “meddlesome” Russian media attempting to influence politics and instigate ethnic strife, rather than control of domestic media – according to a 1994 report by the Committee to Protect Journalists.

The structural situation remains mostly the same today, with the notable exception – for now – of foreign owned press such as The Moscow Times.[68] The Russian government both has direct ownership of state-run television and defacto ownership through private companies with government links, such as the infamously state-owned oil company Gazprom. Indeed, the aforementioned newspaper Izvestiya once praised in 1993 by Nicholas Daniloff as “beginning to take the aura of a Russian New York Times” has long since been bought out by none other than Gazprom.[69] [70] However, it should be noted that there are cases of notable opposition reporting, such as the case of also Gazprom-owned yet liberal leaning Ekho Moskvy, which regularly reported on the 2011 opposition protests and has received warnings for reporting on the conflict in Ukraine.[71] It should be noted that Ekho Moskvy is an outlier, and one of the few media services that actually earns a profit – perhaps demonstrating a key factor in media independence. If an outlet can survive based on profit from legitimate advertising, it is much less likely to utilize a system of patronage by the elites.

Structural Analysis: Selective Enforcement of the Law and Self-Censorship

In both Russia and Ukraine, who is a criminal and who is not is typically reflective of what oligarch or clan interest holds political power. Boris Berezovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky, and Mikhal Khodorkovsky, who had financed Yeltisn's 1996 campaign, fell out of favor with Putin. The prior two fled Russia, and Khodorkovsky spent years in prison. Gusinsky had been director of the independent NTV; his successor, Boris Jordan, was later fired over the coverage of the Moscow theatre crisis in 2002. NTS, the spiritual successor to NTV, was later closed over a regulatory action.[72] In 2007, the computer servers of the Educated Media Foundation, formerly known as Internews Russia, was seized based on the failure to declare funds in customs – a punishment that usually results in a fine of 2,000 rubles. [73]

Despite censorship being legally forbidden, the practice of self-censorship is rampant due to the coercion and influence of state actors. The 2005 IREX Panel for the Media Sustainability Index on Russia noted the discrepancy between formal rules and informal practices. Andrei Richter, director of the Media Law and Policy Institute, stated “media laws exist, but they are not observed due to how little respect there is for laws in general, the low authority of the media in the community, and the minimal interest of the community in defending free speech, in particular.” Furthermore, according to Mikhail Melnikov, a Russia analyst at the Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations in Moscow, “Journalists and the community very seldom make use of the formal and legal ways of protecting free speech.”[74] Information itself is property rather than a public good, and contrariwise to the variety of press centers and press secretaries that theoretically would aid journalist access to information, they serve instead as barriers.

Laws on extremism and libel have also been utilized against opposition media for what is perhaps political means. Ekho Moskvy, the earlier mentioned radio station, was investigated in April 2015 by Russia’s Investigative Committee after the pro-state Izvestia accused outlets such as Ekho Moskvy and the television channels RBC and Dozhd of receiving “substantial financial infusions from state budget into mass media outlets whose editorial policy followed a clearly expressed anti-state position.” [75] In January 2015, an appeals court upheld a warning issued by Roskomnadzor – a state media “watchdog” – to Ekho Moskvy for “extremist” reporting on the fighting in Ukraine.[76]

Structural Analysis: The Use of Violence

Shared with the selective enforcement of the law is the lack of an insurance of consequences for physical violence against journalists thanks to the poor legal environment. In Russia, what particularly separates Putin from Yeltsin is the apparent use of violence. Since 1992, 56 journalists have been killed, 36 certainly murdered, and 32 with impunity.[77] Known to those particularly critical of Putin's regime, the most infamous murder is that of Anna Politkovskaya, notable for her criticism of the Second Chechen War. In May 2005, the Committee to Protect Journalists listed Russia on the top five “most murderous” countries for journalists.[78] While a handful of murders have had convictions, including recently Politkovskaya’s, the “masterminds” behind the contract killings have never been revealed.

In the period between 1994 and 1999 in Ukraine, violence against journalists also readily increased. Freedom House’s ranking of repressive actions against the press went from 0 (the lowest) in 1994, to 5 (the highest) in 1999 in Ukraine.[79] Reporters Without Borders stated that “the police do everything they can to hinder investigation into the murder of journalists,” referring to the murder of investigative journalists Georgy Gongadze and Igor Alexandrov.[80] Gongadze, an editor of the news website Ukrainska Pravda or Ukrainian Truth, went missing in September of 2000. His body was found in November, but it was not until late December that the identity was confirmed, due in large part to a half-hearted police investigation and the seemingly intentional decomposition of the body by authorities which stored it negligently. On November 28^th, Oleksandr Moroz – a rival of Kuchma’s – released recordings of supposed conversations between President Kuchma, Chief of Staff Vladimir Litvin, and Interior Minister Yury Kravchenko, discussing Gongadze. One voice states “You give me this same one at Ukrainska Pravda and we will start to decide what to do with him. He’s simply gone too far.” The recordings were allegedly from an officer of Ukraine’s State Security Service, Mykola Melnychenko, who justified his actions by stating “I gave my oath of allegiance to Ukraine, to the people of Ukraine. I did not break my oath. I did not swear allegiance to Kuchma to perform his criminal orders.” The Committee to Protect Journalists finds the allegations credible.[81]

It is beyond the scope of this research, however, to prove guilt of the elites with the attacks on investigative journalists in Russia and Ukraine. Various NGOs such as the Committee to Protect Journalists have independently investigated the various claims and circumstances, but these obviously have no real legal effect. Nevertheless, one may reasonably infer that the climate of fear and lack of accountability has a “chilling effect” of strongly discouraging the pursuit of investigative journalism. Whereas the Soviet Union had fairly clear boundaries regarding press freedom, there is now a significant degree of uncertainty of what those boundaries are in both Ukraine and Russia. Journalists now have to tread far more carefully – or pay with their lives.

Structural Analysis: Media Availability

As noted earlier by the quote from Putin, Russian media is diverse. However, this diversity does not readily translate into independence. Despite the popularity of newspaper during the Soviet era, television is now overwhelmingly the dominant political information medium in Russia, reaching over 90% of the nation's 140 million people.

Print media, formerly lauded after the era of perestroika, became too expensive for Russians and Ukrainians in the face of liberalized prices in the 1990s. “Liberal outlets have small audiences,” writes Lipman, noting that outside of Izvestiya, which had a press run at the time of 250,000, others seldom exceeded 100,000. This translates to a readership of around 2% of the national audience, confined mostly to distribution in large urban centers such as Moscow.

Despite the growth of the Internet, its penetration of the public sphere has been low, largely catering to the already politically disaffected youth and liberals. [82] In 2010, only 42.8% of the population had access to the Internet as a whole, versus 2.1% in 2000.[83] However, of this percentage, only about 28% actually seems to access online Russian content, often called Runet.[84]

The situation is not much different in Ukraine. According to Gallup, 96.8% of Ukrainians watch TV for news at least weekly, but unlike in Russia the Internet is the second most dominant news source, with 48.3% of Ukrainians going online for news.[85] However, an important factor is that of Russian media broadcasts in Ukraine. While the aspect of foreign information warfare is ultimately beyond the scope of this paper, it nevertheless deserves mention as this can and does have specific effects on Ukrainian politics, especially in Eastern Ukraine, most recently after the Euromaidan movement in 2014. [86]

Cultural Analysis: View of Journalism and Civil Society

Binding structural relationships and rationality is culture, shaping the behavior of individual actors by societal values, beliefs, and norms. This is not to make a case as “Clash of Civilizations” style case for cultural determnism, however. Giddens stresses the importance of civil society within culture, noting that, “…[Y]ou need civil society. Without civil society you cannot balance the first two factors. Without an effective civil society you cannot promote democratic culture as we see from the case of Russia, and neither can you have an effective market economy.” [87]

Russians hold no delusions over the accuracy of their media. However, perhaps surprisingly to Westerners, is that Russians overwhelming reject the concepts of objectivity and balance in mass media, instead accepting the media as instruments of their patrons. According to Sarah Oates, “the Russian audience... understands that the 'news' they receive... is an arrangement of information through strong political filters. As long as they understand the type of filter, they feel that they can understand the news.”[88] Furthermore, there is the cultural view that the media is meant to lead and inspire – potentially explaining the preference for state-run First Channel.[89] Criticism of the state is, instead, viewed as chaotic and leading to instability – perhaps baggage from the turbulent Yeltsin years. Just the same, Masha Lipman's prognosis of Russian culture is particularly damning.

Just like other democratic institutions—the parliament, political parties, the judiciary— mass media tried to follow the time-tested Western models, yet none of them made good progress. Disillusioned with a democracy that failed to meet their expectations of a better life, and abhorring the new rich as well as greedy officials, the Russian people resumed their habitual attitude: a deeply ingrained mistrust of the government and of each other, supported by apathy and cynicism. The mass media failed to evolve as a means of advancing public politics in part because the sphere for vigorous debate was gradually reduced and because few Russians sustained hopes of using the media to hold authorities accountable. [90]

Hedwig de Smaele notes that “the position of the media cannot be seen as the exclusive responsibility of the authorities.”[91] Individual journalists accept the structural realities of their system consider themselves as missionaries of ideas based on tradition and norms, rather than rational-material considerations alone. This is in line with the greater public opinion as well. “...politicians, media-owners, journalists, and the public at large share a common view, common values and a common culture.”[92]

Information is considered a commodity in post-Soviet cultures. De Smaele further attributes this to cultural influence, contrasting “low-context” universalistic cultures and “high-context” particularistic cultures. Whereas information is a universal right in low-context cultures, it is a particularistic right in high-context cultures. Russia, operating with a system of patronage, is a particularistic high-context culture, characterized by in-groups versus out-groups, clan-life mentality such as the siloviki – Putin's favored cadre of those in the military and power ministries, versus the more liberal, technocratic oligarchs, valuing their particular interests higher than a common societal interest. Economically, particularism leads to corruption and privileges, rather than professional and impersonal market relations. Despite the legal structure ideally putting media outlets on an equal playing field, De Smaele cites the Orwellian phrase, “All animals are equal but some animals are more equal than others.”[93]

Differentiating Ukrainian culture from its Russian counterpart could take volumes, as such justice cannot possibly be done within the space of this research. Nevertheless, the difference in the two societies’ approaches to civil society must be addressed, as related to the media landscape. The World Values Survey’s 6^th Wave, in 2011-2012, found that survey respondents’ in Ukraine, both Russian speakers and Ukrainian speakers, reported with a higher level the importance of living in a democratically governed country as did Russians, giving some measurable degree of empirical evidence to the idea that Ukraine is more culturally predisposed towards democracy.[94]

Masha Lipman, writing in response to the 2004 revolution in Ukraine, stated “What happened in Ukraine is inconceivable in today’s Russia… As Ukraine has demonstrated, powerful opposition may be formed even when national television is under tight control. The real problem with the Russian media is that they do not act as watchdogs.” Lipman, a Russian journalist herself, has harsh criticism for Russia’s lack of civil society and professional journalism, but notes several cultural differences between Russia and Ukraine: the western part of Ukraine is much more historically European, having been part of the Hapsburg Empire; Ukraine has not been engaged in dealing with continuing terrorism such as the Chechen war; Ukraine is much more economically diverse, unlike the oil-dependent Russia; Ukraine was never the “key” state in the Soviet Union, and thus has no real motivation “to bring back the Soviet great-power mentality.”[95]

Rational Analysis: The Desire to Control

The elites have a rational desire to try and shape media coverage. Despite the seeming acknowledgment by Russians of a political “filter” on information and supposedly being “wise” to it, there is a quantitatively demonstrable – if minimal – effect on the political ideology of society. Media outlets that were critical of the elites, such as NTV during the Chechen War, have had demonstrable negative consequences for their interests; the elites quickly learned this, and measures were quickly undertaken to clamp down on the media’s newfound freedom in the post-Soviet era. According to Masha Lipman, the first war in Chechnya owed a large degree of its unpopularity – and thus a poor outlook for Yeltsin's 1996 re-election – thanks to coverage by the aforementioned once-private network NTV.[96] That sharp criticism of the original war is contrasted by the unanimous support of the second war in 1999. In the coverage of the first war, when the military refused to grant information and access to NTV, the NTV turned to an alternative source: the Chechens themselves. This grew far more risky under Putin and the later establishment of the Media Ministry. According to Ivan Zasurskiy, regarding the first Chechen War the media displayed a remarkable degree of principle. Media coverage was the first significant, long-term occurrence of press criticism towards the administration; however, despite its damaging effect against the administration, the media came out from the confrontation weakened – the battle between the two was a draw, but not one soon forgotten.

Нужно было либо признать верховную власть президента, граничащую с диктатурой, – и тем самым признать, что эта диктатура была создана усилиями «демократической» печати и ТВ... несмотря на то, что средствам массовой информации удалось нанести серьезный урон партии власти, в конце концов «четвертая власть» вышла из этого противостояния побежденной, хотя со стороны могло показаться, что получилась «ничья».[97]

Putin, thrust into the position of president by Yeltsin's resignation, has been a fast learner. Although Yeltsin managed to hold onto power in 1996, his approval ratings were as low as 2% at one point. [98]The new regime had to avoid this, solidifying power after establishing it. Exercising minimalistc control in lieu of micromanagement and legalistic repression, as well as defacto control through affiliated business interests, there is little doubt that – at least in the case of television – the media is a Kremlin mouthpiece. In 1999, Boris Berezovsky – then an ally of Putin – smeared Putin's political rivals through the directed use of kompromat, or compromising materials, along with the aforementioned biases and unbalanced coverage present in Russian media. Berezovsky was closely associated with “the Family”, the Kremlin inner circle, and was the most important minority shareholder in the ORT channel. Additionally, he owned or controlled Kommersant, Novye izvestiya, Nezavisimaya gazeta and TV-6. Beyond his association with the Kremlin, his interests were personal; Primakov, a rival of Putin, had previously investigated Berezovsky's rapid enrichment when Primakov was prime minister. In a scathing response, Primakov would later write comparing this to the activities of propaganda minister Goebbels in Nazi Germany.[99]

With the notable exception of the issuance of temnyky in 2003 and 2004, Ukraine has also lacked much in the way of direct censorship. A 1999 US State Department report accuses Kuchma of interfering with freedom of the press particularly during the run up to the elections, and that censorship was primarily self-imposed due to tax investigations and libel measures.[100] In 2003, as earlier mentioned, Kuchma’s administration began directing what events to cover and how to cover them, but towards the end of the election the media began ignoring these directives. According to a 2004 US State Department report,

The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the press; however, the authorities often did not respect these rights in practice. During most of the year, the authorities took a direct role in instructing the media on events and issues it should cover and how they should be covered. However, toward the very end of the presidential election campaign in November, many media outlets began to ignore government direction and covered events in a more objective, professional manner. This aptly named "journalists' rebellion" gained significant momentum on November 25, when Ukrainian National Television (UT 1) sign language interpreter Natalya Dmytruk departed from her approved script and informed viewers that the official election results announced on November 23 were false, adding that "Yushchenko is our President." In the wake of the Orange Revolution, top media watchdog organizations asserted that the media were generally more free and politically diverse than at any time in the country's modern history.[101]

Some degree of direct censorship has recently returned in Ukraine, although the target has now shifted. In the wake of the 2014 Revolution, there has been a crackdown on Russian and “pro-separatist” media outlets, drawing the criticism of even Western observers. On September 11^th, 2014, the Kiev-based Vesti newspaper was shut down for “violating Ukraine’s territorial integrity,” which drew the ire of the Committee to Protect Journalists and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Ukraine has a list of barred Russian journalists, and has shut down most Russia-based television channels. [102]

Rational Analysis: The Party of Power

At first glance, it would appear that United Russia – formerly known as Unity – represents the return to a single party system with minority parties allowed to operate on an unequal level, if only to present a thin veneer of democracy. Regardless, Putin's regime is not solely personalistic, nor is it solely single party. While United Russia exists as a “party of power,” it lacks a coherent ideology and exists more as a “rubber stamp” for decisions of the president. Putin himself is not and has never been officially a member of the party.[103] United Russia owes much of its creation to Putin's use of Yeltsin's former loyal elites in the media, and its practically unwavering support of Putin is where it maintains its support.

Arguably, the difference in coverage in the first Chechen War, the 1999-2000 period was the only time that TV channels were distinctly oriented in different political directions in Russia, excluding a brief post-Soviet flurry of ideological platforms. A clear correlation of political allegiances and media preference is shown by the survey-based research of Stephen White, Sarah Oates, and Ian McAllister in 2005. The researchers found that not only was there clear biases on the part of Unity voters to prefer state media in the 1999 Duma elections and likewise with Putin voters in the 2000 Presidential elections, but also that – through regression analysis – state media was significant in Putin's victories.

“...television had major but quite selective effects on the vote in both the Duma and presidential elections. These effects remained important even after we had controlled for a range of socio-economic and attitudinal factors, and after we had purged the effects of reciprocal causation between media exposure and vote choice... Overall, the analysis we have presented is strongly supportive of the conclusion that it was ORT that had ‘won it’ in the Duma contest, paving the way for an easy victory for Vladimir Putin three months later. It was ORT, and state television more generally, that had helped to create a party at very short notice.”[104]

A research project by Ruben Enikolopov, Maria Petrova, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya found similar results. By comparing NTV availability, measured by transmission strength to subregions, “the vote for Unity was significantly smaller in subregions with higher NTV availability... a 10% increase in NTV availability in a subregion leads to a decrease of the vote for Unity of 1.55 percentage points.”[105]

Media bias, while less empirically researched to date, did not stop in Putin's initial consolidation of power or the creation of Unity – later United Russia. According to Gehlbach's calculations using data from NewsLab Russia, Medvedev received four minutes more coverage on the average evening news broadcast than the other three candidates combined in 2008.[106]

In Ukraine, there has not been the level of success in either political or media consolidation. According to Valerie Bunche, Michael McFaul, and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss in Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Postcommunist World, Ukraine in the 2000s was characterized by a weak ruling party strength, a medium coercive strength, and low state economic control – in comparison to Russia’s medium with the initial two and high in the latter. [107] Perhaps then, given these structural factors, it was not irrational for media outlets, oligarchs, and journalists to openly defy Kuchma. There was not the same level of risk.

Rational Analysis: Direct Censorship – Foreign Media and the Internet

In recent years there has been the establishment of what is arguably direct censorship. Foreign media and many Internet media outlets do not share the same sort of structuralist and cultural factors that play in traditional mass media. For example, a foreign owned media outlet is neither dependent on state funding, and may employ foreign but Russian speaking journalists with a different cultural sense of journalism. The Internet, by common sense, is used by the urban youth. Giddens stated controlling information would become more – not less – difficult for authoritarian regimes. The reverse seems to be true. While he had written optimistically about the Internet – and, for a time, it seemed as though that might be a bastion of freedom – the cadres are clamping down.

“An authoritarian regime tries to control information, and it can do so to some degree, but it is much harder now than 20 years ago. We live in a world monitored by a global community where things are more visible. Every time you switch on your computer or use the internet you are contributing to globalisation processes. A world where everything is more visible has consequences for the nature of democracy and the legitimacy of existing democratic systems.”[108]

In Russia, beyond the continued informal control of the media, in recent years the Putin regime has undergone extensive legal reforms regarding the media – particularly in terms of consolidation and the Internet and foreign owned media. Foreign owned media, at least formally, has yet to endure significant repression. An attempt by Yevgeny Fedorov to pass a bill requiring media with half of their funding from foreign sources to register as foreign agents, much like has been done with NGOs, ultimately failed.[109] Of course, it should be noted that even domestic giants are not immune from consolidation, as RIA-Novosti and Voice of Russia are no more, having been replaced with Rossiya Segodnya – not to be confused with RT, formerly known as Russia Today, which operates as Russia's state-owned foreign media. The agency is headed by Dmitry Kiselev, a notoriously anti-Western TV anchor.[110]

The domestic cable news outlet Dozhd, which had covered the protests against Putin in 2011-2012 and had a significant online presence, was taken off the air due to refusal of cable services to host its channel.[111] With the Internet, once regarded as the last remaining vestige of independent media, the anticorruption blogger Aleksei Navalny has been continuously under house arrest as part of pending charges on defrauding two companies, this despite one supposed victim – Yves Rocher – writing to prosecutors denying damages.[112] The Russian social media giant Vkontakte forced its CEO and opponent of Putin – Pavel Durov – out from leadership, and he later fled the country. Replacing him are two key Putin supporters, Alisher Usmanov and Igor Sechin.[113] Even more concerning, if implemented, is the new law requiring writers with over 3,000 visitors a day to register with the state, subject to the same regulations as the mass media.[114]

A year after the 2011 protests in Moscow, the agency Roskomnadzor was created. The agency maintains a central blacklist of blocked sites which are used by Russian Internet Service Providers in directly censoring content; according to the agency’s own website, it acts as a “unified register of the domain names, website references, and network addresses that allow identifying websites containing information circulation of which is forbidden in the Russian Federation.”[115] Two prominent Kremlin foes – namely Alexei Navalny and Garry Kasparov – have had their websites blocked by the agency. Roskomnadzor’s reasoning was that Navalny’s blog violated the terms of his house arrest, and other sites called for “illegal activity and participation in mass events conducted in violation of the established order.” [116] According to Robert McMillan, writing for Wired,

Ostensibly, the Roskomnadzor’s blacklist is there to keep what Russia considers to be dangerous content from the internet—things like suicide instructions, drug cookbooks, and information about terrorist organizations. But critics see it as a first step toward shuttering dissent.[117]

In 2014, the Duma passed a law forcing foreign companies – such as Google and Twitter – to store data from Russian users inside of Russia. [118]

In Ukraine, a 2010 report by the OpenNet Initiative credits in part the 2005 Orange Revolution in the continuance of “unfettered access to the Internet,” while simultaneously warning that a legal structure was in place for future censorship. Still, the report concludes, “The country possesses an Internet infrastructure that is more oriented toward European ISPs, and this orientation diminishes the influence of any filtering behavior on the part of Russian ISPs.”[119] Even in 2013, Freedom House ranked Ukraine’s Internet Freedom Status as 27 out of 100, with 100 being the least free. [120]

Conclusion

The problem of de-democratization in the post-Soviet world is multifaceted. The case studies of Ukraine and Russia demonstrate this; even examining mass media as a microcosm, there is not one singular cause readily identifiable utilizing any of the three methods of analysis. Both Russia and Ukraine share a problem of a politically efficacious media that is ruled by elites rather than serving public interest. Both share a communist past and view information as a commodity. Whereas there may be a significant cultural difference between Russians and Ukrainians and how they approach civil society, I do not find this to be as significant as Masha Lipman. If there is a primary difference from Russia in the Ukrainian case, it is in the media ownership structure with oligarchs who are significantly less loyal to the state and a lack of power consolidation in the state. No Ukrainian leader has consolidated power as Putin did, this despite Kuchma’s attempts at subverting opposition media through more direct means. Russia has had only two real leaders since the fall of the Soviet Union – discounting Medvedev – and leaders who were more tolerant of liberal and democratic ideas such as Yuschenko had a profound effect on Ukrainian civil society.

While it is true that democratic institutions never truly took hold in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse, the situation is less democratic than its initial years as a result of institutions being immediately subverted by the elites before they even had a real chance to solidify. Putin not only continued that trend, but mastered it. Without independent viability, media are inescapably dependent on legal and financial favor with the elites. Coercion in the form of unequal enforcement of the law, quasilegal measures, and violence ultimately determine the power relationship between journalists and the state. Culturally, a lack of demand for journalistic professionalism plagues the state of civil society in Russia, and cynicism towards the media and democratization paints an ominous future for a cultural re-evaluation of democracy. Unlike in Ukraine, where the censorship is now directed more towards Russian and separatist media, Russian elites rationally continue to consolidate further power over the media given a lack of domestic resistance to their efforts, and the demonstrable effects of media on political persuasion. As Giddens lectured, “In Russia ... gangster capitalism is rife, and strong authoritarian overtones persist from the past, a more open and democratic society can't be built in only a top down manner. It has to be constructed bottom up, through a revival of civic culture.” [121] I ultimately argue that the most significant difference between Ukraine and Russia is the differentiation between the media ownership structure, rather than state makeup or culture, given the similarities in both.

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Based in part on previous research in Dr. Nylen’s Comparative Politics Course and Dr. Huskey’s Russian Politics Course

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[1] Jordan Gans-Morse. “Searching for Transitologists: Contemporary Theories of Post-Communist Transitions and the Myth of a Dominant Paradigm.” pp 328.

[2] Giddens, Anthony. “Reith Lectures Revisited.” London School of Economics. 10 November 1999. pp 76.

[3] Ibid. pp 77.

[4] Giddens, Anthony. “Reith Lectures: Runaway World.” BBC. 5 May 1999. pp 5.

[5] Richard Sakwa. Putin Redux (Third Avenue: Routledge, 2014), pp 2-3.

[6] Freedom House. Freedom of the Press 2002: Global Press Freedom Rankings.

[7] Freedom House. Freedom of the Press 2013: Global Press Freedom Rankings.

[8] Freedom House. Freedom of the Press 2013: Central and Eastern Europe / Eurasia.

[9] Oleh Rozadovskyy. “Media Landscapes: Ukraine.” European Journalism Centre.

[10] Sakwa, Richard. Putin Redux (Third Avenue: Routledge, 2014). pp 223.

[11] Ibid. pp 22

[12] Ibid. pp 21

[13] Ibid. pp 32

[14] Ibid. pp 162-164

[15] Sarah Oates. “The Neo-Soviet Model of the Media.” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, No. 8 (Dec., 2007), pp 1279.

[16] Ibid. pp 1279.

[17] Ibid. pp 1280-1283.

[18] Ibid. pp 1285.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid. pp 1286.

[21] Hedwig De Smaele. “Mass Media and the Information Climate in Russia.” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, No. 8 (Dec., 2007). pp 1299.

[22] Ibid. pp 1299.

[23] Ibid. pp 1305.

[24] Ibid. pp 1300.

[25] Ibid. pp 1302.

[26] Ibid. pp 1310.

[27] Stephen White, Sarah Oates and Ian McAllister. “Media Effects and Russian Elections, 1999-2000.” British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Apr. 2005), pp 191-208.

[28] Ibid. pp 192.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid. pp 198.

[31] Ibid. pp 199.

[32] Daphne Skillen. “The Next General Elections in Russia: What Role for the Media?” Europe-Asia Studies: 59.8 (Dec 2007). pp 1265.

[33] Marta Dyczok. “Was Kuchma’s Censorship Effective? Mass Media in Ukraine Before 2004.” Europe-Asia Studies, 58.2: (Mar. 2006). pp 224.

[34] Ibid. pp 218.

[35] Ibid. pp 220.

[36] Ibid. pp 221.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid. pp 222.

[39] Ibid. pp. 226.

[40] Ibid. pp. 225.

[41] Ibid. pp. 228.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Natalya Ryabinska. “Media Capture in Post-Communist Ukraine.” Problems of Post-Communism, (Mar/Apr 2014): 61.2, pp. 47.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid. 49.

[46] Ibid. 54.

[47] Ibid 51.

[48] Natalya, Ryabinska. “The Media Market and Media Ownership in Post-Communism.” Problems of Post-Communism, (Nov/Dec 2011): 58.6. pp 661.

[49] Olga Nikolayenko. “Press Freedom During the 1994 and 1999 Presidential Elections in Ukraine: A Reverse Wave?” Europe-Asia Studies, (Jul 2004): 56.5. pp 662.

[50] Ibid. pp 665.

[51] Ibid. pp 667.

[52] Ibid. pp. 668.

[53] Sarah Oates. “The Neo-Soviet Model of the Media.” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, No. 8 (Dec., 2007), pp 1287.

[54] Giddens, Anthony. “Reith Lectures Revisited.” London School of Economics. 10 November 1999. pp 11.

[55] Interview with NBC Television Channel. 12 July 2006. <http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/07/12/1443_type82916_108525.shtml>.

[56] Russian Constitution. Government-provided translation. <http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-03.htm>.

[57] Law of the Russian Federation No. 2124-1 Of December 27, 1991 on Mass Media. <http://www.democracy.ru/english/library/laws/eng_1991-1/index.html>.

[58] Закон РФ от 21.07.1993 N 5485-1 (ред. от 21.12.2013) "О государственной тайне" (21 июля 1993 г.) <http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_156018/>.

[59] Hedwig De Smaele. “Mass Media and the Information Climate in Russia.” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, No. 8 (Dec., 2007), pp. 1303.

[60] Olga Nikolayenko. “Press Freedom During the 1994 and 1999 Presidential Elections in Ukraine: A Reverse Wave?” Europe-Asia Studies, (Jul 2004): 56.5. pp 670.

[61] Hedwig De Smaele. “Mass Media and the Information Climate in Russia.” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, No. 8 (Dec., 2007), pp. 1303.

[62] Sarah Oates. Television, Democracy and Elections in Russia. (Routledge: July 2006), pp 22.

[63] Masha Lipman. “Constrained or Irrelevant: The Media in Putin's Russia.” Current History, Vol. 104, No. 684 (Oct. 2005). pp, 321.

[64] Nicholas Daniloff. “Yeltsin, the Press, and the New Constitution: Will Glasnost Survive Presidential Power in Russia?” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, (Winter 1993). <http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/demokratizatsiya%20archive/02-1_Daniloff.pdf>.

[65] Mikhail Gulyaev. “Media as Contested Power in Post-Glasnost Russia.” Post-Soviet Media Law & Policy Newsletter, Issue 29 (April 1996).

[66] Ibid.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Delphine d'Amora. “Russia Tightens Control Over Foreign Ownership of Print Media.” The Moscow Times, 16 Nov. 2014.

[69] Nicholas Daniloff. “Yeltsin, the Press, and the New Constitution: Will Glasnost Survive Presidential Power in Russia?” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, (Winter 1993)

[70] Claire Bigg. “State-Owned Gazprom Buys Leading Independent Daily 'Izvestiya.' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 3 June 2005.

[71] Gabrielle Tetrault-Farber. “Moscow Court Upholds Extremism Warning Issued to Ekho Moskvy Radio Station.” The Moscow Times. 27 Jan. 2015.

[72] Paul J. D'Anieri. Understanding Ukrainian Politics: Power, Politics, and Institutional Design. (Sharpe, Nov. 2006), pp 220-221.

[73] Committee to Protect Journalists. “Successor of Internews Russia Suspends Activity After Police Search.” 23 Apr. 2007.

[74] IREX. Media Sustainability Index 2005: Russia. pp, 185.

[75] http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/russian-state-agency-accused-of-funding-opposition-media/518795.html

[76] Anna Dolgov and Gabrielle Tetrault-Farber. “Moscow Court Upholds Extremism Warning Issued to Ekho Moskvy Radio Station.” The Moscow Times. 27 Jan. 2015.

[77] Committee to Protect Journalists. “Russia.”

[78] Committee to Protect Journalists. “Marked for Death.” 2 May 2005.

[79] Olga Nikolayenko. “Press Freedom During the 1994 and 1999 Presidential Elections in Ukraine: A Reverse Wave?” Europe-Asia Studies, (Jul 2004): 56.5. pp 670.

[80] Reporters Without Borders. Ukraine – Annual Report 2002. 30 Apr. 2002.

[81] Committee To Protect Journalists. “Georgy Gongadze.” 2000.

[82] Masha Lipman. “Constrained or Irrelevant: The Media in Putin's Russia.” Current History, Vol. 104, No. 684 (Oct. 2005). pp 319-324

[83] Internet World Stats. Russia – Internet Usage and Marketing Report.

[84] Peter Piatetsky. “Russia’s New Leader: Fan of the Internet.” The New York Times – Blogs. 14 Apr. 2008.

[85] Broadcasting Board of Governors. Contemporary Media Use in Ukraine.

[86] Oleg Sukhov. “The Media War Behind the Ukraine Crisis.” The Moscow Times. 11 Mar. 2014. http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/the-media-war-behind-the-ukraine-crisis/495920.html

[87] Giddens, Anthony. “Reith Lectures Revisited.” London School of Economics. 10 November 1999. pp 85.

[88] Sarah Oates. “The Neo-Soviet Model of the Media.” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, No. 8 (Dec., 2007), pp 1285.

[89] Ibid. pp1296.

[90] Masha Lipman. “Constrained or Irrelevant: The Media in Putin's Russia.” Current History, Vol. 104, No. 684 (Oct. 2005). pp 322.

[91] Hedwig De Smaele. “Mass Media and the Information Climate in Russia.” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, No. 8 (Dec., 2007), pp. 1304 – 1305.

[92] Ibid. pp. 1305.

[93] Hedwig De Smaele. “Mass Media and the Information Climate in Russia.” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, No. 8 (Dec., 2007), pp. 1307.

[94] Pippa Norris. “Ukrainians Are Not That Divided In Their Views Of Democracy.” The Washington Post – Blogs. 3 Mar. 2014.

[95] Masha Lipman. “How Russia Is Not Ukraine: The Closing of Russian Civil Society.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Jan 2005.

[96] Ibid.

[97] Иван Засурский. «Масс-медиа второй республики.» Московского университета, 1999. Глава 3. МЕДИАТИЗАЦИЯ ПОЛИТИКИ.

[98] Mark Tran. “A Bold Buffoon.” The Guardian. 23 April 2007.

[99] Stephen White, Sarah Oates and Ian McAllister. British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Apr. 2005), pp 198-200

[100] U.S. Department of State. Ukraine – 1999 Report on Human Rights Practices. 23 Feb. 2000.

[101] U.S. Department of State. Ukraine – 2004 Report on Human Rights Practices. 28 Feb. 2005.

[102] Fred Weir. “Crackdown in Ukraine Sullies its Democratic Aspirations.” The Christian Science Monitor. 21 Sep. 2014.

[103] http://rt.com/politics/putin-united-russia-party-833/

[104] Stephen White, Sarah Oates and Ian McAllister. British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Apr. 2005), pp 205-207.

[105] Ruben Enikolopov, Maria Petrova, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. “Media and Political Persuasion: Evidence from Russia.” The American Economic Review, Vol. 101, No 7. (Dec. 2011), pp. 3267.

[106] Scott Gehlbach. “Reflections on Putin and the Media.” Post Soviet Affairs, Vol 26 No. 1 (2010). pp 82.

[107] Valerie Bunce, Michael McFaul, and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss. Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Postcommunist World. pp 235.

[108] Giddens, Anthony. “Reith Lectures Revisited.” London School of Economics. 10 November 1999. pp 80.

[109] RIA-Novosti. “Deputies Withdraw Bill To Label Media Firms 'Foreign Agents.'” 22 Jan. 2014.

[110] Ennis, Stephen. “Putin's RIA Novosti Revamp Prompts Propaganda Fears.” BBC Monitoring. 9 Dec. 2013.

[111] “Opposition Dozhd TV Appears To Be Latest Victim Of Kremlin Pressure.” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. 31 Jan. 2014.

[112] “Russian Court Extends Navalny's House Arrest By Six Months.” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. 24 Apr. 2014.

[113] “Pavel Durov: Founder of Russia's Facebook and No Friend of Putin.” The Guardian. 22 Apr. 2014.

[114] Lyudmila Alexandrova. “New Law Restricts Rights of Russian Bloggers.” ITAR-TASS 22 Apr. 2014.

[115] Roskomnadzor. Unified Register. <http://eais.rkn.gov.ru/en/>.

[116] Steve Gutterman. “Russia Blocks Internet Sites of Putin Critics.” Reuters. 13 Mar. 2014.

[117] Robert McMillan. “Russia’s Creeping Descent Into Internet Censorship.” Wired. 10 Dec. 2014.

[118] Ibid.

[119] OpenNet Initiative. Ukraine – 2010.

[120] Freedom House. Freedom on the Net – Ukraine: 2013.

[121] Giddens, Anthony. “Reith Lectures: Runaway World.” BBC. 5 May 1999. pp 5.

ANDREI: POLICY BRIEF - POST EUROMAIDAN EU APPROACH TO UKRAINIAN FAR-RIGHT

2014-07-23T07:47:00.000-07:00

SRAS/NovaMova

6 May 2014

Policy Brief: The Post Euromaidan EU Approach to the Ukrainian Far-Right

Executive Summary:

The political situation in Ukraine has dramatically changed after the ouster of Yanukovich. This requires a re-evaluation of the European Union's approach towards the new government – particularly, if radical elements are truly increasing in strength. The dominant dialogue from the Russian government has been to accuse the interim Ukrainian government as being composed of, in President Putin's words, “Nationalists, neo-Nazis, russophobes and anti-Semites”.

While the Euromaidan movement initially began in response to the refusal of the Yanukovich government to sign the European Association agreement, it later evolved into a much more multifaceted movement discontent with the corruption and unaccountability of the government. Other groups that did not necessarily support EU affiliation joined in, and the movement became much larger. The idea that these far-right groups, whose views are fundamentally incompatible with European Union ideals, are puppets of the EU is patently absurd.

During the initial period, Russian media criticized the Euromaidan movement of being composed of the far-left, rather than the far-right, even calling it “Gayeuromaidan”. When this tactic failed, and when groups affiliated with the Right Sector name entered the protests, the Russian media and government quickly changed tactics. The resulting information war has reinvigorated fears of the Ukrainian far-right, but how accurate these fears are is debatable.

The truth of the matter is that Euromaidan was not “co-opted” by “fascists” per se, even at the height of the nationalist involvement. Although Svoboda played a significant role, along with Right Sector affiliated groups manning barricades, many of those affiliated with either movement do not actually support the more extreme sentiments of their respective affiliations.

Furthermore, Euromaidan was an incredibly diverse movement, composed of groups from all across the political spectrum. Far-left anarchists, even from Russia, came to assist their Ukrainian left-wing allies. Pro-European youth movements initiated the protests, protected by veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War. Feminist and LGBT groups became paramilitary groups putting up barricade. And, as uncomfortable as it to admit, nationalist elements did play a significant although by no means majority role in Euromaidan. This was a unified movement against Yanukovich.

Now with Yanukovich gone, the right-wing party Svoboda temporary holds a handful of executive positions in the interim government – which, even in countries such as Greece, the far-right has not held executive positions. The European Union has a desire to take Ukraine as a member, and Ukraine is seemingly on this path. Neither Svoboda nor Right Sector has supported this idea, instead being further focused on the idea of a culturally and economically independent Ukraine – something that is not likely to happen.

However, both Svoboda and Right Sector are much more against Russian influence than European – contrariwise to far-right groups in EU member states. Still, the European Union has no greater existential threat than the far-right. Far-right and fascist affiliated parties regularly earn around 4 to 10% of the vote in several EU member states, such as the NDP in Germany and Golden Dawn in Greece. Therefore, the strength and influence of the far-right in Ukraine must be assessed. In addition, the history of the movement deserves examination.

The Issue:

What has been the past and what will be the future roles of the far-right in Ukraine, and how should the European Union respond?

Background:

Svoboda

Populism and Nationalism, questionable Fascism

Officially, Svoboda's positions are presently not to the far-right. Despite this, rhetoric and symbolism is not necessarily in line with its official positions. Although initially much more extreme, Svoboda has made efforts at “mainstreaming” in recent years. Svoboda was originally known as the Social-National Party of Ukraine, and was particularly opposed to communist ideology during the 1990s. Its growth is most likely due to being a new “opposition party”, one that was allowed to exist with a fair amount of impunity as Yanukovich clamped down on democracy, particularly with the more centrist parties.

Although perhaps not “controlled opposition”, Svoboda's support flourished. It was a convenient excuse for Yanukovich: the question of who would people prefer, his government or the “hooligans” of Svoboda? Now, without Yanukovich, some of its support can be expected to wane with more moderate voices, and the release of Tymoshenko and her Fatherland Party's influence returning.

Symbolically, Svoboda's use of the wolfsangel has been a source of controversy. Svoboda typically makes two claims about the symbol: one, is that it is a historically Ukrainian symbol. The other is that it stands for the “Idea-Nation” (Idea-Natsii) concept of a Ukrainian ethnocracy. Nevertheless, although the symbol bears artificial similarity to the Norse eihwaz rune and was often used in medieval – primarily German – coats of arms, it was most recently used by units of the Waffen SS and the failed Nazi Werwulf insurgency.

Anecdotal evidence through interviews in Maidan before Yanukovich's ultimate ousting revealed that some Ukrainians readily reject the association of the symbol with neo-Nazism, even if they are not supporters of Svoboda.

Although Svoboda officially dropped the symbol, altogether uncommon to see it spraypainted in Kyiv or Odesa, along with being worn as an armband by Euromaidan protestors. This may be because a small group known as the Patriots of Ukraine, which ended affiliation with Svoboda in 2007 but is now affiliated with the Right Sector movement, also uses the logo.

In addition, anti-Semitic rhetoric from the early years has continuously haunted Svoboda's image, despite a lack of evidence of anti-Jewish attacks or violence, although it does not take much for rhetoric to escalate into action. Svoboda leader Oleh Tyahnybok once said that Kyiv was governed by a “Jewish-Russian mafia”, and the European Parliament has censured Svoboda as recently as 2012, condemning them as “racist, anti-Semitic, and xenophobic.” In addition, the EU Parliament warned “pro-Democratic parties... not to associate with, endorse or form coalitions with this party.”

Nevertheless, there are reports of IDF veterans working with Svoboda in Euromaidan, such as the “Blue Helmets” organization. Furthermore, although the international Jewish community has typically censured Svoboda or criticized it, the domestic feeling by the Jewish community is significantly different – they certainly do not embrace Svoboda, but nor do they fear them as an impending oppressor.

Svoboda's actual positions seem much closer to populism than open fascism. A brief glance through their website reveals no further fascistic symbolism, and their issued statements revolve around Ukrainian independence from both European and Russian influence, along with “middle class issues.”

Even some informal statements echo the old “Idea Nation” concept with an idea of a Ukrainian ethnocracy, similar – in their idea – to Israel. Even according to Oleksander Aronets, who recently filmed the beating of a TV network worker by Svoboda members for showing the Moscow celebrations relevant to Crimea, “They [the Jews] had a Holocaust, we had a holodomor” – speaking about Stalin’s forced starvation of millions of Ukrainians. “They were without their own country. And then when they formed a country, Israel… They brought back their own language. We have problems [maintaining] our language. They brought back their laws, their traditions.”

Although they have significant connections to other European far-right parties, they do not openly display the neo-Nazi extremism that certain elements of the much smaller and much less organized Right Sector does. Although there are not readily available statistics, interviews show that many Svoboda members are not in agreement with some of the harsher rhetoric, nor often times some of Svoboda's positions.

Furthermore, Svoboda's influence is greatly exaggerated. For example, in the 2012 parliament elections, they won 10% of the vote. Furthermore, they have joined with the much more supported Batkivshchyna and UDAR parties as part of a coalition. Still, the presence of a handful of Svoboda members in the interim executive, widely controversial, is not indicative of their future influence, and most signs point to the party slowly becoming less neofascistic, although retaining nationalist roots.

Right Sector – A Banner, not an Organization:

Right Sector has recently usurped Svoboda's position as an extreme-right movement in the minds and eyes of many. The question that is rarely asked and even rarer answered is: who is Right Sector? Right Sector's influence at Maidan was estimated to only be around 2,500 members, although Right Sector claims 5,000 to 10,000. Even at Maidan, statistically their influence was marginal the total number of people at Maidan regularly was between 400,000 and 800,000. In addition, left-wing groups easily dwarfed Right Sector's presence in terms of members.

"The Right Sector is marginal," according to Andreas Umland, assistant professor of European studies at the Kyiv Mohyla Academy, who studies nationalist groups. "It's an umbrella organization of extra parliamentary lunatic fringe groups that has now come to this big prominence largely because of the media... Its importance is certainly overstated."

However, it is Right Sector's organization that is the source of its strength. Right Sector manned many of the barricades at Maidan, providing almost paramilitary security. Still Right Sector, until after Yanukovich's ousting, had virtually no “official” political presence, although a party has recently been formed by the same name. It is much too early to determine the relevance of such a party. Although the violence of Right Sector affiliates should not be understated, they too are insignificant in the “bigger picture” of the political landscape.

Right Sector is viewed by many western analysts as a more fascistic, more radical counterpart to Svoboda. However, Right Sector's “leader”, Dmytro Yarosh, who also leads the Right Sector affiliated group “Trident of Stepan Bandera” denies this, saying instead that Right Sector is undoubtedly nationalist but not racist, and that Svoboda is far more intolerant. Yarosh even met with Israeli ambassador Reuven Din El, stating that he was not a supporter of antisemitism.

Later, Right Sector ousted the “White Hammer” movement from its banner for its neo-fascist leanings. Yarosh also told the “Pravda” news paper that, despite sharing some political beliefs with other far-right parties, he did not share in their racism – including that, allegedly, of Svoboda.

Statement of Interest:

As aforementioned, the European Union has no greater internal political-existential threat than the far-right. Even without the presence of a radical right-wing, Ukraine has a difficult road ahead of it in order to meet the standards necessary to one day become a European Union member. Even not considering membership, the situation requires monitoring from a human rights standpoint.

The right-wing must be watched, monitored, and radical policies either censured or punished. However, policy recommendations must be made with the realistic understanding of the political climate. Svoboda, and even Right Sector, are not the same as Greece's Golden Dawn. Bringing the conservative Ukrainian zeitgeist closer to European values must be done cautiously, as to not aggravate and increase the influence of the far-right.

Previous Policies:

Isolation and Censuring

The European Union has previously approached both Right Sector and Svoboda with a policy of marginalization; that is to say, officials have often issued censuring statements and excluded them from particular organizations, as recently as 2012. In cases of the far-right parties of European Union member states, the policy has been similar; however, often times the governments of those countries have tried to repress the far-right with varying degrees of success, such as the German government's attempts at banning the NDP.

Euromaidan

During Euromaidan, the European Union did not make particular statements for or against the right-wing in Ukraine. This was perhaps to avoid lending credence to the anti-Euromaidan arguments poised by the Russian government, and because the situation was rapidly changing on the ground.

Policy Options:

Return to Isolation

Continue the policy of marginalization of the far-right, including Svoboda. Work with the Ukrainian government to actively oppose them in a democratic fashion.

Pros:

1. Follows similar trends in EU member states.

2. Shows that the EU is opposed to the far-right.

3. Works against the Russian argument that the new Ukrainian government is dominated by the far-right.

Cons:

1. Runs the risk of seeming “meddlesome.”

2. Could still be used by the Russian government as an example of a domineering EU.

3. Likely to actually encourage continued radicalization, rather than moderation.

Status Quo

Bide time – do not make “official” statements or take positions on Svoboda or Right Sector until further down the road. The interim government in Ukraine is still weak, and taking a role too early may further destabilize the situation.

Pros:

1. Allows for more objectivity and neutrality for better analyzation.

2. Does not run the risk of inadvertently creating bigger problems.

Cons:

1. Easily exploitable by Russian propaganda.

2. May make the EU seem “weak” on the far-right.

Rapprochement

Recognize, if the trend holds, that Svoboda is evolving into a more moderate force. Also watch Right Sector as it too disassociates from the more neofascist groups associated with it.

Pros:

1. Both organizations do seem to be on a path to moderation in “official” terms.

2. Rapprochement may actually accelerate their moderation.

Cons:

1. Easily exploitable by Russian propaganda as a “far-right friendly EU.”

2. Rapprochement may strengthen them without moderation as a result.

3. Despite the apparent track to moderation, neither Svoboda nor Right Sector are particularly friendly to the EU, and have close ties with other far-right parties and anti-EU parties such as the UK Independence Party.

Recommendation:

A “carrots and sticks” approach incorporating elements of both censuring and rapprochement.

Svoboda and Right Sector both currently hold close ties to other far-right groups in the European political sphere. They cannot be ignored, but they also cannot be viewed in the same light as their counterparts – it may be an opportune time to influence Svoboda and Right Sector as well, given that their extremist counterparts in EU member states have often spoken in support of Putin. Certainly, their influence and extremity is exaggerated, but it exists.

Ukrainian nationalism, even Right Sector's “ethnocratic” ideas that are, in the long run, incompatible with certain European Union ideals. However, this is not to say that they are on the same level as the Golden Dawn movement in Greece.

Still, the European Union cannot sit idly by in the rapidly developing situation in Ukraine if human rights are being violated. It is important, however, that the European Union not act too hastily. The interim government in Ukraine cannot repeat the past mistakes of political oppression, but in the same token it cannot allow for violent antisemitism. Furthermore, the role the European Union can play is limited by both the tenuous political situation and the fact that Ukraine is not, as of yet, a member of the EU.

Ultimately, Svoboda and Right Sector are not the “cause” inasmuch as the symptoms. Neither are “puppet parties” although their activity may have been convenient at times for more powerful factions. Neither are they “merely” neo-fascist groups. They are symptoms: the result of an extreme version of the increasing desire for a Ukrainian identity, but manifested as right-wing and anti-liberal organizations. Although the symptoms merit treatment, the causes must also be addressed.

Sources Consulted:

Danilova, Maria. “After Ukraine Protest, Radical Group Eyes Power.” Associated Press. 14 Mar. 2014. <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/after-ukraine-protest-radical-group-eyes-power>. 6 May 2014.

An article on the political ambitions of Dmytro Yarosh and Right Sector, along with its organization during Euromaidan, as well as Jews serving side by side with Right Sector. Furthermore, Andriy Tarasenko – a Right Sector spokesman – speaks out against the ideas of Right Sector being associated with neo-Nazism, although embraces the ethnocracy idea.

“Israeli Envoy Opens 'Hotline' with Ukrainian Ultra-Nationalist.” Haaretz. 7 Mar. 2014. <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.578537>. 6 May. 2014.

This article references Svoboda's past use of anti-Semitic slurs, along with Dmitry Yarosh's meeting with Israeli ambassador Din El, and Yarosh's disavowal of racism.

Motyl, Alexander J. “Ukraine's Chief Rabbi Refutes Putin's Anti-Semitic Charges.” World Affairs Journal. 5 Mar. 2014. <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/alexander-j-motyl/ukraines-chief-rabbi-refutes-putins-anti-semitic-charges>. Accessed 6 May 2014.

Op-ed by Alexander Motyl, Rutgers University professor political science, on Rabbi Yaakov Dov Bleich accusing Russia of staging anti-Semitic provocations and the “Russians... blowing this way, way out of proportion” with regards to anti-Semitism by nationalist factions.

Motyl, Alexander J. “'Experts' On Ukraine.” World Affairs Journal. 5 Mar. 2014. <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/alexander-j-motyl/experts-ukraine>. Accessed 6 May. 2014.

After criticizing other commentators, Motyl goes into extreme detail on Svoboda's more populist positions here, staying that despite the extreme right-wing nature of Right Sector and Svoboda that they are not neofascist and not “dominating” the post-Yanukovich government.

Olszanski, Tadeusz. “Svoboda Party – The New Phenomenon on the Ukrainian Right-Wing Scene.” The International Relations and Security Network: Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) Warsaw, Poland. 4 July 2011. <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=137051>. 6 May. 2014.

This article describes the use of the wolfsangel by Svoboda, and the “Idea-Natsii” ethnocracy concept, along with the potential causes for Svoboda's growth, arguing against the idea of it as merely a “puppet party” or a neo-Nazi party.

“Open Letter of Ukrainian Jews to Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin.” 5 Mar. 2014. <http://maidantranslations.com/2014/03/05/open-letter-of-ukrainian-jews-to-russian-federation-president-vladimir-putin/>. 6 May 2014.

An open letter by various Jewish representatives to Putin stating the problem of “Fascism” is overblown, and even in the case of “Bandera followers” they do not show blatant xenophobia or anti-Semitism.

Stern, David. “Svoboda: The Rise of Ukraine's Ultra-Nationalists.” BBC News. 26 Dec. 2012. <http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-20824693>. 6 May 2014.

A brief article describing the aftermath of the 2012 parliamentary elections, and the possible motivations for their support, including evidence of potential anti-Semitism along with denials by Svoboda members of anti-Semitism.

“Ukraine: Report From a Visit in Kiev in April 2014.” Tahrir-ICN. 30 Apr. 2014. <http://tahriricn.wordpress.com/2014/04/30/ukraine-report-from-a-visit-in-kiev-in-april-2014/>. 6 May 2014.

A collective news report from an anonymous anarchist who operated with left-wing groups in Maidan such as Left Oppositon, Student Direct Action, and Autonomous Workers' Union.

Umlaud, Andreas. “The Rise of the Radical Right in Ukraine.” KyivPost. 21 Oct. 2010. <https://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/op-ed/the-rise-of-the-radical-right-in-ukraine-87119.html?flavour=mobile>. 6 May. 2014.

A brief opinion piece describing the use of the wolfsangel by Svoboda, and its increasing trend towards moderacy.

ANDREI: POLICY BRIEF - SEX TRAFFICKING IN MOLDOVA

2014-04-05T11:30:00.001-07:00

Policy Brief: Sex Trafficking in Moldova

Executive Summary:

Moldova is the largest source of sex-slavery related human trafficking in Europe. The Global Slavery Index ranks Moldova as being the sixth country in the world with the highest prevalence of modern slavery, underneath Mauritania, Haiti, Pakistan, India, and Nepal. In Moldova, many women are routinely kidnapped from rural villages or promised legitimate employment, led legally or illegally to foreign countries, and then forced into sexual slavery. To a lesser extent, Moldova is also a transit and destination country for sex trafficking. Although the Moldovan government has made great progress in recent years through partnering with NGOs and taking into account international recommendation in improving victim protection and rehabilitation, as well as prevention, government corruption and a weak judiciary prevents sufficient punishment of well-connected offenders, many of whom go on to retaliate against witnesses and victims.

The Issue:

What should the European Union assist and pressure Moldova on in terms of solving the human trafficking problem?

Background:

The Roots of Moldovan Human Trafficking:

Moldova's human trafficking problem stems from its poverty woes. The Moldovan economy is primarily centered around its farmland, particularly in terms of its wineries and tobacco growth. 23% of its GDP comes from abroad as remittances, both in illegitimate and legitimate labor. Those seeking legitimate employment abroad make up the largest portion of those forced into labor, sex slavery, and begging. Only around 10% are directly kidnapped. The story is typically similar – upon arrival to the target destination, the traffickers hold the victim against their will and take their passport. The victim is then receives personal threats of violence, along with the threat of violence against their family. Seeking help is further complicated due to a language barrier and a lack of knowledge about victim assistance. Even when assistance is granted, often times the victims are retaliated against upon return to Moldova. While forced labor makes up the largest portion of known trafficking, sexual-slavery is usually directed to Turkey, the Middle East, and some specific EU countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy. Trafficking with its roots in the breakaway region of Transnistria is difficult to gauge and outside of the realistic scope of enforcement of the Moldovan government. In Transnistria, NGOs arguably wield more power over combating human trafficking than the Transnistrian government or the Moldovan government.

Victims:

According to a variety of reports, 90% of the victims are women, with 80% younger than 25. Children make up 14% of the victims, and this has been increasing over time. It should be noted that statistics do not always differentiate between whether the human trafficking was for the purposes of forced labor or sexual slavery, which may leave a significant margin of error.

Logistics:

79% of recruitment occurs through false job offers. 30% of recruiters are foreigners, and data shows that in recent years women have been used as recruiters to bolster the apparent legitimacy of the operation. 29% of victims are trafficked into Turkey, and 28% into Russia. The duration of exploitation has been shrinking in recent years. Some estimates put the most recent average duration of exploitation at 3 months.

Statement of Interest:

The European Union has a vested interest in international law, especially with regard to human rights. As many Moldovans are trafficked into European Union countries, the EU has both some responsibility and potential for success in dealing with the source of the problem. Human trafficking is a problem directly associated with development, and tackling this issue will not only help the victims of human trafficking but also bolster Moldovan development. In addition, Moldova is friendly to the EU, and has been on the path for membership. The Moldovan government has responded to international pressure after more than a decade of neglecting the problem of human trafficking, and has ratified many – but not all – relevant treaties dedicated to preventing human trafficking.

Previous Policies:

Victim Support:

a) NGO Activities:

Support for victims of trafficking has been primarily provided by foreign-donor funded NGOs and international organizations. One of the largest such groups within Moldova itself is La Strada, which started activity in 2001 as the trafficking problem was becoming more well known. The Moldovan government has involved NGOs in an effort at reformation and solving the problem of trafficking, recognizing the significant expertise and capabilities that NGOs wield in the matter. While NGOs have had success in drawing attention to the problem as well as assisting victims, ultimately their acts are primarily responsive – rather than preventive.

La Strada and other NGOs have operated temporary shelters for victims of trafficking, with more long-term solutions for child victims. Additionally, NGOs have launched education campaigns in collaboration with the Moldovan government to educate people on how to avoid becoming a victim of trafficking. NGOs also typically keep the best statistics on trafficking, given the lack of an effective national trafficking statistics database.

NGOs are a very effective policy tool, not only in Moldova, but much of the post Soviet world. With foreign funding and separation from the issues that plague governments, their influence is not bound to the same preconditions as a government program would be. Although this at times causes tension between governments and NGOs, such as fears of foreign influence, Moldova's (mostly) westward-orientation seems to keep this in check in the country. Even in Transnistria, when it comes to certain issues such as human trafficking, the local government is fairly cooperative. Unfortunately, NGOs outside of Moldova in transit and destination countries have struggled with dealing with victims of human trafficking, especially in regards to funds.

b) National Referral System

The National Referral System for Assistance and Protection of Victims and Potential Victims of Trafficking, or NRS, is a system put in place by the Moldovan government in 2009. It is one of the most important preventative and reactive measures that has been undertaken in Moldova, and is widely hailed as a model for the region. The system provides direct assistance and education for those deemed “at risk”, refers victims to specialists and specialized services for rehabilitation, and to facilitate interaction between victims and law enforcement.

The NRS works in tandem with NGOs such as La Strada and Interaction, hosting toll-free 24/7 hotlines in Transnistria and Moldova to provide information about migration and preventing trafficking, as well as for “SOS calls” from victims. The NRS' approach has been described as “proactive prevention”, and makes use of a wide network of different teams of police, social workers, doctors, and lawyers.

The NRS has been criticized for not having uniform effectiveness in certain regions, particularly Transnistria. However, this should come as no surprise. As well, despite a dramatic increase in prosecutions of offenders and an increased willingness of victims to come forward, there have been comparatively few convictions.

International Pressure:

a) Treaties:

Moldova has not ratified all relevant treaties to trafficking, particularly the Slavery Convention, the Supplementary Slavery Convention, nor the Domestic Work Convention. However, slavery is prohibited by the Moldovan constitution; the ratification of these treaties may have little to no realistic effect, rather than being an affirmative statement against modern slavery.

Despite its prohibition by the Moldovan constitution, Moldova did not have laws relevant to human trafficking in particular before the year 2000. The few cases there were investigated were prosecuted under pimping regulations and received fairly light sentences. It was only after signing – but not yet ratifying – the Palermo Protocol, or the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially “Women and Children” that the laws were amended. To date, Moldova still does not meet the minimum standards of anti trafficking.

However, Moldova has been particularly responsive to adopting reforms pursuant to EU standards after the international community recognized the growing problem at the turn of the twentieth century. Even the NRS itself was formed not only with NGO assistance, but with the assistance of the European Commission, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the International Organization for Migration.

b) Judicial Reform:

Government indifference to enforcement of existing laws has let many of the worst offenders operate without punishment. Moldova does not comply with minimum anti-trafficking standards, though as of recent years given international pressure they have undertaken significant reforms. Most actions, like those of NGOs, however, are reactive – aimed at helping victims reintegrate and preventing retribution, but neither preventive nor punitive against offenders.

Although there have been significant efforts at prosecuting offenders in recent years, investigations into corrupt government officials are usually a dead-end and no government officials have been convicted as of this brief. Most analyses state that this is a result of a weak and inefficient judiciary.

For example, a mere 22 trafficking offenders were convicted in 2011, despite 135 investigations and 79 prosecutions. Of these 22 convictions, 12 spent no time in jail, with only paying fines or serving suspended sentences – a violation of Moldova's own mandatory minimum sentences for trafficking. Many later had their convictions overturned, without a written explanation of why by the appeals courts.

The judiciary's problems are not limited to human trafficking. A report by the International Commission of Jurists and the Soros Foundation-Moldova noted in 2011 that the government had drafted proposals as well as considerations for reform, they have yet to be implemented.

Policy Options:

Destination Country Protection

Rather than focus on further Moldovan reforms, protect victims of trafficking in EU member destination countries. Investigate trafficking rings and offer amnesty for victims of trafficking for illegal activity done under duress. Work with victims to investigate the local operation of trafficking rings.

Pros:

Within EU member states. Existing system infrastructure can easily be utilized to protect victims and punish offenders.

Moldovan cooperation. Using NRS resources back in Moldova, Moldovan embassies and consulates can coordinate assistance for victims found in EU states.

Cons:

Asylum is not likely to resolve the problem and is not popular. While there are known cases of women who were granted asylum and became participants within their new homes, it is an expensive program and was previously funded by foreign donors to NGOs in EU member states. With Moldova improving their victim support systems, there is a wide feeling that getting victims back safely to, and safely within, Moldova is more effective.

Expense. Starting direct programs for treatment of particularly Moldovan victims of human trafficking is costly and not likely to be popularly supported.

Although these efforts may curb local demand for prostitution, EU member states like Greece and Germany have legalized prostitution. Furthermore, EU countries do not make up the entirety of destination countries for Moldovan trafficking victims. Stemming the flow in one place may simply redirect the destination.
Instead of coordinating efforts primarily in one country, this would involve many different infrastructures.
NGOs like the Poppy Project in Britain struggle with funding and are not as effective as NGOs operating within Moldova.
Ultimately, this option is the least intersectional with greater Moldovan development.

Status Quo

Take no greater measures than maintaining current pressure. Although Moldova may have failed to meet certain expectations, they have made significant progress. The human trafficking problem will be increasingly alleviated through greater Moldovan development. Further pressure may backfire, especially if the Eurasian Customs Union looks more attractive.

Pros:

This is not a politically risky proposition. It continues the already implemented plans and recommendations for Moldovan development.
No major increased costs.

Cons:

The lack of efficiency within the judiciary is not only morally unacceptable but destabilizing for the region. The status quo is not likely to resolve this.
The problem may get better in the long term, but victimization is occurring now.

Further Judicial Reform

Firmly demand drastic measures of judicial reform. Moldova must continue its path of reform to meet international standards against human trafficking, along with ensuring that offenders are sentenced under the mandatory minimum sentences. Judicial reform is one of the key reforms that Moldova has been lacking on in recent years; although they have shown a willingness to listen, the progress is not sufficient. The judiciary must be monitored given the wide-spread corruption and how many trafficking cases drag out for years in the appeals process, giving ample time for them to simply “fade away” through bribery. A separate special court for trafficking may be considered.

Pros:

Judicial reform is likely to be a significant deterrent to traffickers. As it stands, there is little faith in the Moldovan justice system when it comes to trafficking, due to widespread corruption and a lack of convictions. Even with resulting convictions, the sentences are lax or the convictions may even be overturned on appeal.

Transnistrian authorities have shown some willingness to participate in Moldovan trials with regard to trafficking.

Moldova has previously shown willingness to respond to international pressure to establish and subsequently strengthen its laws. This may follow that they will strengthen enforcement.

Strengthening the judiciary will have more far reaching effects in terms of enforcing law and order beyond human trafficking.

Cons:

Moldova's problem with its judiciary and corruption is not limited to trafficking. Thus, tackling the problem is a significant effort, perhaps independent of a focus on trafficking alone.

Establishing a special court system would be fairly expensive. This could be alleviated through involving NGOs with monitoring the judiciary.

Recommendation:

Work diplomatically with Moldova to institute dramatic judicial reforms. Continue the support of Moldova's other anti-trafficking elements, as well as Moldovan NGOs, but stress that the issue of a weak judiciary goes well beyond the human trafficking problem. Ultimately, human trafficking will be alleviated as Moldovan development continues, particularly economically – but one of the most influential and far-reaching programs would be a reformation of the judiciary.

Although events in 2012 and 2013 cast doubt on whether Moldova would continue its EU path, the post-Maidan, post-Crimea situation seems to have reinvigorated the movement. As such, the Moldovan government should once again be willing to listen to what the EU has to say, especially if aid and agreements have particular strings attached.

Ultimately it is perhaps most pragmatic to solve “one problem at a time”, but trafficking is a complex issue with roots in multiple spheres, as has been shown. Still, ensuring that there is justice for victims is perhaps the most pressing matter both for the victims' security and to prevent further victimization in the future.

Sources Consulted:

“2012 Trafficking in Persons Report – Moldova.” United States Department of State. 19 June 2012. <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4fe30cabc.html>. 5 Apr. 2014. | This is a report on Moldovan human trafficking by the US government that details the successes and failures of the NRS as well as provides regional statistics. It details how the government has been funding victim shelters, but also points out the incredibly inefficient judiciary.

Ganta, Vladimir. “Human Trafficking in Moldova.” CARIM East – Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration. 2013. <http://www.carim-east.eu/media/exno/Explanatory%20Notes_2013-56.pdf>. 5 Apr. 2014. | Primarily an explanatory summary of other more detailed reports, but it also gives detailed information on La Strada and is my primary source on statistics.

Gentleman, Amelia. “Katya's Story: Trafficked to the UK, Sent Home to Torture.” The Guardian. 19 Apr. 2011. <http://www.theguardian.com/law/2011/apr/19/sex-trafficking-uk-legal-reform>. 5 April. 2014. | Another fairly short article, but it gives graphic detail on the plight of one particular trafficking victim, along with the difficulties of dealing with victims discovered abroad.

Ghimpu, Viorica, Viorica Zaharia and Natalia Porubin. “Action Against Human Trafficking and Domestic Violence in Moldova.” United Nations Population Fund, Moldova. 2011. <https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/HSU/Outreach/Moldova/063/Public%20Report%20Moldova.pdf>. 5 Apr. 2014. | This UN report primarily focuses on the background of human trafficking in terms of how vulnerable women come from abusive households, as well as the problem of domestic violence in Moldova. However, in provides statistics on victim rehabilitation as well as critiques of the judiciary and legislature.

“Global Slavery Index 2013: Moldova.” Global Slavery Index. 2013. <http://www.globalslaveryindex.org/country/moldova/>. 5 Apr. 2014. | My most used source. The report neatly summarizes important statistics of judicial inefficiency and corruption, as well as strong background information on the history and timeline of the problem and attempted reforms.

“Reforming the Judiciary in Moldova: Prospects and Challenges.” International Commission of Jurists. 21 Feb. 2013. <http://www.refworld.org/docid/530efeb74.html>. 4 Apr. 2014. | The Soros Foundation-Moldova and ICJ worked together on this report to detail the lack of independence within the judiciary.

Tomiuc, Eugen. “Moldova: Young Women From Rural Areas Vulnerable to Human Trafficking.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 6 Oct. 2004. <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1055188.html>. 5 Apr. 2014. | This is a fairly small news report on RFERL's website that gives information on La Strada as well as the personal stories of a few victims of trafficking, as well as the destination countries of victims and the reforms being made at the time. As it is an older article, it shows a very early approach to the Moldovan situation.

Policy Brief: Russia's International Approach to the Central Asian Drug Problem

2014-03-31T05:53:00.000-07:00

Andrei

17 Mar. 2014

Policy Brief: Russia's International Approach to the Central Asian Drug Problem

Executive Summary:

Russia has a vested interest in combating the illegal drug trade. As there is neither political will nor an existing framework for decriminalization or legalization in international law, and as demand-side security has proven ineffective, a supply-side approach must be undertaken. With the United States' Afghanistan draw-down, their absence will both complicate and open up possibilities of combating the Central Asian drug market at its source. Russia must involve the international community, including the United States, if it is to be successful. This is contingent upon the domestic willingness of key Russian figures, such President Putin, Viktor Ivanov, and the whole of the Federal Drug Control Service of Russia

The Issue:

What can the Federal Drug Control Service (FDSC) of the Russian Federation do in Russia's “near abroad” to combat the illegal drug trade – and how can the international community be convinced to approve?

Background:

One of the most prevalent issues of destabilization in Central Asia is its illicit drug trade, the essential shadow economy of Central Asia. The illicit drug trade perpetuates corruption and may help fund terrorism – though certainly funds the ruling elites, weakening the state and negatively affecting legitimate growth.¹ Of course, this also complicates reform. Still, repressing the illicit drug trade may be more politically tenable than other investments. The United States, Russia, and indeed the United Nations, has a public face of being highly dedicated to continuing the drug war with a prohibitionist stance. Drug use has been an enormous public health crisis in both Russia and Central Asia, along with creating issues of security through criminality.

Trade Routes:

The majority of drugs are trafficked through Turkmenistan and roughly half through Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. From Tajikistan, the drugs continue to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Through Uzbekistan, drugs are trafficked into Russia as well as the Caucasus via Kazakhstan. In recent years, Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan have moved from simply a transit country into a market for drugs from Afghanistan, as well as into its own production of opium, ephedra, and cannabis. It is estimated that 30% of Afghan-produced opiates find their way into Western Europe, with 60% moving into Central Asia and Eastern Europe. Afghanistan accounts for 88% of the world’s opium production.

Prevalence of Use:

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates the total number of opiate users in the combined Central Asian regions being between 3.4 and 3.8 million people. Illicit drug use represents a public health hazard, beyond the addictive nature of opiates. Hepatitis C and HIV, given injection methods of opiate and stimulant use, spread rapidly.² There is an estimated HIV prevalence among intravenous drug users from 7% in Kyrgyzstan, 4% in Kazakhstan, and 16% in Uzbekistan as well as Tajikistan.

This prevalence is higher dependent on subregion. For example, 2% in Bishkek, to 13% in Osh. These rates have been on the rise.³ In western Siberia, there has been a 700% increase in the rate of HIV infections, theorized to be mostly amongst intravenous drug users.Younger individuals have been the most affected. In Uzbekistan, 8413 (64%) of 13,146 HIV cases have been among people aged 34 years or younger.⁴ Beyond public health, the criminal aspects of the drug problem are enormous.

The Criminal Element:

According to Aleksandr Zelitchenko, a retired Kyrgyz police colonel and coordinator for the European Union’s Central Asian Drug Action Program in Kyrgyzstan, corruption poses a greater risk than the public health crisis. Although the extent of the drug problem is mostly measured in drug seizures, the records are unreliable. Measures of yield have been historically off, and even Turkmenistan has not provided data on seizures since 2000. In Kyrgyzstan, Zelitchenko estimates that the actual number of illicit drug users is probably around 100,000.⁵ In addition to seizure data, one can conclude that drug-related criminal activity is growing worse through an examination of how drug-related crimes feature.

Kairat Osmonaliev states, “…in the early 1990s, each 23^rd crime was related to drugs, but by the end of the 1990s, each 10^th crime registered was directly related to illegal drug circulation.” Organized crime is steadily increasing. Central Asia’s corruption and reliance on clientele socio-political forms of interaction do not help in this; low legal salaries give rise to the temptation to take cuts of the enormous profits of the drug business. For example, the Department Head of the DCA in Zaravshan Valley was arrested with 30 kg of heroin in 2004. Even worse, the Tajik ambassador to Kazakhstan was caught twice transporting drugs, including 62 kg of heroin.⁶ Although these drug syndicates have not yet grown in comparable power to South American counterparts, this may actually complicate enforcement through a small chain of distributors.

Central Asian leaders are keen to link Islamic terrorism with the drug trade, in part legitimized by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s drug trade involvement in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan before 2001. According to Sebastian Peyrouse, however, the baseline linkage between terrorism and drugs is “based on a very simplistic reading of the Afghan situation.” A lack of profitable crops outside of poppy fields complicates the situation in Afghanistan, coupled with “warlords and patronage mechanisms.” In addition to the exaggeration of the link between Islamic terrorism and the drug trade, Central Asian states also tend to paint themselves as victims of an Afghanistan “spillover”, diverting attention from their own responsibility.

Statement of Interest:

Russia cannot hope to combat the illegal drug trade with a purely domestic focus. Russia has the largest population of injecting drug users in the world, estimated at 1.8 million, and 90% of them are estimated to have hepatitis C. Each year, drug use reportedly kills 70,000 people. Prosecution of drug offenders costs one-hundred million annually, with an astonishing thirty-five billion leaving the country in what is theorized to be drug-related money laundering.⁷ The problem must be attacked at transit points and at the supply source, in Russia's “near abroad.” The Federal Drug Control Service, working with foreign agencies, may be able to accomplish this. Previously, Victor Ivanov and President Putin have shown a willingness for supply-side initiatives, but have had their ideas complicated by NATO/US policies in Central Asia. With the post 2014 Afghanistan drawdown, this may now be more tenable. In addition to stemming the crisis at home, the secondary effect of stabilizing Central Asian countries will be an added benefit for Russia.

Previous Policies:

Border Security

CAEC, the Central Asian Organization for Economic Cooperation, attempted to include discussions on regional security, particularly which of drug control. Within CAEC, the IDCC – the Interstate Drug Control Commission – was formed. However, IDCC has done little more than provide lip service to the idea of enforcement, with little in the way of real results.⁸ To focus on all of the domestic problems with Central Asia’s drug enforcement is beyond the scope of this paper, but they deserve mention as they are inextricably linked. Nevertheless, Central Asian states have been shown to act on combating the drug trade under international pressure, giving foreign policy a voice in encouraging compliance.⁹

Domestic Drug Enforcement Reform

The political will, internationally, does not yet exist for mass drug legalization, nor does the framework presently exist in international law.¹⁰, ¹¹ Even with some exceptions such as minor incidences of decriminalization and legalization, the most important figure in efforts to combat Central Asia's drug trade – Vladimir Putin – has expressed skepticism. “We consider it essential to fight all kinds of drugs. We observe with concern the relaxation in laws by some countries moving towards the legalization of so-called soft drugs,” Putin said at the annual International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC).¹²

Military/International Involvement:

Although the Central Asian states have adopted virtually every major narcotics treaty, most efforts at international pressure have been conducted bilaterally. There has been a significant missed opportunity in dealing multilaterally and involving the international community in combating the Central Asian drug issue, representative of the over politicization of the issue. With the drawdown in Afghanistan, there are fears that dealing with the supply side of the issue will now be significantly more difficult, in spite of US claims to the contrary. Russian attempts at convincing NATO and the UN Security Council to act against Afghan drug production were unsuccessful. One such plan, dubbed “Rainbow-2”, would have been a large scale poppy eradication program, partnering CSTO with NATO, in addition to UN sanctions on Afghan landowners who authorize the cultivation of opium.¹³ According to Viktor Ivanov, director of the Federal Drug Control Service in Russia, stated that he believed “a joint operation… by NATO and CSTO wherein CSTO could focus upon the transit states and NATO would have to destroy the poppy fields in Afghanistan…. would be accomplished in a week.”¹⁴

NATO refused, fearing that this would worsen the image of the organization in Afghanistan, along with a lack of alternative sources of revenue for Afghan farmers. This attempt at hitting the focal point of supply remains Russia’s objective.¹⁵ Contrariwise, a plan known as CACI, the Central Asian Counternarcotics Initiative, seeks to build support for law enforcement agencies by establishing counternarcotics task forces in each of the five Central Asian countries, communicating across boundaries.

Then-assistant secretary of state for international narcotics and law enforcement affairs, William Brownfield, stated to RFE/RL that the plan would help in preventing a boost in the flow of opium poppy after the 2014 drawdown in military power. The plan would have been funded by the State Department, purchasing equipment and paying for training. However, the plan is essentially dead in the water.¹⁶ According to Elena Chernenko, writing for Kommersant, unlike the plan of attacking supply directly Moscow was less than enthusiastic about CACI, and it felt that the plan was little more than a cover for the US to increase their footprint in Central Asia.

This fear of US-Central Asian bilateral talks is not a new one. In addition, Russian diplomats have raised the valid concern that CACI does nothing to actually solve problems of corruption in law enforcement. According to a February 2012 report by RFE/RL, CACI has not been “rejected” but “blocked.” Ultimately, the US wants to deal with the drug problem by attacking demand in Central Asia, but Russia wants to deal with supply in Afghanistan. Both want the other’s help, but both have very differing strategies.¹⁷ This is an example of Russian fears – whether legitimate or not – of the United States attempting to circumvent Russia’s geopolitical influence.

Although there may be hope with the European Union improving relations with the Central Asian republics, they have traditionally had a distant relationship.¹⁸ Obviously, the bilateral nature of CACI did not help to alleviate these fears. As Aleksandr Zelitchenko recommended, Russia has a vested interest – more than the United States – in combatting narcotics. Not involving CSTO, thus, is an immediate mistake. Dealing unilaterally instead of regionally and involving interested powers, as well as neighbors, is a mistake. Having a narrow focus on security measures rather than attacking the problem at the source of demand is costly, and may be less effective.

Policy Options:

Solving Porous Borders:

Establish border checkpoints, offer Russian forces to complement Central Asian domestic forces. Fund and train anti-drug task forces for border control.

Pros:

Feasible. It has been done in the past, and Central Asian states are willing to acquiesce.
Not politically controversial abroad.
Keeps the relations between Russia and Central Asia.
Does not necessarily involve direct contact with Afghanistan.

Cons:

Unlikely to resolve the issue. Although Central Asian states are willing to acquiesce, actual enforcement lacks will – even Russian forces have fallen prey to widespread corruption.
The borders are simply too large.
Politically controversial at home. Russian politicians are skeptical of past attempts such as CACI.
Securing porous borders is not as simple as establishing a few checkpoints with barbed wire. Writes Peyrouse, “Every entry into Central Asian territory can be negotiated (by buying a false passport, bribing a border guard to forgo a document check, and so on).” It requires political will to secure the borders – a will that is substantially lacking.

Afghanistan-centric, law-enforcement approach

Attack the drug supply at its source: Afghanistan. Involve international law enforcement agencies and domestic Afghanistan agencies directly, with FDCS agents present in Afghanistan.

Pros:

Poppy fields are not hard to destroy, and not easy to hide.
International actors are very willing for a law-enforcement approach.
With the US drawdown, it is more likely NATO will cooperate, especially given EU interest in combating drugs – however, the EU has typically done this from a “boots on the ground” law-enforcement approach done cooperatively with Afghanistan domestic agencies.
Law-enforcement approaches have had some success in the past, but the operations have typically been too bilateral.

Cons:

The bigger the operation, the harder and more expensive it is to coordinate. Still, intelligence sharing is a vital operation.
Afghanistan remains an incredibly dangerous and volatile region.
Most, if not all, opium production is in Taliban controlled areas .
International cooperation is seen by many in Russia as giving foreign powers a “footprint”, hence the earlier pressure on Central Asian states to reject the US-backed CACI plan.

Afghanistan-centric, military approach

Attack the drug supply at its source: Afghanistan. Use limited, precision military force against drug operations.

Pros:

Does not necessarily require “boots on the ground.”
Does not necessitate Afghanistan domestic involvement or even necessarily approval.
Whether an operation is in a Taliban controlled area or not becomes irrelevant.
Poppy fields are the beginning of the chain.

Cons:

The political will for both renewed and limited NATO or CSTO military action does not exist in Afghanistan domestically, and Russia has routinely criticized the US in recent years for unauthorized drone attacks abroad. If a poppy field operation was to have civilian casualties, this would interfere with Russia's rhetoric.
Destroying poppy fields was highly unpopular for US forces, hence its eventual ceasing.
Putting military “boots on the ground” in Afghanistan would be nigh unthinkable given the Soviet history.
Buying off poppy farmers has not been previously effective, and was tried by NATO.
Given years of operation, there is most likely already such a large stockpile of opium that poppy field destruction would not have an immediate effect.
Enormously expensive, especially if military action is performed only by CSTO.

Drug Policy Reform

Through decriminalization, medical treatment, or legalization domestically, the situation in both Russia and Central Asia could be improved and demand curtailed, thus lowering supply in the long run in Afghanistan. At bare minimum, the punitive model should be reserved for traffickers.

Pros:

The medical model has been shown to be extremely effective in treating drug addicts, such as use of opiate substitution therapy.
Comparatively, the medical model costs far less than the punitive model.
Decriminalization in Portugal reduced the usage of “hard drugs.”

Cons:

Legalization is typically considered to be a violation of international law.
There is absolutely no political will outside of Kyrgyzstan even for the medical model of treatment. Although it exists to some extent in Russia, opioid substitution therapy is not permitted.
Drug use is a “moral issue” and difficult to confront politically.

Recommendation:

A multi-tiered, Afghanistan-centric law enforcement approach: stricter punishments for drug traffickers and corrupt officials, and international law-enforcement efforts in Afghanistan.

Ultimately, there is no single action that will resolve the drug crisis. However, the least controversial and most effective approach to date has been punishing drug traffickers themselves rather than users, and law-enforcement efforts in Afghanistan. The European Union and the United States have already shown a willingness for law enforcement acts, and if these can be coordinated with Russia's FDCS, they may have larger successes.

Military action in terms of destroying poppy fields is most likely unfeasible at this point, even without US presence. Still, their absence and murky policies may do more to help than harm international drug-control efforts. The US prefers to act unilaterally.¹⁹ Russia has traditionally criticized or pressured Central Asian states to reject plans that do not involve Russia at the helm.

While it may be within Russia's interests to prevent too large of a footprint of specific powers, there is a far greater cost in allowing the drug trade to continue than the theoretical “footprint” of foreign powers. International players must also show a willingness to involve Russia, perhaps even at the helm, given that Russia suffers from the problem of the Central Asian drug trade the most. Concession will be required on both sides.

Sources Consulted:

Activist Post. “UN Drug Czar: States Can’t Legalize Marijuana Under International Law.” Activist Post. 21 Nov. 2012. <http://www.activistpost.com/2012/11/un-drug-czar-states-cant-legalize.html>. 8 Mar. 2014.

A slightly biased secondary source examining UN policy towards legalization movements and UN International Narcotics Control Board president Raymond Yans' letter concerning how legalization violates international law. The original press release is no longer available as a primary source from the INCB.

Blank, Stephen. “AWOL: U.S. Policy in Central Asia.” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. 30 Oct. 2013. <http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/12848-awol-us-policy-in-central-asia.html>. 8 Mar. 2014.

Stephen Blank examines how US policy typically judges Central Asia for its failures while failing to directly engage.

Brunnstrom, David. “NATO Rejects Russian Call for Afghan Drug Removal.” Reuters. 24 Mar. 2010. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/24/idUSLDE62N1YZ>. 8 Mar. 2014.

David Brunnstorm reports on NATO's refusal of the Rainbow-2 plan. He also notes that, given stockpiles of opium, destroying poppy fields may make little initial impact.

Committee on Political Affairs and Democracy. “Drug Traffic from Afghanistan as a Threat to European Security.” Parliamentary Assembly – Council of Europe. 24 Sep. 2013. <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref-ViewPDF.asp?FileID=19717&lang=en>. 8 Mar. 2014.

A report from the EU Parliamentary Assembly detailing how drugs from Afghanistan are a threat to European security, how the international community has failed to stemmed the tide, and offering suggestions of domestic law-enforcement measures in Afghanistan.

Doward, Jamie. “Leaked Paper Reveals UN Split Over war on Drugs.” The Guardian. 30 Nov. 2013. <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/nov/30/un-drugs-policy-split-leaked-paper>. 8 Mar. 2014.

Jamie Doward reports on a leaked UN draft document showing Latin America's difference in opinion with the present prohibitionist policies of the UN, and the intense internal disagreement.

DrugWarFacts.org. “International – Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Abstracts and statistics from other studies).”Common Sense for Drug Policy. http://www.drugwarfacts.org/cms/?q=node/1111#sthash.1eYFzkkM.dpbs>. 8 Mar. 2014.

DrugWarFacts is a secondary-source compendium of statistics from primary sources.

EEAS. “First EU-Central Asia Security Dialogue…” European Union. 13 June 2013. <http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2013/14062013_eu_central_asia_secdial_en.htm>. 8 Mar. 2014.

A brief press release by the European Union on security dialogue between EU and Central Asian representatives. Very sparse in actual details.

Fergana International Information Agency. “Viktor Ivanov...“ Ferghana.news. 3 May 2012. <http://enews.fergananews.com/news.php?id=2246>. 8 Mar. 2014.

A news article detailing the Rainbow-2 plan, with Viktor Ivanov's comments to Kommersant newspaper translated on the success of joint-law enforcement activities, but NATO's unwillingness to take military action.

Guneev, Sergei. “Putin Criticizes States Legalizing Soft Drugs.” RIA-NOVOSTI. 5 Jun. 2013. <http://en.ria.ru/russia/20130605/181522078.html>. 8 Mar. 2014.

Sergei Guneev reports on Putin's critique of the trend of legalization of so-called “soft drugs.”

Krambs, Timothy. “Drug Control in Central Asia.” Foreign Military Studies Office. U.S. Army. http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/Collaboration/FAO/Drug-Control-Central-Asia.pdf.> 8 Mar. 2014.

A heavily detailed intelligence report by Timothy Krambs on drug control in Central Asia and its logistics.

Luong, Pauline and Erika Weinthal. “New Friends, New Fears in Central Asia.” Foreign Affairs. March/April 2002. Web. <http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Political_Science/OLD/pauline/New%20Friends%20New%20Fears.pdf>. 8 Mar. 2014.

A report detailing the sudden and briefly warm relationships between Central Asian countries and the United States that arose in the Afghanistan conflict, and initial reactions to their human rights abuses.

Mankoff, Jeffrey. “The United States and Central Asia after 2014.” CSIS. January 2013. Web. <http://csis.org/files/publication/130122_Mankoff_USCentralAsia_Web.pdf>. 8 Mar. 2014.

Jeffrey Mankoff explains how the United States' policy to Central Asia has always been short-sighted, and that there is not a coherent post-Afghanistan plan.

Osmonaliev, Kairat. “Developing Counter-Narcotics Policy in Central Asia.” Silk Road Studies. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. January 2005. <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/Silkroadpapers/Osmonaliev.pdf>. 8 Mar. 2014.

Osmanaliev's report is an enormous intelligence research paper detailing the post-Soviet problem of the drug war, and at the time how US forces were approaching it. It is dated as it was written in 2005.

Paul, T.V. “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy.” International Security. 2005, 30.1. The MIT Press. JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.stetson.edu:2048/stable/4137458>. 8 Mar. 2014.

Paul's article describes how the US has typically acted unilaterally in security issues, rather than waiting or even approaching the international community, given its primacy.

Peyrouse, Sebastien. “Drug Trafficking in Central Asia.” PONARS Eurasia. Sep 2012. <http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/pepm_218_Peyrouse_Sept2012.pdf>. 8 Mar. 2014.

Peyrouse reports on the complexities of combating the drug trade, given corruption in Central Asian states and the porous borders.

RFE/RL. "Russia Said To Block U.S. Drug Plan Amid Wariness Over Central Asian Influence.“ Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. 12 Feb. 2012. <http://www.rferl.org/content/russia_reportedly_blocks_us_plan_central_asia_opium_drugs_narcotics_afghanistan/24488075.html>. 8 Mar. 2014.

The article describes how Russia blocked the US-backed CACI plan, despite wishing for military action by the US in the past.

Standish, Reid. “The Three Evils of Narco-Policy in Central Asia.” Registan. 7 Sep. 2013. <http://registan.net/2013/07/09/the-three-evils-of-narco-policy-in-central-asia/>. 8 Mar. 2014.

Reid's article is a secondary source linking back to UN reports, as well as the rejected Rainbow-2 and CACI plans. It elaborates on international concern for an even greater drug-problem after the US withdrawl.

UNODC. “Opiate Flows Through Northern Afghanistan and Central Asia: A Threat Assessment.” UNODC. United Nations. Pages 23, 68. May 2012. <http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Afghanistan_northern_route_2012_web.pdf>. 8 Mar. 2014.

A highly detailed UN report showing how the drug-trade has gotten worse rather than better over the course of the Afghanistan war.

Vatutin, Alexander. “Rainbow-2 Anti-Drug Plan for Afghanistan.” Voice of Russia. 6 Sep. 2011. <http://voiceofrussia.com/2011/09/06/55757403/>. 8 Mar. 2014.

Vatutin's article translates Ivanov's statements on the Rainbow-2 plan, and some of its details.

Weitz, Richard. "Kyrgyzstan: A Look at Central Asia’s Drug War.” Eurasianet. 29 Feb. 2012. <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65066>. 8 Mar. 2014.

Weitz report takes an exclusive look at Kyrgyzstan, detailing what Kyrgyzstan is doing different in its efforts against illegal drug-use along with statistics.

1 Timothy Krambs. “Drug Control in Central Asia.” Foreign Military Studies Office. Pg. 5. U.S. Army. http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/Collaboration/FAO/Drug-Control-Central-Asia.pdf.> 8 Mar. 2014.

2 DrugWarFacts.org. “International – Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Abstracts and statistics from other studies).”Common Sense for Drug Policy. http://www.drugwarfacts.org/cms/?q=node/1111#sthash.1eYFzkkM.dpbs>. 8 Mar. 2014.

3 DrugWarFacts.org. “International – Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Abstracts and statistics from other studies).”Common Sense for Drug Policy. http://www.drugwarfacts.org/cms/?q=node/1111#sthash.1eYFzkkM.dpbs>. 8 Mar. 2014.

4 DrugWarFacts.org. “International – Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Abstracts and statistics from other studies).”Common Sense for Drug Policy. http://www.drugwarfacts.org/cms/?q=node/1111#sthash.1eYFzkkM.dpbs>. 8 Mar. 2014.

5 Richard Weitz. "Kyrgyzstan: A Look at Central Asia’s Drug War.” Eurasianet. 29 Feb. 2012. <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65066>. 8 Mar. 2014.

6 Kairat Osmonaliev. “Developing Counter-Narcotics Policy in Central Asia.” Silk Road Studies. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. January 2005. PDF Pg. 26-28. <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/Silkroadpapers/Osmonaliev.pdf>. 8 Mar. 2014.

7 Drug War Facts: “Russia.” <http://www.drugwarfacts.org/cms/?q=node/1245#sthash.vhCrmqVc.dpbs>. 17 Mar. 2014

8 Kairat Osmonaliev. “Developing Counter-Narcotics Policy in Central Asia.” Silk Road Studies. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. January 2005. PDF Pg. 68. <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/Silkroadpapers/Osmonaliev.pdf>. 8 Mar. 2014.

9 Timothy Krambs. “Drug Control in Central Asia.” Foreign Military Studies Office. Pg. 4. U.S. Army. <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/Collaboration/FAO/Drug-Control-Central-Asia.pdf.> 8 Mar. 2014.

10 Activist Post. “UN Drug Czar: States Can’t Legalize Marijuana Under International Law.” Activist Post. 21 Nov. 2012. <http://www.activistpost.com/2012/11/un-drug-czar-states-cant-legalize.html>. 8 Mar. 2014.

11 Sergej Guneev. “Putin Criticizes States Legalizing Soft Drugs.” RIA-NOVOSTI. 5 Jun. 2013. <http://en.ria.ru/russia/20130605/181522078.html>. 8 Mar. 2014.

12 Sergej Guneev. “Putin Criticizes States Legalizing Soft Drugs.” RIA-NOVOSTI. 5 Jun. 2013. <http://en.ria.ru/russia/20130605/181522078.html>. 8 Mar. 2014.

13 Alexander Vatutin. “Rainbow-2 Anti-Drug Plan for Afghanistan.” Voice of Russia. 6 Sep. 2011. <http://voiceofrussia.com/2011/09/06/55757403/>. 8 Mar. 2014.

14 Fergana International Information Agency. “Viktor Ivanov...“ Ferghana.news. 3 May 2012. <http://enews.fergananews.com/news.php?id=2246>. 8 Mar. 2014.

15 David Brunnstrom. “NATO Rejects Russian Call for Afghan Drug Removal.” Reuters. 24 Mar. 2010. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/24/idUSLDE62N1YZ>. 8 Mar. 2014.

16 RFE/RL. "Russia Said To Block U.S. Drug Plan Amid Wariness Over Central Asian Influence.“ Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. 12 Feb. 2012. <http://www.rferl.org/content/russia_reportedly_blocks_us_plan_central_asia_opium_drugs_narcotics_afghanistan/24488075.html>. 8 Mar. 2014.

17 RFE/RL. "Russia Said To Block U.S. Drug Plan Amid Wariness Over Central Asian Influence.“ Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. 12 Feb. 2012. <http://www.rferl.org/content/russia_reportedly_blocks_us_plan_central_asia_opium_drugs_narcotics_afghanistan/24488075.html>. 8 Mar. 2014.

18 EEAS. “First Eu-Central Asia Security Dialogue…” European Union. 13 June 2013. <http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2013/14062013_eu_central_asia_secdial_en.htm>. 8 Mar. 2014.

19 T.V. Paul. “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy.” International Security. 2005, 30.1. The MIT Press. JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org.proxy.stetson.edu:2048/stable/4137458>. 8 Mar. 2014.

Breaking Affiliations

2013-10-17T12:38:00.004-07:00

Although Andrei does not know it yet, I am breaking affiliations with Kriegsphilosophie.

It was nice to write here when the going got tough.

The Death of Thomas Paine and Civic Duty

2013-10-16T10:09:00.001-07:00

Dead is the age of pamphleteers. Hard data brings to mind visions of science fiction movies and the Utopian surveillance state which has - and this is a cliche - used Orwell's "1984" as a training manual as opposed to a warning. We do not have Huxley on the six o'clock anymore and Tupac is not around except in hologram form to remind us that slavery days are hardly an age past.

Here are some koans instead.

Q: Why has the fifth estate experienced mass surveillance through the centuries?
A: It's easy

Q: What do you call a non-Russian speaker who quotes Tolstoy and Dostoevsky?
A: Typical Blogspot user

Q: How many software updates does it take before you blame it on the compiler?
A: I don't know, it's still compiling

edit: If you're in Calgary, make sure you vote for your school trustee, councilor and mayor. I'm sure if Andrei was living here, he'd vote Mr. Naheed Nenshi as well. Nenshi has a strong Public Policy background from Harvard and was a professor of many years at Mount Royal University. His leadership was instrumental during the city flooding and may have been key in saving the town from a massive shutdown.

Media Crawling

2013-10-15T16:00:00.001-07:00

http://pressthink.org/
http://www.onstrat.com/osint/
http://www.study4cyberpeace.com/
http://www.sebastian-kautz.com/
http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtec.pdf

Spoof attacks, MITM and outdated certificates

2013-10-15T08:08:00.001-07:00

On the subject of network ethics, we often want to ask how fraudulent digital fingerprints may manifest themselves over a particular domain. Whether you are using Chrome, Internet Explorer or Firefox, it is very easy to access the SSL certificates you have access to. As it turns out, the layer is not so secure.

The investigation started when I got onto campus this morning and decided to check the key chain on the Windows 7 machines in the library. A quick Google search turned up (using the keywords "fraudulent certificates") a few articles on spoofs, phishing and man in the middle (MITM) attacks over outdated certificate authorities. While some Tom can (and do) access information over web sockets between Alice and Bob's computers, we must keep in mind that most of these certificate authorities over SSL were instantiated in the 21st century. You can usually find certificates from Mozilla, Microsoft, Yahoo and Google. Other typical objects in the key chain usually come from international telecommunication networks, like Turkish and Dutch roots.

Typical adopters of web browsers will never give these objects much thought, they just kind of run in the background as artifacts of SOCKS routing. It is a matter of course that an attacker would use the path of least resistance and spoof or else forge a digital fingerprint for malicious means using what, prima facie, look like trusted certificates.

Although the latest documentation says that browser updates usually circumvent attacks on outdated or fraudulent authorities, it seems like it may not be the case after all. Attacks have been cited in 2011 onward by sources worldwide (a quick Google will turn up thousands of results). At the cost of bashing Microsoft (which is not the intent), the interesting case is that you usually do not find such digital fingerprints on even what figures like RMS call "spyware operating systems" (like Ubuntu). Indeed, a quick look at my home network does not turn up any fraudulent or else outdated certificate authorities.

Now, a colleague did make mention of some back-doors like this back when we were studying at the University of Calgary Health Sciences department, and it seems to have been patched, but IT in general here seems to allow for more than just MITM attacks - often unwittingly. Dangers of unauthenticated or non-secure SSL channels could be a 'black hat' digital signature, which implicates unknowing end users as perpetrators - not victims - of MITM or spoofs, and also allows prying eyes to look into your email. As an example, we trust our service providers to keep our banking information secured. I can say that my bank account information has been left as a starred item on Gmail since 2010 or so and there have been no worries. What does cause worry is when geographic metadata itself releases malicious digital fingerprints into cyberspace, particularly as a University student, and the next thing you know some police choppers are flying over an entire sub-net to investigate what is believed to be bad traffic.

Core/Operator Design Pattern

2013-09-02T16:49:00.001-07:00

define Core:
     Collection of libraries constituting the [modular] components that compose the software/hardware abstraction layer. Size N for object(libraries) is "very large".

define Operator:
   A user-agent, real or simulated, that enacts the effect of maximizing symbolic links and symmetry at the operating system level through the use of software developer kits and formal logic.

0. (Core ^ Operator) is a unity
1. A unity defines new work closures in software life-cycles

Information and No Original Research

2013-09-02T16:14:00.000-07:00

The nature of information, whether on the Internet or the "real world" has been very obviously well-characterized as "increasing without limit", denoted by our favourite function: the exponential. With the saturation of information versus the lack of interested academics, we can only get out of this slump of having no original research by generating new questions from preexisting data sets. There is a running joke in the programmers community: "grids, grids and more grids". Indeed, the mathematical structure of the grid and matrix are timeless. Euclid and the pre-Socratics solved very interested properties in maths using these kind of structures.

Rather than coming up with new programming languages and frameworks, give your Data Structures and Algorithms textbook some love and read the first three chapters or so. You'll find everything you need to solve interesting statistical problems to be pre-installed with your GNU/Linux minimal build or else your Windows/Apple machine.

Time Distortion and Learning in Virtual Realities

2013-09-02T16:10:00.000-07:00

In the film The Matrix, Morpheus and other red-pillers tell us about how being plugged in longer than others seems to change our sense of reality, personalities and perceptions. Indeed, if you were to ask the regular net user since the inception of IRC and those who have successfully run a business on the Internet, they might tell you "it's all about the timing". In a place where mathematical logic rules and propositions inherit their futures from the study of vector fields, we have to ask ourselves the point at which imagination and reality begin to break down. At the cost of sounding like a hipster, the plugging in process seems to change the time scale at which our minds manage to process and learn new information and the rate at which it acquires knowledge.

Just like the "slumdogs" in India managed to learn biotechnology in two weeks with one computer connected to the Internet, we now see a boundary re-emerging in which humans are melding with the neo-agora and decentralized economics: the boundary of choice. Perhaps this is what Captain Picard meant when he was discussing how economies worked in his future:

We... handle our money systems differently here.

Hashes per second versus Cryptocoin Output

2013-09-02T16:00:00.000-07:00

If you look at a typical mining pool for cryptocurrencies, you will notice that most of them contain a "Hall of Fame" segment. Upon closer inspection, you may notice that some people clock in at some absurd number like 140954085 mhash/second and get x number of some cryptocoin (let's say it's 100 BTC). One row down, you may see some user who clocks in at 43948 mhash/second is getting 10 or 20 more BTC than the user getting x number of BTC. Statistically, this means that there is little to no correlation.

The race for building the "best miners" seems to have been a rat race instead of one to the finish line. Save your cash and read the documentation. The transmission protocols used in cryptocurrencies are based on the same ones used for your favourite BitTorrent client and relies on open connectivity to the network. Hash computations aren't going to solve any quicker when the original algorithm by Satoshi was meant to actually be a self-evolving blockchain.

ANDREI: MUSINGS - THE PIOUS ATHEISTS

2013-07-16T11:57:00.000-07:00

"Our atheists are pious people. If in the so-called feudal times we held everything as a fief from God, in the liberal period the same feudal relation exists with man." - Max Stirner, "The Ego and its Own," 1844

"'Good' without God." This is the present moralistic battlecry of the new wave of amateur-scientist, pseudo-intellectual atheists. Prominently described as "atheistkult" by detractors -- both religious and otherwise -- such individuals are fueled by an addiction to YouTube videos with poor production values, a library of atheist+ rhetoric masquerading as haphazard philosophy by Dawkins and Hitchens. These same individuals are known to parrot Nietzsche's most infamous saying that "God is dead." They readily, and perhaps even rightly, openly mock the idea that one need a deity to preserve some sort of moral code. However, paradoxically, they still play the game of the theists -- of the religious. Some even go as far as to claim moral superiority based solely on their more "intellectual" morality.

Such individuals find themselves stuck playing the theists' game -- and losing. God is not dead to them -- God has only dropped its false skin mask. Its persona is gone, but the concept remains. A metaphysical dictation. A "right" or "wrong" that is objective. This is, of course, not a new thing. Objectivists for years have proposed an atheistic objective morality in the sense of a rationalization that will always rise to a "moral" act, done in one's "rational self-interest."

Of course, even amongst Objectivists there is never much agreement in supposed life-boat situations where a single outcome is the inherently moral one. Act as they might that they have found a perfect ethical system, the schisms within Ayn Rand's circles and the vitriol spat back and forth between newsletters of Objectivist-influenced thinkers should demonstrate that the system is every bit as subjective as any other system of morality.

Scientific attempts at hammering down morality are even less convincing than the logically rigged debates of metaethical philosophers. Lawrence Kohlberg's stages of moral development, based on the work of developmental psychologist Piaget, offer only a window into one possible framework of reasoning. The inherent criticism is that Kohlberb gave justification for such reasoning after the fact; it is only "good" because he said it was. This criticism so too applies to the circular argumentation of moral universalists. No matter how rigged the game or invocations are based on boolean logic, "good" and "bad" are eternally subjective without an outside, prototypical force.

It stands to say that this metaphysical, prototypical force is represented by some as God, by others as axiomatic ways of thinking. It does not, of course, take someone with a doctoral degree in philosophy to see that, if examined critically, the axiom is no more -- perhaps even less! -- convincing than the deity. It is an inherently losing game, then, to act as a moralist atheist -- or moralist, for that matter. A "moral" does not exist in a tangible, material fashion -- it is an idea, based on the subjective norms of the society and the values of the individual. What is "good" is what is pleasing, what is "evil" is what is not. This is an independent statement of what may or may not be harmful for society as a whole. To claim otherwise is to be as faithful as their Jehova-worshiping kin.

"Good" is a misnomer.

ANDREI: ACADEMIA - NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION IN THE 21st CENTURY

2013-06-15T20:10:00.005-07:00

Individual Analysis: Nuclear Non-proliferation in the 21st Century

At no point in history has humanity been closer to nuclear war than during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the modern era, where the United States has attempted to ensure nuclear non-proliferation; the distant memories of the Cuban Missile Crisis remain terrifying enough for the nation to have decent support by its populace when it comes to pressuring other nations to not develop nuclear capabilities. Although the dreaded nuclear apocalypse has continued to be thankfully averted, there are important lessons in diplomacy that one can take from the most notorious situation. The most prominent today is Iran. The IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), a NGO (Non Governmental Agency) of the United Nations published a report in 2011 stating that they feared Iran was taking clear steps towards the development of nuclear weapons. Graham Allison in his article for Foreign Affairs entitled “The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50” gives a brief history of the namesake crisis, proposed solutions, along with making a potential “Kennedyesque” third solution to the Iranian situation. Iran, which claims to be developing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, has been repeatedly warned by both Israel and the United States about the potential for military strikes if they do not end their nuclear program. The reasoning given behind this is their potential for nuclear weapons. In realist terms, this would upset the balance of power, obstructing Israel as the regional hegemonic power. Outside of the commonly proposed airstrikes and simply leaving Iran alone, Allison states that the third solution he sees it would be a “carrot and the stick” approach, threatening a regime-changing attack should Iran attempt to muddle investigations into their nuclear program. To believe that a genuine Kennedyesque solution is possible with the individual actors today seems a stretch. One must take a look at the individual actors of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the crisis of today – Khrushchev and Netanyahu, Castro and Netanyahu, ending with Kennedy and Obama.

Khrushchev, the Soviet leader during the Cuban Missile Crisis, knew that a nuclear war would be disastrous for both sides. In spite of Soviet rhetoric that socialists would easily emerge out of a nuclear catastrophe, Khrushchev himself was a Soviet reformer and considered a liberal among his own party (“Khruschev on Khruschev,” “Khruschev and Stalin,” “Averting the Apocalypse”). While Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President of Iran, is also considered somewhat of a reformer in his nation, he is much more of a realist than Khrushchev the idealist – along with the fact that he is not the supreme leader of Iran, further complicating matters (Miner). Ahmadinejad has continuously expressed wishful thinking, along with his generals, that the United States would struggle to topple the Iranian regime; that reprisals from Iran would bring the western power to its knees (Nal). While military engagement with Iran would certainly be more costly than the engagement with Saddam's army in Iraq, it is hard to see how Iran imagines it would withstand the incredible air superiority of both the United States and Israel. Furthermore, one could assume that Iran, and by proxy Ahmadinejad, is sincere that it does not wish to pursue nuclear weapons and only nuclear power. If this was indeed true, then they would be an inevitable frustration-aggression response from Iranian leaders who may see the United States and Israel attempting to bully Iran into economic disparity. The oil will dry up, and Iran has claimed that nuclear energy is the only way to ensure its future. Both Khrushchev and Ahmadinejad lacked/lack the favor by the conservative hardliners within their party, however (“Krushchev on Krushchev,” Miner). Khrushchev was deposed soon after the Cuban Missile Crisis for his idealist, pro-western policies, and Ahmadinejad is constantly criticized by the Supreme Council for his domestic policies (“Senior Citizen Khrushchev,” Miner). It is, therefore, not a stretch to imagine that like his superficial Soviet counterpart, Ahmadinejad is playing a game of rhetoric which is often times mistranslated (either accidentally or intentionally) by the western media. For example, an infamous line by Khrushchev is “History is on our side. We will bury you.” However, this idiosyncratic line is a saying in Russian that one will simply outlast their opponent (“Khrushchev on Krushchev,” “Power and Peace”). It was not taken as such in the western media.” An infamous comment by Ahmadinejad is that Israel would be “wiped off the map,” but this too is a repeated mistranslation. According to Ahmadinejad himself during an interview with Piers Morgan on CNN,

“So when we say ‘to be wiped’, we say for occupation to be wiped off from this world. For war- seeking to (be) wiped off and eradicated, the killing of women and children to be eradicated. And we propose the way. We propose the path. The path is to recognise the right of the Palestinians to self- governance.”

Ahmadinejad is also an idealist at home, but his rhetoric shows that he is a realist abroad.

In the Cuban Missile Crisis, as Allison writes, Castro was not a true actor. The United States knew he was essentially a rogue agent, and was quick to state that they would see any nuclear attack directed from Cuba as a proxy of the Soviet Union. He was cut out of the picture. Castro was an exemplar of wishful thinking; perhaps strengthened in his delusion by the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion where forces trained and equipped by the United States were easily routed, Castro wished nuclear confrontation according to Allison. It is unfair, even superficially, to compare Netanyahu to a man like Castro, but for the purposes of comparison to the Cuban Missile Crisis it is nevertheless necessary. Netanyahu presents an interesting dilemma, as Israel is more than capable of acting independently. Having boasted that Israel could lead the United States “by the nose,” Netanyahu seems eager that military action is the only realistic response to a nuclear Iran (Pillar). Israel destroyed a Syrian nuclear facility in an airstrike before, and while Iran has been careful to fortify their own through bunkering and scattering, this has not prevented Israel from taking action (Follath, Stark). Israel has been supplied bunker-busting bombs by the United States (Shanker). Israel may be partly responsible for a campaign of assassinations against Iranian nuclear scientists, striking Iran's knowledge at its core (Vick, Klein). Netanyahu's experience no doubt affects him on a drastic, individual level. A wounded combat veteran, he has been in the special forces in a variety of military operations, including the Suez Canal, the Yom Kippur War, the Six Day War, and more (Melman). It is little wonder, therefore, that despite his time with the United Nations he is widely seen as a realist. Dennis Ross notes that, during the Clinton administration, there was little idea that “Bibi” wanted anything to do with the pursuit of peace [with Palestine] (Beinart). The existence of Israel as an essentially independent actor greatly complicates the situation, and regardless of if the United States were to join in on an attack against Iran, the United States would be greatly affected.

The matter of the United States, currently led by President Obama, is a particularly interesting situation. Obama, at the individual level, differs greatly from his predecessor Bush. In terms of foreign policy, however, there is a massive overlap (Moughty). To say that he is capable of a Kennedyesque solution seems improbable. Obama has continued much of the Bush doctrine, though with a more strategic policy (Moughty). He is not motivated by the same neo-conservative idealism that so affected the Bush doctrine. His ambition is arguably less in terms of nation-building and “spreading democracy,” but a sort of hard-power play on eliminating what his administration see as threats to American interests. Considering his actions in nations such as Libya and Pakistan, it is not unreasonable to say that he may try to avoid a “boots on the ground” situation in Iran, instead relying on methods such as airstrikes, cruise missiles, and drones (Moughty). While the United States does not face an immediate military threat, a nuclear Iran still upsets the balance of power, and from a zero-sum game perspective it cannot be allowed. Nevertheless, Obama is motivated to delay what may be the inevitable showdown – with an election mere months away, with an economy in shambles, and with a stretched-thin military that is prepared more for unconventional warfare than the traditional conflict that would be Iran, the question may not be a matter of “if,” but how and/or when.

To compare the Cuban Missile Crisis to the issue of a nuclear Iran seems to be a stretch. Iran is not yet a true nuclear power, and there is the possibility – however faint some may view it – that they are genuinely not pursuing weaponization. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, there was no genuine third party, and there was a great chance of nuclear mutually assured destruction. The complete opposite is currently the case in Iran. Perhaps a greater comparison would be a what-if scenario in the future. If Iran is allowed to become a nuclear power, and does pursue nuclear weapons, then Israel may be inevitably faced with a situation much more similar to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Ahmadinejad, Netanyahu, and Obama, all act as chemical elements in a volatile mix. Each bring with them their own biases, each hold different religions, each hold their own ambitions and motivations. War seems inevitable – but a different war seemed inevitable fifty years ago, as well.

Works Cited
Beinart, Peter. “How U.S. Jews Stymie Peace Talks.” The Daily Beast. 27 Sep. 2010. Web. 28 Sep. 2012.
Follath, Eric and Holger Stark. “The Story of Operation Orchard.” Der Spiegel. 11 Feb. 2009. Web. 28 Sep. 2012.
“Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran.” IAEA Board of Governors. 8 Nov. 2011.
“Khrushchev: Averting the Apocalypse.” Time. 21 Dec. 1970. Vol 95 Iss 25. Academic Search Complete. Web. 26 Sep. 2012.
“Khrushchev's Last Testament: Power and Peace.” Time. 6 May 1974. Vol 103 Iss 18. Academic Search Complete. Web. 26 Sep. 2012.
Khrushchev, Sergei. “Khrushchev on Khrushchev.” Time. 18 June 1990. Vol 135. Academic Search Complete. Web. 26 Sep. 2012.
Melman, Yossi. “More Than Six Decades On, Israel Memorializes Late Commander of British Army's Jewish Unit.” Haaretz. 18 Nov. 2010. Web. 28 Sep. 2012.
Miner, Michael. “Mahmoud Ahmadinejad: The Reformer.” PBS. 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 28 Sep. 2012.
Moughty, Sarah. “Top CIA Official: Obama Changed Virtually None of Bush's Controversial Programs.” PBS. 1 Sep. 2011. Web. 28 Sep. 2012.
Nal, Renee. “Another Iranian General Threatens U.S., Warns of World War III.” Gather. 24 Sep. 2012. Web. 28 Sep. 2012.
Pillar, Paul. “Has Netanyahu Gone Too Far?” ConsortiumNews. 14 Sep. 2012. Web. 28 Sep. 2012.
“Senior Citizen Khrushchev.” Time. 7 July 1967. Vol 90 Iss 1. Academic Search Complete. Web. 26 Sep. 2012.
Shanker, Thom. “U.S. Quietly Supplies Israel With Bunker-Busting Bombs.” The New York Times. 23 Sep. 2011. Web. 28 Sep. 2012.

Sheinman, Anna. “Ahmadinejad Interviewed By Piers Morgan on CNN.” The JC. 25 Sep. 2012. Web. 28 Sep. 2012.
Thatcher, Ian. “Khrushchev and Stalin.” History Review. Mar 2009. Academic Search Complete. Web. 26 Sep. 2012.
Vick, Karl and Aaron Klein. “Who Assassinated an Iranian Nuclear Scientist? Israel Isn't Telling.” Time. 13 Jan. 2012. Web. 28 Sep. 2012.

ANDREI: ACADEMIA - DURNOVO'S PREDICTION OF WORLD WAR I

2013-06-15T20:08:00.004-07:00

Peter Durnovo wrote to Tsar Nicholas II in February of 1914 a memorandum warning of the consequences of war, mere months before the onset of the first World War. Tensions were brewing. Franz Ferdinand had not yet been assassinated, but there was a deep sense of growing unrest. Only a decade earlier, Russia had experienced a failed revolution after the Russo-Japanese War (Steinberg). Durnovo, a reactionary determined to keep the status quo, recognized the risks of what a war would bring and how it would sever the last threads holding Imperial Russia together. He blasted the Triple Entente as having been meddled in by Britain, and that Russia had pragmatically gained nothing as a result – but could lose everything, as the battering ram of Britain. “To sum up, the Anglo-Russian accord has brought us nothing of practical value up to this time, while for the future, it threatens us with an inevitable armed clash with Germany.” Many of his warnings eerily came true, down to Russia's inadequacy to fight a war on the side of Britain, to how the socialists would rise up in the smoke, to the fall of Germany (Steinberg). There is one glaring error in Durnovo's memorandum: the mistaken belief that naval and imperial tensions between Britain and Germany would be the primary cause of a greater European war. While “the Great War” did occur, its origins and onset were not as Durnovo envisioned. To fully understand how Durnovo made this poor call, in the face of being so right on so much, one must examine not only why, but how he was wrong.

Durnovo wrongly states that “The vital interests of Russia and Germany do not conflict.” History tells us a different story. Germany pursuing an aggressive policy for years, perhaps even making realistic plans 18 months in advance of the onset of World War I for military action (Sheffield). Kaiser Wilhelm II had deliberately decided against renewing a treaty with Russia years in the 1890s, and instead opted for the creation of a purely German alliance – this key factor had been the cause of the first entente, an alliance between Russia and France. Britain, fearing a powerful Germany, would later engage in mending relations with France and Russia, dividing the powers into those of the Central and the Entente. Durnovo neglects to bring up the fact that Germany, by proxy through its support of Austria-Hungary, was pursuing a more aggressive policy in the Balkans as well. Russia, through its alliance with Serbia, stood in the way (Steinberg).

It would be Germany that played the part of aggressor, not Britain (Sheffield). While Durnovo was right that the growing imperialist ambitions, along with military buildup, would increase tension, his prediction was ultimately wrong. The entangled web of alliances, mutual defense, treaties, and severe foreign policy miscalculations would be the brush. The spark would be the assassination of Franz Ferdinand – not a war between Britain and Germany spilling over. The assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne was blamed squarely on Serbia. Russia, bound by alliance and treaty, announced the mobilization of its forces (Kubilius). Germany, which had written as essentially blank heck to Austria-Hungary, had perhaps not anticipated that Russia would go this far. Nevertheless, they had encouraged the concept of war, and readily declared war on Russia with the view that mobilization was an act of war. France, allied to Russia, would also be engaged at war – Germany would invade the neutral Belgium in order to reach Paris quickly (Sheffield). Britain, which was morally obligated to defend France per treaty, would also utilize a nearly century old treaty with Belgium to justify its involvement after Germany's invasion. Germany's rampant aggression directly conflicts with Durnovo's predictions, who had warned that Britain would play the part of antagonist, and would exploit Russia as a battering ram. “The main burden of the war will undoubtedly fall on us... The part of a battering ram, making a breach in the very thick of the German defense, will be ours, with many factors against us to which we shall have to devote great effort and attention.”

Durnovo either failed to include or intentionally omitted the potential idiocy of Russia's own decision making in his memorandum. The decision to mobilize the military in the face of Germany's blank check to Austria-Hungary was foolish, regardless if it was backed by treaty. Without Nicholas' decision to support Serbia, World War I almost certainly would not have happened – at least, not the way that it did. The alternative would have been to remain idle, abandoning Serbia to Austria. While this would have resulted in incredible criticism from Pan-Slavicists, it would have permitted Russia to at the very least have more time in building its forces. Even the most optimistic predictions stated that Russia would not be ready for war until 1917 (Sheffield).

One explanation for Durnovo's insistence to the Tsar that better relations with Germany were preferable is Durnovo's belief that Britain was a natural ally of the socialist opposition within Russia. “Strange as it may seem, England, monarchistic and conservative to the marrow at home, has in her foreign relations always acted as the protector of the most demagogical tendencies, in variably encouraging all popular movements aiming at the weakening of the monarchical principle.” As a reactionary, Durnovo was doubtlessly terrified by the idea of the monarchy falling. It was only rational, then, that Russia should ally with Germany, to which it was ideologically closer. “It should not be forgotten that Russia and Germany are the representatives of the conservative principle in the civilized world, as opposed to the democratic principle, incarnated in England and, to an infinitely lesser degree, in France.” Whatever Durnovo's idealization of the German monarchy, it would be the conflict of Germany and Russia over Austria-Hungary and Serbia that was the first sign that war was now inevitable.

Durnovo was wrong that war was an entirely British prospect. He was wrong that a war between Britain and Germany would pull its allies in – instead, the opposite happened. It is unlikely that even if Russia had heeded Durnovo's advice that war could have been avoided for too long. The end of monarchism may have been inevitable. Ultimately, Durnovo's warnings would not be heeded. While World War I did not start the way he had envisioned, the difficulties Russia would face both during and after the war came true. World War I would accelerate the end of the Russian Tsardom. The Socialists would be victorious in Russia, and monarchism would come to a crashing end. Durnovo would not live to see the end of the monarchy, dying in 1915 – not long after his warnings.

Sources cited:

Durnovo, Peter. “Memorandum to Tsar Nicholas II.” Course Material; Provided Reading.

Kubilius, Kerry. “Russia's Position in WWI.” Web. [http://suite101.com/article/russias_position_in_wwi-a71574], accessed October 30th, 2012.

Sheffield, Gary. “The Origins of World War One.” Web. [http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/origins_01.shtml], accessed October 30th, 2012.

Steinberg, John, Anthony Heywood, David McDonald. “Could Russia Have Avoided War in 1914?” Web. [http://russiasgreatwar.org/media/international/avoided.shtml], accessed October 30th, 2012.

ANDREI: ACADEMIA - LENIN'S "TAX IN KIND"

2013-06-15T20:08:00.001-07:00

Vladimir Lenin found himself in yet another precarious position in the last days of the Russian Civil War. The economy was in ruins; the policy of “War Communism”, which practiced the redistribution of peasant-farmer's grains for the industrial workers and the military, had been a complete disaster, only deepening the hunger that years of war had forced Russians into. Something new had to be done. Whether out of Marxist theory or pure pragmatism, Lenin proposed a “strategic retreat” – a new policy of “tax in kind” would be the lead into his idea of state capitalism. Lenin sought to reconcile state capitalism under his “New Economic Policy” with Bolshevik ideology, and also to utilize a controlled capitalism in order to rebuild the Russian economy.

Many Soviet citizens feared that Lenin's undertakings were a move away from Bolshevik ideals, and Lenin needed a propaganda element in order to win Bolshevik support. He would utilize his own writings and argumentation to bolster support of the NEP, while simultaneously taking harsh authoritarian measures. Lenin argued that under atypical Marxist history, there is a linear progression of time. Russia could not simply skip from the beginning stages of capitalism all the way to communism. Lenin asks, rhetorically, “Can the Soviet state and the dictatorship of the proletariat be combined with state capitalism? Are they compatible?” and he answers his own question with a resounding “yes.” Lenin further argues that there must be a dictatorship of the proletariat to guide capitalism, avoiding any further ills beyond the revival of the “petty bourgeoisie.” Lenin writes, “Capitalism is a bane compared with socialism. Capitalism is a boon compared with medievalism.” He appeals to the ideological and intellectual senses of the communists, that capitalism must be used in order to build Russia. “Those who compare state capitalism only with socialism commit a host of mistakes.” He cautions in an October 1921 publication, furthermore, that “We must not count on going straight to communism.” Lenin warns in this same publication that the Communists risk being their own worst enemies with “communist conceit” with the belief that all problems could be issued by empty idealism. It was not just other Communists that were proving an issue, but resistant peasants. Lenin could not risk this undermining of Soviet recovery, and he directed Agitprop, the Department for Agitation and Propaganda, to undermine culture and religion in order to bolster support for Bolsheviks as a supplement to the New Economic Policy (Brovkin). This attack would not be limited to merely words, and the GRU secret police also took a dual role of monitoring Russians, and to silence dissent (Brovkin).

Lenin hammers out the details of his economic scheme, after his attempts at gaining ideological temperance by his comrades. Put another way, he tries to argue the beneficial effects of a controlled capitalism for Soviet Russia beyond ideological rectification. Lenin explains the first element of the transition from War Communism to state-capitalism – that of a new and incredibly lower tax. “The correct policy of the proletariat exercising its dictator ship in a small-peasant country is to obtain grain in exchange for the manufactured goods the peasant needs...The tax in kind is a transition to this policy.” Lenin points to the successes of Western European capitalism as the most civilized, and recommends its adoptions with key changes. Namely, profiteering would not be illegal, but the state-capitalist system would be so closely monitored that those who pilfer private capital would be subject to particularly harsh punishments. The peasant farmers would also be allowed to sell their food on an open market, as well as employing others and expanding their farms. A greater degree of private commerce would be allowed, and small factories would be denationalized (Simkin). Lenin also recommends massive, large-scale state-run initiatives for manufacture and industry, all closely regulated, as to not become overpowered by “the anarchy of petty bourgeois relations.”

Lenin eloquently attempted to make the case for concessions to capitalism, alienating many of his allies but at the same time hoping to save Soviet Russia from collapse. He expended massive effort, both in terms of propaganda to support his ideas as well as their implementation. Ultimately, Lenin's New Economic Policy would prove decently successful at restoring the Russian economy, but only to the level it had been in the first World War. Nevertheless, his successor Josef Stalin would quickly get rid of Lenin's concessions to capitalism and implement his own ideas – the first Five-Year Plan (Simkin). With Lenin's death, so too died the brief taste of a greater economic freedom and recovery.

Sources cited:

Brovkin, Vladimir. “Russia After Lenin.” eBook. [http://www.revalvaatio.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/brovkin-russia_after_lenin_politics_culture_society_1921-1929.pdf], accessed 6 Nov. 2012.

Lenin, Vladimir. “The Tax In Kind.” 21 Apr. 1921. Course material; provided reading.

Lenin, Vladimir. “The New Economic Policy.” 17 Oct. 1921. Web. [http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1921/oct/17.htm], accessed 6 Nov. 2012.

Simkin, John. “New Economic Policy.” Web. [http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/RUSnep.htm], accessed 6 Nov. 2012.

ANDREI: ACADEMIA - STALIN AND THE SHAKHTY AFFAIR

2013-06-15T20:06:00.006-07:00

What were, and how did Stalin utilize, the threats mentioned in “The Tasks of Business Execuives”?

Josef Stalin spoke at the “First All-Union Conference of Leading Personnel of Socialist Industry” on February 4th, 1931, about the need for rapid industrialization, how earlier programs had not met their quotas, and the conditions needed for fulfillment. The talk, entitled “The Tasks of Business Executives,” was filled with self-praise and minor self-criticism. When it comes to the ability to utilize Soviet power, however, Stalin states “Unfortunately, not everything is in order here.” Stalin was determined at any cost to proceed with industrialization, and he was ready and willing to use the secret police to be rid of those that stood in his way – whether the threat was real or imagined. Two particular incidents are mentioned that, according to him, are examples of bourgeois counterrevolutionary activity by the intelligentsia as a direct result of class struggle. He accuses those that were in charge of economic planning and engineering of lacking “revolutionary vigilance.” These incidents are the Shakhty Affair and Trial, as well as the Industrial Party Trial – show trials that would precede the Moscow Trials and purges of the late 1930s.

The Shakhty Affair occurred in 1928, an incident that – according to Stalin – was a “counter-revolutionary group of bourgeois experts carried on their work for five years, receiving instructions from the anti-Soviet organisations of international capital.” Stalin spoke as though the affair “came out of the blue,” a complete surprise for the Bolsheviks, who were then still in the final years of the NEP (Stalin, “Work”). The namesake of the affair is the Shakhty coal mines, and accused engineers within of engaging in both sabotage and treason. The accusations read like a list of White Army heresies, from the singing of the tsarist anthem, to rude treatment of workers, to intentional delays and siding with foreigners (Kuromiya 15). These engineers, for their alleged sabotage, would come to be known as “wreckers.” On a purely objective basis, it is unclear whether or not the affair was a setup by Stalin against his critics; much like the assassination of Sergei Kirov, Stalin would use the incident as a political pretext in achieving his own goals (Kuromiya 15). In “The Tasks of Business Executives,” Stalin gives a damning indictment of centrism. “We, too, in the centre, are also to blame. About ten years ago a slogan was issued: 'Since Communists do not yet properly understand the technique of production, since they have yet to learn the art of management, let the old technicians and engineers — the experts — carry on production...'” Stalin states that in allowing others to lead the way, with true Bolsheviks only “signing the papers” rather than becoming experts, the Bolsheviks had left themselves vulnerable. “Some of the old engineers and technicians, working without supervision, rather easily go over to wrecking activities, especially as they are constantly being besieged by "offers" from our enemies abroad.” The Shakhty Affair marked the essentially official shift from the class-conciliatory NEP, to class warfare against what Stalin saw as a bourgeois intelligentsia. Five engineers were sentenced to death, with another fourty-four sent to prison (“Shakhty Trial”).
The next stage of Stalin's persecution came with the Industrial Party – in essence, a continuation of the Shakhty Trial, and a precursor to the Moscow Trials. The “wreckers” as they had been called were accused of trying form an anti-Soviet union, or “Industrial Party” (Graham 163). The defendants were accused of plotting a coup, guided by foreign capitalist powers. The prosecution alleged that the wreckers moved beyond simple sabotage, which encompassed the majority of earlier allegations, to concealed wrecking. Essentially, the wreckers were now scapegoats for economic woes (“Industrial Party”). Although this had been expressed earlier to a lesser extent in the Shakhty Trial, with workers who had apparently not been producing as much enduring the accusation of co-conspiracy, this was a step beyond. The wreckers had been accused of shifting from such minimalist, small means to maximal destruction, something that was only capable of happening under the old policies. The Great Soviet Encyclopedia lists the accusations. “The members of the organization held a number of responsible positions in Vesenkha (Supreme Council on the National Economy) and Gosplan (State Planning Committee)... created disproportions among the different branches of the national economy, “froze” capital funds, and disrupted the supply process... The ultimate aim of the anti-Soviet underground was the overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the USSR and the restoration of capitalism.”
According to Stalin, the old intelligentsia must not only be converted – but instead, in the place of these bourgeois intelligentsia, a strong Bolshevik intelligentsia must rise. No more of Bolsheviks simply signing away the papers – they must become experts, themselves. Stalin had tamed whatever threat that Soviet economists and engineers may have offered to his regime, while simultaneously discrediting moderates in the Bolshevik Party with the accusation that they had been partially responsible for allowing the situation to unfold. Against individuals like Bukharin, it was doubly effective as some of them had been engaged in technocratic discussion – absent Marxist ideology – with some of the accused wreckers (Graham 165). A new era was beginning. Gone was Lenin's New Economic Policy of state-capitalism, and to replace it was forced collectivization. Equally as important, this new class war would also include Stalin's “cultural revolution,” during which Marxist science was a staple of academic thought so that incidents like the Shakhty Affair and Industrial Party Trial could be avoided in the future.
Sources cited:
Graham, Loren. “Science in Russia and the Soviet Union.” Print. [http://books.google.com/books?id=m_wPpj64GqMC&pg=PA163&lpg=PA163&dq=General+counsel+of+technocratic+party+russia&source=web&ots=nKYC6bXk2Q&sig=1M8sh3W3wtRhZzI9_PkKSiDded8&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=6&ct=result#v=onepage&q&f=false], preview accessed 15 Nov. 2012.

“Industrial Party.” Web. [http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Industrial+Party+Trial], accessed 15 Nov. 2012.

Kuromiya, Hiraki. “Stalin's Industrial Revolution: Politics and Workers, 1928-1931.” [http://books.google.com/books?id=cyJNElP75EwC&pg=PA15&lpg=PA15&dq=shakhty+affair&source=bl&ots=bm1wQgtQgf&sig=YUymqG_DNLhSNCJtfYK34M5dMSY&hl=en&sa=X&ei=SMikUMu_KZP29gSFqoGYBg&ved=0CFAQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=shakhty%20affair&f=false], preview accessed 15 Nov. 2012.

“Shakhty Trial.” Web. [http://www.answers.com/topic/shakhty-trial], accessed 15 Nov. 2012.

Stalin, Josef. “The Tasks of Business Executives.” 4 Feb. 1931. Web. 2008. [http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1931/02/04.htm], accessed 15 Nov. 2012.

Stalin, Josef. “The Work of the April Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission.” 13 Apr. 1928. Web. 2008. [http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1928/04/13.htm], accessed 15 Nov. 2012.

ANDREI: ACADEMIA - THREE DIRECTIONS: THE IDEOLOGICAL POWER VACUUM IN RUSSIAN POLITICS

2013-06-15T20:05:00.003-07:00

The aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse left an ideological vacuum in Russia. The move was at first towards the west – an unreceptive and unenthusiastic host. It did not take long for such a move to fail. The difference in important systems of thought in Russian foreign policy can be readily examined by their approach to the West. Tsygankov labels these systems as follows: the Westernists, pushing for closer relations and the adoption of values with and of the West – though their definition of “West” differs; the Civilizationists, who wish for a nationalist and Stalinist state in Russia, or a Eurasian union completely independent from the West; lastly, the Statists, who take elements from both preceding systems while pushing for a very realist balance of power and desire a multipolar world (62).

Westernists have their roots in the “New Thinking” of Gorbachev. Gorbachev followed a pattern of liberalism blinded by idealism. His policy of reform was ultimately painted with a negative legacy – to readily gave in to withdrawals and concessions, all with the futile goal of western acceptance (50). With Gorbachev's vast efforts at decreasing military tension between the Soviet Union and the West, there was a genuine hope for turning attention towards domestic affairs – perhaps even with the assistance of the West. Gorbachev, however, found himself essentially used by Western powers; in pushing for liberalism, he essentially gave up the power that would have acted as his rock (51). Although its roots were within Gorbachev's New Thinking, Kozryev's liberal Westernists viewed Gorbachev's failure as a systemic one (56). Gorbachev was buying oats for a dead horse; no amount of concessions and reforms could save the utopian Soviet Union from extinction. Based in part on liberalist ideas such as Fukiyama's “the end of history”, the liberalist Westernists saw Russia's future as becoming entwined with the West, both economically and politically (56). For the first few years after the Soviet Union, they were the dominant force. Alternatively, the Social Democrats – also considered Westernisers – held to Gorbachev's teachings. The Social Democrats viewed pure the liberal Westernists focus as undermining Russia's potential for social democracy – there was too much of a focus on the US, rather than the European powers and perhaps the world as a whole (64). Nevertheless, in 1993, westernization as a whole was on the way out (67). Like before, the West essentially turned its attention away from Russia; the aid it did give was not up to expectations (67). In spite of liberalist Westernists pushing for closer relations with the West, rather than their own neighboring former Soviet republics, the West forgot about Russia. Despite attempts at integrating with western organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the failure on the West's part to helpfully engage a ready and willing Russia had left Russia to its fate, and a rapidly decaying moral and economic fabric offered itself as fertile breeding grounds for nationalism, much like the Weimar Republic of Germany had. Today, Westernists remain a critical voice of the other systems (205). They criticize Civilizationists and Statists of being too focused on narrow-minded balancing with the US, rather than focusing on non-western powers like China (206).

The Civilizationists are the old guard. Much like the Westernists, Tsygankov places the Civilizationists in two groups – the National Communists, and the Hard-line Eurasianists. He uses Gennadi Zyuganov to represent the National Communist ideology, which is based in the neo-nationalism that arose in the ashes of the Soviet Union (61, 63). Coupling nationalism with communism, they wish a restoration of Soviet Russia – socialism in one country. National Communists, particularly Zyuganov who remains the head of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. They are dramatically opposed to westernization, going as far to accuse Westernists of being traitors, as they see the influence as merely undermining Russian influence in the world (63). The second group of Civilizationists are the Hard-line Eurasianists. The Eurasianists wish to stand opposed to the US' interests, which they view as inherently incompatible with Russia (63). The Eurasianists hold very real geopolitical ambitions – that of a “Greater Russia”, but their influence is little (63). The Eurasianists flirt with fascism, especially individuals like Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and they have been used as examples of radical bogeymen (Laparenok). The Civilizationists radically oppose integration with western organizations, as well as western influence, seeing themselves as either independent or having farm ore in common with the East.

The dominant influence in Russia, however, belongs to the Statists. The Statists are viewed by many to be the pragmatists, rather than the ideologues of the Westernists and the Civilizationists, though they take lessons from both camps (64) The Statists view Russia as unique, with its own objective national interests independent of the rest of the world. With the rejection of westernism came Kozyrev's removal, and the installation of Primakov, as foreign minister under Boris Yeltsin in 1995 (65). Under Primakov, Yeltsin's administration turned from idealism, to realism – to securing its own interests (96). While Russia did not retreat into isolationism, it simultaneously pursued a more international foreign policy rather than simply ignoring non-western powers as the Westerinizers had (97). The Statist method also incorporated certain terminology and concepts from the Civilizationists, such as Russia as a sovereign power with roots in Eurasia, without playing into imperialist dogma (97). The Statists opposed what they perceived to be encroachment by the West on their power, especially with regards to NATO expansion (Tsygnakov 94). If the Statist way of thinking could be summed up in one word, it would be realism – contrasting the different strains of idealism of both the Civilizationists and the Westernists. There is a sort of middle ground in the Statist approach to the West; instead of the anti-hedgemon, Russia simply “is” in the Statist worldview (95). It does not bend to American whims, nor does it necessarily oppose them for the sake of being contrarian. One key element of Primakov's ideas that differed from both was the reintegration of former Soviet territories, something that was incredibly draining on Russia's health (121). Primakov would soon abandon this policy of a closer-knit CIS. One may argue that Putin's continuation policies of “Great Power Pragmatism” are a direct continuation of Statism's “Great Power Balancing” – yet with pragmatic and adaptive shifts. Statism has been the dominant weltanschauung behind Russian foreign policy for more than a decade, regardless of brief Westernist-Statist hybridization post 9-11. Putin wishes for Russia to have a strong, independent, and paternalistic state, and he has readily pursued aggressive foreign policy to achieve this end. There is no settling for the status of a “middle” power in Putin's world – Russia must be a great power. The West may be engaged, but western democratization may be nothing more at times than a sham for cloaked imperialism

While to come extent any labeling of diverse thought into neatly packaged constructs is a gross oversimplification, it does provide a useful method of making complicated ideas more understandable. The Westernists wait, seeing the impending conflict between China and Russia as their new chance as Russia retains and builds its status as a great power. One cannot help but believe that there may still be some resentment on the part of the liberals for the failure of the US to seize the moment in which it could have allied itself further with Russia. The Social Democrats had looked to Western Europe longingly, though now face the sight of watching forces ebb and flow within the financially tumultuous European Union. The Civilizationists remain the nationalistic bogeymen, with much of their talk of Russia as a Great Power readily co-opted by the Statists. They no longer hold the sway they once did as being the “anti-Westernists”, though now they present themselves as an alternative to what they claim is the corrupt Statist methodology of Putin. The Statists continue to dominate, though perhaps not in the same ways that the Primakovites had hoped. The differing approaches to the West will continue to be how the systems of thought differentiate between themselves.

Works Cited

Laparenok, Leonid. “Vladimir Zhirinovsky.” Russiapedia, by Russia Today. Web. <http://russiapedia.rt.com/prominent-russians/politics-and-society/vladimir-zhirinovsky/>. 19 Nov. 2012.

Tsygankov, Andrei P. Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity. 2nd ed. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010. Print.

ANDREI: ACADEMIA - CHANGES IN THE WIND; THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF RUSSIA

2013-06-15T20:04:00.002-07:00

Changes in the Wind

Russia, regardless of the ideology in vogue at the time, has always operated on a pragmatic level. Even in the Soviet era, western analysts – and foreign Communists – were blindsided by the deals struck with the Anti-Comintern force of Nazi Germany, regardless of the cold, harsh logic behind the decision. This was not a decision based upon ideology, or backwardness, or barbarity, but a situation – an event. The West had pursued a policy of appeasement towards Germany, and Russia saw their enemies moving toward them. Space had to be made, and time had to be bought. This example is one of many. A factor that should be calculated into the analysis of Russian foreign policy is its unpredictability in the face of specific events that makes the nation feel threatened, where Russia will act with what it deems most pragmatic, given the situation. Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet era has been largely reactionary to perceived threats by the United States, particularly through NATO, and terrorism. Two particular time periods deserve examination in post-Soviet Russia: the early to late 90s, during which the dominant force shifted from Westernism to Statism, and Putin's radical shift back and forth between Statism as well as Westernism in the face of Chechen terrorism and US policies.

The seemingly sudden end to radical Westernism in Russia was accelerated by changes in both administration and sudden entanglements, and not merely a slow erosion (64). Russia, initially intoxicated by radical Westernism, was met with a barrage of issues that threatened its power. United Nations intervention in the Balkans was dramatically opposed by parliament, and NATO's swallowing up of former Soviet bloc members allowed for mobilization against the Westernists in Russia – a trend that would continue (66). To chalk this up to some sort of formula of a combination of inescapable economic backwardness and a distinct separation from the West is a gross oversimplification and borderline ignorant of the facts on the ground. Russia, under westernization, had gone as far as abandoning its traditional “shatter zone” with the complete disregard of some former territories and former Soviet Republics. Russia felt threatened – and one is most unpredictable when backed into a corner, especially in a relative democracy. Kozyrev, Boris Yeltisn's foreign minister, had been the most important driving force behind westernization. With nationalist victories in the 1993 and 1995 elections, Yeltsin made the conscious decision to wildly modify his policy by removing Koryzev and appointing Primakov, who signaled the abandonment of Westernism and the adoption of Statism (65). The appointment was a cold calculation against the growing nationalist power in Russia. Still, even Primakov was not yet opposed so much to NATO expansion and instead pushed for a more multipolar world. To say that relations merely “worsened” with the West with NATO's airstrikes in the Balkans in 1999 is an understatement. NATO's rampant expansionism set the stage for Russia in the 21st century (103). For better or worse, Russia found itself poised once more as a counterbalance to the West, though not on the bipolar level of the Cold War, and Statist Russia quickly allied itself with nonwestern powers in an attempt at ensuring a power balance.

Much of Russia's foreign policy has been reactionary to how the United States acts. The Chechen War in 1999 has had a lasting effect on Russia, beyond the obvious tension. Much like how Americans united around Bush in the aftermath of 9-11, so too did Russians around Putin, who was a greatly unpopular prime minister (103). Putin was quite friendly to western interests in the aftermath of 9-11, sharing with them a mutual concern regarding terrorism. Russia had been plagued with terrorism since 1999, and Putin saw this as more of a threat to Russian security than conventional warfare between states (105). Another event in the United States' continuation of the war on terror ultimately put the two powers at odds, once more – the invasion of Iraq. The United States had acted unilaterally, completing going over the head of the United Nations unlike the earlier airstrikes at the turn of the century (143). This boiled into three separate fears: a US policy of regime change, internal revolutions, and radicalization of Muslims through a perceived clash of civilizations. Russia perceives the continued expansion of NATO as a threat of a military bloc right on its border. Russia also blames the “colored revolutions” as being orchestrated by the United States, and took steps to expunge “foreign agents” from Russia, including even the Peace Corps.

Russia is no longer quite as bound by ideology as it once had been, particularly under the Soviet era. Russia operates in an incredibly pragmatic manner, twisting and turning to worm its way through the obstacles that it finds itself within. These often result in longterm policy changes, as a direct result of experience, drastically changing the political landscape of the country. “Persistent factors” are not so persistent; reducing Russian foreign policy to a formula will often leave an analyst surprised and dumbfounded. Russia's attempts at westernization were derailed by sharp, painful situations, and terrorism's influence on the country is third only perhaps to Israel and the United States. It is important to keep an eye on Russia's approach to foreign policy in the brewing turmoil within the Middle East, especially given their feelings of being “duped” by the United Nations with regards to Libya – and now they stand flatly opposing interventionism in Syria.

Works Cited

Tsygankov, Andrei P. Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity. 2nd ed. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010. Print.

ANDREI: ACADEMIA - RUSSIA AND THE MEDIA AS AN INFORMATION WAR TOOL

2013-06-15T20:03:00.001-07:00

Russia and the Media as an Information War Tool

Carl von Clausewitz, an early 19^th century Prussian general, once said that war is an extension of politics.¹ In the modern era, the line between the two has been inexplicably blurred. The internet age has brought with it new and changed forms of warfare; in particular, information warfare is of new importance. Information warfare (IW) is a blanket term that can include different methods ranging from cyber-attacks against internet infrastructure, to espionage of poorly guarded sensitive material, to spreading a certain view through the media. It may also be known as information or psychological operations.² For the purposes of this paper, IW explicitly refers to the propaganda element. No longer are the generals of information warfare solely censoring productions and jamming radio signals from abroad to attempt to control the image that their populace receives. The propaganda of revolutionary foreign policy has evolved. Russia openly views information warfare as a critical component of soft power, and has underlined the importance of using the media as a tool of “soft propaganda” for controlling the information environment; its most recent and seemingly innocuous weapon is its state-owned international news outlet, RT – formerly known as Russia Today. To understand this new use of media as a weapon, the theory behind RT must be examined, along with the outlet's status, its content and critique, along with the rebuttal of its defenders.

Russian Professor Aleksandr Selivanov, writing in Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer, states that the purpose of IW is “to form a stratum of people with transformed values in society who actually become carriers of a different culture and of the tasks and goals of other states on the territory of one’s own country.” He further states that territory can even be seized through the use of IW by “‘nontraditional occupation’ as the possibility of controlling territory and making use of its resources without the victor’s physical presence on the territory of the vanquished.”³ According to Timothy Thomas, an analyst whose works are published by the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, Russia's strategy is using IW as a replacement for the loss of ideology.⁴ Whereas rudimentary IW was a tactic of revolutionary foreign policy in the Soviet past, it is now an entity unto itself – applicable at both foreign and domestic fronts. Russia portrays its IW practices as a method of self-defense.⁵ There are two fronts of IW – domestic and foreign. On the domestic front, there is a fear of foreign agents. Professor Igor Panarin – a Russian political scientist analyst regularly cited by Russian media for his expertise in IW – accuses the West, particularly through military intelligence operations, of installing anti-government agents in the more liberal media such as Novaya Gazeta and Radio Echo, forcing the Russian government's hand in creating state-run media.⁶ Despite the conspiracy-theory level of Panarin's claims, the idea that the West is playing information warfare is taken seriously by the Russian media. Defenders of Russia's IW practices regularly quote US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who said,

"We are in an information war and we are losing that war. Al Jazeera is winning, the Chinese have opened a global multi-language television network, the Russians have opened up an English-language network. I’ve seen it in a few countries, and it is quite instructive.^7"

Walter Isaacson, Chairman of the U.S. Government's Broadcasting Board of Governors – which runs state-owned outlets including Voice of America, requested higher funding because “We can't allow ourselves to be out-communicated by our enemies.” He explicitly mentioned channels such as RT.⁸ This motif of self-defensive soft power has continued. According to RT, the modern information war was started by the United States. Unlike many other international media outlets, RT's coverage is not merely limited to its home nation and the near-abroad. In fact, RT has had a shift from covering mostly Russian news to covering western news with a Russian perspective, or hiring “alternative media”. When interviewed by The New York Times, Aleksei Makarkin, an analyst at the Institute of Political Technology, stated that “The Americans have a view of Russia and they show it to us. Russians have a point of view about America, too, and we want to show it to you.”⁹

RT is certainly capable. RT now rivals Al Jazeera in Britain as the most popular foreign English news channel.¹⁰ ¹¹ Pew Research shows that RT is the top source for news videos on YouTube.¹² American viewers doubled in 2012 from 2011; in some regions of the US, such as New York, viewership nearly tripled, and Nielsen Media Research surveys indicate that audiences tend to prefer watching RT as compared to other international news channels. ¹³ There is evidence of a continued push for utilizing state-owned media as part of the information war. RT's funding has generally increased every year. In US dollars, RT's budget has gone from 80 million in 2007, 120 million in 2008, 380 million in 2011, to 300 million in 2012 – a slight decrease.¹⁴ Recently, President Putin refused to allow Russia's Finance Ministry to slash funding for state-run media, notably including “Rossikyskaya Gazeta” and RT; simultaneously, funding for non state-run news organizations such as ITAR-TASS was drastically cut – ITAR-TASS alone had its funding cut by nearly 40%.¹⁵ Furthermore, RT is no longer a single channel, as it has been expanded to Spanish and Arabic broadcasts, bringing RT to three global channels.¹⁶ RT's performance has been chalked up to a combination of its young staff, its provocative image, and its “alternative” take. Heidi Brown, writing for Forbes, states that RT uses sex appeal of attractive, young anchors as a method of the Kremlin “using charm... to appeal to a diverse and skeptical audience.” ¹⁷

As aforementioned, RT's coverage is self-admittedly aimed at giving a “Russian perspective” of events in the West – or, more accurately, RT has a hard agenda of representing the state view in a positive light. There are two sorts of coverage that RT provides, much like other cable media outlets: talk shows, and regular news. Talk shows featured on RT are of particular interest, as RT has shown willingness to be the soapbox for dissident voices in the West – not merely Russian critics. Anti-war Marine veteran, libertarian activist, and self-proclaimed anarchist Adam Kokesh was featured in a show entitled “Adam versus the Man” on the English RT, regularly criticizing the US government.¹⁸ His show also interviewed anarchist philosopher Stefan Molyneux, a Canadian and host of the popular, online, anti-government podcast Freedomain Radio.¹⁹ Adam Kokesh and others also regularly interviewed Alex Jones, founder of InfoWars.com, an online platform for anti-government conspiracy theories. ²⁰ Recently, Julian Assange, founder of the Wikileaks organization was even given a show, although Assange openly stated that he believed that would not have been the case had Russian documents been part of Wikileaks.²¹ RT's regular operations, from advertisement to news, have also come under fire as an example of being propaganda, right down to its slogan of “Question more.” RT correpsondant William Dunbar resigned in protest, claiming that RT was intentionally censoring the Georgian side of events in their coverage of the 2008 South Ossetian War.²² RT placed ads superimposing US President Barack Obama and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad's face together with the question of “Who poses the greater nuclear threat?” in Britain, and these ads were quickly banned in American airports.²³ The Southern Poverty Law Center criticized RT as pushing conspiracy theories and white supremacy in its 2010 intelligence report by Sonia Scherr, which also accuses the channel of making the United States “look bad,” and that it gives the false impression that many of these individuals are taken seriously in mainstream political discourse.²⁴ Cliff Kincaid of the conservative media-watchdog group Accuracy in Media called Kokesh a “Russian agent of influence and a member of the Moscow-funded 'resistance' to the U.S. Government on American soil...KGB TV,” and he cites former KGB agent Preobrazhensky's conspiracy theory that RT is nothing more than “propaganda... managed by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service.” Kincaid goes further, blasting those who appear on the program as “playing into Moscow's hands.” Preobazhensky further states that RT is “a part of the Russian industry of misinformation and manipulation.” ²⁵

It would be a mistake to label RT as simply old-school propaganda. According to James Painter, writing for the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at Oxford University, RT and other channels like it represent a new wave of “soft-propaganda” but the staffers within instead view themselves “counter-hegemonic” media. While there is a bias, Painter says, Western media is hardly free of such a bias, even in corporate media such as FOX News. Painter goes on to say,

If there is evidence of a soft or hard agenda in a station’s coverage, it can of course be debated if this is a result of a conscious agenda, or rather as a product of an unconscious ‘attitudinal’ set of values... [this can be] seen as another example of a more general trend observed in different parts of the world, namely the growing phenomenon of ‘news with views’. The abundance of new 24x7 channels and news web sites makes it more possible to choose a source of information which confirms a news consumer’s particular point of view. Fox News is the classic example of this, but there are plenty of others. ²⁶

Glenn Greenwald, writing for Salon.com, shot back at critics of RT by answering criticism with criticism.

Let’s examine the unstated premises at work here. There is apparently a rule that says it’s perfectly OK for a journalist to work for a media outlet owned and controlled by a weapons manufacturer (GE/NBC/MSNBC), or by the U.S. and British governments (BBC/Stars & Stripes/Voice of America), or by Rupert Murdoch and Saudi Prince Al-Waleed Bin Talal (Wall St. Journal/Fox News), or by a banking corporation with long-standing ties to right-wing governments (Politico), or by for-profit corporations whose profits depend upon staying in the good graces of the U.S. government (Kaplan/The Washington Post), or by loyalists to one of the two major political parties (National Review/TPM/countless others), but it’s an intrinsic violation of journalistic integrity to work for a media outlet owned by the Russian government. Where did that rule come from?

Greenwald further argues is that there is a hypocritical view of RT by those in the West, for doing – what he argues – the West does in Russia. Josh Kucera, a journalist specializing in Russian affairs, states that “RT covers the US like US media covers Russia – emphasizing decline, interviewing marginal dissidents.”²⁷ RT itself has come out in self-defense, stating that while they are state-funded, they are editorially independent. The media outlet further goes on to say that it readily embraces its role in in what it claims is an information war declared by the US.²⁸ The editor in chief of RT adds, in response to criticism over supposedly negative reporting on America, that they are merely applying the same standards Western reporters use in covering Russia.²⁹ Adam Kokesh stated in much plainer language, revealing his reasoning behind dissident use of the network as a soapbox,

Truth is the best propaganda. I love it! I really love the concept of that. It's funny: People say we're hiding shit as a network. No, no—we put the fact that this is propaganda right out front. We're putting out the truth that no one else wants to say. I mean, if you want to put it in the worst possible abstract, it's the Russian government, which is a competing protection racket against the other governments of the world, going against the United States and calling them on their bullshit.³⁰

It is obvious that RT has a bias, if not indirect control by the Kremlin. What RT is not, however, is “Pravda 2.0.” No permeating ideology is attached to RT, and it has been used as a platform for adversarial journalism – the only string attached is that the information is anti-hegemonic, typically painting Russia's rival states in a very negative light. The Kremlin obviously finds RT useful, having tended to increase funding almost every fiscal year, but the individuals attached to RT are anything but “useful idiots” as displayed by Kokesh's frank statement on his lack of love for the Russian government. Nevertheless, state-run media will continue to be an important part of soft power and revolutionary diplomacy. There is, and has been for some time, a raging war for the hearts and minds of citizens. The use of the media as part of information warfare is not unique to Russia – Russia did not start it, but Russia has certainly been more apt about it. RT has been confronted with relatively few incidents of outright misreporting, no more than average. The critics themselves of RT have often been ideologically biased; Kincaid even attempted to make the case that RT was “extreme left propaganda” due to their interviewing of Americans on the far left, despite the fact that the Kremlin as of today is anything but liberal. RT is more than just a vanity project, and RT is not merely a tool of the Kremlin, but neither is it purely objective. Then again – there may not be such a thing. One may state that all media is propaganda – RT does not claim otherwise.

Bibliography

«Анатомия несопротивления.» Lenizdat.ru. 2 July 2012. <http://lenizdat.ru/a0/ru/pm1/c-1105568-0.html#1>. Accessed 3 Dec. 2012.

Adam Vs The Man: Episode 1. RT. 11 Apr. 2011. Web. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0jM1xmSeMDE>. Accessed 3 Dec. 2012.

“Alex Jones on RT's Adam vs the Man.” InfoWars.com. 4 May 2011. <http://www.infowars.com/alex-jones-on-rts-adam-vs-the-man-bin-laden-dead/>. Accessed 3 Dec. 2012.

“A New Kind of Visual News.” Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism. 16 July 2012. Web. <http://www.journalism.org/analysis_report/youtube_news>. Accessed 3 Dec. 2012.

Bassford, Christopher. “Clausewitz and His Works.” 23 Sep. 2012. Web. <http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Cworks/Works.htm>. Accessed 3 Dec. 2012.

Brown, Heidi. “Springtime (For Putin) In Russia” 27 Feb. 2008. Forbes. <http://www.forbes.com/2008/02/26/putin-russia-today-vote-oped-cz_hb_0227putin.html>. Accessed 3 Dec. 2012.

Burell, Ian. “From Russia With News.” The Independent. 15 Jan. 2010. Web. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/tv-radio/from-russia-with-news-1869324.html>. Accessed 3 Dec. 2012.

“Corporate Profile.” RT. <http://rt.com/about/corporate-profile/>. Accessed 3 Dec. 2012.

Dunbar, William. “They Forced Me Out For Telling the Truth About Georgia.” The Independent. 20 Sep. 2010. Web. <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/william-dunbar-they-forced-me-out-for-telling-the-truth-about-georgia-2083870.html>. Accessed 3 Dec. 2012.

Greenwald, Glenn. “Attacks on RT and Assange Reveal Much About the Critics.” Salon. 18 Apr. 2012. Web. <http://www.salon.com/2012/04/18/attacks_on_rt_and_assange_reveal_much_about_the_critics>. Accessed 3 Dec. 2012.

“Is RT state-run?” RT. 17 June 2011. Web. <http://rt.com/usa/news/rt-government-broadcasting-radio/>. Accessed 3 Dec. 2012.

“It's Official: RT is the Enemy.” RT. 19 Oct. 2010. Web. <http://rt.com/usa/news/us-money-media-wars/>. Accessed 3 Dec. 2012.

Johnson, L. Scott. “Toward a Functional Model of Information Warfare.” Central Intelligence Agency. Web. <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/97unclass/warfare.html>. Accessed 3 Dec. 2012.

-Kramer, Andrew. “Russian Cable Station Plays to U.S.” The New York Times. 22 Aug. 2010. Web. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/23/business/media/23russiatoday.html?pagewanted=all>. Accessed 3 Dec. 2012

1 Christopher Bassford, “Clausewitz and His Works.” 23 Sep. 2012.

2 L. Scott Johnson, “Toward a Functional Model of Information Warfare.” Central Intelligence Agency.

3 Timothy Thomas, “Russian Information Warfare Theory: The Consequences of August 2008.” pp 5. The Foreign Military Studies Office.

4 Timothy Thomas, “Russian Information Warfare Theory: The Consequences of August 2008.” pp 4. The Foreign Military Studies Office.

5 “It's Official: RT is the Enemy.” RT. 19 Oct. 2010.

6 Igor Panarin. “The Information War Against Russia: Operation Anti-Putin.” Schiller Institute.

7 Kirit Radia. “Sec. Of State Hillary Clinton: Al Jazeera is 'Real News', U.S. Losing 'Information War.' ABC News.

8 “It's Official: RT is the Enemy.” RT. 19 Oct. 2010.

9 Andrew Kramer, “Russian Cable Station Plays to U.S.” The New York Times. 22 Aug. 2010.

10 “RT Leads Al Jazeera in UK'S Barb Ratings.” RT. 16 July 2012.

11 “Russia Today Catching Up With Murdoch's Sky News.” ITAR-TASS. 22 Nov. 2012.

12 “A New Kind of Visual News.” Pew Research Center's Project for Excellence in Journalism. 16 July 2012.

13 “'Russia Today' Doubles its U.S. Audience.” Russia Briefing. 7 June 2012.

14 «Анатомия несопротивления.» Lenizdat.ru. 2 July 2012.

15 “Putin Forbids Funding Cuts To State-Run Media Outlets.” Gazeta.ru. 30 Oct. 2012.

16 “Corporate Profile.” RT.

17 Heidi Brown. “Springtime (For Putin) In Russia” 27 Feb. 2008. Forbes.

18 Cliff Kincaid. “KGB TV to Air Show Hosted by Anti-War Marine Vet.” Accuracy in Media. 5 Apr. 2011.

19 Adam Vs The Man: Episode 1. Produced by RT. Hosted by YouTube.

20 “Alex Jones on RT's Adam vs the Man.” InfoWars.com

21 Jerome Taylor. “Hello, Good Evening and Welcome to My Country House Prison: Assange Makes His Talk Show Debut.” The Independent. 18 Apr. 2012. Gale: Questia.

22 William Dunbar. “They Forced Me Out For Telling the Truth About Georgia.” The Independent. 20 Sep. 2010.

23 Ian Burrell. “From Russia With News.” The Independent. 15 Jan. 2010.

24 Sonia Scherr. “Russian TV Channel Pushes 'Patriot' Conspiracy Theories.” Southern Poverty Law Center. 2010.

25 Cliff Kincaid. “KGB TV to Air Show Hosted by Anti-War Marine Vet.” 5 Apr. 2011.

26 James Painter. “The Boom In Counter-Hegemonic News Channels: a Case Study of TeleSUR. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at Oxford University. 2006.

27 Glenn Greenwald. “Attacks on RT and Assange Reveal Much About the Critics.” 18 Apr. 2012.

28 “Is RT state-run?” RT. 17 June 2011.

29 Andrew Kramer. “Russian Cable Station Plays to U.S.” The New York Times. 22 Aug. 2010.

30 David Weigel. “Pravda Will Set You Free: Russian's Answer to FOX News and MSNBC.” Slate. 27 June 2011.

SARTAJ: CYBERNETICS, TELEONOMY, ENTROPY

2012-12-08T19:57:00.004-08:00

I would like to thank Ivan Gomez.

---

Teleology as applied to the study of biological evolution has a history going back to Plato and Aristotle. Plato attempted to ground final causes into those necessary ends which were the good based on the whim of an external agency (9; sec. 99), whereas Aristotle grounded his account as a type of formative force intrinsic to natural forms (10; pp. 639-643). He [Aristotle] also presents four causes in his Physics. One of them, the efficient cause, is the principle which, as I will show, begins with the primitive entropic relation between the original components which have been implicated in the origin of life. The final ends assigned to biological structures constituting organisms have become part of a linguistic game given by the statement S: “the structure X is for the function Y” (5; line 1). I use the term biological structure to mean those components which we can view under the microscope that seem to constitute organic life when cultured – morphological structures. Indeed, this view has served well in the fields of Medicine and Microbiology (e.g. “Genes are for the encoding of proteins”). However, it has failed to provide an account for the phenomena underlying the unity of living organisms due to its inability to achieve a complete model encompassing the plurality of functions which biological structures are capable of expressing within the constraints of this Universe’s physics, the world which we can observe around us. Consider the case of a mousetrap. We would say that its function – the natural purpose that comes from its structure – is to catch mice. What is not considered is that nothing would stop me from using it as a tie-clip, either. This example elucidates what is meant by the plurality of functions that the organism is capable of expressing, whether it is the components making it up or the whole organism interacting with the environment.

Mechanistic theories that explain highly organized systems as having a list of structures working towards natural purposes cannot be explained without reference to immanent teleology (6; pp. 22). When a mechanism or otherwise linear pathway is proposed for the function of an organism, the classical teleology would ascribe this generally as S. S can further be extended in a chain of causation going backwards and forward in time and space. The structure X, initiating function Y which enacts on structure Y’ and so on, is the backbone of such mechanisms or bauplan/wiring diagrams for organisms, tracing the chain from the birth of the living system to its destruction. From the DNA/RNA come proteins, functional units which are used for building blocks involved in a hierarchy of structures going from the single cell up to entire organs, which compose the organism. Mind you, this only applies for the case of organisms which transfer a genetic component to an offspring generation. In the cause-and-effect scheme, we can determine the life history of an organism using such mechanisms, and whether we ascribe the final cause of a biological individual to perpetuate selfish replicators, or to pursue God as a result of having conscious minds, there is still a question which remains of what moved that first cause. The ultra-reductionist analysis which has been applied to biological individuals has, in effect, asserted that life has some vital force in an attempt to better understand it. However, that there is a greater abundance of the data regarding the physical components making up an organism (and always growing) does not lead us to a holistic understanding of the phenomena that leads to novelty within organisms; that principle which gives life autonomy-without-purpose and causes the structures underlying organisms to transmute into novelty, giving rise to new lineages.

Contrast this account of teleology with the Principia Cybernetica*. The linguistic states that we formulate to study the natural purposes of the living recursively interact with and continually transform/perturb the system under consideration (18). Maturana and Varela say that once an observer actually applies the statement S to their system, the observation made under S will transform subsequent claims made about that system in the future. It is upon this definition that first-order cybernetics bases itself upon. From the point of view of humans, we can see that since Darwin came up with his theory, the natural philosophers that came to follow him operated upon the organisms they studied with the domain of knowledge that Darwin himself interacted in. The idea itself subsequently became absorbed in that recursive process to go on and change what we understood about teleology in the context of life and continues to iterate as modern scientists attempt to apply the theory to lower and lower levels of resolution. As Dennett said, Darwinian evolution has become a universal acid (24), and it is a matter of course that this recursive path it has set us upon will continue to assign meaning to the structures which we study. What S suggests as the generic feature of this teleology is insufficient under the cybernetic view because what we observe as humans will fail to refer to the set of components which are not denoted by structure X but may actually be for a function Y. Although this may sound like solipsism on the surface, I direct the reader towards the instrumentation problem. The structure called “gene” is for the encoding of functional proteins in sexually reproducing life-forms, but in the 19th century the equipment was not available to actually map this structure and establish the gene as a sufficient cause for that clockwork. This failure in reference occurs today with our linear pathways paradigm, particularly in Medicine where advances in Systems Biology are showing associations connections between components that were thought to be completely unrelated before, but are somehow implicated in disease (23). An example of this is the association between the kidney and brain.

However, despite how operationally useful this view of “applying S” may be, there is a paradoxical situation (3) faced by the notion of intrinsic natural purposes. We may only apprehend the natural purposes in nature in terms of a “reciprocal domination” between the parts and the whole of an organism. The poverty of statements such as S lies in the detail that once a final cause has been identified for the parts (and sum-of-parts), then we have in essence already recognized the efficient cause to be inseparable from the final. In essence, the developmental program that we recognize as the intrinsic teleology to interacting agents is precisely that which we want to prove. Van de Vijver states it beautifully by stating that we are “inverting cause and effect in such a way that future events could determine that which happened in an anterior time” (pp. 147). Beginning with that which you set out to prove or otherwise purport is “the end” for a living system is akin to supposing the conclusion of an experiment as its very hypothesis.

Now that it has been shown that organisms have neither immanence nor intrinsic natural purpose based on the interplay between their parts and wholes, I will instead focus on what is meant by teleonomy. I stress first that living systems are without purpose entirely. From a first-order cybernetics point of view, it is my purpose to view such systems from the outside as an observer and integrate teleonomy as a descriptive term for the domain of observations made in the empirical study of the relations underlying the components we can currently handle under the constraints of our technology. Under this framework, there is an end for the living system, and it occurs at the level of the biological individual maintaining itself through its organization (1; pp. 67), although this is unique from the intrinsic purpose which underlies animistic accounts of mechanicism. I consider such an individual to be that which has task closure, which will be expanded on in a later segment. The distinction of observing from the outside versus developing a system within the bounds of say, second-order cybernetics, is the difference of whether we include the observer-community as part of the closure. As was mentioned, it is the case with humans that as we continue observations within a domain of knowledge, we will continue down that research program. By assuming this externalist stance, I seek to extend the current scientific theories we have regarding the study of biological evolution to a generalized view of tackling these largely metaphysical questions regarding where novelty has its origins and how a plurality across biological structures finds itself co-evolving with the external world without purpose.

To address these questions, I introduce entropy. The term entropy has usages within thermodynamics and information theory (7, 13, 15, 17, 19). With respect to being a thermodynamic property, it is the physical quantity which, as it increases over time, determines the ability of life to work and subsequently create useable structures for maintaining its existence (17). In the cell, when the entropy outweighs its capacitive abilities to continue splitting, programmed cell death will occur. With respect to a single living organism, composed of many cells, as this quantity increases over time, order will collapse into ever-increasing disorder as the organism dissipates into other forms of useable energy in the Universe. On the other side, the entropy of information theory (Shannonian) represents a mathematical term for measuring uncertainty (7). This term measures the statistical mechanics of discrete outcomes (15) for a system. One may measure the Shannonian entropy of a coin toss and obtain a solution to how likely it will be to make predictions about its outcome in the future. As the number of coin tosses increases in time, the total entropy begins to increase, implying the unpredictable nature of the outcome as information is lost. Denbigh claims that both of these contexts in which the word is used is independent of man’s presence and thus fully objective on the basis of the persistence of the Universe (pp. 115) and the creativity it manifested pre-human history. Not only is entropy scientifically objective, but the thermodynamic and statistical mechanical forms is also interchangeable within the framework I wish to propose. The basis upon which I consider entropy to be scientifically objective does not necessitate its material existence, however. Rather, it is used here as an abstraction for what appears to be an external phenomena to our observer-community; that as time goes forward, complexity and the irreversibility of the reactions underlying the physico-chemical equations behind life’s self-maintaining processes become greater. It is much easier to reverse the formation of sodium hydroxide than it is to reverse an adult human male back into a fetus. The distinction between reversible and irreversible reactions based on a synthesized view of entropy also allows us to reconsider what is life as it moves from minimal life-forms to incredibly complex ones.

Now that we have a working definition of entropy, I will demonstrate why biological life definitely has a finite initial point. Imagine a machine with a series of knobs on it. This machine (call it B) is controlled by another (A), which works towards optimizing the knobs in the precise positions required for B to begin tinkering with the next machine in the sequence, C. However, if such knobs exist on all the machines in this sequence, then either there is an infinite number of such machines or there was a prime agency which started tinkering with the first machine. In the case of life, if we are to assume the Big Bang occurred 3.5 billion years ago, then organic life cannot be in an infinite state of such machines extending back since time is finite under this theory. In evolutionary time, we know that life on earth did not begin 3.5 billion years ago, as it took an even longer time for the formation of planets even capable of sustaining life. This issue does not even begin to account for the other forms of life which have unfolded asexually or non-genetically. As Brillouin points out, “life is playing upon all these exceptional conditions on the fringe of the second principle of thermodynamics” (pp. 566). Any “prime mover” we know of is residual of how life emerged, although addressing the origin of life cannot give us the “why”. I do not wish to understand the conditions before the seed was planted, only how it lead to the world’s state of affairs as they are today.

On first-order cybernetics, there have been attempts in the field of theoretical biology to provide an account of organization in living systems using autopoiesis (self-creation) and metabolic-repair (M, R) systems (11). The emergence of rudimentary life-forms has been characterized by the following formula F: (in)organic chemistry => prebiotic metabolism => RNA world => proteins => DNA (13; pp. 1735). The transition between (in)organic chemistry to prebiotic metabolism is particularly important, because the presence of a metabolic cycle is early evidence of rudimentary, self-replicating structures (19) capable of converting useable energy into work (and subsequently, entropy). The earliest work cycles could only have been made possible by what is called task closure. Closure is defined mathematically as a function, or a reference to a function, which has a reference table to all the free variables within the function. To better explain this, consider the term self-referentiality. The clearest example of this is Ouroburos; the world-snake which is forever consuming itself. Self-referentiality in reality is not so extreme, but considers the case of one object, or node, which contains such a pointer back to itself (i.e. the pointer for Ouroburos is his mouth referring back to his tail). When two nodes in concert point to each other, the set over both becomes closed. Experimental and computational evidence has made it quite clear that the existences of such sets are certainly plausible. In the case of that transition between in(organic) chemistry to prebiotic metabolism, metabolic closure based on the Krebs cycle has been proposed as the network underlying minimal life (11). Such reactions are notably reversible, and chemoautotrophs which are living today are capable of this metabolism, which would imply that this lineage has existed from its minimal predecessors. Ashkenazy et al discovered a nine-peptide autocatalytic set capable of achieving closure over a task space which involves the catalysis of all reactions within that set by its very own members out of those nine peptides (21). Others have shown that components such as stem cells can commit to specific lineages based on a rule-based discrete transition at the level of transcriptome-wide noise (2). At what point do these phenomena converge?

Apply the metaphor of machines optimizing one another in sequence to an origin of life scenario on early earth. The scientific literature lends ear to notions such as a primordial soup (a mixture of organic and inorganic components within the open system of the first oceans. Suppose that these first oceans are a finitely bounded, but open, thermal bath (i.e. early earth was “very hot”). Given enough [evolutionary] time (Bywater says it is ~0.3 Gya; pp. 167) the probability of at least one of the organic or inorganic components to collide with one another becomes very high. It is from this collision, similar to the particle collision which unfolded the Universe from the Big Bang that the first primitive relations began, as well as the unfolding of prebiotic, informational components which could self-replicate the very primitive relations implied by that initial contact. Whichever component was first to manifest itself as a “classical” biological structure – the cell membrane, DNA, RNA, cytoplasm – is inconsequential. This is what is meant by component-independence. Instead, if we focus on the primitive relation that emerged from the task closure from minimal life as the efficient cause for biological life to begin on earth, the cybernetic-teleonomic account of life becomes a matter of the change through time of that relation, as implied by the micro-states which it takes, as opposed to a final meaning that is intrinsic to morphological structures. It is on this basis that I pretend to claim Shannonian micro-states perpetuate spontaneous creativity through the production of negative entropy. If the primitive relations underlying the first forms of autonomy and rudimentary life are irreversible, then the living system is guaranteed to also persist and replicate on the basis of entropy in the thermodynamic sense as well (a necessary principle of the second law).

To visualize, suppose that two particles collide in a thermal bath, representing the initial conditions of early earth. Under the collision, the particles form a complex X, which is denoted by the symbol *. The symbol represents the first node (the root) of what is called a binary tree, where successive self-replications of * gives rise to two more, and those two nodes replicate two more nodes and so on. In a sequence, the number of nodes increases in a geometric series on each level, which begins as {1, 2, 4, 8, 16…}. Level n = 0 is defined as the root node. It is at this level that the total information entropy is 1, which represents a finite, yet undetermined, amount of free energy available to convert into useful work within that closure (19). I call this variable ΔI which is the change in information entropy from level n to n + k, where k > 0. In this manner, as the binary tree grows to an indefinite level, the production of negative entropy increases, and the living system loses meaningful micro-states as the information required to maintain the unity begins to experience a loss of integrity. It is at this point that the entropy underlying the relation between the components can no longer undergo self-maintenance and self- renewal, resulting in biological death. When a unique micro-state denoted by ΔI comes about by the behaviour of cells on a continuous space-time plane in two-dimensions, I hypothesize that it is sufficient to be able to trace the emergence of conditions such as cancer. What is especially elegant about tracing such changes through a binary tree is that its growth can be denoted by a logarithmic function, where the logarithm of n (the number of nodes) is actually ΔI As ΔI goes closer to 0, one would expect to observe features such as a loss in genomic stability and a greater number of say, copy-number variations. In the case of n = 0, ΔI = log2 (0) which is 1; intuitively, at the point of origin for an organism, the amount of meaningful information available to its cells to proliferate is 100%. As its cells continue to divide, ΔI becomes smaller and the predictability of what micro-state the cell will take on will continue to grow smaller as well, a result of Shannonian information theory. Within this descriptive domain, the unpredictability of how biological structures, such as the cell membrane, will behave becomes less clear than the statement S which I have originally explained. Evidence from cell signaling studies have shown us that when stem cells move away from their “natural purposes”, the communication between individual cells loses its integrity and as cells within the same tissue are unable to pass messages on to one another, they split into distinct cell populations. As far as a biological program goes, if such a structure as the entire group of cells is for the function of “normal proliferation” leading to non-cancerous tissue, it will inevitably fail as the integrity of the relations between them begins to collapse. At the level of resolution of evolution acting on entire species and sets of individuals constituting a lineage, we can determine their paths insofar as the most probabilistic directions they can take under the constraints imposing themselves on the very micro-states that define those relations, which itself is a recursive process. This does not mean that “the best” structures are selected for based on the solution of an optimization problem, given by the computer gestalt model of evolution (12).

Such autocatalytic sets capable of achieving task closure and performing work (13, 14) are Kantian wholes, where the whole exists for and by the mean of the parts, and the parts for and by the means of the whole (22; pp. 1381). In the context of evolution, the likeliest Kantian wholes to continue to survive in biological evolution were those with the highest probability distribution of obtaining a micro-state x at time t, or the least set of entropy capable of self-maintaining the living functions by means of available, meaningful information within the system. The meaning, behaviours, and even the perceived goal-directedness towards a final cause for organisms are derived from the ways the Kantian wholes assert their autonomy. As rudimentary autocatalytic sets begin to tend towards multicellularity and increase in the total available degrees of freedom (16), the requirement of the living system to develop control systems also begin to manifest themselves. Examples of these are microRNA noise modulators which attenuate DNA coding strands to increase expression levels and the transcription/translation process which is akin to an assembly line for producing functional units (protein). By implementing first-order cybernetics with entropy, I am essentially attributing the intrinsic purposelessness of biological components to their self-referentiality. At the resolution of the Kantian whole, entropy underlies that self-referential pointer of the task closure, and from this foundation of entropy change as an inherently meaningless phenomena (does energy have goals?), I conclude that the only meaning we can assign to the living system is that which emerges from the constraints which a micro-state imposes between components.

However, there are some shortcomings with respect to this view. The first lies with the term entropy itself. I have used it here as a mathematical description – an abstraction – of what seems to happen during the life history of individuals and to account for the origins of novelty. However, even von Neumann, when discussing the matter with Shannon, suggested the term entropy over information or uncertainty for the mere fact that in its thermodynamics context, no one actually knows (and still do not) what entropy actually is as a physical entity in this Universe (7; pp. 113). If I claim that my intention is to nevertheless apply the formalism to biological evolution, and then try to resolve the dynamics of individuals under them, then I have already failed to account for the apparent process of inscribing meanings as an observer embedded within that domain of discourse. Even within the bounds of a second-order cybernetics, where I consider myself as an observer as an input within the feedback loops that underlie living systems, we still cannot say with full confidence that such laws as applied to the thermodynamics and linguistics used to describe those systems – and the subsequent perturbations made by recursive process between the observer (myself) and the individual – apply. Largely this is due to the unresolved gap between the quantum and classical worlds at which evolution enacts upon the biosphere. Furthermore, considering entropy as a primitive relation has been considered by some scientists to be a vital force or perhaps even the res extensa that Descartes describes. However, as I have also recognized, applying this principle of self-referentiality on the level of Kantian wholes does not imply a meaningful substance is where biological individuals derive purposes and intentions from. In the continuous arrow of time, notions of agency, intentionality and meaning – particularly in regards to humans – could be indicative of the discrete transitions under which local compartments (15) emerge given the unique state of entropy flow within that whole. For an example of such a transition, consider the decoupling of the neural tube from the fetus, which gives rise to the brain (6). The development of the brain as such and it becoming an autonomous entity may give rise to inscribed meanings which also lock onto notions of intentions and immanence, but could also be illusions based on the recursions which arise from that “mind” being embedded in the so-called external world. I have derived this line of reasoning as an operational matter constrained within the bounds of the cybernetic-teleonomic account. This cannot be stressed enough, as the self-creating and autonomous nature of the individual exists independently of such first-order cybernetic accounts with which we operate upon them with. To know the inherent purposelessness of life is to understand the mind of God.

REFERENCES

1. Varela, F. (1979) “Principles of Biological Autonomy.” New York: Elsevier North Holland, Inc.
2. Pina, C., Fugazza, C., Tipping, A.J., Brown, J., Soneji, S., Teles, J., Peterson, C., Enver, T.
(2012) “Inferring rules of lineage commitment in hematopoiesis.” Nat Cell Bio, 14(3): 287-94.
3. Van de Vijver, G. (2006) “Kant and the Intuitions of Self-Organization.” Self-Organization and
Emergence in Life Sciences, 143-161.
4. Weber, A., Varela, F. (2002) “Life after Kant: Natural purposes and the autopoietic foundations
of biological individuality.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1: 97-125.
5. Cummins, R. “Neo-Teleology.” Philosophy of Biology (Part V: 12) in Rosenberg and Arp.
6. Ruiz-Mirazo, K., Moreno, A. (2011) “Autonomy in evolution: from minimal to complex life.”
Synthese, 185: 21-52.
7. Denbigh, K. (1981) “How subjective is entropy?” in Maxwell’s Demon: Entropy Information
Computing, Princeton Series in Physics.
8. Brillouin, L. (1949) “Life, Thermodynamics, and Cybernetics.” in Maxwell’s Demon: Entropy
Information Computing, Princeton Series in Physics.
9. Plato. “Phaedo 99.” Retrieved from Archive.org.
10. Aristotle. “The Organon and Other Works: Physics.” Retrived from Archive.org.
11. Letelier, JC., Marin, G., Mpodozis, J. (2003) “Autopoietic and (M, R) Systems.” J Theor Biol,
2(21): 261-272.
12. Dawkins, R. (1986) “The Blind Watchmaker: The Weasel Program.” Oxford University Press.
13. Hordijk, W., Hein, J., Steel, M. (2010) “Autocatalytic Sets and the Origin of Life.” Entropy, 12:
1733-1742.
14. Monaco, RR., de Montozon, FR. (2012) “Self-Organization, Autocatalysis and Models of the
Origin of Life.” Working draft: NASA Ames Research Center and University for College London.
SUBMITTED.
15. Bennett, CH. (1986) “On the Nature and Origin of Complexity in Discrete, Homogenous,
Locally-Interacting Systems.” Foundations of Physics, 16(6): 585-592.
16. Furusawa, C., Kaneko, K. (2000) “Origin of complexity in multicellular organisms.” Phys Rev
Lett, 84: 6130-6133.
17. Lloyd, S. (1988) “Black Holes, Demons and the Loss of Coherence: How complex systems get
information, and what they do with it.” The Rockefeller University PhD Thesis.
18. Maturana, HR., Varela, F. (1980) “Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living.” D.
Riedel Publishing Company.
19. England, JL. (2012) “Statistical Physics of Self-Replication.” Working draft: MIT Physics
Laboratory. SUBMITTED.
20. Bywater, RP. (2012) “On dating stages in prebiotic chemical evolution.” Naturwissenschaften, 3:
166-176.
21. Zadon, Z, Samiappan, M., Wagner, N., Ashkenasy, N., Ashkenasy, G. (2012) “Peptide Based
Computation: Switches, Gates, and Simple Arithmetic.” Biomol Info Proc: From Logic Sys to
Sensors and Actuators, pp. 9-32.
22. Longo, G., Montevil, M., Kauffman, SA. (2012) “No entailing laws, but enablement in the
evolution of the biosphere.”, Proceedings of the fourth international conference on Genetic and
Evolutionary Computation Conference Companion (GECCO Companion ’12), Terence Soule
(Ed.). ACM, New York, NR, USA, 1379-1392.
23. Huang, S. (2011) “Systems biology of stem cells: three useful perspectives to help overcome the
paradigm of linear pathways.” Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci, 366(1575): 2247-59.
24. Dennett, D. (1995) “Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life.” ISBN: 0-
684-82471-X.

*I derive subsequent orders of cybernetics from this definition as a result of the recursion indicated by the
principle.

SARTAJ: INDIVIDUALS

2012-12-08T19:55:00.001-08:00

The transient emergence from lower-level assemblies (genes, cells) to individuals like us assumes that the ensembles of such assemblies function as a hierarchy of forms which leads to the whole. This view is, prima facie, a reductionist one, which would lead us to believe that the living system first embodies the sum-of-its-parts and the evolutionary forces subsuming these parts act on more than one level of resolution. The distinction that Godfrey-Smith has made between an organism and a Darwinian individual seeks to go past the living system as a sum-of-parts towards clarifying the phenomena of selection acting upon collectives, whether very small or very large. In this respect, a “dynamic linking” of organisms and Darwinian individuals becomes context-dependent upon the scale of interaction at which evolution unfolds.

I extend the binary distinction and dance between the two and place them within the context of a Kantian whole, where the parts exist for and by the means of the whole, and the whole for and by the means of the parts (2). The Kantian whole itself is the phenomena of biological evolution, where biological species falling under the organism/Darwinian individual dualism are characterized by the observation of the interactions between material objects in our reduction-materialist domain of knowledge. The emergence of novelty in the physical world by those things we cannot see or touch, but may be real in its pressure upon this Kantian whole is manifested in the actual Universe (i.e. accessible by our senses), although somehow immaterial as well and still enacting upon the biological evolution of species. Homo sapiens devise an ever-increasing number of virtual realities; whether in silico, our social structures, and civilizations and the subsequent memes developed within them. Subsequently, these virtual realities also allow us to dominate and manipulate the land around us – and perhaps it is the bacteria! The superstructure which consists of all the domains within the web of evolution takes into account these types of non-material realities, and the scales of resolution at which we operate upon is that context-dependence which the organism/Darwinian individual dualism recognizes as far as being under one law binding all of them together. Other examples of this are the dance of honey bees
and mating rituals between peacocks that could have mathematically well-defined dynamics, but go beyond the interaction of the inner-machinations of individual members of that organism set. For the peacocks to mate, they would have to lock eyes, and the eyes are connected to the brain, which “processes” the photons perceived as images. However, recently the link between photons and colour has not been so clear*, and the brain is not an information processor as given by the computational theory of mind (7). Even the dynamic linking the quantum effects as applied to the photon do not necessarily entail or integrate with the physics at the level of a protein encoded by sexual mating signals in the genome, although specific mechanisms do link components such as electrons with pathways, as in the case of electron chain transport in the plant. This is what is meant by the whole being greater than the sum-of-parts. The mixtures of these virtual realities, the interactions that emerge from the materialization of lineages in time, constitute the web of evolution which I have recognized as a Kantian whole. Darwinian individuals and organisms co-create instances in which they interact as observers and being observed as well, manifesting their own domain of knowledge upon the world around them through their behaviour at all the scales of existence we have recognized. The success of an idea, a creature, a kind – and the exchange between these classes – in maintaining their own existence, is that selection pressure which ensures the continued existence of the Kantian whole as well. This process also includes destruction if it has to; the destruction of stars, self-sacrificing ants, suicide, warfare and the like.

When implementing a biological theory such as classical Darwinian selection, these considerations must be taken into mind as well. Although Godfrey-Smith’s model does well to classify the distinction between the non-mating mule as an organism and sexually reproducing mammals, he does not consider the Darwinian legacy that organisms may leave behind. In this sense, the boundary he purports fails, since the conditions of the niche in which the unique Darwinian individuals perpetuate their coil to an offspring generation is influenced by such Darwinian legacies. There is evidence (4, 5), for example, that the food tastes of a human father are epigenetically imprinted into his daughter through a methyl-tag. The legacy of a mule is the methyl-tag which encodes for a father’s taste in food, which passes onto his daughter, who later goes on to become a mule breeder. In a sense, this could be kin selection; the mule has ensured the success of his species, albeit non-sexually, nor even asexually in the sense of a yeast budding. If that epigenetic mark is embedded within the mule that would go onto the daughter, but the mule was merely an organism acting as vehicle to that mark (the Darwinian individual), then whence came the residuum of the mule enacting itself as a replicator (6) upon the world around it despite its status as a eunuch? To place the distinction of organism/Darwinian individual under the enablement of Kantian wholes avoids this dangerous reduction-materialist game and allows us to focus on the generation and implications of useful results in analyzing nonconventional phenomena in the biosphere otherwise not riddled onto the biologist.

REFERENCES

1. Godfrey-Smith, P. (2011) “The Evolution of the Individual.” The Lakatos Award
Lecture, LSE.
2. Weber, A., Varela, F. (2002) “Life after Kant: Natural purposes and the autopoietic
foundations of biological individuality.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1:
97-125.
3. Dennett, DD. (1993) “Review of F. Varela, E. Thompson and E. Rosch, the Embodied
Mind.” American Journal of Psychology, 106: 121-6.
4. Landecker, H. (2011) “Food as exposure: Nutritional epigenetics and the new
metabolism.” Biosocieties, 6: 167-194.
5. Muhlhausler, S., Ong, Z. (2011) “The Fetal Origins of Obesity: Early Origins of Altered
Food Intake.” Endocrine, Metabolic & Immune Disorders, 11(3): 189-197.
6. Dawkins, R. (1990). “The Selfish Gene.” ISBN-13: 978-0192860927. Pp. 15.
7. Horst, S. (2005). “The Computational Theory of Mind.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy.

*“The same is true of the color of objects: they have indeed coevolved with the color-vision systems of the organisms that
perceive them, but, except on an evolutionary time scale, they are in the main imperturbable by organisms' perceptual activity.
Once we have this metaphysical point duly corrected and secured, does it play much of a role in ongoing cognitivist research?”
(3)

SARTAJ: ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY II - ONTOLOGY OF TAXONOMIC DESCRIPTIONS

2012-12-04T05:11:00.001-08:00

Taxonomy as an ontological question (2) falls under the purview of what is meant by a definite description. On the basis of Frege’s analysis, we are told that a singular common noun is a referring expression (4; Sinn), and I use this notion to ground taxonomy within a pluralist context. Questions concerning life, particularly the taxa we devise for it, necessarily refer to those components which we can observe. When the biologist splits reptiles and birds as separate classes, she is referring to a list of features extracted from observations made about those individuals within them. In evolutionary biology, such a list will generate a number of splittings depending on the algorithm used. For example, algorithm A may place alligators and chickens into a closely-related clade, whereas algorithm B would recognize alligators as being distinctly separated from Aves within the taxonomy. As well, the organization and collection of data is instrumentation-dependent, which subsequently “co-evolves” with the observer community and vice versa. From this phenomena stems plurality. The referent components analyzed and subsequently categorized are in a dynamical flux on the basis of evolving methods for collecting novel features in the specimen under study. What was previously invisible to the senses will become “real” in the future. For example, Darwin could create taxonomies without knowing genetic sequences, although the supposed “transforming principle” underlying evolution did not refer in this case. Darwin could simply not see DNA with his eyes, a direct result of unavailable instrumentation. The beauty of Frege’s analysis is that it allows for gappy propositions (5), and I suppose that the referents collected for each individual take the object position of the gap within Frege’s calculus. I will contrast this allowance with Russell’s method to show why gappy propositions are vehicles for pluralism and potentially high-dimensional spaces.

In Russell’s view, particularly the On Denoting period, singular common nouns cannot be referring expressions because they are merely symbols which quantify objects in space and time; our observable, “actual world”. If statements of this quantified form are computable, then we cannot implement it within taxonomy without sacrificing the transforming nature of life in the program’s output. To say that a symbol quantifies an object in the actual world is to select a finite subset of characters and assigning it the value of a string, which is a referential data type for denoting alphabetical expressions. Consider the following sentence:

(1) The present King of France is bald

First recognize that “the present King of France” (a string denoted by X) has some unique properties as a definite description. It is temporally restricted to the present time. Using tuple notation, an object X has some monadic property/universal Y (denoted as “is bald”; the universal is the state of being bald) at time t, which can be read as A = <<X, t>, Y>. On the case of what is meant by present, view the following set B = {...,<<X, t – 1>, Y>,< <X, t>, Y>, <<X, t + 1>, Y>,...}. B informs us of a fatalist state of affairs, where the dot notation denotes the object X for all time-points in the history of our universe of discourse far in the past and the future, and is subsequently true for all time. When discussing what is meant by the present, it is precisely the behaviour/property Y of X at that time-point which is not t - 1 and t + 1. The implication of this view is that when we are discussing X, we have one, already presupposed its existence; and two, the arrow of time can be constrained to single points in a continuous life history. However, t “right now” and t in “the future” (t + 1) are both denoting expressions for what is already the present. The king of France may have been bald when he was alive (eg. t - 1), but certainly his “monadic status” in the world has since passed. B taken as a set would fall under having a truth value of false. Furthermore, time flows forward, and to make a statement about an object at t + 1 is to say that we will definitely know the dynamics of the object in all future flows of time as well; Y is not necessarily universal across all time, and certainly not when Y is with respect to biological evolution. Unfortunately for Russell, it seems that truth is not as static as he would like in this context, his purports on linguistic rules are too tight for generating dynamic taxonomies for biological entities in this instance and leaves no room for the imagination when considering the instrumentation problem.

On the other hand, the consideration of a “gap” within a proposition about a species acts as a placeholder which may be presupposed to be those adjacent possible (3) properties that emerge from available resources in the future. We cannot know the morphology and functions biological structures will take in the future, but the development of techniques such as genetic stochastic modeling allows us to account for theoretical properties and derived traits from current information extracted from the species being classified. In the scheme of devising an effective ontology for discerning “useful” taxonomies from ones that have no utility, using incomplete, gappy propositions allows the [in silico] experimentalist to consider higher dimensions in which they capture the level of resolution being studied in the set of species being classified. For example, the set C = {...<X, t - 1>, Y0, Y1, Y2...>>, <Z, t>, Y0, Y2, Y5...>>, < , t + 1>, Y0, Y2, Y3...>>,...} contains gaps in the object position of future elements and now recognizes an existential difference between an object X and Z versus an undetermined adjacent structure in the future falling under a suspected list of properties. If the presupposition of such empty structures fail to generate references within our model, the list is rejected for a better optimization and we may derive a stronger taxonomy for our species set with a more effective predictive power.

REFERENCES

1. Russell, B. "On Denoting." Mind 14 (1905): 479-493.
2. Ereshefsky, M. “Species, Taxonomy, and Systematics.” In Rosenberg and Arp.
3. Kauffman, SA. “Investigations.” Oxford University Press (2002): 22.
4. Frege, G. “. Über Sinn und Bedeutung.” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, (1892): 25-50.
5. Everett, G. “Empty Names and ‘Gappy’ Propositions’.” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 116(1), (2003): 1-36.