Workers

R.A. 10154 - Early Release of Retirement Pay, Pensions, Gratuities and Benefits

noreply@blogger.com (Jess V. Quijano) — Mon, 13 Feb 2012 11:24:00 +0000

Republic of the Philippines

CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES

Metro Manila

Fifteenth Congress

First Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-sixth day of July, two thousand then.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 10154

AN ACT REQUIRING ALL CONCERNED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO ENSURE THE EARLY RELEASE OF THE RETIREMENT PAY, PENSIONS, GRATUITIES AND OTHER BENEFITS OF RETIRING GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Declaration of State Policy. -- It is hereby declared that it is the policy of the State to ensure the timely and expeditious release of the retirement pay, pensions, gratuities and other benefits of all retiring employees of the government. Public officers and employees who have spent the best years of their lives serving the government and the public should not be made to wait to receive benefits which are due to them under the law. Accordingly, it is hereby mandated that highest priority shall be given to the payment and/or settlement of the pensions, gratuities and/or other retirement benefits of retiring government employees.

Section 2. Period for Release of Retirement Benefits. -- The head of the government agency concerned, the President and other responsible officers of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), the President and other responsible officers other Home Development Mutual Fund (Pag-IBIG Fund) and/or the Secretary and other responsible officers of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) shall ensure the release of the retirement pay, pensions, gratuities, and other benefits of a retiring government employee within a period of thirty (30) days from the date of the actual retirement of said employee: Provided, That all requirements are submitted to the concerned government agency at least ninety (90) days prior to the effective date of retirement: Provided, further, That in the case of the GSIS, it shall pay the retirement benefits of the retiring employee on his/her last day of his/her service to the government, pursuant to the GSIS Charter.

Section 3. Retiring Employees With Pending Cases. -- In the case of retiring government employees with pending cases and whose retirment benefits are being lawfully withheld due to possible pecuniary liability, the head of the agency where such case is pending shall ensure that the said case shall be terminated and/or resolved within a period of three (3) months from the date of the retirement of the concerned employee: Provided, That in case the concerned agency fails to terminate and/or resolve the case within the said period without any justifiable reason(s), the retirement benefits due to the employee shall be immediately released to him/her without prejudice to the ultimate resolution of the case, except, when the delay is deliberately caused by the retiring employee.

Section 4. Coverage. -- This Act shall cover all branches, agencies and/or instrumentalities of the government, including government-owned and/or controlled corporations (GOCCs), excluding personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and shall be applicable both to applications for compulsory retirement and optional or early retirement as authorized by law.

Section 5. Penal Provisions. -- The unjustified failure and/or refusal to release the pension, gratuities and other retirement benefits due to a retiring government employee within the periods prescribed above or to comply with any provision of this Act shall be a ground for the filing of administrative disciplinary action against the erring officer(s) and/or employee(s). Such erring officer(s) and/or employee(s) shall, after hearing and due proceedings, be penalized with suspension from the service without pay from six (6) months to one (1) year, at the discretion of the disciplining authority.

This penalty shall not apply if the release of the retirement benefits could not be accomplished due to force majeure and other insuperable causes. In such cases, the thirty (30)-day period shall be counted from the time such cause(s) cease(s) to exist.

Section 6. Implementing Rules and Regulations. -- The Civil Service Commission (CSC), after consultation and coordination with the government agencies and/or instrumentalities affected by this Act, including, but not limited to, the GSIS, the Pag-IBIG Fund, the Constitutional Commissions, the Legislature and the Judiciary, as well as the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), shall promulgate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations for the proper implementation of this Act.

Such rules and regulations shall include provisions prescribing uniform periods for the advance filing of retirement applications in the different agencies concerned, as well as standard period for the processing and release of claims for retirement benefits, gratuities and allowances which will pinpoint responsibility in case of delay in release thereof.

Section 7. Separability Clause. -- If any provision, part or portion of this Act shall be held as invalid, the provisions, parts or portions of this Act not otherwise affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.

Section 8. Repealing Clause. -- All laws, executive issuances, orders and rules and regulations contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act or any part thereof are hereby repealed, amended and/or modified accordingly.

Section 9. Effectivity. -- This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the country.

Approved.

(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR. (Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE
Speaker of the House of Representatives President of the Senate

This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2748 and House Bill No. 3862 was finally passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives on May 30, 2011 and June 1, 2011, respectively.

(Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO REYES (Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP
Secretary of Senate Secretary General
House of Representatives

APPROVED: (July 14, 2011)

(Sgd.) BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III

President of the Philippines

Rights of Union Members

noreply@blogger.com (Jess V. Quijano) — Sat, 11 Feb 2012 06:57:00 +0000

The rights and conditions of membership laid down in Art. 241 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, may be summarized as follows:

(1) Political right -- the member's right to vote and be voted for, subject to lawful provisions on qualifications and disqualifications.

(2) Deliberative and decision-making right -- the member's right to participate in deliberations on major policy questions and decide them by secret ballot.

(3) Rights over money matters -- the member's right against excessive fees; the right against unauthorized collection of contributions or unauthorized disbursement; the right to require adequate records of income and expenses and the right of access to financial records; the right to vote on officers' compensation; the right to vote on proposed special assessments and be deducted a special assessment only with the member's written authorization.

(4) Right to information -- the member's right to be informed about the organization's constitution and by-laws and the collective bargaining agreement and about labor laws.

These are rights as union members. As employees, the union members retain the right to directly present grievances to the employer at any time. This right is protected in Article 255, last sentence.

Laws Protecting Women Workers

noreply@blogger.com (Jess V. Quijano) — Thu, 24 Nov 2011 12:20:00 +0000

Justice Regalado, in the case of Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Co. vs. NLRC, et al., (G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997) paints a canvas of Philippine laws extending protection to women workers.

"The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all phases of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions. To cite a few of the primordial ones, Section 14, Article II on the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, expressly recognizes the role of women in nation-building and commands the State to ensure, at all times, the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.

"Corollary thereto, Section 3 of Article XIII (the progenitor whereof dates back to both the 1935 and 1973 Constitution) pointedly requires the State to afford full protection to labor and to promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all, including an assurance of entitlement to tenurial security of all workers.

"Similarly, Section 14 of Article XIII mandates that the State shall protect working women through provisions for opportunities that would enable them to reach their full potential.

"Corrective labor and social laws on gender inequality have emerged with more frequency in the years since the Labor Code was enacted on May 1, 1974 as Presidential Decree No. 442, largely due to our country's commitment as a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

"Principal among these laws are Republic Act No. 6727 which explicitly prohibits discrimination against women with respect to terms and conditions of employment, promotion, and training opportunities. Republic Act No. 6955 which bans the "mail-order-bride" practice for a fee and the export of female labor to countries that cannot guarantee protection to the rights of women workers.

"Republic Act No. 7192, also known as the 'Women in Development and Nation Building Act,' which affords women equal opportunities with men to act and to enter into contracts, and for appointment, admission, training, graduation, and commissioning in all military or similar schools of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police.

"Republic Act No. 7322 increasing the maternity benefits granted to women in the private sector. Republic Act No. 7877 which outlaws and punishes sexual harassment in the workplace and in the education and training environment; and Republic Act No. 8042, or the 'Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,' which prescribes as a matter of policy, inter alia, the deployment of migrant workers, with emphasis on women, only in countries where their rights are secure.

"Likewise, it would not be amiss to point out that in the Family Code, women's rights in the field of evil law have been greatly enhanced and expanded.

"In the Labor Code, provisions governing the rights of women workers are found in the Articles 130 to 138 thereof."

ART. 130. Nightwork Prohibition. -- No woman, regardless of age, shall be employed or permitted or suffered to work, with or without compensation:

(a) In any industrial undertaking or branch thereof between ten o'clock at night and six o'clock in the morning of the following day; or

(b) In any commercial or non-industrial undertaking or branch thereof, other than agricultural, between midnight and six o'clock in the morning of the following day; or

(c) In any agricultural undertaking at nighttime unless she is given a period of rest of not less than nine (9) consecutive hours.

ART. 131. Exceptions. -- The prohibitions prescribed by the preceding Article shall not apply to any of the following cases:

(a) In cases of actual or impending emergencies caused by serious accident, fire, flood, typhoon, earthquake, epidemic or other disasters or calamity, to prevent loss of life or property, or in cases of force majeure or imminent danger to public safety;

(b) In case of urgent work to be performed on machineries, equipment or installation, to avoid serious loss which the employer would otherwise suffer;

(c) Where the work is necessary to prevent serious loss of perishable goods;

(d) Where the woman employee holds a responsible position of managerial or technical nature, or where the woman employee has been engaged to provide health and welfare service;

(e) Where the nature of the work requires the manual skill and dexterity of women workers and the same cannot be performed with equal efficiency by male workers;

(f) Where the women employees are immediate members of the family operating the establishment or undertaking; and

(g) Under other analogous cases exempted by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate regulations.

ART. 132. Facilities for Women. -- The Secretary of Labor shall establish standards that will insure the safety and health of women employees. In appropriate cases, he shall by regulations, require employers to:

(a) Provide seats proper for women and permit them to use such seats when they are free from work and during working hours, provided they can perform their duties in this position without detriment to efficiency;

(b) To establish separate toilet rooms and lavatories for men and women and provide at least a dressing room for women;

(c) To establish a nursery in a workplace for the benefit of the woman employees therein; and

(d) To determine appropriate minimum age and other standards for retirement or termination in special occupations such as those of flight attendants and the like.

R.A. No. 10023 - An Act Authorizing the Issuance of Free Patents to Residential Lands

noreply@blogger.com (Jess V. Quijano) — Wed, 14 Sep 2011 02:38:00 +0000

Republic of the Philippines

CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES

Metro Manila

Fourteenth Congress

Third Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-seventh day of July, two thousand nine.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 10023

AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE ISSUANCE OF FREE PATENTS TO RESIDENTIAL LANDS

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Qualifications.- Any Filipino citizen who is an actual occupant of a residential land may apply for a Free Patent Title under this Act: Provided; That in highly urbanized cities, the land should not exceed two hundred (200) square meters; in other cities, it should not exceed five hundred (500) square meters; in first class and second class municipalities, it should not exceed seven hundred fifty (750) square meters; and in all other municipalities, it should not exceed one thousand (1,000) square meters; Provided, further, That the land applied for is not needed for public service and/or public use.

Section 2. Coverage.- This Act shall cover all lands that are zoned as residential areas, including townsites as defined under the Public Land Act; Provided, That none of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 705 shall be violated.

Zoned residential areas located inside a delisted military reservation or abandoned military camp, and those of local government units (LGUs) or townsites which preceded Republic Act No. 7586 or the National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) law, shall also be covered by this Act.

Section 3. Application.- The application on the land applied for shall be supported by a map based on an actual survey conducted by a licensed geodetic engineer and approved by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and a technical description of the land applied for together with supporting affidavit of two (2) disinterested persons who are residing in the barangay of the city or municipality where the land is located, attesting to the truth of the facts contained in the application to the effect that the applicant thereof has, either by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, actually resided on and continuously possessed and occupied, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, the land applied for at least ten (10) years and has complied with the requirements prescribed in Section 1 hereof.

Section 4. Special Patents. - Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary and subject to private rights, if any, public land actually occupied and used for public schools, municipal halls, public plazas or parks and other government institutions for public use or purpose may be issued special patents under the name of the national agency or LGU concerned: Provided, That all lands titled under this section shall not be disposed of unless sanctioned by Congress if owned by the national agency or sanctioned by the sanggunian concerned through an approved ordinance if owned by the LGU.

Section 5. Removal of Restrictions. - The restrictions regarding encumbrances, conveyances, transfers or dispositions imposed in Sections 118, 119,121, 122 and 123 of Chapter XII, Title VI of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended, shall not apply to patents issued under this Act.

Section 6. Period for Application. - All applications shall be filed immediately after the effectivity of this Act before the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR. The CENRO is mandated to process the application within one hundred and twenty (120) days to include compliance with the required notices and other legal requirements, and forward this recommendation to the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO), who shall have five (5) days to approve or disapprove the patent. In case of approval, patent shall be issued; in case of conflicting claims among different claimants, the parties may seek the proper judicial remedies.

Section 7. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The Director of the Land Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) shall promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this Act, and shall see to it that such are gender responsive.

Section 8. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executive order, executive issuance's or letters of instruction, rules and regulations or any part thereof inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of this Act are hereby deemed repealed, amended or modified accordingly.

Section 9. Separability Clause. - If, for any reason or reasons, any part or parts of this Act shall be declared unconstitutional or invalid by any competent court, other parts of this Act shall be thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.

Section 10. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen days (15) after its publication in two (2) national newspapers of general education.

Approved

(Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE

President of the Senate

(Sgd.) PROSPERO C. NOGRALES

Speaker of the House of Representatives

This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 5618 and Senate Bill No. 3429 was finally passed by the House of Representatives and Senate on December 18, 2009.

(Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES

Secretary of Senate

(Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP

Secretary General

House of Representatives

Approved: March 9, 2010

(Sgd.) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines

ATTY. GODOFREDO "Boy" SEÑIRES, JR JOINS HIS MAKER

noreply@blogger.com (Jess V. Quijano) — Sun, 24 Apr 2011 13:07:00 +0000

GODOFREDO "Boy" SEÑIRES, JR.

GODOFREDO "Boy" V. Senires, Jr. joined our Creator last 23 April 2011 at 1235am while confined at the V. Luna General Hospital in Quezon City.

His medical certificate reported: "ARF Type I secondary obstructive pneumonia non-small cell lung adeno, CA stage IV bone metastasize CVD Infarct, Parietal lobe left S/P chemotheraphy C2; Gastro-duodenal ulcer."

He now lies peacefully at HABAKKUK ROOM, St. Peter Chapel, Quezon Ave., QC.

His last mass and final sacraments will be given to him on the 30th of April, 2011 at 9:00am. Afterwhich, we will comply with one of his last wishes to be cremated immediately after.

He will be joining the final resting place of my grandfather: GODOFREDO "Godong" B. Senires, Sr., at the Manila Memorial Park, Sucat, Pque.

We, therefore ask all relatives and those that have been part of his life to pray for the repose of his soul.

He was the pillar of our family from whom we find strength.

Pahinga ka na, Dy. We love you very, very much! We will surely miss you.

- Janeth D. Lim-Señires

Who are covered the employees’ right to self-organization?

noreply@blogger.com (Jess V. Quijano) — Sat, 19 Dec 2009 15:30:00 +0000

The Labor Code of the Philippines, Article 243, provides thus:

ART. 243. Coverage and Employees’ Right to Self-Organization. – All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable, medical or educational institutions whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection.

Consistent with the Constitutional mandate, Article 243 of the Code allows “all persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises” to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining.

The right is extended even to those employed in traditionally non-profit organizations like religious, charitable, medical or educational institutions. This extension of the right departs from the policy under the old Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No. 875) which withheld the right to organize from employees of non-profit firms.

But the seemingly all-inclusive coverage of “all persons” in Article 243 actually admits of exceptions.

Under Art. 244, for instance, all employees in the civil service, that is, those not employed in government corporations established under the Corporation Code, may only form associations but may not collectively bargain on employment terms and conditions fixed by law.

Similarly, under Art. 245, managerial employees, regardless of the kind of organization where they are employed, may not join, assist or form any labor organization.

Accordingly, managerial employees cannot, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, be allowed to share in the concessions obtained by the labor union through collective negotiation. Otherwise, they would be exposed to the temptation of colluding with the union during the negotiations to the detriment of the employer. (Martinez vs. NLRC, GMCR Inc. and M.A. Javier, G.R. No. 118743, October 12, 1998)

However, there is nothing to prevent the employer from granting benefits to managerial employees equal to or higher than those afforded to union members.

Supervisors are allowed to organize, but they cannot form, join or assist a rank-and-file union.

More exceptions to the right to organize can be found in court decisions, however.

"Wage" and "Salary" Defined

noreply@blogger.com (Jess V. Quijano) — Thu, 12 Nov 2009 12:06:00 +0000

The term "wages," as distinguished from "salary," applies to the compensation for manual labor, skilled or unskilled, paid at stated times, and measured by the day, week, month, or season, while "salary" denotes a higher degree of employment, or a superior grade of services, and implies a position or office; by contrast, the term "wages" indicates inconsiderable pay for a lower and less responsible character of employment, while "salary" is suggestive of a larger and more permanent or fixed compensation for more important service.

By some of the authorities, it has been noted that the word "wages" in its ordinary acceptance, has a less extensive meaning than the word "salary," "wages" being ordinarily restricted to sums paid as hire or reward to domestic or menial servants and to sums paid to artisans, mechanics, laborers, and other employees of like class, as distinguished from the compensation of clerks, officers of public corporations, and public offices.

In many situations, however, the words "wages" and "salary" are synonymous. (35 Am. Jur., Sec. 63, pp. 496-497)

Our Supreme Court reached the same conclusion, i.e., the words "wages" and "salary" are in essence synonymous.

Wage Includes Sales Commissions

noreply@blogger.com (Jess V. Quijano) — Wed, 11 Nov 2009 10:21:00 +0000

"Salary," the etymology of which is the Latin word "salarium," is often used interchangeably with "wage," the etymology of which is the Middle English word "wagen."

Both words generally refer to one and the same meaning, that is, a reward or recompense for services performed. Likewise, "pay" is the synonym of "wages" and "salary."

Inasmuch as the words "wage," "pay" and "salary" have the same meaning, and commission is included in the definition of "wage," the logical conclusion is, in the computation of the separation pay, the salary base should include also the earned sales commissions. (Songco, et al. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 50999-51000, March 23, 1990)

In another case, certain workers received compensation on a percentage commission based on the gross sale of the fish-catch, i.e., 13% of the proceeds of the sale if the total proceeds exceed the cost of the crude oil consumed during the fishing trip, otherwise, only 10% of the proceeds of the sale. Such compensation falls within the scope and meaning of the term "wage" as defined under Article 97(f) of the Labor Code. (Ruga, et al. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 72654-61, Jan. 22, 1990)

Can Bonus Be Withdrawn by the Employer?

noreply@blogger.com (Jess V. Quijano) — Mon, 09 Nov 2009 05:06:00 +0000

Even if a bonus is not demandable for not forming part of the wage, salary or compensation of the employee, the same may nevertheless be granted on equitable consideration.

In Philippine Education Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al. (92 SCRA 381), the Court ruled:

Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case -- that bonuses had been given to the employees at least in three previous years; that the amount of P90,706.36 has been set aside for payment as bonus to its employees and laborers and the reason for withholding the payment thereof was the strike staged by the employees and laborers for more favorable working conditions which was declared legal by the respondent court -- justice and equity demand that bonus already set aside for its employees and laborers be paid to them.

The award would still be within the ambit of the respondent court's power and function which is mainly to prevent further disputes and perhaps strikes which are so detrimental to both labor and management and to the public weal.

Furthermore, while normally discretionary, the grant of a gratuity or bonus by reason of its long and regular concession, may be regarded as part of regular compensation. (Liberation Steamship Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., G.R. No. L-25389, June 27, 1968, 23 SCRA 1105; National Development Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., G.R. No. L-25390, June 27, 1958, 23 SCRA 1106)

In Heacock Co. vs. NLU, et al. (95 Phil. 553), the Court ruled:

"It appears herein that for the year 1947 the Company paid a bonus of one month salary to all its employees, and for the years 1948 and 1949, realizing necessary profits, it also paid a bonus to its executives and heads of departments, omitting only the low-salaried employees. The payment of the bonus in 1947 already generated in the minds of all the employees the fixed hope of receiving the same concession in subsequent years, and on the ground of equity they deserved to be paid the bonus for the years 1948 and 1949, when the Company admittedly realized enough profits.

"The Company insists that its high officials were given bonus for 1948 and 1949 because they had never been granted any salary raise or paid for any overtime work. This is, however, answered by the Union which alleges that no salary increase or overtime pay was necessary for the high officials of the Company, since they have already been receiving adequate compensation.

"The Company also maintains that no valid obligation to pay the bonus in question could arise, because there was no consideration therefor. It is sufficient to state that any extra concession granted by the employer to his employee or laborer is necessarily premised on the need of improving the latter's working conditions to the highest possible level, in return only for the efficient service and loyalty expected from the employee or laborer.

"The decision favorable to the Union may further be predicated upon the case of Philippine Education Company, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al. (48 Off. Gaz. (13) 5278; 92 Phil. 381), in which we held that, even if a bonus is not demandable for not forming part of the wage, salary or compensation of the employee, the same may nevertheless be granted on equitable considerations."

The Heacock ruling, rendered in 1954, reverberated in NWSA vs NWSA Consolidated Labor Union (21 SCRA 203) rendered in 1967. In that case the employer granted Christmas bonus under a collective bargaining agreement up to its expiry in 1959. In 1960, while a labor dispute was pending, the employer again paid the bonus. For 1961, the union pressed again for continuance of the bonus. The employer strongly refused. The Supreme Court held:

"Petitioner disputes the grant of Christmas bonus for the year 1961 and points out that it is purely an act of liberality which may be withheld, considering that the collective bargaining agreement of 1956 under which the employees enjoyed such benefits had already expired. This is true enough, as a matter of law. But this Court has held that "even if a bonus is not demandable for not forming part of the wage, salary or compensation of the employee, the same may nevertheless be granted on equitable considerations" (Heacock Co. vs. National Labor Union, et al., 95 Phil. 553, 559), and the Court of Industrial Relations, "according to the law of its creation, may make an award for the purpose of settling and preventing further disputes."

Respondent Court stated the following considerations, which we believe justify the award:

"There is no question that the respondent's employees and laborers have been enjoying the benefit of Christmas bonus. It is not denied that even during the operation of the corporation under the defunct Metropolitan Water District and since its administration and operation by the respondent Authority, the employees and laborers have been continuously given such benefit. And even while this case was pending, the NWSA granted Christmas bonus in December 1960."

In the 1995 case of Marcos et al. vs. NLRC and Insular Life Assurance Co. (G.R. No. 111744, September 8, 1995), the Court quoted authorities holding that if one enters into a contract of employment under an agreement that he shall be paid a certain salary by the week or some other stated period and, in addition, a bonus, in case he serves for a specified length of time, there is no reason for refusing to enforce the promise to pay the bonus, if the employee has served during the stipulated time, on the ground that it was a promise of mere gratuity.

The Court further said:

This is true if the contract contemplates a continuance of the employment for a definite term, and the promise of the bonus is made at the time the contract is entered into. If no time is fixed for the duration of the contract of employment, but the employee enters upon or continues in service under an offer of a bonus if he remains therein for a certain time, his service, in case he remains for the required time, constitutes an acceptance of the offer of the employer to pay the bonus and, after that acceptance, the offer cannot be withdrawn, but can be enforced by the employee.

The weight of authority in American jurisprudence, with which we are persuaded to agree, is that after the acceptance of a promise by an employer to pay the bonus, the same cannot be withdrawn, but may be enforced by the employee."

Prohibitions Regarding Wages: Wage Deductions

noreply@blogger.com (Jess V. Quijano) — Wed, 09 Sep 2009 12:04:00 +0000

The Labor Code of the Philippines, in requiring written authorization as a pre-requisite to wage deductions, seeks to protect the employee against unwarranted practices that would diminish his compensation without his knowledge and consent.

Nonetheless, service fee collected by the Union does not run counter to the express mandate of the law since the same are not unwarranted. Also, the deductions for the union service fee are authorized by law and do not require individual check-off authorizations. [Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 77950, Jan. 9, 1989]

In one case, the question is whether the non-payment of stock subscriptions can be offset against a money claim of an employee against the employer.

The corporation admitted that there was due to the employee the amount of P17,060,07, but this was applied to the unpaid balance of his subscription in the amount of P95,439.93. The employee questioned the set-off alleging that there was no call or notice for the payment of the unpaid subscription and that, accordingly, the alleged obligation was not enforceable.

The Court ruled that the set-off was without lawful basis, if not premature. As there was no notice or call for the payment of unpaid subscriptions, the same is not yet due and payable. Assuming that there was a call for payment of the unpaid subscription, the NLRC cannot validly set it off against the wages and other benefits due the petitioner.

Article 113 of the Labor Code allows such a deduction from the wages of the employees by the employer, only in three instances, to wit:

(a) in cases where the worker is insured with his consent by the employer, and the deduction is to recompense the employer for the amount paid by him as premium on the insurance;

(b) for union dues, in cases where the right of the workers or his union to check-off has been recognized by the employer or authorized in writing by the individual worker concerned; and

(c) in cases where the employer is authorized by law or regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor. [Apodaca vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 80039, April 18, 1989]

Overseas Employment Policy of the Philippines

noreply@blogger.com (Jess V. Quijano) — Sun, 06 Sep 2009 15:36:00 +0000

The export of Filipino labor is an offspring of national poverty. The export of people, instead of products, has come about largely because of the high rate of unemployment and under-employment.

Particularly during the dark, debauched, and deplorable years of the Martial Law presidency, manpower export had to happen to alleviate the twin problems of unemployment and the deficit in the balance of trade.

But the dictatorial government did not even bother to formulate the courses of action that it would take if misfortune should befall its working citizens abroad. And yet, it did not forget to require homeward remittance of their earnings.

Because of the remittances, the so-called stop-gap measure fast evolved to become the country's top dollar-earning industry. Indeed, good sums of money flowed in.

But it was blood money. The remittances were accompanied by accounts of horrendous abuses suffered by Filipino workers in the hands of some foreign employers. The fate of the Contemplacions, the Magas, and the Balabagans woke the government up. Out of these tales of woe, condemned in widespread street demonstrations, the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995" (R.A. No. 8042) was passed during the Ramos Administration.

R.A. No. 8042

R.A. No. 8042, which was signed on June 7, 1995 and took effect on July 16, 1995, redefines the policy on overseas employment. It states in part:

"While recognizing the significant contribution of Filipino migrant workers to the national economy through their foreign exchange remittances, the State does not promote overseas employment as a means to sustain economic growth and achieve national development. The existence of the overseas employment program rests solely on the assurance that the dignity and fundamental human rights and freedoms of the Filipino citizen shall not, at any time, be compromised or violated. The State, therefore, shall continuously create local employment opportunities and promote the equitable distribution of wealth and the benefits of development." (Sec. 2[c], R.A. No. 8042)

Deployment

Republic Act No. 8042, furthermore, requires certain guarantee of protection for the overseas workers before they are deployed. It states:

SEC. 4. Deployment of Migrant Workers -- The State shall deploy overseas Filipino workers only in countries where the rights of Filipino migrant workers are protected. The government recognizes any of the following as a guarantee for the protection of the receiving country for the protection of the rights of overseas Filipino workers:

(a) It has existing labor and social laws protecting the rights of migrant workers;

(b) It is a signatory to multilateral conventions, declarations or resolutions relating to the protection of migrant workers;

(c) It has concluded a bilateral agreement or arrangement with the government protecting the rights of overseas Filipino workers; and

(d) It is taking positive, concrete measures to protect the rights of migrant workers.

SEC. 5. Termination or Ban on Deployment -- Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4 hereof, the government, in pursuit of the national interest or when public welfare so requires, may, at any time, terminate or impose a ban on the deployment of migrant workers.

SOURCE:

Cesario Alvero Azucena, Jr., The Labor Code With Comments and Cases, 1999, p. 44.

Article 97

noreply@blogger.com (Jess V. Quijano) — Wed, 12 Aug 2009 10:35:00 +0000

ART. 97. Definition.

As used in this Title: (a) "Person" means an individual, partnership, association, corporation, business trust, legal representative, or any organized group of persons.

(b) "Employer" includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee and shall include the Government and all its branches, subdivision and instrumentalities, all government-owned or -controlled corporations and institutions, as well as non-profit private institutions, or organizations.

(d) "Agriculture" includes farming in all its branches and, among other things, includes the cultivation and tillage of soil, dairying, the production, cultivation, growing and harvesting of any agricultural and horticultural commodities, the raising of livestock or poultry, and any practices performed by a farmer on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations, but does not include the manufacturing or processing of sugar, coconuts, abaca, tobacco, pineapples or other farm products.

(e) "Employ" includes to suffer or permit to work.

(f) "Wage" paid to any employee shall mean the remuneration or earnings, however designated, capable of being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or other method of calculating the same, which is payable by an employer to an employee under a written or unwritten contract of employment for work done or to be done, or for services rendered or to be rendered and includes the fair and reasonable value, as determined by the Secretary of Labor, of board, lodging, or other facilities customarily furnished by the employer to the employee. "Fair and reasonable value" shall not include any profit to the employer or to any person affiliated with the employer.

Marcos et al vs. NLRC et al

noreply@blogger.com (Jess V. Quijano) — Sun, 09 Aug 2009 15:45:00 +0000

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 111744
September 8, 1995

LOURDES G. MARCOS, ALEJANDRO T. ANDRADA, BALTAZARA J. LOPEZ AND VILMA L. CRUZ, petitioners,

- versus -

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

This petition for certiorari seeks the nullification of the decision¹ of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) promulgated on May 31, 1992 in NLRC NCR CA No. 004120-92, and its resolution dated August 27, 1993 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof. The said decision set aside on appeal, the decision of Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez ordering private respondent to pay petitioners their service awards, anniversary bonus and prorated performance bonus in the amount of P144,579.00 and 10% attorney's fees in the amount of P14,457.90.²

First, the undisputed facts.

Petitioners were regular employees of private respondent Insular Life Assurance Co:, Ltd., but they were dismissed on November 1, 1990 when their positions were declared redundant. A special redundancy benefit was paid to them, which included payment of accrued vacation leave and fifty percent (50%) of unused current sick leave, special redundancy benefit, equivalent to three (3) months salary for every year of service; and additional cash benefits, in lieu of other benefits provided by the company or required by law.³

Before the termination of their services, petitioner Marcos had been in the employ of private respondent for more than twenty (20) years, from August 26, ]970; petitioner Andrada, more than twenty-five (25) years, from July 26, 1965; petitioner Lopez, exactly thirty (30) years, from October 31, 1960; and petitioner Cruz, more than twenty (20) years, from March 1, 1970.⁴

Petitioners, particularly Baltazara J. Lopez, sent a letter dated October 23, 1990 to respondent company questioning the redundancy package, She claimed that they should receive their respective service awards and other prorated bonuses which they had earned at the time they were dismissed. In addition, Lopez argued that "the cash service awards have already been budgeted in a fund distinct and apart from redundancy fund.⁵

Thereafter, private respondent required petitioners to execute a "Release and Quitclaim,"⁶ and petitioners complied but with a written protest reiterating their previous demand that they were nonetheless entitled to receive their service awards.

On March 21, 1991, petitioners inquired from the Legal Service of the Department of Labor and Employment⁷whether respondent corporation could legally refuse the payment of their service awards as mandated in their Employee's Manual.

About three months later the labor department issued its opinion, with pertinent authorities, responding to petitioners' query as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

This Department believes that your query presents several issues. These shall be addressed point by point, thus:

First, the Department deems the service award to be part of the benefits of the employees of Insular Life. Company policies and practices are fertile sources of employee's rights. These must be applied uniformly as interpretation cannot vary from one employee to another. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

While it may be argued that the above-cited case applies only to retirement benefits, we find solace in the cases of Liberation Steamship Co., Inc. vs. CIR and National Development Company vs. Unlicensed Crew members of Three Dons vessels (23 SCRA 1105) where the Supreme Court held that a gratuity or bonus, by reason of its long and regular concession indicating company practice, may become regarded as part of regular compensation and thus demandable.

xxx xxx xxx

Second, the award is earned at the pertinent anniversary date. At this time, entitlement to the award becomes vested. The anniversary date is the only crucial determining factor. Since the award accrues on that date, it is of no moment that the entitled employee is separated from service (for whatever cause) before the awards are physically handed out.

xxx xxx xxx

Third, even if the award has not accrued — as when an employee is separated from service because of redundancy before the applicable 5th year anniversary, the material benefits of the award must be given, prorated, by Insular Life. This is especially true (in) redundancy, wherein he/she had no control.

xxx xxx xxx

Fourth, the fact that you were required to sign "Release and Quitclaim" does not affect your right to the material benefits of the service award. . . .⁸

Meanwhile, in the same year, private respondent celebrated its 80th anniversary wherein the management approved the grant of an anniversary bonus equivalent to one (1) month salary only to permanent and probationary employees as of November 15, 1990.⁹

On March 26, 1991, respondent company announced the grant of performance bonus to both rank and file employees and supervisory specialist grade and managerial staff equivalent to two (2) months salary and 2.75 basic salary, respectively, as of December 30, 1990. The performance bonus, however, would be given only to permanent employees as of March 30, 1991.¹⁰

Despite the aforequoted opinion of the Department of Labor and Employment, private respondent refused to pay petitioners service awards. This prompted the latter to file a consolidated complaint, which was assigned to NLRC Labor Arbiter Lopez, for payment of their service awards, including performance and anniversary bonuses.

In their complaint, petitioners contended that they are likewise entitled to the performance and anniversary bonuses because, at the time the performance bonus was announced to be given, they were only short of two (2) months service to be entitled to the full amount thereof as they had already served the company for ten (10) months prior to the declaration of the grant of said benefit. Also, they lacked only fifteen (15) days to be entitled to the full amount of the anniversary bonus when it was announced to be given to employees as of November 15, 1990.

In a decision dated October 8, 1992, the labor arbiter ordered respondent company to pay petitioners their service awards, anniversary bonuses and prorated performance bonuses, including ten percent (10%) thereof as attorney's fees.

Respondent company appealed to public respondent NLRC claiming grave abuse of discretion committed by the labor arbiter in holding it liable to pay said service award, performance and anniversary bonuses, and in not finding that petitioners were estopped from claiming the same as said benefits had already been given to them.

In setting aside the decision of the labor arbiter, respondent NLRC upheld the validity of the quitclaim document executed by petitioners. For this conclusion, it rationalized that "(c)ertainly, before complainants signed the quitclaim and release, they are aware of the nature of such document. In fact, they never assailed the genuineness and due execution of the same. Hence, we can safely say that they were not placed under duress or were compelled by means of force to sign the document."¹¹

Furthermore, the NLRC held that "(n)either was there any unwritten agreement between complainants and respondent upon separation, which entitled the former to other renumerations or benefits. On the contrary, they voluntarily accepted the redundancy benefit package, otherwise, they would not have been separated from employment."¹²

Hence, this petition wherein it is postulated that the basic issue is whether or not respondent NLRC committed reversible error or grave abuse of discretion in affirming the validity of the "Release and Quitclaim" and, consequently, that petitioners are not entitled to payment of service awards and other bonuses.¹³
The Solicitor General public respondent NLRC and private respondent company duly filed their respective comments.¹⁴

In their petition, petitioners stress that they have actually devoted much, if not all, of their employable life with private respondent; that given their length of service, their loyalty to the latter is easily demonstrable; and that the same length of service had rendered slim, if not eliminated, their chances of getting employed somewhere else."¹⁵

On the other hand, respondent company reiterates its basic contention that the consideration for the settlement of petitioners' claim is credible and reasonable, more than satisfies the legal requirement therefor, and that petitioners, in executing the release and quitclaim, did so voluntarily and with full knowledge of the consequences thereof.¹⁶

The petition being meritorious, we find for petitioners.

Under prevailing jurisprudence, the fact that an employee has signed a satisfaction receipt for his claims does not necessarily result in the waiver thereof. The law does not consider as valid any agreement whereby a worker agrees to receive less compensation than what he is entitled to recover. A deed of release or quitclaim cannot bar an employee from demanding benefits to which he is legally entitled.¹⁷

We have heretofore explained that the reason why quitclaims commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy, and why they are held to be ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of the workers' legal rights, is the fact that the employer and the employee obviously do not stand on the same footing. The employer drove the employee to the wall. The latter must have harsh necessities of life. He thus found himself in no position to resist money proffered. His, then, is a case of adherence, not of choice. One thing sure, however, is that petitioners did not relent on their claim. They pressed it. They are deemed not have waived any of their rights. Renuntiatio non praesumitur.¹⁸

Along this line, we have more trenchantly declared that quitclaims and/or complete releases executed by the employees do not estop them from pursuing their claims arising from unfair labor practices of the employer. The basic reason for this is that such quitclaims and/or complete releases are against public policy and, therefore, null and void. The acceptance of termination does not divest a laborer of the right to prosecute his employer for unfair labor practice acts.¹⁹ While there maybe possible exceptions to this holding, we do not perceive any in the case at bar.

Furthermore, in the instant case, it is an undisputed fact that when petitioners signed the instrument of release and quitclaim, they made a written manifestation reserving their right to demand the payment of their service awards.²⁰ The element of total voluntariness in executing that instrument is negated by the fact that they expressly stated therein their claim for the service awards, a manifestation equivalent to a protest and a disavowal of any waiver thereof.

As earlier stated, petitioners even sought the opinion of the Department of Labor and Employment to determine where and how they stood in the controversy. This act only shows their adamant desire to obtain their service awards and to underscore their disagreement with the "Release and Quitclaim" they were virtually forced to sign in order to receive their separation pay.

We have pointed out in Veloso, et al., vs. Department of Labor and Employment, et al.,²¹ that:

While rights may be waived, the same must not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

Article 6 of the Civil Code renders a quitclaim agreement void ab initio where the quitclaim obligates the workers concerned to forego their benefits while at the same time exempting the employer from any liability that it may choose to reject. This runs counter to Art. 22 of the Civil Code which provides that no one shall be unjustly enriched at the expense of another.

We agree with the further observations of the Solicitor General who, in recommending the setting aside of the decision of respondent NLRC, called attention to the fact that "contrary to private respondent's contention, the "additional" redundancy package does not and could not have covered the payment of the service awards, performance and anniversary bonuses since the private respondent company has initially maintained the position that petitioners are not legally entitled to the same. . . . Surprisingly, in a sudden turnabout, private respondent now claims . . . that the subject awards and bonuses are integrated in the redundancy package. It is evident, therefore, that private respondent has not truly consolidated the payment of the subject awards and bonuses in the redundancy package paid to the petitioners.²²

We are likewise in accord with the findings of the labor arbiter that petitioners are indeed entitled to receive service awards and other benefits, thus:

Since each of the complainants have rendered services to respondent in multiple(s) of five years prior to their separation from employment, respondent should be paid their service awards for 1990.

We are not impressed with the contention of the respondent that service award is a bonus and therefore is an act of gratuity which the complainants have no right to demand. Service awards are governed by respondent's employee's manual and (are) therefore contractual in nature.

On the matter of anniversary and performance bonuses, it is not disputed that it is respondent's practice to give an anniversary bonus every five years from its incorporation; that pursuant to this practice, respondent declared an anniversary bonus for its 80th Anniversary in 1990; that per terms of this declaration, only the employees of respondent as of 15 November 1990 will be given the bonus; and that complainants were separated from respondent only 25 days before :the respondent's anniversary. On the other hand, it is also (not) disputed that respondent regularly gives performance bonuses; that for its commendable performance in 1990, respondent declared a performance bonus; that per terms of this declaration, only permanent employees of respondent as of March 30, 1991 will be given this bonus; and that complainants were employees of respondents for the first 10 months of 1990.

We cannot see any cogent reason why an anniversary bonus which respondent gives only once in every five years were given to all employees of respondent as of 15 November 1990 (pro rata even to probationary employees; Annex 9) and not to complainants who have rendered service to respondent for most of the five year cycle. This is also true in the case of performance bonus which were given to permanent employees of respondent as of 30 March 1991 and not to employees who have been connected with respondent for most of 1990 but were separated prior to 30 March 1991.

We believe that the prerogative of the employer to determine who among its employee shall be entitled to receive bonuses which are, as a matter of practice, given periodically cannot be exercised arbitrarily.²³(Emphasis and corrections in parentheses supplied.)

The grant of service awards in favor of petitioners is more importantly underscored in the precedent case of Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., et al. vs. NLRC, et al.,²⁴ where this Court ruled that "as to the service award differentials claimed by some respondent union members, the company policy shall likewise prevail, the same being based on the employment contracts or collective bargaining agreements between the parties. As the petitioners had explained, pursuant to their policies on the matter, the service award differential is given at the end of the year to an employee who has completed years of service divisible by 5.

A bonus is not a gift or gratuity, but is paid for some services or consideration and is in addition to what would ordinarily be given.²⁵ The term "bonus" as used in employment contracts, also conveys an idea of something which is gratuitous, or which may be claimed to be gratuitous, over and above the prescribed wage which the employer agrees to pay.

While there is a conflict of opinion as to the validity of an agreement to pay additional sums for the performance of that which the promisee is already under obligation to perform, so as to give the latter the right to enforce such promise after performance, the authorities hold that if one enters into a contract of employment under an agreement that he shall be paid a certain salary by the week or some other stated period and, in addition, a bonus, in case he serves for a specified length of time, there is no reason for refusing to enforce the promise to pay the bonus, if the employee has served during the stipulated time, on the ground that it was a promise of a mere gratuity.

This is true if the contract contemplates a continuance of the employment for a definite term, and the promise of the bonus is made at the time the contract is entered into. If no time is fixed for the duration of the contract of employment, but the employee enters upon or continues in service under an offer of a bonus if he remains therein for a certain time, his service, in case he remains for the required time, constitutes an acceptance of the offer of the employer to pay the bonus and, after that acceptance, the offer cannot be withdrawn, but can be enforced by the employee.²⁶

The weight of authority in American jurisprudence, with which we are persuaded to agree, is that after the acceptance of a promise by an employer to pay the bonus, the same cannot be withdrawn, but may be enforced by the employee.²⁷ However, in the case at bar, equity demands that the performance and anniversary bonuses should be prorated to the number of months that petitioners actually served respondent company in the year 1990. This observation should be taken into account in the computation of the amounts to be awarded to petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision and resolution of respondent National Labor Relations Commission are hereby SET ASIDE and the decision of Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Puno, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, 42; per Commissioner Rogelio I. Rayala, with Commissioners Edna Bonto-Perez and Domingo H. Zapanta, concurring.

2 Ibid., 53; id.

3 Ibid., 43, 237-239.

4 Petition, 3; Rollo, 4.

5 Ibid., 4; id., 5.

6 Rollo, 5.

7 Ibid., 6.

8 Ibid., 7-8.

9 Ibid., 93.

10 Ibid., 43-44

11 Ibid., 50-51.

12 Ibid., 51.

13 Ibid., 18.

14 Ibid., 88, 145, and 65.

15 Ibid., 32.

16 Memorandum of Private Respondent, 13-14; Rollo, 226-227.

17 Fuentes vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 76835, November 24, 1988, 167 SCRA 767; see alsoGarcia vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 67825, September 4, 1987, 153 SCRA 639.

18 Lopez Sugar Corporation vs. Federation of Free Workers, Philippine Labor Union Association (PLUA-NACUSIP), et al, G.R. Nos. 75700-01, August 30, 1990, 189 SCRA 179, quoting from Cariño, et al., vs. Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration, et al., L-19808, September 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 183.

19 Armed Forces of the Philippine Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. vs. Armed Forces of the Philippine Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. Employees' Union (AFP-MBAI-EU), et al., L-39145, May 17, 1980, 97 SCRA 715.

20 Rollo, 5.

21 G.R. No. 87297, August 5, 1991, 200 SCRA 201.

22 Rollo, 123.

23 Ibid., 46-48.

24 G.R. No. 74191, December 21, 1987, 156 SCRA 740.

25 Kenicott vs. Wayne County, 16 Wall. (U.S.) 452, 21 L. Ed. 319.

26 35 Am. Jur. Master and Servant, Section 71, 501-502.

27 Roberts vs. Mays Mills, 184 NC 406, 114 SE 530, 28 ALR 338; Scott vs. J. F. Duthie & Co, 125 Wash 470, 216 P 853, 28 ALR 328; Zwolanek vs. Baker Mfg. Co. 150 Wis 517, 137 NW 769, 44 LRA (NS) 1214, Ann Cas 1914A, 793.

Rights of Legitimate Labor Organizations

noreply@blogger.com (Jess V. Quijano) — Sun, 09 Aug 2009 01:35:00 +0000

The rights of legitimate labor organizations are enumerated in Article 242 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by Sec. 17, R.A. 6715.

The code provides thus:

A legitimate labor organization shall have the right:

(a) To act as the representative of its members for the purpose of collective bargaining;

(b) To be certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining;

(c) To be furnished by the employer, upon written request, with the annual audited financial statements, including the balance sheet and the profit and loss statement, within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of receipt of the request, after the union has been duly recognized by the employer or certified as the sole and exclusive barganing representatives of the employees in the bargaining unit, or within sixty (60) calendar days before the expiration of the existing collective bargaining agreement, or during the collective bargaining negotiation;

(d) To own property, real or personal, for the use and benefit of the labor organization and its members;

(c) To sue and be sued in its registered name; and

(d) To undertake all other activities designed to benefit the organization and its members, including cooperative, housing welfare and other projects not contrary to law.

Notwithstanding any provision of a general or special law to the contrary, the income and the properties of legitimate labor organizations, including grants, endowments, gifts, donations and contributions they may receive from fraternal and similar organizations, local or foreign, which are actually, directly and exclusively used for their lawful purposes, shall be free from taxes, duties and other assessments. The exemptions provided herein may be withdrawn only by a special law expressly repealing this provision.

Collective Bargaining Expression of Democracy

noreply@blogger.com (Jess V. Quijano) — Mon, 03 Aug 2009 06:39:00 +0000

Collective bargaining or negotiations towards collective agreement is a democratic framework under the New Labor Code to stabilize the relation between labor and management to create a climate of sound and stable industrial peace. It is a mutual responsibility of the employer and the union, and is their legal obligation. (Loy vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 54334, Jan. 22, 1986).

The Labor Code definition of collective bargaining is almost a verbatim copy of Section 8(d) of the US Taft-Hartley Act which defines collective bargaining as:

...the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of any concession.

Under this definition, collective bargaining includes four related but distinguishable processes: (1) negotiation between representatives of the management and the union over "wages, hours, and other terms...of employment;" (2) the execution of a written contract embodying the terms agreed upon; (3) negotiation of any question arising as to the interpretation or application of the contract; and (4) negotiation over the terms of a new contract or proposed modifications, when an existing agreement is validly opened for negotiations. (Edwin E. Witte, Collective Bargaining and the Democratic Process in E. Wright Bakke, Clark Kerr, and Charles Anrod, Unions, Management and the Public [Harcourt, New Yourk, 1967], p. 295.)

Collective bargaining is a system made up of a set of continuous processes; it is customary and helpful to distinguish negotiation of contracts (the "legislative" phase of the union-employer relationship), administration of contracts (the "executive" phase), and interpretation or application of contracts (the "judicial" phase). (Harold Davey, Mario F. Bognanno and David Estension, Contemporary Collective Bargaining [Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1982], p. 3.)

In common usage as well as in legal terminology, collective bargaining denotes negotiations looking forward to a collective agreement. However, it does not end with the execution of an agreement. It is a continuous process. It requires both parties, the employer and duly authorized representatives of employees, to deal with each other with open and fair minds and sincerely endeavor to fight the obstacles in the process to stabilize employer-employee relationship. (PAMBUSCO vs. PAMBUSCO Employees Union, 68 Phil. 451)

A collective bargaining agreement (CBA) as used in Article 252 of the Labor Code, refers to a contract executed upon request of either the employer or the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees incorporating the agreement reached after negotiations with respect to wages, hours of work, and all other terms and conditions of employment, including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions under such agreement. (Davao Integrated Port Stevedoring Services vs. Abarquez, G.R. No. 102132, March 19, 1993)

Power to Dismiss Not Absolute

noreply@blogger.com (Jess V. Quijano) — Fri, 31 Jul 2009 06:39:00 +0000

The power to dismiss is the normal prerogative of the employer. An employer, generally, can dismiss or lay off an employee for just and authorized causes enumerated under Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.

However, the right of an employer to freely discharge his employees is subject to regulation by the State, basically in the exercise of its paramount police power. This is so, because the preservation of the lives of the citizens is a basic duty of the State, more vital than the preservation of corporate profits. (Manila Electric Company vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 78763, July 12, 1989)

The employer is bound to exercise caution in terminating the services of his employees especially so when it is made upon the request of a labor union pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Dismissals must not be arbitrary and capricious. Due process must be observed in dismissing an employee, because it affects not only his position, but also his means of livelihood. Employers should, therefore, respect and protect the rights of their employees, which include the right to labor. (Rance, et al. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 68147, June 30, 1988)

Thus, where the employee's dismissal was not based on any of the grounds provided in the contract of employment, but because the employer's personnel manager resented the act of the respondent of writing memos calling the manager's attention to the problems in the camp site and furnishing copies of said memos to government agencies and the Office of the President of the Philippines, which act the employer perceived as detrimental to its interest, the dismissal was held unjustified. (Trans-Orient Overseas Contractors, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 75602, Dec. 29, 1989)

Similarly, the dismissal of an employee without any investigation having been previously conducted by the employer to ascertain his participation in the fistfight within company premises, is illegal for non-compliance with the requirements of procedural due process. (Broadway Motors, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 78382, Dec. 14, 1987)

As Mr. Justice Panganiban, in an en banc decision, states:

To constitute a completely valid and faultless dismissal, it is well-settled that the employer must show not only sufficient ground therefor, but it must also prove that it observed procedural due process by giving the employee two notices: one, of the intention to dismiss, indicating therein his acts or omissions complained against, and two, notice of the decision to dismiss; and an opportunity to answer and rebut the charges against him, in between such notices. (MGG Marine Services, Inc., et al. vs. NLRC and E.A. Molina, G.R. No. 114313, July 29, 1996)

Management's Right to Dismiss Employees

noreply@blogger.com (Jess V. Quijano) — Fri, 31 Jul 2009 05:55:00 +0000

The law in protecting the rights of the laborer authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.

While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has its own rights, which as such are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out of its concern for those with less privileges in life, the Supreme Court has inclined more often than not toward the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded the Court to rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and applicable law and doctrine. (Mercury Drug Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 75662, Sept. 15, 1989)

No employer may rationally be expected to continue in employment a person whose lack of morals, respect and loyalty to his employer, regard for his employer's rules and appreciation of the dignity and responsibility of his office, has so plainly and completely been bared. (Makati Haberdashery, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 83380-81, Nov. 15, 1989)

The right of the company to dismiss its employees is a measure of self-protection. (Reyes vs. Minister of Labor, G.R. No. 48705, Feb. 9, 1989)

Ferrer, et al. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 100898, July 5, 1993

noreply@blogger.com (Jess V. Quijano) — Thu, 30 Jul 2009 03:21:00 +0000

Hereunder is the case digest of Ferrer, et al. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 100898, promulgated on July 5, 1993:

FACTS:

Petitioners Ferrer and others were regular and permanent employees of the Occidental Foundry Corporation (OFC). They had been in the employe of OFC for about ten years at the time of their dismissal in 1989.

On May 6, 1989, petitioner Ferrer and companions filed with the Department of Labor and Employment a complaint seeking the expulsion from SAMAHAN of its officers headed by president Capitle. The complaint was founded on the said officers' alleged lack of attention to the economic demands of the workers. However, on September 4, 1989, petitioners Diaz and Ferrer withdrew the petition.

On September 10, 1989, petitioners conducted a special election of officers of the SAMAHAN. FFW, to which SAMAHAN was affiliated, questioned the election. Nonetheless, the elected set of officers tried to dissuade the OFC from remitting union dues to the officers led by Capitle.

The intra-union squabble came to a head when, on September 11, 1989, the union officials headed by Capitle expelled Ferrer, et al. from the union.

Ferrer and his four companions turned to the Federation of Democratic Labor Unions (FEDLU). They volunteered to be admitted as members of the FEDLU and requested that they be represented ("katawanin") by said federation before the DOLE in the complaint which they intended to file against the union (SAMAHAN), the FFW and the company for illegal dismissal, reinstatement, and other benefits in accordance with law.

Thereafter, on various dates, petitioners sent individual letters to the Company professing innocence of the charges levelled against them by the SAMAHAN and the FFW and pleading that they be reinstated. Their letters elicited no response.

Thus, contending that their dismissal was without cause and in utter disregard of their right to due process of law, petitioners through the FEDLU, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice before the NLRC against Hui Kam Chang, OFC, M.S. Velasco (as representative of the FFW), the FFW, and the SAMAHAN officers headed by Capitle.

RULING:

In the first place, the union has a specific provision for the permanent or temporary "expulsion" of its erring members in its constitution and by-laws ("saligang batas at alituntunin"). Under the heading Membership and Removal ("pag-aanib at pagtitiwalag"), it states:

SEC. 4. Ang sinumang kasapi ay maaring itwalag (sic) ng Samahan pangsamantala o tuluyan sa pamamgitan (sic) ng tatlo't ikaapat (3/4) na bahagi ng dami ng bilang ng Pamunuang Tagapapaganap. Pagkaraan lamang sa pandinig sa kanyang kaso. Batay sa sumusunod:
(a) Sinumang gumawa ng mga bagay bagay na labag at lihis sa patakaran ng Samahan.
(b) Sinumang gumawa ng mga bagay na maaring ikabuwag ng Samahan.
(c) Hindi paghuhulog ng butaw sa loob ng tatlong buwan na walang sakit o Doctor's Certificate.
(d) Hindi pagbibigay ng abuloy na itinadhana ng Samahan.
(e) Sinumang kasapi na natanggal sa kapisanan at gustong sumapi uli ay magpapanibago ng bilang, mula sa taon ng kanyang pagsapi uli sa Samahan.

No hearing ("pandinig") was ever conducted by the SAMAHAN to look into petitioners' explanation of their moves to oust the union leadership under Capitle, or their subsequent affiliation with FEDLU. While it is true that petititioners' actions might have precipitated divisiveness and, later, showed disloyalty to the union, still, the SAMAHAN should have observed its own constitution and by-laws by giving petitioners an opportunity to air their side and explain their moves. If, after an investigation the petitioners were found to have violated union rules, then and only then should they be subjected to proper disciplinary measures.

What aggravated the situation in this case is the fact that OFC itself took for granted that the SAMAHAN had actually conducted an inquiry and considered the CBA provision for the closed shop as self-operating that, upon receipt of a notice that some members of the SAMAHAN had failed to maintain their membership in good standing in accordance with the CBA, it summarily dismissed petitioners. To make matters worse, the labor arbiter and the NLRC shared the same view in holding that "(t)he matter or question, therefore, of determining why and how did complainants fail to retain membership in good standing is not for the company to inquire via formal investigation."

Petitioners' alleged act of sowing disunity among the members of the SAMAHAN could have been ventilated and threshed out through a grievance procedure within the union itself. But resort to such procedure was not pursued. What actually happened in this case was that some members, including petitioners, tried to unseat the SAMAHAN leadership headed by Capitle due to the latter's alleged inattention to petitioners' demands for the implementation of the P25-wage increase which took effect on July 1, 1989. The intra-union controversy was such that petitioners even requested the FFW to intervene to facilitate the enforcement of the said wage increase.

Petitioners sought the help of the FEDLU only after they had learned of the termination of their employment upon the recommendation of Capitle. Their alleged application with federations other than the FFW can hardly be considered as disloyalty to the SAMAHAN, nor may the filing of such applications denote that petitioners failed to maintain in good standing their membership in the SAMAHAN. The SAMAHAN is a different entity from FFW, the federation to which it belonged. Neither may it be inferred that petitioners sought disaffiliation from the FFW for petitioners had not formed a union distinct from that of the SAMAHAN. Parenthetically, the right of a local union to disaffiliate from a federation in the absence of any provision in the federation's constitution preventing disaffiliation of a local union is legal. (People's Industrial and Commercial Employees and Workers Org. [FFW] vs. People's Industrial and Commercial Corp., 112 SCRA 440 [1982]) Such right is consistent with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association. (Tropical Hut Employees' Union-CGW vs. Tropical Hut Food Market, Inc., 181 SCRA 173 [1990])

Hence, while petitioner's act of holding a special election to oust Capitles, et al. may be considered as an act of sowing disunity among the SAMAHAN members, and, perhaps, disloyalty to the union officials, which could have been dealt with by the union as a disciplinary matter, it certainly cannot be considered as constituting disloyalty to the union. Faced with a SAMAHAN leadership which they had tried to remove as officials, it was but a natural act of self-preservation that petitioners fled to the arms of the FEDLU after the union and the OFC had tried to terminate their employment. Petitioners should not be made accountable for such an act.

Compromise of Money Claims Is Personal Right

noreply@blogger.com (Jess V. Quijano) — Thu, 30 Jul 2009 02:54:00 +0000

Money claims due to laborers cannot be the object of settlement or compromise effected by a union or counsel without the specific individual consent of each laborer concerned. The beneficiaries are the individual complainants themselves. The union to which they belong can only assist them, but cannot decide for them. Awards in favor of laborers after long years of litigation must be attended to with mutual openness and in the best of faith. Only thus can we really give meaning to the constitutional mandate of giving laborers maximum protection and security.

The union officers' authority to compromise must be presented in evidence.

A judgment based on a compromise agreement authorized by the members does not bind the individual members or complainants who are not parties thereto nor signatories therein. (Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa La Campana vs. Sarmiento, 133 SCRA 220 [1984])

Under the philosophy of collective responsibility, an employer who bargains in good faith should be entitled to rely upon the promises and agreements of the union representatives with whom he must deal under the compulsion of law and contract. The collective bargaining process should be carried on between parties who can mutually respect and rely upon the authority of each other. Where, however, collective bargaining process is not involved, and what is at stake are backwages already earned by the individual workers by way of overtime, premium and differential pay, and final judgment has been rendered in their favor, as in the present case, the real parties in interest with direct material interest, as against the union which has only served as a vehicle for collective action to enforce their just claims, are the individual workers themselves.

Authority of the union to waive or quit claim all or part of the judgment award in favor of the individual workers cannot be lightly presumed, but must be expressly granted, and the employer, as judgment debtor, must deal in all good faith with the union as the agent of the individual workers.

The court in turn should certainly verify and assure itself the fact and extent of the authority of the union leadership to execute any compromise or settlement of the judgment on behalf of the individual workers who are the real judgment creditors. (Heirs of Teodolo M. Cruz vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 30 SCRA 917 [1969])

In another case, the Court noted that the complainant union members had not ratified the Return-to-Work Agreement. It follows that they cannot be held bound by the Return-to-Work Agreement. The waiver of money claims, which in this case were accrued money claims, by workers and employees must be regarded as a personal right, that is, a right that must be personally exercised.

For a waiver thereof to be legally effective, the individual consent or ratification of the workers or employees involved must be shown. Neither the officers nor the majority of the union had any authority to waive the accrued rights pertaining to the dissenting minority members, even under a collective bargaining agreement which provided for a "union shop."

The same consideration of public policy which impelled the Court to reach the conclusion it did in Manggagawa sa La Campana vs. Sarmiento (133 SCRA 220) are equally compelling in the present case. The members of the union need the protective shield of this doctrine not only vis-a-vis their employer, but also, at times, vis-a-vis the management of their own union, and at other times even against their own imprudence or impecuniousness. (General Rubber and Footwear Corp. vs. Drilon, 169 SCRA 808 [1989])

Compromise Agreement Binds Minority Members of Union

noreply@blogger.com (Jess V. Quijano) — Thu, 30 Jul 2009 02:38:00 +0000

A compromise agreement between the Union and the Company, pursuant to which the complaint in an unfair labor practice case had been withdrawn and dismissed, is binding upon the minority members of the union. The action taken by said minority members in disauthorizing the counsel of record and filing another unfair labor practice case against the company is contrary to the policy of the Magna Carta of Labor, which promotes the settlement of differences between management and labor by mutual agreement. If said action were tolerated, no employer would ever enter into any compromise agreement, for the minority members of the union will always dishonor the terms of the agreement and demand their better terms. (See Dionela vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 8 SCRA 832 [1963])

G.R. No. 174209

noreply@blogger.com (Jess V. Quijano) — Wed, 29 Jul 2009 10:44:00 +0000

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 174209

August 25, 2009

PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY,

Petitioner,

- versus -

RIZALINA RAUT, LEILA EMNACE and GINA CAPISTRANO,

Respondents.

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] in CA-GR SP. No. 85829 which affirmed the National Labor Relations Commission’s (NLRC’s) dismissal[2] of petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company’s Memorandum of Appeal for failure to attach thereto the requisite Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping.

The facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:

This case was originally filed on December 17, 1996 by Rizalina Raut and [Leila] Emnace against Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT for brevity) for illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries, overtime pay, night shift differential, 13th month pay, service incentive leave, backwages with moral damages and attorney’s fees. Gina Capistrano followed suit by filing a similar case on January 18, 1997. These cases were consolidated by the Labor Arbiter on February 25, 1997 due to similarity of facts and issues involved.

In the complaint, signed and verified by the respondents, they alleged that they were illegally dismissed on November 30, 1996 and December 16, 1996 respectively.

In the decision of the Labor Arbiter promulgated on July 30, 1997, it reinstated the respondents x x x to their former position as telephone operators or if not feasible anymore to another equal position without loss of seniority rights and benefits and to pay the following backwages which are subject to recomputation up to the date of the finality of the decision as follows:

1. Rizalina Raut -

P32,505.00

2. [Leila] Emnace -

P32,505.00

3. Gina Capistrano -

P34,320.00

P99,330.00

Soon after, the respondents were reinstated on December 16, 1998, but allegedly continued to be treated as temporary employees of the petitioner.

Petitioner appealed the decision, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Honorable Labor Arbiter, insisting that the respondents were never employees of the petitioner but that of independent contractor, Peerless Integrated Services, Inc.

In respondents’ Answer to the Appeal, respondents argued that their functions were no different from those performed by the regular employees. They aver that they were trained by petitioner to become Traffic Operator, a position that is categorized as technical. Now, if they were trained to be skilled workers, how come they were extended only contractual employment of ten (10) months? Aside from that, respondents maintained that the claim of the petitioner that their arrangement with Peerless to supply it with various types of workers “in order to augment its present workforce” is but a scheme to subvert their tenurial security. According to respondents, petitioner expressly admits that Peerless provides only the workers. Thus, its contract with the former is one of “labor only” contracting, which is specifically prohibited under Sec. 9 (b) Rule VIII of the Omnibus Rules in relation to Article 106 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.

Subsequently, on April 30, 1998, the NLRC rendered a Decision affirming with modification the Decision of the Honorable Labor Arbiter. In addition to those already granted, petitioner x x x is further ordered to pay respondents their overtime pay, nightshift differential pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in a Resolution promulgated by the NLRC dated September 25, 1998.

Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. However, the court rendered a Decision dated September 24, 1999, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“Wherefore, with the modification that the 13th month pay for respondents Raut and Emnace for the period August 16, 1995 to June 15, 1996 and for respondent Capistrano for the period of August 1, 1995 to May 31, 1996 should be deducted from the computation of the awards to private respondents, the assailed Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED.”

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the court. In effect, its aforesaid Decision became final and executory on March 26, 2000 per Entry of Judgment.

On April 24, 2002, respondents filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution which was granted by the Labor Arbiter in an Order dated June 21, 2002, the dispositive portion of which viz.:

“Wherefore, let a writ of execution be issued for the enforcement of the following awards:
1. Rizalina Raut - P354,535.36
2. [Leila] Emnace - P354,535.36
3. Gina Capistrano - P354,535.36
____________
P1,063,606.00”[3]

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the order to the NLRC which, as previously adverted to, dismissed petitioner’s Memorandum of Appeal for failure to attach a Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping.

Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC’s dismissal of its appeal. Once again, petitioner fared no better in the CA; its petition for certiorari was denied due course.

Indefatigably, petitioner comes before us on appeal by certiorari raising the following issues for our resolution:

1. WHETHER x x x THE DECISION DATED APRIL 18, 2006 OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, WHICH AFFIRMED RESOLUTION DATED JANUARY 15, 2004 AND RESOLUTION DATED JULY 26, 2004, BOTH ISSUED BY THE NLRC, IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT.
2. WHETHER x x x THE OMISSION OF THE CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING IN THE APPEAL MEMORANDUM WARRANTS THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITIONER’S APPEAL FROM THE ORDER DATED JUNE 21, 2002 OF THE LABOR ARBITER TO THE NLRC.
3. WHETHER x x x THE ORDER DATED JUNE 21, 2002 OF LABOR ARBITER ERNESTO F. CARREON DIRECTING THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF EXECUTION FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE AWARD OF [P]354,535.36 TO EACH OF THE RESPONDENTS, WHICH WAS AFFIRMED IN TOTO BY THE NLRC’S DECISION DATED JANUARY 15, 2004[,] AND WHICH[,] IN TURN[,] WAS AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED APRIL 18, 2006, IS NULL AND VOID.[4]

The definitive issue boils down to whether the CA erred in affirming the NLRC’s dismissal of petitioner’s appeal for failing to attach a Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping.

We find the petition bereft of merit. We note that petitioner deftly brought to the fore the validity of the Labor Arbiter’s order of execution. However, even on this issue, the appeal lacks merit.

The decision of the CA is consistent with both law and jurisprudence. Petitioner’s contention – that the only jurisdictional requirements of appeal are: (1) the perfection of the appeal within the reglementary period of ten (10) days from receipt of the decision, award, or order; and (2) the posting of a cash or surety bond in appeals involving monetary awards, as specified under Article 223 of the Labor Code – is wrong. Petitioner is mistaken in confining the perfection of an appeal to compliance with just those requisites.

The perfection of an appeal necessarily includes the filing of a complete (not a defective) memorandum of appeal within the ten (10) day reglementary period. Petitioner conveniently disregards that the NLRC Rules of Procedure requires the appeal to be accompanied by a Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping.[5] Thus, petitioner’s filing of a memorandum of appeal without the requisite certificate did not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal. In short, the Order of Execution of the Labor Arbiter became final and executory.

Our ruling in Accessories Specialist, Inc. v. Alabanza[6] emphasizes the nature of an appeal:

Furthermore, we would like to reiterate that appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege. Thus, parties who seek to avail themselves of it must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it. Perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is mandatory and jurisdictional. The requirements for perfecting an appeal must, as a rule, be strictly followed. Such requirements are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and are necessary for the orderly discharge of the judicial business. Failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment of the court final and executory. Just as a losing party has the privilege to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so does the winner also have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision.

In the case at bar, the judgment against petitioner became final and executory on March 26, 2000. However, to this day, respondents are prevented from enjoying fruits of the final judgment in their favor because of petitioner’s frivolous appeal against an order of execution.

To lend some semblance of merit to its appeal and to further delay the execution of judgment against it, petitioner insists that the Labor Arbiter’s order of execution is null and void for increasing the judgment award in the original decision. Petitioner likewise avers that nothing appears in the dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter’s decision that respondents ought to be reinstated as regular employees.

Petitioner’s contention splits hairs. Indeed, an order of execution must conform to the decision sought to be enforced.[7] The Labor Arbiter’s order of execution does ostensibly appear to increase the original judgment award if, as what petitioner has done, only the dispositive portions of the lower tribunals’ decisions are laid out. However, we point out that the Labor Arbiter’s decision specifically declared “that the [respondents] were never the employees of Peerless Integrated Services, Inc., as they were all the time employees of [petitioner].”

We need not belabor the point. It is quite apparent from the respective decisions of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA that respondents were found to be regular employees of petitioner. Article 279, in relation to Article 280 of the Labor Code, confirms the nature of employment of respondents regardless of petitioner’s unschooled opinion. The articles read:

ART. 279. Security of Tenure. – In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. – The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.

Thus, the lower tribunals all affirmed the order of reinstatement of respondents and their corresponding entitlement to the payment of salaries and other benefits received by petitioner’s regular employees.

Finally, on the increase in the computation of the monetary award to respondents, the decision of the Labor Arbiter specified that for purposes of putting up a bond should petitioner appeal, the backwages were computed only for a certain period. Otherwise, the actual backwages to be paid to respondents are computed from the date of dismissal until the finality of the decision. In addition, because petitioner continues to refuse and accord regular status to respondents and to pay them their corresponding wages even after the lapse of two (2) years from the finality of the Labor Arbiter’s decision, the Labor Arbiter correctly included that in its order of execution. Thus, the Labor Arbiter’s order of execution simply covered the correct computation of wages and other payments enjoyed by petitioner’s regular employees.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 85829 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

Acting Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

Acting Chairperson, Third Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

* Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago per Special Order No. 679 dated August 3, 2009.

** In lieu of Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago per Special Order No. 678 dated August 3, 2009.

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos, with Justices Enrico Lanzanas and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 37-45.
[2] Rollo, pp. 67-69.
[3] Id. at 38-40.
[4] Id. at 260.
[5] See Rule VI, Section 4 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure.
[6] G.R. No. 168985, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 550, 562-563, citing Cuevas v. Bais Steel Corporation, 439 Phil. 793, 805 (2002).
[7] Banquerigo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164633, August 7, 2006, 498 SCRA 169.

Right of the Labor Union to Represent Its Members

noreply@blogger.com (Jess V. Quijano) — Wed, 29 Jul 2009 02:02:00 +0000

It is the function precisely of a labor union such as petitioner to carry the representation of its members particularly against the employer's labor practices against it and its members. It can file an action for their benefit and behalf without joining them and to avoid the cumbersome procedure of joining each and every member as a separate party under Rule 3, Section 3 of the Rules of Court. (Davao Free Workers Front vs. CIR, 60 SCRA 408 [1974])

In Liberty Manufacturing Workers Union vs. Court of First Instance, the Court reiterated the view that a labor union has the requisite personality to sue on behalf of its members for their individual money claims. It would be an unwarranted impairment of the right to self-organization through formation of labor organizations if thereafter such collective entities would be barred from instituting action in their representative capacity. (La Carlota Sugar Central vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 64 SCRA 78 [1975])

Compromise agreements between employer and employees are valid only when made in good faith. The Union and its attorney should be allowed to participate in the making of compromise settlements with employees. In one case, petitioner Company was adjudged to have acted with evident bad faith and malice when it secured the 53 quitclaim agreements individually with the 53 sugar workers without the intervention of court. This subterfuge is tantamount to a sabotage of the interest of respondent association. Needless to say, the means employed by petitioner in dealing with the workers individually, instead of collectively through respondent and its counsel, violates good morale as they undermine the unity of respondent union and fuels industrial disputes, contrary to the declared policy in the Industrial Peace Act. (Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. vs. CIR, 114 SCRA 725 [1982])

G.R. No. 75602

noreply@blogger.com (Jess V. Quijano) — Wed, 29 Jul 2009 01:15:00 +0000

SUPREME COURT

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 75602

December 29, 1989

TRANS-ORIENT OVERSEAS CONTRACTORS, INC. and

JOINT VENTURE YIT-VESIPEKKA,

Petitioners,

- versus -

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,

HON. ELMOR D. JURIDICO and

DISDADO P. VILLARAMA, JR.,

Respondents.

x-------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

PADILLA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review (treated as a Petition for Certiorari) of the majority Resolution[1] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Third Division, affirming in toto the Decision[2] of respondent Director Elmor D. Juridico of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), the decretal portion of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, respondents Trans-Orient Overseas Contractors, Inc. and Joint Venture YV YIT-VESIPEKKA are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the complainant the following sums:

1. US $15,839.99 or its Peso equivalent representing salaries for the remaining period of nine months and twenty seven days considering that complainant was illegally terminated. chanroblespublishingcompany
2. US $929.67 as reimbursement of travel expenses.
Insofar as complainant’s other claims, this Office cannot award the same for lack of merit and without basis.

SO ORDERED.”

The facts, as stated in the comment of the Solicitor General, are as follows:

“On June 12, 1981, petitioners hired private respondent Diosdado Villarama, Jr. as camp physician at their Taijat Island Resort or YIT-VESIPEKKA jobsite in Baghdad, Iraq at a monthly salary of US $1,600.00 for a period of twelve (12) months commencing from the date he would leave Manila.

On August 18, 1981, private respondent departed from Manila, subject to a probation period of ninety (90) days, to commence from the actual date of work at the jobsite. The contract of employment pertinently stated:

‘3. Probation Period -- The employee shall be under probation for a period of 90 days commencing from the actual starting date of the Employee’s work in the work location. If the employee fails to meet the requirement as to the skill and willingness to work or fails to adjust himself to the rules and regulations for the camp and the working conditions, or if he in any way gets in conflict, with the
local laws and regulations’, he will immediately be sent back to the country of recruitment.’

On August 22, 1981, respondent Villarama immediately attended to emergency consultations. During the following days, the work operations being twenty four (24) hours a day, he attended to consultations and treatment of workers from 5:30 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. or 12:00 midnight.

On September 3, 1981, he wrote Seppo Havia, the Personnel Manager, about the availability for use of a service coaster in emergency cases for transporting patients to the hospitals. He added that although Havia had assured him the availability of a service coaster for ambulance use, he had yet to obtain permission from the Finnish supervisor whenever the need arose.

On September 7, 1981, he again wrote Havia about the need to provide workers with safety boots and heavy duty hand gloves to minimize, if not prevent, the widespread incidence of punctured wounds of the feet as well as lacerations and crushing injuries of the hands of workers. He also wrote Borja, officer-in-charge of the Filipino camp area, on the cleanliness and sanitation of the camp. He requested receptacles with covers for waste matter so as to eliminate the sticky pungy smell of the place.

On September 12, 1981, he wrote again to Havia regarding the quality and variety of food being served on Filipino workers. This complaint was answered. A letter was written to the concessionaire, warning on the problems of food served to workers.

On September 26, 1981, he wrote another letter suggesting that immediate action be taken to correct the continued serving of spoiled food which had caused diarrhea and loose bowel movement among the workers. Instead of taking immediate action on the complaint, Havia took samples of the food and sent them to a laboratory to test whether the food was spoiled or not.

On October 16, 1981, respondent Villarama’s employment contract was terminated by Havia. chanroblespublishingcompany

Upon receipt of the letter of termination, he verbally protested the same, but to no avail. He also demanded payment of his salaries and overtime pay but was told that the amount would be sent to him in Manila.

In Manila, after pressing for payment, he was paid first P10,000.00, then after filing a complaint, later amended, P23,853.09 for salaries up to October 15, 1981.

On February 23, 1982, he filed an amended complaint alleging among others, that he was prematurely and unlawfully terminated.

On February 7, 1983, after the parties had filed their respective position papers and other pleadings, respondent Director Juridico rendered the questioned decision.”[3]

The motions for reconsideration filed by both parties were initially dismissed by the NLRC on 29 February 1984 for their failure to comply substantially with the jurisdictional requirements of appeal. However, on 25 June 1986, the NLRC reconsidered its resolution and gave the appeals due course. On 25 June 1986, the NLRC, through a majority of two (2) commissioners, with one (1) commissioner dissenting, issued the now assailed resolution dismissing the appeals of both parties for lack of merit, and affirming the decision of the POEA.[4]

Hence, this petition.

The only issue to be resolved in the petition is whether or not public respondents gravely abused their discretion in holding that Diosdado P. Villarama was illegally dismissed by petitioners.

It is the contention of petitioners that Villarama, a probationary employee, was terminated for his failure to meet the performance standards set by them for regularization.

Petitioners argue that in terminating Villarama’s services, they were merely exercising their reserved prerogative of probationary termination for, after all, the selection of employees is of particular importance to any employer, as it effects the enterprise in no small measure.

Probationary termination, according to petitioners, is not the same as dismissal for cause. They maintain that as long as an employer does not abuse his discretion in exercising his reserved prerogative of probationary termination, the dismissal of an employee under probation who fails to qualify for regularization is not illegal.

Petitioners assert the public respondents should not have substituted their (respondents’) own discretion and judgment in deciding whether an employee is to be terminated or regularized; and since public respondents did substitute their judgment for that of the employer, this was grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.

In further support of their position, petitioners contend that they gave Villarama guidelines for the operation of the clinic, e.g., regular clinic hours; personnel rotation; maintenance of hygiene and sanitation; medical records; etc.

They allege that Villarama failed to schedule clinic hours within his eight (8) hour regular work, which resulted in unnecessary overtime work. He likewise failed to comply with company rules on the observance of prior requests and authorizations for medical treatment and established procedures for emergency consultations. Instead, petitioners state, Villarama dismissed these instructions as impossible to comply with, as he was the only camp physician and that he had to treat all medical referrals coming to him as emergency cases. Petitioners further allege that Villarama met with hostility petitioners’ reminders to him to keep the first aid kits replenished and the clinic surroundings clean and sanitary.

On the matter of the quality of food served in the camp, petitioners maintain that they tried to find solutions to the complaints of the Filipino workers but, unfortunately, Villarama instead of cooperating with management in finding solutions to the very problems he perceived, accused petitioners of maintaining sub-human conditions in his memorandum to the personnel manager and went so far as to circularize these “Memos” not only inside the job site but even furnished copies thereof to various Philippine government agencies, including the Office of the President.

Last but not least, petitioners aver that Villarama’s performance should reflect not only his skills as a doctor, which they do not question, but also his overall competence in all areas of activity covered by his assigned task as camp physician. As camp physician, they expected Villarama not only to be medically competent but likewise possessed of effective management and administrative skills in order to effectively run and operate the camp clinic. In short, Villarama’s performance and willingness to work must be judged, according to petitioners, on his work attitude, relationship with co-employees, adjustment to work and camp conditions, rapport with other site officials and the ability to work as a team.

Petitioners submit that POEA made no express finding that they (petitioners) were guilty of grave abuse of discretion in terminating Villarama but only concluded that Villarama was dismissed mainly to silence him because of his compilation and distribution of letters critical of petitioners’ operation which tended to be detrimental to the interest of petitioners.

On the other hand, private respondent contends that work at the jobsite was a 24-hour operation. Being the only camp physician, he had to work beyond the eight (8) regular clinic hours. For this reason, he avers, he found himself attending to consultations and treatment of workers as early as 5:30 a.m. and as late as 11:00 p.m. or 12:00 midnight. He alleges that because he noticed the high incidence of punctured wounds in the feet and lacerations and crushing injuries of the workers’ hands, he was prompted to write to the personnel manager suggesting that safety boots and heavy duty hand gloves be provided the workers. Another memo he had to write concerned food being served to Filipino workers. He alleged that spoiled food was served to the Filipino workers with deleterious effect.

Villarama maintains that when he wrote “memos” to the personnel manager, he was merely taking the cudgels for the workers whose health and safety were his concern as the camp physician and to “wake up” management. It was, he adds, a legitimate exercise of freedom of speech and of expression equally important to the cause of labor in this country and anywhere in the world. He insists that his dismissal is mainly because of his compilation and distribution of letters in which he criticized the operation of JV Yit-Vesipekka and its subcontractors, which petitioners regarded as an intentional action against the employer.

The petition must fail.

Undoubtedly, Villarama’s skill as a physician is not questioned by petitioners. They, however, submit that the term “skills” more accurately refers to Villarama’s overall competence as a camp physician, which covers possession of effective management and administrative ability in supervising and operating the camp clinic. Furthermore, petitioners accuse Villarama of refusing to cooperate with the site management and actually discrediting petitioners in the public eye.

Admittedly, Villarama was the only doctor in the camp who could attend to the medical cases referred to him. The locale was a construction site on a 24-hour operation. Hence, injuries to the workers could be expected to occur not only during daytime but even at night time. True, guidelines were set regarding clinic hours but, as already stated, injuries and emergency cases could occur at any time.

Petitioners, instead of resenting Villarama’s suggestion to provide the workers with heavy duty gloves and safety boots, should have welcomed the same, as it would minimize, if not totally avoid the cases of injuries that the doctor had to treat.

The letters/memos written by private respondent, e.g., the serving of spoiled food and the short supply of food to the workers, proved that Villarama was not only concerned with the health of the workers but showed that he was also concerned with the interest of petitioners who in the long run would be spared strikes called by workers complaining about the quality and quantity of food served to them.

The Court agrees with the finding of public respondents that Villarama’s letters were constructively written, calling the attention of petitioners to the conditions at the jobsite. The tenor of the letters was informative. We do not discern any intent on the part of private respondent to discredit petitioners. Had petitioners taken more time to implement the suggestions of Villarama concerning the problems of the workers, a more pleasant and understanding working relationship would have developed to their mutual benefit. But, unfortunately, petitioners opted to dismiss private respondent after only two (2) months, even as they claimed to be working towards a solution to the problems cited by private respondent.

Petitioners cite the case of Grand Motor Parts Corp. vs. Minister of Labor (130 SCRA 436) to justify their dismissal of Villanueva.

That case cannot be applied to the case at bar. There, private respondent was hired as manager of a branch store, a position he never held before. On his managerial skills hinged the success and profitability of the business. He was found negligent in submitting reports vital to business operations and lax in implementing company policies.

In the case at bar, private respondent was hired specifically as a camp physician. His skills as a doctor were never questioned by petitioners. He was not found to be ineffective or inept as a physician. There were no complaints from the workers against him. What petitioners allegedly question is the administrative skills of Villarama in running the clinic. But these skills are only corollary to his main work as a camp physician. In truth, petitioners became unhappy at having to pay an “alarming claim” for overtime pay by respondent Villarama. They faulted him with the non-replenishment of the first-aid kits and the dirty state of the clinic premises. These conditions were satisfactorily explained by private respondent.

In fine, petitioners’ dismissal of private respondent was not based on any of the grounds provided in the contract of employment entered into between them. We are more inclined to believe and agree with the respondents that Villarama was dismissed because petitioners’ personnel manager resented the act of Villarama of writing memos calling the manager’s attention to the problems in the camp site and furnishing copies of said memos to government agencies and the Office of the President of the Philippines, which act petitioners perceived as detrimental to their interest.

In the final analysis, petitioners are not raising in the case at bar a question of jurisdiction but only questions of fact. As aptly observed by the Solicitor General, in reality petitioners are claiming that respondent officials erred in not believing their submission that Villarama had failed to meet the prescribed standards for regularization and in giving credence to Villarama’s claim to the contrary.

Clearly, this is a factual issue.[5] Factual findings of the NLRC are not correctible by certiorari;[6] in fact they are binding on this Court in the absence of any showing that they are completely without any support in the evidence on record.

We do not believe that public respondents acted capriciously and whimsically in their exercise of judgment as to warrant a conclusion that there was, on their part, a grave abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

-------------------

[1] Commissioners Guillermo C. Medina and Gabriel M. Gatchalian concurred; Commissioner Miguel B. Valera dissented.
[2] Annex B, pp. 34-45, Rollo.
[3] Rollo, pp. 261-264.
[4] Annex “A”, pp. 29-30, ibid.
[5] p. 272, ibid.
[6] Manila Hotel Corp. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. L-53453, January 22 1986, 141 SCRA 169; CCLU vs. NLRC, G.R. Nos. L-35955-56, October 31, 1974, 60 SCRA 450.

G.R. No. 100898

noreply@blogger.com (Jess V. Quijano) — Wed, 29 Jul 2009 01:04:00 +0000

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 100898 July 5, 1993

ALEX FERRER, RAFAEL FERRER HENRY DIAZ, DOMINGO BANCOLITA, GIL DE GUZMAN, and FEDERATION OF DEMOCRATIC LABOR UNIONS, (FEDLU), petitioners,

vs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION), HUI KAM CHANG (In his capacity as General Manager of Occidental Foundry Corporation), OCCIDENTAL FOUNDRY CORPORATION, MACEDONIO S. VELASCO (In his capacity as representative of the Federation of Free Workers), GENARO CAPITLE, JESUS TUMAGAN, ERNESTO BARROGA, PEDRO LLENA, GODOFREDO PACHECO, MARCELINO CASTILLO, GEORGE IGNAS, PIO DOMINGO, and JAIME BAYNADO, respondents.

Genrosa P. Jacinto and Raymundo D. Mallilin for private respondents.

MELO, J.:

The petition for certiorari before us seeks to annul and set aside: (a) the decision dated June 20, 1991 of the Second Division of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) (Penned by Commissioner Rustico L. Diokno and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Edna Bonto-Perez and Commissioner Domingo H. Zapanta) which affirmed in toto the decision of April 5, 1990 of Labor Arbiter Eduardo J. Carpio dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice on the ground that both the company and the union merely complied with the collective bargaining agreement provision sanctioning the termination of any employee who fails to retain membership in good standing with the union; and (b) the NLRC resolution denying the motion for the reconsideration of said decision (NLRC NCR Case No. 00-10-04855-89).

Petitioners were regular and permanent employees of the Occidental Foundry Corporation (OFC) in Malanday, Valenzuela, Metro Manila which was under the management of Hui Kam Chang. As piece workers, petitioners' earnings ranged from P110 to P140 a day. They had been in the employ of OFC for about ten years at the time of their dismissal in 1989 (p. 38, Rollo).

On January 5, 1989, the Samahang Manggagawa ng Occidental Foundry Corporation-FFW (SAMAHAN) and the OFC entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which would be effective for the three-year period between October 1, 1988 and September 30, 1991 (Memorandum for OFC and Hui Kam Chang, p. 6, Rollo; p. 551). Article II thereof provides for a union security clause thus:

Sec. 1 — The company agrees that all permanent and regular factory workers in the company who are members in good standing of the union or who thereafter may become members, shall as a condition of continued employment, maintain their membership in the union in good standing for the duration of the agreement.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3 — The parties agree that failure to retain membership in good standing with the UNION shall be ground for the operation of paragraph 1 hereof and the dismissal by the company of the aforesaid employee upon written request by the union. The aforesaid request shall be accompanied by a verified carbon original of the Board of (sic) Resolution by the UNION signed by at least a majority of its officers/directors. (p. 562, Rollo.)

On May 6, 1989, petitioner Alex Ferrer and the SAMAHAN, filed in the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), a complaint for the expulsion from SAMAHAN of the following officers: Genaro Capitle (president), Jesus Tumagan (vice-president), Godofredo Pacheco (auditor), and Marcelino Pacheco (board member) (Case No. NCR-00-M-89-11-01). The complaint was founded on said officers' alleged inattentiveness to the economic demands of the workers. However, on September 4, 1989, petitioners Diaz and Alex Ferrer withdrew the petition (p. 590, Rollo).

On September 10, 1989, petitioners conducted a special election of officers of the SAMAHAN (pp. 205 & 583, Rollo). Said election was, however, later questioned by the FFW. Nonetheless, the elected set of officers tried to dissuade the OFC from remitting union dues to the officers led by Capitle who were allied with the FFW. Later, however, Romulo Erlano, one of the officers elected at the special election, manifested to the DOLE that he was no longer objecting to the remittance of union dues to the officers led by Capitle. Petitioners' move to stage a strike based on economic demands was also later disowned by members of the SAMAHAN.

The intraunion squabble came to a head when, on September 11, 1989, a resolution expelling petitioners from the SAMAHAN was issued by the aforesaid union officials headed by Capitle, together with board members George Ignas, Pio Domingo, and Jaime Baynado (pp. 286 & 599, Rollo). The following day, Capitle sent OFC the following letter:

12 September 1989

Mr. Hui Kam Chang
General Manager
Malanday, Valenzuela
Metro Manila

Dear Mr. Chang:

In compliance with Article II, Sec. 3 of the Union Security Clause as enunciated in our Collective Bargaining Agreement, I would like you to dismiss the following employees on the ground of failure to retain membership in good standing:

1. Alex Ferrer
2. Gil de Guzman
3. Henry Diaz
4. Domingo Bancolita
5. Rafael Ferrer, Jr.

Attached herewith is the verified carbon original of the Board Resolution of the union signed by the majority of its officers/directors.

Thank you very much.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.)
GENARO CAPITLE
President
(p. 66, Rollo.)

Although petitioners received this letter weeks after its date, it appears that on that same date, they had learned about their dismissal from employment as shown by the letter also dated September 13, 1989 which they sent the Federation of Democratic Labor Unions (FEDLU). They volunteered therein to be admitted as members of the FEDLU and requested that they be represented ("katawanin") by said federation before the DOLE in the complaint which they intended to file against the union (SAMAHAN), the FFW and the company for illegal dismissal, reinstatement, and other benefits in accordance with law (p. 74, Rollo).

Thereafter, on various dates, petitioners sent individual letters to Hui Kam Chang professing innocence of the charges levelled against them by the SAMAHAN and the FFW and pleading that they be reinstated (pp. 69-73, Rollo). Their letters appear to have elicited no response.

Thus, contending that their dismissal was without cause and in utter disregard of their right to due process of law, petitioners, through the FEDLU, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice before the NLRC against Hui Kam Chang, OFC, Macedonio S. Velasco (as representative of the FFW) the FFW, and the SAMAHAN officers headed by Capitle (p. 75, Rollo).

In due course, after the case was ventilated through position papers and other documents, the labor arbiter rendered a decision dismissing petitioners' complaint (pp. 79-89, Rollo). He found that in dismissing petitioners, OFC was "merely complying with the mandatory provisions of the CBA — the law between it and the union." He added:

To register compliance with the said covenant, all that is necessary is a written request of the union requesting dismissal of the employees who have failed to retain membership in good standing with the union. The matter or question, therefore of determining why and how did complainants fail to retain membership in good standing is not for the company to inquire via formal investigation. By having the request of the union, a legal presumption that the request was born out of a formal inquiry by the union that subject employees failed to exist. This means generally that where a valid closed shop or similar agreement is in force with respect to a particular bargaining unit as in the case a quo, the employer shall refuse to employ any person unless he is a member of the majority union and the employer shall dismiss employees who fail to retain their membership in the majority union. This must be deemed a just cause recognized by law and jurisprudence. The effect is discrimination to encourage membership in other unions. (pp. 86-87, Rollo.)

Hence, the labor arbiter concluded, the dismissal of petitioners was an exercise of legitimate management prerogative which cannot be considered as an unfair labor practice. On whether the SAMAHAN and the FFW could be held liable for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice, the arbiter opined that since there was no employer-employee relationship between petitioners and respondent unions, the complaint against the latter has no factual and legal bases, because petitioners "should not have confused expulsion from membership in the union as one and the same incident to their subsequent employment termination."

Consequently, petitioners appealed to the NLRC on the grounds that there was prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the labor arbiter and that he committed serious errors in his findings of facts.

On June 20, 1991, the NLRC rendered the herein questioned decision affirming in toto the decision of the arbiter. Petitioners motion for the reconsideration of the NLRC decision having been denied, they resorted to the instant petition for certiorari which presents the issue of wether or not respondent Commision gravely abused its discretion in affirming the decision of the labor arbiter which is allegedly in defiance of the elementary principles of procedural due process as the petitioners were summarily dismissed from employment without an investigation having been conducted by the OFC on the veracity of the allegation of the SAMAHAN-FFW that they violated the CBA.

A CBA is the law between the company and the union and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy to give protection to labor. Said policy should be given paramount consideration unless otherwise provided for by law (Meycauayan College vs. Drilon, 185 SCRA 50 [1990]. A CBA provision for a closed shop is a valid form of union security and it is not a restriction on the right or freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution (Lirag Textile Mill, Inc. vs. Blanco, 109 SCRA 87 [1981]. However, in the implementation of the provisions of the CBA, both parties thereto should see to it that no right is violated or impaired. In the case at bar, while it is true that the CBA between OFC and the SAMAHAN provided for the dismissal of employees who have not maintained their membership in the union, the manner in which the dismissal was enforced left much to be desired in terms of respect for the right of petitioners to procedural due process.

In the first place, the union has a specific provision for the permanent or temporary "expulsion" of its erring members in its constitution and by-laws ("saligang batas at alituntunin"). Under the heading membership and removal ("pag-aanib at pagtitiwalag"), it states:

Sec. 4. Ang sinumang kasapi ay maaring itwalag (sic) ng Samahan pangsamantala o tuluyan sa pamamagitan (sic) ng tatlo't ikaapat (¾) na bahagi ng dami ng bilang ng Pamunuang Tagapagpaganap. Pagkaraan lamang sa pandinig sa kanyang kaso. Batay sa sumusunod:

(a) Sinumang gumawa ng mga bagay bagay na labag at lihis sa patakaran ng Samahan.

(b) Sinumang gumawa ng mga bagay na maaaring ikabuwag ng Samahan.

(c) Hindi paghuhulog ng butaw sa loob ng tatlong buwan na walang sakit o Doctor's Certificate.

(d) Hindi pagbibigay ng abuloy na itinatadhana ng Samahan.

(e) Sinumang kasapi na natanggal sa kapisanan at gustong, sumapi uli ay magpapanibago ng bilang, mula sa taon ng kanyang pagsapi uli sa Samahan. (Emphasis supplied; Ibid., p. 177).

No hearing ("pandinig") was ever conducted by the SAMAHAN to look into petitioners' explanation of their moves to oust the union leadership under Capitle, or their subsequent affiliation with FEDLU. While it is true that petitioners' actions might have precipitated divisiveness and, later, showed disloyalty to the union, still, the SAMAHAN should have observed its own constitution and by-laws by giving petitioners an opportunity to air their side and explain their moves. If, after an investigation the petitioners were found to have violated union rules, then and only then should they be subjected to proper disciplinary measures.

Here lies the distinction between the facts of this case and that of Cariño vs. NLRC (185 SCRA 177 [1990]) upon which the Solicitor General heavily relies in supporting the stand of petitioners. In Cariño, the erring union official was given the chance to answer the complaints against him before an investigating committee created for that purpose. On the other, hand, herein petitioners were not given even one opportunity to explain their side in the controversy. This procedural lapse should not have been overlooked considering the union security provision of the CBA.

4. Turning now to the involvement of the Company in the dismissal of petitioner Cariño, we note that the Company upon being formally advised in writing of the expulsion of petitioner Cariño from the Union, in turn simply issued a termination letter to Cariño, the termination being made effective the very next day. We believe that the Company should have given petitioner Cariño an opportunity to explain his side of the controversy with the Union. Notwithstanding the Union's Security Clause in the CBA, the Company should have reasonably satisfied itself by its own inquiry that the Union had not been merely acting arbitrarily and capriciously in impeaching and expelling petitioner Cariño . . .

xxx xxx xxx

5. We conclude that the Company had failed to accord to petitioner Cariño the latter's right to procedural due process. The right of an employee to be informed of the charges against him and to reasonable opportunity to present his side in a controversy with either the Company or his own Union, is not wiped away by a Union Security Clause or a Union Shop Clause in a CBA. An employee is entitled to be protected not only from a company which disregards his rights but also from his own Union the leadership of which could yield to the temptation of swift and arbitrary expulsion from membership and hence dismissal from his job. (pp. 186 & 189.)

The need for a company investigation is founded on the consistent ruling of this Court that the twin requirements of notice and hearing which are essential elements of due process must be met in employment-termination cases. The employee concerned must be notified of the employer's intent to dismiss him and of the reason or reasons for the proposed dismissal. The hearing affords the employee an opportunity to answer the charge or charges against him and to defend himself therefrom before dismissal is effected (Kwikway Engineering Works vs. NLRC, 195 SCRA 526 [1991]; Salaw vs. NLRC, 202 SCRA 7 [1991]). Observance to the letter of company rules on investigation of an employee about to be dismissed is not mandatory. It is enough that there is due notice and hearing before a decision to dismiss is made (Mendoza vs. NLRC, 195 SCRA 606 (1991]). But even if no hearing is conducted, the requirement of due process would have been met where a chance to explain a party's side of the controversy had been accorded him (Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. NLRC, 198 SCRA 748 [1991]).

If an employee may be considered illegally dismissed because he was not accorded fair investigation (Hellenic Philippine Shipping vs. Siete, 195 SCRA 179 (1991]), the more reason there is to strike down as an inexcusable and disdainful rejection of due process a situation where there is no investigation at all (See: Colegio del Sto. Niño vs. NLRC, 197 SCRA 611 [1991]; Artex Development Co., Inc. vs. NLRC, 187 SCRA 611 [1990]). The need for the observance of an employee's right to procedural due process in termination cases cannot be overemphasized. After all, one's employment, profession, trade, or calling is a "property right" and the wrongful interference therewith gives rise to an actionable wrong (Callanta vs. Carnation Philippines, Inc., 145 SCRA 268 (1986]). Verily, a man's right to his labor is property within the meaning of constitutional guarantees which he cannot be deprived of without due process (Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 71 SCRA 470 [1976]).

While the law recognizes the right of an employer to dismiss employees in warranted cases, it frowns upon arbitrariness as when employees are not accorded due process (Tan, Jr. vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 651 [1990]). Thus, the prerogatives of the OFC to dismiss petitioners should not have been whimsically done for it unduly exposed itself to a charge of unfair labor practice for dismissing petitioners in line with the closed shop provision of the CBA, without a proper hearing (Tropical Hut Employees' Union-CGW vs. Tropical Hut Food Market, Inc., 181 SCRA 173 [1990]; citing Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., Inc. (BISCOM) vs. Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), 8 SCRA 700 [1983]). Neither can the manner of dismissal be considered within the ambit of managerial prerogatives, for while termination of employment is traditionally considered a management prerogative, it is not an absolute prerogative subject as it is to limitations founded in law, the CBA, or general principles of fair play and justice (University of Sto. Tomas vs. NLRC, 190 SCRA 758 [1990]).

Under Rule XIV, Sections 2, 5, and 6 of the rules implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, the OFC and the SAMAHAN should solidarity indemnify petitioners for the violation of their right to procedural due process (Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation vs. NLRC, 187 SCRA 694[1990], citing Wenphil vs. NLRC, 170 SCRA 69 [1989], Cariño vs. NLRC, supra). However, such penalty may be imposed only where the termination of employment is justified and not when the dismissal is illegal as in this case where the damages are in the form of back wages.

As earlier discussed, petitioners' alleged act of sowing disunity among the members of the SAMAHAN could have been ventilated and threshed out through a grievance procedure within the union itself. But resort to such procedure was not pursued. What actually happened in this case was that some members, including petitioners, tried to unseat the SAMAHAN leadership headed by Capitle due to the latter's alleged inattention to petitioners' demands for the implementation of the P25-wage increase which took effect on July 1, 1989. The intraunion controversy was such that petitioners even requested the FFW to intervene to facilitate the enforcement of the said wage increase (Petition, p. 54; p. 55, Rollo).

Petitioners sought the help of the FEDLU only after they had learned of the termination of their employment upon the recommendation of Capitle. Their alleged application with federations other than the FFW (Labor Arbiter's Decision, pp. 4-5; pp. 82-83, Rollo) can hardly be considered as disloyalty to the SAMAHAN, nor may the filing of such applications denote that petitioners failed to maintain in good standing their membership in the SAMAHAN. The SAMAHAN is a different entity from FFW, the federation to which it belonged. Neither may it, be inferred that petitioners sought disaffiliation from the FFW for petitioners had not formed a union distinct from that of the SAMAHAN. Parenthetically, the right of a local union to disaffiliate from a federation in the absence of any provision in the federation's constitution preventing disaffiliation of a local union is legal (People's Industrial and Commercial Employees and Worker's Org. (FFW) vs. People's Industrial and Commercial Corp., 112 SCRA 440 (1982]). Such right is consistent with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association (Tropical Hut Employees Union-CGW vs. Tropical Hut Food Market, Inc., 181 SCRA 173 [1990]).

Hence, while petitioners' act of holding a special election to oust Capitle, et al. may be considered as an act of sowing disunity among the SAMAHAN members, and, perhaps, disloyalty to the union officials, which could have been dealt with by the union as a disciplinary matter, it certainly cannot be considered as constituting disloyalty to the union. Faced with a SAMAHAN leadership which they had tried to remove as officials, it was but a natural act of self-preservation that petitioners fled to the arms of the FEDLU after the union and the OFC had tried to terminate their employment. Petitioners should not be made accountable for such an act.

With the passage of Republic Act No. 6715 which took effect on March 21, 1989, Article 279 of the Labor Code was amended to read as follows:

Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.

and as implemented by Section 3, Rule 8 of the 1990 New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission, it would seem that the Mercury Drug Rule (Mercury Drug Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 56 SCRA 694 [1974]) which limited the award of back wages of illegally dismissed workers to three (3) years "without deduction or qualification" to obviate the need for further proceedings in the course of execution, is no longer applicable.

A legally dismissed employee may now be paid his back wages, allowances, and other benefits for the entire period he was out of work subject to the rule enunciated before the Mercury Drug Rule, which is that the employer may, however, deduct any amount which the employee may have earned during the period of his illegal termination (East Asiatic Company, Ltd. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 40 SCRA 521 [1971]). Computation of full back wages and presentation of proof as to income earned elsewhere by the illegally dismissed employee after his termination and before actual reinstatement should be ventilated in the execution proceedings before the Labor Arbiter concordant with Section 3, Rule 8 of the 1990 new Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission.

Inasmuch as we have ascertained in the text of this discourse that the OFC whimsically dismissed petitioners without proper hearing and has thus opened OFC to a charge of unfair labor practice, it ineluctably follows that petitioners can receive their back wages computed from the moment their compensation was withheld after their dismissal in 1989 up to the date of actual reinstatement. In such a scenario, the award of back wages can extend beyond the 3-year period fixed by the Mercury Drug Rule depending, of course, on when the employer will reinstate the employees.

It may appear that Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715, has made the employer bear a heavier burden than that pronounced in the Mercury Drug Rule, but perhaps Republic Act No. 6715 was enacted precisely for the employer to realize that the employee must be immediately restored to his former position, and to impress the idea that immediate reinstatement is tantamount to a cost-saving measure in terms of overhead expense plus incremental productivity to the company which lies in the hands of the employer.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and private respondents are hereby ordered to reinstate petitioners to their former or equivalent positions without loss of seniority rights and with full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, pursuant to Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 180884 - Executive Summary (Talento vs. Escalada, et al.)

noreply@blogger.com (Jess V. Quijano) — Tue, 28 Jul 2009 22:27:00 +0000

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY¹

“Emerlinda S. Talento, in her capacity as the Provincial Treasurer of the Province of Bataan vs. Hon. Remigio M. Escalada, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan, Branch 3 and Petron Corporation”, Supreme Court, Third Division, G. R. No. 180884.

Introduction

1. In the Decision dated 27 June 2008, as reiterated in the Resolution dated 8 September 2008 dismissing the 1st Motion for Reconsideration (“MR”) in the above-captioned, the SC set forth the ruling that taxpayers can defer payments of real estate tax by simply filing 1) an appeal with the Local Board of Assessment Appeals and 2) a Petition for Prohibition with the Regional Trial Court and by posting a surety bond.

2. This ruling has extremely serious implications, not only to the LGUs of Bataan, but all over the country. It practically amended, through judicial legislation, the expressed provisions of the Local Government Code (“LGC”) of 1991 that a taxpayer cannot defer and must first pay to the LGU the real estate tax due before any appeal can be entertained.

3. Thus, LGUs will no longer receive cash payments from real estate tax collections as they fall due but merely surety bonds, which have no immediate use to LGUs. One-half of the proceeds of RPT accrues to the general funds of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, while the other half accrues to the Special Education Fund of their Local School Boards. With such erroneous ruling, LGUs and ultimately the people are bound to suffer, particularly the children from poor families who go to public schools.

Summary of the Relevant Facts:

(1) On 18 June 2007, Petron received from the Provincial Assessor’s Office of Bataan a notice of revised assessment for deficiency real property tax for Petron’s machineries and equipment in Lamao, Limay, Bataan in the amount of PhP1,731,025,403.06 due from 1994 up to the 2^nd quarter of 2007.

(2) On 17 August 2007, Petron filed a petition with the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA) contesting the revised assessment.

(3) On 22 August 2007, Petron received from Petitioner (the Provincial Treasurer of Bataan) a final notice of delinquent real property tax with warning that the subject properties would be levied and auctioned should Petron fail to settle the revised assessment.

(4) Petron wrote a letter to Petitioner stating that in view of the pendency of the appeal with the LBAA, any action on the subject properties would be premature. Petitioner replied that only payment by Petron under protest shall bar the collection of the taxes due, pursuant to Sections 231 and 252 of the Local Government Code.

(5) Subsequently a Warrant of Levy was issued against machinery and equipment of Petron.

(6) Petron filed with the LBAA on 24 September 2007 an urgent motion to lift final notice of delinquent real property tax and Warrant of Levy.

(7) On 3 October 2007, Petron received a notice of sale of its properties scheduled on 17 October 2007.

(8) Petron subsequently merely withdrew its motion to lift final notice of delinquency and Warrant of Levy with the LBAA on 8 October 2007. On the same date, Petron filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bataan the present case (Civil Case No. 8801) against Petitioner for prohibition with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. (NOTE: To avoid questions of forum shopping, what Petron should have done was to first withdraw its appeal entirely from the LBAA and then file the Petition for Prohibition with the RTC.)

(9) Civil Case No. 8801 was filed by Petron with the RTC while its petition with the LBAA was still pending. Subsequently, the LBAA dismissed Petron’s petition on the ground of forum shopping.

(10) On 15 October 2007, the RTC issued a TRO for 20 days enjoining Petitioner from proceeding with the public auction of Petron’s properties.

(11) Petitioner filed an urgent motion for the immediate dissolution of the TRO as well as motion to dismiss Petron’s petition for prohibition.

(12) On 5 November 2007, the RTC issued the Order granting Petron’s petition for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction subject to Petron’s posting of a PhP 444,967,503.52 bond in addition to its previously posted surety bond of PhP1,286,057,899.54.

(13) In view of the urgent nature of the case and the patently illegal order of the RTC, which was Order was tainted with grave abuse of discretion, Petitioner no longer filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated 5 November 2007.

(14) On 4 January 2008, Petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus (G.R. No. 180884) with the Supreme Court, as an exception to the rule on hierarchy of courts, to annul and set aside the Order of the RTC dated 5 November 2007 to permanently enjoin the RTC from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 8801.

(15) All of the foregoing actions of the Petitioner were consistent with law, particularly with the Local Government Code, contrary to Petron’s allegations.

Issue raised in the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus:

Whether or not the RTC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in causing the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction that effectively renders nugatory the express provisions of Sections 252 and 231 of the Local Government Code.

Summary of The Supreme Court’s Decision dated 27 June 2008:

In the Decision of the Supreme Court dated 27 June 2008, penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, regarding the above-stated Petition for Certiorari (G.R. No. 180884), it was held that the question posed in the Petition, i.e., whether the collection of taxes may be suspended by reason of filing of an appeal and posting of a surety bond, is a question of law.
The Decision stated that Petitioner resorted to an erroneous remedy when she filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, when the proper mode should have been a Petition for Review under Rule 45.
Under Rule 45, the period to file a Petition for Review is 15 days from receipt of the Order appealed from. The Decision stated that the present Petition was filed beyond the said 15 day period as it was filed 43 days late.
The Decision further stated that, even on the assumption that a petition under Rule 65 is the proper remedy, the present petition is still dismissable. It was noted that Petitioner did not file a Motion for Reconsideration with the RTC prior to the filing of the present Petition with the Supreme Court.
The Decision likewise stated that Petitioner disregarded the hierarchy of courts, and that the present Petition should have been filed with the Court of Appeals instead of directly filing the same to the Supreme Court.
The Decision went on to state that the RTC correctly granted Petron’s petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction based on Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
It was stated that there was urgency and paramount necessity for the issuance of the writ of injunction considering that what is being enjoined is the sale by public auction of 1.7 Billion Pesos worth of Petron’s properties which are vital to Petron’s operations.
The Decision also stated in essence that Petron had a clear and unmistakable right to refuse or to withhold in abeyance the payment of the taxes. Citing the grounds used by Petron in contesting the revised assessment, the Decision stated that the resolution of the said issues would have a direct bearing on the assessment made by Petitioner, and that it is necessary that the issues must be first passed upon before the properties of respondent is sold at public auction.

Courses of Action Taken by Petitioner in light of the said Decision Supreme Court dated 27 June 2008:

Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 27 June 2008. This Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Supreme Court in a minute resolution dated 8 September 2008.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Refer the Case to the Court en Banc. This is due to the fact that the Decision dated 27 June 2008 has in effect abandoned established jurisprudence that Rule 65 is the remedy for interlocutory orders such as the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and the ruling in Manila Electric Company vs. Barlis (G.R. No. 114231, 18 May 2001) that the trial court has no jurisdiction to entertain a Petition for Prohibition absent petitioner’s payment, under protest, of the tax assessed. This motion was likewise denied in the said resolution dated 8 September 2008.

Comments on the Decision of the Supreme Court dated 27 June 2008.

Re: On the finding in the Decision dated 27 June 2008 that Petitioner resorted to an erroneous remedy when she filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, when the proper mode should have been a Petition for Review under Rule 45.

COMMENT:

The Order of the RTC granting the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by Petron was an interlocutory order. Hence, Petitioner may validly file a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 to question the legality of such order of the RTC.
In the 7 August 2007 Supreme Court Decision entitled “United Overseas Bank (formerly Westmont Bank) vs. Hon. Judge Reynaldo Rios, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, and Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation”, G.R. No. 171532, it was confirmed that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and not Rule 45, is the proper remedy for interlocutory orders.
In the Supreme Court Decision dated 5 August 2003 which was penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago herself, entitled “Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Severino Listana, Jr.”, G. R. 152611, the Supreme Court specifically provided that “an order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order”. Being an interlocutory order, a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is a proper remedy.
In light of the established jurisprudence on the matter, it is extremely surprising why the subject Decision dated 27 June 2008 ruled that Petitioner availed of the wrong remedy under Rule 65. The said Decision runs counter to and in effect abandons prevailing jurisprudence that interlocutory orders, such as an order granting a writ of preliminary injunction, may be questioned in a higher court by way of Certiorari under Rule 65.

Re: On the finding that the Petition is fatally defective due to Petitioner’s failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC’s Order dated 5 November 2007.

COMMENT:

While it may be true that the general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari, such rule nevertheless is subject to recognized exceptions. The Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus filed by Petitioner specifically alleged that it falls within such recognized exceptions to the general rule. As such, it was pointed out in the said Petition that resort to the Supreme Court without filing of a motion for reconsideration was dictated by considerations of urgency, and that the issues raised are purely legal in nature.
In the case of Indiana Aerospace University vs. Commission on Higher Education, G.R. No. 139371, cited in Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, the recognized exceptions to the general rule are: (a) the issues raised are purely legal in nature; (b) public interest is involved; (c) extreme urgency is obvious; (d) special circumstances that warrant immediate or more direct action. The case involves the collection of taxes due the local government unit in the amount of 1.7 Billion Pesos and the writ of preliminary injunction has deprived the local government unit the right to immediately collect such real property taxes to the detriment of its constituents. Not only was there urgency involved, but public interest was likewise a principal consideration.
In view of the foregoing reasons, the Decision should have allowed the Petition to fall under the exception to the general rule on the requirement of a motion for reconsideration.

Re: On the finding that Petitioner disregarded the rule on hierarchy of courts.

COMMENT:

The Decision dated 27 June 2008 likewise faulted Petitioner for filing the Petition directly to the Supreme Court instead of having the same filed with the Court of Appeals. Again, such rule on hierarchy of courts is subject to certain exceptions. The present Petition is one such exception.
There are compelling reasons to file the Petition directly to the Supreme Court. The case has far reaching implications on the right of local government units to collect real property taxes that it can use for public services and to finance the cost of public education. The resolution of the issue of whether or not a trial court can prohibit a local government unit to collect real property taxes, despite provisions in the Local Government Code favoring such power of the local government units, will affect not only the Province of Bataan, but all local government units in the country as well. It will have significant importance on the finances and economic viability of all local government units.

Re: On the finding that the RTC correctly granted Petron’s petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

COMMENT:

The Decision declared that there was urgent and paramount necessity for the issuance of the writ of injunction considering that what is being enjoined is the sale by public auction of the properties of Petron amounting to 1.7 Billion Pesos, which properties are vital to Petron’s operation.
However, there is no urgent and paramount necessity on the part of Petron. Even assuming that the properties are sold by the Province of Bataan by public auction, under Section 261 of the Local Government Code, Petron has the right to redeem the properties within one (1) year from the date of the sale. During such one (1) year period, Petron shall have possession of the subject properties and Petron shall be entitled to the income and other fruits thereof. In light of this, Petron’s operations will not be immediately affected. As such, there is no urgent and paramount necessity for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
The Decision in essence also declared that Petron has a clear and unmistakable right to refuse or hold in abeyance the payment of the taxes. In support of this, the Decision cited the grounds relied upon by Petron in contesting the revised assessment. The Decision then stated that the resolution of the grounds raised by Petron would have a direct bearing on the assessment made by Petitioner and that it is necessary that the issues must first be passed upon before the properties of respondent is sold at public auction.

It should be noted however that the RTC, in its Order dated 5 November 2007, in justifying the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, used as basis the provisions of Section 267 of the Local Government Code. Section 267 provides that:

“SEC. 267. Action Assailing Validity of Tax Sale. - No court shall entertain any action assailing the validity of any sale at public auction of real property or rights therein under this Title until the taxpayer shall have deposited with the court the amount for which the real property was sold, together with interest of two percent (2%) per month from the date of sale to the time of the institution of the action. The amount so deposited shall be paid to the purchaser at the auction sale if the deed is declared invalid but it shall be returned to the depositor if the action fails. Neither shall any court declare a sale at public auction invalid by reason of irregularities or informalities in the proceedings unless the substantive rights of the delinquent owner of the real property or the person having legal interest therein have been impaired.

The above-quoted Section 267 specifically applies to a case where the property has already been sold at public auction due to delinquency for real property tax. It does not apply in the present case where the property has not yet been sold. It was patently erroneous for the RTC to use Section 267 as legal basis for granting the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Petron. Such act of the RTC amounts to excess of jurisdiction as the RTC overstepped its lawful authority. There was likewise grave abuse of discretion as such patently erroneous use by the RTC of Section 267 as basis is capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic in manner, and is in effect equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
The patently erroneous reliance by the RTC on Section 267 of the Local Government Code is one indication that there was no clear and unmistakable right in favor of Petron. Despite this, the Decision dated 27 June 2008 still validated the writ of preliminary injunction granted by the RTC to Petron.
On the other hand, Sections 252 and 231 of the Local Government Code gives the clear and unmistakable right to Petitioner to collect the real property taxes due. Under Section 252, no protest shall be entertained unless the taxpayer first pays the tax. Under Section 231, appeal on assessments of real property shall in no case suspend the collection of the corresponding realty taxes on property.
In Manila Electric Company vs. Barlis, G.R. No. 114231, 18 May 2001, the Supreme Court, interpreting a provision in the previous Real Property Tax Code which similar to Section 252 of the Local Govt. Code, held that the “trial court has no jurisdiction to entertain a Petition for Prohibition absent petitioner’s payment, under protest of the tax assessed as required by Section 64 of the RPTC. It is our view that this ruling is still valid despite the passage of the Local Government Code as the reason behind the law remains the same. In view of this ruling, the RTC had no authority to grant the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Petron. This is another basis for stating that Petron had no clear and unmistakable right.
Even assuming that there is doubt in the interpretation of Sections 252 and 231 of the Local Government Code, such doubt should have been resolved in favor of the LGU. Section 5 (a), Chapter 1, Title 1 of the Local Government Code provides that in the interpretation of the provisions of the same, any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the local government unit. If further provides that any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned. This was no longer taken into consideration in the Decision.
The amount of deficiency real estate tax due Petron was in fact arrived at following data supplied by Petron itself. Such data consisting of annual acquisition costs of machineries can be seen from the printed copies of the electronic email of one Arvin Frank C. Daquiog of the Government Reports and Compliance Controllers Department of Petron and the attached computation/data send on 20 March 2007 to the Bataan Provincial Assessor. (Annexes “A-MR” and “B-MR” of Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration) The said data from Petron itself show that the Sworn Statement of the True Value of the Real Properties previously submitted by Petron was grossly understated. In light of this, it is an error to rule that Petron had a clear and unmistakable right to hold in abeyance the payment of real property tax.

Re: On the issue of forum shopping committed by Petron, which was not discussed and was not ruled upon in the Decision of the Supreme Court.

COMMENT:

The Petition of Petron with the RTC (Case No. 8801) was filed while Petron’s Petition with the LBAA is pending. The case with the RTC and the LBAA filed by Petron involved an identity of parties, identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, and a decision on one case will amount to res adjudicata. Petron was therefore guilty of forum shopping.
The issue of forum shopping was squarely raised by Petitioner in the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus. On account of such forum shopping, the RTC should have dismissed the complaint of Petron entirely. Instead, the RTC even issued the subject writ of preliminary injuction.
The LBAA has in fact dismissed the Petition of Petron on account of such forum shopping committed by Petron.
However, the Decision dated 27 June 2008 never mentioned anything about this issue of forum shopping.
Per the ruling of the Supreme Court in City Government of Quezon City vs. Bayan Telecommunications, Inc., G.R. No. 162015, 6 March 2006, the proper procedure is to first withdraw the appeal from the LBAA and then file the Petition for Prohibition with the RTC. However, Petron did not comply with this and instead maintained the LBAA case while it filed the RTC case in violation of the rule against forum shopping and multiplicity of suits based on a single cause of action.

[1 Aside from the Executive Summary, the other articles included are as follows: Petition, Comment, Reply, Decision, Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Refer the Case to the Court En Banc.]

1. Rizalina Raut -	P32,505.00
2. [Leila] Emnace -	P32,505.00
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY1

Introduction

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY¹