By Ali Aziz:

America inherited global leadership from Britain at the dawn of the 20th century, a position cemented during World War II. Then, the world began to divide into two camps: the liberal capitalist bloc led by America and the communist socialist bloc led by the Soviet Union. However, Soviet communist influence was mainly limited to military and ideological power. At the same time, American leadership was comprehensive, covering social, commercial, economic, media, scientific, and intellectual influence, alongside military and ideological dominance. The lifestyle that emerged from the rise of the socialist bloc was not compelling enough for the world’s populations to adopt, as the people of the Soviet Union endured extreme poverty, suppression of freedom, and widespread backwardness. This disparity fostered a natural division between the two blocs in the eyes of the world’s peoples. In other words, the superiority of Western civilisation became undeniable and unrivalled. Since the collapse of the socialist bloc in 1990, it has become clear that the world’s peoples are gravitating towards liberalism, free markets, democratic transfers of power, and social models that emulate the Western way of life. This trend is now evident, with many embracing liberalism as a way of life, as described by the Australian academic Alexander Lefebvre.

However, several regions around the world have opposed this shift and Western dominance, instead retreating to strengthen their own power bases by all available means. This reinforcement has often been limited to military and ideological spheres, a spontaneous echo of the socialist bloc’s experience of prioritising military force and ideological mobilisation. The Islamic movement, in its two forms—Shia, led by Iran, and Sunni, led by Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood-represents one of these regions that has sought to challenge the Western world. However, the Islamic movement has not only failed to offer an alternative model to Western civilisation but has also become a scourge and a disaster for Muslims, severely damaging the global image of Islam. Nonetheless, Iran, as a centre of Shi’ism and for many historical and geopolitical reasons, has managed to exploit numerous contradictions and paradoxes in global politics, especially those where the United States held the final say, such as the wars in Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003, the fight against ISIS in 2014, and other events that have destabilised the Middle East. In most of these cases, when major conflicts occurred that caused radical shifts in the political, economic, military, and social fabric of the Middle East, Iran benefited significantly, leading to a substantial increase in its military power and the expansion of its influence across many countries, including Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and, to some degree, the Gulf states, especially Qatar.

The question remains: how did Iran manage to turn US policy to its advantage, despite their ongoing conflict, where Iran denounced America as the Great Satan, while the US  consistently called Iran part of the “axis of evil”? Since the end of World War II, American policy in the Middle East has largely been driven by economic and financial interests, often ignoring Western civilisational values. This intense focus on immediate gains, coupled with a conscious neglect of higher civilisational principles, has fostered a negative image of America as employing outright Machiavellian tactics, disregarding alliances and treaties, and appearing unreliable and untrustworthy. This view has been reinforced among regional and global populations through the US administration’s frequent statements and actions. One notable example is the Kurdish people, victims of the Sykes-Picot Agreement at the beginning of the 20th century. They have made immense sacrifices for freedom and continue to struggle against Iran, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. America supported the Shah of Iran, ignoring the injustices faced by the Kurdish people there. However, during the 1960s and 70s, both America and the Shah backed the Kurdish movement in Iraq against Iraq, aiming to weaken it for Israel’s benefit during the Arab-Israeli conflict and for Iran’s interests in its conflict with Iraq. Once their goals were achieved, they abandoned the Kurds in Iraq in 1975, when the Kurds faced a significant setback after Iran and Iraq signed the Algiers Agreement. When Henry Kissinger, then Secretary of State, was asked about the moral responsibilities of the US, he replied, “Politics is not charity.” Nearly four decades later, John Kerry, then Secretary of State under Obama, echoed this pattern when he opposed the Kurdistan Region’s referendum in 2014, following the fall of Arab cities in Iraq to ISIS. The US justified its opposition by arguing that the referendum could be held after ISIS’s defeat. In 2017, when America declared ISIS defeated, the Kurdistan Region held a referendum. Still, the US opposed it and, alongside Britain, deliberately took the oil-rich city of Kirkuk from the Kurds and handed it over to Iran under the leadership of General Qassem Soleimani.

Since 1979 and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the United States has shown little willingness to support the Iranian opposition, particularly the Kurdish opposition. This has allowed the Iranian regime significant freedom of movement, enabling it to strengthen its military and economic position. American policy in such situations has been based on the belief that Shiites are a minority in the Islamic world, led by Iran. Therefore, maintaining this minority’s strength is seen as essential to counter the Sunni majority and pressure it into accepting American policies. These policies, which were unprecedentedly blatant under Donald Trump, included compelling Gulf states to pay enormous sums of money, the likes of which they had never seen before, in a publicly humiliating manner. These policies have delivered short-term benefits for the United States on several occasions, such as Iran’s cooperation with the US against Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003, ISIS in 2014, and Iraqi Kurdistan in 2017. However, all of this has come at the expense of broader strategic interests, which should transcend temporary gains. What we see today, a perilous situation in the Strait of Hormuz, and the Iranian regime’s refusal to surrender despite intense attacks, is a consequence of American policies in the Middle East since 1990. These policies have favoured maintaining a strong Iran to serve American interests in the region. Due to the immense pressures of capitalism (to use a Marxist term) and the financial crises that have plagued America, most notably in 2008, preserving a strong regime in Tehran appeared to be the most effective way to sustain American hegemony, especially in the Arab Gulf states, as well as the financial gains involved. Yet, at the same time, Iran’s power has grown, supported by China, Russia, and North Korea. It has managed to build a substantial military arsenal, capable of harming Israel and allied countries in the region. Today, Iran has even inflicted damage on the global economy. While the Iranian regime remains ideologically rigid and terrorist in nature, much of its strength results from America’s complacency towards Iran’s expanding influence over the past three decades and its failure to support the Iranian people in resisting this intransigent regime.Had America supported oppressed groups within Iran, such as the Kurds, Baloch, and Ahwazis, and supplied them with deterrent arms like missiles, Iran’s regime would not remain so powerful, capable of harming Israel, regional allies, and severely impacting the global economy. Therefore, returning to Immanuel Kant’s philosophy of international relations and prioritising universal values such as freedom and human rights is essential to reshaping American policies, particularly as the United States remains the world’s superpower. Such a shift requires major reforms that prioritise Western values over immediate interests. This urgency is critical before the balance of power shifts further, because Western liberal civilisation still holds its appeal and evidence, with no better alternative, at least in our current context.

Protest in Iranian Kurdistan, October 2022

Iran is governed as an Islamic theocracy, where the Supreme Leader has ultimate authority over the military, judiciary, and major policies. Khomani and his regime of terror came to power in 1979 with the help of western world and since then Iran exporting their terror all over the world.  Khomeini died on 2005 and Ali Khamenei, had ruled since 1989. Ali Khameni was killed in a U.S.–Israeli strike in February 2026, during escalating tensions over Iran’s nuclear program. This has created a major leadership vacuum and uncertainty about who will control the state. Other key power centers still exist: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) the clerical establishment the presidency (currently Masoud Pezeshkian) These factions could compete for power as the political system tries to stabilize. On 8 March, Khameni’s son, Mojtaba, was appointed to succeed him as Supreme Leader.

Iran has been experiencing nationwide protests since late 2025 economic collapse, inflation has rising by 40%, currency devaluation, inflation and shortages, anger at the ruling system The demonstrations spread to over 100 cities and are considered the largest challenge to the government since the 1979 revolution. Many protests began with economic grievances but soon turned into explicit anti-government protests questioning the legitimacy of the ruling elite. Authorities have responded with extreme repression: mass arrests, shootings of protesters, internet shutdowns, executions and death sentences. Estimates of the death toll from the crackdown vary widely: sources close to Kurdistan Tribune inside Iran suggest tens of thousands were killed during the unrest. Human rights groups say the repression has been one of the deadliest in decades. Iran’s economy is under severe stress due to several factors: international sanctions, currency collapse The rapid fall of the Iranian currency (rial) and price shocks were major drivers of the recent protests. The government also shut down much of the internet during the protests, which hurt businesses and financial activity. The “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement that began in 2022 still influences protests. Many activists oppose:

Eastern Kurdistan (Rojhelat) is significant because it sits at the intersection of Kurdistan’s Historic identity, political struggle and regional geopolitics. A flashpoint for political resistance especially today. Its importance comes from comination demography with culture heritage, strategic geography and its central role in contemporary movements for rights and autonomy. There is an estimated 8–10 million Kurds living across the provinces of West Azerbaijan, Kermanshah, Ilam, and Hamadan—the official provincial capital—but Kermanshah is strategically important, and Mahabad carries deep historical symbolism. It was the birthplace of the Republic of Mahabad in 1946, the most iconic attempt at establishing a Kurdish state, led by Qazi Muhammad. He later became the leader of the republic and was executed by Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi after its collapse.

Kurdish forces from this region fought in major historical conflicts, including against the Safavid Empire at the Battle of Chaldiran. Kurdish political parties and activists in Rojhelat are heavily targeted by the Iranian regime since it came to power. The two leaders of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran were assassinated in Europe—Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou and Sadegh Sharafkandi—illustrating the reach and brutality of the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran. After Bakur, Rojhelat contains one of the largest Kurdish populations in the world. The region is religiously diverse: Sunni and Shia Kurds, as well as Christians, Jews, Yarsanis, and Yazidis all live there. Kurds have suffered some of the harshest repression under the rule of the Ayatollahs since they came to power following the Iranian Revolution. Rojhelat is also one of the most economically underdeveloped parts of Iran, with high unemployment and poverty rates, and few opportunities for investment, infrastructure, or access to services.

Many Kurds rely on kolbarí—dangerous cross-border goods carrying—to survive, often risking death. In Rojhelat, this informal labor has become a means of economic survival for many living along the mountainous frontier.

Rojhelat has also become a focal point of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, which began after the killing of Mahsa Amini, a Kurdish woman from Saqqez. The slogan “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî” (“Woman, Life, Freedom”) originates from the Kurdish freedom movement and was popularized by groups such as Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK), spreading from Rojhelat across Iran. The political struggle in the region has largely centered on cultural rights, political representation, demands for autonomy, and resistance to centralized government control.

One of the earliest major Kurdish uprisings in modern Iran was the revolt led by Simko Shikak between 1918 and 1922. Simko attempted to establish Kurdish autonomy in the region, but the effort ultimately failed, in part because it lacked unified support among Kurdish tribes. Eventually, Simko Shikak was assassinated through an Iranian plot after being called to negotiations by the Iranian authorities. The Republic of Mahabad in 1946 was a short-lived Kurdish state established in the city of Mahabad. It was led by Qazi Muhammad and supported indirectly by the Soviet Union during its occupation of northern Iran following World War II. The Kurdish state collapsed when Soviet forces withdrew and the Iranian army reoccupied the region. After 1946, the principal Kurdish political organizations advocating Kurdish political rights were the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan and the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan. These parties and movements have long been banned inside Iran, and many of their leaders have been assassinated in exile. Among the most notable were Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou in 1989 and Sadegh Sharafkandi in 1992.Human rights conditions in Eastern Kurdistan—the Kurdish-majority regions of western Iran such as Kurdistan, Kermanshah, Ilam, and parts of West Azerbaijan—are widely described by human rights organizations as systematically repressive .Kurdish regions have historically been centers of anti-government protest, and the state response has often been violent. During a crackdown linked to protests in early 2026, at least 257 Kurdish civilians were reportedly killed, including 20 children and 19 women.

Violations occur in several areas: political rights, civil liberties, cultural rights, economic conditions, and the use of lethal force by the state. Kurdish individuals are often arrested without warrants during intelligence raids and held without clear charges, and may face accusations such as “propaganda against the state,” “disturbing public order,” or alleged links to banned Kurdish parties. Political trials are commonly held in Revolutionary Courts, where defendants have limited access to lawyers and evidence. Iran already has one of the highest execution rates in the world, and Kurdish people are disproportionately affected. In 2025, more than 1,500 executions were reported nationwide, with at least 231 Kurdish prisoners executed—a disproportionate share given that Kurds make up about 12% of Iran’s population. Rojhelat is among the least economically developed regions in Iran, with high unemployment and limited investment. This economic disparity contributes to the migration of youth, reliance on risky border trade, and increased vulnerability to exploitation and pressure from security forces. Demographic and geographic importance Zagros Mountains: Much of the region lies in the Zagros Mountains, which historically helped Kurdish communities maintain cultural autonomy. For reference its border position; It sits near the borders with Iraq and Turkey, making it a key cross-border cultural and political zone. Its access to Natural resources; Parts of the region contain oil, gas, and agricultural valleys, especially around Kermanshah. Trade routes; Historically important routes linking Mesopotamia and the Iranian plateau pass through this area. Eastern Kurdistan has a long history of uprisings and movements for autonomy. From the Republic of Mahabad (1946) to local protests against centralization policies in Iran, the region has shown that Kurdish populations are willing to mobilize for self-determination. This historical consciousness fosters a foundation for future freedom movements because the memory of past struggles provides both legitimacy and a blueprint.

The Kurdish identity in Eastern Kurdistan is tightly knit through language, traditions, and shared social norms. The persistence of Kurdish language education (albeit often limited), literature, and local media helps sustain national consciousness. A strong cultural identity can act as the bedrock for political and social mobilization, which is essential for any freedom movement. If meaningful democratic change occurred there—such as local autonomy, free political participation, or decentralization—it could have ripple effects across several regions where Kurds live. It could encourage political reforms among Kurds in Bakur, foster greater coordination with the autonomous Kurdish region in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and inspire political models similar to the governing system in Rojava.

If democratic governance worked well in Rojhelat, it could become a model for Kurdish self-governance. Democratic change in Kurdish areas could also influence border politics within Iran. Other ethnic regions—such as Baluch, Arab, and Azeri communities—might demand greater local autonomy or democratic representation. This, in turn, could push the central government toward debates over federalism and decentralization, while reformist movements across the country might use it as a precedent for regional democracy. Turkey is highly sensitive to Kurdish autonomy. Democratic change in Rojhelat might increase Kurdish political activism in Turkey, potentially triggering stricter security policies or renewed negotiations with Kurdish movements. In the south of Kurdistan, in Erbil, the authorities of the Kurdistan Region might gain stronger cross-border cultural and economic ties, as well as greater political influence among Kurds in Iran. Such developments could strengthen a transnational Kurdish identity. A democratic Rojhelat could reinforce the idea of pan-Kurdish cooperation without necessarily creating a single unified state. Instead, it might foster deeper cross-border cultural interaction and more coordinated political strategies among Kurdish parties.

The risks and challenges, however, would remain considerable. Democratic change could also generate tensions with the government in Iran or with neighboring countries that fear separatism. Unlike some other Kurdish regions, Rojhelat currently has very limited international backing. The Kurdistan Region gained significant international partnerships after Gulf War, while the administration in Rojava received international support during the fight against the Islamic State in Syria. By contrast, the movements in Rojhelat lack comparable global recognition or strategic alliances, leaving their aspirations largely isolated within the international system. Iran will be liberated from the tyranny of the mullahs, that liberation will begin in Kurdistan. In Iraq, when the first Gulf War started in 1991, the allied forces’ objective was to liberate Kuwait from the regime of Saddam Hussein. Their objective was achieved in roughly 100 hours, according to Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander of the operation. The United States forces subsequently halted operations in southern Iraq for fear that the uprising would replace Saddam’s regime with forces aligned to the Islamic Republic of Iran, rather than leading to a stable post-war political transition. Kurdistan was left to the mercy of Saddam Hussein’s regime. However, Iraqi forces eventually withdrew from the Kurdistan area, and the Kurdish front was put in charge of managing the region with support from the United Kingdom and the United States. In 1992, the Kurdistan Region government was established, becoming an aspiration for the wider Iraqi Kurdish political movement to build a political base in Erbil, including groups such as the Iraqi National Congress.

During the Second Gulf War in 2003 and the subsequent invasion of Iraq, large United States forces crossed the border and began much of their operation from the Kurdistan region. Without Kurdish territory, the liberation and invasion of Iraq would have been considerably more difficult. The cooperation of Kurdish political parties with the United States and allied forces was an important condition in the effort to topple Saddam’s regime. The Kurdistan Regional Government became a political model and source of aspiration for other Kurdish regions. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) represented hope for Kurds across the broader region. The main Kurdish political parties—the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan—played pivotal roles in the events of 2003. Without their participation, the operation could not have been fully finalized

In Syria, the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), with the help of Turkey, managed to advance toward the Syrian capital of Damascus. The city had already been largely liberated by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), with support from the United States since around 2014, while much of Syrian territory was controlled by the SDF with U.S. backing. HTS forces led by Ahmed al Sharaa could not fully control or secure the Syrian army positions without broader military coordination, including the influence of Kurdish forces led by the SDF. Kurds in Rojava have enjoyed a degree of autonomy and have maintained their own administration since the withdrawal of forces loyal to Bashar al Assad during the early years of the Syrian civil war. Kurdish-led groups took control of several towns in northern Syria after Syrian government forces withdrew. This period is generally considered the beginning of Rojava’s self-rule. In January 2014, the region formally declared three autonomous cantons—Kobani, Afrin, and Jazira—and adopted a governing charter. In March 2016, the administration announced a border federal system called the “Democratic Federation of Northern Syria.” Since 2018 to the present, the system has evolved into the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, which governs much of the territory once called Rojava.

In Iranian Kurdistan (Rojhelat), Kurdish nationalism is primarily a politics of affirming Kurdish national identity. Kurdish nationalism in Rojhelat is largely seen as a product of historical repression and assimilation policies toward Kurds by the Iranian state. These dynamics are rooted in broader political and cultural processes. The denial of Kurdish ethnicity and national identity within Iran is sometimes associated with constitutional and state policy debates. Federalist movements, which currently influence many Kurdish political currents across Kurdistan, are viewed by some as a potential way to protect Kurdish identity and overcome the fragmentation of Kurdish culture. The harsh treatment of Kurdish political activism under the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran has made it difficult for some Kurds to view themselves as fully integrated within the Iranian state. In light of recent geopolitical disputes between Iran and the international community regarding its nuclear program—amid suspicions that nuclear capabilities could be used in armed conflict—tensions have increased, raising concerns about possible confrontation involving the United States and Israel, which have negotiated with Iran for an extended period over security and strategic issues.

Kurdish political parties in Rojhelat and their armed or affiliated movements remain among the most significant actors within Iranian territory at this stage. As noted by Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, “the Iranian homeland, though still formally the birthplace of Armenians, Kurds, and Baluchis, as well as Persians and others, increasingly came to represent the vatan (country) of Shi‘i Persians through the persistent effort of the state to suppress competing cultural identities.” Some Kurdish nationalist discourse frames the struggle as a historical response to political marginalization. Following the fall of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Kurds participated actively in demonstrations that helped destabilize the Pahlavi regime. The political vacuum created by the overthrow of the Shah was quickly filled by the forces of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, which remain major political actors in Rojhelat.

References:
Falah, A., & Dawod, H. (2006). The Kurds: Nationalism and Politics. London: Saqi.

Romano, D., & Gurses, M. (2014). Conflict, Democratization, and the Kurds in the Middle East: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chaliand, G. (1993). A People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan. London: Olivier Branch Press.

By Issa Chomani:

Washington, DC

Feb 27, 2026, marks Five months since the resumption of the Kurdistan Regional Government’s oil exports through the Iraq–Turkey pipeline. Iraq’s oil minister, Hayyan Abdul Ghani on Feb 25 said, “Kurdistan Region exports currently range between 200,000 and 210,000 barrels per day.” According to Iraq’s state oil marketing company, SOMO, over the first three months, the company exported about 19 million barrels of crude oil from the Kurdistan Region, confirming the continuation of oil deliveries under the existing agreement between Baghdad and Erbil, mediated by the United States. The agreement which was expiring on Dec 31, 2025, extended to March 30, 2026. According to Erbil and Baghdad officials as well international oil companies (IOCs), it may further extend until a consultant company is hired for a more accurate cost assessment in each oil field which is now $16 US dollars per barrel.

On September 27, 2025, Kurdish oil exports resumed to Turkey’s Ceyhan port after a temporary halt imposed by the Iraqi Federal Government (IG). This suspension followed a decision dated on March 25, 2023, by the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, France, which decided in favor of the IG, indicating that Turkey had violated the ‘1973 treaty’ by permitting the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) to independently export its oil through Iraq–Turkey pipeline, and this is against the clauses of the treaty.

For more than two years, the international oil companies operating in the Kurdistan Region were unable to export the crude oil produced from the region’s oilfields. According to the Association of the Petroleum Industry of Kurdistan (APIKUR), which represents eight international oil companies in the IKR, these companies were producing 350,000 to 400,000 barrels per day (bbl/day) before the export halt.

It is worth mentioning that three of the international oil companies, including HKN, Hunt Oil, and WesternZagros, out of APIKUR’s eight members, are American oil and gas companies. The companies have been operating in the Kurdistan Region for over a decade. In the early 2000s, after the US-led military campaign in Iraq, some American hydrocarbon companies entered Kurdistan’s market to invest in the region’s oil sector. Notably, their involvement paved the way for other international oil companies to enter the region to invest in its oil sector.
In this paper, I shed light on the role of US diplomacy to facilitate the breakthrough that eventually led to the resumption of Kurdish oil exports through the Iraq–Turkey pipeline. Also, I argue that without the US pressure on Baghdad, the IG would not have reached an agreement to address the concerns of international oil companies (IOCs).

Many US oil companies operating and investing in the Kurdistan Region’s rich natural resources sector helped to have Congress and the Administration exert a clear pressure on Baghdad to reach an agreement with IOCs and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to resume the region’s 500,000 barrels of oil return to the global oil markets. It is clear that the US energy companies lobbied members of the Congress to encourage Washington to intervene directly with Baghdad and Erbil, with the hope that the US officials would utilize their power over the Iraqi government to push for compromise.

The United States officials have repeatedly encouraged American oil companies to invest in Iraq and Kurdistan Region’s energy sector to strengthen economic stability and support US’s energy policy to ensure a steady supply to global markets. Reportedly, the US companies have invested billions of dollars in Kurdistan’s oilfields. For the US government, while these companies make a significant financial gain, they reinforce both economic and mutual strategic interests.

Kurdistan region’s oil export halt

Oil exports from the Kurdistan Region through the Iraq-Türkiye pipeline were suspended in March 2023 after an arbitration court ruled that Ankara had breached a 1973 agreement by enabling independent Kurdish exports since 2014 (ICC 2023). The halt ended independent oil sales from Erbil, which had long been a point of contention with Baghdad. On March 25, the International Chamber of Commerce’s International Court of Arbitration (ICC-ICA), which temporarily suspended the export of Kurdish oil through the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline (ITP), the pipeline exports oil from northern Iraq, including the Kurdistan Region, to the Turkish port of Ceyhan.

The shutdown had deep economic consequences for the region — the pause disrupted roughly 450,000 barrels per day that had been flowing through the pipeline, equivalent to about 0.5 % of global oil supply at the time ( Rasheed 2023). As a result, the export halt dealt a heavy blow to Kurdish revenues: according to regional sources, the suspension caused losses worth billions of dollars, triggering fiscal strain in Erbil (Edwards 2023).

US Interests in Kurdistan’s energy sector

In May 2025, during a visit to Washington, DC, KRG’s Prime Minister Masrour Barzani signed two multi-billion-dollar ($110) contracts with two US energy companies, HKN and WesternZagros, to invest in two gas fields. The ceremony was attended by the US Secretary of Energy, businessmen, and public figures. The projects’ goal is to produce natural gas as well as condensate from the Miran gas field and Topkhana-Kurdamir blocks. The life span of the projects is estimated to be 50 years (HKN Energy 2025, WesternZagroz 2025).

In a daily briefing, the US Department of State commented on these energy contracts, labeling them as a cornerstone to enhance the economic relations between Washington and Erbil. State Department principal, Tammy Bruch, stated “the United States supports economic deals that benefit all Iraqis, including the two announced last week. We encourage Baghdad and Erbil to work together to expand domestic gas production as soon as possible. These types of economic partnerships will benefit both the American and Iraqi peoples, and help Iraq move toward energy independence. U.S. oil companies have invested billions of dollars in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region’s oil sector. We hope to see additional investment from U.S. oil companies throughout Iraq.” (Bruce 2025).

While Baghdad considered such two contracts are against the Iraqi constitution, the spokesperson said the United States expects such deals to continue and to be facilitated, underscoring the importance of a strong and resilient IKR within a sovereign federal Iraq. Tammy Bruce repeated her government’s official stance, stating “the Secretary commended the prime minister for finalizing deals with U.S. companies to expand natural gas production in the IKR, which will help Iraq move toward energy independence.”

Reportedly, the two multi-billion-dollar energy projects are not the only investments made by US companies in Kurdistan; US oil firms also maintain an important presence in the region’s energy infrastructure. Data from the Ministry of Natural Resources of the KRG indicate that the first oil companies to begin operations in the region were US’s, including HKN, HuntOil,
Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Weatherford, among few others. American companies collectively invested billions of dollars in Kurdistan’s oil sector. WesternZagros, HuntOil, and HKN alone have invested more than $5 billion in the northern part of Iraq (Noam 2025).

From 2007 to 2025, HKN mainly invested in oilfields in the Kurdistan region. However, a strong interest shown by the US investor also led the company to enter the natural gas sector. The HKN acquired a license for an estimated 8 trillion standard cubic feet (scf) of proven natural gas at the Miran gas field. HKN’s CEO, Russell Freeman, expressed, “the agreement paves the way for the phased development of the field, with the possibility to generate over $40 billion in long-term value. This agreement marks a significant milestone not only for our company, but for the energy future of the region.” HKN Energy, in partnership with ONEX, implemented the project, which is considered one of the Kurdistan region’s strategic gas resources (HKN 2025).

Another US-based energy firm, WesternZagroz that has been operating in the Kurdistan region of Iraq since 2005 in exploration and production of crude oil, successfully secured a multibillion dollar project in a gasfield in the KRG in 2025 which is a resources-rich Topkhana-Kurdamir block. The project aims to provide natural gas to produce electricity to millions of homes as well as industry in the region (WesternZagroz 2025).

The signing ceremony was held in Washington, DC. The event was attended by US Secretary of Energy, KRG Prime Minister, WesternZagroz Chairman. According to WesternZagroz, the combined Topkhana-Kurdamir block holds a resource potential of up to 5 trillion standard cubic feet of gas, and an estimated 900 million barrels of recoverable crude oil. This acquisition, through a phased development approach, is expected to generate an estimated $70 billion of revenue over the life of the project. Toufic Chahine, Chairman of WesternZagros stated “the agreement also serves as a model for commercial collaboration between American energy companies and the KRG, with the support of the US Government.” The chairman added that “we look forward to our partnership with the Kurdistan Regional Government, contributing to the bright energy future of the Region.” (Kurdistan24 2025). The company emphasized that this development is seen as a milestone to improve US-KRG relations and further motivate US oil companies to invest in KRI.

The agreements that were signed soon after Donald Trump returned to office in his administration, were emphasized by people from both U.S. energy firms as having full US support, and the deals marked the major American energy investment in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The previous US investment in the KRI’s energy sector was solely in oil, rather than gas. Regarding the development of gas in Kurdistan and the potential for its existing power infrastructure to produce electricity for its neighbors, US Energy Secretary Chris Wright said, “this is fantastic. This is very aligned with President Trump’s agenda”, and signaled that the administration would continue to pursue energy investments in the country’s northern autonomous region in order to help develop its untapped resources (Almonitor 2025).

The US energy policy

The Trump administration’s energy policy aimed to supply as much oil as possible to global markets. The administration repeatedly criticized the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and its allies, known as OPEC+, for reducing production rates to stabilize oil prices. The Kurdistan Region’s total production is approximately 500,000 barrels per day, representing roughly 0.5% of the world’s daily oil production. Being relatively modest, this volume could still influence global oil prices. Energy analysts agree that such production could help stabilize global oil markets, particularly amid Washington’s “Maximum Pressure” campaign to curtail Iranian oil exports and limit Russia’s oil revenues, which serve as a key source of funding for its military operations in Ukraine.

However, the closure of the Iraq–Turkey pipeline from March 2023 to September 2025 deprived global markets of nearly 500,000 barrels of oil, running counter to US political and commercial interests and contributing to market uncertainty. The Association of the Petroleum Industry of Kurdistan (APIKUR) estimated that Iraq, including Kurdistan, and the eight members of APIKUR lost more than $35 billion in revenue due to the pipeline shutdown (APIKUR 2025).

US Energy Secretary Chris Wright signaled the administration would continue to pursue energy investments in the country’s northern autonomous region in order to help develop its untapped resources. “We are very keen to work with and support the people of the Kurdistan region to turn their endowments underground into resources,” Wright told an audience at an Al-Monitor Global Institute event in Washington on Thursday.

“I see great opportunity for American cooperation there, as evidenced by the signing of these two deals, and we would love to see that commercial relationship grow and flourish the oil production in the region, and very exciting projects in natural gas that can help electricity generation in the Kurdish region,” Wright said. (Al-Monitor 2025).

$250 million commitment from the US Development Finance Corporation The US government also provided loans to non-US companies to invest in the Kurdistan Region’s oil and gas sector. Crescent Petroleum CEO Majid Jafar in an interview with Rudaw TV highlighted the importance of this loan by the US government. According to Jafar, in 2018, the US Development Finance Corporation committed $250 million to Pear Petroleum, a consortium that includes UAE-based companies Dana Gas and Crescent Petroleum, as well as European companies RWE from Germany, OMV from Austria, and MOL from Hungary (Rudaw 2025). The purpose of the loan was to expand their investment to help Iraq and Kurdistan rely on their own energy resources and reduce dependence on Iranian-imported gas for electricity production.

US Threats

From mid-2025 through late October, Kurdistan Region oil and gas infrastructure came under a sustained wave of attacks, heightening a reaction from Washington to pressure on Baghdad and reshaping U.S. leverage over Iraq’s energy policy. Several of the strikes targeted sites linked to U.S. investment, including facilities operated by HKN Energy at the Sarsang block. Although the government of Iraq announced investigations, it did not officially identify the perpetrators. Public opinion domestically as well as externally , however, widely blamed Iran-backed militias, reinforcing long-standing U.S. concerns about militia influence and the safety of American economic interests.

The attacks provoked a strong reaction from the Trump administration. The U.S. State Department issued repeated condemnations, calling on Baghdad to protect civilian and energy infrastructures, investigate the attacks, and bring those responsible to justice. Lawmakers on Capitol Hill echoed those demands, arguing that continued impunity for attacks on U.S. companies undermined Iraq’s investment climate and its relationship with Washington.

Against this backdrop, the United States sharply increased pressure on Baghdad to reopen the long-shuttered Iraq–Turkey pipeline, a key route for exporting Kurdish crude to
international markets. According to multiple sources talked to Reuters, U.S. officials warned Iraqi leaders that failure to resume oil flows through Turkey could trigger American sanctions. The message linked security, energy, and economic policy: protecting U.S. investments and restoring exports were framed as inseparable from Iraq’s broader relationship with Washington.
The threat of sanctions marked a significant escalation, signaling that the U.S. was prepared to use financial and diplomatic pressure to break the political deadlock between Baghdad, Erbil, and oil companies. It also underscored Washington’s growing influence in Iraq, as energy security and the resumption of Kurdish oil exports became central tools in countering militia violence and stabilizing Iraq’s economy.

US Brokered a Deal to Resume KRI’s Oil through Pipeline Between March 2023 to Sep 2025, the US oil firms which operate in the Iraqi Kurdistan oil sector lobbied in the Congress to warn the US administration to exert pressure on Baghdad to open the pipeline. Several US lawmakers during the Biden administration wrote letters to Secretary of State Antony Blinken to use White House leverage over Baghdad. Despite US engagement with Baghdad, Erbil and Ankara, the Iraqi government did not open the pipeline. However, the lobby by US oil companies continued when Trump took office (Atencio 2023, Atencio 2023). Between 2023 to 2024, in nine separate letters to the US members of Congress, APIKUR demanded pressure on the US government to engage in the talks between Erbil and Baghdad. In one of the letters, APIKUR wrote to Mike Rogers, Chairman United States House Committee on Armed Services and Adam Smith, Ranking Member United States House Committee on Armed Services “We request your immediate assistance to persuade the Federal Government of Iraq (GoI) to promptly resolve issues that have resulted in the halt of greater than 400,000 barrels a day of crude oil exports from the KRI to global markets.”

Michael Waltz, who served as congressmen, and who also co-chairs the congressional Kurdish caucus, called on the Biden administration to exert strong pressures on Iraq to get KRG oil moving again. Waltz, with some colleagues in Congress, wrote a letter to President Biden’s secretary of State where he noted that; the U.S. has significant leverage in Baghdad, if it decides to use it (Mylroie, 2023).

During the Second Trump Administration, Waltz became National Security Advisor. Soon after taking office, Waltz called the Iraqi prime minister, Mohammad Shia’ Al-sudani. According to a read out he raised the issue of resuming Kurdish oil exports through the Iraq-Turkey pipeline and stressed the need to re-open the pipeline (Kurdistan24 2025).
The readout also included that the US National Security Advisor urged Sudani to have his government “work with the Kurdistan Regional Government to address remaining contract disputes and pay arrears owed to U.S. energy companies,”

As the US companies continued their demand from Washington to put further pressure on Sudani’s government, it seemed that the Trump administration took it seriously (Rasheed 2025). US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio in a call with the Iraqi prime minister stressed that it is in the interest of all sides to re-open the Iraq-Turkey pipeline in order to flow the Kurdish oil to international markets. The State Department published the detail of the call as quoting:

“The two agreed on the need for Iraq to become energy independent, to quickly reopen the Iraq-Türkiye Pipeline, and to honor contractual terms for U.S. companies working in Iraq to attract additional investment.”( State Department, 2025). In an announcement the APIKUR welcomed Secretary Rubio’s efforts and direct engagement with Baghdad and Erbil, “Association of the Petroleum Industry of Kurdistan (APIKUR) applauds U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s efforts to restart oil exports from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, including in a call with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani on February 25, 2025.” ( Caggins, 2025).

Although the Iraqi officials including the ministry of oil repeatedly announced that the issue of Kurdistan’s oil export has been resolved and set different dates to resume the oil, technical disputes between oil companies, Baghdad and Erbil remained the main obstacle to open the resume exploring oil for some time (El Dahan 2025). In Sep 2025, some hundred thousand barrels started flowing through the Iraq-Turkey pipeline.

US officials welcomed the agreement that they themselves initiated the tripartite agreement between the IOCs, KRG and Federal government of Iraq. Marco Rubio in a post on “X” wrote: “We welcome the announcement that the Government of Iraq has reached agreement with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and international [oil] companies to reopen the [Iraq-Turkey] pipeline, a deal facilitated by the United States that will bring tangible benefits for both Americans and Iraqis,”

Persistent U.S. diplomacy helped Erbil and Baghdad to resolve their standoff. Through commercial diplomacy, President Donald J. Trump’s administration pressed Kurdish and Iraqi leaders to accept a compromise deal that protected Erbil’s basic financial and energy rights while honoring Baghdad’s long-standing quest for sovereignty over oil sales (Saeed 2025).
It is significant to report that days before the Kurdish oil export resume, Reuters revealed that the United States intensified its efforts to push Iraq into resuming Kurdish oil exports, warning Baghdad that failure to do so could result in sanctions (Reuters 2025).

Conclusion

The events regarding Kurdish oil exports via the Iraq–Turkey pipeline highlight the strategic significance of the energy resources in the Kurdistan Region for regional stability and international energy markets. The halt of exports from March 2023 to September 2025, after the International Chamber of Commerce determined that Ankara violated the 1973 agreement, showed how political conflicts among Baghdad, Erbil, and global players can result in immediate economic impacts. The shutdown impacted worldwide markets by nearly 500,000 barrels of oil daily, this led to instability in the energy sector and caused an estimated revenue decline of more than $35 billion for Iraq, including the Kurdistan Region, as well as the international oil firms operating in Iraq.

Even though this output constitutes merely around 0.5% of the total daily global production, it still makes a significant impact, especially within the framework of the larger U.S. energy policy, which includes the “Maximum Pressure” initiative aimed at disrupting oil revenues from both Iran and Russia.

The participation of the U.S. was crucial for the eventual restart of exports. U.S. energy companies, such as HKN, HuntOil, and WesternZagros, have poured billions into the Kurdistan Region in the last twenty years, starting with oil and subsequently branching out into gas. These investments, backed diplomatically and financially by the U.S. government, showcase the connection between private-sector interests and foreign policy. Loans and commitments from entities such as the U.S. Development Finance Corporation have also advanced energy development that supported initiatives like HKN’s Miran gas field and WesternZagros’s Topkhana-Kurdamir block. These initiatives enhance the region’s energy framework while also fostering greater economic stability and energy autonomy for Iraq and the Kurdistan Region.

The energy policy of the Trump administration, which focused on maximizing oil availability in global markets and condemned production limits imposed by OPEC+, matched these commercial and strategic goals. U.S. diplomatic influence on Baghdad and support for American energy companies played an important role in restarting the pipeline that allowed almost half a million barrels of Kurdish oil to flow into the markets.

Finally, the restart of Kurdish oil exports signifies the alignment of geopolitical dynamics, economic motives, and energy strategies. It emphasizes the necessity of continued global collaboration and funding to secure dependable energy supplies, reduce market fluctuations, as well as foster long-term growth in the Kurdistan Region. The experience highlights how strategic involvement by global powers can assist in balancing regional conflicts while promoting both economic and political goals.

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Syrian Democratic Forces

By Ali Aziz:

The media widely regard the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as representing the Kurdish people in Syria. SDF demands national and cultural rights for Kurds and others, and the enshrinement of these rights in the Syrian constitution. On January 4, 2026, an SDF delegation, headed by Mazloum Abdi, was in Damascus negotiating with the Syrian government. However, the Syrian government delegation abruptly ended the talks without explanation. The SDF delegation returned to its areas, and the following day, a Syrian government delegation travelled to Paris for indirect negotiations with Israel, sponsored by Washington.

It appears that, during the Paris negotiations, the Syrian delegation received a green light from the US to launch military operations against SDF-held areas, starting with Aleppo. On January 5, Syrian government forces began advancing towards areas previously controlled by the SDF. After six days of fighting, the remaining SDF forces withdrew from the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh neighbourhoods, following an unequal battle with the Syrian Interim Government militias that had besieged the city. The two neighbourhoods were almost destroyed after being bombarded by government militias using drones, artillery, and tanks. This is exactly what happened to the city of Hama in 1982 at the hands of Syrian forces under the leadership of the late President Hafez al-Assad. The SDF forces in Aleppo consisted of a few hundred fighters with light weapons, while the government militias numbered more than 30,000 heavily armed fighters.

The Syrian government’s victory in Aleppo gave it the impetus and momentum to continue its military campaign towards the city of Hasakah and the areas controlled by the SDF, under what could be described as a green light from the US-led coalition. Contributing to the collapse of the SDF’s defences was the presence of large Arab tribal forces that refused to fight the government. These tribes quickly merged with the Syrian army within hours, and thus the SDF lost the Arab areas that had been under the control of these tribal forces for years. To understand what happened in Syria and the dramatic collapse of the SDF, we must note three dimensions of current politics: the international, the regional, and finally the internal on the Kurdish level, what is happening inside the Kurdish house in Rojava (meaning Western Kurdistan), and the turbulent Kurdish reality in the region in general.

On the international stage, US policy under Trump has undergone significant and sometimes surprising shifts, underscoring its unreliability in any region of the world when it comes to formulating policies and achieving objectives. America bombed Iran during the twelve-day war with Israel, destroying the Fordow facility. Yet, at least so far, it has not intervened to support the Iranian people who took to the streets in most Iranian cities. America, which abandoned the Ukrainian president while he was its guest in Washington, overthrew Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and declared its right to control that country’s oil. Meanwhile, there is a direct threat to annex Greenland and other territories, while the possibility of launching strikes against countries in South America, and perhaps Iran, if necessary, remains. This context explains why America is not a permanent ally to any entity in the world, except Israel, for specific and well-known reasons. Therefore, what primarily motivates America is business and self-interest, which fluctuate with changing circumstances and power dynamics. The European side, which has less influence in the Middle East, is also bound by these circumstances and equations, perhaps even more so than America, in accepting new realities, abandoning less significant allies, and entering into political deals even with entities described, or previously described, as terrorist or otherwise. Europe has a long history of such equations, particularly concerning the Kurds and the Turkish and Iranian regimes for decades. To illustrate this point, it’s worth recalling the concept of ‘Critical Dialogue’ launched by the European Union in the 1990s, which served as a pretext for restoring relations with the Iranian regime in 1997. This followed the European Court of Justice’s condemnation of the Iranian regime for the assassination of Kurdish leaders in Berlin in 1992, in the case known as the Mykonos Tribunal. The court’s rulings were disregarded, and European countries resumed relations with Iran under the umbrella of critical dialogue, driven by economic and trade interests. Therefore, the European-Kurdish relationship has remained captive to equations and fluctuations that often come at the expense of Kurdish aspirations. In reality, the Kurds have no better alternative than to continue their struggle with all their might. This has been precisely the Achilles’ heel for the Kurds in Syria, as it is for Kurds in general. This explains the weak European presence in the current events in Syria. The Western coalition’s stance culminated today when Tom Barrack declared, “The American alliance with the SDF against ISIS has ended.” However, Europe, through France and Britain, has reconsidered its position, as the SDF still controls Kurdish areas, and the momentum of the Syrian victory has significantly diminished following the rise in Kurdish enthusiasm across all parts of Kurdistan and the increased Kurdish fervour for resistance.

Regionally, Turkey remains the greatest obstacle to the Kurdish national liberation movement. For a century, the Turkish state has devoted all its resources to entrenching Ataturk’s ideology across all aspects of social and political life. This ideology is so alien and aberrant that it denies obvious realities, such as the existence of the Kurdish people, not only in Turkey but globally. Although some Turkish politicians, including Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, have attempted to eradicate this ideology, its deep-rootedness and entrenchment within Turkish society have prevented its complete elimination. Since 1991, Turkey has lived in great fear of Iraqi Kurdistan and a growing apprehension about the rise of armed nationalist struggle in Kurdish regions of Iraq, Iran, and, more recently, Syria since 2011, as well as within Turkey itself since 1984, when the conflict between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Turkey first erupted. The Kurdistan Region, established with Western support as a safe haven for Kurds after they suffered genocide with internationally prohibited weapons in Iraq, has evolved into a constitutional federal system within Iraq, a constant source of anxiety for Turkey. This reality has been met with persistent rejection from Turkey, and its suffering intensified after Kurdish forces, later known as the SDF, seized control of a large part of northern and eastern Syria, the region Kurds refer to as Western Kurdistan, along with areas outside Kurdistan, namely Arab regions bordering Kurdish areas. Because the SDF fought ISIS with such force that it garnered international admiration, and because the Western coalition, led by the United States, considered the SDF an ally and friend, this dealt a significant blow to Turkey, whose fears grew even more acute due to the direct impact of this situation on the Kurdish population within Turkey, which numbers around thirty million or more. Therefore, Turkey began strongly supporting ISIS, opening its borders to volunteers from around the world to enter Syria, supporting ISIS against the SDF, and supplying ISIS and other Islamist factions with weapons and money, though it continues to deny it. Today, Turkey plays a major role in Syria. Turkey and Qatar are the dominant powers in the interim government headed by al-Sharaa, and both consider Syria their strongest arm in the region. Therefore, Turkey and Qatar are keen to protect Syria from partition, viewing it as a bulwark against Israel and the possibility of Israel penetrating the region through the division of Syria, which would also affect Turkey itself. Adding to the complexity is Saudi support for Syria, given that the majority of Syrian forces are composed of Wahhabi jihadist Islamist groups. The new Syrian regime is dealing with these countries with remarkable pragmatism while achieving successive battlefield victories. This reality has burdened the SDF, which has lost much international support in a hostile regional environment, particularly from Turkey. Al Jazeera, which employs many Syrians, Islamists and supporters of jihadist organisations, played a prominent role in this campaign, perhaps more so than Syrian government-affiliated channels.

On the Kurdish domestic front, the SDF is considered a young and politically inexperienced institution, despite its battlefield strength and the experience it gained in the war against ISIS. To this day, the SDF remains captive to the ideology of Abdullah Öcalan, who has been imprisoned in Marmara Prison in Turkey since the last century. The problem is that Öcalan, now under the influence of Turkish intelligence, is isolated from the outside world and has become a tool in the hands of the Turkish government to neutralise the Kurdish national struggle and steer it towards paths that are safe for Turkey, thus avoiding its inevitable threat to Turkey. The PKK, which Öcalan founded, formed the SDF and selected its leadership. The PKK suffers from a dictatorship stemming from Marxist ideology, an exclusionary dictatorship that it practices in any area it controls. The SDF, however, draws its strength from the Kurdish nationalist movement and the perceived oppression of the Kurds as a people. The young Kurdish fighters, both boys and girls, are extremely enthusiastic, but their recruitment, driven by Kurdish nationalism, has been squandered on channels unrelated to Kurdish national aspirations. These channels are those promoted by the SDF, which espouses Öcalan’s Marxist-Leninist ideology. Consequently, the SDF has practised exclusion against other Kurdish parties and groups, preventing their presence in the Rojava region since 2011, despite attempts by Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani to form a unified front of Kurdish parties in Syria. This reality has prevented the SDF from becoming a comprehensive and inclusive popular force for the Kurds in Syria. Therefore, the decline of the SDF is the decline of a rigid Marxist organisation that was poised to dominate the global stage for years. When the conditions that enabled its rise disappeared, its demise became contingent on its continued political, educational, and social deficiencies. However, the Kurdish question in Syria has entered a new phase. The Kurdistan Region’s influence in Rojava is growing, and the Kurdish reality will witness major developments from now on. I am optimistic about that.

This article was written on January 23, 2026. Since then, several events have taken place, which I will discuss in another article to keep this one concise.

By Arian Mufid:

When civil war broke out in Syria in 2011, the Assad Regime lost control over Syrians. The Kurdish area became an autonomous area of its own called Rojava which was founded in July 2012. The remainder of rebel-held areas were under the control of ISIS and similar organisations such as HST,  Nusra and other Al-Qaeda adjacent groups. Rojava, meaning West  in Kurdish, refers to the Kurdish-majority areas of northern and northeastern Syria. Its goals reflect liberation, socialism, direct democracy, gender equality, eco-socialism and federalization of Syria. Rojava has survived since 2012 with the help, from late 2014, of air cover from allied forces. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) were set up and supported by the US. The main ambition of ISIS in Syria was to dismantle SDF and build a Caliphate state. Their leader Al Baghdadi was killed by US forces but they struggled to eliminate ISIS without the help of the SDF. SDF forces comprised of Kurds and Arabs.

Rojava’s main enemy is Turkey because Turkey sees such a successful model of autonomy for Kurdish people in the western part of Kurdistan as a threat. Turkey has made several attempts to destroy Rojava since 2013. All these attempts have been documented by the Peoples Tribunal in Belgium in March 2025. Turkey has used several plans to bring down the hope and aspirations of Kurds for their independent state and self rule. Turkey held secret negotiations between Hakan Fidan, Head of MIT the Turkish intelligent services, President  Erdogan and  Al Qaeda forces of  Ahmed Shibani and Ahmed Shariq in Idlib Syria. They decided to send $18 billion support for Syrian affiliated Al-Qaida forces to overthrow the Bashar Al Assad regime, on this one condition: that Turkey would be in full control of the new government, allowing Turkey to smash Rojava self rule. On December 8 ,2024 the Syrian Regime toppled by forces of Sharrah belonging to HTS. On 4th Jan 2026, the Syrian provisional government, with the help of the Turkish secret agency MIT, has launched ethnic cleansing style attacks similar to what happened in the former Yugoslavia, starting from Aleppo, in order to target the Kurds over the last several days. Although a ceasefire was declared on Tuesday, foreign observers’ predictions are not optimistic.

The betrayal of the Kurds goes back even further, to the Sykes-Picot agreement of May 1916, in which Britain and France redrew the map of the Middle East. As part of this imperialist scheme to divide the Ottoman Empire, the Kurdish homeland was carved into parts of what would become Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. The Kurds were left stateless, divided among British, French, and Russian spheres of influence. The agreement ignored Kurdish national aspirations entirely. Fearing Allied retribution for their perceived role in the Armenian genocide, and with no political allies, the Kurds found themselves isolated and vulnerable. For Britain, the Kurdish cause was not a priority especially in the face of appeasing central governments like those of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey.

Despite this, the Kurdish struggle for self-determination continued. On August 10, 1920, the Treaty of Sèvres acknowledged the desirability of a Kurdish homeland. Britain and France promised the full and final liberation of peoples oppressed by the Ottoman Empire, including the Kurds. Article 62 of Section III on Kurdistan empowered a commission composed of British, French, Italian, Persian, and Kurdish representatives to determine changes to Ottoman boundaries. However, this promise was never fulfilled. The Allied powers, especially Britain, abandoned Kurdish self-determination after World War I, prioritizing their colonial interests and the strategic value of the region.

When Iraq became an official state in 1932 under British mandate, the Kurds were again used as pawns in regional politics. The British deliberately maintained a complex stance: on one hand, acknowledging Kurdish concerns, but on the other, consistently favoring Iraq’s territorial integrity under British influence. This position continues on. In the 2017 Kurdish independence referendum, Britain refused to support full Kurdish independence, reaffirming its commitment to a federal Iraq.

The Kurdish movement continues as aspirations for Kurdish self rule are crushed by Ex Al Qaeda affiliated groups of the new Syrian state and their leader. Kurds in Rojava have been stung following abandonment by the US administration, who have supported Rojava for the last eleven years and now they’ve been left at the mercy of the Syrian state which is backed by Turkey. Rojava has protected the Western world from the criminal thugs of ISIS. It is the moral obligation of the Western world to protect Rojava from the attacks by Syrian Army forces affiliated with HTS and Al Qaeda.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

By Arian Mufid:

Internal conflict within any family, party, or government inevitably leads to destruction and cripples the organisation. After the expulsions of Ahmet Davutoğlu, Abdullah Gül, and hundreds of others, the party is now facing more internal conflict than ever before. Today, Selçuk Bayraktar—the chairman of Baykar, Turkey’s leading defence contractor—has his eyes on power after President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Bayraktar, now a billionaire, is reportedly backed by Erdoğan’s two other sons-in-law as a potential successor. Erdoğan has little confidence in his own son, Necmettin Bilal Erdoğan, who is 46 years old.

However, Hakan Fidan current foreign minister , considers himself the main contender, having served as Erdoğan’s “black box” for almost twenty years and possessing full knowledge of the party’s internal secrets and scandals. Fidan has positioned himself on the main path to the presidency, leveraging his deep understanding of Turkey’s diplomatic relations across the world. Having transformed the National Intelligence Organisation (MIT) during his 13-year tenure as its head, he turned it into a powerful tool in the hands of the Turkish state.

Erdoğan’s latest visit to the White House has added further strain to his presidency. The trip, widely discussed in Turkish media, was reportedly arranged by Donald Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, due to Kushner’s indirect business interests in Turkey through Erdoğan’s inner circle. During the September 2025 meeting, Trump joked that President Erdoğan “knows about rigged elections better than anybody,” potentially humiliating him. Trump attempted to reference his own narrative of being unfairly exiled. To add to the embarrassment, Trump refused to lift military sanctions on Turkey, instead setting conditions related to Turkey ending oil trade with Russia and resolving issues surrounding its Russian-made S-400 missile system. As usual, Erdoğan claimed the visit was a success, but Hakan Fidan publicly contradicted him, calling it a failure. The visit produced no strategic realignment with the United States.

Inside the AKP, Hakan Fidan is one of the key figures opposing any peace process with the PKK. He continues to pressure Ahmed al-Shara’a, a prominent former jihadist leader and ex-al-Qaeda  figure in Syria, not to reach any agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) unless they lay down their arms and join the Syrian militia forces. Fidan claims to be focused on dismantling the PKK’s broader organisational and intelligence structures. However, İbrahim Kalın, the current head of MIT, and Erdoğan himself hold different views on the matter, and oppose Fidan’s radical approach to resolving the Kurdish issue in Turkey.

Turkey is heading toward serious instability: escalating tensions in Cyprus with Greece, economic calamity, rampant inflation, deteriorating infrastructure, and intensifying internal conflict within the AKP and its fractured positions on the Kurdish question. Erdoğan is highly unlikely to secure another presidential victory as internal conflict continues to weaken the party day by day. Turkish companies with strong ties to the AKP are entering liquidation, as high financing costs are strangling major firms. The country is facing severe economic difficulties, resulting in a wave of corporate bankruptcies—especially among politically connected businesses now under immense financial pressure.

In the Israel-Palestine conflict, Turkey has played a consistently ambiguous role, leading to its exclusion from any peacekeeping force in Gaza. Erdoğan’s nearly 26-year rule marks one of the longest and most autocratic periods in modern Turkish history, with a level of centralised power never witnessed in the republic.

PKK commanders and fighters at a symbolic disarmament ceremony, Sulaymaniyah, July 2025

By Arian Mufid:

For four decades, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has waged an armed struggle against the Turkish state. However, the PKK has not achieved the independent Kurdish state it originally set out to fight for when the group was founded in 1978. Despite this, its long-running insurgency eventually led the Turkish government to engage in negotiations initiated under the leadership of right-wing nationalist politician Devlet Bahçeli in October 2024.

Abdullah Öcalan’s leadership and ideology have had a significant and lasting impact on the Kurdish movement. The conflict has claimed over 40,000 lives and cost Turkey nearly 3 trillion Turkish lira. Öcalan, along with senior PKK commanders Murat Karayılan, Cemil Bayık, and Duran Kalkan, are widely recognized as the organization’s most influential leaders. Although Öcalan was captured in 1999, the armed struggle continued under his ideological influence, gradually transforming into a movement advocating democratic confederalism (a revolutionary ideology more compatible with the diversity of the Middle East) rather than outright independence.

However, a clear and unified long-term vision has often been lacking among the PKK leadership. The Kurdish population in northern Kurdistan is urged to understand the strategy and objectives of the imprisoned leadership, especially since negotiations with the Turkish state began. A clear and realistic vision should be embraced by the Kurdish people as part of this evolving process.

The transition is being guided by Abdullah Öcalan from prison. In 2025, the PKK announced its disbandment and the cessation of its armed campaign following Öcalan’s February 2025 declaration, the “Call for Peace and Democratic Society.” A symbolic disarmament ceremony took place in Sulaymaniyah, South Kurdistan, where PKK fighters destroyed their weapons rather than surrendering them to any government.

The PKK’s latest statements and programs indicate that Öcalan continues to face significant challenges in steering the movement through this new phase of negotiation and transformation. While the details of the PKK’s decisions and future plans remain unclear, with full outcomes yet to be made public, the path forward demands careful consideration.

The PKK’s vision has evolved over time, shifting its focus from independence to achieving Kurdish rights within Turkey through the framework of democratic confederalism, which remains at the heart of its political and social philosophy.

A statement by Emergency Committee for Rojava:

The attack this week on Aleppo’s Kurdish-majority neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh by Damascus-backed forces represents an act of aggression, and a dangerous escalation which threatens to jeopardize prospects for lasting peace and democracy in Syria.

On October 6th, following growing protests by local residents against the Syrian government’s escalating road closures, blockades, and militarization, state-backed forces attacked the two residential neighborhoods. The resulting clashes with the community’s internal security forces (“Asayish”) resulted in deaths and injuries on both sides, as well as damage to local property and infrastructure.

These incursions were a clear violation of the April 1st agreement between the Syrian Caretaker Government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, which was a critical step towards reunifying the country while respecting the self-determination of local communities. This agreement permitted the free movement of local residents, the retention of their own internal security force (Asayish), and the demilitarization of the neighborhoods’ surrounding area, in exchange for the withdrawal of SDF forces.

As news spread of the clashes, crowds filled the streets in cities across North and East Syria, gathering to show their solidarity with the people of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh. For so many of the region’s diverse communities, the fate of Kurds in Aleppo is seen as a harbinger of the country’s future. After state-backed massacres of Alawites on the Syrian coast, and of Druze in Suwayda, Syrian Kurds’ mistrust towards the new regime in Damascus has only deepened.

The ceasefire negotiated between the SDF and Damascus in the aftermath of this week’s violence is a welcome sign, but while relative calm has returned to Aleppo, serious questions remain about the future of the country. Following the March 10th agreement outlining the SDF’s formal commitment to integrate into a unified Syrian state, the new government of HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa has consistently failed to demonstrate a good faith willingness to respect the security and self-determination of North-East Syria’s diverse communities. Even the basic right of women to participate in political and military institutions has been a sticking point for Damascus, bringing negotiations to a stand-still.

Ultimately, Damascus and Rojava represent fundamentally different and competing visions for the future of Syria: one, a theocratic ethno-state where absolute power is centralized in the hands of al-Sharaa, and another, a pluralistic grassroots democracy, where all Syrians enjoy equal rights and local communities are empowered to self-govern.

The Kurdish freedom movement’s paradigm of “democratic confederalism” represents a viable path beyond the bloody legacy of centralized state power and oppression; a proven model for governing society through radical inclusivity and grassroots empowerment.

We call on governments and civil society alike to support the people of Rojava in their call for a pluralistic and democratic Syrian constitution that respects the rights of all Syrians to peace, security, and self-determination.

In the words of the Zenobia Women’s Assembly: “Building a democratic and inclusive Syria starts with decentralization.”

Emergency Committee for Rojava

Source – Wikipedia

By Arian Mufid:

When Allied forces expelled Iraq from Kuwait in January 1991, President George H. W. Bush called for regime change and encouraged the Iraqi people from the North and South of the country to rise up against Saddam Hussein. In response, uprisings erupted in the south and north of Iraq. However, these uprisings were brutally suppressed by Saddam’s regime. The United States abandoned the Iraqi people in their moment of need, leaving them at the mercy of dictator Saddam Hussein. This betrayal resulted in a mass exodus from Iraqi Kurdistan to the mountains. Over a million Kurdish people fled to the mountains in the cold spring to flee the violence.

In response, the U.S. administration sent Secretary of State James Baker to assess the situation. Observing the suffering from a helicopter, Baker concluded that the United States had a moral obligation to assist. Eventually, the U.S. provided humanitarian aid by airlifting food and blankets through Turkey, dropping large supply boxes from military aircraft. This wasn’t the first time the United States had betrayed the Kurds. In 1974 a similar betrayal took place when Secretary of State Henry Kissinger withdrew support for the Kurdish rebellion led by Barzani against Saddam. This took place after Iran and Iraq reached an agreement whereby Iran agreed to stop arming the Kurdish resistance in 1975.

The betrayal of the Kurds goes back even further, the Sykes-Picot agreement of May 1916, in which Britain and France redrew the map of the Middle East. As part of this imperialist scheme to divide the Ottoman Empire, the Kurdish homeland was carved into parts of what would become Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. The Kurds were left stateless divided among British, French, and Russian spheres of influence. The agreement ignored Kurdish national aspirations entirely. Fearing Allied retribution for their perceived role in the Armenian genocide, and with no political allies, the Kurds found themselves isolated and vulnerable. For Britain, the Kurdish cause was not a priority especially in the face of appeasing central governments like those of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey.

Despite this, the Kurdish struggle for self-determination continued. On August 10, 1920, the Treaty of Sèvres acknowledged the desirability of a Kurdish homeland. Britain and France promised the full and final liberation of peoples oppressed by the Ottoman Empire, including the Kurds. Article 62 of Section III on Kurdistan empowered a commission composed of British, French, Italian, Persian, and Kurdish representatives to determine changes to Ottoman boundaries. However, this promise was never fulfilled. The Allied powers, especially Britain, abandoned Kurdish self-determination after World War I, prioritizing their colonial interests and the strategic value of the region.

When Iraq became an official state in 1932 under British mandate, the Kurds were again used as pawns in regional politics. The British deliberately maintained a complex stance: on one hand, acknowledging Kurdish concerns, but on the other, consistently favoring Iraq’s territorial integrity under British influence. This position continues on. In the 2017 Kurdish independence referendum, Britain refused to support full Kurdish independence, reaffirming its commitment to a federal Iraq.

Historically, the British Royal Air Force (RAF) even bombed Kurdish regions to suppress uprisings on Christmas Day  December 25, 1920, when the Kurds were being led by Sheikh Mahmoud who opposed British colonial rule in Kurdistan. The British who divided Kurdistan have a moral obligation to ensure the protection and survival of the Kurdish people whose struggle against oppression and state violence continues at the hands of the states the British annexed their homeland into. 

Citations: 

• Randal, Jonathan. After Such Knowledge, What Forgiveness? My Encounters with Kurdistan. New York.1989

• Kissinger, Henry. World Order. (“Extraordinary, truly staggering…an unambiguous masterpiece.” — Tom Rogan, Washington Post, p. 326)

• Luqman Radpey. The Sèvres Centennial: Self-Determination and the Kurds, Volume 24, Issue 20, August 10, 2020.

Erdogan, Trump, Bin Salman, Al Sharaa

By Dr. Muhamad Sabir Kareem:

Amid Trump’s trip to the Arab Co-operation Council (ACC) which includes Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE – on May 13th, the groundwork was prepared for Trump’s Al-Sharaa meeting in Riyadh. A meeting which came under the impact of an offering by Prince Mohammed bin Salman through the signing of various financial and arms agreements estimated at $1 trillion. In other words, what Mr. Trump aimed to achieve major gains from the Saudi Leadership.

On the other side there is a political goal which includes that meeting with Syria’s interim administration, in order to erase any risk and break for Hayat Tahrir al-Sham administration in Damascus from western states, particularly the USA. This served the interests of Prince Salman as well.

This goal was pursued further in the region by Trump’s Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, who, in a press conference, stated that al-Sharaa was ready to make peace with Israel. Rubio described al-Sharaa as a sincere figure for the Syrian people who is trying to advance his country through peace and stability. This statement was made following a meeting in Istanbul on May 16 with both Turkish and Syrian foreign ministers.

This important change in the relation between the Syria’s interim administration and the U.S. foreign policy establishment. It opened the door to substantial progress for the new leadership in Damascus. This was evidenced by Ahmed al-Sharaa’s trip to Istanbul on May 24, where he met with President Erdogan. That meeting laid the foundation for greater cooperation between the U.S., EU, and the emerging Syrian government and the decision to lift sanctions on Syria.

Support for Syria’s interim administration by the U.S., EU, and Middle Eastern countries like Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia has continued. For example, on May 29, a memorandum of understanding was signed between Syria’s Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources and an international consortium of leading energy companies—including American, Qatari, and Turkish institutions. These agreements aim to attract investment in the energy sector and rebuild Syria’s electrical infrastructure.

In lieu of recent shifts, we should ask some important and pressing questions; Firstly, where is the concern of USA and EU leaders about the the terrorist roots of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which is still recognized as a terrorist organization? This includes Ahmed al-Sharaa’s alleged connections and past involvement with al-Qaeda, as well as accusations of crimes against U.S. and Iraqi soldiers—leading Washington to place a $10 million bounty on al-Sharaa’s head. Secondly, what happened to the investigations into incidents like the killing of over one hundred Alawite civilians in March, or the crimes committed against the Druze minority in April?

Why have liberal democratic leaders remained silent about the continued use of sectarian violence against Christian communities in Syria?

Dealing with this events; We must also remember the recent development on May 23, when the so-called “French-Alawite Alliance”—including representatives from various Syrian sects—filed a complaint with the International Criminal Court against Syria’s interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa, accusing him of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Ultimately, this situation highlights that we still live in a world where political morality and ethical conduct seem to hold no real value. The international system continues to operate on classical rules and criteria that often replace moral values with financial interests and material gain. This leads us to ask: have the principles of human rights, freedom, liberty, and social justice been replaced by the oil money of the Arab Cooperation Council?