Plaintiffs, a corporation and its director, brought suit against the Charter Township of Genoa and its ordinance officer alleging the denial of its requested special land use application for a prayer campus violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), the First Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment.

Prior to discovery, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on their RLUIPA claim contending there was no genuine issue of material fact. The court denied the motion on the basis that the issue required fact finding and to grant the motion would be an abuse of discretion. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration arguing the court erred in denying the motion.

The court noted that a motion for reconsideration is not proper when used to merely repeat an argument. Further, the court determined plaintiff’s motion “largely reiterate[d]” the same arguments proposed in their original motion. The court noted plaintiffs were required to demonstrate how the record demonstrated a “one-sided record.” However, the court reasoned that plaintiffs could not do so because no record existed. Further, the court noted that the inquiry as to whether the Township “substantially burdened plaintiffs’ religious exercise was too fact intensive to resolve as a matter of law.”

The court determined it was required to consider whether plaintiffs had a feasible alternative location, whether plaintiffs suffered substantial delay or expense, and whether such burden was self-imposed. The court noted that the issue of feasible alternative locations was not at issue and therefore not part of the record. Further, that the Order is dispute simply permitted the parties to proceed with discovery as to the issue.

Additionally, the court determined that discovery was required to determine if plaintiffs imposed such burden on themselves. The court determined that while plaintiffs did not expect their religious display to be treated as a church, it was not out of the ordinary as “discretionary land-use decisions are inherently uncertain.” Thus the court concluded it was necessary to determine plaintiff’s knowledge as to legal determinations surrounding the ordinance.

Finally, the court considered whether it could certify the order for interlocutory appeal. The court determined that the Order denying plaintiff’s motion involved a question of law and that an immediate appeal could advance termination of litigation. The court noted that if plaintiffs prevailed on their substantial burden claim, the court would only need to determine relief.

Accordingly, the court certified the Order for immediate interlocutory appeal.

Catholic Healthcare International, Inc. v Charter Township of Genoa, 2026 WL 1865739 (EDMI 6/29/2026)

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky (the “Court”) addressed an appeal from a circuit court’s order dismissing a complaint for declaratory judgment and denying injunctive relief brought by recreational vehicle park (RV park) operators (collectively, “Appellants”) against Meade County, Kentucky (“Appellee”). Appellants sought judicial intervention to bar local officials from requiring conditional use permits (CUP[s]) for their ongoing operations, arguing that their RV park was immune from local zoning authority under Kentucky’s Agricultural Supremacy Clause (the “Clause”) and the Right to Farm Act (the “Act”). The matter came before the Court to determine whether an RV park operated in conjunction with a bed and breakfast and agritourism activities falls within the statutory exemption for agricultural land use.

Appellants, owners of a bed and breakfast and a nearby agricultural parcel, acquired a separate, commercially taxed property and obtained a temporary CUP to operate an RV park. Although initially intended to house industrial construction workers, the permit was extended once before Appellee denied further extensions. Appellants filed a declaratory judgment action, alleging that because guests engaged in farm-stay experiences—such as viewing livestock and hay baling—the RV park constituted an agritourism operation protected under the Clause, which exempts land used for agricultural purposes from local zoning regulations. The circuit court initially granted a temporary injunction but ultimately dissolved it and dismissed the action, holding that the RV park served no direct agricultural purpose.

The Court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal, holding that Appellants failed to establish that the property was exempt from municipal oversight. Reviewing the statutory framework de novo, the Court emphasized that local governments possess broad statutory authority to establish zoning regulations, subject only to narrowly defined exceptions. Under the clear language of the governing statutes, “agricultural use” is strictly constrained to tracts of at least five contiguous acres devoted to the actual production of crops or livestock. Because no agricultural or horticultural crops were produced on the commercial RV park parcel itself, the Court held that the land was not used for agricultural purposes under the law.

The Court declined Appellants’ position to try and expand the statutory definition of agricultural use to encompass agritourism activities or related commercial lodging. The Court reasoned that while the General Assembly enacted separate protections for agritourism, it chose not to amend the agricultural zoning exemption to include non-farming ancillary operations like RV parks. The Court further rejected Appellants’ reliance on the the Act, noting that the statute addresses nuisance claims rather than zoning enforcement.

Therefore, the Court held that the circuit court properly applied the law in finding that Appellants’ RV park remained subject to local zoning authority and permit requirements. The Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment in its entirety.

Padgett v. Meade County, S.W.3d, 2026 WL 16262 (Ky. App. 1/2/2026).

Plaintiffs, corporations, filed an application for zoning amendments, variances and exceptions with defendant, Calcasieu Parish Police Jury (“Board”) to construct and operate a three thousand acre solar energy facility on land zoned as agricultural. The proposal included a $440 million investment, estimated to generate $87 million in tax revenue. The application included a three hundred foot set back as well as a fifty foot “vegetative buffer” consisting of pine trees. Plaintiffs also supplied several reports including an economic impact report, community impact report, environmental report, property value report, and a socioeconomic impact report.

The Board held a public hearing, where there was significant opposition to the application. The vote was then deferred to a later meeting. Thereafter, the Board voted three in favor and three for denial. Three members abstained. Therefore, the application was denied because it did not receive a majority of votes.

Plaintiffs filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Appeal from the Board decision, alleging the Board previously granted substantially similar applications within the agricultural district. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to uniformly apply zoning rules, failed to provide adequate grounds for denial, and failed to follow voting procedure. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment contending the Board denied the application solely due to the number of objectors. The trial court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and reversed the Board’s denial.

On appeal, the Board alleged the court’s failure to issue a writ of certiorari and granting of plaintiff’s motion were procedurally improper. The Court rejected the argument, determining the plain language of the relevant statute did not require a trial court to issue a writ of certiorari in a certain form. The Court concluded the trial court implicitly granted the writ when it assumed jurisdiction and granted the motion.

The Board also alleged the trial court improperly admitted and relied on exhibits attached to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. The Court agreed with the Board that when a party seeking summary judgment relies on documents in the record, such documents must be filed in the record prior to moving. The court determined that three exhibits relied upon were not previously filed and should not have been considered by the trial court.

Further, the Board contended the trial court erred when it granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and found the Board acted illegally. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate how the Board treated plaintiffs differently than similarly situated solar applicants. Additionally, the court noted the record did not contain admissible evidence as to previously approved applications for solar projects in the agricultural district. Thus, the court was unable to analyze whether plaintiff’s application was similar to others. Therefore, it could not make a determination as to the alleged non-uniform application of zoning ordinances.

Further, the court determined the meeting minutes did not demonstrate the Board acted unreasonably. Rather, the court noted the meeting minutes revealed significant opposition to the application. In sum, the court determined plaintiffs failed to introduce admissible evidence and therefore could not demonstrate non-uniform application of the relevant ordinance.

Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court’s order granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, reinstated the Board’ denial of the application and remanded the matter.

Cajun Crossroads Energy Center, LLC v Calcasieu, 2026 WL 2035621 (LA App. 7/15/2026)

Plaintiff commenced an action against the Eddy County Zoning Board (“Board”), Eddy County Commissioners (“Commissioners”), and Eddy County (“County), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to void zoning regulations. The relevant facts are set forth below.

In June of 2025, the Board held a public hearing to consider amendments to a zoning ordinance. At the hearing, plaintiff contended Board members and Commissioners had conflicts and should have been excluded. In July, the Board approved the amendments at a “decisional meeting” closed to public comment. Due to the nature of the meeting, plaintiff’s request to address the conflicts of interest issue and amendments was denied. The following day, the Commission voted to adopt the amendments despite plaintiff’s objections.

Thereafter, plaintiff commenced an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Board, Commissioners, and County for zoning ordinance and conflict of interest violations. Specifically, plaintiff sought to void the amendments and compel recusals of certain officials for conflicts. The defendants moved to dismiss on the basis that such challenge could only be reviewed through specific statutory appeal procedures. Plaintiff alleged he sought relief for procedural violations rather than the zoning decision itself.

In a separate action, plaintiff appealed the Commission’s decision under the proper statute, followed by a voluntary motion to dismiss his appeal, which was granted.

The district court then granted the County’s motion to dismiss in the first action, determining plaintiff was required to file an appeal under a specific statute because his challenge involved the validity of a zoning proceeding. However, plaintiff voluntarily moved to dismiss his appeal in that action. Accordingly, the court determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the complaint.

On appeal, plaintiff argued the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint because he challenged independent statutory violations rather than the zoning decision itself. Thus, plaintiff contended “exclusive-remedy provisions governing statutory zoning appeals” did not apply.

The Court noted that plaintiff voluntary dismissed his appeal filed under the proper statute and did not pursue review under the exclusive statutory appeal process. Further, the court determined plaintiff’s amended complaint sought to void the Commission’s zoning action and therefore challenged the validity of the decision-making process. Thus, the court determined the challenge fell within the exclusive statutory review process. In sum, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the claims were independent statutory and constitutional claims.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision, determining the trial court properly concluded it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

Danduran v Eddy County Zoning Board, 2026 ND 125 (6/25/2026)

The Court agreed with the trial court’s finding that plaintiff’s complaint involved the permitting of the same cell tower that was at issue in a prior planning board appeal to the superior court — in which the plaintiff intervened — and in a zoning board appeal brought by the plaintiff.  The trial court correctly found that res judicata bars the plaintiff’s complaint because the parties are the same as in the prior appeals, the prior appeals resulted in final judgments on the merits, and the causes of action in this appeal are the same as in the plaintiff’s prior appeals.  Further, the Court noted that the plaintiff did not provide the complaint that the trial court dismissed and which forms the basis for this appeal, nor had he presented developed legal arguments regarding the issues he raises on appeal. The Court concluded that the plaintiff did has not met his burden to provide an adequate record or to demonstrate that the trial court erred.

MacMillen v Town of Conway, 2026 WL 23358546 (NH 7/21/2026)

. In response to a large number of requests to site data centers across the State and its impact on energy, the environment and host communities, the Governor has directed the Department of Public Service to examine the interconnectedness of the data centers to connect to the electric grid and to study and submit a Generic Environmental Impact Statement to the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. The Department of Public Service must hold in abeyance all data center applications until the DEC has reviewed and accepted the GEIS. the Order further directs Empire State Development, within 60 days of the Executive Order, to study and post on their website a Community Investment Framework that will help guide local governments as they negotiate with data center applicants.

Plaintiff, Forest Hills Hardens Corporation, commenced an action seeking to enjoin defendants, the West Side Tennis Club from hosting concerts at a stadium located within a private residential community.

Plaintiff alleged the stadium was located within its community and that it owned the streets, sidewalks and parks within the community. Further, that the defendant licensed the stadium to a corporation to host concerts. Plaintiff contended it ceased issuing licenses for concert attendees to use its streets and sidewalks in October of 2022. As a result, plaintiff contended it sustained harm resulting from increased noise, traffic and increased clean-up costs. Therefore, plaintiff’s brought suit alleging “breach of a restrictive declaration, trespass, a violation of a zoning resolution, public nuisance, and private nuisance.” The defendant moved to dismiss.

The trial court granted defendants motion to dismiss as to the restrictive declaration, trespass and zoning resolution violations. However, it denied the motion as to public and private nuisance. Plaintiff appealed, followed by defendant’s cross-appeal.

On appeal, the court noted that plaintiff conceded that defendant had a nonexclusive easement over the streets and sidewalks. Further, that such easement extended to the defendant’s invitees. However, the court found plaintiff adequately plead a cause of action for trespass based on a liberal construction of the complaint. The court noted that the defendant installed a bag check station, barricades and a VIP area. The court determined plaintiff sufficiently alleged these alterations resulted in an increased burden on plaintiff’s property, exceeding the scope of the easement. Thus, the Court determined the trial court should have denied defendant’s motion as to trespass.

The Court also determined the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the public nuisance and private nuisance causes of action. As to public nuisance, the court found plaintiff sufficiently pled a special injury as it alleged it suffered pecuniary loss and trespass not suffered by the community in general.

However, the Court determined the trial court properly granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the restrictive declaration cause of action. The court noted the defendant submitted evidence demonstrating the restrictive covenant did not prohibit the use of the stadium for concerts. Thus, the court determined defendant sufficiently refuted plaintiff’s contention that defendant breached the restrictive declaration. Additionally, the Court determined the trial court properly granted defendant’s motion as to the alleged zoning resolution violation because plaintiff did not specify a zoning resolution which would affect plaintiff.

Accordingly, the Second Department modified the trial court decision, affirming in part.

Forest Hills Gardens Corporation v West Side Tennis Club, 2026 WL 1741374 (NYAD 2 Dept. 6/17/2026)

In 2021, the City of Chicago adopted the “Keep Chicago Renting Ordinance.” That ordinance requires anyone who obtains a rental property through a foreclosure action to negotiate new leases with existing tenants in good faith and if the tenant declines to renew a lease, pay the tenant $10,600 to assist with relocation expenses. When BBLI took control of a rental property through a sheriff’s deed in 2024, BBLI followed the procedures under the ordinance for negotiating new leases, but at least five tenants declined new leases and requested the relocation assistance fee. BBLI filed a lawsuit against the city claiming that the ordinance violated its civil rights because requiring payment of the fee constituted an unconstitutional “takings” under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The district court dismissed the case, and BBLI appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The Seventh Circuit uphold the dismissal of the case. 

First, the Court found that the city had authority to adopt the ordinance as a regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship. 

Second, the Court rejected BBLI’s argument that the relocation assistance fee requirement was a “physical” taking because it transfers wealth, finding this ordinance to be similar to rent control regulations which courts have found are not “physical” takings. 

Third, the Court did not find a “regulatory” taking because, among other things, the city’s ordinance did not interfere with BBLI’s “investment-backed expectations” since the ordinance was already in effect when BBLI purchased the property.

Finally, the Court rejected BBLI’s “unconstitutional conditions” argument because BBLI was not asking for permission to build or engage in some other lawful activity that the city was withholding or imposing conditions on the issuance. Instead, the ordinance was enacted to further the city’s interest in keeping its residents housed.

In short, the Court upheld the dismissal of BBLI’s “takings” challenge to the rental assistance ordinance.

BBLI Edison, LLC v. City of Chicago, 2026 WL 2107132 (7^th Cir CA 7/22/2026)

Plaintiff, Amelia Island Sanctuary Property Owners Association, brought suit against Nassau County, Florida and Riverstone Properties, LLC alleging a settlement agreement was a “development order” which violated a statute requiring orders to comply with the Nassau County Comprehensive Plan.

On appeal, plaintiff contended the trial court erred when determining the settlement agreement was not a development order. The court noted that the settlement agreement was not made pursuant to an application or a development permit. Rather, the court reasoned the agreement was merely the resolution of Riverstone’s claims and the County’s reduction of a structure height requirement. Further, the court noted that the agreement only contemplated future development, which would require an application.

Further, the court noted that “a Chapter 163 challenge to a settlement under the Bert Harris Act, as a general matter, would undercut the statutory framework the Act established for review of settlement agreements.” The court emphasized that “a Bert Harris Act settlement agreement arising from an amendment to a comprehensive plan that imposes an inordinate burden is subject to mandatory judicial review and approval.” However, the court stated that plaintiff did not directly challenge the settlement agreement itself, rather it appealed pursuant to Chapter 163.

Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision determining that the settlement agreement was not a development order reviewable under Chapter 163.

Amelia Island Sanctuary Property Owners Association v Nassau County, FL, 2026 WL 1991986 (FL App. 7/10/2026)

Plaintiffs, real estate developers, sought to construct a 300-unit mixed-use residential building. The Town Board of the Town of Hempstead adopted a Transit Oriented Development ordinance (“TOD”) which permitted mixed-use development. Plaintiffs spent three years advancing their development project in reliance on the TOD and submitted a project application in February of 2022. However, the Town’s “hard look” procedure was insufficient. In September 2022, “the Town enacted a moratorium on development” and retained an environmental planning firm to review the TOD. Prior to the expiration of the moratorium, the Board voted to repeal the TOD without a “Grandfathered-In Clause.”

Plaintiffs then initiated two Article 78 proceedings. First, to compel the town to review plaintiffs’ application pursuant to the TOD. Second, plaintiffs sought an order declaring the repeal of the TOD to be void for falling to comply with Gen. Mun. § 239-m. The court found in favor of plaintiffs in both actions. The Town appealed.

Plaintiffs then brought suit against the Town alleging Takings Clause, Equal Protection Clause and due process violations.  Thereafter, a resident in close proximity to the subject property filed a motion to intervene on the basis that he had a protectable interest in preventing the project. Both parties objected.

The judge issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), recommending denying the motion to intervene. The judge concluded the “intervenor lacked a cognizable interest required” for mandatory or permissive intervention as plaintiffs only sought monetary damages. Further, that intervention would “unduly delay adjudication of the Parties’ rights.” The intervenor filed an objection, asserting interests in “‘zoning, land use, traffic, environmental quality, and community character.’”

On consideration, the court adopted the R&R.  The court determined that the intervenor failed to establish a protectable interest under FRCP Rule 24(a). The court rejected the intervenors argument that plaintiff’s request for “such other, further, or different relief as this Court deems just and property” constituted a request for injunctive relief. Further, the court determined that plaintiff’s complaint contained financial computations for the purpose of seeking monetary damages rather than declaratory of injunctive relief. Moreover, the court determined that the intervenors “interest” was speculative and failed to demonstrate the Town was not “vigorously defending” the suit.

Accordingly, the court adopted the R&R and denied the intervenors motion. 25 Wanser, LLC v Town of Hempstead, 2026 WL 1878628 (EDNY 6/30/2026)