Law Landmark Cases

Tañada vs. Tuvera

2013-12-20T23:12:00.007-08:00

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, ¹ as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question ² said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, ³ this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions,⁴ this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.⁵
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. ⁶
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC ⁷:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank ⁸ to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban ⁹ sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. ¹⁰ Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, ¹¹ the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. ¹ I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. ²
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. ³ It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. ⁴ Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. ⁵ In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. ⁶ In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,¹ citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. ² To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity ³ would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. ¹ I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. ²
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. ³ It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. ⁴ Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. ⁵ In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. ⁶ In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,¹ citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. ² To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity ³ would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
Footnotes

1 Section 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shag be recognized, access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shag be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law.

2 Anti-Chinese League vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012; Costas vs. Aidanese, 45 Phil. 345; Almario vs. City Mayor, 16 SCRA 151;Parting vs. San Jose Petroleum, 18 SCRA 924; Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392.

3 16 Phil. 366, 378.

4 Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil 848; Mejia vs. Balolong, 81 Phil. 486; Republic of the Philippines vs. Encamacion, 87 Phil. 843; Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. vs. Social Security System, 17 SCRA 1077; Askay vs. Cosalan, 46 Phil. 179.

5 1 Manresa, Codigo Civil 7th Ed., p. 146.

6 People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Balbuena et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 110 Phil. 150.

7 82 SCRA 30, dissenting opinion.

8 308 U.S. 371, 374.

9 93 Phil.. 68,.

10 The report was prepared by the Clerk of Court after Acting Director Florendo S. Pablo Jr. of the Government Printing Office, failed to respond to her letter-request regarding the respective dates of publication in the Official Gazette of the presidential issuances listed therein. No report has been submitted by the Clerk of Court as to the publication or non-publication of other presidential issuances.

11 129 SCRA 174.

Fernando, CJ.:

1 Separate Opinion of Justice Plana, first paragraph. He mentioned in tills connection Article 7, Sec. 21 of the Wisconsin Constitution and State ex rel. White v. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing the Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A

2 Ibid, closing paragraph.

3 Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 104 (1960).

4 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, 3 (1924).

5 Cf. Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 50581-50617, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA 433.

6 Cf. Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, L-24396, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 172.

Teehankee, J.:

1 People vs. de Dios, G.R. No. 11003, Aug. 3l, 1959, per the late Chief Justice Paras.

2 Notes in brackets supplied.

3 Respondents: comment, pp. 14-15.

Plana, J.:

* See e.g., Wisconsin Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 21: "The legislature shall provide publication of all statute laws ... and no general law shall be in force until published." See also S ate ex rel. White vs. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A.

Co Kim Chan vs. Tan Keh

2013-12-20T23:09:00.001-08:00

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5¹ November 16, 1945
CO KIM CHAM (alias CO CHAM), petitioner,
vs.
EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondents.
Marcelino Lontok for petitioner.
Revilla and Palma for respondent Valdez Tan Keh.
Respondent Judge Dizon in his own behalf.
Vicente Hilado and J. A. Wolfson as amici curiae.

R E S O L U T I O N

FERIA, J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of our decision rendered in this case filed by the respondent. Two attorneys at law, who were allowed to appear as amici curiae, have also presented memoranda to discuss certain points on which the dissenting opinions rely.
(1) It is contended that the military occupation of the Philippine Islands by the Japanese was not actual and effective because of the existence of guerrilla bands in barrios and mountains and even towns and villages; and consequently, no government de facto could have been validly established by the Japanese military forces in the Philippines under the precepts of the Hague Conventions and the law of nations.
The presence of guerrilla bands in barrios and mountains, and eren in towns of the Philippines whenever these towns were left by Japanese garrisons or by the detachments of trOops sent on patrol to these places, was not s5fficient to make tha military occupation ineffective, nor did it cause that occupation to cease, or prevent the constitution or establichment of a de facto govarnment in the Islands. The belligerent occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese invaders became an accomplished fact from the time General Wainwright, Commander of the American and Filipino forces in Luzon, and General Sharp, Commander of the forces in Visayas and Mindanao, surrendered and ordered the surrender of their forces to the Japanese invaders, and the Commonwealth Government had become incapable of publicly exercising its authority, and the invader had substituted his own authority for that of the legitimate government in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao.
"According to the rules of Land Warfare of the United States Army, belligerent or so-called military occupation is a question of fact. It presupposes a hostile invasion as a result of which the invader has rendered the invaded government incapable of publicly exercising its authority, and that the invader is in position to substitute and has substituted his own authority for that of the legitimate government of the territory invaded." (International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, by Hyde Vol. II, pp. 361, 362.) " Belligerent occupation must be both actual and effective. Organized resistance must be overcome and the forces in possession must have taken measures to establish law and order. It doubtless suffices if the occupying army can, within a reasonable time, send detachments of troops to make its authority felt within the occupied district." (Id., p. 364.) "Occupation once acquired must be maintained . . . . It does not cease, however, . . . Nor does the existence of a rebellion or the operations of guerrilla bands cause it to cease, unless the legitimate government is re-established and the occupant fails promptly to suppress such rebellion or guerrilla operations." (Id., p. 365.)
But supposing arguendo that there were provinces or districts in these Islands not actually and effectively occupied by the invader, or in which the latter, consequently, had not substituted his own authority for that of the invaded government, and the Commonwealth Government had continued publicly exercising its authority, there is no question as to the validity of the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts functioning in said territory, under the municipal law, just as there can be no question as to the validity of the judgments and proceedings of the courts continued in the territory occupied by the belligerent occupant, under the law of nations.
(2) It is submitted that the renunciation in our Constitution and in the Kellog-Briand Pact of war as an instrument of national policy, rendered inapplicable the rules of international law authorizing the belligerent Japanese army of occupation to set up a provisional or de facto government in the Philippines, because Japan started war treacherously and emphasized was as an instrument of national policy; and that to give validity to the judicial acts of courts sponsored by the Japanese would be tantamount to giving validity to the acts of these invaders, and would be nothing short of legalizing the Japanese invasion of the Philippines.
In reply to this contention, suffice it to say that the provisions of the Hague Conventions which impose upon a belligerent occupant the duty to continue the courts as well as the municipal laws in force in the country unless absolutely prevented, in order to reestablish and insure "I" ordre et al vie publice," that is, the public order and safety, and the entire social and commercial life of the country, were inserted, not for the benefit of the invader, but for the protection and benefit of the people or inhabitants of the occupied territory and of those not in the military service, in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged.
This is the opinion of all writers on international law up to date, among then Wheaton (Vol. II, p. 236) and Oppenheim (Vol. II, p. 338) in their recently revised Treatises on International Law, edited in the year 1944, and the Interpretation of the Supreme Court of the United States in many cases, specially in the case of Dow vs. Johnson (106 U. S., 158), in which that Court said: "As a necessary consequence of such occupation and domination, the political relations of its people to their former government are, for the time being, severed. But for their protection and benefit, and the protection and benefit of others not in the military service, or, in other words, in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged, the municipal laws, that is, such as affect private rights of persons and property and provide for the punishment of crime, are generally allowed to continue in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals as they were administered before the occupation. They are considered as continuing, unless suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent." (Dow vs. Johnson, 100 U. S., 158; 25 U. S. [Law, ed.], 632).
The fact that the belligerent occupant is a treacherous aggressor, as Japan was, does not, therefore, exempt him from complying with the said precepts of the Hague Conventions, nor does it make null and void the judicial acts of the courts continued by the occupant in the territory occupied. To deny validity to such judicial acts would benefit the invader or aggressor, who is presumed to be intent upon causing as much harm as possible to the inhabitants or nationals of the enemy's territory, and prejudice the latter; it would cause more suffering to the conquered and assist the conqueror or invader in realizing his nefarious design; in fine, it would result in penalizing the nationals of the occupied territory, and rewarding the invader or occupant for his acts of treachery and aggression.
(3) We held in our decision that the word "processes," as used in the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of October 23, 1944, cannot be interpreted to mean judicial processes; and because of the cogent reasons therein set forth, we did not deem it necessary to specify the processes to which said proclamation should be construed to refer. As some doubt still lingers in the minds of persons interested is sustaining a contrary interpretation or construction, we are now constrained to say that term as used in the proclamation should be construed to mean legislative and constitutional processes, by virtue of the maxim "noscitur a sociis." According to this maxim, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found. (Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2d ed., pp. 194-196.) Since the proclamation provides that "all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void," the word "processes" must be interpreted or construed to refer to the Executive Orders of the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission, Ordinances promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, and the Constitution itself of said Republic, and others that are of the same class as the laws and regulations with which the word "processes" is associated.
To illustrate, "an English act required licenses for "houses, rooms, shops, or buildings, kept open for public refreshment, resort, and entertainment." It was adjudged that the word "entertainment," in this connection, did not necessarily mean a concert, dramatic performance, or other divertissement, nor did it necessarily imply the furnishing of food or drink, but that, judged from its associations, it meant the reception and accommodation of the public. So where a policy of marine insurance is specified to protect the assured against "arrests, restraints, and detainments of all kings, princes, and people," the word "people" means the ruling or governing power of the country, this signification being impressed upon it by its association with the words "kings" and "princes." Again, in a statute relating to imprisonment for debt, which speaks of debtors who shall be charged with "fraud" or undue preference to one creditor to the prejudice of another, the word "undue" means fraudulent. A statute of bankruptcy, declaring that any fraudulent "gift, transfer or delivery" of property shall constitute an act of bankruptcy, applies only to such deliveries as are in the nature of a gift — such as change the ownership of the property, to the prejudice of creditors; it does not include a delivery to a bailee for safekeeping." (Black on Interpretation of Laws, supra.)
(4) The state of Wheaton (International Law), 7th ed., p. 245) that "when it is said that an occupier's acts are valid, it must be remembered that no crucial instances exist to show that if his acts should all be reversed (by the restored government or its representatives) no international wrong would be committed," evidently does not mean that the restored government or its representatives may reverse the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts during the belligerent occupation without violating the law of nations and doing any wrong at all. A violation of the law of nations does not always and necessarily cause an international wrong. As the said judicial acts which apply the municipal laws, that is, such as affect private rights of persons and property, and provide for the punishment of crimes, are good and valid even after occupation has ceased, although it is true that no crucial instances exist to show that, were they reversed or invalidated by the restored or legitimate government, international wrong would be committed, it is nonetheless true and evident that by such abrogation national wrong would be caused to the inhabitants or citizens of the legitimate government. According to the law of nations and Wheaton himself, said judicial acts are legal and valid before and after the occupation has ceased and the legitimate government has been restored. As there are vested rights which have been acquired by he parties by virtue of such judgments, the restored government or its representative cannot reverse or abrogate them without causing wrong or injury to the interested parties, because such reversal would deprive them of their properties without due process of law.
In this connection, it may not be amiss to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Raymond vs. Thomas (91 U. S., 712), quoted in our decision as applicable by analogy. In said case, the Commander in Chief of the United States forces in South Carolina, after the end of the Civil War and while the territory was still under Military Government, issued a special order annulling a decree rendered by a court of chancery in a case within its jurisdiction, on the wrong assumption that he had authority to do so under the acts of Congress approved March 2, and July 19, 1867, which defined his powers and duties. That Supreme Court declared void the said special order on the ground "that it was an arbitrary stretch of authority needful to no good end that can be imagined. Whether Congress could have conferred power to do such an act is a question we are not called upon to consider. It is an unbending rule of law that the exercise of military power where the rights of the citizen are concerned, shall never be pushed beyond what the exigency requires."
(5) It is argued with insistence that the courts of the Commonwealth continued in the Philippines by the belligerent occupant became also courts of Japan, and their judgments and proceedings being acts of foreign courts cannot now be considered valid and continued by the courts of the Commonwealth Government after the restoration of the latter. As we have already stated in our decision the fundamental reasons why said courts, while functioning during the Japanese regime, could not be considered as courts of Japan, it is sufficient now to invite attention to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of The Admittance, Jecker vs. Montgomery (13 How., 498; 14 Law. ed., 240), which we did not deem necessary to quote in our decision, in which it was held that "the courts, established or sanctioned in Mexico during the war by the commanders of the American forces, were nothing more than the agents of the military power, to assist it in preserving order in the conquered territory, and to protect the inhabitants in their persons and property while it was occupied by the American arms. They were subject to the military power, and their decisions under its control, whenever the commanding officer thought proper to interfere. They were not courts of the United States, and had no right to adjudicate upon a question of prize or no prize." (The Admittance, Jecker vs. Montgomery, 13 How., 498; 14 Law. ed., 240.).
(6) The petition for mandamus in the present case is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy. The mandamus applied for is not to compel the respondent judge to order the reconstitution of the record of the case, because the record had already been reconstituted by order of the court. It is sought to compel the respondent judge to continue the proceedings in said case. As the judge refused to act on the ground that he had no power or jurisdiction to continue taking cognizance of the case, mandamus and not appeal is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy. For it is a well established rule that "if a a court has erroneously decided some question of law or of practice, presented as a preliminary objection, and upon such erroneous construction has refused to go into the merits of the case, mandamus will lie to compel it to proceed." (High on Extraordinary Legal Remedies, section 151; Castro Revilla vs. Garduño, 53 Phil., 934.)
In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration filed by the respondents is denied. The petition for oral argument on said motion for reconsideration, based on the resolution of division of this Court dated July 3, 1945, amendatory of section 2, Rule 54, of the Rules of Court, is also denied, since said resolution has not yet been adopted by this Court in banc, and the respondents and amici curiae were allowed to file, and they filed, their arguments in writing.
Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla, De Joya, and Pablo, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
BENGZON, J., concurring:
I subscribe to the majority view, because it follows the trend of American juridical thought on the legal consequences of liberation from enemy conquest; and because General MacArthur's proclamation annulling all laws, regulations and " processes" other than those of the Commonwealth did not include judicial proceedings.
In ordinary parlance, process means, "Act of proceeding; procedure; progress"; "something that occurs in a series of actions or events"; "any phenomenon which shows a continuous change in time."¹
In court language, process, of course, refers to the means whereby a court compels the appearance of a defendant before it or a compliance with its demands, and may include in its largest sense, all proceedings of the court, from the beginning to the end of a suit.²
Here we have, not a judicial statement, but a military proclamation of the great American liberator whose intent may be gleaned from his utterances and writings. Speaking at the inauguration of President Quezon, December 31, 1941, he called the occasion "symbolical of democratic processes."³ Announcing the discontinuance of United States Army's participation in Philippine affairs, he referred to "Government by constitutional process" and "Government under constitutional process." In the very proclamation of October 23, 1944, he promised to restore to the people "the sacred right of Government by constitutional process." Therefore, the word "processes" in that proclamation referred to orders or instructions, establishing governmental changes or practices — directives that may not fall strictly within the category of laws or regulations. I am fortified in this conclusion by the auxiliary rules of interpretation, noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis.
Furthermore, General MacArthur could not have forgotten the classic Army tradition that, upon military occupation, usually the "legislative, executive or administrative" functions of the enemy Government are affected — not the judicial.⁴
Unconvincing is the argument that no judicial act is touched by Judge Dizon's order. The summons requiring the defendant to answer was a positive court action or proceeding.
Untenable is the position that petitioner should be restrictly to his remedy by appeal. Considering the numerous persons and cases affected, and the pressing importance of the issue, the Court may rightly entertain a petition for extraordinary legal remedy⁵.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
We are of opinion that the motion for reconsideration should be granted, and the petition denied.
We believe that the majority opinion in this case should be revoked and not be given effect:
1. Because it ignores one of the specific provisions of the October Proclamation issued by General Douglas McArthur;
2. Because it sets aside completely the true meaning and significance of the words "all processes," as nullified in said proclamation;
3. Because it attributes to General MacArthur an intention which is precisely the opposite of the one expressly manifested in the proclamation;
4. Because it wrongly surmises what General MacArthur could not have intended, on the false assumption that judicial processes during the Japanese regime are valid in accordance with international law;
5. Because it gives judicial processes under the Japanese regime such character of sacredness and untouchability that they cannot be nullified by the legitimate government;
6. Because it gives the judicial processes under the Japanese regime, although taken under the authority of an enemy, greater sanctity than those of a legitimate occupant or of a government de jure, which are always subject to nullification, in the discretion of the legitimate government;
7. Because it gives judicial processes under the Japanese regime greater force and validity than final decisions rendered by courts of the individual states of the United States of American, which cannot be enforced in our country without the institution of an action before our tribunals;
8. Because it exempts the parties in the judicial processes, under the Japanese regime, for the obligation of paying the necessary judicial fees to the Government of the Commonwealth, granting them a discriminatory privilege in violation of the "equal protection of the laws" clause of the Philippine Constitution;
9. Because it flagrantly violates the policy specifically delineated in the declaration of President Roosevelt regarding the Vargas "Executive Commission" and the Laurel "Philippine Republic;"
10. Because it validates foreign judicial processes taken when the Commonwealth Government was already reestablished in Philippine territory;
11. Because it ignores the fact that the judicial processes in question were taken under a foreign authority with an ideology which is the opposite of that underlying the Philippine legal and constitutional systems and repugnant to the judicial sense of our people;
12. Because it encourages, in some way, the defiant attitude adopted by plaintiff Co Kim Cham against the Commonwealth Government which has been reestablished in Philippine territory by filing the complaint before a court, under the Japanese regime, almost one month after the Commonwealth Government began functioning in Leyte with the absolute certainty that its authority will soon be extended throughout the Philippines;
13. Because it creates problems that might lead to either injustice or inconsistency on the part of this Court, such as the deposit of P12,500 made by plaintiff Co Kim Cham in "micky mouse" money, which is one of the processes validated in the majority opinion;
14. Because it subjects the legitimate government to greater restrictions than those imposed by international law upon a belligerent invader, notwithstanding the fact that The Hague Convention restrictions are only applied to the invader, and not to the restored legitimate government, there being absolutely no reason why international law should meddle with the domestic affairs of a legitimate government restored in her own territory;
15. Because there is absolutely no reason why an invader may revoke the officials acts of the ousted legitimate government, a right specifically recognized in the majority opinion, but the legitimate government, once restored, is bound to respect such official acts of the defeated invader, as judicial processes, which is the same as granting outlaws greater privileges than those granted to law-abiding citizens.
On October 20, 1944, with the landing in Leyte of the armed forces of liberation, the Commonwealth Government under President Sergio Osmeña was reestablished in Philippine territory.
On October 23, 1944, General Douglas MacArthur issued his October Proclamation, nullifying all processes of any government other than the Commonwealth Government. Said proclamation was issued in keeping with the spirit and purposes of the following declaration of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt:

On the fourteenth of this month, a puppet government was set up in the Philippine Islands with Jose P. Laurel, formerly a justice of the Philippine Supreme Court, as "president." Jorge Vargas formerly a member of the Philippine Commonwealth Cabinet and Benigno Aquino, also formerly a member of that cabinet, were closely associated with Laurel in this movement. The first act of the new puppet regime was to sign a military alliance with Japan. The second act was a hypocritical appeal for American sympathy which was made in fraud and deceit, and was designed to confuse and mislead the Filipino people.

I wish to made it clear that neither the former collaborationist "Philippine Executive Commission" nor the present "Philippine Republic" has the recognition or sympathy of the Government of the United States . . . .

Our sympathy goes not to those who remain loyal to the United States and the Commonwealth — the great majority of the Filipino people who have not been deceived by the promises of the enemy . . .

October 23, 1943

FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT
President of the United States

(From U. S. Naval War College, International Law Documents. 1943, pp. 93-94.)

Plaintiff Co and her attorneys must have been fully aware of the above-mentioned facts when on November 18, 1944, she filed the complaint in this case, and deposited in court the amount of P12,500.
The fact of the landing in Leyte was officially announced by the Japanese radio, by the papers published in Manila, all Japanese controlled, and by all agencies of Japanese propaganda, although with a few days' delay and with the usual distortion of real facts.
As to the real facts, it must be presumed that plaintiff and her attorneys obtained the same information generally circulated from underground sources — Filipino, Chinese, Spanish, Swedish, Swiss, Czechs, etc. — who were keeping short wave radio sets, and were circulating surreptitious sheets containing the latest war news, including developments in Leyte.
Although the Japanese kempei were becoming harsher, it is also a fact that in the second half of November, 1944, the Japanese forces in Manila were considerably weakened and reduced, being deployed in great number in two opposite directions, north and south, and people were bolder in obtaining and propagating the real war news.
Among these were the victorious occupation of Leyte and Samar in October, 1944, and the crushing defeat suffered in said month by the bulk of the Japanese Navy in two greatest naval battles recorded in history, and the reestablishment of the Commonwealth Government including several measures adopted by the same.
Among the underground means of propaganda was the circulation of the mimeographed paper The Liberator, containing almost full accounts of political and war developments in Europe and in the Pacific.
When plaintiff filed her complaint in this case, she was fully aware that she was running the risk that her action and efforts in court might become useless or futile, besides the imminent reestablishment of the Commonwealth authority in Manila.
We may add that plaintiff, in fact, defied the authority of the Commonwealth Government reestablished in Philippine territory, when she filed said complaint about one month after said government was reestablished.
It is true that the Japanese were still controlling Manila then. But it is not less true that their control was precarious and everybody, including the Japanese themselves, was awaiting the arrival at any time of the American forces of Manila. The Japanese had already dug trenches in many places in Manila, built gun emplacements, and constructed, specially in the south side of the Pasig River, very visible military installations and other preparations to give battle within the City streets against the Fil-American forces. Everybody saw how the Japanese airplanes were reduced to a negligible minimum and how the American bombers, encountering no opposition, except from anti-aircrafts, ranged at will over all Japanese military installations in and around Manila and in the waterfronts of the City. In Manila, no aerial dogfights were seen after the first two days of bombing on September 21 and 22, 1944. After then, the Japanese fliers chose, as a wiser policy, to disappear completely from the Manila sky whenever American planes began to show up, to return one or two hours after the American planes had ended their mission.
Under these circumstances the position of plaintiff seems to become precarious and indefensible by her attitude of defiance to the Commonwealth Government, which was certain to be reestablished also in Manila, with the same sureness that a falling stone will follow the universal law of gravitation as stated by Isaac Newton.
In the present case plaintiff Co seeks to recover from defendant Eusebio Valdez Tan Keh the undivided half of a property located in Manila described in Torrens title under Transfer Certificate No. 64610 of the Register of Deeds of the City.
From the facts alleged in the complaint, as a condition precedent to the recovery of said undivided half, plaintiff had to return to defendant the amount of P12,500. As defendant refused to accept said amount, upon filing the complaint, plaintiff deposited in court said amount. It does not appear clearly what money was deposited. No doubt it must be of the kind commonly known as "mickey mouse" money, as the complaint was filed in the latter part of November, 1944. (President Osmeña and General MacArthur were already in Philippine territory with the Armed Forces of Liberation.).
If the proceedings had in the case until the record of the same was burned are to be validated, it is evident that plaintiff must be credited with having made a valid deposit in court in the amount of P12,500.
In case decision is rendered as prayed for in the complaint, and the undivided half of the property in question is adjudicated to the plaintiff, no one shall deny, as a matter of elemental justice, that defendant is entitled to receive the full amount of P12,500, which must be returned to him as a condition in order that he may relinquish his title to the property in favor of the plaintiff.
Now the problem facing us is how to determine the way in which defendant will recover the amount of P12,500. The amount was deposited in the court of that brazen political fraud inflicted upon our people, the Laurel Philippine Republic. But where is that court today? If the money could be located and disposed of, is it not absolutely worthless?
The decision will be rendered by the courts of the Commonwealth Government, the Court of First Instance of Manila, in the first place, and, in case of appeal, this Supreme Court, as a tribunal of last resort.
The decision necessarily will include a pronouncement as to how defendant will get the money. To make that pronouncement the Court of First Instance of Manila and this Supreme Court, undoubtedly, will be placed in a quandary.
Indeed we do not see how the money deposited in the court under the Japanese regime can be turned over to defendant.
The validation of the proceedings in question starts from the fiction that Commonwealth courts are continuations of the courts which functioned under enemy occupation and authority, including the Court of First Instance which functioned under the Vargas Philippine Executive Commission, and, later, the Laurel Philippine Republic, in which the complaint of this case has been filed. To follow this fiction to its natural consequences, the present Court of First Instance of Manila must be the one who ought to turn over the money to the defendant. Can it do it? Can it give a money which is not in its possession but in the possession of the defunct Court of First Instance under the Japanese regime?
As the Commonwealth courts have no money to turn over to the defendant, from whom and from where shall it get the money? This is a question that has never been answered, and we are afraid that it cannot be given any satisfactory answer.
As the defendant is entitled to his money, and the money must be paid by the plaintiff, it seems that plaintiff is the one who must find a way to give the money to defendant. But plaintiff may justly claim that she had done what was legally expected from her when, after offering the amount to defendant and the same refused to accept the money, she deposited it in court.
She cannot be compelled to disburse another P12,500 to be given to the defendant. If the Court of First Instance of Manila, in the decision it may render, should order her to pay P12,500 to the defendant, without taking into consideration what she has deposited in court in November, 1944, she may invoke the decision of this Supreme Court validating the proceedings, including therein the deposit of P12,500. If the deposit is valid, plaintiff is relieved from further obligations and in such case, how shall justice be rendered to defendant?
Our courts must not fall in the inconsistency of validating all the proceedings taken until the record of the case has been destroyed, and to except from said validation the deposit made by the plaintiff. If the deposit is valid, the courts must not allow such validation to be a simple mockery, and offensive farce without any other meaning than to make the administration of justice an object of laughter.
It is evident from the foregoing that the validation of the proceedings in question, in utter disregard of the October Proclamation issued by General MacArthur and of the Declaration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, leads to an absurd situation from which our courts cannot escape and which will entangle them in a maze of problems incompatible with the administration of justice.
The validation of the processes in the case in question, including the deposit of P12,500, will place our courts of justice in the same predicament as the judge in the "Merchant of Venice," the Shakespearean masterpiece. The validity of the deposit made by plaintiff Co Kim Cham once recognized, she is entitled, like Shylock, to her pound of flesh, which can be denied her only through a judicial trick, the only way open to apparently avoid inconsistency.
In the preface to his work entitled "The Struggle for Law," the great jurist Jhering, expressed the following opinion as to the legal issue presented by the English dramatic genius:

One word more, on a point which has been contested even by those with whom I otherwise agree. I refer to my claim that injustice was done to Shylock.

I have not contended that the judge should have recognized Shylock bond to be valid; but that, once he had recognized its validity he should not, subsequently, have invalidated it by base cunning. The judge had the choice of deciding the bond valid or invalid. He should have declared it to be the latter, but he declared it to be the former. Shakespeare represents the matter as if this decision was the only possible one; no one in Venice doubted the validity of the bond; Antonio's friends, Antonio himself, the court, all were agreed that the bond gave the Jew a legal right. And confiding in his right thus universally acknowledged, Shylock calls for the aid of the court, and the "wise Daniel," after he had vainly endeavored to induce the revenge-thirsty creditor to surrender his right, recognized it. And now, after the judge's decision has been given after all doubt as to the legal right of the Jew has been removed by the judge himself, and not a word can be against it; after the whole assembly, the doge included, have accommodated themselves to the inevitable decree of the law — now that the victor, entirely sure of his case, intends to do what the judgment of the court authorized him to do, the same judge who had solemnly recognized his rights, renders those rights nugatory by an objection, a stratagem so contemptible that it is worthy of no serious attention. Is there any flesh without blood? The judge who accorded Shylock the right to cut a pound of flesh out of Antonio's body accorded him, at the same time, the right to Antonio's blood, without which flesh cannot be. Both refused to the Jew. He must take the flesh without the blood, and cut out only an exact pound of flesh, no more and no less. Do I say too much when I assert that here the Jew is cheated out of his legal right? True, it is done in the interest of humanity, but does chicanery cease to be chicanery because practiced in the name of humanity?

We vote for granting the motion for reconsideration to avoid placing our courts of justice in the predicament depicted in the Shylock case.
The next question we are about to discuss, concerning a procedural incident in this case, is most unusual. So far, we were concerned only with questions of right of parties coming to us for redress, and we have striven to champion the cause of those parties who, we believe, are deprived of their rights, victims of oppression, or denied justice. The problem confronting us now is essentially of internal character. Although it also affects the litigants in this case, it also transcends into the very official functions of this very Court.
What really is under test is the ability or capacity of this Court to administer justice. The question affects the rights and constitutional prerogatives of the individual members of the Tribunal in relation to the performance of their official duties.
Is a member of this Court entitled to hear the parties and their attorneys on a question pending before us before exercising his constitutional duty to vote on said question? May a majority deprive any member of the opportunity of being apprised of all the facts and all the arguments, written or oral, that the parties and their attorney may present in a case submitted to our consideration?
In the present case, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent, in which it is prayed that said motion for reconsideration be set for hearing, invoking the resolution adopted by this Court on July 3, 1945, and in view of the special fact that there are two new members of this Court who did not have the opportunity of hearing the parties when this case was originally argued, or of participating when it was decided.
One of the new members proposed, seconded by two other members, that said hearing on the motion for reconsideration be set, alleging that he wants to have an opportunity of hearing the parties or their attorneys before voting on said motion.
A majority resolved to deny the motion. We dissented from such action, and this opinion explains why we had to dissent.
The motion was made by one of the member of this Court, prompted not only by the desire to give the respondent ample opportunity to argue upon his motion for reconsideration and to give the movant a change of hearing oral arguments upon the vital questions raised in this case, but by the idea of granting the petition of the respondent in accordance with the resolution unanimously adopted by the Supreme Court on July 3, 1945, which reads as follows:

The Supreme Court, upon motion of Justice Perfecto, unanimously resolved to adopt the policy of granting litigants or their attorneys the most ample and fullest opportunity of presenting and arguing their cases, by permitting them to present, after oral arguments, memoranda within reasonable time, to argue in open court motions of reconsideration, and, in general, by liberalizing in the discretion of the Court the application of the rules, to insure, in the interest of justice, the most complete and free discussion of every question properly submitted. (41 Off. Gaz., No. 4, p. 284.)

It must be remembered that this resolution was adopted simultaneously with another proposed by Mr. Justice De Joya for the purpose of definitely stopping a practice which was not in keeping with the highest ethical standards of the law profession, or with the dignity of the Supreme Court. Said resolution reads as follows:

The Supreme Court, upon motion of Justice De Joya, unanimously resolved, as one of the means of maintaining the highest ethical standard of the legal profession, not to permit private discussion by lawyers of their cases with individual Justices. (41 Off. Gaz., No. 4, p. 284.)

We were fully aware that the real cause of the practice sought to be stopped by the De Joya Resolution was the desire of litigants and their attorneys to have important motions, such as motions for reconsideration, properly considered before they are acted upon.
In all courts other than the Supreme Court, the parties and their attorneys are always given the opportunity of arguing before the tribunals, or the corresponding judges, all their motions and their petitions, without distinction as to their importance or lack of importance.
But in the Supreme Court no such opportunity was granted in the past. All motions were acted upon without hearing and without granting the litigants or their attorneys the opportunity of properly discussing by oral argument the questions raised in said motions, although said questions are of great importance and of decisive nature, such as motions for new trial, rehearing, or reconsideration.
The fact that the resolutions upon said motions usually are not accompanied by any reason to support the action taken, although in many instances the motions raised important questions and in their preparation the lawyers employed weeks or months of painstaking research, study, thinking, and many sleepless nights, in order to present, in the best possible manner, the questions raised, gave rise to the suspicion, founded or unfounded, generally entertained by the members of the bar, that the members of the Supreme Court did not care to read even said motions. The suspicion was even stronger with respect to the almost invariable denial, expressed in one or two words, of motions for reconsiderations. From mere suspicion to a strong belief only one step is lacking.
To meet this unsatisfactory situation, resourceful litigants and attorneys decided to have private conversations with individual members of the Court to argue their motions without, naturally, giving the opposing parties the necessary opportunity to be heard therein.
The fact that some motions for reconsideration, although very few, were granted in cases where said private conversations took place, could not dispel the suspicion.
Years ago, we came to the conclusion that the only way of stopping the practice is to eliminate the causes, that is, to eliminate the unjustifiable restrictions which deprived parties and attorneys of all the opportunities to fully present the cases and argue their motions.
The practice of not allowing an attorney to argue orally and to submit, at the same time, a written memorandum was a cause of much dissatisfaction among the members of the bar; and it was also one of the causes which induced some of them to seek private conversations with members of the Supreme Court.
Convinced that these procedural restrictions are unreasonable as they serve only to restrict the opportunities by which this Court may be completely apprised of the questions of fact and of law submitted to their decision, we were of opinion that it is high time for the Supreme Court to do away with them.
That is the reason why we proposed the resolution which was unanimously adopted by the Supreme Court, incorporating amendments proposed by Mr. Justice Feria and Mr. Justice De Joya, and which we very willingly accepted.
This is the first time when a party in a litigation is seeking the opportunity to argue orally upon his motion for reconsideration according to the terms of the resolution.
We do not see any reason why the Supreme Court shall betray the faith of that party by ignoring a resolution unanimously adopted by the same Court.
One of the members thereof, invoking his official privilege, in the performance of his constitutional duties to be duly apprised of the questions raised in the motion for reconsideration, proposed that he be given an opportunity to hear the parties in an oral argument. We do not understand why his proposition should be turned down, as it was, and why he should be denied the opportunity he needs for the proper performance of his constitutional duties.
In a legislative chamber composed of members belonging to opposing political parties, in the heated debates to vie for popular favor, the majority party have sometimes denied improperly some prerogatives to members of the minority party, but it is unheard of that a majority party ever denied any minority member a right essential to the proper performance of his official functions, such as the right to have proper information upon any question to be voted upon, the right to hear witness and arguments, the right to read memoranda, the right to ask questions to any other member of the chamber and to the chair, and to interrogate any person who might enlighten him as to matters under consideration of the chamber.
The Supreme Court is not a political body composed of members divided for partisan considerations. No one here is personally, politically, or economically interested in the result of any case. It is really inconceivable how a majority in this Court could trample upon the rights and privileges of a fellow member. It is more inconceivable if we take into account the fact that we consider ourselves as brethren, and by tradition we are calling ourselves as such.
We can understand that amour propre may induce judges not to entertain with sympathy motions for reconsideration, as one of the natural weaknesses of humankind is to resent that others should point out one's real or fancied mistakes. But when we assumed our position in the highest tribunal of the land, the only governmental institution on which our fundamental code bestowed the appellative "supreme," where we attained the uppermost position of honor to which a lawyer can aspire, we are supposed to have left that weakness behind, and all questions on matters which are official in nature submitted to us shall be viewed with absolute personal detachment, with the only aim of doing justice to all and anyone of the eighteen million inhabitants of this country that might come to us, without asking anything for ourselves, but giving all of ourselves to help our people attain their mission in the centuries and millennia to come.
We know that the publication of the resolution in question was received by members of the bar with a sigh of relief. They could not fail to welcome a procedural innovation which will to away with one of the headaches in the practice of the profession of law; how to argue in person a motion for reconsideration, and such other motions of decisive importance in the cases they are handling. We who had endured the same headaches sympathize with and share the disappointment that the action of the majority will inflict upon law practitioners. Such unhappiness cannot allow us to be happy. Happiness, to be true, must be shared with others. Unshared happiness is deceitful tinsel.
When the resolution was adopted by unanimous vote, we felt elated by the though that the cause of the administration of justice had advanced another step in the thorny way of procedural progress. We believed that the liberal spirit embodied in the resolution accomplished another triumph against outworn practices, without better claim for survival than the fact that they are mouldy appendices of an old routine, which is a strong appeal to those who would not lift a finger to find out if there are better things than those of which we are used to, to look in the realms of law and ideas for happier worlds to discover and conquer, to see if new pages of the book of science will offer hitherto unknown marvels for an improved service to human necessities, because they do not happen to feel the natural urge towards perfection, which is a permanent force in mankind.
Our satisfaction did not last long. The resolution lived a paper life in the minutes of the Supreme Court and in the pages of the Official Gazette, giving for almost four months new hopes to the members of the bar, hopes which !alas!, did not come true. The liberal spirit which we felt triumphant, suffered a crushing defeat, overwhelmed by the forces of reaction, bent on clinging to the mistakes of the past. The liberal innovation was decreed decapitated, to give way to the revival of an absurd judicial practice, wholly unreasonable and unsatisfactory, and not the best suited for a more effective administration of justice by the highest tribunal of our country.
In this hour of sorrow at the running back of the clock of judicial progress, it is our hope that the last setback is not definite for all time. Someday the forces of progress will rally and again march forward, singing the blissful hymn of a new dawn. Setbacks are frequent in the trials and errors of democracy. But in the long run, reason will reign supreme. The slippery earthen feet of the idols of error shall be exposed and will cause them to crumble into a crash from which there is no possible redemption. What is good, is good; what is bad, is bad. We firmly believe that, for the proper performance of its official functions, for the most efficient fulfillment of its judicial duties, the Supreme Court should never curtail the opportunity of the parties and their lawyers to present and argue fully, in writing and by oral argument, all questions properly submitted to our consideration. It is the only way of reducing to the possible minimum our chances of rendering erroneous decisions. If we are not fully apprised of all information, evidence, and arguments that litigants and their attorneys might present and offer to present within the proper time, we are likely to overlook facts and ideas that might give the necessary clue to the correct solution of the factual or legal problems raised in the cases and which will determine whether we are doing justice or injustice.
Painstakingly searching and inquisitive in fact-finding, benedictine patience in trying to understand the respective positions of contending parties, and thoroughness in judicial investigation and in proving and testing legal propositions and theories in the medical laboratory of analysis and inquiry, are the prices of real and substantial justice. The prices are high, but justice is a treasure worth paying all the prices men can offer. Her value is so high that no price is enough to insure its attainment. It even merits, not only the best prices, but the noblest sacrifices. It is after all, one of the fundamental purposes of society. It is one of the dazzling gems with which human character is studied. No efforts must be spared to reach the goal where the golden wreaths and jewelled garlands of human aspirations lay.

HILADO, J., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent from the resolution of the majority denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the respondents in this case. There will be no need of restating here all the arguments set forth in my dissent against the original majority opinion herein, as well as those which have been expressed in my concurring opinion in G.R. No. L-49, Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, p. 355, ante. However, in reiterating these arguments, by reference, in support of the present dissent, I feel in duty bound to reinforce them by some additional considerations in view of the resolution of the majority.
In the first place, the resolution of the majority says:

We held in our decision that the word "processes," as used in the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of October 23, 1944, cannot be interpreted to mean judicial processes; and because of the cogent reasons therein set forth, we did not deem it necessary to specify the processes to which said proclamation should be construed to refer. As some doubt still lingers in the minds of persons interested in sustaining a contrary interpretation or construction, we are now constrained to say that term as used in the proclamation should be construed to mean legislative and constitutional processes, by virtue of the maxim "noscitur a sociis." According to this maxim, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found. (Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2d ed., pp. 194-196.) Since the proclamation provides that "all laws" regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void, the word "processes" must be interpreted or construed to refer to the Executive Orders of the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission, Ordinances promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, and the Constitution itself of said Republic, and other that are of the same class as the laws and regulations with which the word "processes" is associated, (Pp. 5, 6.)

Here we have a frank admission that "the Constitution itself of said Republic" is among the "processes" declared null and void by the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. Now, the courts of that "Republic" were organized and functioned under and by virtue of said Constitution, particularly under Article IV thereof. Section 4 of said Article provides that the members of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President with the advice of the Cabinet, and all judges of inferior courts shall be appointed by the President with the advice of the Supreme Court. Consequently, those courts, commencing with the Supreme Court down to the lowest justice of the peace or municipal court, had to be organized anew, for their constitution under said Article IV was to be different from that of the Commonwealth courts under Article VIII of the Commonwealth Constitution. And, of course, the courts, which has thus been created under the Constitution of the "Republic," could not derive their powers, authority or jurisdiction, if any, except from the same Constitution, and any pertinent legislation enacted pursuant thereto. But if, as admitted by the majority, that Constitution was null and void under General of the Army MacArthurs' aforesaid proclamation, no legal power, authority or jurisdiction could have been conferred by virtue thereof upon the said courts and, as a consequence, the so-called Court of First Instance of Manila wherein the proceedings in question were had could not validly exercise such power, authority or jurisdiction. As a corollary, all of said proceedings must of necessity be null and void.
When the record of the case was burned during the battle for the liberation of Manila, the only proceedings which had been had in civil case No. 3012 of the Japanese-sponsored Court of First Instance of Manila were: (1) the complaint Annex X of the petition for mandamus, dated November 17, 1944; (2) the notification Annex X-1 dated November 20, 1944; (3) the motion to dismiss Annex X-2, dated November 28, 1944; (4) the urgent motion for time to file opposition Annex X-3, dated December 14, 1944; and (5) the opposition to motion to dismiss Annex X-4, dated December 21, 1944. The case had not been heard yet; consequently, there had been no decision disposing thereof.
At that stage of the proceedings, the record was destroyed, and shortly thereafter, upon the liberation of the city, it became legally and physically impossible for that Japanese-sponsored court to continue functioning. The very Constitution under which it had been organized was admittedly declared null and void by the Commander in Chief of the liberation army in his aforesaid proclamation. As we believe having demonstrated in our dissenting opinion when this case was decided, that declaration of nullity was retroactive to the very inception of the laws, regulations and processes condemned thereby — that these were null and void ab initio. But, making another concession to the contrary view, let us suppose that under the aforesaid proclamation the Constitution of the "Republic" became null and void only upon the liberation of Manila is so far as this area was concerned. Under the same hypothesis, the Japanese-sponsored Court of First Instance of Manila created by authority of that instrument, and all its pending unfinished proceedings also became null and void upon the date of that liberation. When the Court of First Instance of Manila was reestablished under the Commonwealth Constitution and laws, it had absolutely nothing to do with either the defunct and so-called Court of First Instance of Manila under the "Republic" nor its "proceedings" which were, besides, nothing but a name without substance in the eyes of the law. And yet the majority would by mandamus compel the reestablished the Court of First Instance of Manila to continue said legally non-existent proceedings to final judgment. This could not be done without considering those proceedings valid despite the nullity of the court in which they were had due to the admitted nullity of the Constitution of the "Republic of the Philippines" under which said court was created, and without making the Commonwealth of the Philippines respect pro tanto the said "Republic," which was the creature of the very representatives of the Japanese Empire who are currently being tried as War Criminals.
In the second place, the said resolution contains the following paragraphs:

It is submitted that the renunciation in our Constitution and in the Kellog-Briand Pact of war as an instrument of national policy, rendered inapplicable the rules of international law authorizing the belligerent Japanese army of occupation to set up a provisional or de facto government in the Philippines, because Japan started war treacherously and emphasized was as an instrument of national policy; and that to give validity to the judicial acts of courts sponsored by the Japanese would be tantamount to giving validity to the acts of these invaders, and would be nothing short of legalizing the Japanese invasion of the Philippines.

In reply to this contention, suffice it to say that the provisions of the Hague Conventions which impose upon a belligerent occupant the duty to continue the courts as well as the municipal laws in force in the country unless absolutely prevented, in order to reestablish and insure "I" ordre et la vie publice," that is, the public order and safety, and the entire social and commercial life of the country, were inserted, not for the benefit of the invaders, but for the protection and benefit of the people or inhabitants of the occupied territory and of those not in the military service, in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged. (Pp. 3, 4.)

The trouble with the case of Japan in the Philippines is that, in establishing here the puppet regimes of the Philippine Executive Commission and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, she did not undertake to fulfill any duty as provided by the Hague Conventions in order to reestablish and insure public order and safety, etc. "for the protection and benefit of the people or inhabitants of the occupied territory and of those not in the military service, in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged." Her sole purpose, as conclusively shown by her previous, contemporaneous, and subsequent acts in the Philippines, was to make of those puppet organization mere instrumentalities for the further prosecution of her war aims. The strict control and supervision which were constantly retained and exercised by the Japanese Army over, first the Philippine Executive Commission and, later, the so-called Republic, under the circumstances prevailing during the entire period of their existence, show to my mind that they were created merely to serve as such instrumentalities. A strong corroboration of this conclusion is found in the declaration of Mr. Jose P. Laurel, President of that "Republic," when Japan surrendered, that by the acceptance by Japan of the terms of the Potsdam Declaration the said "Republic" ceased to exist: this could only mean that said "Republic" was inseparably linked with Japan's war effort — if it had been intended only as a provisional government set up by the occupation army, it would have been considered by Mr. Laurel as terminated upon the liberation of the Philippines which happened before Japan's surrender. Any semblance of incidental benefit which to some eyes might have appeared to accrue therefrom to a more or less insignificant portion of our population, was not more than incidental or nominal. It should not be allowed to blindfold our eyes to the real and deceitful aim of the enemy. This is the same deceit to which President Roosevelt referred in his message dated October 23, 1943, cited in my main dissenting opinion.
If, fundamentally, the Japanese-sponsored Court of First Instance of Manila lacked all power and jurisdiction over the said civil case No. 3012, no amount of benefit to any particular litigants who might have resorted to it, which may be said to arise from the proceedings of that court, could confer upon it such power and jurisdiction. This is so self-evident as to render demonstration unnecessary.
I, therefore, vote for the granting of the motion for reconsideration.

BRIONES, M., disidente:
Siento tener que disentir de la resolucion de la mayoria. Opino que el pedimento de reconsideration debe concederse y en consecuencia denegarse el mandamus solicitado por el recurrente.
Al interpretar la proclama del General MacArthur de 23 de Octubre de 1944 que anula todas las actuaciones del gobierno establecido en estas islas bajo la ocupacion militar japonesa, creo ue la inteleccion mas apropiada es que, como regla general, esa proclama anula todo, incluso las actuaciones judiciales (judicial processes), sobre todo aquellas cuya entidad y cuyos efectos rebasan el periodo de la esclavitud forzosa y transcienden y repercuten en la postliberacion. En otras palabras, la nulidad, la ineficacia debe ser la regla general; y validez, la eficacia la excepcion, la salvedad.
La razon de esto es sencilla. El gobierno de ocupacion representaba en nuestra vida un parentesis anomalo, de obligada ilegitimidad, y es nada mas que natural que el gobierno legitimo, de jure, al restaurarse, no transigiese con los actos y procesos de aquel gobierno, excepto en lo que fuera absolutamente necesario e irremediable. Caerian, por ejemplo, bajo esta excepcion solamente aquellos actos y procesos resultantes del hecho de que formabamos una comunidad civilizada con necesidades e intereses individuales y sociales complejos; y de que por instinto de conservacion y para vivir con cierto orden y relativa tranquilidad y no precipitarnos en la anarquia y en el caos habiamos menester la egida de un gobierno, sin importar que este no fuese hechura de nuestra voluntad y que inclusive no fuera repulsivo. Mas alla del minimum de esta forzosidad, no puede haber transaccion con los actos y procesos de aquel regimen.
Como corolario de esta inteleccion es obvio que por mucho que nos tienten y atraigen ciertas doctrinas y principios conocidos de derecho international sobre gobiernos de facto, no es conveniente y es hasta peligroso sentar reglas absolutas que a lo mejor no cuadran con las circunstancias peculiares de cada caso. Lo mas seguro es enjuiciar por sus propios meritos cada acto o proceso que se plantee.
En la determinacion judicial de esta clase de asuntos nunca se deben perder de vista, entre otras, las siguientes circunstancias: (1) que la invasion japonesa, aun en el apogeo de su fuerza, jamas pudo quebrantar le lealtad fundamental del pueblo filipino a su gobierno y al gobierno de los Estados Unidos de America; (2) que en casi todas partes de Filipinas esta lealtad hizo posible la articulacion y organization soterranea de fuerzas de resistencia contra el enemigo; (3) que si bien el control japones era por lo general efectivo en las ciudades y grandes poblaciones, era, sin embargo, precario en muchos pueblos y barrios, sobre todo en aquellos que no tenian valor estrategico o eran poco propicios a la confiscacion y rapiña, dominando practicamente en dichos sitios las guerrillas; (4) que en algunas regiones el gobierno del Commonwealth seguia funcionando, trasladandose de un sitio a otro para burlar la persecucion del enemigo a acuartelandose en zonas a donde no alcanzaba la accion de las guarniciones japonesas; (5) que muchos habitantes de los llanos y poblados se sustrajeron a la jurisdiccion del gobierno de fuerza predominante ( paramount force), refugiandose en las montañas y lugares dominados por las guerrillas y colocandose bajo la proteccion y salvaguardia de estas, o bien en sitios donde no habia ni japoneses ni guerrillas, (6) y por ultimo, que despues del desembarco del General MacArthur y de sus fuerzas libertadoras en Leyte el 20 de Octubre de 1944, la lealtad filipina y el espiritu de resistencia llegaron a su maxima tension y la ocupacion japonesa se fue desmoronando rapidamente a pedazos hasta sufrir finalmente un colapso total.
Examinemos ahora el caso que nos ocupa. ¿Hay razones para catalogarlo excepcionalmente en la categoria de aquellos actos o procesos judiciales que, bajo la inteleccion ya antedicha, merecen que se les de vida y efectividad aun despues de fenecido el rigimen de ilegitimidad bajo el cual se iniciaron y tramitaron? Creo que no. Veanos por que.
De autos resulta que el expediente cuya reconstitucion se pide formose mediante demanda incoada ante el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila el 17 de Noviembre de 1944, es decir, cuando ya las fuerzas libertadoras del General MacArthus estaban fuertemente asentadas en Leyte y el Gobierno del Commonwealth firmemente restablecido en suelo filipino. El asunto versaba sobre derechos relacionados con propiedad inmueble y el estado de su tramitacion no paso de la etapa de las alegaciones hasta que ocurrio el devastador incendio de Manila causado por los japoneses despues de la entrada de los Americanos en esta ciudad el 3 de Febrero de este ano, 1945. Los records del Juzgado se quemaron con motivo de dicho incendio, entre ellos el expediente de autos. Despues de la restauracion de los tribunales, la parte demandante pidio la reconstitucion del expediente por medio de copias de los escritos presentados. La parte demandada se opuso: primero, porque se trataba de un asunto incoado bajo la ocupacion japonesa y, por tanto, quedaba automaticamente anulado, despues de la liberacion de Manila, bajo los terminos de la proclama del General MacArthur de que se ha hecho mencion; segundo, porque no se podia confiar en la autenticidad de las copias proporcionadas por la parte demandante. El Juzgado estimo la opisicion por el fundamento de la invalidez y porque, a falta de una ley expresa del Commonwealth al efecto, no se consideraba autorizado para ordenar la reconstitucion del expediente y asumir jurisdiccion sobre el mismo. De ahi la interposicion del presente recurso de mandamus para compeler al Juzgado a ordenar la reconstitucion del expediente y a seguir conociendo del mismo.
Aunque es verdad que la Ciudad de Manila no estaba aun liberada cuando se presento la demanda de autos, con todo opino que el Juzgado no erro ni abuso de su discrecion al negarse a dar validez a lo tramitado bajo la ocupacion japonesa con motivo de dicha demanda y a reconstituir el expediente, a tenor de lo dispuesto en la proclama del General MacArthur tantas veces mencionada. Es evidente que no se trata aqui de un proceso judicial comprendido dentro del minimum de forzosidad de que hablo mas arriba y cuya validez y eficacia el gobierno legitimo no tendria mas remedio que reconocer so pena de causar un dano irreparable a las partes. No habia llegado a cristalizar ningun estado juridico definitivo en el asunto, no se habia dictado ninguna sentencia, ni siquiera habia comenzado a verse. No se pretende que las partes perderian algun derecho vital y sustantivo si no se reconstituyera el expediente quemado, o que no podria reproducirse el litigio ahora ante los tribunales del Commonwealth, en un pleito completamente nuevo y original.
Si esto es asi ¿por que, pues, se ha de compeler al gobierno legitimo, al tribunal de jure, a aceptar como validas y, por añadidura, a heredarlas y reconstituirlas, unas actuaciones tramitadas a ultima hora, de prisa y corriendo, cuando los japoneses ya estaban de retirada y las fuerzas libertadoras del General MacArthur estaban en visperas de una victoria aplastante y decisiva, maxime porque esas actuaciones no envolvian nada vital ni apremiante en el sentido de que su incoacion no pudiera haberse pospuesto para despues de la liberacion?
¿Por que no se ha de dar al gobierno legitimo, al tribunal de jure, cierta latitud en el ejercicio de su discrecion al determinar cual debe ser aceptado como valido en los autos y procesos de aquel regimen de fuerza predominante ( paramount force) y cual debe ser considerado como nulo e ineficaz? ¿Es acaso que el gobierno legitimo ha de sentirse como paralizado y cohibido al enjuiciar los actos y procesos del gobierno establecido por el invasor?.
Y, sobre todo ¿por que al interpretar la proclama del General MacArthur hemos de restringirla demasiado en ves de darle la mayor latitud posible, limitada tan solo por aquel minimum de forzosidad de que he hablado antes? ¿No es acaso un principio bien establecido de derecho internacional que si el gobierno legitimo, al restaurarse, puede convalidar ciertos actos o procesos del gobierno de ocupacion, tambien puede optar por lo contrario y que no hay nada que en buena ley le impida hacerlo en gracia a la majestad de la soberania legitima? (Wheaton's International Law, pp. 244-245.)
Existen, ademas, otras consideraciones fuera de las indicadas. El 17 de Noviembre de 1944 en que se presento la demanda de autos la situacion en Manila ya era muy critica y alarmante. Los aviones aliados dominaban el aire. Los Japoneses estaban tratando desesperadamente de fortificar la ciudad. Parecia que iban a defenderse aqui hasta el ultimo cartucho. Las autoridades locales conminaban a la poblacion a que evacuara la ciudad en prevencion de batallas en las calles y de casa en casa. Bajo tales circunstancias es harto dudoso ques los tribunales estuvieran funcionando todavia normalmente entonces y que los procesos judiciales fueran tales como debian ser en una situacion ordenada y normal. Es evidente que tales procesos, tramitados en condiciones tan anomalas y precarias, no merecen que se les de validez reconstituyendolos, tanto mas cuanto que las partes nada pierden con su invalidacion, pudiendo, como pueden, someter sus contenciones a los tribunales restablecidos del Commonwealth mediante la incoacion de nuevos pleitos. Lo mas que tendrian que hacer seria pagar nuevos derechos de escribania y de sherifato, pero si protestasen por este nuevo pago, diria entonces que ello seria un buen argumento en contra de la reconstitucion.
En vista de todas las circunstancias, se puede afirmar con buen fundamento que la parte demandante, cuando presento su demanda en Noviembre de 1944, sabia o debia saber que el gobierno del Commonwealth — el de jure — ya estaba firmemente restablecido en suelo filipino, y que el tremendo exito de unas operaciones militares victoriosas estaba posibilitando rapidamente su pronta restauracion en plena capital del archipielago. Asi que por anologia se puede aplicar a este caso lo que en el asunto de State vs. Carroll (28 Conn., 449) se declaro, a saber:

When, therefore, in civil cases, the public or third persons had knowledge that the officer was not an officer de jure, the reason for validating the acts to which they submitted, or which they invoked, failed, and the law no longer protected them. (Cases on Amer. Admin. Law, 146.)

Es igualmente aplicable por anologia esto que se dijo en el asunto de State vs. Taylor (108 N. C., 196):

The citizen is justly chargeable with laches, does that which is his own wrong and wrong to the public, when he recognizes, tolerates, encourage and sustains a mere usurper, one whom he knows, or ought, under the circumstances, to know to be such. In such cases, neither justice, necessity nor public policy requires that the acts of the usurper shall be upheld as valid for any purpose. Indeed, these things, the spirit and purpose of government strongly suggest the contrary. (Cases on Amer. Admin. Law, 143.)

Ahora pasare a tratar de un punto procesal. El mandamus procede cuando hay de por medio un deber ministerial que cumplir y a la parte agraviada no le queda otro remedio expedito y adecuado. ¿Es este el caso que tenemos ante nosotros? Creo que no. El Juzgado tenia perfecta discrecion para reconstituir o no el expediente en cuestion porque mientras, por un lado, no se creia autorizado para asumir jurisdiccion sobre un asunto heredado de la ocupacion japonesa a falta de una ley expresa del Commonwealth que le autorizase para ello, por otro lado con su proceder no privada a las partes del derecho de plantear sus desavenencias ante los tribunales del gobierno legitimo restablecido, en medio de la presente atmosfera de plena libertad y plena justicia. Pero de todas maneras, aun suponiendo que el Juzgado haya incurrido en error al ejercer su discrecion de la manera que ejercio, a la parte agraviada le quedaba un remedio expedito y adecuado: la apelacion.
En resumen, mi inteleccion del asunto que nos ocupa es la siguiente:
(a) Que la proclama del General MacArthur anula, como regla general, todos los actos y procesos legislativos, administrativos y aun judiciales del gobierno de superior fuerza establecido por los japoneses durante la guerra.
(b) Que esa proclama, sin embargo, deja excepcionalmente un margen para cierto minimum de validez forzosa, minimum impuesto por las exigencias del instinto de conservacion, del orden y de la vida civilizada que teniamos que vivir y conllevar en medio de los riesgos, tribulaciones y horrores bajo la ocupacion militar.
(c) Que el caso que tenemos ante nosotros no cae dentro del radio de ese minimum no solo porque no envolvia para las partes nada urgente ni vitalmente forzoso que hiciese inaplazable su planteamiento ante los tribunales del regimen de ocupacion en visperas de la victoria devisiva de las fuerzas libertadoras y cuando el gobierno de Commonwealth ya estaba firmemente restablecido en suelo filipino y la situacion en Manile era a todas luces anormal, sino porque nada hay que prive a las partes de su derecho de promover el mismo litigo ante los tribunales del Commonwealth mediante la incoacion de un expediente nuevo y original.
(d) Y, finalmente, que aun suponiendo que el Juzgado haya incurrido en error, el recurso procedente no es el de mandamus sino la apelacion.

Arcega vs. Court of Appeals

2013-12-20T22:47:00.004-08:00

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 122206 July 7, 1997
SPOUSES RAFAEL Y. ARCEGA and TERESITA F. ARCEGA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (17th Division), and RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

In June 1988, petitioners herein, the spouses Rafael and Teresita Arcega, obtained two loans amounting to P900,000.00 from respondent Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). Said loan was secured by a real estate mortgage executed by the parties on April 10, 1989 on a 561-square-meter property with improvements covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 377692. ¹ Petitioners paid a total of about P300,000.00 but later defaulted on their loan obligations.

The bank foreclosed the mortgage on petitioners' property and acquired the property at the public auction held on May 21, 1990 with the highest bid of P984,361.08. The Sheriff's Certificate of Sale issued on the same day was duly registered with the Quezon City Register of Deeds on May 25, 1990.

The spouses Arcega repeatedly communicated with respondent bank's Assistant Vice-President Emily Sibulo Hayudini in connection with the status of the foreclosed property.² On May 23, 1991, two days before the expiration of the redemption period, Rafael Arcega wrote the bank for an extension of three weeks and informing it that he has applied for a housing loan³ to refinance his loan account with RCBC. On May 25, 1991, petitioners' counsel wrote respondent bank for a four-week extension within which to redeem the property. Four days later, respondent bank informed petitioners that their request for a three-week extension, until June 14, 1991, was granted. During all this time, petitioners raised no question regarding the regularity of the foreclosure sale and proceedings.

On June 14, 1991, Assistant Vice-President Hayudini inquired through the telephone from Mr. Ching Hoe, Benefits Specialist of the Asian Development Bank about the status of Rafael Arcega's loan. Mr. Hoe informed her that said loan application was canceled because Arcega was going to file a court case. Surprised at this development, after the expiration of the extended redemption period, respondent bank's officers executed an Affidavit of Consolidation on June 17, 1991 to secure a new title in the name of Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. T.C.T. No. 40782 was later issued in the bank's name.

It appears that on June 11, 1991, petitioners filed Civil Case No. 91-9055 against respondent bank for annulment of foreclosure and/or auction sale with restraining order/preliminary injunction/damages before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104. In said complaint, petitioner averred that they were not aware of the auction sale, that there was no notice of posting or prior publication thereof in a newspaper of general circulation as required by law and that they registered the bank's action pertinent to the foreclosure to no avail. The Notice of Lis Pendens was annotated on the title of the subject property on July 16, 1991.

On November 23, 1993, the bank filed "In re: Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession" (LRC No. Q-6483(93)) with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

On February 3, 1994, petitioners sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order to prevent respondent bank and Sheriff from transferring the subject property to third persons in the case at bar. After hearing and due consideration of the evidence submitted by the parties, on June 21, 1994, the Regional Trial Court issued its questioned Order granting the writ of a preliminary injunction. Respondent bank's motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on August 1, 1994.

On August 24, 1994, RCBC sought relief in the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari seeking the nullification of the trial court's Orders dated June 21, 1994 and August 1, 1994. Respondent appellate court granted the petition on August 17, 1995 in a decision with the following dispositive portion.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED by this Court. The questioned Orders dated June 21, 1994 and August 1, 1994 of the respondent court, granting the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, and denying its reconsideration in Civil Case No. Q-91-9055 are declared null and void.

On October 12, 1995, the motion for reconsideration filed by the Arcegas was denied by respondent court.

Hence, the instant petition for review was filed seeking the annulment of the Court of Appeals' decision for lack of legal basis and for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

On the sole question of whether or not the writ of preliminary injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion, we affirm respondent court's decision and deny the instant petition.

The issuance of the writ was unjustified, the spouses Arcega not having any legal right the merits protection by the court.

For the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to be proper, it must be shown that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.⁴

In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion.⁵ Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Where the complainant's right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper.⁶ The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is no ground for an injunction.⁷

The circumstances in the case at bar show that the Arcegas did not possess a clear legal right sought to be protected by said writ. Petitioners defaulted on their loan and failed to redeem the subject property during the extended period granted by the bank. It was only three days prior to the redemption period that petitioners added to question the foreclosure proceedings, giving the impression that the case at bar is an afterthought or a last-ditch effort to save their property. Title to the property had already been transferred to the bank which now possesses a certificate of title in its name.

Respondent bank's right to possess the property is clear and is based on its right of ownership as a purchaser of the properties in the foreclosure sale to whom title has been conveyed.⁸ Under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 and Section 35 of Rule 39, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale is entitled to possession of the property.⁹ The bank in this case has a better right to possess the subject property because of its title over the same. ¹⁰

Respondent appellate court added:

. . . (I)t was highly irregular for the respondent court to issue the questioned writ based merely on the document of sheriff's certificate of posting. No other evidence, oral or documentary, was ever presented by the private respondents to fully substantiate their prayer for the injunctive relief. It is well-settled that a foreclosure proceeding enjoys the presumption of regularity in its conduct being an official business, and it is the defendants, herein private respondents, who have the burden of showing by convincing proof that the foreclosure proceeding is tainted with irregularity for them to be entitled to the writ prayed for. ¹¹

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, where Civil Case No. 91-9055 is pending is directed to continue with the proceedings of said case and resolve the same with dispatch. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., are on leave.
Footnotes

1 The bank charged 19.5% per annum as interest rate on the loans which were payable in ten years.

2 As of October 15, 1990, the Statement of Account amounted to P1,232,479.94, which amount included 33% interest for 143 days, attorney's fees, sheriff's fee, documentary stamps, etc.

3 With the Asian Development Bank, where petitioner Rafael Arcega was employed.

4 Syndicated Media Access Corporation v. CA, 219 SCRA 797 (March 11, 1993).

5 Vinzons-Chato v. Natividad, 244 SCRA 787 (June 2, 1995).

6 China Banking Corporation et. al. v. CA, G.R. No. 121158, December 5, 1996.

7 Ulang v. CA, 225 SCRA 642 (August 29, 1993) citing Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. v. CFI Negros Occidental, 42 SCRA 577); Prado v. Veridiano II, 204 SCRA 654 (December 6, 1991).

8 Philippine National Bank v. CA, 118 SCRA 110 (November 2, 1982).

9 Javelosa v. CA, G.R. No. 124292, December 10, 1996.

10 Persons with Torrens title over land are entitled to possession thereof. Pangilinan v. Aguilar, 43 SCRA 136 (1972).

11 Rollo, p. 38.

Alcantara vs. Director of Prisons

2013-12-20T21:41:00.000-08:00

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-6 November 29, 1945
ANICETO ALCANTARA, petitioner,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
Buenaventura B. Martinez for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Tañada for respondent.
FERIA, J.:
This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and for the release of the petitioner on the ground that the latter is unlawfully imprisoned and restrained of his liberty by the respondent Director of Prison in the provincial jail at Vigan, Ilocos Sur.
Petitioner was convicted by the Court First Instance of Ilocos Sur (Criminal case No. 23) of the crime of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon at Baguio modified said sentence (CA- G.R. No. 790)and sentence the petitioner to an indeterminate penalty of from four months four months and twenty-one days of arresto mayor to three years, nine months and three days of prison correccional. The sentence as modified became final on September 12, 1944, and June 23, 1945, petitioner commenced serving his sentence.
Petitioner now questions the validity of the decision of the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon, on the sole ground that said court was only a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation of the Islands; that the Court of Appeals was not authorized by Commonwealth Act No. 3 to hold sessions in Baguio, and that only the two Justices constituted the majority which promulgated the decision in question. The petitioner does not question the validity of said decision on the strength of the Proclamation of General Douglas McArthur of October 23, 1944, which according to our decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, G.R. No. L-5 (p. 113, ante), does not refer to judicial processes.
In the said case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, this Court ruled that the so-called Republic of the Philippines and the Philippine Executive Commission established in the Philippines during the Japanese regime were governments de facto organized by the belligerent occupant by the judicial acts thereof were good and valid and remained good and valid after the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, except those a political complexion. In that the same case this Court held that the Court of Appeals which was continued throughout the Japanese occupation, was the same Court of Appeals existed prior to the Japanese occupation and was lately abolished by Executive Order No. 37. The division of the Court of Appeals into several District Court of Appeals, and the reduction of the number of Justices sitting in each division, the regime of the so-called Republic effected no substantial change in its nature and jurisdiction.
Even assuming that the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon was a new court created by the belligerent occupant or the de facto governments established by him, the judgments of such court, like those of the court which were continued during the Japanese occupation, were good and valid and remain good and valid, and therefore enforceable now after the liberation or occupation of the Philippines, provided that such judgments do not have a political complexion, as this court held in its decision in the abovementioned case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon supra, in accordance with the authorities therein cited.
Obviously, the sentence which petitioner is now serving has no political complexion. He was charged with and convicted of an offense punishable under the municipal law of the Commonwealth, the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, the sentence of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, as modified by the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon, is valid and enforceable.
A punitive or penal sentence is said to of a political complexion when it penalizes either a new act not defined in the municipal laws, or acts already penalized by the latter as a crime against the legitimate government, but taken out of the territorial law and penalized as a new offenses committed against belligerent occupant, incident to a state of a war and necessary for the control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupier. They are acts penalized for public rather than private reasons, acts which tend, directly or indirectly, to aid or favor the enemy and are directed against the welfare, safety and security, of the belligerent occupant. As example, the crimes against national security , such as treason, espionage, etc., and against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, etc., were crimes against the Commonwealth or United States Government under the Revised Penal Code, which were made crimes against the belligerent occupant.
In view of the foregoing, the petitioner for the writ of habeas corpus is denied.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla, Pablo and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
DE JOYA, J., concurring:
The principal question involved in this habeas corpus case is the validity of the judicial proceedings held, during the Japanese occupation, in the Court First Instance of Ilocos Sur, in which herein petitioner was accused of frustrated murder, and in the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon, in which, on appeal, said petitioner was found guilty of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries, and sentenced to a term of imprisonment ranging from four moths and twenty-one days of arresto mayor to three years, and nine months and three days of prison correccional; and the effect on said proceedings of the proclamation of General Douglas McArthur, dated October 24 1944. The decision of this questions requires the application of principles of International Law, in connection with the municipal law of this country.
Under the Constitution Commonwealth of the Philippines, International Law is part of the Fundamental law of the land (Article II, sec. 3). As International Law is an integral part of our law, it must be ascertained and administered by this Court, whenever question of right depending upon it are presented for our determination (Kansas vs. Colorado, 185 U.S. 146; 22 Sup. Ct., 552; 46 Law. ed., 838).
Since International Law is a body of rules accepted by nations as regulating their mutual relations, the proof of their existence is to be found in the consent of the nations to abide by them; and this consent is evidenced chiefly by the usages and customs of nation, as found in the writings of publicist and in the decisions of the highest courts of the different countries of the world (The Habana, 175 U. S., 677; 20 Sup. Ct., 290; 44 Law. ed., 320.).
But while usages and customs are the older original source of International Law, great international treaties are a latter source of increasing importance, such as The Hogue Conventions of 1899 and 1907.
The Hague Conventions of 1899, respecting laws and customs of war on land, expressly declare that:

ARTICLE XLII. Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.

The occupation applies only to the territory where such authority is established, and in a position to assert itself.

ART. XLII. The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to reestablish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country. (32 Stat., II, 1821.).

The above provisions of the Hague Conventions have been adopted by the nations giving adherence to them, among which is the United States of America (32 Stat., II, 1821).
The commander in chief of the invading forces or military occupant may exercise governmental authority, but only when in actual possession of the enemy's territory, and this authority will be exercised upon principles of International Law (New Orleans vs. Steamship Co. [1874], 20 Wall., 387; Kelly vs. Sanders [1878], 99 U.S., 441; MacLeod vs. United States 229 U.S. 416; 33 Sup Ct., 955; 57 Law. ed., 1260; II Oppenheim on International Law, sec. 167).
It will thus be readily seen that the civil laws of the invaded state continue in force, in so far as they do not affect the hostile occupant unfavorably. The regular judicial tribunals of the occupied territory continue to act in cases not affecting the military occupation, and is not usual for the invader to take the whole administration into his own hands, because it is easier to preserve order through the agency of the native officials, and also because the latter are more competent to administer the laws of the territory; and the military occupant generally keeps in their posts such of the judicial and administrative officers as are willing to serve under him, subjecting them only to supervision by the military authorities, or by superior civil authorities appointed by him (Young vs. United States, 97 U.S. 39; 24 Law. ed 992; Coleman vs. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509; 24 Law ed., 1118; MacLeod vs. United States, 229 U.S. 416; 33 Sup Ct., 955; 57 Law. ed., 1260 Taylor, International Law, secs. 576, 578; Wilson, International Law, pp. 331-337; Hall, International Law, 6th ed. [1909], pp. 464, 465, 475, 476; Lawrence, International Law, 7th ed., 412, 413; Davis, Elements of International Law, 3d ed., pp. 330-332, 335; Holland, International Law, pp. 356, 357, 359; Westlake, International Law, Part II, 2d ed., pp. 121-123).
In 1811, during the occupation of Catalonia, Spain, by the French army, a Frenchman, accused of the murder of a Catalan in that province, was tried and convicted by the assize Court of the Department of the Pyrenees Orientales, France. Upon appeal to the French Court of Cassation, the conviction was quashed, on the ground that the courts of the territory within which the crime had been committed had exclusive jurisdiction to try the case and that "the occupation of Catalonia by French troops and its government by the French authorities had not communicated to its inhabitants the character of French citizens, nor to their territory the character of French territory, and that such character could only be acquired by a solemn act of incorporation which had not been gone through." (Hall, International Law, 6th ed., p. 461.)
It is, therefore, evident that the establishment of the government under the name of the Philippine Executive Commission, or the so-called Philippine Republic, afterwards, during Japanese occupation, respecting the laws in force in the country, and permitting our courts to function and administer said laws, as proclaim in the City of Manila, by the commander in chief of the Japanese Imperial Forces, on January 3, 1942, was in accordance with the rules and principles of International Law.
If the military occupant is thus in duty bound to establish in the territory under military occupation governmental agencies for the preservation of peace and order and for the proper administration of justice, in accordance with the local laws, it must necessarily follow that the judicial proceeding conducted before the courts established by the military occupant must be considered legal and valid, even after said government established by the military occupant had been displaced by the legitimate government of the territory.
Thus the judgments rendered by the Confederate Courts, during the American Civil War, merely setting the rights of private parties actually within their jurisdiction, not only tending to defeat the legal rights of citizens of the United States, nor in furtherance of laws passed in aid of the rebellion, had been declared valid and binding (Cook vs. Oliver, 1 Woods, 437; Fed. Cas., No. 3, 164; Coleman vs. Tennessee, 97 U.S., 509;24 Law. ed., 1118; Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176; Horn vs. Lockhart, 17 Wall., 570; Sprott vs. United States, 20 Wall., 459; Texas vs. White, 7 Wall., 700; Ketchum vs. Buckley [1878], 99 U.S., 188); and the judgment of a court of Georgia rendered in November, 1861, for the purchase money slaves was held valid judgment when entered, and enforceable in 1871 (French vs. Tumllin, 10 Am. Law. Reg. [N.S.], 641; Fed. Case, No. 5104).
The judgments by the courts of the states constituting the Confederate States of the America were considered legal and valid and enforceable, even after the termination of the American Civil War, because they had been rendered by the courts of a de facto government. The Confederate States were a de facto government, in the sense that its citizens were bound to render the government obedience in civil matters, and did not become responsible, as wrong-doers, for such act of obedience (Thorington vs. Smith, 8 Wall. [U.S.] 9; 19 Law ed., 361).
In the more recent case of Ketchum vs. Buckley ([1878], 99 U.S., 188), the Supreme Court of the United States held-- "It is now settled law in this court that during the late civil war the same general law for the administration of justice and the protection of private rights, which had existed in the States prior to the rebellion, remained during its continuance and afterwards. As far as the acts of the States did not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the national authority, or the just rights of the citizens, under the Constitution, they are in general to be treated as valid and binding." (Williams vs. Bruffy, 96 U.S., 176; Horn vs. Lockhart, 17 Wall., 570; Sprott vs. United States, 20 Wall., 459; Texas vs. White 7 Wall., 700.)
The government established in the Philippines, during Japanese occupation, would seem to fall under the following definition of de facto government given by the Supreme Court of the United States:

But there is another description of government de facto, called also by publicists a government de facto, but which might, perhaps, he more aptly denominated a government of paramount force. Its distinguishing characteristics (1) that its existence is maintained by active military power within the territories, and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and (2) that while it exists it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government. Actual governments of this sort are established over districts differing greatly in extent and conditions. They are usually administered directly by military authority, but they may be administered, also, by civil authority, supported more or less directly by military force. (MacLeod vs. United States [1913], 229 U.S., 416.)

The government established in the Philippines, under the Philippine Executive Commission or under the so-called Philippine Republic, during Japanese occupation, was and should, therefor, be considered as a de facto government; and that the judicial proceedings conducted before the courts has been established in this country, during said Japanese occupation, and are should be considered as legal and valid enforceable, even after the liberation of this country by the American forces, as a long a said judicial proceedings had been conducted, in accordance with the law of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
The judicial proceedings involved in the case under consideration merely refer to the prosecution of the petitioner in this case, for the crime of frustrated murder, which was reduced to illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries, under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, in force in this country under the Commonwealth government, before and during Japanese occupation.
Now, petitioner contends that the judicial proceedings in question are null and void, and that the accused should be immediately released from the custody, under the provisions of the proclamation issued by General Douglas McArthur dated October 23, 1944; as said proclamation nullifies all the laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
In other words petition demands a literal interpretation of said proclamation issued by the General Douglas McArthur, a contention which, in our opinion, is untenable, as it would inevitably produce judicial chaos and uncertainties. When an act is susceptible of two or more constructions, one of which will maintain and the others destroy it, the Courts will always adopt the former (United States vs. Coombs [1838]], 12 Pet., 72; 9 Law. ed., 1004; Board of Supervisors of Grenada County vs. Brown [1884], 112 U.S., 261; 28 Law. ed., 704; 5 Sup. Ct. Rep., 125; In re Guariña [1913], 24 Phil., 37; Fuentes vs. Director of Prisons [1924], 46 Phil., 22; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385). The judiciary, always alive to the dictates of national welfare, can properly incline the scales of its decisions in favor of that solution which will most effectively promote the public policy (Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd. vs. Natividad [1919], 40 Phil., 136). All laws should receive a sensible construction as not to lead it injustice, oppression or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exception to its language, which would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter (United States vs. Kirby, 7 Wall [U.S.], 482; 19 Law. ed, 278; Church of Holy Trinity vs. United States, 143 U.S., 461; 12 Sup. Ct., 511; 36 Law. ed., 226; Jacobson vs. Massachussetts, 197 U.S., 39; 25 Sup. Ct., 358; 49 Law. ed., 643; 3 Ann. Cas., 765; In re Allen, 2 Phil., 630). The duty of the court in construing a statute, which is reasonably susceptible of two constructions to adopt that which saves its constitutionality, includes the duty of a avoiding a construction which raises grave and doubtful constitutional questions, if it can be avoided (United States vs. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S., 366; 29 Sup. Ct. 527; 53 Law. ed., 836).
According to the rules and principles of International Law, and the legal doctrines cited above, the judicial proceedings conducted before the court of the justice, established here during Japanese military occupation, merely applying the provisions of the municipal law of the territory, as the provisions of the Revised Penal Code in the instant case which have no political or military significance, are and should be considered legal, valid and binding. It is to be presumed that General Douglas McArthur knows said rules and principles of International Law, as International Law is an integral part of the fundamental law of the land, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the United States. And it is also to be presumed that General Douglas McArthur has acted, in accordance with said principles of International Law, which have been sanction by the Supreme Court of the United States, as the nullification of all judicial proceedings conducted before our courts, during the Japanese occupation would be highly detrimental to public interests.
For the forgoing reasons, I concur in the majority opinion, and the petition for habeas corpus filed in this case should, therefore, be denied.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
Following our opinions in this cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (p. 153, ante), and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (p. 334, ante), G.R. No. L-5 and G.R. No. L-49 respectively, the proceedings attacked by petitioner belong to the judicial processes declared null and void in the proclamation issued by General McArthur on October 23, 1944, and therefore, we vote the granting of the writ of habeas corpus prayed for.

HILADO, J., dissenting:
Upon the grounds stated my main dissenting opinion, in G.R. No. L-5 Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (p. 199, ante), and in my concurring opinion in G.R. No. L-49, Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (p. 355, ante), I dissent from the opinion of the majority herein. The writ of habeas corpus sought by petitioner should be granted because the nullity of the judgment and proceedings under which he has been imprisoned and restrained of his liberty. As stated in the majority opinion, the sentence against him became final on September 122, 1944, and had been pronounced by the Japanese-sponsored Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon upon appeal from a judgment of conviction by the Japanese sponsored Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur.

2012 Bar Exam Result

2013-03-21T04:33:00.002-07:00

Go to the Main Directory

Provided hereinbelow is the list of successful examinees of the October 2012 Bar Examinations held at the University of Sto. Tomas, released by the Supreme Court of the Philippines today, March 20, 2013.

Congratulations!

Source: http://121.58.195.99/bar2012.html

1. A JOSE- AGUSTIN, Karren
2. ABASTILLAS, Lemuel
3. ABERIN, Ma. Christine
4. ABES, Royce Nieville
5. ABRENZOSA, Cleofe
6. ABUAN, Ruby Ryza
7. ACEDO, Kristian Josef
8. ACORDA, Jacqueline
9. ACOSTA, Lourdes Mae
10. ACOSTA, JR., Gil
11. ACUÑA, Jose Fidel
12. ADAN, Jan Mari
13. ADAP, Sanawia
14. AGANA, III, Carlos Ivan
15. AGATEP, Pia Augustha
16. AGBAY-ABILAR, Janice
17. AGBON, Ma. Cecelia Esperanza
18. AGOPITAC, Nestle
19. AGUAVIVA, Ava Marie
20. AJES-LAURENTE, Lilibeth
21. ALAMEDA, Abigail
22. ALAWI, JR., Saipal
23. ALBANO, Pia Ursula
24. ALBANO, Ranvylle
25. ALBAS, Dominique
26. ALBINA, Dionel
27. ALBOTRA, Tet Chea
28. ALCANTARA, Austin Claude
29. ALCANTARA, Rickmon Albert
30. ALCERA, II, Hermie
31. ALDOVINO, Marian Mae
32. ALEJANDRE, Pauline
33. ALFELOR, JR., Avelino
34. ALI, JR., Lanang
35. ALIM, Nicolito Jesus
36. ALIVIA, Mikhail Sherard
37. ALMARIO, Ann Therese
38. ALMENDRAL, Chrizellie
39. ALMIREZ, Hanna Maria Nica
40. ALOJADO, Carlo Enrico
41. ALVAREZ, Aila May
42. ALVAREZ, Maria Margarita
43. ALVERO, Marierose
44. AMADOR, Tina Andrea
45. AMAN, Takahiro Kenjie
46. AMARO, Ana Mae
47. AMBROCIO, Ma. Carmencita
48. AMSAN, Munib
49. ANDAWI, Melody
50. ANDRION, Jofre
51. ANG, Kathleen Mae
52. ANG, JR., Rodolfo
53. ANGELES, Raul
54. ANTIGUA, Perseus
55. ANTONIO, Rafael
56. APALISOK, JR., Simplicio
57. APARTE, Frances Margaret
58. APORTADERA, Mario Leonardo Emilio
59. AQUENDE, Joseph Angelo Wesley
60. ARANAS, Kim
61. ARCEO, Irene
62. ARCEO, Mariam
63. ARCEÑO, Jackielyn
64. ARDIENTE, Arnold
65. ARELLANO, May Kristine
66. ARIAS, Michelle
67. ARMENTA, Joshua
68. ARQUIZA, Arbee
69. ARQUIZA, Carlo
70. ARRIBA, Mona Liza
71. ARRIOLA, Roanne
72. ARTICONA, Mercedes
73. ARTICULO, Mark Anthony
74. ARTUGUE, Arianne
75. ARUGAY, Manuel Adrian
76. ASPIRAS, Janice
77. ASUNCION, Mark Anthony
78. ASUNTO, Daisy Ray
79. ATANACIO, John David
80. AUGUSTO, Davemark
81. AUSAN, Anniefair
82. AUSTRIA, Carlo
83. AUTENCIO, Anthony
84. AUZA, Jannycer
85. AVILA, Aldan
86. AVILA, Rachelle Faye
87. BABIERA, Jan Christian
88. BACOLOD, Julse
89. BAGAIPO, Cesar
90. BAGATSING, Lea Margarette
91. BAGUIO, Cindy
92. BAGULAYA, Jose Duke
93. BAILAN, Bai Sittie Saida
94. BAINTO, Neal Vincent
95. BAJAS, Joey
96. BAJETA, Jonathan
97. BAKILAN, Bernard
98. BALAGA, Jo Ann
99. BALANQUIT, Raoul Jann
100. BALAORO, Grace
101. BALBA, Zack Hansel
102. BALDOMERO, Ivan Jeffrey
103. BALDOVINO, Aldwin Kenneth
104. BALDOVINO, Alexander
105. BALDOVINO, Tanya Justine
106. BALILI, Neil Aaron
107. BALMES, Irene
108. BALORO, Joemyl
109. BALTAZAR, Ana Lyn
110. BANAYAT-NAS, Hermilia
111. BANDALAN, Jared Anthony
112. BANGHE, Hannah Jane
113. BANZON, Eva
114. BAPTISTA, Joe Allan
115. BARCELONA, Ralph Karlo
116. BARQUEZ, Ma. Elisa Jonalyn
117. BARRIOS, Angelo
118. BASCUGUIN, Maria Jocelyn
119. BASE, Amerissa
120. BASE, Maria Graciela
121. BAUTISTA, Judy-ann
122. BAUTISTA, Krystel Jehan
123. BAUTISTA, Maria Theresa
124. BAYONA, Phoebe Ann
125. BEBER, Dindo
126. BECHAYDA, JR., Jose
127. BEDURAL, Vladimir
128. BENIGIAN, II, Mardovic Dodge
129. BENITEZ, JR., Arcadio
130. BERAY-DE AUSEN, Penelope
131. BERNARDINO, Ramon Felipe
132. BERNARDO, Donna Ametyst
133. BERNARDO, Nicolo
134. BERNARDO, Pallo Mert
135. BIADO, Nazariel
136. BIDAD, Jonelyn
137. BILANGEL, Judy Ann
138. BILIRAN, Amabelle
139. BINARAO, Romael Meng
140. BIRONDO, Francis Ian
141. BLANCIA, Andrei Marion
142. BONDOC, Hector Jerome
143. BONGHANOY, Al
144. BONILLA, Diana Lutgarda
145. BORBON, Mariven
146. BORDON, Maria Janina Ann
147. BORJA, Ma. Arlene
148. BORROMEO, Gabriel Angelo
149. BOTABARA, Theresa
150. BRACERO, II, Wivino
151. BRAGAT, Junrie
152. BRILLANTES, Roselle Louie
153. BRION, Eden
154. BRIONES, Conrado
155. BRIONES, Gerald
156. BRONCE, Roentgen
157. BUAGÑIN, Venice
158. BUENAVENTURA, Ma. Clarissa Hearty
159. BUENAVENTURA, Roberto Martin
160. BULOTANO, Ronnie
161. BULSECO, Khristine Gail
162. BUSTOS, Adrian Francis
163. CABANTING, Gil Matthew
164. CABANTUD, Racel
165. CABATINGAN, Justine Mae
166. CABI, Romina Aina
167. CABIEDES, Rodrigo
168. CABRERA, Fernando Juan
169. CABRERA, John Patrick
170. CACHAPERO, JR., Oliver
171. CADABUNA, Marvin Jay
172. CADDAWAN-PANCHO, Julaida
173. CAHAYAG, Rommel
174. CAIBAN, Lee Ferdinand
175. CAJUCOM, Oscar Carlo
176. CALAG, Welan
177. CALALANG, Mary Bianca
178. CALAMAY, Cesar Norman
179. CALDERINI, Charmaine
180. CALDERON, Abegail Joan
181. CALINGASAN, Charlene Mae
182. CALMA-CHAN, Gabriela
183. CALUAG, Edmond
184. CALVAN, Myrtle
185. CAMACHO, Gianfrancis
186. CAMACHO, Paolo Francisco
187. CAMAGANACAN, Emelie
188. CAMISO, Aldous Benjamin
189. CAMUA, Mariacarla
190. CANDELARIA, Marissa
191. CANTILLAS, Irish Claire
192. CANTOS, Rj
193. CAPANAS, Jovalie Claire
194. CAPELLAN, Marina Victoria
195. CARANDANG, Ma. Buenafe
196. CARBONELL, Rhea Joy
197. CARDIÑO, Gian Carlo
198. CARDONA, Sarah Jeane
199. CARILLO, Marc Jay
200. CARINGAL-DE CASTRO, Maria Yvet
201. CARLOBOS, Princess Christine
202. CARPIO, Menachem
203. CARTAGENA, Philipp King
204. CASADOR, Angeli Ness
205. CASALS, Detchie
206. CASIBANG, JR., Ruben
207. CASIDSID-PORTENTO, Regina
208. CASIO, Jo Ann Marie
209. CASISON-DUNGCA, Maricel
210. CASTILLO, Beverly
211. CASTILLO, Dante
212. CASTILLO, Mark Erwin
213. CASTRO, Joanne Frances
214. CASTRODES, Kristine Joyce
215. CASUELA, Nathaniel Joseph
216. CATACUTAN, Richard
217. CATACUTAN, JR., Felicisimo
218. CATALAN, Jo-am
219. CATALUÑA-RENEGADO, Catherine
220. CATULONG, Zacharias
221. CAYABAN, Iva Freyritz Erica
222. CAYCO, Natasha
223. CAYCO, Victor Carlo Antonio
224. CAÑARES, Vhincent
225. CAÑETE, Stephen Roy
226. CEDEÑO, Jessa Mary Ann
227. CERIALES, Roni
228. CHAN, Christian
229. CHAN, Clifford
230. CHAN, Jereline
231. CHAVES, Carla Michelle
232. CHING, May Ann
233. CHINTE, Mary Eileen
234. CHU, Kristine Paula
235. CHUA, Sacel Anne
236. CINCO, Abegail Marie
237. CLAUDIO, Joanne Lucille Germaine
238. CLAUDIO, Kristoffer
239. CLAUDIO, Lesley Anne
240. CLEDERA, Kim Debra
241. COMA, Joanne Marie
242. CONCEPCION, Irene Charmaine
243. CONCEPCION, Robin Bryan
244. CONDE, Fiona
245. CONDE, Maricar
246. CONVOCAR, Daniel Luis
247. CORESIS, Ma. Katrina
248. CORPUZ, Danielle Sigfreid
249. CORPUZ, Grazielynne
250. CORRALES, Michael John
251. CORSAME-FUENTES, Gazzelenne
252. COVARRUBIAS, Jose Janello
253. CRISOSTOMO, Jaim Mari
254. CRUZ, Emmanuel Rey
255. CRUZ, Gino Carlo
256. CRUZ, Jennifer Anne Marie
257. CRUZ, Keneth Joyce
258. CRUZ, Niño Martin
259. CRUZ, Roxanne Joan
260. CUARTERO, Dave
261. CUBA, Margareth Kristel
262. CUBERO, Ronald
263. CUBILLAN, Asis
264. CUCHAPIN, Mykedox Knoel
265. CUEVAS, Dyan Marie
266. CUI, Rosabel
267. CURADA, Yul Bernie
268. CURAMMENG, Jessieh Rey
269. CUSTODIO, Daniel Ben
270. DANCE, Kristoffer Lee
271. DAPITON, Roel
272. DAQUIOAG, Florence
273. DE ANDRES, JR., Gabriel
274. DE CHAVEZ, Marc Roby
275. DE CHAVEZ-ALEDO, Sharon
276. DE DUMO, Jilliane Joyce
277. DE GUZMAN, Arjel
278. DE GUZMAN, Michael
279. DE GUZMAN, Robert Josef
280. DE GUZMAN, Steven Michael
281. DE LA CRUZ, Christian
282. DE LEON, Jose
283. DE LOS REYES, Dianne Margarette
284. DE LOS SANTOS, Christian Loren
285. DE MESA, Beverly Elvy
286. DE VERA, Ma. Christine Fel
287. DE VERA, II, Rustico
288. DE VILLA, Rhodora
289. DEJARME, Doreen
290. DEL ROSARIO, Joseph Carl
291. DELA CALZADA, Renato
292. DELA CRUZ, Gerald
293. DELA CRUZ, Glenna Mari
294. DELA CRUZ, Vann Allen
295. DELA CUESTA, Rogie
296. DELA PEÑA, Toni Carla
297. DELOS SANTOS, Lilian
298. DEOMPOC, Mary Khristel
299. DEVERATURDA, Joan Paula
300. DIALINO, Karen
301. DIAZ, Mario Vincent
302. DIESMOS, Angelo Ted
303. DIESTO, Jovian
304. DIGO, Jerry
305. DIMACULANGAN, Roberto Miguel
306. DIMAFELIX, II, Alfredo
307. DIMATATAC, Edwin
308. DIMSON, Caira Joyce
309. DIOKNO, Angelo
310. DISPO, D'lorenz Miro
311. DIZON, Justinne
312. DOCENA, Hans Christian
313. DOGWE-RAMIREZ, Marifi
314. DOMINGO, Frances Yani
315. DOMINGUEZ, Ilyn
316. DONATO, Carol
317. DORIA, Dianne
318. DU, Minister Moises
319. DUAZO, Rose Shayne
320. DUCUSIN, Alejandro
321. DULAY-MARCOS, Vicky Runa
322. DUMAGAT, Maricon
323. DUMALAY, Marichriz
324. DUNUAN, Brionelle La Realesa
325. DY, Frederick
326. ELEAZAR, Armand Dietrich
327. ELGO, Phil Ephraim
328. ELTANAL, Felwin Rau
329. ENAD, Rajiv
330. ENCABO, III, Melchisedech
331. ENCARNACION, Ian
332. ENCARNACION, Mark Francis
333. EPE, Evan
334. ERMINO, Augusto Ceasar
335. ESCALONA, Leo Miguel
336. ESCATRON, Karie
337. ESCOBER, Carlo
338. ESCUETA, Leonard
339. ESMENDA, Alvin
340. ESMERALDA, Patrick
341. ESPARCIA, Janis Louis
342. ESPARRAGO, Sheldon
343. ESPINA, Corin Celeste
344. ESPINOSA, Ron Ely
345. ESPIRITU, Harvey Rhey
346. ESPIRITU, Leah Eloisa
347. ESPIRITU, Paula
348. ESQUIVIAS, Joaquin Pablo
349. ESTIGOY, Karene Maneka
350. ESTRADA-ALCANTARA, Maria Socorro
351. ESTRELLA, Eric
352. EVAN, Noel
353. EVANGELISTA, Carlo Eduardo
354. EX, Doyle
355. EÑANO, Carissa Ann
356. FABUL, Joseph Vincent
357. FAJARDO, Celerina Rose
358. FAJARDO, Idamae
359. FAJARDO, Jan Ale
360. FATALLA, Dave Florenz
361. FEDERIO, Maria Desiree
362. FELICES, Rachel Marie
363. FELICIA, Luz Angela
364. FELIPE, Eduardo
365. FELIX, Peter Anthony Joseph
366. FERIA, Jerome Christopher
367. FERNANDO, Angelo
368. FERRAREN, Ryan
369. FERRER, Rosette
370. FLORES, Raymund Jonas
371. FLORES, Soleil
372. FLORES, II, Lester Jay Alan
373. FOLLO, Dennis
374. FONTANILLA, Viktor Samuel
375. FRAGANTE, Francis
376. FRANCISCO, Jeremiah
377. FRANCISCO, Jose Ma. Jason
378. FULGENCIO, Genesis
379. GABITO, Garry
380. GABOR-TOLENTINO, Joy Marie
381. GADIT, Earl
382. GALANG, John Paul
383. GALICIA, Gene Franco
384. GALLEVO-BAMBO, Majella Theresa
385. GALMAN, Franklin Gerard
386. GALVEZ, Edmund Cyril
387. GALVEZ, Jerico Angelo
388. GAMO, Ciselie Marie
389. GANASI, Dante
390. GANDO, Jovi Louie
391. GARCIA, Jan David
392. GARCIA, Junnar
393. GARCIA, Ron Michael
394. GARCINEZ, Paolo Gonzalo
395. GARRIDO, Kinni Albert
396. GATCHALIAN, Kate Carra
397. GATDULA, Genesis
398. GAYANILO, Brian
399. GENON, Aero Jel
400. GEOCANIGA, Gene Pedmon
401. GERNALE, Jay
402. GERVACIO, Diana
403. GIGANTONE, Maria Riza Lea
404. GILBUENA, Francis Conrad
405. GINGOYON, Laiza Kristel
406. GO, David Michael
407. GO, Marie Michelle
408. GO, Paolo Angelo
409. GOC-ONG, Lara May
410. GODINEZ, Jose Mari
411. GOMEZ, Ace
412. GOMEZ, Joni
413. GOMEZ, Mikhail Josef
414. GONZAGA, Odessa Grace
415. GONZALES, Christian
416. GONZALES, Jenny
417. GONZALES, Kristine Carmela
418. GONZALES, Nil Ryan
419. GORDULA, Xavier Elbert
420. GOYENA, Ma. Flor De Lis
421. GRANADO, Glenbelle
422. GUANGCO, Ma. Veronica
423. GUERRA, Blesscille
424. GUERRERO, Alan Martin
425. GUERRERO, Katrina Elena
426. GUEVARA, Kristine Bernadette
427. GUILLERMO, Maica
428. GUINOMLA, Mohammad Jamaludin
429. GUINTO, Celeni Kristine
430. GUMBAN, Margaret Rose
431. GUMBAN, Vanessa
432. GURREA, Fay Irene
433. GUTIERREZ, Eva Marie
434. GUZMAN, Jeffvince
435. HADLOCON, Fatima Faye
436. HASSANI, Mary Sayeh
437. HEREDIA, Criselda
438. HERMOSURA, Chasmeneth
439. HERNANDEZ, Maria Concepcion
440. HERNANDEZ, Patricia Andrea
441. HILARIO, Dan Raphael
442. HILARIO, Kyndell
443. HINLO, Marco
444. HIPOLITO, Maria Monica
445. HULIGANGA, Lovella May
446. HUMARANG, Jayson
447. HUMILDE, Noemi
448. IBAÑEZ, Jonathan
449. IGNACIO, Christopher John Marcelino
450. ILANO, Jose Angelito
451. IMPERIAL, Ramil
452. IMRAN, Adzlan
453. INCIONG, Jhoan Andrei
454. INDIOLA, Rio Aiko
455. INFANTE, Colleen
456. INGLES, Ignatius Michael
457. INLAO, Charle Magne
458. IRANZO, Kristoffer Edward
459. ISIDRO, Laida May
460. JAAFAR, Faigdar
461. JACOBA, Maria Laviña Rae
462. JARANILLA, David
463. JAVIER, April Rose
464. JAVIER, Carlo Michael
465. JAYME, Joel
466. JOAQUINO, JR., Joseph James
467. JUAN, Vincent
468. JUATCO, Francis
469. JULARBAL, Starr
470. JUSI, Genevieve
471. KALAW, Jenny Kay
472. KATIPUNAN, Andrea
473. KIAMZON, Joyful Josette
474. KING KAY, Catherine Beatrice
475. KO, Patricia
476. KUSAIN-KANSI, Adjuria
477. LA ROSA-MILLARES, Katherine Joy
478. LABADOR, Jed
479. LABIANO, Lester
480. LACAP, Karen Kristi
481. LACEDA, Jovert
482. LACHICA, Lemuel
483. LACNO, Sarah Vanessa
484. LACSON, April Carmela
485. LAGGUI, Marie Hyacinth
486. LAMBINO, Mary Rhauline
487. LAMSEN, Jaenicen
488. LANGIT, Earla Kahlila Mikhaila
489. LANTION, Mell Christopher
490. LANUZO, Ma. Czarina
491. LAO, Michael Stephen
492. LAOHOO, Joyce Elaine
493. LAUROS, Jus
494. LAXAMANA, Aufelene Anne
495. LAYAAN, Geraldine
496. LAZARO, Grace Ann
497. LAZARO, Nicholai Noel
498. LEAL, Lemuel
499. LEDESMA, Leofred Ian
500. LEGASPI, Erwin
501. LEI, John Christopherson
502. LEIDO, Juan Paolo Miguel
503. LELIS, Alexa Marie
504. LENA, Andrew John
505. LEONG-ANUDIN, Leslie Ann
506. LERONA, Lawuel
507. LI, Carlo Martin
508. LIGGAYU, Minehaha
509. LIM, Jhella
510. LIM, Rachelle
511. LIM, Timothy Dalton
512. LIM-MAGTANGGOL, Rachelle
513. LISTONES, Paul
514. LIWAG, Jobelle Joyce
515. LLAMAS, Marvyn
516. LOGROÑO, Princess Jazmine
517. LONDRES, Louie Marie
518. LOPEZ-BALUYUT, Philjoy
519. LORA, Lizette Lou
520. LOTOC, Jeremy
521. LOZADA, Maria Kristile
522. LOZANO, Daphne
523. LU, Antonio Miguel
524. LUCAS, Danjun
525. LUCIANO, Mark Christian
526. LUIB, JR., Ronald
527. LUNA, Myla
528. LUNASCO, Emil
529. MABANTA, Marco Jose Maria
530. MABAZZA, Paolo
531. MACABODBOD, Lou Bryan
532. MACARAEG, Marck Joseph
533. MACARANDANG, Deen Asliah
534. MACARAYAN, Maichel Rick
535. MACHUCA, Jose Maria Angel
536. MADRIDIJO, Marlon
537. MAGCALAS, Felman Gem
538. MAGLINAO, Patrick
539. MALABUYOC, Ichelle
540. MALAGA, Vic Randolf
541. MALALAD, Warren Wesley
542. MALASA, Michelene
543. MALAWANI, Hanaphi
544. MALLANAO, Paul
545. MAMAILAO, Athiena
546. MAMAILAO, Paiza
547. MAMUKID, Michael
548. MANALO, May
549. MANALO, Melchor
550. MANANDEG, Gertrude Gay
551. MANAUIS, JR., Conrado
552. MANCAO, Katrina Michelle
553. MANGSI, Sanchez
554. MANGUBAT, Rex
555. MANIEGO, Catriona Rhiannon
556. MANRIQUE, Bernard
557. MANUEL, Sheila Gene
558. MAQUILAN, Jonathan
559. MARANAN, Maria Carmela
560. MARASIGAN, Nathan
561. MARAÑA, Jonalyn
562. MARCELO, Monica Joy
563. MARCELO, Ronel
564. MARIÑAS, Maria Rosario
565. MARON-MARTIN, Vobbye Jean
566. MAROTO, Ma. Alexandria Ixara
567. MARQUESES, Dan Michael
568. MARQUEZ, JR., Reynaldo
569. MARTIN, Mary Marjorie
570. MARTINEZ, IV, Lorenzo
571. MARTIREZ, Ike
572. MARTY, Frank Edward
573. MASLOG, Ma. Sheryl
574. MATALAM, Jamil Adrian Khalil
575. MATIAS, Serwin
576. MATILDO, JR, Lerdo
577. MAURERA, Katherine
578. MAYUGA, Adrian
579. MAÑEBO, Ferdinand
580. MEDINA, Maria Ana Karina
581. MEJIA, Nina Remedios
582. MEJIA, Venus Amelie
583. MELGAR, III, Josefino
584. MENDOZA, Daniel Angelo
585. MENDOZA, Emaculada Concepcion
586. MENDOZA, Gerardo
587. MENDOZA, Jason
588. MENDOZA, Marychelle
589. MENZON, Anthony
590. MERCADER, Ryan
591. MERIDA, JR., Manuel
592. MILLEZA, Carmel Rosame
593. MILLORA, II, Efren Joe
594. MINA, Iellen Therese
595. MIRANDA-RIMONTE, Ana
596. MIRAVALLES, Samantha
597. MITCHOR, April
598. MONTANO, IV, Julian
599. MONTEMAYOR, Meriam
600. MONTENEGRO, Kutz Melvin
601. MORA, Crisanto
602. MORALES, Armand
603. MORALES, Generick Humprey
604. MORGA, Ryan Calvin
605. MORILLO, Leo Adrian
606. MOTOOMULL-IDULSA, Marian Kanna
607. MUCOY-GRANADOS, Meralie
608. MULI, Katrina
609. MUPAS, Remedios
610. MUTIA, Mohammad Nabil
611. MUÑIZ, Angelo
612. MUÑOZ, Giselle Angelica
613. NAGAÑO, Lord Jayson
614. NAVARRA, Cherrylyn
615. NEJUDNE, Paul
616. NICOLAS, Jerwin
617. NIEMES, Vanessa
618. NIEVES, Jonas
619. NIFRAS, Francis Ariel
620. NOEL, Laura Katrina
621. NOGRALES, Juan Fidel Felipe
622. NONATO, Roselle Jean
623. NOVERAS, Chrsitian
624. NUCUP, Neil
625. NUEVO, Genie Celini
626. NUÑEZ, Jeremie
627. OBIAS, John Dominic
628. OCADO, Allian
629. OCAMPO, Christopher Louie
630. OCAMPO, Gilbert Paolo
631. OCAMPO, Riza Lyn
632. OFANDA, Adonis
633. OLAVERE, Albert
634. OLYMPIA, Abrame-lionel Gamaliel
635. OMOLON, Maila Giselle
636. ONA, Kristel Concepcion
637. ONG, Tracy Anne
638. OPINION, Richard
639. OPOSA, Juan Antonio
640. OPSIMA, Gayle
641. ORAL, Daniel Martin
642. ORATE, Danessa Fayne
643. ORBETA, Frances Grace Allyana
644. ORBITA, Chona
645. ORDOÑEZ, Jaclyn Anne
646. ORTIZ, Edison
647. OSORIO, Rolant Andrie
648. PABLICO, Maria Asuncion
649. PABLICO, My Kristia
650. PACASEM, Ubaida
651. PADER-VILLANUEVA, Carmina Agnes
652. PADILLA, Albert
653. PADILLA JR., Victor
654. PADOGA, Dean Martin
655. PAGADOR, Winston
656. PAGALILAUAN, Edison James
657. PAGLICAWAN, Maria Angelica
658. PALENCIA-UYTENGSU, Maida Joy
659. PALLA, Bartolome
660. PALOMAR, Sunshine
661. PALU-AY, Matias Monico
662. PANA, Melbourne Ziro
663. PANGANIBAN, Victoria
664. PANTIG, Hazel
665. PARADO, Lovely Myrrh
666. PAREJA, Judiel
667. PARUBRUB, Christina
668. PARUNGAO, Ronald
669. PASION, Roseann Claudine
670. PATAUEG, JR., Nicolas
671. PATIÑO, Erica Christel
672. PAVON, Teddy Edmund
673. PAYUMO, Margielyn
674. PAZZIUAGAN, Cheska Ann
675. PEDROSA, JR., Jose Aaron
676. PEGALAN, Ricky Heart
677. PELAEZ, Lawrence Leo
678. PELANDAS, Bryan
679. PELINIO, Norman
680. PELOBELLO, JR., Herminio
681. PERALTA, Romark
682. PERANDOS, Katty Jean Lourdes
683. PERAS, Phoebeth
684. PERDITO, Kristine Jane
685. PEREDO-MILLAN, Cynthia Lyn
686. PEREGRINO-CO, Jaydee
687. PEREZ, Alexander Brian
688. PEREZ, Lilibeth
689. PERNITES, Russel
690. PEÑADA, Joanna May
691. PICZON, Edson
692. PILAR, Sir Achilles
693. PIMENTEL, Joanna Pauline
694. PINILI, Richard
695. PIÑON, Joseph Carlo
696. PLAZA, Leslie Mae
697. PLAZO, Joseph
698. PRADO, Carlos Manuel
699. PRINCIPIO, Pearl Lizza
700. PROCHINA, Mary Avon
701. PUA, Alvin Greg
702. PUA, Moses Eleazar
703. PUERTO, Basil
704. PUGUON, Jener
705. QUESADA, Michael
706. QUEZADA, Peter Paul
707. QUIACHON, Nea Cecille
708. QUIAMBAO, Reinier
709. QUIBO, Grace May
710. QUIBRANZA, Lorraine Anne
711. QUILATES, Donelle Jay
712. QUIMPO, Andro Julio
713. QUINAGORAN, Fidelis Victorino
714. QUINTOS, Beverly Anne
715. QUISUMBING, Julia Francesca
716. RADAZA, Eirah
717. RAFAEL, Marq Azeus
718. RAMEL, Christopher
719. RAMOS, Agatha Kristy
720. RAMOS, Billy James
721. RAMOS, Dave
722. RAMOS, Maridelle
723. RAMOS, Raymond
724. RASO, Karl Vincent
725. RAVELO, Zaide
726. RAYMUNDO, Vir Celito
727. RECIERDO, Mark Francis
728. RECIO, Albee Alliana
729. RECTO, Mark Alvin
730. REMOLACIO, Emmanuel
731. REPOLLO-UY, Alnessa Thea
732. REVALDE, Jeser
733. REVILLA, JR., Rodrigo
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735. REYES, Jaymie Ann
736. REYES, Jose Antonio
737. REYES, Maryann Agnes Jertez
738. REYES, Misheil
739. RICAFLANCA, Leizl
740. RICAZA, Michelle Marie
741. RIGODON, Lou Diane
742. RILLERA, Jobert
743. RIVERA, Joonee Randyl
744. ROA-OARDE, Dianne Marie
745. ROBLES, Edgar Michael
746. ROBLES, Sunshine
747. ROCHA, Robert Angelo
748. RODRIGUEZ, Miracle Anne
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750. ROLEDA, Danell Lenard
751. ROMEA, George Michael
752. ROMERO, Allan
753. ROMUALDO, Xavier Jesus
754. RONDAL, Jaye Loren
755. ROSALES, Vicente Rafael
756. ROXAS, Juan Paolo
757. RUBINO, Junald
758. RUDAS, Vincent
759. SABADO, Joseph Mario
760. SABAS, Lloyd Francis
761. SABAUPAN, Flor Angela
762. SABORNAY, Ricky
763. SABORNIDO, Noemi
764. SAGARIO, Leo Angelo
765. SAJONIA, Louie
766. SALARZON, Henry Claude Roy
767. SALAZAR, Jerome
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769. SALCEDO, Anna
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773. SALLIDAO, Eric
774. SALVA, Carlo Emmanuel
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777. SAMSON, Martin Luigi
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784. SANDRINO, Maureen Grace
785. SANGGACALA, Naima
786. SANTAMARIA, Dindo
787. SANTIAGO, Dulce Corazon
788. SANTIAGO, Jefferson
789. SANTIAGO, Philippe Emile
790. SANTOS, Alexander
791. SANTOS, Ana Lorraine
792. SANTOS, Aurelia Beatrice
793. SANTOS, Hanzel
794. SANTOS, Joel
795. SANTOS, Joel
796. SANTOS, Joel Enrico
797. SANTOS, Juan Paolo
798. SANTOS, Karichi
799. SANTOS, Kathleen Mae
800. SANTOS, Melissa Christina
801. SARABOSQUEZ, Justine Keith
802. SARANGAYA, JR., Ismael
803. SARI, Jayson
804. SARONA, JR., Isidro
805. SAYSON, Charlotte Lyza
806. SAZON, Ser Christian
807. SEE, Candice Faye
808. SELLEZA, Suzy Claire
809. SERCADO, Marie Arcie Anne
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863. TE, Justine
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865. TEEHANKEE, Ryan Christopher
866. TELAN, John Benedict
867. TINAGAN, James Michael Vincent
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876. TRASPORTO, Jose Donel
877. TUGADI, Marifem
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896. VALERA, Stephen Russel Keith
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Lacoste vs. Fernandez

2012-12-10T23:43:00.000-08:00

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La Chemise Lacoste vs. Fernandez
GR 63796-97, 21 May 1984; First Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J)

Facts:

La chemise Lacoste is a French corporation and the actual owner of the trademarks “Lacoste,” “Chemise Lacoste,” “Crocodile Device” and a composite mark consisting of the word “Lacoste” and a representation of a crocodile/alligator, used on clothings and other goods sold in many parts of the world and which has been marketed in the Philippines (notably by Rustans) since 1964. In 1975 and 1977, Hemandas Q. Co. was issued certificate of registration for the trademark “Chemise Lacoste and Q Crocodile Device” both in the supplemental and Principal Registry. In 1980, La Chemise Lacoste SA filed for the registration of the “Crocodile device” and “Lacoste”.   Games and Garments (Gobindram Hemandas, assignee of Hemandas Q.Co.) opposed the registration of “Lacoste.”

In 1983, La Chemise Lacoste filed with the NBI a letter-complaint alleging acts of unfair competition committed by Hemandas and requesting the agency’s assistance. A search warrant was issued by the trial court. Various goods and articles were seized upon the execution of the warrants. Hemandas filed motion to quash the warrants, which the court granted. The search warrants were recalled, and the goods ordered to be returned. La Chemise Lacoste filed a petition for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether the proceedings before the patent office is a prejudicial question that need to be resolved before the criminal action for unfair competition may be pursued.

Held:

No. The proceedings pending before the Patent Office do not partake of the nature of a prejudicial question which must first be definitely resolved. The case which suspends the criminal action must be a civil case, not a mere administrative case, which is determinative of the innocence or guilt of the accused.   The issue whether a trademark used is different from another’s trademark is a matter of defense and will be better resolved in the criminal proceedings before a court of justice instead of raising it as a preliminary matter in an administrative proceeding.

Inasmuch as the goodwill and reputation of La Chemise Lacoste products date back even before 1964, Hemandas cannot be allowed to continue the trademark “Lacoste” for the reason that he was the first registrant in the Supplemental Register of a trademark used in international commerce. Registration in the Supplemental Register cannot be given a posture as if the registration is in the Principal Register. It must be noted that one may be declared an unfair competitor even if his competing trademark is registered. La Chemise Lacoste is world renowned mark, and by virtue of the 20 November 1980 Memorandum of the Minister of Trade to the director of patents in compliance with the Paris Convention for the protection of industrial property, effectively cancels the registration of contrary claimants to the enumerated marks, which include “Lacoste"

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Seagull Maritime Corporation vs. Balatongan

2012-12-10T22:29:00.000-08:00

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 82252 February 28, 1989
SEAGULL MARITIME CORP. AND PHILIMARE SHIPPING & EQUIPMENT SUPPLY, petitioners

vs.

NERRY D. BALATONGAN, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, respondents.
Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer & San Vicente for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Benjamin B. Vergara for private respondent

GANCAYCO, J.:

On November 2, 1982, a "crew Agreement" was entered into by private respondent Nerry D. Balatongan and Philimare Shipping and Equipment Supply (hereinafter called Philimare) whereby the latter employed the former as able seaman on board its vessel "Santa Cruz" (renamed "Turtle Bay") with a monthly salary of US $ 300.00. Said agreement was processed and approved by the National Seaman's Board (NSB) on November 3, 1982. ¹

While on board said vessel the said parties entered into a supplementary contract of employment on December 6, 1982 ² which provides among others:

1. The employer shall be obliged to insure the employee during his engagement against death or permanent invalidity caused by accident on board up to:

US $ 40,000 - for death caused by accident

US $ 50,000 - for permanent total disability caused by accident. ³

On October 6, 1983 Balatongan met an accident in the Suez Canal, Egypt as a result of which he was hospitalized at the Suez Canal Authority Hospital. Later, he was repatriated to the Philippines and was hospitalized at the Makati Medical Center from October 23, 1983 to March 27, 1984. On August 19, 1985 the medical certificate was issued describing his disability as "permanent in nature."

Balatongan demanded payment for his claim for total disability insurance in the amount of US $ 50,000.00 as provided for in the contract of employment but his claim was denied for having been submitted to the insurers beyond the designated period for doing so.

Thus, Balatongan filed on June 21, 1985 a complaint against Philimare and Seagull Maritime Corporation (hereinafter called Seagull) in the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for non-payment of his claim for permanent total disability with damages and attorney's fees.
After the parties submitted their respective position papers with the corresponding documentary evidence, the officer-in-charge of the Workers Assistance and Adjudication Office of the POEA rendered a decision on May 2, 1986, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents are hereby ordered to pay complainant the amount of US $ 50,000.00 representing permanent total disability insurance and attorney's fees at 10% of the award. Payment should be made in this Office within ten (10) days from receipt hereof at the prevailing rate of exchange. This Office cannot however rule on damages, having no jurisdiction on the matter.

SO ORDERED. ⁴

Seagull and Philimare appealed said decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on June 4, 1986. Pending resolution of their appeal because of the alleged transfer of the agency of Seagull to Southeast Asia Shipping Corporation, Seagull filed on April 28, 1987 a Motion For Substitution/Inclusion of Party Respondent which was opposed by Balatongan. ⁵ This was followed by an ex-parte motion for leave to file third party complaint on June 4, 1987 by Seagull. A decision was promulgated on December 7, 1987 denying both motions and dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. ⁶ A motion for reconsideration of said decision was denied for lack of merit in a resolution dated February 26, 1988. ⁷
Hence, Seagull and Philimare filed this petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order based on the following grounds:

1. Respondent POEA erred in applying the Supplemental Contract;

2. Respondents POEA and NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in holding that the Supplemental Contract was signed on board MV Santa Cruz by and between private respondent and your petitioner; and

3. Respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in not giving due course to your petitioners' Motion for Leave to File Third Party Complaint as well as their Motion for Inclusion/Substitution of respondents. ⁸

On March 21, 1988, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from enforcing the questioned decision and resolution of public respondents.

Petitioners argue that prior to private respondent's departure he executed a crew agreement on November 2, 1982 which was duly approved by the POEA; that the supplementary contract of employment that was entered into on board the vessel "Turtle Bay" which provides for a US $ 50,000.00 insurance benefit in case of permanent disability was neither approved nor verified by respondent POEA; and that the same violates Article 34(i) of the Labor Code, as amended, which provides as follows:

Art. 34. Prohibited Practices. - It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee, or holder of authority:

xxx xxx xxx

(i) to substitute or alter employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of expiration of the same without the approval of the Department of Labor.

Petitioners also call attention to Article VIII, paragraph 2 of the Supplementary Contract which provides as follows:

2. Notwithstanding his claim against the insurers the employee hereby expressly waives all claims of his own or his heirs for compensation of damages due to death or permanent invalidity which he suffered during his engagement against the employers ... unless his death or permanent invalidity has been caused by willful act of any of the above-named persons. ⁹

Petitioners stress that while public respondents upheld the applicability of said supplementary contract insofar as it increased the benefits to private respondent, public respondents considered the provision on the waiver against all claims by private respondent to be contrary to public policy.
In its questioned decision dated December 7, 1987, the respondent NLRC made the following disquisition:

The focal issue for determination is the validity and enforceability of the second contract of employment entered into by and between complainant and respondents on board the vessel where the former had served as a member of its complement despite the absence of NSB verification or approval. With respect to the findings of facts in the appealed decision, We consider the same as duly supported by substantial evidence and the admissions of the parties in their pleadings.

Much stress and emphasis are made by the respondents in their appeal that this claim has no legal basis or footing inasmuch as the second contract of employment containing a total disability insurance benefit of US $ 50,000.00, much more than that embodied in the first contract of employment which was approved by the defunct NSB, was not verified or approved by the latter. Accordingly, the respondents posit the argument that subject claim may not prosper pursuant to the provisions of Art. 34(i) of the Labor Code, as amended, which provides that it shall be unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee, or holder of authority '(T)o substitute or alter employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of expiration of the same without the approval of the Department of Labor.

Did the POEA commit a reversible error when it considered the second contract of employment as valid sans any verification or approval thereof by the NSB? Our answer to this query is in the negative. Apparently, the intention of the law when Art. 34 of the Labor Code was enacted is to provide for the prohibited and unlawful practices relative to recruitment and placement. As shown in the 'Explanatory Note' of Parliamentary Bill No. 4531, pertaining to Art. 34 (supra), thus:

Many of the provisions are already existing and were simply restated. Some however were restated with modifications and new ones were introduced to reflect what in the past have been noted to be pernicious practices which tend to place workers at a disadvantage.'

it is indubitably clear that the purpose of having overseas contracts of employment approved by the NSB(POEA) is whether or not such contracts conform to the minimum terms and conditions prescribed by the NSB (POEA). In other words, the law did not at all prohibit any alteration which provided for increases in wages or other benefits voluntarily granted by the employer. Precisely, under Section 2, Rule 1, Book V of the Rules and Regulations of the POEA, '(t)he standard format of employment contracts shall set the minimum standards of the terms and conditions of employment. All employers and principals shall adopt the model contract in connection with the hiring of workers without prejudice to their adopting other terms and conditions of employment over and above the minimum standards of the Administration.' Where, as here, it is admitted that the second contract although not verified or approved by the NSB (POEA) granted more benefits by way of total disability insurance to the complainant, the respondents may not be allowed to disvow their own voluntary acts by insisting that such beneficial contract in favor of the seaman is null and void. (Emphasis supplied.) ¹⁰

We agree.

The supplementary contract of employment was entered into between petitioner and private respondent to modify the original contract of employment The reason why the law requires that the POEA should approve and verify a contract under Article 34(i) of the Labor Code is to insure that the employee shall not thereby be placed in a disadvantageous position and that the same are within the minimum standards of the terms and conditions of such employment contract set by the POEA. This is why a standard format for employment contracts has been adopted by the Department of Labor. However, there is no prohibition against stipulating in a contract more benefits to the employee than those required by law. Thus, in this case wherein a "supplementary contract" was entered into affording greater benefits to the employee than the previous one, and although the same was not submitted for the approval of the POEA, the public respondents properly considered said contract to be valid and enforceable. Indeed, said pronouncements of public respondents have the effect of an approval of said contract. Moreover, as said contract was voluntarily entered into by the parties the same is binding between them. ¹¹ Not being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order, its validity must be sustained. ¹² By the same token, the court sustains the ruling of public respondents that the provision in the supplementary contract whereby private respondent waives any claim against petitioners for damages arising from death or permanent disability is against public policy, oppressive and inimical to the rights of private respondent. The said provision defeats and is inconsistent with the duty of petitioners to insure private respondent against said contingencies as clearly stipulated in the said contract.

Petitioners however argue that they could not have entered into said supplementary contract of employment as Philimare was a mere manning agent in the Philippines of the shipping company managed by Navales Shipping Management and Marine Consultant (Pte) Ltd., its principal. Petitioners assert that the said supplementary contract was entered into by private respondent with their principal, Navales Shipping Management and Marine Consultant (Pte) Ltd. on board the vessel Turtle Bay so petitioners cannot be held responsible thereunder.

This Court is not a trier of facts and the findings of the public respondents are conclusive in this proceeding. Public respondents found that petitioner Philimare and private respondent entered into said supplementary contract of employment on December 6, 1982. Assuming for the sake of argument that it was petitioners' principal which entered into said contract with private respondent, nevertheless petitioner, as its manning agent in the Philippines, is jointly responsible with its principal thereunder. ¹³

There is no question that under the said supplementary contract of employment, it is the duty of the employer, petitioners herein, to insure the employee, during his engagement, against death and permanent invalidity caused by accident on board up to $ 50,000.00. Consequently, it is also its concomitant obligation to see to it that the claim against the insurance company is duly filed by private respondent or in his behalf, and within the time provided for by the terms of the insurance contract.

In this case, the private respondent met the accident on October 6, 1983. Since then, he was hospitalized at the Suez Canal Authority Hospital and thereafter be was repatriated to the Philippines wherein he was also hospitalized from October 22, 1983 to March 27, 1984. It was only on August 19, 1985 that he was issued a medical certificate describing his disability to be permanent in nature. It was not possible for private respondent to file a claim for permanent disability with the insurance company within the one-year period from the time of the injury, as his disability was ascertained to be permanent only thereafter. Petitioners did not exert any effort to assist private respondent to recover payment of his claim from the insurance company. They did not even care to dispute the finding of the insurer that the claim was not flied on time. ¹⁴ Petitioners must, therefore, be held responsible for its omission, if not negligence, by requiring them to pay the claim of private respondent.

The Court finds that the respondent NLRC did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners, motion for leave to file third-party complaint and substitution inclusion of party respondent. Such motion is largely addressed to the discretion of the said Commission. Inasmuch as the alleged transfer of interest took place only after the POEA had rendered its decision, the denial of the motion so as to avoid further delay in the settlement of the claim of private respondent was well-taken. At any rate, petitioners may pursue their claim against their alleged successor-in-interest in a separate suit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 21, 1988 is hereby LIFTED. No costs. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Annex 1 to Annex D of the Petition, Page 31, Rollo.

2 Annex R of the Petition, Page 105 Rollo.

3 Page 163, Rollo.

4 Annex G to the Petition, pages 48 to 49, Rollo.

5 Annexes K to L to the Petition, pages 58 to 68, Rollo.

6 Annex O to the Petition, pages 82 to 96, Rollo.

7 Annex T to the Petition, page 120, Rollo.

8 Page 9, Rollo.

9 Page 12, Rollo. +

10 Pages 87 to 89, Rollo.

11 Ramos vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, 41 SCRA 565 (1971).

12 Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 722 (1980); Philippine American General Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Mutuc, 61 SCRA 22 (1974); Article 1306 and 1356, Civil Code.

13 Hydro Resources Contractors Corporation vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. Nos. 80143-44, December 8, 1988.

14 Annexes 2 and 1-A to Annex D the Petition, pages 33 to 35, Rollo.

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Leonardo vs. Court of Appeals

2012-12-10T22:21:00.001-08:00

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Leonardo vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 152459

FACTS

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 29 June 2001 Decision[1] and 20 February 2002 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51160. The Court of Appeals set aside the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which sustained the Labor Arbiter’s Decision holding Digital Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (DIGITEL) jointly and severally liable with Balagtas Telephone Company (BALTEL) and its proprietor Domingo de Asis.[3]

The Antecedent Facts

BALTEL holds the franchise from the Municipality of Balagtas, Bulacan to operate a telephone service in the municipality. BALTEL also has authority from the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) to operate in the municipality.

BALTEL hired Emelita Leonardo, Conrado Bargamento, Emelita Nuñez, Rodolfo Graban, and Roberto Graban (“petitioners”) for various positions[4] in the company. On 22 April 1991,[5] BALTEL[6] and DIGITEL entered into a management contract.[7] Under the terms of the contract, DIGITEL was to provide personnel, consultancy and technical expertise in the management, administration, and operation of BALTEL’s telephone service in Balagtas, Bulacan. DIGITEL also undertook to improve the internal and external plants of BALTEL’s telephone system and to handle customer relations and such other matters necessary for the efficient management and operation of the telephone system.

In a letter[8] dated 27 January 1994, BALTEL informed the NTC that it would cease to operate effective 28 February 1994 because it was no longer in a financial position to continue its operations. On 17 February 1994, BALTEL assigned to DIGITEL its buildings and other improvements on a parcel of land in Balagtas, Bulacan covered by OCT No. O-7280 where BALTEL conducted its business operations. The assignment was in partial payment of BALTEL’s obligation to DIGITEL which as of 31 December 1993 amounted to P712,471.74.

On 28 February 1994, petitioners’ employment ceased. They executed separate, undated and similarly worded quitclaims acknowledging receipt of various amounts representing their claims from BALTEL. In their quitclaims, petitioners absolved and released BALTEL from all monetary claims that arose out of their employer-employee relationship with the company. Petitioners also acknowledged that BALTEL closed its operations due to serious business losses.

On 1 March 1994, petitioners filed a complaint against BALTEL and Domingo De Asis for recovery of salary differential and attorney’s fees. Petitioners later filed a supplemental complaint to include illegal dismissal as additional cause of action and to implead DIGITEL as additional respondent. DIGITEL denied having any liability on the ground that it was not petitioners’ employer. In its 29 May 1995 Decision,[9] Labor Arbiter Dominador B. Saludares ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby entered in favor of the complainants and against respondents Balagtas Telephone System and/or Domingo de Asis and Digital Telecommunications Phils., Inc. ordering the latter, jointly and severally as follows:

1. To pay the sum of P14,950.00 representing the unpaid salaries of all the five (5) complainants for the month of February 1994;

2. To pay another sum of P4,486.44 representing the unpaid overtime pay of complainants Emelita Leonardo, Conrado Bargamento and Emelita Nuñez for February 1994;

3. To pay the sum of P71,400.00 as salary differential of the complainants;

4. To pay the backwages of all complainants from the date they were dismissed on February 28, 1994 up to this writing computed in the sum total of P224,250.00, less their separation pay which they have received;

5. To pay the sum of P31,508.64 as attorney’s fees which is equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the amount of the award; and

6. To immediately reinstate all the complainants to their former or equivalent positions under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal or separation including payment of their prevailing basic salaries and all other benefits or at the option of the employer merely reinstate in the payroll also with the payment of their salaries and all other benefits in accordance with Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6715. Respondents are further ordered to submit upon receipt hereof their compliance with the reinstatement aspect.

SO DECIDED.[10]

DIGITEL appealed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision before the NLRC. In its 29 December 1997 Decision,[11] the NLRC dismissed the appeal. DIGITEL moved for the reconsideration of the NLRC Decision. In its 29 July 1998 Decision,[12] the NLRC denied DIGITEL’s motion for reconsideration.

DIGITEL filed a petition for review before this Court. In its 2 December 1998 Resolution, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals pursuant to St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC.[13]

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its 29 June 2001 Decision, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the NLRC Decision insofar as it held DIGITEL severally liable with BALTEL and Domingo de Asis. The Court of Appeals ruled that DIGITEL is not the successor-in-interest of BALTEL. The Court of Appeals held that the records do not show that DIGITEL became the absolute owner of BALTEL, or that DIGITEL absorbed BALTEL’s employees. The Court of Appeals further ruled that there was no showing that DIGITEL acquired BALTEL’s franchise. The Court of Appeals ruled:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE insofar as it held petitioner jointly and severally liable with Balagtas Telephone Company and Domingo de Asis for the obligations of the two to private respondents, with the result that private respondents’ complaint against petitioner before the labor arbiter is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[14]

Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ Decision. In its 20 February 2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

Petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the factual findings of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC which should have been given more weight by appellate tribunals.

The Issues

The petition raises the following issues:

1. Whether DIGITEL is the successor-in-interest of BALTEL; and

2. Whether an employer-employee relationship exists between petitioners and DIGITEL.

The Ruling of This Court

The petition has no merit.

The Court of Appeals has the power to review the decisions of the NLRC and to pass upon factual issues raised by the parties. In R & E Transport, Inc. v. Latag,[15] this Court held:

The power of the CA to review NLRC decisions via a Rule 65 petition is now a settled issue. As early as St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC, we have definitively ruled that the proper remedy to ask for the review of a decision of the NLRC is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and that such petition should be filed with the CA in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. Moreover, it has already been explained that under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa (BP) 129, as amended by Republic Act 7902, the CA – pursuant to the exercise of its original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari – was specifically given the power to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual issues.

We agree with petitioners that factual findings of quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are accorded great respect and even finality by the courts. However, this rule is not absolute. When there is a showing that the factual findings of administrative bodies were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record, they may be examined by the courts.[16] In this case, the Court of Appeals found “nothing in the records [to support] the conclusion that DIGITEL became the ‘absolute owner’ of BALTEL or that the former ‘absorbed’ the latter’s employees.” Hence, the Court of Appeals is justified in reviewing the factual findings of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.

There is No Employer-Employee Relationship

Between DIGITEL and Petitioners

To determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the Court has to resolve who has the power to select the employees, who pays for their wages, who has the power to dismiss them, and who exercises control in the methods and the results by which the work is accomplished.[17] The most important element of an employer-employee relationship is the control test. Under the control test, there is an employer-employee relationship when the person for whom the services are performed reserves the right to control not only the end achieved but also the manner and means used to achieve that end.[18]

In this case, DIGITEL undoubtedly has the power of control. However, DIGITEL’s exercise of the power of control necessarily flows from the exercise of its responsibilities under the management contract which includes providing for personnel, consultancy and technical expertise in the management, administration, and operation of the telephone system. Thus, the control test has no application in this case.

The Court notes that DIGITEL did not hire petitioners. BALTEL had already employed petitioners when BALTEL entered into the management contract with DIGITEL. We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the fact that DIGITEL uses its payslips does not necessarily imply that DIGITEL pays petitioners’ salaries. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, DIGITEL introduced its own financial and accounting systems to BALTEL and it included the use of DIGITEL’s payslips for accounting purposes. The management contract provides that BALTEL shall reimburse DIGITEL for all expenses incurred in the performance of its services and this includes reimbursement of whatever amount DIGITEL paid or advanced to BALTEL’s employees.

Finally, DIGITEL has no power to dismiss BALTEL’s employees. When DIGITEL wanted to dismiss Roberto Graban for habitual tardiness, BALTEL did not approve DIGITEL’s recommendation. In the end, Roberto Graban was just suspended from work.

In sum, no employer-employee relationship exists between petitioners and DIGITEL. Hence, DIGITEL is not solidarily liable with BALTEL and Domingo de Asis to petitioners.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 29 June 2001 Decision and 20 February 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51160.

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz with Associate Justices Ramon Mabutas, Jr. and Roberto A. Barrios, concurring. Rollo, pp. 315-324.

[2] Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz with Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon Magtolis and Roberto A. Barrios, concurring. Id. at 34.

[3] Also referred to as Domingo Asis.

[4] Emelita Leonardo was hired in 1988 as telephone operator; Conrado Bargamento was hired in 1977 as collector; Emelita Nuñez was hired in 1984 as telephone operator; Rodolfo Graban was hired in 1971 as telephone lineman and Roberto Graban was hired in 1990 as telephone lineman. Rollo, pp. 315-316.

[5] 21 April 1991 in the Decision of the Court of Appeals.

[6] The agreement was signed by Estela L. de Asis, attorney-in-fact of Domingo de Asis who owns the franchise to operate the telephone system.

[7] Denominated as “Appointment and Agreement.”

[8] Signed by Estela de Asis. Rollo, p. 107.

[9] Id. at 69-81.

[10] Id. at 79-81.

[11] Penned by Commissioner Vicente S.E. Veloso with Commissioner Alberto R. Quimpo, concurring. CA rollo, pp. 16-22.

[12] Penned by Commissioner Vicente S.E. Veloso with Commissioners Rogelio L. Rayala and Alberto R. Quimpo, concurring. Id. at 24-26.

[13] 356 Phil. 811 (1998).

[14] Rollo, pp. 323-324.

[15] G.R. No. 155214, 13 February 2004, 422 SCRA 698, at 703-704.

[16] Id.

[17] Miguel v. JCT Group, Inc., G.R. No. 157752, 16 March 2005, 453 SCRA 529.

[18] Abante, Jr. v. Lamadrid Bearing & Parts Corporation, G.R. No. 159890, 28 May 2004, 430 SCRA 368.

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Who is to blame when a marriage fails?

2012-12-10T21:55:00.000-08:00

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SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 119190. January 16, 1997]

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.

Who is to blame when a marriage fails?

This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision on November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.

The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals[1] in its decision are as follows:

"From the evidence adduced, the following facts were preponderantly established:

"Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, xxx Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")

"After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.

"There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.

"It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.

"In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.

"Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.

“The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband’s examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.

"The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.

"The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

"On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.

"But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical technology or scienceK

"The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.

"There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant, why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.

"The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.

"The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent. As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")

"The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.

"In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that the evidence is not fabricated.”[2]

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.

"SO ORDERED. "

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:

in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the parties without making any findings of fact.

in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.

III

in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.

in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.

We find the petition to be bereft of merit.

Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.[3]

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:

"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved."

The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it became incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.

To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).

The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:

"The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995)."[4]

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to psychological disorders" because there might have been other reasons, - i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, - why private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.

First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.

Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is suffering from psychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.

We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection.[5] Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.

"If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity."[6]

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

As aptly stated by the respondent court,

"An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of sympathy for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his rights even though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife who was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.

"We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not psychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code.”[7]

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is - a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

[1] Thirteenth Division: Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, J., ponente, Eduardo Montenegro and Antonio P. Solano, JJ., concurring.

[2] Rollo, pp. 20-24.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Rollo, p. 34.

[5] Exhs. "2", "2-B" and "2-C”.

[6] Psychological Incapacity, G.T. Veloso, p. 20, cited in The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, Pineda, 1989 ed., p. 51.

[7] Decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 30-31.

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Cayetano vs. Monsod

2012-12-10T19:56:00.000-08:00

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action. ¹ To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: ²

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:

1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term "practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)

3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). ³

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva: ⁴

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority to choose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts ... in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:

1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the following:

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated companies

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt — Member

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

b. Dataprep, Philippines

c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.

d. Semirara Coal Corporation

e. CBL Timber Corporation

Member of the Board of the Following:

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier

f. Manila Electric Company

g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

h. Philippine Electric Corporation

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:

The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.

It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)

For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally answered: "I have done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)

xxx xxx xxx

... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)

In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):

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... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:

l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)

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While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent

Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary action. ¹ To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: ²

3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority to choose between two claimants to the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:

1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the following:

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated companies

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt — Member

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

b. Dataprep, Philippines

c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.

d. Semirara Coal Corporation

e. CBL Timber Corporation

Member of the Board of the Following:

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier

f. Manila Electric Company

g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

h. Philippine Electric Corporation

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)

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In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):

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United States of America vs. Ruiz

2012-12-10T19:50:00.000-08:00

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United States of America vs. Ruiz
136 SCRA 487

Facts: The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the US. Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding conducted by the US fro the construction of wharves in said base that was wrongly awarded to another group. For this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against the US.

Issue: Whether the United States Naval Base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity.

Held: The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of states. However, the rules of international law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them — between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial and proprietary acts. The result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental acts.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. A state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates the exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the US and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

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American Home Insurance Company vs. Court of Appeals GR. No. 9419 (1992)

2008-12-27T08:03:00.000-08:00

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(Transportation Law)

American Home Insurance Company vs. Court of Appeals
GR. No. 9419 (1992)

Facts:

Both petitioner American Home Insurance Company and respondent National Marine Corporation (NMC) are foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines. On or about June 19, 1988, Cheng Hua Pulp Corporation shipped 5000 bales of Kraft bulb from Taiwan on board “SS Kaunlaran” owned by NMC. Such shipment with American Home Insurance. On June 22, 1988, the shipment arrived in Manila and was discharged into the custody of Marina Port Services for delivery to the consignee assured. However, upon delivery, it was discovered that 12 bales had either been damaged or lost. The loss had an estimated value of P61,263.41. Petitioner paid Mayleen Paper, Inc. The adjusted amount of P31,501.75. As subrogee, petitioner bought suit against respondent NMC for the recovery of the amount it paid Mayleen Paper Inc. The trial court dismissed the complaint. The CA affirmed decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the provisions of the Code of Commerce will apply in determining the liability of a common carrier when there is negligence.

Held:

The Supreme Court held in favor of the petitioner on the ground that the law in general averages of the Code Commerce is applicable only when such law or damages of the cargoes does not arise from the negligence of the court of the carrier otherwise the provision of the Civil Code in law on common carrier shall primarily govern the obligations and liabilities of the common carrier. Therefore, respondent is civilly liable to petitioner American Home Insurance.

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Aboitiz Shipping Corporation vs. Court of Appeals GR. No. 89757, August 8, 1990

2008-12-27T07:57:00.000-08:00

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(Transportation Law)

Aboitiz Shipping Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
GR. No. 89757, August 8, 1990

Facts:

On October 28, 1980, M/V P/ Aboitiz took on board in Hong Kong for shipment to Manila one twenty-footer container holding 281 rolls of goods and one twenty-footer container holding 447 rolls, 10 bulk and 95 carbons of goods for apparel covered by bill of lading No. 575-M. Both shipment were consigned to the Philippines Apparel, Inc an insured with the general Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corporation, Ltd (GAFLAC). The vessel is owned aned operated to manila, the vessel sank and it was declared lost wit all its cargoes. CAFLAC was subrogated to all the rights, interests of action of the consignee against Aboitiz, it filed an action for damages against Abiotiz in the RTC of Manila alleging that the loss was due to the fault or negligence of Aboitiz and the master and crew of its vessel in that they did not observe extraordinary diligence required by law as regards to common carrier.

Issue:
Whether or not the loss was due to fortuitous event.

Held:

The trial court and the appellee court found that the sinking of M/V P.Aboitiz was not due to waves caused by tropical storm Yooning but due to the fault and negligence of petitioner, its master and crew.

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Dily Dany Nacpil vs. International Broadcasting Corporation G.R. No. 144767. March 21, 2002

2008-12-27T07:54:00.000-08:00

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(Labor Relations)

Dily Dany Nacpil vs. International Broadcasting Corporation
G.R. No. 144767. March 21, 2002

Facts:

Petitioner was the Assistant General Manager for Finance/Administration and Comptroller of private respondent Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC) from 1996 until April 1997. Upon assumption of Emiliano Templo as the IBC President, petitioner was forced to retire. Templo refused to pay him his retirement benefits. Hence, in 1997, petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of benefits.

IBC alleged that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the case, that the petitioner was a corporate officer who was duly elected by the Board of Directors of IBC; hence, the case qualifies as an intra-corporate dispute falling within the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

Petitioner argues that he is not a corporate officer of the IBC but an employee thereof since he had not been elected nor appointed as Comptroller and Assistant Manager by the IBC's Board of Directors. He pointed out that he had actually been appointed on January 11, 1995 by the IBC's General Manager, Ceferino Basilio.

Issue:

Whether or not the Labor Arbiter had jurisdiction over the case for illegal dismissal and non-payment of benefits filed by petitioner.

Held:

Dismissal or non-appointment of a corporate officer is clearly an intra-corporate matter and jurisdiction over the case properly belongs to the SEC, not to the NLRC. Under Presidential Decree No. 902-A (the Revised Securities Act), Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers, or managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations fall under the exclusive of the SEC. Two elements are to be considered in determining whether the SEC has jurisdiction over the controversy, to wit: (1) the status or relationship of the parties; and (2) the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy. Since complainant's appointment was approved unanimously by the Board of Directors of the corporation, he is therefore considered a corporate officer and his claim of illegal dismissal is a controversy that falls under the jurisdiction of the SEC as contemplated by Section 5 of P.D. 902-A. That the position of Comptroller is not expressly mentioned among the officers of the IBC in the By-Laws is of no moment, because the IBC's Board of Directors is empowered under Section 25 of the Corporation Code and under the corporation's By-Laws to appoint such other officers as it may deem necessary.

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