Liberal Blogosphere

Sat, 29 Aug 2026 00:26:43 +0000

ICE IN SPACE

President Trump Signs Executive Order To Create US Space Academy

President Donald J. Trump signed an Executive Order on Aug. 28, 2026, to establish the nation’s first U.S. Space Academy at NASA’s Johnson Space Center in Houston. Credit: NASA

August 28, 2026

By Eurasia Review

Key Takeaways:

President Trump signed an executive order to start creating a U.S. Space Academy aimed at training Space Force, NASA, and commercial talent for national security, the Moon, and industry.
NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman would chair a presidential commission, with Deputy Administrator Matt Anderson as executive director and White House science and economic aides as vice chairs.
The commission has 120 days to recommend governance, graduate service obligations, a site, and any needed laws; the signing was at Johnson Space Center during Artemis II medal presentations.

To strengthen the nation’s space workforce and develop the next generation of space leaders, President Donald J. Trump signed an Executive Order on Friday to establish the nation’s first U.S. Space Academy.

The order highlights how space is a critical domain for American national security, economic growth, scientific discovery, and technological innovation. The proposed academy would focus technical education with leadership development, discipline, and a commitment to public service, helping ultimately advance U.S. interests in space.

“Given the rapid growth of the U.S. Space Force and commercial space industry, and the expansion of our ambitions to the Moon and far beyond the Moon, it’s clear we will need to educate and train an entire generation of skilled service members, engineers, and civil operators,” said President Trump. “That’s why I will sign an Executive Order to begin the process of creating a new a national academy called the U.S. Space Academy.”

The order also calls on NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman to serve as the chair of a new Presidential Commission on the United States Space Academy, and NASA Deputy Administrator Matt Anderson to serve as the executive director. They will work with vice chairs — Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, Michael Kratsios, and Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, Kevin Hassett — and other representatives from the White House and the interagency on the commission.

“President Trump’s vision for a new academy is a transformational step to educate the engineers, scientists, technicians, operators and even the astronauts who will be necessary for the inspiring future we are pursuing in space. In the years ahead, we will return NASA astronauts to the lunar surface, build the Moon Base, get underway on nuclear power, ignite the orbital economy and launch more missions of science and discovery,” said Isaacman. “I have no doubt that so much of the future talent that will graduate and contribute to these exciting endeavors will be educated at the United States Space Academy.”

A report from the commission to the President is due within 120 days of the signing with recommendations on governance framework, service obligations for graduates, physical location of the academy, legislative requirements, and more.

The signing of “Establishing the United States Space Academy Executive Order,” took place at NASA’s Johnson Space Center in Houston where the President also presented the Artemis II crew members with the Congressional Space Medal of Honor.

Sat, 29 Aug 2026 00:16:35 +0000

Beyond Impeachment: The Politics Of Survival And Political Fatigue In The Philippines – Analysis

Manila, Philippines

August 28, 2026

By Rizal G. Buendia

Key Takeaways:

While Sara Duterte’s impeachment dominates Manila politics, the author argues most households are focused on inflation, rice and fuel prices, wages, and flooding—not Senate drama.
Official and survey figures cited include April 2026 inflation of 7.2% (8.5% for the poorest), rice inflation of 13.7%, a real minimum wage of about ₱378, and polls ranking prices and pay far above impeachment (about 1.2% as a top concern).
Many still support holding a trial (around 70–74% in some polls) but treat it as background noise amid political fatigue, elite Marcos–Duterte rivalry, and corruption they feel most when flood-control projects fail.

A nation of over 110 million people, the Philippines is currently enmeshed with the impeachment trial of the country’s Vice-President, Sara Duterte, over allegations concerning financial irregularities, unexplained wealth, misuse of public resources and other constitutional and legal questions. While the trial commands headlines and occupies the attention of Manila’s political elite, ordinary Filipino household is rivetted not with a debate before the Senate trial but in counting how much money is left it has after transportation, i.e., jeepney, bus, or commuter train, fare is paid; checking whether the rice in a plastic container will last for a week; and glancing anxiously at the sky during the wet season, wondering if the streets will flood again before nightfall.

This does not mean that everyday Filipinos are not concerned with the fate of the Vice-President. This is not because they are indifferent to accountability or governance. It is because economic survival is immediate, tangible, pragmatic, and inescapable, while impeachment proceedings feel distant, slow-moving, and largely disconnected from the price of galunggong (round scad, known as “poor man’s fish”) rice, vegetables, or meat at the market. This is not apathy; it is the arithmetic of survival. This suggests that political salience is strongly shaped by the immediacy of material conditions. A constitutional controversy may dominate the news cycle, but the price of food, electricity, transport and gasoline is experienced directly by households every day.

Economy and welfare

The economic reality of 2026 is brutal for the average Filipino family. The Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) reported that inflation jumped to 7.2 percent in April 2026, its fastest pace in three years. For the bottom 30 percent of households – those most vulnerable to price shocks – inflation climbed even higher, reaching 8.5 percent. These are not abstract statistics; they translate into daily struggles at the market.

Rice, the nation’s staple food, saw its inflation rate soared to 13.7 percent in Apri 2026. Prices of other essential goods rocketed, galunggong (a common fish), carrots, and kangkong (water spinach)to name a few. An 11-kilogram LPG tank now costs between Php1,110 (US$18) and Php1,600 (US$26), up from Php830 (US$13.40) previously. Electricity rates have climbed to Php14.48 (US$0.23) per kilowatt-hour, adding roughly Php466 (US$7.52) to a typical household’s monthly bill. All of this unfolds against a backdrop of stagnant wages. The average nominal minimum wage nationwide is just Php512, (US$8.27) but its real value—factoring in inflation—is only Php378 (US$6.11). As research group IBON stressed, “Filipinos’ wages are not enough to keep up with higher prices.”

Compounding the cost of food is the relentless volatility of fuel prices. Fuel price hikes ripple through every sector of the economy. They increase the cost of transporting goods, which in turn drives up food prices further. They burden jeepney drivers and farmers alike. Energy Undersecretary Alessandro Sales acknowledged the connection, noting that “a conflict thousands of kilometres away can still affect the jeepney driver filling up for the day”

E20 Petrol: Balancing Energy Security – Analysis

Image: Grok

August 28, 2026
By Patial RC

Key Takeaways:

India’s E20 ethanol-blend push is credited with cutting oil-import exposure, saving foreign exchange, and opening markets for sugarcane, maize, and surplus grain—but the author says net benefits are assumed more than measured.

Hidden costs include ethanol’s lower energy content (fewer km per litre at similar pump prices), uneven gains for small farmers versus mills, food-versus-fuel risk, and water use in stressed regions.

The piece urges a published cost-benefit ledger, residue-based second-generation feedstocks, clearer consumer choice for older vehicles, and an independent review before raising blends further. Farmers, Consumers and Sustainability

India’s transition towards ethanol-blended petrol represents one of the country’s most significant energy-policy initiatives of the past decade. The move towards E20—petrol containing up to 20 per cent ethanol—has been driven by several legitimate national objectives: reducing dependence on imported crude oil, conserving foreign exchange, improving energy security, creating additional markets for agricultural produce and reducing emissions.

Measured against these objectives, the programme has achieved considerable scale and speed. India imports a substantial proportion of its crude-oil requirements, leaving the economy exposed to international prices, exchange-rate movements and geopolitical disruptions. Replacing a portion of imported petroleum with domestically produced ethanol therefore provides a degree of insulation from global oil-market volatility.

The strategic value of that insulation became particularly apparent during periods of international uncertainty. When crude prices rise sharply because of geopolitical tensions or disruption to supply routes, a portion of India’s transport-fuel requirement is effectively sourced domestically rather than being entirely exposed to international crude prices and the dollar. In that sense, ethanol blending can be viewed not merely as an environmental programme but also as a form of energy-security insurance.

The important question is not whether E20 has benefits—it clearly does—but whether those benefits and costs are being measured comprehensively and distributed fairly among farmers, consumers, oil companies, distilleries and the wider economy.
The Economic Case for Ethanol

The economic rationale for ethanol blending is straightforward. Every litre of ethanol used in petrol represents a corresponding reduction in the quantity of petroleum that has to be imported, subject to the actual energy content of the respective fuels.

The programme has also created a large and predictable market for agricultural feedstocks, including sugarcane, maize and certain surplus or damaged grains. This can provide additional revenue streams for sugar mills, distilleries and agricultural producers, while encouraging investment in processing capacity and rural infrastructure.

There are environmental benefits as well. Ethanol is a renewable fuel and, depending on the feedstock, cultivation practices, processing technology and transport involved, blending can reduce the lifecycle carbon intensity of petrol.

These are important gains. India’s energy transition cannot be assessed solely from the perspective of the price paid at a petrol pump. Foreign-exchange savings, energy security, rural employment, industrial investment and emissions reduction also have economic value.

At the same time, the net benefit needs to be measured rather than assumed.
The Cost of the Energy Transition

One of the less discussed characteristics of ethanol is its lower energy content compared with petrol. Ethanol contains substantially less energy per litre, which means that a vehicle may require more blended fuel to travel the same distance.

The government’s own assessments acknowledge some loss in fuel economy, while earlier projections by NITI Aayog indicated that the impact could be more significant for vehicles designed for lower ethanol blends. This creates an important consumer question.

If E20 is sold at essentially the same pump price as conventional petrol, but provides fewer kilometres per litre, the motorist’s effective cost per kilometre can rise even if the price per litre does not. That does not necessarily make E20 an uneconomic policy. If the additional cost to the consumer is outweighed by foreign-exchange savings, energy-security benefits and environmental gains, the programme can still produce a positive national return.But that calculation should be transparent.

A useful next step would therefore be publication of a comprehensive cost-and-benefit assessment of E20, including the cost of ethanol, petrol displaced, transportation and blending, taxation, vehicle efficiency effects and the value of reduced petroleum imports. Such transparency would make the debate considerably more constructive.
Who Ultimately Benefits?

The programme is also frequently presented as an opportunity for farmers. The creation of a large domestic ethanol market can certainly benefit agricultural producers, but the distribution of those benefits deserves closer examination.

Payments made by oil marketing companies to distilleries and sugar mills do not automatically translate into equivalent increases in farm incomes. The extent to which the additional value reaches the farmer depends on procurement arrangements, feedstock prices, market conditions, processing margins and the bargaining position of individual producers.

Large farmers and organised agricultural producers may be better positioned to benefit from assured demand than small and marginal cultivators, who often have limited marketable surpluses.

This is particularly relevant in the case of maize. If government policy encourages greater maize production for ethanol while market prices remain below the declared minimum support price, questions naturally arise about how much of the value generated by the ethanol market is actually reaching cultivators.

These questions need not imply that the ethanol programme has failed. Rather, they point to the need for better measurement of the programme’s farm-level outcomes.

The ultimate test of the agricultural component should therefore be simple: has the additional demand for ethanol translated into a sustained improvement in farm incomes?
Food Versus Fuel

Another issue requiring careful consideration is the increasing use of food-related feedstocks for ethanol.

Maize, sugarcane and rice have legitimate competing uses in India’s food and agricultural economy. In normal years, there may be sufficient supplies to accommodate both food and fuel requirements. However, droughts, crop failures, international disruptions or sudden changes in domestic demand can alter that balance quickly.

The use of surplus, damaged or otherwise unsuitable grain for fuel can be economically sensible because it creates value from material that may not otherwise enter the food chain.

The situation becomes more complicated when cultivable resources are deliberately redirected towards fuel production at the expense of food, feed or other essential uses.

This is not an argument against ethanol. It is an argument for maintaining flexibility in feedstock policy and ensuring that energy security does not unintentionally create a food-security challenge.
The Water Question

Water may ultimately prove to be one of the most important sustainability questions surrounding ethanol.

The environmental footprint of ethanol varies substantially according to the feedstock. Sugarcane is water-intensive, while grain-based ethanol also carries the water requirements associated with cultivation.

Therefore, the environmental benefit of replacing imported petrol cannot be assessed as stand alone. The entire lifecycle—from cultivation and irrigation to processing, transportation and blending—needs to be considered. This becomes particularly important in regions already experiencing groundwater stress.

A sensible long-term strategy would encourage feedstocks and technologies that impose lower pressure on scarce water resources. Agricultural residues, crop waste and other non-food biomass could play a progressively greater role through second-generation biofuel technologies. Such diversification would also reduce the potential conflict between food and fuel.

The Consumer Perspective

The motorist is another important stakeholder in the transition.Consumers are being encouraged to move towards cleaner and more efficient forms of mobility while simultaneously facing higher fuel prices, changing vehicle regulations and the costs associated with newer technologies.

Petrol vehicles remain an important part of India’s transport system. If higher ethanol blends result in even modest reductions in fuel economy, the impact will be felt most directly by high-mileage users, particularly two-wheeler owners and households for whom fuel expenditure represents a significant share of monthly income.

Vehicle compatibility is another consideration. Newer vehicles are increasingly designed and calibrated for higher ethanol blends, but India’s vehicle fleet is large and diverse, with millions of older vehicles still on the road. The objective should therefore be to ensure that the transition is technologically sound as well as environmentally desirable.

One possible transitional approach is to retain consumer choice through the availability of ethanol-free petrol where technically and economically feasible, particularly for older vehicles, while the newer fleet progressively moves towards higher blends.

Capacity, Investment and the Next Phase

The rapid expansion of ethanol production has also resulted in substantial investment in distilleries and associated infrastructure. This investment is positive in principle. However, installed capacity must ultimately correspond with sustainable demand. Excess capacity can create pressure for higher blending mandates, additional feedstocks or new markets simply to maintain utilisation.

That is why the move from E20 towards still higher blending levels should be guided by evidence rather than by capacity considerations alone. Before moving further, India would benefit from an independent assessment of the E20 experience—covering energy security, foreign-exchange savings, carbon emissions, agricultural incomes, food availability, water consumption, consumer costs, vehicle performance and the financial health of the ethanol industry.

A More Balanced Way Forward

The case for E20 need not be framed as a choice between supporting ethanol and opposing it.A more constructive approach would recognise that ethanol can be an important component of India’s energy strategy while also acknowledging that every energy policy produces winners, costs and trade-offs.Five areas deserve particular attention:

First, greater transparency. A clear per-litre cost and benefit structure for E20 would allow consumers and policymakers to understand what they are paying for and where the economic value is being created.

Second, better measurement of farmer benefits. The programme should be assessed not simply by the value of ethanol purchased from distilleries, but by its measurable impact on farm incomes, particularly for small and marginal cultivators.

Third, feedstock diversification. Greater emphasis should gradually be placed on agricultural residues, waste biomass and other non-food feedstocks, reducing pressure on food supplies and water resources.

Fourth, consumer protection. The impact of ethanol blending on fuel economy, vehicle compatibility and cost per kilometre should be transparently communicated. Where necessary, appropriate transitional mechanisms could be considered for older vehicles and vulnerable consumers.

Fifth, independent periodic review. The E20 programme should be evaluated on a full lifecycle basis before the country moves towards substantially higher blending levels. The objective should not simply be to maximise the percentage of ethanol in petrol, but to maximise the net national benefit.

Conclusion

India’s ethanol programme deserves recognition for its ambition and for the strategic benefits it can provide. Reducing dependence on imported crude, strengthening domestic energy security, creating agricultural markets and encouraging investment in rural industry are all legitimate national objectives.At the same time, the success of E20 should not be judged solely by the achievement of a blending target.

The more important questions are whether the foreign-exchange savings justify the overall economic cost, whether farmers receive a fair share of the value created, whether food and water security are adequately protected, and whether motorists receive an equitable outcome from the transition.

The debate, therefore, should not be ethanol versus petrol, nor should it become a contest between government policy and its critics. The real objective is to ensure that India’s ethanol strategy remains economically viable, environmentally sustainable, farmer-oriented and fair to consumers.

E20 can be an important force multiplier for India’s energy security. But its long-term credibility will depend on transparency, independent assessment and the willingness to adjust the policy wherever evidence shows that the costs are falling disproportionately on farmers, consumers or natural resources. A successful energy policy must ultimately balance all these interests.

Note: Broad issues discussed in the article need to be specifically be considered by non-oil producing nations with agriculture surplus.

About Patial RC
Patial RC is a retired Infantry officer of the Indian Army and possesses unique experience of serving in active CI Ops across the country and in Sri Lanka. Patial RC is a regular writer on military and travel matters in military professional journals. The veteran is a keen mountaineer and a trekker.
View all posts by Patial RC →

Sat, 29 Aug 2026 00:04:58 +0000

King Abdullah II’s China Visit Opens A New Chapter In Jordan’s Strategic Balancing – Analysis

China's President Xi Jinping with Jordan's King Abdullah II in Beijing on August 24, 2026. Photo Credit: kingabdullah.jo (cropped)

August 28, 2026

By Dr. Shehab Al-Makahleh

Key Takeaways:

King Abdullah II’s Aug. 18–24 China visit is framed as Jordan seeking economic and diplomatic “optionality”—more Chinese investment, tech, and air links—without dropping U.S. security ties or Gulf partners.
Signed MoUs span industry, e-commerce, aviation, energy, water, minerals, AI, and tourism; the author says the test is jobs, exports, skills, and local control of data and infrastructure, not ceremony.
Amman and Beijing also aligned on Hormuz navigation, U.S.–Iran ceasefire talks, and a two-state Palestine line with Hashemite Jerusalem custodianship—treated as shared interest in pausing regional wars, not a bloc switch.

King Abdullah II’s state visit to China from August 18 to 24, 2026, was not simply another stop on the familiar circuit of Middle Eastern diplomacy. It came at a moment when the region is being forced to reconsider some of its oldest assumptions about power, security, economic dependence, and the role of external actors. The Middle East is no longer a region in which one outside power can effortlessly define the political agenda while everyone else adjusts. China is expanding its economic and diplomatic footprint, Gulf states are pursuing greater strategic autonomy, regional powers are asserting their own agendas, and countries such as Jordan are increasingly compelled to think in terms of flexibility rather than alignment. Against this backdrop, King Abdullah’s journey to Beijing was best understood as an exercise in strategic diversification—an attempt to enlarge Jordan’s economic and diplomatic options without dismantling the partnerships on which its security has traditionally depended.

The official Jordanian account makes the purpose of the visit clear. The Royal Hashemite Court’s account of the King’s talks with President Xi Jinping describes the relationship as nearly five decades old and emphasizes Jordan’s readiness to expand cooperation with China in agriculture, pharmaceuticals, food, engineering, tourism, education, and culture. The joint statement issued by Jordan and China goes further, placing the relationship within a broader framework of political coordination, economic cooperation, technological development, regional diplomacy, and Global South engagement. From Beijing’s perspective, the emphasis is equally revealing. Chinese President Xi Jinping called for deeper alignment between the two countries’ development strategies, while Chinese state media highlighted cooperation in traditional sectors alongside artificial intelligence, the digital economy, green energy, advanced manufacturing, and industrial innovation. The message is therefore larger than the language of friendship normally associated with state visits. Amman and Beijing are trying to convert political trust into strategic utility. That is the real story.

A Relationship Moving Beyond Diplomatic Courtesy

Jordan and China established diplomatic relations in 1977 and elevated them to a strategic partnership in 2015. The fiftieth anniversary of diplomatic relations will arrive in 2027, giving the current moment a useful historical marker. But anniversaries, however politically convenient, do not themselves create strategic relationships. What matters is whether the institutions, businesses, universities, and governments on both sides can turn political confidence into durable cooperation.

The Chinese-Jordanian relationship has already accumulated considerable political capital. During his meeting with Xi, King Abdullah reaffirmed Jordan’s commitment to the One-China policy, while Beijing reiterated its support for Jordan’s sovereignty, security, development, and regional role. The two governments also reaffirmed their willingness to coordinate on issues of mutual interest and to deepen political trust.

That political language is important precisely because it establishes the boundaries of trust. Jordan does not have to become a Chinese ally, and China does not need Jordan to become an anti-American partner. The relationship can instead occupy a more pragmatic space: one based on sovereignty, development, economic interdependence, and diplomatic coordination. This distinction is essential to understanding Jordanian foreign policy.

Amman has historically avoided putting all of its strategic eggs in one basket. Its security relationship with the United States remains fundamental. Its economic and political links with Europe remain substantial. Its ties with the Gulf are indispensable. At the same time, Jordan has increasingly recognized the value of Asian markets, Chinese technology, and alternative sources of investment. That is not inconsistency. It is hedging.

In an increasingly uncertain international system, a middle state does not necessarily gain security by choosing one great power and excluding another. It can

Fri, 28 Aug 2026 23:58:03 +0000

Faith Leaders, US Justice Department Meet To Push For Stronger Protections For Houses Of Worship

August 29, 2026

EWTN News

By Tessa Gervasini

Key Takeaways:

On Aug. 27 the Justice Department and the Appeal of Conscience Foundation met with faith leaders, including the Vatican’s U.S. nuncio, to discuss attacks on houses of worship.
Assistant Attorney General Harmeet Dhillon said the Civil Rights Division will investigate and prosecute religiously targeted violence; participants asked for stronger laws and a standing interfaith body to track threats.
The meeting fell on the anniversary of the 2025 Annunciation Church shooting in Minneapolis; U.S. Catholic bishops also want more Nonprofit Security Grant Program funding, noting fewer than half of applicants get awards.

Religious leaders met at the U.S. Department of Justice to discuss strengthening efforts to protect places of worship across the nation.

The DOJ and the Appeal of Conscience Foundation, a religious freedom advocacy group, held the meeting in Washington, D.C., on Aug. 27 to address the rise in attacks against houses of worship and faith-based communities.

Participants consisted of leaders from diverse faith backgrounds, including Archbishop Gabriele Caccia, apostolic nuncio to the United States.

The leaders spoke with Harmeet Dhillon, assistant attorney general for civil rights at the DOJ, and Karen Schneier Dresbach, executive vice president of the Appeal of Conscience Foundation — a coalition of business and religious leaders working worldwide on behalf of religious freedom, human rights, and the protection of houses of worship.

“No American should ever fear violence for simply practicing their faith,” Dhillon said in a statement.

“The Department of Justiceʼs Civil Rights Division has zero tolerance for attacks on houses of worship, and we will continue to investigate and prosecute those who target Americans because of their religion,” Dhillon said.

“Iʼm grateful to the Appeal of Conscience Foundation and the faith leaders gathered here today for their partnership in this work. Protecting religious liberty is a fundamental American value, and this Department will keep fighting to defend it,” Dhillon said in a statement.

The event also included a panel discussion among leaders and the presentation of a statement by participating groups read by Serbian Orthodox Bishop of Eastern America Irinej Dobrijevic and Archbishop Elpidophoros of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, according to a press release.

The statement called for stronger legislation to protect houses of worship and for the establishment of an ongoing body of religious leaders to monitor threats. The leaders asked that the DOJ work in tandem with the groups to help ensure that people of faith can worship safely.

The gathering comes amid rising concerns over attacks against houses of worship across the U.S. The meeting was held on Aug. 27, the first anniversary of the fatal shooting at Annunciation Catholic Church in Minneapolis in which two children were killed.

Bishops’ concern about religiously motivated violence continues

In 2026, “the Committee for Religious Liberty continues to be concerned about politically and religiously motivated violence,” the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) said.

The U.S. bishops previously laid out “areas of critical concern” in their

Is global warming supercharging El Niños? New study may reveal the answer

By Angela Symons with AP

Published on 28/08/2026 EURONEWS

El Niño can supercharge the impacts global warming. But burning fossil fuels could also be strengthening the destructive climate phenomenon.

A new study suggests that El Niños – the natural climatic chaos agent that pops up periodically and spikes global temperatures – are getting stronger because of human-caused climate change.

El Niños are more than 36 per cent stronger than they were before the industrial age began in the mid 1800s, with a 16 per cent jump in just the last 40 years showing that the increase is accelerating, according to a study published on 27 August in journal Science.

The findings come as a strong El Niño that formed a couple of months ago is forecast to be the biggest on record in the coming months. El Niños, which are a temporary warming of parts of the equatorial Pacific, warp weather worldwide and increase extreme events, including heatwaves, floods in some places and droughts in others. They can cost trillions in damage.

“That’s important because strong El Niños have much stronger impacts on climate hazards and extremes worldwide," says study lead author Julia Cole, a paleoclimate scientist at the University of Michigan in the US.

"When we set out to answer the question of why this might be happening, we set our data up against a record of global temperature, and we found that the increase in El Niños' strength closely parallels the rise in global temperature that is due to human causes such as the burning of fossil fuels."

Her study looks back at El Niños going back around 900 years.

Aggravating already nasty El Niños

“El Niño is the most violent aspect of climate variability worldwide, with effects ranging from local fisheries collapse, to widespread coral die-offs to severe droughts and food shortages around the world,” says Dalhousie University marine scientist Boris Worm, who wasn't part of the study.

Worm quotes the late climate scientist Wallace Broecker who warned “the climate system is an angry beast and we are poking it with sticks.” And then Worm adds: “Human emissions are the stick and El Niño is [one] of the ‘angry’ outbursts that can be so threatening to our collective safety.”

An El Niño's strength is determined by measuring water temperature in a region of the central Pacific around the equator and comparing a three-month average to normal. If it's 0.5 degrees Celsius warmer than normal, it's becomes an El Nino. The top of the scale is 2 degrees Celsius and is called “very strong".

The most recent weekly El Nino figure is at 2.7 degrees and is expected to keep growing for another two to four months, according to Columbia University's El Niño tracker.

Scientists have long theorised that as the world warms, El Niños would get stronger because they are based on ocean temperature differences compared to average. But observational records only go back about 75 years, so scientists have previously said the data is too spotty for a trend.

So scientists have looked for clues that indicate an El Niño without measuring water temperatures directly. Scientists, for example, have looked back at historical records of changes in weather around the world and figured out past El Niños – such as the super-sized one in 1877 – due to the changes they cause across the globe.

Using coral fossils to study temperature

Cole's team took a novel approach by looking at at what happened to coral over the centuries to act as “a time machine to look into the past”, she says. Cole says measurements of the ratio of calcium and strontium in coral skeletons and of different oxygen isotopes create two independent readings of the seawater in which the coral formed. Another measurement of uranium and thorium tell when those skeletons were formed.

Cole looked at 29 coral fossils in the Galapagos Islands – 14 from before the industrial era, 14 after the modern era began and one more from about

Sat, 29 Aug 2026 02:05:09 +0000

ICE IN SPACE

President Trump Signs Executive Order To Create US Space Academy

HUNTING ALIENS

President Donald J. Trump signed an Executive Order on Aug. 28, 2026, to establish the nation’s first U.S. Space Academy at NASA’s Johnson Space Center in Houston. Credit: NASA

August 28, 2026

By Eurasia Review

Key Takeaways:

President Trump signed an executive order to start creating a U.S. Space Academy aimed at training Space Force, NASA, and commercial talent for national security, the Moon, and industry.
NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman would chair a presidential commission, with Deputy Administrator Matt Anderson as executive director and White House science and economic aides as vice chairs.
The commission has 120 days to recommend governance, graduate service obligations, a site, and any needed laws; the signing was at Johnson Space Center during Artemis II medal presentations.

Sat, 29 Aug 2026 02:03:44 +0000

MTG-I2 satellite launches on Ariane 6, completing Europe's new weather satellite constellation

The Meteosat Third Generation Imager-2 (MTG-I2) on its Ariane 6 rocket on the launch pad

at the European Spaceport in French Guiana. ESA–M. Pédoussaut

By Maria Muñoz Morillo

Published on 28/08/2026 - EURONEWS

The launch of MTG-I2 from French Guiana completes the first trio of Meteosat Third Generation satellites, delivering high-resolution data and images every 2.5 minutes to transform weather forecasting and early warnings of extreme events.

The European Space Agency (ESA) has reached a historic milestone in Earth observation and meteorological science, amid the climate crisis and meteorological disasters. The MTG-I2 ("Meteosat Third Generation Imager-2") satellite has been successfully launched aboard the Ariane 6 rocket from the European Spaceport in Kourou, French Guiana.

With this mission, ESA completes the first trio in the Meteosat Third Generation constellation (MTG). MTG-I2, successfully launched on 27 July, is the second imaging satellite in this fleet and joins the first Imager (launched in 2022) and the Sounder (launched in 2025). Once its commissioning phase is complete, the constellation will begin operating at full capacity.

Revolution in forecasting extreme weather events

Located at an altitude of 36,000 kilometres in geostationary orbit, MTG-I2 will maintain a fixed position, acting as a watchful eye over the Earth's surface. Its main instrument, the Flexible Combined Imager, will provide a rapid-scan service over Europe, delivering high-resolution observations every 2.5 minutes.

This very high refresh rate represents a change of paradigm for nowcasting, improving short-term weather forecasts and proving vital for the monitoring of disasters such as floods or wildfires. The technology will make it possible to track atmospheric fronts in real time, anticipate the formation of severe storms or DANA events and improve the monitoring of fires and air pollution across Europe, with a particular focus on the Mediterranean and North Africa.

In addition, the satellite includes the Lightning Imager, a sensor capable of detecting and mapping individual lightning discharges both day and night. Integrating these satellites will make it possible to build the "weather cube", a three-dimensional representation of lightning, winds, cloud dynamics and greenhouse gases.

A milestone for the Ariane 6 rocket and the next operational steps

The launch marked the ninth mission of Ariane 6 (source in Spanish) and the first time the European heavy-lift rocket has carried a satellite to a Geostationary Transfer Orbit (GTO). To reach the furthest distance achieved by this launcher to date, it flew in a configuration with two P120C solid-fuel boosters.

After satellite separation, contact with the spacecraft was successfully established. Ground teams are now overseeing the deployment of the solar panels and the gradual ignition of its propulsion system to raise the perigee and fine-tune its trajectory towards its final geostationary orbit. Once it has been repointed towards Earth, the Launch and Early Orbit Phase (LEOP) will end and scientific calibration can begin.

European industrial cooperation and the future of the programme

Development of the MTG family has been led by ESA together with a European industrial consortium headed by Thales Alenia Space, with support from OHB System and Leonardo. Once the calibration phase is complete, responsibility for operating the satellites and distributing data to the international scientific community will pass to Eumetsat.

This fleet guarantees continuity of the observations begun by the Meteosat Second Generation series (operational between 2002 and 2015). From 2033, a second family of MTG satellites is expected to be launched in stages, ensuring the continuity of the service beyond 2040.

ESA signs first major European Launcher Challenge contract with Spain's PLD Space

No more doomscrolling till dawn: Meta sets curfews for teen Instagram use

By Una Hajdari

Published on 28/08/2026 - EURONEWS

Meta's Instagram and Facebook will soon lock kids out at midnight and cap their scrolling at two hours a day, part of an $18bn (€15.4bn) settlement with 48 US states.

So what will Meta's new child safety rules actually mean for your kids' feeds? From now on, Instagram and Facebook will look and feel different for anyone under 18.

Meta has agreed to a nearly $18 billion (€15.4bn) settlement with 48 US states, introducing a two-hour daily limit, a midnight-to-6am blackout and hidden "like" counts, among other changes.

The deal, reached on Wednesday, will see Meta pay out the settlement over a decade. The company said the new safeguards would apply only in the United States, with most measures remaining in place for 10 years.

While critics acknowledged the changes go further than any child safety measures Meta has previously introduced, they cautioned the settlement would not resolve the platform's problems overnight.

Arturo Béjar, a former Meta engineering director, called the settlement a "significant milestone" but said parents should not assume Instagram is now safe for children.

"The agreement has a big problem in that it allows Meta to define harm," Béjar said. "It's one thing to say, 'Yeah, you only get like two hours of alcohol or two hours of cigarettes a day,' but it's still as bad for you because of what's getting delivered."

Béjar, the first witness to testify in the federal trial that the settlement cut short, said he wanted Meta to address the effect of content recommendations on teenagers, which he argues can prove addictive.

He said teenagers who hit the two-hour limit could still feel pressure to keep scrolling because of how the platform is designed.

Meta said adults could also adopt individual versions of the new controls, such as daily time-limit reminders, but would not be able to opt into the full settings designed for teenage users.

Stronger age checks

Meta has agreed to strengthen its age-verification technology, combining its own tools with third-party systems, and will submit to regular independent audits of their effectiveness.

The settlement sets specific targets for false positive rates — cases in which minors are wrongly identified as adults. If a user is identified as under 13 and removed from the platforms, Meta will also check the ages of their friends.

"The age assurance section is reasonably good because it has measurement, has independent testing, has goals," Béjar said. "I think Meta should be measured on effectiveness, not effort."

Federal child privacy law requires users to be at least 13 to hold an account. Béjar testified last week that Meta had taken a "don't ask, don't tell" approach to enforcing this.

"Meta has one of the most sophisticated infrastructures in the world to detect fake accounts," he said, but had "no goals, no metrics" for identifying and verifying users suspected to be under 13.

Defaults, not just options

Critics have long argued that too many of Meta's safety features require users to switch them on manuall

Under the settlement, several will now be enabled by default, including the two-hour time limit, which can only be disabled with a parent's permission, and the overnight block between midnight and 6 am.

Other features, such as turning off video autoplay or displaying posts in chronological order rather than through an algorithm, will remain opt-in.

Josh Golin, executive director of the online safety group Fairplay, said the settlement leaned too heavily on giving parents tools rather than restricting harmful features outright.

"We are disappointed that the settlement does not turn off by default recommendation algorithms that connect kids to predators and send young people down dangerous rabbit holes," Golin said.

During the trial, a lawyer representing the states pressed Instagram head Adam Mosseri on the low take-up among teenagers of the app's "take a break" feature, which prompts users to pause after extended scrolling.

Few teenagers used the feature when it first launched, though Meta made it a default setting for teen accounts after introducing them in 2024. Users can still swipe away the notification if they choose not to take a break.

Results may take time to show

Researchers have previously found that many of Meta's past safety measures proved ineffective or fell short of expectations.

"It is a little premature, unfortunately, to tell if exactly all the changes we want to see are going to happen," said Yaël Eisenstat, director of policy and impact at the Cybersafety Research Center, which recently audited safety tools across Meta and other platforms and found most fell short.

Still, Eisenstat described Wednesday's settlement as a significant step, showing that alternative approaches to platform design are possible.

Eisenstat, who previously worked at Facebook before leaving in 2019, said Meta had "decided to go against the advice of some of their own internal employees and continue to ignore the fact that these design features were unsafe in search of profit."

She said the measures announced this week showed there were technically feasible options for making the platform safer — something whistleblowers had "been saying very loudly" for years, and that fixing the problem would require a mix of technical solutions, market pressure and government regulation.

"There's no singular silver bullet for fixing all of this," she said. "I'm just glad that at least we are catching up a little bit now."

US District Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers approved the settlement on Wednesday. It also covers the District of Columbia and US territories.

Two states were not included: New Mexico, which won a separate case against Meta, and Florida, whose attorney general said the settlement's terms were not tough enough.

Sat, 29 Aug 2026 01:56:01 +0000

Waymo in Munich: Could autonomous vehicles make Europe's roads safer?

By Fred Roeder, EU Tech Loop with Euronews

Published on 28/08/2026 -

Waymo is bringing driverless taxis to Munich, its third city outside the US, as data suggests autonomous vehicles are far safer than human drivers.

Following technology news about Europe on social media can be frustrating, as positive news is often overshadowed by complaints that consumers lack access to the latest innovative technologies and services due to a plethora of regulations from Brussels.

The autonomous vehicle (AV) sector, however, looks positive in Europe this year — the United States’ leading autonomous vehicle company, Waymo, just announced that Munich will be its latest addition to its ongoing global expansion.

While Waymo already offers services in dozens of cities across the United States, it recently began its international rollout, with London, Tokyo and Munich as the first three cities abroad.

This is not the first good news for Europe’s consumers, lazy drivers and AV-enthusiasts this year.

Yael Ossowski recently pointed out that a Dutch decision to greenlight Tesla’s Full Self-Driving Supervised (FSD) led to a domino effect of approvals, with Danish, Lithuanian and Estonian regulators quickly following suit and giving Tesla owners more choice in how much they trust their car's semi-autonomous features.

AV taxis are 12 to 20 times safer than human-driven taxis

Waymo coming to Munich’s streets is not just good news for passengers dreading the music choice of local taxi drivers but also has wider implications for road safety.

Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman suggested early on that machines will ultimately be better and safer than humans at decisions about navigation and driving. A few years later, we do have hard data to back this up.

Data from major US cities show that AV-taxis are between 12 and 20 times safer than human-driven taxis, helping prevent many accidents and injuries.

Given that we still have around 20,000 road fatalities in Europe every year, where 67% of all accidents happen due to the drivers’ fault, it should be in the interest of consumers and policymakers to reduce this by enabling cutting-edge technology.

With Munich taxi fares from the airport to downtown ranging from €80 to €90 per trip, AV taxis could be a game-changer for many passengers across the EU, especially those living in remote areas with no access to public transport or many late-night flights.

Although, in the past, ride-hailing apps have created a competitive challenge to traditional taxis, the expansion of AV taxis can add to it, ultimately making rides more affordable for average consumers.

Companies like Waymo should also not be seen as competitors to the car industry but as companies that program and build your driver.

Especially for the German automotive industry, this might be a huge opportunity to partner up and plug into the AV ecosystem so that, one day, visitors from all over the world can be chauffeured in a driverless, locally manufactured BMW or Audi through Munich.

This story was originally published on EU Tech Loop and has been shared on Euronews as part of a syndication agreement.

Sat, 29 Aug 2026 01:37:17 +0000

Is Spain facing another major earthquake? A geologist tells Euronews about the risks

By Lucia Blasco

Published on 27/08/2026 - EURONEWS

Euronews talks to a geologist from the Geological and Mining Institute of Spain about the real danger, the areas most at risk and what science can – and cannot – predict.

More than 1,000 earthquakes in just 10 days, two of them of magnitude 4.8. The seismic sequence that began on 14 August in Granada has once again raised a question that goes far beyond Andalusia: could Spain soon be hit by a major earthquake?

By 24 August, the National Geographic Institute (IGN) had recorded 1,075 tremors which were felt by the population. The two largest, with a magnitude of 4.8, were very shallow and were felt in more than 500 localities, from Andalusia to parts of Murcia, Castilla-La Mancha and even the Madrid region.

Spain has far more destructive precedents. The Arenas del Rey earthquake of 1884, with an estimated magnitude of 6.5, affected more than 100 population centres and left between 750 and 900 people dead. In 1954, Dúrcal recorded a magnitude-7.8 quake, but at a depth of around 650 kilometres, which greatly limited its effects at the surface.

Does this mean Spain should brace for another major earthquake?

"The occurrence of earthquakes with a magnitude above 4 in the south and southeast of Spain is nothing unusual," emergency geologist Raúl Pérez López of the Spanish Geological and Mining Institute (IGME-CSIC) tells Euronews.

In this area there are faults capable of generating magnitude-5 and, in some cases, magnitude-6 earthquakes.

So what is the real risk of a major earthquake in Spain, which areas are most exposed, and how far in advance can we anticipate it?

140 years without a major earthquake: A ticking clock?

Some of the recent warnings have focused on the roughly 140 years that have passed since the 1884 earthquake. Pérez López adds a key nuance: a statistical average does not allow us to predict the next earthquake.

"We can divide the elapsed time by the number of earthquakes and say: every 100 years Spain experiences a major earthquake, because that is what the statistics tell us," he explains. But seismic activity does not behave in a linear fashion: 200 years may pass without a major earthquake and then two may occur in quick succession.

"Even though we have gone 140 years without an earthquake, we do not know whether it is going to happen soon or in a long time", he points out.

What does happen is that tectonic energy continues to build up. Spain is subjected to the push of the African and Eurasian plates and, the more time passes, the probability of a major earthquake may increase. But that does not mean it is imminent.

"There are faults that can trigger earthquakes, but we do not know whether it will be today, tomorrow or in 50 years' time", Pérez López sums up. "We have no way of knowing."

The expert also warns of the false perception that can be created by the coincidence of several earthquakes in different parts of the world. Pérez López explains that the large tremors recently recorded in various countries may lead people to think there is some connection between them, but "from a scientific point of view that is not the case."

More than 200 faults: Risk is not confined to Granada

According to Pérez López, the IGME has mapped more than 200 active faults in Spain. The big unknown is where and when the accumulated energy will eventually be released: "How is that energy going to be distributed or released across all the existing faults? We do not know."

The highest level of risk is concentrated along the Mediterranean coast, "from Valencia to Cadiz," because of the presence of faults and a history of destructive earthquakes. But the expert points out that significant tremors can also occur in the Pyrenees, the Catalan ranges and on intraplate faults found, for example, around Granada and Albacete.

History shows that major Spanish earthquakes are not confined to a single province either: Torrevieja suffered an estimated magnitude-6.6 tremor in 1829, and the Lorca earthquake of 2011, much smaller at magnitude 5.1, left nine people dead.

Preventing what we cannot predict

"Our best tool is prevention, without any doubt", says Pérez López. The danger posed by an earthquake depends not only on its magnitude, but also on where it occurs, its depth and, above all, on how buildings respond.

"What kills people in earthquakes is the seismic intensity and the response of buildings", he explains. That is why, even though it is not possible to predict the next tremor, hazard maps make it possible to estimate in the long term how much the ground may move and to adapt building practices to that level of risk.

The geologist cites the recent earthquakes in Venezuela and Colombia to illustrate how tremors of similar magnitude can have very different consequences. While he notes that the geological characteristics were not the same, he highlights the role played by the strength of buildings in explaining their impact.

Predicting earthquakes remains one of the major scientific challenges. Pérez López points out that scientists still do not know exactly what determines the moment when a fault ruptures, how an earthquake begins or how that rupture will spread.

The expert himself acknowledges the paradox that, despite huge scientific and technological advances, we are still unable to predict earthquakes. This shows that "nature has a degree of complexity that we do not yet understand": researchers still do not know exactly what triggers a tremor, when the rupture threshold is reached or how it will propagate.

Artificial intelligence and 'deep learning' could in future help to identify patterns that we do not currently see, he says. But Pérez López believes there is still a long way to go: more exhaustive monitoring of faults could one day make it possible to develop some form of forecasting. "But for now, we are completely in the dark."

Sat, 29 Aug 2026 01:37:06 +0000

Fight for water: Dried-up lakes and mass fish deaths at one of Hungary's largest fish farms

By Gábor Tanács

Published on 28/08/2026 - EURONEWS

The fish farm's manager blames upstream irrigation, but water authorities say water was shared according to the rules and none was withheld.

Several hundred tonnes of fish died in August in one of Hungary's largest fish farm complexes at Rétimajor, south of Budapest.

This fishpond system, with a water surface of around 800 hectares, is what remains of the former Sárrét marshlands.

Its current owner, Ferenc Lévai, privatised it in 1994 and has since been running it as a continuously developed, integrated agri-tourism estate, although its main source of income is still fish farming.

The fishpond system, made up of shallow, nutrient-rich lakes of varying depth, reedbeds, islands and muddy shorelines, provides a uniquely concentrated and hard-to-replace habitat for water birds.

The Rétszilasi Lakes and their surroundings are among the most strictly protected areas in Europe. In addition to their Natura 2000 status they are, under the Ramsar Convention, a wetland of international importance.

Fish living in just 30 centimetres of water

The owner and chief executive of Aranyponty Zrt., Ferenc Lévai, believes the problem stems from the water management authorities, in this case the Middle Danube Water Directorate, holding back water above the fishponds for irrigation purposes.

"In our view, because of a very poor water distribution regime, very little water reached us here; we could not even reach the water level that Hungary's most protected area would be entitled to, the ecological water level, which stipulates at least 50% water across the whole water surface," Lévai told Euronews.

"We were unable even to maintain that 50% level: the extent of evaporation and the inadequate water supply led to a catastrophe."

"Around 150 hectares of our area are already dry, on another roughly 400 hectares the fish are eking out an existence in 30-40 centimetres of water, because they are not really living, and it is only on about 200-250 hectares that we have more than half the normal depth, where proper fish farming can take place," he added.

Although they did everything they could in Rétimajor to minimise the damage, 300 to 350 tonnes of fish still died, which according to Lévai's calculations means a loss of around 400 to 500 million forints (€1.1-1.4 million).

The low water level meant the water warmed up more easily, which accelerated gas formation. Gases released from the sludge then poisoned the fish.

Lévai says an even greater problem is that the drying out has put protected wildlife at risk, as the fishpond system is home to numerous rare amphibians and birds.

Authority denies witholding water

Euronews contacted the Central Transdanubian Water Directorate and they said they had prepared for the drought situation, but "the summer heat-dome phenomenon, which caused an emergency situation across the whole country, was not yet known at that time."

From 26 July they had to impose regional water restrictions, under which use of water by fishponds could be limited by at most 20% and irrigation by 60%. They said they complied with this rule and did not withhold water.

On the contrary, in August they released 1.18 million m3 of water over two weeks from the Fehérvárcsurgó reservoir, which largely contains Székesfehérvár's treated sewage, to replenish the fishponds.

According to the water authority there is currently barely more water than that left in the reservoir, 1.4 million m3.

The authority estimates that in the extreme heat as much as 100,000 m3 of water a day may have evaporated from the 800-hectare water surface and alongside this the water use of upstream irrigation, restricted under the rules, is negligible.

"In our view, meeting (restricted) irrigation demands does not materially affect the very substantial volume of water requested to compensate for evaporation losses from fish-farming water use," the Central Transdanubian Water Directorate told Euronews.

"The emergency situation may not have been caused by the abstraction of irrigation water, but by the oxygen-depleted state of water heated up by the heat."

Looking for solutions

Ferenc Lévai has previously told Euronews that he is not looking for someone to blame, but for solutions.

He believes the answer lies in crop-growing businesses building their own reservoirs, storing water during wetter periods and, in times of scarcity, not having to compete for supplies, so that livestock farming and wildlife can come first.

The local water authority also concluded its letter by saying that "the Central Transdanubian Water Directorate is examining the hydrological status of the water system in a study, with particular regard to water reserves committed by users holding water-management operating licences within the system."

"The aim of the study is to determine how water demands can be met in future. It is expected that permits and operating practices will need to be reviewed."

Sat, 29 Aug 2026 01:36:39 +0000

Where German troops train with live ammunition: Euronews on NATO’s eastern flank

Euronews journalist Johanna Urbancik with Kevin in Pabradė, 23 June 2026. Franziska Müller / Euronews

By Johanna Urbancik & Franziska Müller

Published on 28/08/2026 - EURONEWS

Eurofighters, Leopards, drones and helicopters – Euronews reports from military exercises in Lithuania. On NATO’s eastern flank, germansoldiers are preparing for a real-life emergency. We accompany a tank crew from the Lithuanian Brigade and electronic warfare units right on the border with Belarus.

Just a few kilometres from the Belarusian border, thousands of NATO troops are focused on one objective: defending Alliance territory in Lithuania. For around six weeks, nearly 3,000 troops – most of them from the German military – trained at Pabradė, using drones, electronic warfare, heavy armour, artillery, infantry, helicopters and fighter jets to practise defending NATO territory against what the military describes as a "conventional aggressor".

A major part of Exercise Freedom Shield I is Germany’s 45th Armoured Brigade, also known as the Lithuania Brigade. More than three years ago, Germany decided to permanently station around 4,800 troops in Lithuania by the end of 2027. Spread across two locations, the brigade will comprise five battalions.

Its purpose: to deter Russia.

But who are the men and women who have chosen to leave Germany and help defend NATO's eastern flank? Euronews accompanied two soldiers from Tank Battalion 203 in Augustdorf, which is due to relocate to Lithuania by the end of 2027.

Corporal Kevin, a driver known as "Rogi", has signed up to serve in the brigade until the end of 2029. Tank commander Staff Sergeant Kevin has volunteered for six years in Lithuania.

Kevin and "Rogi" on a Leopard 2 tank in Pabradė, 23 June 2026. Franziska Müller / Euronews

Find out why Kevin and Rogi chose to serve in Lithuania in the special Euronews report: "German troops in Lithuania: tanks, drones and deterrence".

German Combat Brigade: 4.800 troops to protect Lithuania

A plaque on Vilnius City Hall – currently hidden behind construction sheeting – carries a quote from German Chancellor Friedrich Merz: "Lithuania's security is also our security. Protecting Vilnius means protecting Berlin."

Germany has contributed troops to NATO's multinational battlegroup in Lithuania since 2017 as part of the Alliance's enhanced Forward Presence (eFP), established in response to the growing threat from Russia. But the deployment was based on a rotational model, with troops and equipment regularly replaced rather than permanently stationed in the country.

Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Lithuania pushed for a stronger and more permanent NATO presence. In June 2022, then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz pledged that Germany would lead a brigade in the country. "I promised our friends in Lithuania that Germany would lead a robust Bundeswehr brigade, with a presence on the ground in Lithuania and the ability to be reinforced immediately with troops from Germany in the event of a crisis," Scholz told the Bundestag. "That is solidarity between friends and allies in action."

Lieutenant Colonel Kaufmann, Corporal Rogi and Staff Sergeant Kevin in Sennelager, 13 May 2026. Franziska Müller / Euronews

‘It is our mission to provide protection for the eastern flank’

Initially, Germany had not planned to permanently station a fully manned brigade in Lithuania. Only the brigade headquarters was to be based in the country, while combat troops would continue to deploy from Germany for exercises or in the event of a crisis, broadly following the existing rotational model.

According to the German Armed Forces Association, that approach changed in the summer of 2023. The shift came after Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin's failed rebellion against Russia's military leadership and the subsequent relocation of large numbers of Wagner fighters to neighbouring Belarus. The German government said the Wagner mutiny and the movement of mercenaries to Belarus were not the sole reasons for the decision to establish a permanent presence. Berlin acknowledged, however, that the developments had added "further momentum" to the debate.

Germany ultimately changed course. During a visit to troops in Lithuania, Defence Minister Boris Pistorius and Germany's Chief of Defence, General Carsten Breuer, announced that, for the first time in the Bundeswehr's history, a combat-ready brigade would be permanently stationed outside Germany. Pistorius reiterated the commitment in the autumn of 2023: "It is our mission to play a key role in defending NATO’s eastern flank."

The plan is to staff the brigade with volunteers. But there are already signs that relying on volunteers alone may not be enough.

'I want soldiers by my side who believe in the mission'

According to the battalion's commander, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver Kaufmann, Tank Battalion 203 has "a very high proportion of volunteers". Speaking to Euronews, Kaufmann said the figures currently being reported needed to be put into context.

Lieutenant Colonel Oliver Kaufmann in Sennelager, 13 May 2026. Franziska Müller / Euronews

"I can speak for my battalion, and the vast majority of soldiers are prepared to go to Lithuania voluntarily. And that is exactly what I want: I want soldiers by my side who believe in the mission and who are ready to take on this important responsibility together as part of the Tank Battalion 203 team," Kaufmann told Euronews.

According to the Bild newspaper, around 60% of the planned brigade has so far been staffed by volunteers, leaving a shortfall of roughly 2,000 troops. Among the forces already stationed in Lithuania, staffing levels stand at 92 %. These include primarily the multinational battlegroup, which has been deployed there since 2017.

Tank Battalion 203 and Panzergrenadier Battalion 122 are not due to relocate to Lithuania until 2027. According to Bild's reporting, those units are still around 40 % short of the personnel they need.

Der litauische Verteidigungsminister Robertas Kaunas und Verteidigungsminister Boris Pistorius in Pabradė, 22.06.2026 Franziska Müller / Euronews

"They are all volunteers. Of course, there are occasional shortages, particularly among specialists, such as IT and logistics personnel, although it is not limited to those areas. It is no different from what we see back home. We are continuing to rely on volunteers and are offering their families the best possible conditions. Once we have exhausted all the options available to us, we will look at alternatives," the minister said.

Euronews accompanied soldiers who volunteered to go to Lithuania

Pistorius added, however, that being posted elsewhere was "nothing unusual" for Bundeswehr soldiers, should relying on volunteers prove insufficient.

Euronews spent a week with different Bundeswehr units in Lithuania and heard mixed views on the issue. Some agreed with Pistorius, while others said they believed soldiers with families might be less willing to make the move. While soldiers will be able to fly regularly between Vilnius and Germany, "service in Lithuania will not fundamentally differ from normal military life in Germany". That means exercises, guard duty, periods on standby and other military duties may also take place at weekends.

Beyond the political decisions and debates over troop numbers and deterrence are the soldiers who will ultimately carry out the mission.

Euronews followed two members of the brigade to find out why they volunteered to serve in Lithuania, what they expect from their new mission and what a permanent posting will mean for them personally.

Watch the full Euronews report, "German troops in Lithuania: tanks, drones and deterrence", to find out more.

Fri, 28 Aug 2026 23:57:43 +0000

Nigerians Turn To Faith Healers As HIV Aid Dries Up

A notice promoting an HIV/AIDS medicine product from Nigeria traditional healer Sarkin Lakanin Jihar Kano. When US funding cuts disrupted access to free antiretroviral therapy, some Nigerians turned to traditional healers marketing herbal ‘cures’ framed as Islamic medicine. Copyright: Photo Courtesy of Sarkin Lakanin Jihar Kano

August 22, 2026

By Yahuza Bawage

Key Takeaways:

US PEPFAR funding freezes and cuts disrupted free antiretroviral therapy (ART) for many people living with HIV in northern Nigeria (and neighboring areas), leading some patients to abandon proven treatment when they could not afford out-of-pocket costs.
In the resulting gap, traditional and so-called “Islamic medicine” practitioners have marketed unproven herbal remedies claiming permanent cures, often invoking religious teachings to attract desperate patients.
Medical experts stress that ART suppresses but does not cure HIV, while Islamic scholars condemn the sale of ineffective remedies as deceptive; patients who switched frequently experienced worsening symptoms and further financial hardship.

Aisha* once relied on free antiretroviral therapy (ART) from a clinic in Maiduguri, northeastern Nigeria, funded through the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) programme. The treatment kept her HIV suppressed.

That changed when US President Donald Trump ordered a halt to PEPFAR funding in January 2025.

“When I went to the facility and was told the drugs were no longer available for free, my heart sank because I couldn’t afford to pay for them out of pocket,” Aisha told SciDev.Net.

Although PEPFAR partially resumed its activities in February 2025, the programme was subject to significant budget cuts. A study by AIDS research foundation amfAR found that at least 1,714 HIV service sites globally closed entirely after terminated or delayed PEPFAR payments and almost none could replace lost funding.

Facing donor stockouts and financial barriers, Aishia and other HIV patients across northern Nigeria, Niger and Chad have been abandoning proven ART for unregulated alternatives marketed locally under the guise of so-called “Islamic medicine”, SciDev.Net reporting found.

“When someone talked to me about a traditional healer whose medicine could cure the virus permanently after just one treatment, I decided to sell my household furniture to buy it,” explained Aisha, recalling the healer’s unfounded claims.

Her desperation reflects a growing trend across northern Nigerian urban centres such as Kano, Bauchi, Gombe and Maiduguri, where alternative health practitioners are filling the treatment void left by the funding cuts.

Operating through offline community networks and social media channels, some of these practitioners market herbal concoctions, promising a total cure in a few months through a one-off purchase of their products.

“I thought it would be a sacrifice that would save my life and my pockets once and for all,” Aisha told SciDev.Net.

Globally, PEPFAR has invested over US$100 billion in the fight against HIV/AIDS since 2003, supporting antiretroviral treatment for more than 20 million people in over 50 countries.

In Nigeria, Lost Letter From Pope Alexander II Casts 1066 As A Holy War Against ‘Followers Of Satan’

Pope Alexander II. Image: Grok reimaged from fresco in Wikipedia Commons

August 22, 2026

By Eurasia Review

Key Takeaways:

Newly analysed excerpts from a lost letter by Pope Alexander II, preserved in Vatican collections, suggest that papal politics—not only the dynastic dispute over the English throne—helped shape the Norman Conquest of 1066.
In the early 1060s Western Christendom was split between rival popes (Alexander II and Honorius II); England’s apparent alignment with Alexander’s opponents may have led him to treat William’s invasion as a legitimate struggle against those he regarded as enemies of the Church.
The research reframes 1066 as part of a wider European contest involving the papacy and the Holy Roman Empire, helping explain why a pope would support the overthrow of an anointed king.

A lost letter from Pope Alexander II could rewrite the story of 1066 – according to research from the University of East Anglia.

Excerpts from the letter are now held in the Vatican archives and they suggest that a power struggle in Rome helped shape the Norman Conquest.

Analysis shows that King Harold may have forfeited his crown long before the Battle of Hastings by backing the wrong side in a bitter struggle between two rival popes. And that the outcome of 1066 may have been shaped as much by political conflict in Rome as by events on the battlefield at Hastings.

The findings are published by Yale University Press in a new book titled ‘Harold: Warrior King’, by UEA historian Prof Tom Licence.

They come as the British Museum prepares to open its blockbuster exhibition featuring the Bayeux Tapestry, one of the most famous surviving artefacts from the Norman Conquest.

A time of not one, but two popes

In the 1060s, Western Christendom was divided by a rift that saw two rival popes claiming authority. According to the new research, England’s support for one faction may have helped persuade Pope Alexander II to back William of Normandy’s invasion.

It suggests England’s backing for one side of the dispute may have had far-reaching consequences.

Prof Tom Licence, Professor of Medieval History and Literature at UEA, said: “1066 was not simply decided on the battlefield at Hastings. The outcome may also have been shaped by decisions taken almost a thousand miles away in Rome.”

For centuries, the Norman Conquest has largely been understood as a dynastic struggle sparked by the death of Edward the Confessor and rival claims to the English throne.

Now, Prof Licence argues that a contemporary letter from the Pope points to a muchwider political and religious struggle stretching across medieval Europe.

He said: “Harold’s policy on the papacy may ultimately have played into the hands of his enemies, giving William’s opportunistic invasion the legitimacy of a just war.”

New evidence from the Vatican

The new findings centre on previously overlooked excerpts from a lost letter from the Pope preserved in a medieval canon law collection held in the Vatican.

“The Pope’s whole register of letters is lost,” said Prof Licence. “But some survive as copies or excerpts. Two excerpts from this particular letter survive in collections of papal rescripts.”

Newcleo-Led Consortium To Develop Floating Nuclear Plant

A cutaway of Newcleo's reactor design (Image: Newcleo)

August 29, 2026

By World Nuclear News

Key Takeaways:

A Newcleo-led consortium with Bureau Veritas Marine & Offshore and ABMI won about €1 million from Bpifrance for an 18-month conceptual design of “n-Floating,” a non-self-propelled barge meant to host several 200 MWe LFR-AS-200 lead-cooled SMRs.
The study would look at power and heat for isolated coasts, ports, industry, desalination, and low-carbon fuels, aiming at a possible French-built industrial path by 2036.
Newcleo says it builds on earlier work with Fincantieri, RINA, and Saipem on ship and offshore nuclear uses; Bureau Veritas would handle classification and safety review.

A consortium led by France-headquartered innovative reactor developer Newcleo has been awarded funding to develop the conceptual design of a nuclear barge able to host multiple 200 MWe small modular reactors.

The consortium – which includes classification society Bureau Veritas Marine & Offshore and French engineering company ABMI Groupe – was selected under the call-for-projects “Supporting the decarbonisation of the French maritime sector” managed by French public sector investment bank Bpifrance.

The project, named n-Floating, aims to demonstrate the relevance and technical feasibility of an innovative floating nuclear power solution, consisting of a non-self-propelled floating unit housing multiple LFR-AS-200 reactors. The project has been awarded almost EUR1 million (USD1.2 million) in funding under the programme. Newcleo said work has already begun and is expected to run for approximately 18 months.

The LFR-AS-200 is a 200 MWe lead-cooled fast reactor designed to provide stable, low-carbon electricity and process heat for industrial users, including data centres, hydrogen production facilities, cement and steel manufacturers.

The initial phase of the n-Floating project will focus on conceptual studies for the nuclear barge, assessing its potential to deliver reliable, low-carbon and competitive energy across a range of applications. These include supplying isolated regions, ports and associated industrial hubs, and coastal areas, as well as supporting energy-intensive applications such as desalination and the production of low-carbon fuels.

The project will also define the subsequent development programme and roadmap towards potential industrial deployment by 2036, with the ambition to design and build the solution in France, contributing to the country’s industrialisation and decarbonisation efforts.

“Designed with industrialisation and deployment at scale in mind, the concept will draw on the extensive experience and established capabilities of the maritime and offshore industries,” Newcleo said. “It will leverage proven approaches developed by the oil and gas sector for the design, construction and operation of floating infrastructure for energy production, storage, liquefaction and regasification. By combining mature maritime capabilities with advanced nuclear technology, the project aims to develop a standardised, deployable and competitive solution for low-carbon energy generation at sea and in coastal locations.”

“Maritime deployment of advanced reactors opens a broader and still largely unexplored market for nuclear energy,” said Stefano Buono, CEO of Newcleo. “Floating nuclear offers an opportunity to bring reliable, low-carbon power to applications at sea and in coastal locations. Working with Bureau Veritas Marine & Offshore and ABMI Groupe combines highly complementary nuclear, maritime and engineering expertise, and the support of Bpifrance provides important recognition to develop this project within a French industrial context with deep international credibility.”

In the project, Bureau Veritas Marine & Offshore – part of the Bureau Veritas Group – will contribute its expertise in classification, risk assessment and certification, supporting the evaluation of safety, regulatory and technical considerations associated with the development of floating nuclear applications.

“Achieving large-scale decarbonisation will require energy solutions that are not only technically feasible, but also capable of being deployed safely, efficiently and at scale,” said Christophe Chauviere, Marine & Offshore Technical & Operations Excellence Senior Vice-President at Bureau Veritas. “The n-Floating project provides an opportunity to evaluate how advanced nuclear technology can be combined with established maritime and offshore practices to support the development of a scalable and commercially viable floating energy solution for future industrial and maritime applications.”

ABMI Groupe CEO François Laborde added: “N-Floating brings together complementary expertise to explore new pathways for low-carbon maritime energy solutions. While Newcleo brings its reactor technology and Bureau Veritas Marine & Offshore provides maritime regulatory expertise, ABMI Groupe brings engineering and project delivery experience gained across complex industrial programmes in the maritime and nuclear sectors. Through this work, we aim to support the development of a solution designed and built in France, contributing to the country’s industrial and energy transition ambitions.”

Newcleo noted that the award extends its activities in maritime nuclear, building on existing collaborations with Fincantieri on nuclear-powered commercial vessels and with Saipem on offshore nuclear applications. In July 2023, Newcleo signed an a

Sat, 29 Aug 2026 00:09:03 +0000

Nepal-China Death Toll Hits 579; Concerns Another Disaster Is Coming

Buildings are submerged in mud following flash floods in Rasuwa district in central-northern Nepal. Photo Credit: UNICEF

August 29, 2026

Al Bawaba News

By Osama Ali

(Albawaba) — Catastrophic flash floods have ripped across communities along the Nepal-China border, killing at least 579 people, as rescue teams race to find survivors and authorities warn another major storm could be imminent.

More than 200 individuals are reported missing and hundreds have been rescued in the impacted areas. Dozens of injured people were being treated in Kathmandu.

Hundreds of foreigners have also been affected by the issue. Chinese state media reported 558 individuals missing in Gyirong County in Tibet, including 260 foreigners. But officials warned that some names may show up on missing-persons lists in both nations.

Another Disaster Could Be Coming

The current danger may not be past. Authorities are constantly watching lakes caused by landslides damming rivers, concerned that water and debris could suddenly break through.

Parts of Nepal, rescue operations were briefly delayed as villagers fled to higher ground after warnings of rising flood levels.

China predicted up to 3 million cubic meters of water, almost 1,200 Olympic swimming pools, might flood into an already choked lake, greatly raising the likelihood of another flood.

The calamity followed a major fall of a glacier that sent rocks, ice, mud and debris hurtling down the Himalayan valleys. Experts calculated the debris flow rates to be about 50 meters per second and the distance to be more than 20 kilometers.

The United Nations has begun mobilizing humanitarian assistance as Nepal and China conduct one of the region’s biggest search and rescue missions.

About Al Bawaba News

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As The Himalayas Melt, Deadly Floods Become The New Normal

The Himalaya mountain range stretches across Nepal. Photo Credit: UN Nepal/Ajay Das

Joint Statement Highlights ‘Shared Convictions’ In First Catholic-Confucian Conference

August 22, 2026

By EWTN News

By Tyler Arnold and Hannah Brockhaus

Key Takeaways:

Catholic and Confucian scholars held their first formal joint conference in Seoul (Aug. 4–5), organized by the Holy See’s Dicastery for Interreligious Dialogue, the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Korea, and the Sungkyunkwan Confucian Academy.
A joint statement highlighted shared convictions on human flourishing through virtue and compassion, moral leadership, care for the vulnerable and the environment, and ethical guidance of technologies such as AI, while acknowledging differing foundations.
Participants linked the Christian vision of a “new heaven and new earth” with the Confucian ideal of Datong (great harmony), and further dialogue is planned for Indonesia in 2028 and Hong Kong in 2030.

Catholic officials concluded their first-ever conference with Confucian thinkers this month, with both traditions coming together to spotlight their “shared convictions” for humanity in spite of the stark differences in their historical developments.

The Holy See’s Dicastery for Interreligious Dialogue and the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of Korea teamed up with the Sungkyunkwan Confucian Academy to hold the event at Sogang University in Seoul, South Korea, on Aug. 4–5.

A joint statement, approved by Catholic and Confucian scholars, recognized “our traditions arise from different religious and philosophical foundations” but that “our dialogue revealed important shared convictions.”

Both traditions expressed agreement that “human flourishing begins with the formation of virtuous, compassionate, and responsible individuals.” The statement added: “Personal transformation, ethical living, and care for others are the foundations of healthy families, communities, and societies.”

Scholars in both traditions agreed “a just and peaceful society depends on leadership rooted in integrity, humility, service, and concern for the common good” and “good institutions matter, but they can truly serve society only when guided by moral wisdom and public responsibility.”

There was also agreement that “care for the vulnerable, future generations, and our common home is both a moral and spiritual responsibility,” people are called toward solidarity, and hope requires people to “work together through the trials and imperfections of the present.”

With the growth of artificial intelligence, the scholars found similarities in the Confucian spirit of benevolence and the Christian value of love, which both point toward ensuring “all technological progress actively [enhances] human dignity and ethical values.”

Confucianism, rooted in the philosophy of fifth-century B.C. Chinese thinker Confucius, is a philosophical and ethical system focused on benevolence and harmony with an emphasis on living virtuously, adhering to tradition, and respecting one’s parents and ancestors, among other ideals.

Adherents often engage in ritual honor of their ancestors. Confucius discusses deities but focuses more heavily on the way one should live. His philosophy is influential in many East Asian countries. Many adherents follow other traditions as well, such as Buddhism or local religious traditions.

Christianity, and specifically Catholicism, has grown in some countries heavily influenced by Confucian thought in recent decades, particularly South Korea, Hong Kong, and Vietnam.

‘Datong’ and new heaven

Father Paulin Batairwa Kubuya, SX, who serves as the undersecretary for the dicastery, told EWTN News that Catholic dialogue with Confucianism is growing, although it is still not one of the religions that is technically under the dicastery’s jurisdiction for outreach. He said the need for dialogue is emphasized in the Second Vatican Council documents.

“But the idea behind the document Nostra Aetate is one of greater openness toward religious realities, and so this dialogue marks a moment when the conditions for officially beginning talks with the Confucians had matured,” he said. “And so we went there to Korea, one of the countries that still bears the marks of these religions.”

He said the theme of the conference was based on the Christian belief expressed in the Book of Revelation about the new heaven and the new earth and the Confucian idea of “Datong” — the “great unity” or “great harmony.”

“These describe an ideal state where everyone lives together in a society organized to care for the weak and the orphans — a place where everything is so beautiful,” Kubuya said.

“It is a city where the gates are never locked because there is security,” he said. “It’s the same as what is said about the New Jerusalem. There is no more death; there is openness — so there was that similarity between these two visions of these two religions. And those were the starting points, the reflections: so, as a society, how can we bring that vision to life?”

Is Spain facing another major earthquake? A geologist tells Euronews about the risks

By Lucia Blasco

Published on 27/08/2026 - EURONEWS

Euronews talks to a geologist from the Geological and Mining Institute of Spain about the real danger, the areas most at risk and what science can – and cannot – predict.

Does this mean Spain should brace for another major earthquake?

In this area there are faults capable of generating magnitude-5 and, in some cases, magnitude-6 earthquakes.

So what is the real risk of a major earthquake in Spain, which areas are most exposed, and how far in advance can we anticipate it?

140 years without a major earthquake: A ticking clock?

"Even though we have gone 140 years without an earthquake, we do not know whether it is going to happen soon or in a long time", he points out.

"There are faults that can trigger earthquakes, but we do not know whether it will be today, tomorrow or in 50 years' time", Pérez López sums up. "We have no way of knowing."

More than 200 faults: Risk is not confined to Granada

Preventing what we cannot predict

Sat, 29 Aug 2026 01:27:11 +0000

Fight for water: Dried-up lakes and mass fish deaths at one of Hungary's largest fish farms

By Gábor Tanács

Published on 28/08/2026 - EURONEWS

The fish farm's manager blames upstream irrigation, but water authorities say water was shared according to the rules and none was withheld.

Several hundred tonnes of fish died in August in one of Hungary's largest fish farm complexes at Rétimajor, south of Budapest.

This fishpond system, with a water surface of around 800 hectares, is what remains of the former Sárrét marshlands.

The fishpond system, made up of shallow, nutrient-rich lakes of varying depth, reedbeds, islands and muddy shorelines, provides a uniquely concentrated and hard-to-replace habitat for water birds.

Fish living in just 30 centimetres of water

"We were unable even to maintain that 50% level: the extent of evaporation and the inadequate water supply led to a catastrophe."

The low water level meant the water warmed up more easily, which accelerated gas formation. Gases released from the sludge then poisoned the fish.

Lévai says an even greater problem is that the drying out has put protected wildlife at risk, as the fishpond system is home to numerous rare amphibians and birds.

Authority denies witholding water

According to the water authority there is currently barely more water than that left in the reservoir, 1.4 million m3.

"The emergency situation may not have been caused by the abstraction of irrigation water, but by the oxygen-depleted state of water heated up by the heat."

Looking for solutions

Ferenc Lévai has previously told Euronews that he is not looking for someone to blame, but for solutions.

"The aim of the study is to determine how water demands can be met in future. It is expected that permits and operating practices will need to be reviewed."

Sat, 29 Aug 2026 01:53:01 +0000

'Grief, anger, rage': Former Nazi camp site becomes business park, sparking anger in Austria

By Doloresz Katanich with AFP

Published on 28/08/2026 - EURONEWS

Construction of a business park on part of a former Nazi concentration camp site has prompted calls for its surviving remains to be preserved.

A few crumbling concrete blocks in an overgrown field are all that remains visible of what was once a sprawling Nazi forced labour complex around the Austrian town of Leobersdorf.

Now, plans to build a business park on the site, including a cold storage warehouse and a store operated by the discount supermarket chain Lidl, have sparked anger in the Alpine nation, which long neglected to address its Nazi past.

"For me, it's a sad feeling, because a place burdened by history is being built over, sacrificed to the economy," Erich Strobl, head of a local campaign to preserve part of the site, told AFP.

After Nazi Germany annexed Austria in 1938, the Weinberglager complex was used for thousands of prisoners of war and forced labourers.

It later included the Hirtenberg subcamp of the Mauthausen concentration camp — one of Austria's largest camps exclusively for women.

Around 400 women, mainly from the Soviet Union but also from Italy and Poland, were imprisoned at the Hirtenberg subcamp between September 1944 and April 1945 and forced to manufacture infantry munitions at a nearby factory complex.

Although some factory ruins survive, the camp barracks and most other structures were gradually demolished, repurposed or destroyed after the war.

But Bertrand Perz, a historian specialising in the Mauthausen camp, told AFP the Hirtenberg site remains "historically important," partly because "women prisoners in Mauthausen have been marginalised in the culture of remembrance".

Plans to build a business park on the plot about 40 kilometres (25 miles) south of Vienna, including on land that once formed part of the concentration camp, were made public in 2024.

'Grief, anger, rage'

Archaeological investigations have identified surviving traces of the former camp complex, but Austria's Federal Monuments Office concluded that the remains were "not sufficient" for monument protection.

With the bulldozers now moving in, activists have renewed their calls for the site to be preserved.

"A former concentration camp must not be built over with new structures," the International Mauthausen Committee said.

Standing in front of the site, where grey columns already rise from the ground, Josef Pumberger, a board member of the Mauthausen Committee Austria, told AFP he felt "grief, anger, rage, that something like this can happen in Austria in the year 2026".

The project has also attracted controversy because the land was previously owned by a company linked to the local mayor, Andreas Ramharter, which sold it in 2022 and 2023 for more than €15 million, according to local media reports.

Austrian company TRA LEO GmbH & Co KG, which bought the plot, told AFP it had offered to support the creation of a memorial on the site.

Lidl confirmed plans to open a store in the planned business park, but stressed that it would be located "not directly on the site of the former concentration camp, but on an adjacent plot of land".

Stele memorial

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Austria long presented itself as a victim of the Nazis, ignoring the complicity of many Austrians

It was only from the late 1980s that the country where Adolf Hitler was born began to examine its responsibility in the Holocaust.

Perz, the historian, said a debate like the one now taking place over the Hirtenberg site "would have been impossible in the 1980s," adding that there is now "more sensitivity" towards former Nazi sites.

However, in contemporary Austria, demands for remembrance are increasingly clashing with "the opposite tendency, namely to say: 'Now this really has to stop'," he said.

The far-right FPÖ, founded by former Nazis, topped Austria's 2024 parliamentary election, though it failed to find partners to govern. But it is part of the governing coalition in five of the country's nine states.

In central Leobersdorf, locals approached by AFP had either not heard about the development or did not want to talk about it.

A stele memorial was erected in 2024 to commemorate the victims of the Hirtenberg camp.

But for Pumberger, that is not enough.

"It is very important to have tangible evidence of the buildings in which the Nazis imprisoned people, tortured them, killed them," he said.

"Otherwise it becomes a virtual act of remembrance, or one that exists only in books and photos and films."

Sat, 29 Aug 2026 01:49:04 +0000

Climate change leaves 560 million children facing extra heat stress every year, study finds

Copyright AP Photo/Petros Giannakouris
By Marta Iraola Iribarren
Published on 28/08/2026 - EURONEWS

As many as 560 million children are already living through at least one extra month of dangerous heat every year because of climate change, a threat that puts them at serious health risk.

Children today are exposed to significantly more heat stress days per year than previous generations — a burden that is expected to increase, according to a new study.
Researchers at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel found that younger populations face disproportionate health risks, including direct physiological strain and indirect threats like food and water insecurity.
The findings, published in the Science Advances journal, showed that up to 560 million children aged 0-9 years old are living through at least one additional month of heat stress every year due to human-induced climate change.
“Climate change is already causing hundreds of millions of children to suffer from dangerous heat worldwide, posing severe risks to their health,” said Rosa Pietroiusti, lead author of the study.
“At the same time, poverty, inadequate housing, limited access to cooling, and overstretched healthcare systems leave many children with few ways to protect themselves from the heat.”
Related
Two-thirds of children exposed to extreme temperatures in Europe

Children are more vulnerable

Vulnerability to heat stress varies with age, the researchers noted, with older adults, newborns and young children being particularly at risk.
“Children are particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts and will face intensifying effects of climate change during their lifetimes,” the authors wrote.
The study found that children’s exposure outpaces that of any other age group, nearly tripling the 190 million people aged 60-69 who experience this additional health threat.
Excessive heat is dangerous for the body as it hinders its ability to thermoregulate, aggravates existing health conditions and increases the risk of heatstroke, kidney failure and lung damage.
In children, the impact is even greater when they are undergoing physical development and have lower capacity for body temperature regulation. They sweat less per kilogram of body weight and have a higher metabolic rate, causing them to heat up more quickly during periods of extreme heat.
According to the researchers, there are multiple factors that increase children’s exposure to dangerous heat.
The largest increases in humid heat caused by climate change are occurring in tropical regions and poorer countries with younger populations — South Asia, Southeast Asia and West Africa — which have the highest number of children exposed to dangerous heat stress today.
They also noted that children in the worst-affected areas are likely to be more socioeconomically vulnerable, and affected by heat through both direct pathways such as heat strain and indirect pathways, including the spread of mosquito-borne diseases, disrupted child feeding practices and complications at birth.
Related
Nearly all children are exposed to the lasting health impacts of climate change, UNICEF says

A worrying picture for the future

According to temperature projections, the researchers found that children will remain disproportionately exposed to heat stress, even as global populations age.
In a scenario in which the world is 1.5°C warmer, an estimated 620 million children aged 0-9 would experience at least one additional month of heat stress per year, and 390 million are projected to experience at least five total months of heat stress.
If the temperature increases reach 2.0°C, estimates project 650 million children facing
one additional month of heat stress per year, and 420 million at least five total months of heat stress.

Sat, 29 Aug 2026 01:46:15 +0000

EU sea defence: the new race to protect cables, pipelines and trade

By Elisabeth Heinz & Leticia Batista Cabanas

Updated 26/08/2026 -

Is the deep blue sea the next frontier for defence? Global economies are increasingly dependent on vulnerable subsea data and energy pipelines. So, the EU and its members are shifting budgets towards maritime defence tools.

In just the last decade, the EU has spent almost €118 billion in maritime defence, with a sharp 23.6 percent increase in 2022 after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Data from the EU Blue Economy Observatory show a sharp rise in domestic maritime defence spending, reaching a record high of €11.6 billion. Submarines alone account for 27 percent of the EU's total production value; the rest includes surface ships, aircraft, and other types of warfare.

The bloc decided to transition from a purely commercial ‘blue’ economy approach to a securitised maritime strategy. In 2023, it updated its European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) to protect critical seabed infrastructure.

Then it locked in its strategic defence priorities by launching dedicated European Defence Projects of Common Interest and implementing a Submarine Cable Security Toolbox to counter grey-zone threats and protect underwater networks.

Protecting international trade

The global economy relies almost completely on secure, open seas. More than 95 percent of international digital traffic moves through them. Financial transfers happen through over 1.4 million kilometres of submarine fibre-optic cables, which carry an estimated €9.2 trillion in financial transactions every single day. Approximately two-thirds of the world’s oil and gas is either extracted at sea or transported by water.

80 percent of global trade volume is transported by ocean shipping. For the EU, maritime transport accounts for 75.6 percent of all imports and 73 percent of all exports. It totals around €1.126 trillion in goods annually. A disruption at key maritime chokepoints risks triggering inflation and global manufacturing shortages.

An attack on these sea lanes and underwater assets would paralyse Europe, so it needs more than traditional naval patrols. “Underwater Domain Awareness is a critical activity to know what is happening below the surface, particularly around cables, pipelines and offshore energy infrastructure, prioritising those identified as critical for the security of the Union”, said Jürgen Scraback, Head of the Maritime Domain Unit at the European Defence Agency (EDA).

As threats increasingly come from low-cost drones, uncrewed underwater vehicles and mine warfare, governments are investing in autonomous technologies and surveillance systems. Between 2016 and 2025, the EU's annual production value of crewless vehicles, including aerial and submarine drones, increased by 132 percent to €847 million. Fixed-wing unmanned systems accounted for one third of that output, worth €277 million, while production of traditional unmanned submarine platforms fell by 23 percent over the same period.

Fleet modernisation continues to focus on both conventional naval assets and autonomous platforms. Manned surface ships now account for 65 percent of EU maritime defence vehicle production value and serve as the primary platforms for command, logistics and force projection.

Submarines represent another 27 percent of production, supported by new procurement programmes and investment in next-generation underwater weapons. At the same time, autonomous surface vessels and unmanned underwater vehicles are becoming increasingly important for surveillance, reconnaissance and infrastructure monitoring missions.

Investments also extend to digital tech for maritime surveillance, with European operators deploying AI-enabled unmanned systems to monitor ports, offshore energy infrastructure, and submarine cables, detecting threats across large areas

For Scraback, “autonomous and unmanned systems combined with AI-enabled data fusion are among the technologies likely to have the greatest impact. They can provide persistent surveillance over large areas without requiring expensive crewed platforms to remain almost permanently deployed”.

How is the EU boosting maritime defence?

The 2014 Maritime Security Strategy guides Europe's maritime strategy, protecting citizens, the economy, infrastructure, and borders, while redefining Europe’s approach to maritime defence.

“The new strategy calls for a greater emphasis on the hard power aspects of maritime defence and security, where the EU had previously faced challenges in establishing a role and identity”, said Chris Kremidas-Courtney, senior advisor at the European Policy Centre and associate fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. It identifies “the protection of critical infrastructure in the maritime domain as a key priority”, they added.

The Industrial Maritime Strategy, adopted in March 2026, backs this shift. It boosts Europe's naval production through a new EU Industrial Maritime Value Chain Alliance and reinforces naval, underwater, and dual-use capabilities, including a dual-use ferry construction programme.

By July, Europe allocated €325 million to five European Defence Projects of Common Interest, including one maritime and seabed defence project to strengthen its industrial base. Since February, a new Counter-Drone Action Plan has shifted production towards unmanned naval drones and counter-drone systems for aerial, surface, and underwater threats.

The EU funds its naval ramp-up through defence tools, such as the European Defence Industrial Strategy and the €1.5 billion European Defence Industry Programme. The Readiness 2030 roadmap totals over €800 billion, including naval capabilities and sea lines of communication protection.

The bloc also invests in detection and surveillance technologies to fight threats and sabotage to seabed cables. As cables cover large areas, are privately owned and can be easily damaged, “the best approach is a layered resilience system designed to make interference detectable, limit the disruption caused by a successful attack and restore service quickly”, Kremidas-Courtney explained.

This thinking now drives EU policy. The Action Plan on Cable Security (2025) strengthens Europe’s ability to prevent, detect, respond to, and recover from cable incidents that disrupt critical functions like communication and energy supply. The €92 million OceanEye expands maritime awareness using AI, autonomous sensors, and digital twins.

Under Horizon Europe, the UnderSect and Smart Maritime and Underwater Guardian projects invest nearly €6 million each in underwater threat-detection systems for ports and maritime infrastructure. European Defence Fund (EDF) projects, such as SHIELD and SOUND2, develop AI systems to detect threats using underwater acoustic signals.

Ramping up maritime defence goes beyond detecting and repairing cable breaks. For Kremidas-Courtney, authorities should identify behavioural patterns such as unexplained slowing, shipping lane deviations, and manipulation of identification signals.

“The most effective solution to me is an integrated information-and-action network that fuses undersea sensors, AIS data, coastal radar, satellite imagery, intelligence and port records into a continuously staffed existing regional maritime operations centre”, Kremidas-Courtney explained.

Who invests the most?

Between 2016 and 2025, cumulative EU production of maritime defence vehicles and equipment reached €117.8 billion. According to the EU Commission’s Blue Economy Observatory, production remained concentrated in four countries. France, Germany, Italy and Spain together account for 87 percent of the bloc's maritime defence industrial output. The Netherlands, Sweden and Poland contribute a further 8 percent, largely through surveillance technologies and maritime security systems.

In 2025, France generated 37 percent of the EU’s total production of maritime defence vehicles. Germany and Italy each contributed 19 percent, and Spain followed with 8 percent. These four countries accounted for 82 percent of the EU’s total output value and 60 percent of the EU's total defence expenditure. This shows that defence spending remains higher in member states with a long tradition of armaments.

“A few large navies can provide scarce high-end capabilities, but they can’t secure every coastline, patrol the sea lanes, and protect every piece of undersea infrastructure. Europe doesn’t need everyone to build a fleet to match Italy's or France's, but it does need credible, distributed forces connected by interoperable systems and a shared maritime picture. The only way to make that work is a whole-of-Europe approach which includes the UK and Norway”, Kremidas-Courtney warned.

At company level, the France-based Naval Group led with 24 percent of the EU’s total output, producing advanced surface combatants (frigates and corvettes), nuclear-powered submarines, and unmanned surface and underwater systems. Italy’s Fincantieri (15 percent) specialises in warships and underwater defence systems, including torpedoes and sonars.

The German Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems accounted for 8 percent of the EU’s overall market for maritime defence vehicles, focusing on surface vessels and submarine construction. Spain’s Navantia (7 percent) builds multi-mission frigates, AIP-equipped submarines, aircraft carriers and patrol vessels.

The EDF supp

Sat, 29 Aug 2026 01:39:23 +0000

Chinese imports plunge 30% to 40% after EU tax on small parcels

By Jean-Philippe Liabot

Published on 26/08/2026 - EURONEWS

Since 1 July, the EU has levied a €3 customs duty on parcels worth under €150 and the measure is already biting as imports, especially from China, have slumped by 30% to 40%.

For years, small parcels from China have been flooding European letterboxes. Clothes, accessories, gadgets and everyday items ordered on Shein, Temu or AliExpress were arriving directly at consumers’ homes, at very low prices.

A system, an invasion for some, that the EU has seriously reined in.

Since 1 July, parcels worth less than or equal to €150 have been subject to a flat customs duty of €3 per product category. Until now, these small consignments were exempt from customs duties.

The impact of the measure has been swift.

According to French customs figures cited on Thursday by the economy ministry, the number of small parcels imported into the EU has fallen by 30 to 40% since the introduction of the tax.

The French government sees this as proof that tighter regulation can change consumer behaviour and the market dominance of major Chinese platforms.

Between June and July, sales volumes slumped on Temu (-50%) and AliExpress (-37%).

Shein has held up better (-15%), buoyed by the planned opening of a new warehouse in Poland at the end of 2025, which will help to ease the tax burden.

Why has Europe decided to act?

In 2025, 5.9 billion low-value items entered the EU, the equivalent of more than 16 million parcels a day.

For Brussels, the system gave large foreign platforms an advantage over European retailers, who have to comply with the same rules and pay duties on imports.

The European Commission has also highlighted safety concerns.

According to a survey carried out in 2025 in the EU, more than 60% of low-value products inspected did not comply with European requirements or safety standards.

The new rules therefore also allow customs authorities to better identify products that pose a risk.

Although effective, the measure is not permanent.

It is intended to accompany a broader reform of the European customs system in 2028.

Another step could come already in November, when additional fees to fund parcel handling may also be added.

The Shein figures also hint at what comes next.

A duty levied at the border can be sidestepped by moving the warehouse inside it, and a €3 charge that reshapes buying habits in a month is also a €3 charge that platforms can absorb, split across categories or price back into the product.

Brussels has proved it can slow the flow but whether it has changed where these goods ultimately come from is a question for the next two years.

Sat, 29 Aug 2026 01:21:47 +0000

Are the Baltics safe? CIA director's Moscow trip raises more questions than answers

By Sasha Vakulina

Published on 28/08/2026 - EURONEWS

A rare CIA mission to Moscow has fuelled fears of a possible Russian test of NATO. Baltic officials insist their threat assessments have not changed, but are their reassurances mostly intended to keep public anxiety in check?

If CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s secret trip to Moscow was intended to calm fears of a confrontation between Russia and NATO, it appears to have achieved almost the opposite.

His sudden arrival in the Russian capital this week triggered days of speculation over what intelligence could have prompted Washington to dispatch its spy chief to deliver a message to Moscow and whether the Baltic states should be worried.

US media reported that Ratcliffe warned Russia against attacking NATO members, particularly Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, amid intelligence assessments that Moscow could seek to test the alliance as its war in Ukraine remains deadlocked.

American thinktank the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) said the circumstances of the visit suggest Washington regarded the intelligence behind it as sufficiently urgent and sensitive to justify Ratcliffe travelling to Moscow in person.

“US Central Intelligence Agency Director John Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow suggests that Russia may be preparing to conduct an act of aggression against a NATO member in the relatively near term to invalidate NATO’s Article 5,” ISW said.

But the Washington-based organisation also drew an important distinction: there are no signs of the kind of large-scale Russian military build-up around the Baltic states that preceded the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Instead, it said, any near-term Russian action could be considerably more limited: an air, missile or drone strike, or a small land incursion designed not to seize large amounts of territory but to test whether NATO allies would respond collectively under Article 5.

Former Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves questioned whether the Baltic states were the reason for Ratcliffe’s trip at all.

In an exclusive interview with Euronews, Ilves said he had “severe doubts” that concerns over the Baltic states were behind the CIA director’s mission, arguing that Washington’s more immediate concern was Russia’s support for Iran.

“What is the real problem for the United States right now? The real problem is Iran, the fact that the Russians are giving targeting information to the Iranians,” Ilves said.

A poster with an image of Russian President Vladimir Putin is seen on the wall of the Narva Castle opposite Russian border, in Narva, Estonia, Tuesday, May 9, 2023. AP Photo

He was equally sceptical about suggestions of an increased Russian military threat to the Baltic states, dismissing them as “all spin.”

“Why would they do anything in the Baltic states at this time?” he said, arguing that Moscow had little reason to risk a confrontation with NATO while its war in Ukraine remained deadlocked.

Concern in European military circles

A European military source told Euronews that intelligence agencies have been picking up signals for months suggesting that Moscow could seek to exploit the Trump administration’s changing approach to its European NATO allies to launch another attack in the region, as Washington pushes Europe to assume greater responsibility for its own defence.

The source cautioned that this did not amount to evidence that Russia has taken a decision to act. But the concern, they said, was that a distracted Washington, combined with the shift in responsibility towards Europe, could present Moscow with a window of opportunity.

Seen through this lens, Ratcliffe’s trip could have been intended to remove any doubt in Moscow about the consequences of testing NATO at a time when Washington is both heavily preoccupied elsewhere and redefining its role in European defence.

The source described Ratcliffe as one of the Trump administration’s strongest supporters of NATO, Europe and Ukraine, but doubted that Putin would heed his warning. The timing itself may be part of those calculations.

An Airbus Tiger multi-role attack helicopter flies during a multinational military Exercise Pikne ("Lightning") near Suurekivi, Estonia, Tuesday, Sept. 30, 2025. AP Photo

The source stressed that the Baltic states, particularly Estonia and Lithuania, are considerably better prepared for a potential confrontation with Russia than much of the rest of Europe.

As Europe strengthens its defences, it raises another strategic question: if Moscow is considering testing NATO, why wait until the continent is better prepared and a new US administration that might be more committed to its defence?

A painful memory of 2021

Nearly five years ago, Ratcliffe’s predecessor, William Burns, travelled to Moscow with a warning. When he arrived in November 2021, Russia was already months into a large and increasingly visible military build-up around Ukraine. Less than four months later Russia launched its full-scale invasion.

A European military source drew an uncomfortable parallel between the two missions.

“It is good that the CIA director went to Moscow to deliver a warning," the source told Euronews. “Not that Putin will listen.”

But there is a crucial difference between the two cases. No comparable Russian build-up is visible around the Baltic states today. A Russian attempt to test NATO, however, would not necessarily require one.

A more limited operation could require little of the visible military preparation that preceded the invasion of Ukraine. If the objective is to test NATO rather than seize territory, ambiguity could be the point.

Vladimir Putin arrives at a wreath-laying ceremony marking the 85th anniversary of the Nazi German invasion into Soviet Union in World War II, Moscow, June 22, 2026. AP Photo

Russia’s Second-Front Dilemma: Why Pressure On Japan Could Backfire – Analysis
Russia President Vladimir Putin visit fish processing complex on Iturup island, August 13, 2026. Photo Credit: Kremlin.ru

August 28, 2026
By Collins Chong Yew Keat Facebook

Key Takeaways:
Putin’s first trip as president to disputed Iturup/Etorofu is framed as a show of Pacific power after Ukraine, but the author argues turning the Kurils into a second sustained confrontation would overstretch Russia.
Moscow already faces a huge European war, a larger NATO after Finland and Sweden joined, and limited spare forces; U.S. troops in Japan and Korea plus Tokyo’s 2% defense push, Tomahawks, and Quad/Squad ties would likely harden, not crack.
Pressure on Japan would also hurt Arctic shipping hopes, deepen dependence on China and North Korea, and shrink the energy/investment fallback Tokyo once offered—narrowing Russia’s options rather than opening a new Pacific era.
The Kuril Islands or Northern Territories’ visit by President Putin is intended to project Russian power. However, turning pressure on Japan in the Far Eastern flank in a second strategic confrontation would almost certainly stretch Moscow, further complicate its Arctic ambitions, deepen its conventional dependence on Beijing and Pyongyang, and accelerate the very US-led security architecture that Russia is opposing.
The recent unprecedented visit to Iturup, known as Etorofu to Japan, came immediately after the Russian president observed Pacific Fleet exercises in Sakhalin. It is seen as a demonstration of power at Russia’s opposite end from the Ukrainian battlefield, and more strategically, it was Putin’s first visit to the disputed island chain during his long rule. This invited response from Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, reflecting how this sovereignty dispute has remained unresolved for more than eight decades, being a thorn in the efforts for both Tokyo and Washington to conclude a formal post-World War II peace treaty.
This show of strength and lending of support by Putin to this Far Eastern symbolism is meant to show Japan, the United States and the wider region that the four-and-a-half years of war in Ukraine have not diminished Russia’s ability to project power thousands of kilometres away in the Pacific on the other end.
However, will Moscow actually benefit from transforming the Far East from a zone of coercive signalling into a second sustained theatre of confrontation? The calculations point to the unfavourable.
For now, Putin may be testing the geographical elasticity and stretch capacity of Russian power but testing it to the breaking point might invite greater risks.
A Second Pressure Axis Is Not Yet a Second Front
Questions abound on whether Russia can generate enough military pressure simultaneously in Europe and East Asia, sustaining two major theatres over time. Geography remains both a boon and a bane for Moscow, and in this case, its strategic vulnerability.
Moscow must simultaneously secure a vast continental state extending from NATO’s eastern frontier across Siberia to the Pacific, while in parallel needing to maintain its nuclear forces, Arctic infrastructure, the Northern and Pacific Fleets and the contested and squeezed maritime openings. Every additional theatre will demand an increase in troops, air defence, logistics, intelligence, surveillance, maintenance, and strategic reserves.
All these are further complicated by the little room left for Moscow for additional military tasks. It set aside 13 trillion rubles for defence this year, with a combined defence and security expenditure of almost 17 trillion rubles, around 7% of GDP.
The most immediate strategic contest remains westward of Russia and Ukraine, and Moscow is also facing a strengthened NATO in the northern frontier with the accession of Finland and Sweden.
The Limits of Russia’s Eastern Deterrence
Macron Pledges Delivery Of French Air Interceptors Following Deadly Wave Of Russian Attacks

A train station damaged by a Russian attack in Ukraine's Odesa region on August 22.

August 23, 2026

By RFE RL

Key Takeaways:

After a deadly Russian drone strike on a Kryvyi Rih shopping mall that killed at least 16 people and injured more than 130, French President Macron pledged accelerated delivery of air interceptor missiles and broader allied support following a call with Zelenskyy.
Paris will advance SAMP/T deployments, license Ukraine to produce interceptors and other weapons, and join a Coalition of the Willing meeting on August 24 focused on increasing pressure on Russia.
Ukraine continues long-range drone strikes on Russian oil and military sites, while Putin warned of retaliation against Ukraine’s “most sensitive economic sectors.”

French leader Emmanuel Macron vowed to accelerate delivery of new air interceptor missiles to Kyiv following devastating Russian attacks on a Ukrainian city and a call with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

“I spoke with President Zelenskyy in the aftermath of the double Russian strike in broad daylight against a shopping center in Kryviy Rih, which caused numerous civilian casualties, and I expressed our horror and deep sorrow,” Macron wrote on Twitter.

Macron said he assured Zelenskyy of “the strengthening of our support with the deployment of interceptors…It is essential that all countries with available capabilities also join this effort. We must also continue to increase pressure on Russia as long as it chooses to refuse a ceasefire and peace.”

Macron, in his X posting on August 22, also said Ukrainian allies in the so-called Coalition of the Willing — an initiative led by Paris and London — will meet on August 24 to explore ways to ramp up pressure on Moscow to halt its full-invasion of Ukraine that began in February 2022 and has cost tens of thousands of lives on both sides.

British Prime Minister Andy Burnham and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz are set to host the coalition meeting, which will be held in Kyiv, with leaders attending in person and remotely. Macron’s office did not specify which leaders will be there in person.

Defense Against Ballistic Missiles

Without providing details, Macron said the accelerated delivery of interceptor missiles is in line with commitments made in July at the launch of an Integrated ‌Anti-Ballistic Missile Coalition.

In that Paris meeting, a grouping of 10 European countries agreed to develop an anti-ballistic missile system as a cheaper alternative to the US-made Patriot air defense system. The Patriot is the only weapon Kyiv holds that is capable of downing high-speed ballistic missiles used by Russia against Ukrainian cities.

Macron said ⁠Paris would advance the deployment of the new SAMP/T system to Ukraine and license Kyiv to manufacture ‌the interceptor missiles, as well as the SCALP long-range cruise missile and other weapons.

Following the two-hour phone call, Zelenskyy said he and Macron also discussed the status of peace talks and contacts with the US. Attempts by US President Donald Trump to bring about a peace deal between Moscow and Kyiv have so far proved unsuccessful.

“We agreed on steps that could open up additional diplomatic opportunities,” Zelenskyy said.

Rescue Operations In Kryviy Rih

As the two spoke, Ukrainian search-and-rescue operat

Sat, 29 Aug 2026 01:17:22 +0000

Skyrocketing windmills: The world’s tallest wind power plant is going to dwarf the Eiffel tower

By Hans von der Brelie

Published on 28/08/2026 - EURONEWS

The world’s tallest wind turbine is currently under construction in eastern Germany; it will rise 365 metres above ground level. This makes it taller than the Eiffel Tower. The technical masterpiece is due to be operational this autumn. Hans von der Brelie was granted access to visit the site.

Smalltown Klettwitz lies at the very heart of Germany’s Lusatia region. Lignite used to be mined here for decades. The bucket-wheel excavators have left gaping scars across the landscape.

But the country is reaching a turning point: Germany is now getting serious about ending coal burning. And Klettwitz is transforming into a frontrunner in the countrys race to handle the climate crisis in a more sustainable way.

Solar and wind farms now stand on the spoil heaps of the former opencast mine, as far as the eye can see. Among these, one steel structure in particular catches the eye - the GICON high-altitude wind power plant. It is still under construction but already outgrowing the neighbouring giant windmills.

It is a big day for the GICON team: Europe’s biggest and most powerful crane, a yellow monster machine, is lifting a tower segment weighing many tonnes into place. Up there, some 160 metres above ground level, climbers are putting the pieces together.

High above ground level, climbers are putting the pieces together spiderman-style... Hans von der Brelie

GICON employs some of Germany’s finest engineers. The company was founded by Jochen Großmann. Why is the GICON team building such a massive structure in the first place? Euronews wants to know.

Why so high, Professor Großmann?

“Because the wind blows stronger and more steadily the further I get from the Earth’s surface,” Großmann explains on site, while a team of high-altitude climbers is moving up and down the steel struts spiderman-style. “That’s why wind turbines have become taller and taller – because there’s so much wind up there that they generate more than double the output of the turbines standing here in the surrounding area.”

Großmann’s idea: future wind farms should have ‘two storeys’ so that the wind can be ‘harvested’ twice – once at the bottom and once at the top. “Retrofitting existing wind farms with taller windmills alongside regular ones give us two tiers of high-altitude windmills, and allows us to triple the yield from the same area,” Großmann estimates.

Großmann’s idea: future wind farms should have ‘two storeys’ so that the wind can be ‘harvested’ twice – once at the bottom and once at the top. Hans von der Brelie

GICON plans to erect 100 high-altitude windmills by the early 2030s, then the objective is to scale it up to 1,000 plants in a few years’ time. GICON could become a global player, “the opportunity is there”, Großmann tells Euronews.

“All the wind farms in Germany would offer the potential for 4,000 additional high-altitude wind turbines,” the GICON-CEO stresses, “Simply by retrofitting existing wind farms. That’s an incredible amount of potential. This also applies to African countries. We’ve had enquiries from Asia. The Chinese are asking about it. I think there’s huge international potential here.”

Fri, 28 Aug 2026 23:23:09 +0000

Reviving Multilateralism In The Era Of Global Disorder – OpEd

August 22, 2026

By Ambassador Lamberto Zannier

Key Takeaways:

The post–Cold War path of European cooperation with Russia eroded through NATO enlargement, mutual distrust, and competing spheres of influence, culminating in the collapse of arms-control regimes, OSCE consensus, and open conflict over Ukraine.
Rapid demographic, technological, environmental, and resource pressures are intensifying geopolitical competition and political polarization, making unlimited growth models and unmanaged AI risks increasingly unsustainable.
Reviving inclusive multilateral frameworks—especially regional dialogue among adversaries modeled on the OSCE—remains essential; the author highlights a possible Gulf/West Asia process (including Iran) focused on shared security and freedom of navigation as a practical next step.

The crisis of multilateralism has become a dangerous signal that the world order based on shared principles enshrined in the UN Charter and other key international instruments and Treaties is crumbling under the weight of a series of global challenges. These challenges are increasingly met with power politics and confrontation, not only in the military sphere but also in the political, economic, trade and financial domains.

The current international environment is marred by increasing geopolitical and geoeconomic competition, which is not only the result of the unfinished business after the end of the Cold War but also, more importantly, provoked by policies aimed at ensuring the control of key mineral resources and sources of energy in an environment where the lack of these resources would threaten the path towards further development and growth, especially for the greater world powers.

The Long Road from Cooperation to Confrontation in Europe

The conclusion of the Cold War brought with it expectations of an era of peace, stability and prosperity for all. In Europe, in the early years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia had floated the idea that NATO itself might be reformed into a cooperative defence organization, one that would contribute to UN peacekeeping, of which Russia itself might over time have become a member. After all, Russia was arguing at the time, since NATO had been created as a defensive alliance, who were its enemies after the end of the Cold War?

In fact, a North Atlantic Cooperation Council was soon established, followed by a Partnership for Peace programme encompassing both NATO members and their former adversaries. Discussions on the new principles for modern peace operations were held in an extended forum, which included Russia, Eastern European countries and other European nations particularly active and experienced in peacekeeping under a UN flag. The group produced important agreed reports, which highlighted the key role of the UN and other inclusive regional organizations such as the OSCE to issue mandates which would ensure full legitimacy of future operations. It looked like a new era of cooperation had in fact emerged, as had been announced in the 1999 CSCE Charter of Paris.

Yet that path was not sustained. A deep inset diffidence between the US and the Russian political and military establishments had in fact not been fully overcome. True, during the 1990s important steps were made, especially in the CSCE/OSCE framework, in the area of disarmament and confidence-building. Regular reciprocal inspections, visits to military establishments, observations of military activities took place in those years, resulting in intensive and stable military relationships. However, the USA, as the only remaining superpower at the time, felt that it had special responsibilities to ensure peace and stability through promotion of democratic institutions. NATO could be a useful tool to support this policy and therefore it started expanding to include former Eastern European members of the former Warsaw Pact which had vowed to embrace a democratic path.

In spite of the reassurances that were provided to Russia, the latter began to perceive NATO’s enlargement as unfriendly and potentially threatening, and this helped fuel the rise of more nationalist political leadership inside Russia, which engaged more actively in rebuilding its own sphere of influence in the former Soviet space. Western support for reforms and leadership changes in countries like Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, among others, was seen in Moscow as open interference in this space and contributed to increasing tensions in Europe and to the introduction of illiberal reforms in Russia.

Deterioration of relations between the West and Russia had an immediate impact on the process of dialogue and cooperation within the OSCE. Throughout the 90s, this organization had regularly issued political statements at the ministerial level, showing an unprecedented degree of convergence among European nations. As disagreements started to emerge towards the end of the decade, especially following NATO’s aerial campaign in Kosovo and against Serbia, achieving consensus on these political statements became increasingly difficult. The last agreed statement was in fact adopted in 2002, after which no OSCE Chairmanship managed to issue an agreed statement: this marked just how wide the underlying divide had become.

From that point onwards, the trajectory was consistently negative. Arms control agreements collapsed one after another at a time when these mechanisms would have been most useful and needed. Russia came to view Western support for democratic movements in countries like Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan as open interference in its neighbourhood. It reacted by tightening its grip over the former Soviet space through new economic and security mechanisms of its own. Ukraine became “the most visible example” of this collision, and the current conflict ultimately was one of its consequences.

As the OSCE was founded on a shared set of governing principles, their violation in the name of national security imperatives produced their progressive erosion and weakening, as European relations were witnessing the progressive emergence of raw power politics.

The Speed of Change

As one looks at the consequences of the growing geopolitical confrontation, it is important not to dismiss the importance of the overall environment within which they are taking place, an environment which is profoundly affecting our societies.

The last half century has undoubtedly witnessed the most profound and unprecedented changes in human history. If we step back and take a broader look at these developments in terms of history of life on our planet, these changes are even more striking. If we look at the decades that immediately follow the end of the Second World War, the world population level was in the order of a couple of billion, with a very different distribution compared to what we see today; the lack of internet and social media prevented global flows of communication; development and growth were the key goal for a

Fri, 28 Aug 2026 23:18:50 +0000

Saudi Dissident, Held By Bulgaria Since 2021, Is Freed

A photo of Abdulrahman al-Khalid that was distributed at a demonstration calling for his release in March in Sofia.

August 23, 2026

Balkan Insight

By Svetoslav Todorov and Tommi Siviero

Key Takeaways:

Saudi dissident and human rights activist Abdulrahman al-Khalidi was released from Bulgarian detention on Friday after nearly five years in administrative custody, one of the longest such cases for an asylum seeker in the country.
Bulgarian authorities had held him since 2021 as a “threat to public security” despite a court ruling that he was eligible for asylum; he had reported poor conditions and alleged police beatings.
He fled Saudi Arabia in 2013 after political activism, lived in exile linked to Jamal Khashoggi’s circle, and sought asylum in Bulgaria to avoid Saudi authorities; his ECHR case remains pending.

Saudi dissident and human rights activist Abdulrahman al-Khalidi was freed on Friday, having spent almost five years in administrative detention in Bulgaria after he was designated as a threat to public security.

“Abdulrahman has just been freed following a modification of the control measure,” activist and publisher Victor Lilov. who has long campaigned for al-Khalidi’s release, confirmed to BIRN.

The Bulgarian Helsinki Committee NGO, which also confirmed al-Khalidi’s release, described his four years and ten months of custody as “one of the most prolonged cases of detention of an asylum seeker in Bulgaria”.

Al-Khalidi has been kept in detention centres in Bulgaria since October 2021 and has reportedly been subjected to beatings by police, suffered from dire living conditions and a lack of transparency over the reasons for his detention.

For most of this time, he was held in the Butmantsi Detention Centre on the outskirts of the Bulgarian capital Sofia. In January 2026 he was transferred to a temporary accommodation centre for foreigners in Lyubimets, near the border with Turkey.

“After almost five years of detention, this is an extremely important moment … Thank you for standing with me throughout all these years,” al-Khalidi wrote to supporters on Facebook as he was being transferred from Lyubimets to Sofia’s Migration Directorate.

Al-Khalidi’s lawyer, Diana Radoslavova from the Voice in Bulgaria Centre for Legal Aid, explained to BIRN that his release happened because he was about to compete the maximum term for which people can be held in migration detention, 18 months. He had previously been held in asylum detention.

Radoslavova was with al-Khalidi after he was released. She said the first thing he did was speak with his wife and children.

“He’s doing extremely surprisingly well, for me. He’s psychologically a very strong person because this is not an easy transition for him,” she said.

Al-Khalidi became politically active in Saudi Arabia around the time of the Arab Spring protests. Interviewed by BIRN in 2024, he explained that political arrests, often followed by death sentences, were frequent in late 2012 to early 2013. That is why he decided to leave the country in 2013.

He continued his activism abroad, also working as a journalist writing articles critical of the Saudi government. According to Human Rights Watch, he was part of l

Fri, 28 Aug 2026 23:13:55 +0000

Macron Pledges Delivery Of French Air Interceptors Following Deadly Wave Of Russian Attacks

A train station damaged by a Russian attack in Ukraine's Odesa region on August 22.

August 23, 2026

By RFE RL

Key Takeaways:

After a deadly Russian drone strike on a Kryvyi Rih shopping mall that killed at least 16 people and injured more than 130, French President Macron pledged accelerated delivery of air interceptor missiles and broader allied support following a call with Zelenskyy.
Paris will advance SAMP/T deployments, license Ukraine to produce interceptors and other weapons, and join a Coalition of the Willing meeting on August 24 focused on increasing pressure on Russia.
Ukraine continues long-range drone strikes on Russian oil and military sites, while Putin warned of retaliation against Ukraine’s “most sensitive economic sectors.”

Defense Against Ballistic Missiles

Without providing details, Macron said the accelerated delivery of interceptor missiles is in line with commitments made in July at the launch of an Integrated ‌Anti-Ballistic Missile Coalition.

“We agreed on steps that could open up additional diplomatic opportunities,” Zelenskyy said.

Rescue Operations In Kryviy Rih

As the two spoke, Ukrainian search-and-rescue operat

Sat, 29 Aug 2026 00:23:20 +0000

Russia’s Second-Front Dilemma: Why Pressure On Japan Could Backfire – Analysis

Russia President Vladimir Putin visit fish processing complex on Iturup island, August 13, 2026. Photo Credit: Kremlin.ru

August 28, 2026

By Collins Chong Yew Keat Facebook

Key Takeaways:

Putin’s first trip as president to disputed Iturup/Etorofu is framed as a show of Pacific power after Ukraine, but the author argues turning the Kurils into a second sustained confrontation would overstretch Russia.
Moscow already faces a huge European war, a larger NATO after Finland and Sweden joined, and limited spare forces; U.S. troops in Japan and Korea plus Tokyo’s 2% defense push, Tomahawks, and Quad/Squad ties would likely harden, not crack.
Pressure on Japan would also hurt Arctic shipping hopes, deepen dependence on China and North Korea, and shrink the energy/investment fallback Tokyo once offered—narrowing Russia’s options rather than opening a new Pacific era.

The Kuril Islands or Northern Territories’ visit by President Putin is intended to project Russian power. However, turning pressure on Japan in the Far Eastern flank in a second strategic confrontation would almost certainly stretch Moscow, further complicate its Arctic ambitions, deepen its conventional dependence on Beijing and Pyongyang, and accelerate the very US-led security architecture that Russia is opposing.

The recent unprecedented visit to Iturup, known as Etorofu to Japan, came immediately after the Russian president observed Pacific Fleet exercises in Sakhalin. It is seen as a demonstration of power at Russia’s opposite end from the Ukrainian battlefield, and more strategically, it was Putin’s first visit to the disputed island chain during his long rule. This invited response from Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, reflecting how this sovereignty dispute has remained unresolved for more than eight decades, being a thorn in the efforts for both Tokyo and Washington to conclude a formal post-World War II peace treaty.

This show of strength and lending of support by Putin to this Far Eastern symbolism is meant to show Japan, the United States and the wider region that the four-and-a-half years of war in Ukraine have not diminished Russia’s ability to project power thousands of kilometres away in the Pacific on the other end.

However, will Moscow actually benefit from transforming the Far East from a zone of coercive signalling into a second sustained theatre of confrontation? The calculations point to the unfavourable.

For now, Putin may be testing the geographical elasticity and stretch capacity of Russian power but testing it to the breaking point might invite greater risks.

A Second Pressure Axis Is Not Yet a Second Front

Questions abound on whether Russia can generate enough military pressure simultaneously in Europe and East Asia, sustaining two major theatres over time. Geography remains both a boon and a bane for Moscow, and in this case, its strategic vulnerability.

Moscow must simultaneously secure a vast continental state extending from NATO’s eastern frontier across Siberia to the Pacific, while in parallel needing to maintain its nuclear forces, Arctic infrastructure, the Northern and Pacific Fleets and the contested and squeezed maritime openings. Every additional theatre will demand an increase in troops, air defence, logistics, intelligence, surveillance, maintenance, and strategic reserves.

All these are further complicated by the little room left for Moscow for additional military tasks. It set aside 13 trillion rubles for defence this year, with a combined defence and security expenditure of almost 17 trillion rubles, around 7% of GDP.

The most immediate strategic contest remains westward of Russia and Ukraine, and Moscow is also facing a strengthened NATO in the northern frontier with the accession of Finland and Sweden.

The Limits of Russia’s Eastern Deterrence

Fri, 28 Aug 2026 23:44:05 +0000

Can Pax Silica De-Sinicize U.S. Supply Chains? – Analysis

Diplomats pose for a photograph after signing the Pax Silica declaration on December 12, 2025. (US State Department)

August 23, 2026

By Lucio Blanco Pitlo III

Key Takeaways:

Pax Silica is a U.S.-led coalition of about 24 countries aimed at building China-independent supply chains for critical minerals, semiconductors, and AI, with an early industrial hub planned in the Philippines.
Its success hinges on long-term endurance and concrete delivery; past U.S. initiatives (Blue Dot, B3W/PGII, IPEF) largely stalled at standards and pledges, while China has locked in partners through sustained industrial policy, refining capacity, and tangible BRI projects.
To compete, Washington must offer developing partners real value-added processing, technology transfer, and better regulation rather than mainly raw-material extraction or security-for-minerals deals, or risk losing credibility and ground in the tech race.

The U.S.-led Pax Silica initiative seeks to reduce dependence on China across critical-mineral, semiconductor, and AI supply chains, but its success will depend on sustained commitment, concrete project delivery, and meaningful benefits for developing-country partners.

In the high-stakes race for AI and computing power, China is moving up from the foundation to the front, catching up with the West. The United States is doing the reverse, rebuilding its material and production base to reinforce its lead. Washington is working backward to develop a complete supply chain independent of Beijing. Last December, the U.S. launched Pax Silica, a coalition of 24 countries aimed at creating a future AI ecosystem from energy and raw materials to advanced manufacturing. Its pioneering project, an industrial hub, is set to open in the Philippines. Endurance, continuity, and the question of whether geopolitics can trump economics will shape the prospects of this U.S.-led endeavor.

From mining and refining critical minerals to accelerating domestic semiconductor production, China is becoming an emerging rule-maker in the evolving technology order. Since 2018, it has been hosting annual international AI conferences. To meet the challenge, Washington rolled out the Clean Network program in 2020 to prevent Chinese suppliers from dominating global information and communication solutions. However, outside U.S. allies, calls to ban Huawei and other Chinese vendors largely went unheeded, especially in the Global South. Affordability, performance, compatibility, lack of competitive alternatives, and the opportunity cost of being left out prevailed over US pressure. In 2023, Beijing proposed the Global AI Governance Initiative. Last July 16, 29 countries agreed to establish the World AI Cooperation Organization, which will be headquartered in Shanghai. With China’s entrenched capacity and growing confidence in both the hard and soft dimensions of the global digital infrastructure, the stakes are high for Pax Silica. Failure to compete may mean further erosion of U.S. technological lead. Two key challenges stand out.

Playing the long game

First is endurance. China’s rise as the world’s largest mineral refiner and production hub is neither inevitable nor providential. Rather, it is the result of a consistent industrial policy to develop national capacity, assured of a huge domestic demand, driven by ambitious targets and sustained by a willingness to bear great costs. It took about three to four decades for the country to become the world’s top ore processor and global factory. And it paid a steep price to att

Fri, 28 Aug 2026 23:40:28 +0000

Why Israel Is Pushing Toward Confrontation With Turkey? – OpEd

File photo of Israeli Air Force McDonnell Douglas F-15I Ra'am. Photo by Tech. Sgt. Kevin Gruenwald, USAF.

August 22, 2026

By Murray Hunter

Key Takeaways:

Israeli airstrikes on Syria’s Abu al-Duhur airbase (linked to Turkish activity) and Türkiye’s pursuit of an Interpol Red Notice against Netanyahu have intensified a deeper strategic rivalry over influence in post-Assad Syria.
Israel views expanded Turkish military presence near its northern approaches as a security threat, while Türkiye sees Israeli operations as violations of Syrian sovereignty; both sides mix kinetic actions with domestic political messaging.
The rivalry strains NATO cohesion and complicates U.S. dual partnerships, raising risks of miscalculation even if neither side currently seeks a full-scale war.

In recent days, Israeli warplanes struck the Abu al-Duhur airbase in northern Syria, a facility Turkish forces have utilised and where Ankara was reportedly considering a larger presence. The attack, which damaged runways and hangars without reported casualties, has sharpened an already poisonous rhetoric between Jerusalem and Ankara.

Israeli politicians have spent months escalating verbal attacks on Türkiye ahead of Israel’s October elections. Türkiye has countered by seeking an Interpol Red Notice against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on charges that include genocide, crimes against humanity and torture linked to the interception of a Gaza-bound flotilla.

What looks at first glance like election-season theatre masks deeper structural rivalry. Syria remains the prize. Israel has steadily expanded its military footprint and security demands inside Syrian territory since the fall of the Assad regime.

Turkish forces, present for years to manage Kurdish threats and stabilise northern zones, now cooperate more openly with the new Syrian authorities. Israel views any Turkish consolidation near Aleppo as a potential forward threat. Where Türkiye sees Israeli strikes as expansionist interference in a neighbour’s sovereignty.

The result is a classic contest for strategic depth in a fragmented state.

The question of why Israel would open a new front while still engaged in Gaza, Lebanon and with Iran is not difficult to answer once domestic politics and long-term strategic culture are considered.

Hard-line messaging against a vocal Muslim-majority NATO member plays well with segments of the Israeli electorate. Portraying Türkiye as a rising regional threat allows politicians to claim vigilance and strength. At the same time, Israel’s security doctrine has long treated any significant military presence near its borders, especially one backed by a capable army as unacceptable.

Turkish military professionalism is well-known; its forces are among the more competent in the region. Yet Israeli planners appear to calculate that limited kinetic actions inside Syria, and perhaps even signalling over Cyprus, can be contained short of Article 5 territory, where NATO nations would have to come in and aid Türkiye under attack.

This calculation is a risky one. Türkiye is a NATO member. Direct attack on Turkish soil would theoretically invoke collective defence. Operations confined to Syrian or Cypriot space might evade the formal Article 5 trigger, particularly while Greece maintains its own historical frictions with Ankara.

Still, the precedent of using force against the interests of a formal ally strains the Alliance’s credibility. Every such episode chips away at the assumption that NATO members do not actively work against one another’s core security concerns. The United States finds itself in the awkward position of close partner to both.

Reports that the Trump administration has explored pathways for Türkiye to acquire F-35 fighters only heighten Israeli objections, underscoring how Washington’s dual alliances are becoming harder to manage.

Broader alignments add further hazard. The emerging network sometimes described around the Mecca framework, incorporating Pakistan’s substantial military capacity, raises the prospect that a serious clash could draw in additional Muslim-majority states.

Israel’s own history of supporting certain Kurdish groups against both Syria and Türkiye injects another layer of mutual suspicion. Meanwhile, the two countries maintain non-trivial trade and tourism links, facts that make open hostility appear economically self-defeating. Yet geopolitics frequently overrides commercial interest when leaders perceive existential stakes or domestic political advantage.

This aggressive style of contemporary statecraft compounds the danger. Rhetoric is no longer separated from kinetic demonstration. Strikes are used as messages and legal manoeuvres such as Red Notice requests function as political theatre, where public statements are calibrated for domestic audiences more than diplomatic resolution.

The risk is familiar from earlier European history where the alliances and prestige considerations can lock parties into escalatory paths no parties fully intended. A limited action in Syria could, under the wrong conditions, cascade into wider confrontation involving Greek-Turkish tensions, Gulf dynamics or great-power signalling.

The Statist Peril Of Techno-Asset Inflation – OpEd

August 23, 2026

MISES

By Brendan Brown

Key Takeaways:

The author defines “techno-asset inflation” as the interaction of monetary inflation and technological revolution that suppresses goods-price rises while driving intense asset-price inflation.
Historical parallels from the sixteenth-century Northern Renaissance (precious-metal inflows plus printing press and globalization) to today’s digital/AI era show how positive supply shocks camouflage monetary excess, benefiting governments, monopolists and crony interests while fostering malinvestment.
Current conditions under the 2% inflation standard and multi-decade tech boom are viewed as a high-risk episode of techno-asset inflation, with little indication that central banks are prepared to confront asset-price dangers rather than focus narrowly on consumer-price targets.

There is nothing new about the perils for peace and liberty which stem from the combination of monetary inflation and technological revolution. Indeed, we can find a prime illustration at the dawn of the modern age during the Northern Renaissance in Europe.

But first, towards better describing the peril, I urgently propose a new entry into the economics dictionary: techno-asset inflation. The definition is this: techno-asset inflation is found where monetary inflation and technological revolution interact to produce virulent asset inflation.

The positive supply shock emanating from the technological revolution bears down on goods and services prices. This expands the scope for monetary inflation by impeding an intensification of its symptoms in goods and services markets. Serious symptoms can trigger serious popular resentment. Under these circumstances it is in asset markets rather than goods markets that symptoms of monetary inflation are likely to become most severe. (Note that many asset inflations occur outside technological revolutions; some of these are twinned with positive supply shocks in the form of previous shortage whether due to for example famine, war, or cartel action, going into reverse).

Asset inflation in some of its phases can be popular. That is the case, for example, when there are widespread wealth gains which outweigh—in electoral arithmetic—the diminished or negative returns on government bonds and money. Simultaneously asset inflation might well be beneficial for some key actors, including—with some overlap— big government, election campaigners, crony capitalists and monopolists. These benefits, though, are problematic for a free society. And the malinvestment which is intrinsic to asset inflation eventually takes its toll on prosperity and can stimulate political extremism.

The asset inflation threat is now at a high level—comparable to dangerous episodes in history all the way back to the Northern European Renaissance in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Yet there is no apparent awareness of the peril in the news about the Fed’s evolving policy framework under its new Chair. Instead, the focus of official communication to date has been the promise of a zero-tolerance policy towards “persistently elevated” inflation.

The best that sound money advocates can now reasonably hope for—not expect—from the task forces at the Fed would be clues that this institution could make a start on tackling its in-built historic deflation phobia. Meanwhile, the laboratory of history does not justify optimism with respect to the menace of techno-asset inflation The history goes all the way back to the Great Monetary Inflation which accompanied the Northern Renaissance in Europe of the sixteenth century and extending into the early seventeenth century, when asset inflation in Holland emerged as the star symptom.

The technological revolution then had at its core the printing press, great strides in scientific knowledge including astronomy, cartography, and actual exploration especially of the Americas. The monetary inflation with its source in precious metal inflows from Latin America went along with goods inflation averaging 2 per cent annually (in terms of gold prices of goods). The underlying monetary inflation (spawning goods and asset markets) was fiercer overall than the 2 per cent statistic (itself a highly imprecise estimate) might suggest, given the camouflage in goods markets. The camouflage resulted from the positive supply shock related to globalization (new lands discovered and brought into the global economy) and productivity gains (increased knowledge and transmission of information via the printing press).

Monarchs and their governments gained fund-raising advantage from the technology revolution coinciding with the precious metal inflows. There were three channels:

First, the underlying real increase in demand for gold and silver coins as explained by the rise in living standards; this was alongside individuals’ demand for gold and silver to make good the erosion of real monetary holdings by the inflation. This revenue was most important for governments which could get the gold/silver at well below the cost of mining (for example the Spanish sovereigns from their new lands in South America or the English sovereigns—especially Elizabeth I—from seized Spanish bullion boats).

Second, the scope for a quick rise in inflation-tax revenue from coin debasement, which would have given rise to more public discontent if price inflation (as measured in gold terms) had not been contained by the positive supply shock of technological revolution. This revenue was short-lived and indeed in England Queens Mary and Elizabeth on the advice of Thomas Gresham turned against debasement as practiced by Henry.

Third, the novel and swelling appetite for risky loans—as North European wealth-owners sought to get a high nominal return on loans to compensate for inflation whilst underestimating the risk of default (in modern terms we would describe this as desperation for yield). There was no such thing then as risk-free government debt; all sovereign debt was inherently high-risk. The European center for this loan market was Antwerp (whose population was then larger than London).

Tudor monarchs, Holy roman emperors, and Spanish kings raised funds in the rapidly growing Antwerp loan market. Henry VIII used as his Antwerp agent the merchant Thomas Gresham (of “Gresham’s Law” fame) and his Chancellor Thomas Cromwell had great business connections there. Of note, the Low Countries were the epicenter of economic growth in Europe at this time with corresponding wealth gains; and these countries were variously under the control of Spanish Monarch or the Holy Roman Emperor. All the easier to raise funds to wage war, which was happening now in the context of the Reformation, which Spanish Kings and Holy Roman Emperors sought to turn back.

In The Bear’s Paw: How Europeans Can Loosen Russia’s Grip On Belarus – Analysis

LONG READ

August 23, 2026
ECFR
By Vasil Navumau

Key Takeaways:

Belarus has shifted from a relatively stable buffer and Russian rear base into a forward-operating platform for Moscow—hosting missiles, joint exercises, logistics, and hybrid pressure on Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia—raising direct security risks for the EU’s eastern flank.

Broad EU sanctions and isolation have deepened Minsk’s dependence on Russia without adequately addressing the military threat or easing repression of political prisoners and the diaspora.

The paper urges a more targeted EU approach: strengthen border-state defence and deconfliction, keep limited working-level channels, support civil society and SMEs, condition limited engagement on verifiable steps, and treat Lukashenko as retaining some residual agency that can still be pressured away from full Russian satellite status.

A satellite state

Take a map of Europe and find Belarus. Trace a finger clockwise, from the country’s northern borders and around to the east, where Russia is followed by Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. Belarus’s capital, Minsk, is itself almost at the exact geographic heart of the country, surrounded by hills, with vast forests sprawled out like capillaries beyond.

It is from here that Belarus’s longtime leader, Alexander Lukashenko, looks out from his “Palace of Independence” on Minsk’s Pieramozcau Avenue. To the east, in Russia, his fellow authoritarian Vladimir Putin continues to decimate Ukraine from its eastern borders and scheme to undermine European political interests. To the west, stretching hundreds of kilometres past Belarus’s western border with Poland and across Germany, lies Brussels. Faced with instability across the continent, the EU’s capital is increasingly unsure about what to do with its problematic Belarusian neighbour.

The EU downgraded its diplomatic relations with Belarus in 2020 after the latter’s disputed presidential election, which saw Lukashenko’s government violently repress protestors who took to the streets to oppose the president seizing victory by undemocratic means. Although bilateral trade between the EU and Belarus was largely undamaged in the subsequent years, the fall in trade with the bloc after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 created an economic gap which Russia has exploited. For example, it has stepped up its own trading relationship with Belarus and become a key market for exports of Belarusian goods such as dairy products and petrochemicals—also allowing Moscow to evade EU sanctions. In doing so, Russia filled a vacuum for Belarus; Lukashenko, facing limited alternatives, deepened his dependence on Moscow.

Although Belarus did not formally commit troops to Russia’s war of aggression, it did allow the latter to house missiles, tanks, artillery, helicopters, aeroplanes and other military equipment in its territory prior to the invasion. It also provided military and civil infrastructure for Russia’s use, including airfields, hospitals and railway lines. This year alone, Russia has transferred more missiles—including dual-capable, hypersonic missiles—to Belarusian territory and conducted joint exercises encompassing the Belarusian Armed Forces. This, combined with a breakdown in dialogue between the EU and Belarus, gives Putin yet more sway in his quest to entrench Russia further into Belarusian structures.

Now that Belarus is apparently firmly committed to the supranational union of Belarus and Russia, known as the Union State, it has become a structural security concern for Europe. Russian deployment of nuclear-capable weapons on Belarusian territory makes Europe’s eastern flank more vulnerable, while Belarus’s already tense relations with neighbouring border states Poland, Latvia and Lithuania are at risk of deteriorating further. At the same time, Belarus has 879 political prisoners languishing, with Lukashenko’s regime having essentially outlawed any political or civic activity which the authorities see as a threat.

All this has compounded the breakdown in relations between Belarus and Europe. Russia is further emboldened to entrench its military deeper into Belarusian territory, tighten its economic dependencies and integrate the country further into its nuclear strategy.

This paper examines Belarus’s transformation from a problematic but stable buffer state between western Europe and Russia to a country which poses an increasing military and security threat to the EU. It argues that the EU should move away from relying solely on economic leverage and the blanket application of sanctions—which are pushing Belarus to rely more heavily on Russia—and develop a more targeted approach. Europeans need to actively contain the growing military and nuclear threat by finding new avenues of diplomatic negotiation, and by incorporating NATO-inspired approaches into its defence policy for its vulnerable eastern states.

Perhaps most importantly, Europeans need to assess to what extent they can treat Minsk as an autonomous actor capable of making decisions independently from Moscow. Europeans should take recent developments, such as Ukraine’s discovery of four signal relay stationsin two Belarusian oblasts and their subsequent removal, as proof that Lukashenko retains the authority to make territorial-based decisions—especially under pressure from Russia.

However, for as long as Lukashenko remains in power, Belarus will never be entirely free of Moscow: he is an authoritarian, and Minsk remains sanctioned due to its breach of human rights clauses and mistreatment of its population. Belarus’s geopolitical position is also at least partly down to early decisions that Lukashenko made when he turned towards Moscow in the mid-1990s—a time when most other former Soviet nations chose real independence. Long before 2020, this posture led to missed opportunities with the EU, reinforced Lukashenko’s propensity to commit human rights violations and kickstarted Belarus’s deepening economic and military integration with Russia.

In its pursuit of a new strategy, the EU needs to recognise that—even if Belarus remains a stable, contained buffer zone—the country will not undergo a full democratic transformation. Europeans are thus searching for a Belarus which no longer presents an urgent security threat on its eastern border. They should aim to help shape a country whose stability reduces geopolitical risk without abandoning the EU’s long-standing commitment to democracy, human rights and the well-being of Belarusian society.

Belarus as a security actor

Belarus declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. But, with what Russia perceived as the NATO and European sphere of influence shifting eastwards, Belarus became increasingly valuable to Moscow—especially because of the Suwalki Gap, which lies between the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad and Belarusian territory. The Russia-Belarus relationship became more entrenched once Lukashenko and Putin came to power in 1994 and 1999, respectively. The two leaders are hardly close personal friends—but they have nonetheless developed strong cultural and economic ties based on the similarity of their two anti-Western and authoritarian regimes, and their notion of a shared history.

Over the past 30 years, Belarus has moved closer to Russia in economy, trade and idea sharing. But it has gone beyond simply sharing a similar geopolitical outlook; now it is a militarised actor on the EU’s eastern flank. The first tipping point came with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. At this point, Lukashenko was already politically entangled with Moscow due to its support for Belarus’s trade network and economic sector after Minsk’s break with Europe in 2020. But the invasion meant that Belarus also became entrenched in the Russian military machine: in the early phase of Russia’s invasion, it became a launchpad for Russian ground offensives towards Kyiv and Chernihiv, and for missile strikes and combat aviation operations.

Since this period, Russia has attempted to consolidate its control even further. Now it has approximately 2,000 troops concentrated around air-defence systems, training facilities, logistics hubs and long-standing Russian military installations. Between 2022 and 2023, ammunition transfers from Belarus to Russia exceeded 130,000 tonnes. Since then, joint training centres, storage bases and transport corridors (many inherited from the Soviet period) have been repurposed and modernised under Belarus-Russia Union State programmes to support Russian operational needs. Rail-linked depots, armament storage facilities and training grounds now serve as key infrastructure for Russian forces on its western flank.

The second tipping point came with the two countries regularly staging recurring joint military exercises that institutionalise operational integration, such as the Zapad military drills which have been taking place since before 2022. Now Russia is eyeing up Belarus as a key component of its nuclear ambitions and has also deployed Oreshnik intermediate-range missile systems in Belarus. In April this year, Belarus confirmed it would no longer allow Russian conscripts who desert the military to leave via its border. Belarus is also a staging post for Russian nuclear missiles and joint military exercises.

The country has thus become Russia’s territorial, militaristic and logistical resource, achieved through durability, military routinisation and institutional embedding. The military aspect of this entrenchment is also compounded through hybrid attacks. For example, as early as November 2021 the EU condemned Belarus for facilitating the weaponisation of migrants—predominantly from conflict areas such as Iraq and Syria—who it had apparently encouraged to breach the borders of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.

This form of hybrid warfare has continued into 2026: recent reports saythat Lithuanian authorities have discovered a cross-border tunnel from Belarus to Lithuania, which they suspect is to continue to facilitate the potential movement of migrants through European territories. Now, with the Union State increasingly functioning as a homogeneous force, there is a threat that Belarus will become more emboldened to facilitate further dangerous hybrid manoeuvring. It intends to check Europe’s readiness and destabilise it from the inside.

Belarus as a threat to Europe

The difference in the threat which Belarus now poses to Europe lies in its shift—which has taken place over the past six years—from being Russia’s “rear-operating base” to Russia’s “forward-operating base”.

As Russia’s rear-operating base, Belarus functioned as a non-combat zone for logistics and maintenance. While it supported Russian military activity and provided strategic depth by shifting military infrastructure and combat flashpoints away from Russian territory, as a rear-operating base Belarus avoided deploying its own forces into Ukraine and directly engaging in combat operations. This allowed Lukashenko to avoid many of the challenges that Putin is experiencing, including politically sensitive military mobilisation, high personnel casualties and mounting internal economic pressure. This approach had previously provided Lukashenko with the degree of political deniability and diplomatic leverage necessary to continue negotiating with Western economies on economic sanctions and market access. He was able to point to Belarus’s arm’s-length approach to the war in Ukraine as proof that he was willing to engage with Europeans at a diplomatic and economic level.

However, Belarus’s position has changed since 2022. Evidence collected by the author demonstrates that Russia is increasingly establishing the country as a forward-operating base. Moscow is building on its routinisation and institutional embedding of military infrastructure to deploy personnel on Belarusian territory and undertake recurring joint military exercises, lately including nuclear forces preparation. Minsk’s rhetoric is changing to match these actions. In 2022, Belarus changed its constitution to allow Russia to store nuclear missiles on its territory; in a “Militarization of Europe” meeting held in June 2026, Belarus’s deputy minister of foreign affairs Igor Sekreta said he was “deeply concerned by… military exercises on NATO’s eastern flank” and “the EU and NATO… systematically promoting a militarist agenda at all levels.”

The Belarusian government is simultaneously becoming a component of Russian forward-military position and aligning ideologically with Russia’s view that Europe (and the West in general) constitutes an existential threat. Lukashenko himself reiterated this in May 2026, when he declared that “… [Belarus is] ready in every possible way to defend our common fatherland from Brest to Vladivostok.” The change is especially worrying for Ukraine, which is already fighting a war against Russia on several fronts. Its brow-beaten army could soon be required to deploy yet more resources to another defensive line on its northern border. Belarusian state media have suggested that Putin desires to open a “second front” against Ukraine, using Belarus as a launchpad for further attacks.

Indeed, evidence suggests that Russia is already using Belarusian infrastructure to gain an advantage in its drone warfare against Ukraine: in June 2026, Ukrainian intelligence services discovered four signal relay stations in the Belarusian oblasts of Homiel and Brest. Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, appealed directly to Belarus to dismantle the sites or face potential Ukrainian consequences. The Belarusian president apparently acquiesced—although no public statement or confirmation has been made.

Belarus’s transformation into a forward-operating base was further bolstered in 2023, when Russia deposited tactical Iskander nuclear-capable warheads on its territory. Then, in early 2025, Russia moved Oreshnik hypersonic missiles to a location which experts estimate to be around 60km south of Minsk. This has changed the calculus for the rest of Europe. Europeans must contend with an additional nuclear threat right on its border (aside from Kaliningrad) and consider how this could compromise security along its eastern flank.

Meanwhile, as noted above, Belarus is mixing concrete actions with rhetoric that suggests it sees Europe as a threat to its own sovereignty. In the same speech, Sekreta commented that Poland, Latvia and Lithuania have a combined defence expenditure of €52bn, which is apparently “25 times more than Belarus allocates for defence”. This suggests that Belarus increasingly views European and NATO defence investments through the lens of Russian military planning. If left unchecked, Russian influence will leave EU member states more vulnerable to further hybrid attacks from Union State forces.

For Europeans, there is also potential for escalation in how these border countries respond, and uncertainty about where escalation could lead. For example, the Zapad-2025 military drills, which took place on September 12th 2025, prompted Poland to close its border with Belarus due to “heightened security concerns”. Prior to this, on September 9th and 10th, Russia had flown several drones into Polish airspace during an attack on Ukraine. Lithuania also closed its border with Belarus for a whole month in October 2025 (and refused to enter negotiations to reopen it) after meteorological balloons travelled into its airspace from Belarus. The latter responded by accusing Lithuania of “pursuing an anti-Belarus policy”. Latvia, for its part, is struggling to deal with Belarus’s tactic of sending illegal migrants over its border. As of July 21st 2026, the Latvian government had recorded 8,413 instances of migrants attempting to cross into its territory this calendar year, stirring discontent prior to the parliamentary election in October. The country has also uncovered several sabotage operations that have appear to have been carried out by Belarusian and Russian spies.

European leaders heating up their confrontations in such critical areas is further adding to NATO’s headache. Belarus’s degradation as a buffer zone between western Europe and Russia means the potential for these flashpoints to drift further west is growing, not helped by a continually deteriorating diplomatic relationship between the Lukashenko government and the

Sat, 29 Aug 2026 01:02:19 +0000

Dutch institute issues 'Red Alert' over potentially lethal Trump-shaped ecstasy pills

By Gavin Blackburn

Published on 28/08/2026 - EURONEWS

It's not the first time ecstasy pills in the form of Trump's head have appeared. In 2017, German police seized thousands of orange Trump-shaped tablets.

A Dutch drug addiction and mental health institute warned users on Friday about potentially lethal ecstasy pills shaped to look like the head of US President Donald Trump.

The Trimbos Institute said that several of the pills have been handed in recently at a network of centres that test drugs for users before they take them.

“Absolutely do not use these pills,” the institute warned.

It released a photo of the pills that have a depiction of Trump's head on one side and on the other side “NL” and “Trump” stamped into the surface either side of a vertical line.

One of the pills has a green face and another is yellow.

The institute warned in a “Red Alert” published on its website and social media that they contain a high concentration of a chemical called PMMA, or para-methoxymethamphetamine, that is similar to MDMA, the active ingredient in ecstasy pills.

However, PMMA is slower working than MDMA and that could lead users to take more because they think that the first pill didn't work, leading to a risk of overdosing, the institute said, adding that use of the pills “can lead to overheating with possibly deadly consequences.”

Spokesperson Anniek Groothuis said that the institute has no reported cases of serious illness or fatalities among people who may have used the drug.

“We do not know of any victims where PMMA was found in their blood,” she said.

Producing, selling and using ecstasy is illegal in the Netherlands, but it's widely used, particularly at clubs and music festivals.

A government report in 2024 said that some 550,000 people took the drug in a year.

It's not the first time ecstasy pills in the form of Trump’s head have appeared. In 2017, German police seized thousands of orange Trump-shaped tablets.

Sat, 29 Aug 2026 00:58:18 +0000

Greenland to open truth commission over forced contraception of Inuit women scheme

By Gavin Blackburn

Published on 28/08/2026 - EURONEWS

From the 1960s to 1990, more than 4,000 Greenlandic women were forced to wear a contraceptive coil, in the majority of cases without their consent.

Greenland said on Friday it would establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission on Denmark's forced contraception of thousands of indigenous Inuits, after experts failed to agree on whether the scheme constituted "genocide."

The forced contraception campaign is one of the darkest chapters in Greenland's history with its former colonial master Denmark.

From the 1960s to 1990, more than 4,000 Greenlandic women were forced to wear a contraceptive coil, or intrauterine device (IUD), in the vast majority of cases without their consent or that of their parents if they were minors.

Girls as young as 12 were affected, some of whom were never able to have children afterwards.

"We cannot say, on behalf of the government, whether there was genocide. This is something we can continue to debate," Greenland's Justice Minister Marianne Paviasen told reporters.

Greenland's Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen said the priority now was to "begin the healing process."

Greenland's Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen and Denmark's Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen in Marienborg, 27 April, 2025 AP Photo

"We will set up a reconciliation commission," he vowed, saying he wanted to cooperate with Denmark on the matter.

In Copenhagen, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen also sounded a conciliatory note.

"We will handle the political process together with the government of Greenland. The most important thing for me is that we find the right path together," she said.

A four-member commission was tasked in August 2024 with shedding light on the scheme.

The experts were unable to agree on a unanimous conclusion, presenting two different reports instead.

"One states there was no genocide at all, while the other says there might have been," Paviasen said.

The reports did however agree that the contraception programme may have violated multiple human rights and the rights of Indigenous peoples.

'Not just about history'

One of the victims, Henriette Berthelsen, told the AFP news agency before the reports were presented that the conclusions were skewed from the start since no Greenlandic Inuit was appointed as experts.

"For me, this is not just about history or politics. It's my body, my life and my right to self-determination," she said.

"And once again, I see that it is others who will investigate and define what was done to me and to other Inuit women."

On Thursday, the Danish parliament agreed that women affected by the forced contraception campaign can claim compensation from Copenhagen, an initiative pushed by Frederiksen, who presented Denmark's official apology last year.

Media coverage of the case has revived trauma that had been buried for decades

"I realised everything it had cost me, all those hospitalisations, those surgeries, the schooling I missed and, above all, those pains I had never associated with that damn IUD," said Kirstine Najarak Berthelsen.

"It was buried so deeply in my subconscious...Everything that happened to people is beyond imagination if you haven't experienced it yourself," she added.

By the late 1970s, one in two Greenlandic women of childbearing age, at least 4,070 women, had been fitted with an IUD, according to an investigation presented in September 2025.

The scandal came to light when one of the victims spoke out in the media about the trauma she experienced.

A podcast series in 2022 then revealed the full extent of the campaign.

Henriette Berthelsen has long called for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to be established.

The 68-year-old psychologist said that would make it possible to "acknowledge what happened."

"I believe that only then will we be able to begin to heal and move forward - not as adversaries, but as human beings and as peoples equal in dignity."

Nuuk and Copenhagen are also shedding light on several other painful chapters from the past, including children adopted without their parents' consent.

Sat, 29 Aug 2026 00:54:38 +0000

Bayeux Tapestry: Macron to open landmark London exhibition next Wednesday

By Serge Duchêne

Published on 28/08/2026 - EURONEWS

According to the Élysée, this is "a highly symbolic moment the President of the Republic wanted for Franco-British relations". The French president thus aims to highlight the "exceptional loan" he himself approved in 2025.

French President Emmanuel Macron will travel to London this Wednesday 2 September to open an exhibition at the British Museum devoted to the Bayeux Tapestry, an 11th-century work depicting William the Conqueror's conquest of England, the Elysée announced on Friday.

Macron will also have a "first in-depth exchange" with the new British Prime Minister, Andy Burnham, on Thursday, the presidency said.

He is also expected to "have the opportunity to greet King Charles", a presidential adviser added, without giving further details.

The main purpose of the visit is "the opening of the exhibition marking the loan of the Bayeux Tapestry to the British Museum", an event described by a presidential adviser as "a particularly significant moment" for Franco-British relations and personally championed by the current occupant of the Elysée.

The French leader wants to highlight this "exceptional loan" of the piece, which left France for the first time in more than 900 years when it was transported to London under tight security.

On Friday, the British Museum unveiled some sections of the work depicting the 1066 Battle of Hastings and the invasion led by William the Conqueror's Norman army.

The exhibition will be open to the public from 10 September to 11 July 2027; 100,000 tickets have already been sold for the first four months.

The French president, who will be accompanied by his wife, Brigitte Macron, is "very much looking forward" to seeing the tapestry displayed "in optimal conditions".

In London, the 70-metre-long linen embroidery will be shown flat for the first time, rather than hung vertically as it has been in Bayeux for decades.

According to the British Museum, this exhibition layout makes it easier to grasp the full scale of the work.

This historic move from Bayeux in Normandy prompted protests from experts who feared irreversible damage to the tapestry, which had already been weakened by 30 unstabilised tears and nearly 10,000 holes. An online petition circulated at the time of Macron's decision, calling on the relevant French authorities to abandon the loan.

The journey nevertheless took place in optimal conditions, and the French Culture Minister, Catherine Pégard, visiting London in mid-July, said she was delighted to see the thousand-year-old embroidery "in very good condition".

The French leader's visit will be the first by a head of state or government from the European Union since Andy Burnham took office last month, following the resignation of Keir Starmer, with whom Macron had worked closely and forged warm personal ties.

"The president had built a very friendly and extremely effective relationship with Prime Minister Starmer, particularly on the Ukraine and Middle East files," a presidency official said.

Coordination with his successor is expected to be "equally important and regular". "Contact was established immediately" with Burnham, the presidency added, also highlighting his first steps in office, including a swift trip to Kyiv to demonstrate his support for Ukraine.

Sat, 29 Aug 2026 00:55:40 +0000

Ceuta warns it is 'on the brink of collapse' as Spain seeks Frontex and Europol help

By Gavin Blackburn

Published on 28/08/2026 - EURONEWS

Meanwhile, Spain's interior minister called for calm after Ceuta residents clashed with police during protests against migrants who have remained in the enclave following a mass influx.

Spain has asked the European Commission (EC) for the support from Frontex and Europol to assist with the screening of migrants who are staying irregularly in Ceuta, according to several Spanish media outlets.

Spain's Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska has asked the EC for Frontex, Europol and the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) to "reinforce the device set up to address the management of the triage and subsequent processing of the personal files of the immigrants who still remain in Ceuta irregularly."

The Interior Ministry also demanded the extension of Operation Minerva, a joint initiative of the Spanish police and the EU border protection agency Frontex.

Madrid ask that that operation run until 2 September until "the situation created in the autonomous city is resolved."

Madrid also asked for the " assistance of the European Union Agency for Asylum in conducting interviews and providing interpreters" in order to triage migrants.

Due to space limitations in Ceuta, this process is expected to be carried out electronically.

Migrants who crossed from Morocco into Spain return to a beach after being expelled from the area the previous day, 21 August, 2026 AP Photo

The Interior Ministry announced on Friday that Ceuta's border would be reinforced with a package of "extraordinary" measures such as extending the Tarajal and Benzú breakwaters, a permanent system of maritime containment buoys, aerial surveillance with drones, light intervention vessels and remotely operated underwater devices.

At the same time, Ceuta's Assembly unanimously called on the central government on Friday to act "immediately and without further delay" arguing that the city is in an "extreme situation, on the verge of collapse."

The Board of Spokespersons, together with the non-affiliated MPs, unanimously approved on Friday an institutional declaration calling on the government to adopt urgent measures one month after the mass entry of at least 72,000 migrants from Morocco.

"Ceuta has lost its way of life and its calm. We do not have much time to avert disaster," Ceuta's President Juan Vivas warned.

The declaration calls for a return to their countries, "in accordance with the law" of those who took part in the mass entry and are still in Ceuta. It also backs citizens' right to demonstrate, as long as it is done "peacefully and in an orderly manner," and condemns violent incidents recorded in recent days.

"No one can or should take the law into their own hands. The defence of Ceuta and the interests of its people can only be pursued through legality," Vivas said.

Migrants who crossed from Morocco into Spain are escorted by Spanish police to temporary shelters after being cleared from a beach in Ceuta, 20 August, 2026 AP Photo

Appeal for calm

Meanwhile, Spain's interior minister called for calm on Friday after residents of Ceuta clashed with police during protests against migrants who have remained in the North African enclave following a mass influx.

Tensions have been high in the territory of 80,000 people since at least 72,000 people crossed into Ceuta over several days in July, triggering a Europe-wide migrant alert.

Spain's leftist government says most have since left the enclave of 18.5 square kilometres but thousands remain wandering the streets and sleeping on beaches.

Demonstrations have intensified in recent days, with some protesters clashing with police on Thursday at a beach where migrants have been sleeping. Some of their belongings were burned.

Migrants who crossed from Morocco into Spain are escorted by Spanish police to temporary shelters after being cleared from a beach in Ceuta, 21 August, 2026 Copyright 2026 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.

A soldier was injured in a separate incident on Thursday when migrants threw stones at troops, while 12 Moroccan migrants were arrested.

Two more arrests were made after migrants attacked a police officer, sources said.

"Violence is not the answer," Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska told parliament on Friday.

"I call for calm and an end to any form of violence, because...violence is not the way to resolve any problem with the complexity" of that facing Ceuta, he added.

Right-wing and far-right parties have demanded that all the migrants be rounded up and sent back to their home countries.

Grande-Marlaska accused them of "inciting hatred and confrontation" in Ceuta.

The government has warned that each individual must be identified to determine whether they are entitled to asylum or subject to deportation, while unaccompanied migrant children require special protection.

Ceuta and Melilla, another small Spanish territory in North Africa, form Europe's only land border with Africa.

Sat, 29 Aug 2026 00:32:52 +0000

Human Rights Rankings Reveal Surprising Over- And Underperformers

The cover of Science and the Study of Human Rights, published by SUNY Press. CREDIT: SUNY Press

August 28, 2026

By Eurasia Review

Key Takeaways:

Science and the Study of Human Rights (SUNY Press) uses CIRIGHTS and other indicators to score countries 0–100; authors put the global average near 70 and the United States at 62.5.
After adjusting for wealth, conflict, and neighbors, they label some states “overachievers” (e.g., Rwanda, the Philippines vs. expected peers) and “underachievers” including China, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Russia, and Iran (scored zero); several countries, including the U.S., were left out of that model for missing data.
The project leans on U.S. State Department reports that the authors say are now less complete, so the book may be a last comparable snapshot while they try other sources and student coding on labor, prisoners, refugees, and trafficking.

A new book co-written by researchers at Binghamton University and the University of Rhode Island provides a framework for comparing human rights practices around the world and over time, and reveals its overachieving and underachieving nations.

The book, Science and the Study of Human Rights by Binghamton University professors David L. Cingranelli and Mikhail Filippov and University of Rhode Island associate professors Skip Mark and Ashlea Rundlett, also evaluates barriers to improvement and ranks countries of the world on a variety of human rights measures.

“I say this to my classes: If you don’t measure something, the impression is that you don’t care about it,” said SUNY Distinguished Professor of Political Science David Cingranelli, co-director of Binghamton’s Human Rights Institute (HRI). “Once you attach numbers to things, you can do all kinds of research that is considered scientific because it uses quantitative methods that are transparent and replicable.”

The book is part of SUNY Press’ Human Rights series, which is edited by Cingranelli and Binghamton University English Professor Alexandra Moore, HRI co-director. Cingranelli, Mark and Cornell University postdoctoral scholar P. DeAnne Roark are currently working on another book in the series, Forecasting and Preventing Mass Atrocities.

The field of human rights has historically hinged on case studies rather than statistical data. However, improving human rights research, policy analysis, and public understanding requires systematic evidence. In the book, the authors introduce a range of publicly available human rights indicators, with particular attention to the CIRIGHTS Data Project, directed by Cingranelli, Mark and Filippov. The largest dataset of its kind in the world, CIRIGHTS provides numerical scores that show how well every country protects — or doesn’t protect — a wide range of internationally recognized human rights.

On a scale of zero to 100, the average human rights score for governments was just 70, according to their most recent analysis. The United States performed even lower, at 62.5.

In terms of human rights, democracies perform better than non-democracies and rich countries typically outperform poorer ones. Some nations, however, buck the expected trends; the book weighs countries’ structural and historical barriers to human rights and names these over- and under-performers. Some countries couldn’t be included in the achievement assessment because they lacked information on variables used in the models, including the United States, North Korea, Germany, South Sudan, Venezuela, and eight others.

Are Rwanda and the Philippines truly comparable to Denmark and Sweden? Being named an overachiever doesn’t mean that a country is flawless when it comes to protecting civil rights, only that it performs better than expected, according to the rankings.

“In an alternative world, where these countries were wealthier, had less conflict and were surrounded by neighbors who protect human rights, their own human rights would be a lot better, but they’re actually doing far better than anyone could expect them to do,” Cingranelli explained.

On the other side are underachievers, nations that perform below expectations; these include China, Egypt, Greece, Guyana, Israel, Macedonia, Paraguay, Romania, Russia, the Seychelles, Sudan, Tuvalu, and Iran, the last of which scored zero on human rights measures, Cingranelli pointed out.

The book is designed for scholars, graduate students, governments, and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, but will also be of interest to journalists, policymakers, and activists.

“We all have impressions about which countries respect human rights and which do not. The advantage of systematic data is that it forces us to check those impressions against evidence,” Rundlett said. “What I hope readers come away with is a sense that human rights are not just abstract principles. We can study how governments behave and compare them systematically.”

File photo of Khataib Hezbollah members in Iraq. Photo Credit: Tasnim News Agency

August 29, 2026

By Neville Teller

Key Takeaways:

The article says Iran-aligned Iraqi militias (Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Nujaba, Badr, Sayyid al-Shuhada and others) act as an IRGC adjunct—about 50,000 fighters with missiles, drones, and autonomy inside the official PMF.
After a July 28 IRGC strike on U.S. forces in Jordan, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia hit those Iraqi groups rather than Iran directly; the author argues that is what Soleimani designed them for: to shift war costs onto Iraq.
They also hold parliamentary, budget, and border-economy power, so Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s September 2026 goal of bringing them under the state is judged unlikely to end their independent role in Iran’s regional network.

A network of Iran-linked Shiite militias is operating in Iraq. Taken together, they are an extremely powerful military force.

When the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) launched ballistic missiles at US forces in Jordan on July 28, the US, in association with Saudi Arabia, did not aim its response at the IRGC direct. They struck a number of the Iraq-based militias instead, accusing them of past attacks on US forces and carrying out drone strikes on Saudi oil facilities, acting under the direction of the IRGC.

In short the US and its allies have recognized that the militias are in effect an integral part of the Iranian military, a functioning wing of the IRGC.

This network of Shiite militias, spread across Iraq, was put together by Qassem Soleimani,theone-timecommander of the IRGC’s Quds Force. Responsible for Iran’s external operations and covert activities, it took him roughly 17 years – from the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq until his death in 2020 by a US drone, on the orders of US President Donald Trump.

His network has since become an invaluable adjunct to Iran’s military potential. The militias, with Iranian financial and military support, have accrued arsenals which include long-range missiles and anti-aircraft weapons. They are, in short, a formidable proxy army capable of engaging the US and Arab countries in long, costly conflict.

That was precisely Soleimani’s intention. The militias were built to fight Iran’s enemies beyond its borders, dragging conflict away from the Islamic Republic itself. With the US and Saudi Arabia striking Iraq instead of Iran, Soleimani’s plan appears to be working.

The UK’s Daily Telegraph reported a Tehran-based analyst’s opinion of the militias. “They have the potential to expand the war to Iraq and add more actors into it. Their main job is to move the war from Iran to Iraq…If America wants to destroy them, it is a matter of one week. But that would officially bring the war to Iraq, and this is what Iran wants. More actors and fronts will make it expensive and hard for Trump to carry on.”

Most of these Iran-aligned factions are nominally part of the Iraqi state’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The PMF as a whole is an umbrella organization comprised of dozens of militias that were mobilized in 2014 to fight ISIS. In 2016, Iraq formally incorporated the PMF, which numbers well over 200,000 personnel, into the state’s security structure. It remains separate from the army and operates through its own command framework under the Iraqi government. In practice, however, the framework is loose and the main factions retain their own chains of command, intelligence networks, missile and drone arsenals, and political organizations, giving them substantial autonomy from the Iraqi state.

The principal Iran-aligned militia organizations operating within Iraq include Kataib Hezbollah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, the Badr Organization, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada. They are estimated to field around 50,000 frontline fighters.

Despite recent US and allied strikes, which have damaged their facilities and killed commanders, they remain militarily formidable. They possess rockets, ballistic missiles, armed drones, anti-tank weapons and sophisticated intelligence capabilities. Several have extensive combat experience from Iraq, Syria and, more recently, operations linked to the wider Iran-Israel-US confrontation.

Moreover, rather like the position that Hezbollah in its heyday achieved within Lebanon, the militia organizations have embedded themselves deeply in Iraq’s political, economic and social fabric. Many militia leaders also head political parties represented in parliament, hold ministerial portfolios or influence appointments throughout the security bureaucracy. Moreover they command substantial financial resources through various economic enterprises, border crossings and reconstruction contracts.

Not all the money acquired is illicit. Many PMF units are officially part of Iraq’s security apparatus and receive government funding. Salaries, equipment, and operational budgets come from the Iraqi state budget and are legal.

But Iraq’s borders with Iran, Syria, and other neighbors handle billions of dollars in trade annually. Reports from Iraqi officials, researchers, and international organizations have described militia influence at certain border crossings, where groups allegedly extract unofficial “fees” from importers and truckers, facilitate smuggling operations, manipulate customs procedures and gain control over transportation and logistics services.

Remains At Home – OpEd

August 24, 2026

THE CONVERSATION

By Sabina Cveček, Timothy Earle, Carol R. Ember, Gary M. Feinman and William A. Parkinson

Key Takeaways

:Residential burial (interring the dead in or near houses and settlements) keeps ancestors as ongoing participants in daily life, reinforcing kinship, memory, inheritance, and claims to place; yet systematic comparison shows this practice is far more common in archaeological samples than in ethnographic ones.
Ethnographic records, drawn mainly from the 20th century, under-represent residential burial because many societies shifted away from it—often under the influence of monotheistic religions or colonial policies that mandated cemeteries—while the archaeological record preserves a wider historical range of the practice.
Rather than relying solely on ethnographic analogy to interpret past mortuary behavior, archaeological patterns of residential burial can be used alongside ethnography to refine theories of permanent residence, kinship-making, and social organization, revealing a long-term global decline in burying the dead at home.
Why Residential Burial?

Through burial practice, it is believed that the living create, affirm, and transform social relationships with those who have passed. Interring the dead in settlements, sometimes even below house floors, makes ancestors enduring participants in daily life. Residential burial practices establish continuity between generations, anchor memory in place, and inscribe kinship, power, inheritance, and ritual within spaces where the living are situated. Residential burials do not mark biological death as an end to social bonds but indicate their reconfiguration, tying households and communities to both histories and futures in the making. Why, then, do some people bury their dead in or near residences and others do not? How can ethnography guide or obscure our interpretation of these intimate contexts in the archaeological record? These questions formed the starting point for our inquiry into residential burial on a global scale, in the ethnographic and archaeological records.

To address these questions, we used information from 60 ethnographically documented cultures in the Probability Sample Files in the electronic Human Relations Area Files (eHRAF) World Cultures database. The aim was to examine residential burial practices across these cases. However, given the limited occurrence of residential burial in the 60 case studies, we soon realized that the ethnographic record did not mirror patterns familiar to archaeologists. Ethnographic descriptions tend to highlight changes in burial practice, often linked with the spread of monotheistic religions. As a result, our questions and interests shifted to how a systematic cross-cultural study of residential burial based on the ethnographic record compared to the archaeological record.

We then asked whether an archaeological sample would differ significantly from the ethnographic sample. The coding of residential burial in 49 cultures formed part of a simple random sample from eHRAF Archaeology. A comparison of these two datasets revealed that residential burials were more prevalent in archaeological than in ethnographic contexts. These findings have important implications for using ethnographic analogy when the aim is to understand mortuary (or other related) practices in the archaeological record.

While ethnographic descriptions can help us understand reasons for change in mortuary placement, the ethnographic record does not fully capture the more frequent occurrence of residential burial, which is apparent in the archaeological record. Therefore, instead of the more conventional use of ethnographic analogy for archaeological interpretation (i.e., formulating hypotheses), our study illustrates how archaeological insights can be used in conjunction with ethnography to develop and test sociocultural theories of permanent residence, kinship, and social structure. The ethnographic studies in our dataset, which derive mainly from the 20th century, have only a small percentage of cases with residential burials. The more frequent occurrence of this practice in archaeological samples indicates that the archaeological record represents a broader array of different burial behavior than those represented in the ethnographic record. While contemporary people rarely bury ancestors at home, in the past, houses, huts, and settlements were much more often spaces where both the living and the dead coexisted—and felt at home.

As we reported in American Antiquity, from which this article is excerpted, we first discuss how traditions of funerary placement can be used to model social organization and reflect diachronic changes. Then, we discuss the role of ethnographic analogy in archaeological explanation and present results from the two datasets on residential burial, based on 60 ethnographic and 49 archaeological cases. These cases suggest a decline in residential burial at different points in the past while also highlighting a more recent global shift away from this practice. These findings underscore the value of archaeological evidence, which can illuminate a diversity of burial practices that have decreased significantly in the ethnographic present but not fully disappeared. Our results have implications not only for our understanding of cross-cultural burial patterns and how they changed in response to other societal changes but also (more generally) for how archaeologists employ ethnographic data and analogy when interpreting the archaeological record.

Why Are Burials So Important?

Funerary practice is ideal for cross-cultural, anthropological studies that combine ethnographic and archaeological data. It is visible and broadly recorded in both research databases. These ritual practices document how social organizations are created and materialized. Burial is a socially and emotionally dramatic moment in individual life cycles—a moment of making, showing, and reaffirming relationships. Arguably, funerary rituals establish kinship between the living and the dead and the memory of the event, while the spatial placement of the dead and the physical markers (memorials) help those kinship relationships to endure. A combination of emotion, social ceremony, and reaffirmation, funerary practices are critical to institutional formation.

Moreover, the relationship between settlement continuity and intramural interments aligns with the view of other scholars who suggest that residential burial does not merely tie the living to their ancestors but also links them to a dwelling and the land it sits on. In many contexts, connections were affirmed and reaffirmed through the sequential reuse of mortuary contexts and ritual activities conducted adjacent to them.

Necrogeography

The use of the dead to structure, mark, and reinforce the taskscapes of the living has been an integral aspect of both prehuman and human practices for thousands of years. The spatial relationship between the living and the dead can, however, also become a matter of political intervention. In the late 19th-century Ghanaian Gold Coast, colonial British law was revised six times to mandate and enforce the transition from residential interments to community cemeteries. Moving the resting place for ancestors to locations outside the house has implications beyond the spiritual: “the colonial state enforced cemetery burial because they realized Gold Coast people would never sell their land if it contained the remains of their elders; cemeteries were therefore a crucial tool in the transformation of land into private property for state dispossession,” stated a 2022 article published in the Journal of Social History. Consequentially, the movement of the deceased to community cemeteries led to changes in interpersonal networks and community relationships with the supernatural, their ancestors, and property. Even after some converted to Christianity, colonial-era Ghanaians initially resisted moving burial locations. Funerary customs can be a core extension of personal identity and connection to places, so they are not easy to change. Although the factors and circumstances that prompted householders to shift their funerary practices and reposition their ancestors outside their houses varied from one historical case to another, the behavioral ramifications in most contexts likely extended well beyond the spiritual to social networks and material possessions.

This connection between burial location and broader social organization has long been explored in anthropological and archaeological studies of kinship and descent groups. In particular, cross-cultural research suggests that formal cemeteries frequently emerge where corporate groups use burial places to legitimize claims to land and resources. However, kinship studies have a long history in anthropology with particular salience for British social anthropologists who examined variability in structural forms governing broader social practices. Implicit in understanding kinship is that the organization it implies is essential to group and individual operations and survival. The British social anthropology approach was fundamentally that of social science, looking for systematic patterning affecting group reproduction. Although criticized for the functionalist logic of the social body, the approach can and should be reconceptualized as social networks in which active participants form kinship through blood or other means as well as break kinship ties for historical and strategic goals. This is captured by the concept of kinship-making that recognizes dynamic ways in which different individuals, households, and larger social networks can coexist and evolve.

Using the HRAF Collection of Ethnography, substantial comparative studies seek to understand variation in kinship patterns, and we hope that by looking at funerary practice, we can document dynamic moments when kinship is formed, given degrees of permanence, or reconstituted through memories and material marking. This is the basis of our comparative study, where we look for regular patterns with implied causal relationships between burial practice and the degree of permanent residence. While cross-cultural comparison in this article focuses exclusively on the link between residence permanence and residential burial, a follow-up study could explore the link between kinship and residential burial practices.

Caring for the Dead

Why do the living care deeply about the dead and choose to place the dead systematically according to specific cultural practices? In some cases, they appear not to; in others, it is highly variable, and often follows specific cultural rules. Humans deal with the dead in ways that vary across time and space, and reasonably, this important moment in the life cycle engages both continuity and change in social relations, especially manifest in kinship reflected in the funerary placement of the dead. Thinking materially (which is so basic to social science reasoning), people care about the dead, especially because of inheritance—the social roles that the living take from the dead and the access it gives them to particular resources, including land and its productive potential.

Credit Line:

Excerpted from “Funerary Placement in the Past and Present: Uses of Ethnographic Analogy for Archaeological Interpretation” by Sabina Cveček, Timothy Earle, Carol R. Ember, Gary M. Feinman, and William A. Parkinson. Copyright © The Authors 2026. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Society for American Archaeology.

This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0). This article was distributed by Human Bridges, a project of the Independent Media Institute.

About Sabina Cveček

Sabina Cveček is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Global Postdoctoral Fellow at the Field Museum of Natural History and a visiting scholar at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Her research focuses on prehistoric kinship, households, and social organization in the eastern Mediterranean and southeastern Europe.

View all posts by Sabina Cveček →

About Timothy Earle

Timothy Earle is professor emeritus and former chair of anthropology at Northwestern University, known for comparative research on political economy, leadership, chiefdoms, and the development of social complexity.

View all posts by Timothy Earle →

About Carol R. Ember

Carol R. Ember is a cultural anthropologist and the president of the Human Relations Area Files at Yale University whose work uses cross-cultural research to examine human societies, including warfare, kinship, gender, and cultural evolution.

View all posts by Carol R. Ember →

About Gary M. Feinman

Gary M. Feinman is the MacArthur curator of Mesoamerican, Central American, and East Asian anthropology, at the Negaunee Integrative Research Center.

View all posts by Gary M. Feinman →

About William A. Parkinson

William A. Parkinson is a curator and associate director of anthropology at the Field Museum of Natural History, as well as a professor at the University of Illinois at Chicago. His work focuses on European prehistory, particularly social organization, migration, interaction, and the emergence of complex societies.

Fri, 28 Aug 2026 22:36:18 +0000

100 Days Of Ebola And The Race To Stop The Spread
A shipment of emergency Ebola response supplies arrives at Bunia airport in Ituri province, DR Congo. Photo Credit: UNICEF/Carmel Ndomba Mbikayi

By UN News

Key Takeaways:
One hundred days into the Bundibugyo Ebola outbreak in eastern DRC, the response has scaled dramatically—testing capacity to 19 labs processing over 3,000 samples daily, treatment beds from under 10 to more than 1,300, community outreach reaching 2.5 million people, and contact tracing rising from 9% to 84%—yet transmission continues and roughly 60% of the recent 260 weekly deaths still occur outside treatment centres.
Insecurity, displacement, attacks on health facilities, high community mortality, and concurrent hunger and water shortages are severely hampering containment; WHO stresses the need for community-led action, 95% contact tracing, expansion to 3,000 beds, better protection for health workers (155 infected, 50 dead), and stronger cross-border preparedness.
Neighbouring South Sudan remains free of cases so far but faces ongoing risk from population movements; prevention efforts (surveillance, entry screening, training, supplies, awareness) are underway, though humanitarian workers have already been targeted, underscoring the urgency of decisive scaled-up action to stay ahead of the outbreak.
A hundred days after the Bundibugyo Ebola outbreak was declared, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is facing an epidemic of an unprecedented scale and efforts must grow to contain the spread in the eastern region and across borders, UN agencies warned on Monday.
WHO is calling to scale up the response in the face of ongoing situation, compounded by ongoing clashes among armed groups in eastern DRC, conflict-related displacement and growing hunger.
“We can bring the Ebola outbreak under control, but only through scaled-up action in affected communities,” said WHO chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus.
He also underlined the importance of a response led by national and local authorities, equipped with the necessary resources and supported by resolute partners.
‘Extraordinary’ progress
In 100 days, the response has grown considerably in scale and capacity, with a testing network expanded from a single site to 19 laboratories now capable of analysing more than 3,000 samples daily.
Treatment capacity has jumped from fewer than 10 beds to over 1,300, community engagement activities have reached more than 2.5 million people and contact tracing has climbed from nine per cent in the first week of the outbreak to 84 per cent as of 18 August.
Scientific efforts have also intensified, with clinical trials of potential treatments, the evaluation of vaccine candidates and the roll-out of the first molecular diagnostic test for the Bundibugyo virus.
WHO regional director for emergency response in Africa Dr. Marie Roseline Belizaire told UN News“these are extraordinary advances,” but not yet sufficient to end the epidemic or stop the transmission of the virus.
60% of deaths occur outside treatment centres
Insecurity, displacement, attacks on health facilities and difficulties in accessing care continue to hamper the response.
Mortality rate remains high, both in communities and amongst patients receiving care. Deaths occurring outside Ebola treatment centres accounted for around 60 per cent of the 260 weekly deaths recorded over the last six weeks.
This figure highlights the ongoing difficulties in detecting cases early, referring patients swiftly to healthcare facilities and ensuring they have access to treatment, according to WHO, which stressed that interventions must be more tailored to local transmission dynamics and operational gaps, missions in active transmission hotspots must be scaled up and high-risk areas need to be well prepared before cases emerge.
Strategic Infrastructure And Accountability: Panama Reassesses Chinese Megaprojects – Analysis
Panama's Bridge of the Americas

August 23, 2026
Diálogo Américas
By Maria Zuppello
Key Takeaways:
An April explosion under the Bridge of the Americas highlighted the vulnerability of Panama’s crossings and renewed criticism of the long-delayed Fourth Bridge over the Canal, now nearly five years behind schedule and far over budget.
The Chinese state-owned consortium leading the project faces sanctions, design revisions, cost overruns (from about $1.42 billion to more than $2.6 billion), and growing scrutiny of “corrosive capital” and strategic influence near the Panama Canal.
Panama’s review of Chinese-linked infrastructure reflects a wider Latin American trend of reassessing, renegotiating, or canceling such projects to protect transparency, sovereignty, and the resilience of critical logistics and energy assets.
The explosion and fire beneath the Bridge of the Americas in April, which killed one person, injured two others, and forced the temporary closure of one of Panama’s vital transportation routes, underscored the importance of resilient strategic infrastructure and alternative routes capable of sustaining mobility and logistical continuity during an emergency.
The incident also revived debate over delays in the construction of the Fourth Bridge over the Panama Canal. Designed to ease congestion on the Bridge of the Americas and the Centennial Bridge, the project was intended to strengthen connectivity between the Canal’s two banks. However, the project’s continued lack of completion is placing additional pressure on existing crossings and increasing the potential impact of accidents and disruptions.
“The Fourth Bridge was announced nine years ago and was supposed to be delivered in 2023. Today, it carries cost overruns of more than $1.84 billion,” Panamanian lawmaker Jhonathan Vega said, describing the April explosion as “further proof of the fragility of the entire system while this project remains unfinished.”
Awarded in 2018 to a consortium formed by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) and China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC), the project has become one of the most visible examples of the growing scrutiny Latin American governments are applying to Chinese investments in strategic infrastructure, as major projects promoted by Chinese state-owned companies fall behind schedule, overrun cost estimates, and face questions about the quality of their execution. In response, governments across the region are reviewing numerous strategic projects linked to Beijing, renegotiating, freezing, or even canceling them outright.
In Panama, the debate extends far beyond technical considerations. The Fourth Bridge has become a test of the broader reassessment the country is undertaking of Chinese investment in strategic sectors.
“China’s interests in Panama are tied to maintaining a degree of control over global supply chains, within which the Panama Canal clearly represents an element of enormous importance,” Guillermo Holzmann, a political analyst at the University of Valparaíso in Chile, told Diálogo.
Following Panama’s 2017 decision to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan and establish them with Beijing, Chinese investment in the country grew rapidly. However, delays, cost overruns, and concerns about the transparency of some projects have fueled growing skepticism. Experts have warned of the risks posed by so-called “corrosive capital”: investments that, beyond their economic risks, can expand Beijing’s political influence and control over strategic assets such as ports, energy networks, and logistics infrastructure.
The Fourth Bridge
The Fourth Bridge over the Panama Canal has become one of the most prominent cases in the regional debate over Chinese investment. Entrusted to the Panama Fourth Bridge Consortium, formed by Chinese state-owned companies, and located next to one of the world’s most strategic trade routes, the project is now marked by delays, technical reviews, contractual changes, and rising costs. In April, Panama’s Labor Minister Jackeline Muñoz announced sanctions after authorities also identified irregularities involving working conditions and immigration requirements.
The main challenges, however, remain the timeline and the cost. According to Panama’s Ministry of Public Works, the project is nearly five years behind schedule and had reached only 37 percent completion this year. The government had already sanctioned the consortium in 2020 over delays during the design phase, while subsequent administrations were forced to revise significant portions of the contract.
Costs have also risen sharply. From an initial estimate of $1.42 billion, the total value of the project has surpassed $2.6 billion. According to Panamanian authorities, part of the increase resulted from the need to correct deficiencies identified in the original design.
Public Works Minister José Luis Andrade said traffic studies conducted by the current administration showed that the initial project would have created congestion as soon as it became operational.
Caspian’s Water Level Decline Accelerating Despite Expectations That Sea’s Declining Surface Area Would Mean Less Evaporation – OpEd
NASA image shows shrinking coastline of the Caspian Sea. Photo Credit: NASA

By Paul Goble

In 2020, the water level of the Caspian fell by eight centimeters; but last year, it fell by 23, despite the predictions of many experts that the decline would slow because the area of the sea had contracted by almost 30,000 square kilometers and thus the amount of evaporation would be reduced.
This change, experts from the littoral states say, reflects both rapidly rising air temperatures as a result of global warming and declines in the flow of rivers emptying into the Caspian as a result of increased human use (ritmeurasia.ru/news–2026-08-28–primorskie-strany-obespokoeny-zdorovem-melejuschego-kaspijskogo-morja-89919).
Because the Volga is the largest of these rivers – the Ural River is a distant second – many in the non-Russian countries are focusing on Russia’s failure to take steps to ensure that the decline in the flow of that river into the Caspian won’t increase. And their objections are infuriating many Russian experts and commentators.
Kazakhstan has called for a consortium to help regulate the flow of the Volga, something Moscow opposes; and Russian experts like Mikhail Bolgov of the Russian Academy of Sciecnes are now arguing that it is “impossible” to regulate the water levels of the Caspian, a confession of Russia’s failure to do something and something certain to infuriate other littoral states.
As a result, the Caspian’s water level is certain to decline and at an increasing rate. A much-ballyhooed proposal to spend 450 million rubles on the problem in the coming years turns out to be hollow: all that money is to go for research and not any of it for steps to limit let alone solve the problem.
Unless Moscow changes course or unless outside powers with an interest in transit across the Caspian get more actively involved, it is virtually certain that the inland sea is on course to follow the Aral into oblivion, a development with enormous and currently incalculable consequences for the littoral states and all those who rely on the Caspian.

Fri, 28 Aug 2026 23:10:58 +0000
In The Bear’s Paw: How Europeans Can Loosen Russia’s Grip On Belarus – Analysis

LONG READ

August 23, 2026
ECFR
By Vasil Navumau

Key Takeaways:

Belarus has shifted from a relatively stable buffer and Russian rear base into a forward-operating platform for Moscow—hosting missiles, joint exercises, logistics, and hybrid pressure on Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia—raising direct security risks for the EU’s eastern flank.

Broad EU sanctions and isolation have deepened Minsk’s dependence on Russia without adequately addressing the military threat or easing repression of political prisoners and the diaspora.

The paper urges a more targeted EU approach: strengthen border-state defence and deconfliction, keep limited working-level channels, support civil society and SMEs, condition limited engagement on verifiable steps, and treat Lukashenko as retaining some residual agency that can still be pressured away from full Russian satellite status.

A satellite state

Take a map of Europe and find Belarus. Trace a finger clockwise, from the country’s northern borders and around to the east, where Russia is followed by Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. Belarus’s capital, Minsk, is itself almost at the exact geographic heart of the country, surrounded by hills, with vast forests sprawled out like capillaries beyond.

It is from here that Belarus’s longtime leader, Alexander Lukashenko, looks out from his “Palace of Independence” on Minsk’s Pieramozcau Avenue. To the east, in Russia, his fellow authoritarian Vladimir Putin continues to decimate Ukraine from its eastern borders and scheme to undermine European political interests. To the west, stretching hundreds of kilometres past Belarus’s western border with Poland and across Germany, lies Brussels. Faced with instability across the continent, the EU’s capital is increasingly unsure about what to do with its problematic Belarusian neighbour.

The EU downgraded its diplomatic relations with Belarus in 2020 after the latter’s disputed presidential election, which saw Lukashenko’s government violently repress protestors who took to the streets to oppose the president seizing victory by undemocratic means. Although bilateral trade between the EU and Belarus was largely undamaged in the subsequent years, the fall in trade with the bloc after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 created an economic gap which Russia has exploited. For example, it has stepped up its own trading relationship with Belarus and become a key market for exports of Belarusian goods such as dairy products and petrochemicals—also allowing Moscow to evade EU sanctions. In doing so, Russia filled a vacuum for Belarus; Lukashenko, facing limited alternatives, deepened his dependence on Moscow.

Although Belarus did not formally commit troops to Russia’s war of aggression, it did allow the latter to house missiles, tanks, artillery, helicopters, aeroplanes and other military equipment in its territory prior to the invasion. It also provided military and civil infrastructure for Russia’s use, including airfields, hospitals and railway lines. This year alone, Russia has transferred more missiles—including dual-capable, hypersonic missiles—to Belarusian territory and conducted joint exercises encompassing the Belarusian Armed Forces. This, combined with a breakdown in dialogue between the EU and Belarus, gives Putin yet more sway in his quest to entrench Russia further into Belarusian structures.

Now that Belarus is apparently firmly committed to the supranational union of Belarus and Russia, known as the Union State, it has become a structural security concern for Europe. Russian deployment of nuclear-capable weapons on Belarusian territory makes Europe’s eastern flank more vulnerable, while Belarus’s already tense relations with neighbouring border states Poland, Latvia and Lithuania are at risk of deteriorating further. At the same time, Belarus has 879 political prisoners languishing, with Lukashenko’s regime having essentially outlawed any political or civic activity which the authorities see as a threat.

All this has compounded the breakdown in relations between Belarus and Europe. Russia is further emboldened to entrench its military deeper into Belarusian territory, tighten its economic dependencies and integrate the country further into its nuclear strategy.

This paper examines Belarus’s transformation from a problematic but stable buffer state between western Europe and Russia to a country which poses an increasing military and security threat to the EU. It argues that the EU should move away from relying solely on economic leverage and the blanket application of sanctions—which are pushing Belarus to rely more heavily on Russia—and develop a more targeted approach. Europeans need to actively contain the growing military and nuclear threat by finding new avenues of diplomatic negotiation, and by incorporating NATO-inspired approaches into its defence policy for its vulnerable eastern states.

Perhaps most importantly, Europeans need to assess to what extent they can treat Minsk as an autonomous actor capable of making decisions independently from Moscow. Europeans should take recent developments, such as Ukraine’s discovery of four signal relay stationsin two Belarusian oblasts and their subsequent removal, as proof that Lukashenko retains the authority to make territorial-based decisions—especially under pressure from Russia.

However, for as long as Lukashenko remains in power, Belarus will never be entirely free of Moscow: he is an authoritarian, and Minsk remains sanctioned due to its breach of human rights clauses and mistreatment of its population. Belarus’s geopolitical position is also at least partly down to early decisions that Lukashenko made when he turned towards Moscow in the mid-1990s—a time when most other former Soviet nations chose real independence. Long before 2020, this posture led to missed opportunities with the EU, reinforced Lukashenko’s propensity to commit human rights violations and kickstarted Belarus’s deepening economic and military integration with Russia.

In its pursuit of a new strategy, the EU needs to recognise that—even if Belarus remains a stable, contained buffer zone—the country will not undergo a full democratic transformation. Europeans are thus searching for a Belarus which no longer presents an urgent security threat on its eastern border. They should aim to help shape a country whose stability reduces geopolitical risk without abandoning the EU’s long-standing commitment to democracy, human rights and the well-being of Belarusian society.

Belarus as a security actor

Belarus declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. But, with what Russia perceived as the NATO and European sphere of influence shifting eastwards, Belarus became increasingly valuable to Moscow—especially because of the Suwalki Gap, which lies between the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad and Belarusian territory. The Russia-Belarus relationship became more entrenched once Lukashenko and Putin came to power in 1994 and 1999, respectively. The two leaders are hardly close personal friends—but they have nonetheless developed strong cultural and economic ties based on the similarity of their two anti-Western and authoritarian regimes, and their notion of a shared history.

Over the past 30 years, Belarus has moved closer to Russia in economy, trade and idea sharing. But it has gone beyond simply sharing a similar geopolitical outlook; now it is a militarised actor on the EU’s eastern flank. The first tipping point came with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. At this point, Lukashenko was already politically entangled with Moscow due to its support for Belarus’s trade network and economic sector after Minsk’s break with Europe in 2020. But the invasion meant that Belarus also became entrenched in the Russian military machine: in the early phase of Russia’s invasion, it became a launchpad for Russian ground offensives towards Kyiv and Chernihiv, and for missile strikes and combat aviation operations.

Since this period, Russia has attempted to consolidate its control even further. Now it has approximately 2,000 troops concentrated around air-defence systems, training facilities, logistics hubs and long-standing Russian military installations. Between 2022 and 2023, ammunition transfers from Belarus to Russia exceeded 130,000 tonnes. Since then, joint training centres, storage bases and transport corridors (many inherited from the Soviet period) have been repurposed and modernised under Belarus-Russia Union State programmes to support Russian operational needs. Rail-linked depots, armament storage facilities and training grounds now serve as key infrastructure for Russian forces on its western flank.

The second tipping point came with the two countries regularly staging recurring joint military exercises that institutionalise operational integration, such as the Zapad military drills which have been taking place since before 2022. Now Russia is eyeing up Belarus as a key component of its nuclear ambitions and has also deployed Oreshnik intermediate-range missile systems in Belarus. In April this year, Belarus confirmed it would no longer allow Russian conscripts who desert the military to leave via its border. Belarus is also a staging post for Russian nuclear missiles and joint military exercises.

The country has thus become Russia’s territorial, militaristic and logistical resource, achieved through durability, military routinisation and institutional embedding. The military aspect of this entrenchment is also compounded through hybrid attacks. For example, as early as November 2021 the EU condemned Belarus for facilitating the weaponisation of migrants—predominantly from conflict areas such as Iraq and Syria—who it had apparently encouraged to breach the borders of Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.

This form of hybrid warfare has continued into 2026: recent reports saythat Lithuanian authorities have discovered a cross-border tunnel from Belarus to Lithuania, which they suspect is to continue to facilitate the potential movement of migrants through European territories. Now, with the Union State increasingly functioning as a homogeneous force, there is a threat that Belarus will become more emboldened to facilitate further dangerous hybrid manoeuvring. It intends to check Europe’s readiness and destabilise it from the inside.

Belarus as a threat to Europe

The difference in the threat which Belarus now poses to Europe lies in its shift—which has taken place over the past six years—from being Russia’s “rear-operating base” to Russia’s “forward-operating base”.

As Russia’s rear-operating base, Belarus functioned as a non-combat zone for logistics and maintenance. While it supported Russian military activity and provided strategic depth by shifting military infrastructure and combat flashpoints away from Russian territory, as a rear-operating base Belarus avoided deploying its own forces into Ukraine and directly engaging in combat operations. This allowed Lukashenko to avoid many of the challenges that Putin is experiencing, including politically sensitive military mobilisation, high personnel casualties and mounting internal economic pressure. This approach had previously provided Lukashenko with the degree of political deniability and diplomatic leverage necessary to continue negotiating with Western economies on economic sanctions and market access. He was able to point to Belarus’s arm’s-length approach to the war in Ukraine as proof that he was willing to engage with Europeans at a diplomatic and economic level.

However, Belarus’s position has changed since 2022. Evidence collected by the author demonstrates that Russia is increasingly establishing the country as a forward-operating base. Moscow is building on its routinisation and institutional embedding of military infrastructure to deploy personnel on Belarusian territory and undertake recurring joint military exercises, lately including nuclear forces preparation. Minsk’s rhetoric is changing to match these actions. In 2022, Belarus changed its constitution to allow Russia to store nuclear missiles on its territory; in a “Militarization of Europe” meeting held in June 2026, Belarus’s deputy minister of foreign affairs Igor Sekreta said he was “deeply concerned by… military exercises on NATO’s eastern flank” and “the EU and NATO… systematically promoting a militarist agenda at all levels.”

The Belarusian government is simultaneously becoming a component of Russian forward-military position and aligning ideologically with Russia’s view that Europe (and the West in general) constitutes an existential threat. Lukashenko himself reiterated this in May 2026, when he declared that “… [Belarus is] ready in every possible way to defend our common fatherland from Brest to Vladivostok.” The change is especially worrying for Ukraine, which is already fighting a war against Russia on several fronts. Its brow-beaten army could soon be required to deploy yet more resources to another defensive line on its northern border. Belarusian state media have suggested that Putin desires to open a “second front” against Ukraine, using Belarus as a launchpad for further attacks.

Indeed, evidence suggests that Russia is already using Belarusian infrastructure to gain an advantage in its drone warfare against Ukraine: in June 2026, Ukrainian intelligence services discovered four signal relay stations in the Belarusian oblasts of Homiel and Brest. Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, appealed directly to Belarus to dismantle the sites or face potential Ukrainian consequences. The Belarusian president apparently acquiesced—although no public statement or confirmation has been made.

Belarus’s transformation into a forward-operating base was further bolstered in 2023, when Russia deposited tactical Iskander nuclear-capable warheads on its territory. Then, in early 2025, Russia moved Oreshnik hypersonic missiles to a location which experts estimate to be around 60km south of Minsk. This has changed the calculus for the rest of Europe. Europeans must contend with an additional nuclear threat right on its border (aside from Kaliningrad) and consider how this could compromise security along its eastern flank.

Meanwhile, as noted above, Belarus is mixing concrete actions with rhetoric that suggests it sees Europe as a threat to its own sovereignty. In the same speech, Sekreta commented that Poland, Latvia and Lithuania have a combined defence expenditure of €52bn, which is apparently “25 times more than Belarus allocates for defence”. This suggests that Belarus increasingly views European and NATO defence investments through the lens of Russian military planning. If left unchecked, Russian influence will leave EU member states more vulnerable to further hybrid attacks from Union State forces.

For Europeans, there is also potential for escalation in how these border countries respond, and uncertainty about where escalation could lead. For example, the Zapad-2025 military drills, which took place on September 12th 2025, prompted Poland to close its border with Belarus due to “heightened security concerns”. Prior to this, on September 9th and 10th, Russia had flown several drones into Polish airspace during an attack on Ukraine. Lithuania also closed its border with Belarus for a whole month in October 2025 (and refused to enter negotiations to reopen it) after meteorological balloons travelled into its airspace from Belarus. The latter responded by accusing Lithuania of “pursuing an anti-Belarus policy”. Latvia, for its part, is struggling to deal with Belarus’s tactic of sending illegal migrants over its border. As of July 21st 2026, the Latvian government had recorded 8,413 instances of migrants attempting to cross into its territory this calendar year, stirring discontent prior to the parliamentary election in October. The country has also uncovered several sabotage operations that have appear to have been carried out by Belarusian and Russian spies.

European leaders heating up their confrontations in such critical areas is further adding to NATO’s headache. Belarus’s degradation as a buffer zone between western Europe and Russia means the potential for these flashpoints to drift further west is growing, not helped by a continually deteriorating diplomatic relationship between the Lukashenko government and the

Fri, 28 Aug 2026 23:47:35 +0000

China: Decade Of Impunity For Crimes Against Uyghurs, HRW Says
File photo of Uyghur detainees listening to speeches in a camp in Lop County, Xinjiang. Photo Credit: Wikipedia Commons

August 29, 2026
By Eurasia Review
The Chinese government’s decade-long severe repression against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims, amounting to crimes against humanity, deserves a stronger response from the international community, Human Rights Watch said.
Ten years after the Chinese Communist Party sharply escalated abuses against Uyghurs in the far western Xinjiang region, the crackdown on rights remains severe. Current evidence shows continued mass arbitrary detention, unjust imprisonment, mass surveillance, cultural and religious erasure, restrictions on travel and communication, and pressure on Uyghurs abroad, even as Chinese authorities promote a public image of normalcy in Xinjiang. State-imposed forced labor in Xinjiang affects the global supply chains, in sectors including automotive, solar panels, apparel, seafood, agricultural products, and critical minerals.
“Rather than ending its crimes against humanity in Xinjiang and bringing justice for hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs whose lives have been destroyed, the Chinese government persists in its atrocities and silences critical voices, even abroad,” said Yalkun Uluyol, China researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The international community’s earlier strong response has fizzled, allowing the Chinese government to shamelessly promote a false sense of normalcy in the region.”
Xi Jinping’s “strike hard campaign against violent terrorism” (严厉打击暴力恐怖活动专项行动) began in Xinjiang in 2014. Repression escalated sharply with the August 29, 2016, appointment of a former Communist Party chief, Chen Quanguo, in Xinjiang. The campaign culminated in the arbitrary detention of an estimated one million Uyghurs in “political education” camps. Chen Quanguo had previously served as party secretary in the Tibet Autonomous Region.
Since then, although some of these camps appear to have closed, hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims remain in prison, according to available
Syria's al-Sharaa appoints SDF commander as adviser after Kurdish force dissolves
Copyright AP Photo

By Sait Burak Utucu & Ali Hasan & Euronews Turkish and Euronews Arabic
Published on 28/08/2026 -

The appointment came days after Abdi declared the Kurdish-led force dissolved and integrated into the Syrian army, ending a decade of independent existence in a move Washington called "genuine integration".
Mazloum Abdi, who led the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) until its dissolution this week, was appointed adviser to Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa, Syria's official news agency SANA announced Friday.
Abdi on Tuesday declared the SDF dissolved and announced the completion of its integration into Syria's armed forces — a process that ended the Kurdish-led force's decade-long existence as an independent military organisation.
US Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack described the SDF's dissolution as "genuine integration" and said assigning influential government positions to Kurdish officials, including Abdi, showed respect for Kurdish leadership and the contribution Kurdish forces had made to regional stability.
Who is Mazloum Abdi?
Born Mustafa Khalil Abdi in 1967 in the Kobani region near the Turkish border, Mazloum Abdi studied engineering at Aleppo University and joined the PKK in the early 1990s, eventually rising through its ranks in Iraq and Europe.
He is known by several names, including Mazloum Kobani, Ferhat Abdi Şahin and Mustafa Halil Abdi. Turkey considers him a terrorist and says he is the subject of an Interpol Red Notice.
Syria analyst Nanar Hawach of the International Crisis Group described him as one of the "experienced cadres of the PKK" who founded the People's Protection Units in Syria after the civil war began in 2011.
Mazloum Abdi, the commander of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, speaks during a news conference in Hassakeh, Syria, 26 November 2022 AP Photo

Abdi gained international recognition during the battle for Kobani in 2015, when Kurdish forces defeated the so-called Islamic State Group (IS) after months of fighting.
The victory became a defining moment for Syria's Kurds and the beginning of Abdi's close partnership with Washington, which backed the SDF as its primary ground partner against the IS throughout the Syrian civil war.
He is reported to have been close to Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned founder of the PKK, who announced in 2025 that the organisation was abandoning armed struggle.
In 2025, Öcalan, whose isolation conditions had been eased following years of requests by Kurdish politicians in Turkey, called on the PKK to lay down arms and abandon armed struggle.
The PKK formally accepted the call and announced it was disbanding as a fighting force, while Abdi said the move did not apply to the SDF.
Recognition from Damascus
The SDF's dissolution and Abdi's appointment are the culmination of an agreement signed in January 2026, which stipulated that Kurdish military and civilian institutions in northern and northeastern Syria would be brought under central state authority.
On 16 January al-Sharaa signed a decree guaranteeing the national rights of Kurds, recognising Kurdish as a national language, declaring Nowruz an official public holiday and granting citizenship to Kurds previously denied legal status — the first such recognition since Syria gained independence in 1946.
By integrating into the Syrian armed forces, the SDF retained aspects of its internal command structure within those brigades during an initial transitional period, though the long-term arrangements remain subject to ongoing negotiation.
Syrian government security forces inspect tunnels used by the retreating Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Raqqa, 20 January 2026 AP Photo

Armed clashes in January in which the SDF lost large swathes of territory to Syrian government forces, and the United States' decision to support the new Damascus leadership, pushed Abdi toward a negotiated settlement.
For al-Sharaa the deal is a significant achievement in his effort to extend state authority across all Syrian territory. For the Kurds it marks the end of their de facto autonomous administration in the northeast.
Abdi said political efforts would continue to ensure Kurdish rights were enshrined in the Syrian constitution. "Our struggle to secure our people's rights in the constitution will continue," he said.
Related
Syria's main Kurdish force SDF ceases to exist after army merger
Kurdish-led SDF and Syrian government reach new agreement to stabilise ceasefire
Turkey regards the YPG — the main Kurdish component of the SDF — as the Syrian branch of the PKK, which is designated a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the US, the EU and the UK.
Ankara has conducted multiple military operations against YPG and SDF positions in Syria.
Ankara has pressed al-Sharaa to ensure that Kurdish armed groups are fully disarmed and that the YPG's former military structures do not survive within the Syrian state.

Sat, 29 Aug 2026 01:05:30 +0000

Thieves buy tickets before plundering necklace worth millions from Vienna museum

By Sertac Aktan & Gavin Blackburn
Published on 28/08/2026 - EURONEWS
Police said the two men did not wear masks, paid to enter the museum and were clearly seen on surveillance cameras in Thursday's heist.
Two men bought tickets to enter Vienna's Museum of Applied Arts (MAK) before smashing a display case, grabbing a 200-carat platinum and diamond necklace and walking away, police said on Friday.
Austrian media said the Van Cleef and Arpels necklace, with 673 precious stones, was worth several million dollars. It is the latest in a series of high-profile heists to hit European museums.
Police said the two men did not wear masks, paid to enter the museum and were clearly seen on surveillance cameras in Thursday's heist.
They "smashed a glass display case" with a hammer before "fleeing with the jewellery in an unknown direction," said a police statement.
The MAK museum confirmed the theft but said it would not comment while the investigation went ahead.
The necklace had been part of an exhibition devoted to the French designers Van Cleef and Arpels. Some 500 pieces had been on display since June. The exhibition is scheduled to end on September 27.
Despite the MAK announcing the exhibition would remain closed until further notice, the wing where the theft occurred reopened hours later.
The stolen necklace was designed for the former Egyptian royal family and was worn by Queen Nazli in 1939 for the marriage of her daughter Faiza to the future Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
On its website, Van Cleef and Arpels called the stolen piece a "triumph of white jewellery." The French company did not immediately comment on the theft.
European museums have been hit by a series of spectacular thefts since thieves in October broke into the Louvre museum in Paris in broad daylight, escaping in less than eight minutes with jewellery worth €88 million.
Related
Thieves on Thursday raided the Treasure of Villena, one of the greatest Bronze Age gold collections, at a museum in the Spanish city of Villena, taking most of the 50-plus mainly gold bracelets, bowls, bottles and other items on display.
Four works "of extraordinary value" by Renaissance artist Antonello da Messina were stolen from a museum in Sicily, Italy's culture ministry said Sunday.
Two days earlier, Italian police said they had recovered paintings by Renoir, Cezanne and Matisse worth over €8 million which were stolen from the Magnani-Rocca Foundation museum near Parma.