Law Library Letter

Summary 2009 WY 136

2009-11-10T16:41:00.004-07:00

Summary of Decision issued November 6, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Legarda-Cornelio v. State

Citation: 2009 WY 136

Docket Number: S-09-0083

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County, Honorable David B. Part, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Esteban Cornelio LeGarda, Pro se.

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Justin A. Daraie, Prosecution Assistance Program, Student Director and Intern.

Facts: The appellant was convicted and sentenced in state court and then in federal court for unrelated offenses. He subsequently filed a W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) motion with the state district court asking it to order that his state sentences run concurrently with his federal sentences, which motion the district court denied. The appellant appeals that denial.
Issues: Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the appellant’s W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) motion.

Holdings: Although it appears that the district court was amenable to the appellant’s request that his state sentences run concurrently with his impending federal sentences, the district court never explicitly ordered that, nor could it. If a defendant is subject to prosecution in more than one court, the decision regarding how the sentences will run with respect to one another should be made by the last judge to impose a sentence. The underlying rationale for this theory is that a judge cannot require a sentence to be served consecutively to a sentence that has not yet been imposed. Moreover, a state district court cannot bind a federal court with such sentencing restrictions. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order the sentences to run concurrently.

With regard to the appellant’s claim that his good behavior justified a sentence reduction, it is clear from the record that the district court considered not only the appellant’s W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) motion, which included the certificates and documentation of the self-improvement courses, but it also considered additional material, such as the appellant’s Presentence Investigation Report. After considering everything as a whole, the district court denied the appellant’s motion. While it is commendable that the appellant has chosen to turn his life around and take a proactive role in completing self-improvement courses while he has been incarcerated, those facts alone do not require the district court to grant the appellant’s W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) motion. Nor do those facts alone provide grounds to find that the district court abused its discretion in denying the appellant’s motion. After reviewing the entire record and giving the required deference to the district court’s determination, it cannot be said that it abused its discretion.

The state district court did not have authority to determine whether the appellant’s state sentences were to run concurrently with or consecutive to the appellant’s impending federal sentences. The district court was not the last court to impose a sentence on the appellant. Moreover, the district court properly denied the appellant’s W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) motion because it was still without authority to issue an order that it could not have entered in the first instance. Also, the district court was not required to grant the appellant’s W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) motion simply because the appellant demonstrated commendable behavior and achievement while he had been incarcerated.

Affirmed.

C.J. Voigt delivered the opinion for the court.

Link: http://tinyurly9rehgx .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2009 WY 135

2009-11-10T16:39:00.005-07:00

Summary of Decision issued November 6, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Collings v. Lord

Citation: 2009 WY 135

Docket Number: S-08-0225

Appeal from the District Court of Uinta County, Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

Representing Appellant (Plaintiff): Mark W. Harris of Harris Law Firm, Evanston, Wyoming

Representing Appellee (Defendant): Raymond W. Martin of Sundahl, Powers, Kapp & Martin, Cheyenne, Wyoming

Issues: Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment and concluding that no genuine issue of material fact existed that Appellee’s negligence was not a cause of Appellant’s injuries.

Facts: Appellant seeks recovery for injuries sustained while using Appellee’s table saw during restoration of a home owned by Appellee.

Holdings: In order to maintain a claim of negligence, a plaintiff must prove: 1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of reasonable care; 2) the defendant breached the duty; and 3) the defendant’s breach was the proximate cause of injury or loss to the plaintiff. In order for proximate cause to exist, “the accident or injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the act of negligence. In fact, the ultimate test of proximate cause is foreseeability of injury. In order to qualify as a legal cause, the conduct must be a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s injuries. Proximate cause is a question of fact in the usual case, reserved for the determination by the trier of fact, unless the evidence is such that reasonable minds could not disagree.

In the present case, the Appellant made no showing of neglect or failure to perform a duty by the Appellee. There is no substantial evidence in the record that shows that the accident was a foreseeable consequence of Appellee’s conduct. Rather, the evidence presented to the district court shows that neither party knows exactly what caused the saw blade to bind. Specifically, Appellant could not identify what Appellee did, if anything, to cause the kickback and resultant injury to Appellant. Appellee knew of Appellant’s prior experience with both table saws and dado blades. As to the particular task at hand, Appellant assured Appellee he understood what needed to be done. In fact, there is evidence on the record as to Appellant’s experience as a cabinet maker and carpenter – in the past, Appellant had actually taken precautions to eliminate and/or reduce the risk of the potential and obvious danger of using dado blades. He was familiar with and in the past had made and used “push sticks” when using dado blades. The purpose of a “push stick,” according to Appellant, is to prevent the operator’s hands from coming into contact with the dado blades – the exact scenario in the instant case. By Appellant’s own account, not keeping wood straight in alignment with the fence and blade on the table saw can cause a bind – the only “input” into keeping a piece of wood in alignment is the operator, who manually pushes the wood across the saw. Appellee was not pushing the wood with Appellant, and, accordingly, did not proximately cause his injuries.

Appellant fails on appeal to show any genuine issue of material fact on the element of causation, and, as such, Appellee is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Affirmed.

J. Hill delivered the opinion for the court.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/yflgjxc

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]

Summary 2009 WY 134

2009-11-10T16:33:00.002-07:00

Summary of Decision issued November 6, 2009

Summaries are prepared by Law Librarians and are not official statements of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Case Name: Pond v. Pond

Citation: 2009 WY 134

Docket Number: S-08-0253

Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County, Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

Representing Appellant (Defendant): Dwight F. Hurich, Hurich Law Office, Gillette, Wyoming

Representing Appellee (Plaintiff): Rex O. Arney and Vincent P. Schutte of Brown, Drew & Massey, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming

Issues: Whether the Trial Court abused its discretion in making an equitable division of the assets and debts of the parties, when the Trial Court provided the marital estate should be equalized but then failed to consider the debts each party would take.
Holdings: The disposition of marital property is committed to the sound discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of that discretion. Abuse of discretion occurs only when the disposition shocks the conscience of the Court and appears so unfair and inequitable that reasonable persons could not abide it.

Dividing a marital estate is not necessarily a mechanical process but rather is guided by considering the factors in Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-114 (2009). The district court has the discretion to determine what weight should be given each of these individual factors and to form a distributive scheme appropriate to the peculiar circumstances of each individual case. The goal of marital property division is to reach an equitable result.

In the instant appeal, Appellant contends that, by using the term “equalize,” the district court intended both parties to receive roughly equivalent dollar amounts from the division of the marital estate. In Wyoming, the distribution of a marital estate is equalized within the context of the respective equities of the parties. In other words, in a divorce proceeding a district court is required to divide property equitably, not necessarily monetarily equally. Indeed, a just and equitable distribution is as likely as not to be monetarily unequal. There is nothing in the record or the district court’s final order to support Appellant’s assumption that the district court intended to order a 50/50 monetary split. Specifically, there is no evidence that the district court failed to take into account the debts of the parties in reaching its final distributive scheme. At trial, Appellant introduced an exhibit representing the marital debts. The district court, in its final order, expressly accepted the exhibit as accurately reflecting the debts. The final order explicitly divided the debt between the parties as the district court determined equitable. The district court then ordered Appellant to pay Wife to equalize the “marital estate,” not just the marital assets. It is extremely doubtful the district court neglected to take the marital debt into account in its decision when the final order so thoroughly discusses the debt. Since all existing indicators point to the district court’s final order “equalizing” the marital estate with both the assets and the liabilities in mind, when it used the term “equalize,” the district court intended to divide the property equitably but not equally.

While Husband’s appellate argument is marginal, as is his compliance with the rules, the appeal is not so egregious as to merit sanctions.

Appellant has failed to establish that the district court erred in dividing the marital estate. The district court’s division of the marital estate, even if not equal, is equitable. The decision of district court is affirmed. Sanctions will not be imposed on the Appellant.

Affirmed.

J. Golden delivered the decision of the Court.

Link: http://tinyurl.com/yapokem .

[SPECIAL NOTE: This opinion uses the "Universal Citation." It was given an "official" citation when it was issued. You should use this citation whenever you cite the opinion, with a P.3d parallel citation. Please note when you look at the opinion that all of the paragraphs are numbered. When you pinpoint cite to a quote, you should cite to this paragraph number rather than to any page number. If you need assistance in putting together a citation using the Universal Citation form, please contact the Wyoming State Law Library.]