Her plight is the merely the most recent in a series of similar cases.

Jason Helveston of Orlando was confronted with a similar problem when the Florida city demanded he uproot the many varieties of vegetables growing in his front yard garden. The reason? Section 60.207 of the city’s Land Development Code concerning the legal requirements for residential landscaping was violated.

Alerting the authorities of the infraction was Helveston’s neighbor, Pedro Padin, who said that the gardener’s house “looks like a farm.” Padin was concerned about the garden’s potential negative effect on the value of his own property.

Ultimately, after a legal battle with the city, Helveston was allowed to keep his vegetable patch. The founder of Kitchen Gardeners International, Roger Doiron, said of the case, “This isn’t about a single garden; this is about the right to garden.”

What Doirin’s statement ultimately alludes to, however, is not some inalienable right to drag a hoe through the ground and sow seeds; rather, it rejects the abrogation of private property rights.

Last summer, the garden battle sprouted in Karl Tricamo’s own backyard—or front yard, rather. He was ordered by the city of Ferguson, MO, to remove his corn, tomatoes, sorghum, and other crops.

Of the zoning codes cited for the city’s action against Tricamo, Ferguson’s city manager, John Shaw, said, “At the end of the day, they’re there to protect homeowners and to protect their property value.”

Front yard gardens may indeed reduce property values. But are gardens violations of property rights?

Long have legal systems conflated property rights and property values, assuming the latter to be an immanent part of the former. American courts have perpetuated this fallacy, establishing the precedent that “property…may be violated without the physical taking of property” if an act “destroys it or its value” (Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 105 (1885)).

Pragmatic effect notwithstanding, this position is not logically feasible within the framework of a theory of private property. Property rights exist to prevent conflict over scarce resources by protecting the physical integrity of goods against unwanted physical damage and invasion. More broadly, property rights ensure that the owner of a physical good is free to use his property so long as he does not interfere with others’ abilities to do the same.

The preservation of property value, however, is not a right. Economist Hans-Herman Hoppe explains as follows:

[I]t is easy to recognize that nearly every action of an individual can alter the value (price) of someone else’s property…When A changes his relative valuations of beer and bread, or if A himself decides to become a brewer or baker, this changes the value of the property of other brewers and bakers. According to the view that value damage constitutes a rights violation, A would be committing a punishable offense vis-à-vis brewers or bakers.

Perhaps I decide to go on a low-carb diet; accordingly, I reduce my consumption of bread. My realignment of my relative valuation of bread obviously has a negative effect on the baker from whom I previously bought bread. Yet, even if my actions reduce the overall demand for bread, so long as I do not physically harm the baker’s goods or prevent him from using them, I do not violate his property rights.

Hoppe continues with the following:

While a person has control over whether or not his actions will change the physical properties of another’s property, he has no control over whether or not his actions affect the value (or price) of another’s property. This is determined by other individuals and their evaluations.

Returning to the garden situations, Padin, Helveston’s neighbor in Orlando, obviously has a low valuation of front yard gardens and is concerned that potential buyers of his property may as well. His property value—that is, the collection of several individuals’ subjective evaluations of his physical goods—may indeed be higher in the absence of Helveston’s garden. Nonetheless, he has no right to a higher property value.

If, in some way, a garden physically damages a neighbor’s property, then the gardener has violated his neighbor’s property rights and should be held liable. But if aesthetic taste is the only thing violated, and property value is the only thing diminished, then no argument for the removal of the garden based on property rights can be logically conjured up.

The Washington Times Communities originally published this article.

Despite being supported by different sides of the political spectrum, abortion and gun control share several striking similarities. For one, very few Americans support a complete abortion ban, just as very few citizens support a ban on all guns. Only 15-20% of Americans want abortion completely banned while about 10-15% want all citizens banned from owning guns.

Also, most Americans want abortion and gun ownership limited in some fashion. For example, around 75% of Americans oppose partial-birth abortion and around 80-90% support laws requiring background checks on potential gun buyers.

However, the federal government imposes comparatively few restrictions on gun ownership and abortion because Americans vacillate between mild support of and mild opposition to major restrictions. Thus, Congress rarely makes sweeping changes in policy regarding these issues. Shocking incidents such as Gosnell’s alleged abortions and the Sandy Hook shooting can shift public opinion for a short time. Nevertheless, these shifts rarely last, since the speed of the modern news cycle forces even the most compelling stories off the air after several weeks of frenzied coverage.

A final similarity between the issues of gun control and abortion is that the chief successes of abortion opponents and gun control supporters have occurred in state legislatures. So-called “red” states impose numerous restrictions on abortion but rarely restrictions on gun ownership while so-called “blue” states enact few abortion restrictions but many strict gun controls.

Despite these similarities, there are major political differences between abortion and gun control. Democrats usually seek gun control but not abortion restrictions while Republicans typically favor abortion restrictions and not gun control. Also, the mainstream media has in large measure sided with Democrats on both of these issues and often resorts to misleading polls in reports about gun control and abortion.

There are also differences in constitutionality regarding gun control and abortion restrictions. The Second Amendment explicitly protects the “right of the people to keep and bear arms,” so nearly all gun control is unconstitutional.  However, no part of the Constitution explicitly protects the right to abortion, which means all abortion restrictions should be constitutional.  Even “pro-choice” advocates agree the Supreme Court used terrible logic in Roe v. Wade, the decision that legalized abortion in America.

The issues of abortion and gun control illustrate the limits of using federal power to change divisive but established policy. Without a substantial congressional majority or widespread public support induced by such tragedies as Gosnell’s abortion practices or the Sandy Hook shooting, supporters of greater restrictions on abortion and guns can achieve little success on the federal level.

In June 2012, the Supreme Court ruled that most of ObamaCare is constitutional under Congress’ tax power.  According to PLF, this ruling means that ObamaCare was a bill for raising revenue.  PLF alleges that the Senate originated ObamaCare by “amending” a House bill titled the Service Members Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009.  Among other decrees, this act granted tax credits to service members seeking their first homes.  The Senate’s amendment completely replaced the title and text of the Service Members act with ObamaCare, leaving only the bill’s label of “House Resolution (H.R.) 3590.”  PLF, which calls such an amendment the “gut-and-amend” procedure, contends that the House and not the Senate should have originated ObamaCare.

In defense of ObamaCare, the Department of Justice (DOJ) argues that “the Senate may amend a House bill in any way it [the Senate] deems advisable, even by amending it [the bill] with a total substitute, without running afoul of the Origination Clause.”  DOJ further argues that ObamaCare wasn’t a bill for raising revenue because ObamaCare’s main purpose is to improve the U.S. health care system and not to raise revenue.

PLF isn’t challenging DOJ’s claim that the Senate can amend a House bill that isn’t a bill for raising revenue by completely replacing the bill’s title and text: “[PLF] does not challenge the gut-and-amend procedure generally.”  PLF is challenging only “the constitutionality of a bill for raising revenue [ObamaCare] which originated in the Senate through the use of … [the gut-and-amend procedure].”  However, if the U.S. district court rules that ObamaCare wasn’t a bill for raising revenue, then PLF’s case could appear doomed.  To strengthen PLF’s case, this article argues that according to the Origination Clause, the Senate can’t amend any House bill, whether a bill for raising revenue or not, with the “gut-and-amend” procedure.

Article 1, Section 5 of the Constitution reads, “Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”  This provision gives the Senate and House control over their rules of proceedings, including how the respective chambers handle bill amendments in general.  In the Senate and House, the current rules of procedure actually allow one chamber’s amendment on another chamber’s bill to completely replace the bill’s title and text.  Congress calls such an amendment an “amendment in the nature of a substitute” or a “complete substitute.”

However, the Supreme Court has held that, while Congress has much latitude in establishing its rules of proceedings, these rules can’t violate a part of the Constitution.  And as I’ve argued in a previous article, the Origination Clause requires that any Senate amendments on House bills, whether bills for raising revenue or not, be parts and not complete replacements of bills.

For this discussion, the relevant portion of the Origination Clause is “the Senate may propose … amendments as on other Bills” (emphasis added).  As I noted in my previous article, in more complete language, this portion appears to read, “the Senate may propose … amendments on House bills for raising revenue as on other Bills.”  Thus, the Origination Clause says any Senate amendments must be “on” House bills for raising revenue and all other House bills.¹  It’s important to note that this relevant portion of the Origination Clause doesn’t read, “[T]he Senate may propose … amendments as determined by the Rules of its Proceedings,” or even “[T]he Senate may propose … amendments as the Senate can do with other House bills.”  Clearly, the Origination Clause’s phrase of “on … Bills” is important and has a limiting purpose.

I’ve argued before that according to Samuel Johnson’s A Dictionary of the English Language (1755), the most widely used dictionary at the Constitution’s ratification, the Founders understood “on” to mean, among other definitions, “noting addition or accumulation” and “noting dependence or reliance.”  The Founders understood a “bill” to be “a law presented to the parliament [or congress], not yet made an act,” with a “law” being “a rule of action” or “a decree, edict, statute, or custom, publically established as a rule of justice.”  Thus, according to the Founders, a Senate amendment on a House bill must be an addition or attachment to a House “rule of action, decree, edict, statute, or custom.”  As an amendment, ObamaCare wasn’t an addition or attachment to a “rule of action, decree, edict, statute, or custom” from the House’s Service Members Home Ownership Tax Act of 2009.  Therefore, ObamaCare violates the Origination Clause.

Of course, the Origination Clause’s main purpose isn’t to specify the congressional procedure to amend bills.  As PLF notes, the Founders included the Origination Clause in the Constitution to keep the power to raise taxes strictly in the House, which, with its elections every two years in local districts, is the chamber of Congress most accountable to voters.  Nevertheless, the Origination Clause’s phrase of “on … Bills,” although a subtle command that Senate amendments on House bills be parts and never replacements of House bills, is a part of the Constitution’s text.

This article’s view that Senate amendments on House bills must actually be “on … Bills” is consistent with the procedures for bill amendments between chambers in Thomas Jefferson’s A Manual of Parliamentary Practice: For the Use of the Senate of the United States.  Jefferson published this manual in 1803.  From 1797 to 1801 he used his manual as, in his role as vice president of the United States, presiding officer of the Senate.

During this time, members of Congress had much uncertainty about the best practices for congressional procedures.  As the Founders modeled the U.S. Congress on the British parliament, Jefferson’s manual prescribes British parliamentary practices that he felt were relevant to the U.S. Congress.  Many scholars actually view Jefferson’s manual as the best publication on British parliamentary practices for that time.  Thus, Jefferson’s manual can help illuminate which British parliamentary practices, such as procedures for bill amendments between chambers, the Constitution may have preserved.  Aside from the Constitution itself, Jefferson’s manual may be the best Founding-era source to discover the Founders’ understanding of what could be bill amendments between chambers.

Discussing in-chamber amendments on bills, such as senators’ amendments on other senators’ bills, Jefferson said there’s much latitude for what can constitute an amendment.  For instance, Jefferson said that “[a]mendments can be made … to totally alter the nature of the proposition” and that “a new bill may be ingrafted by way of amendment[.]”  However, when discussing one chamber’s amendments on another chamber’s bills, such as Senate amendments on House bills, Jefferson makes no reference to the possibility that one chamber’s amendment can completely replace the title and text of another chamber’s bill.  Rather, Jefferson stated that “[w]hen either House … sends a bill to the other, the other may pass it [the bill] with amendments” (emphasis added).  Jefferson’s specification that “the other may pass it [the bill] with amendments” may highlight the British parliament’s practice for bill amendments that the Founders were prescribing for Senate amendments on House bills by including the phrase “on … Bills” in the Origination Clause.

Johnson’s dictionary defined “with” as in “pass it [the bill] with amendments” as, among other definitions, “in [the] company of,” “in partnership,” “noting connection,” “upon,” and “in appendage; noting consequence or concomitance.”  According to Johnson, “concomitance (or concomitancy/concomitant)” meant “together with another thing” and “conjoined with; concurrent with; coming and going with, as collateral.”  So according to Jefferson’s manual, one chamber’s amendment on another chamber’s bill must be “in [the] company of” or “conjoined with” the bill and can never completely replace the bill.  It’s perhaps telling that Jefferson’s discussion of bill amendments between chambers didn’t contain any of the following statements:

• “When either House … sends a bill to the other, the other may pass an amendment(s) without the bill[.]“
• “When either House … sends a bill to the other, the other may pass an amendment(s) instead of the bill[.]“
• “When either House … sends a bill to the other, the other may pass an amendment as a substitute for the bill[.]“

This article’s view that Senate amendments on House bills must actually be “on … Bills” is also consistent with the First Congress’ Joint Rules of the Two Houses, which the Senate and House passed in 1789.  The Senate and House agreed to these rules under their power in Article 1, Section 5 of the Constitution to determine their rules of proceedings, and these joint rules were Congress’s first.  The Joint Rules of the Two Houses‘ rule regarding bill amendments, which lasted until 1876, mostly described how to settle differences between chambers regarding an amendment and not what could constitute a bill amendment.  The joint rule reads as follows (emphasis added):

That in every case of an amendment of a bill agreed to in one House, and dissented to in the other, if either House shall request a conference, and appoint a committee for that purpose, and the other House shall also appoint a committee to confer, such committees shall, at a convenient hour, to be agreed on by their Chairman, meet in the Conference Chamber, and state to each other, verbally, or in writing, as either shall chuse, the reasons of their respective Houses for and against the amendment, and confer freely thereon.²

However, notice that this joint rule for bill amendments contains no language suggesting that “an amendment of a bill” between chambers can completely replace a bill’s title and text.  In fact, the most relevant definition from Johnson’s dictionary of the word “of” in the context of “an amendment of a bill” appears to be “concerning; relating to.”  This definition indicates that one chamber’s amendment “of” another chamber’s bill must be part of the bill and can’t become a complete substitute of the bill.

The Origination Clause’s requirement that Senate amendments on House bills actually be “on” House bills, whether bills for raising revenue or not, is a subtle constitutional requirement regarding congressional proceedings.  However, given the original meaning of the Origination Clause’s phrase of “on … Bills” that this article articulates, this requirement is clear.  Also, this requirement is consistent with the procedures for bill amendments in Jefferson’s Manual of Parliamentary Practice from 1803 and the joint rule between the Senate and House regarding bill amendments that lasted from 1789 to 1876.

Of course, legal scholars should obtain more evidence from the Founding era, such as Founders’ discussion of bill amendments before the Founding and further discussion of British parliamentary practices regarding bill amendments between houses, to verify this article’s claims.  Nevertheless, according to this article, ObamaCare wasn’t an amendment “on” a House bill for raising revenue or any other House bill.  Thus, contrary to DOJ’s claims, ObamaCare runs afoul of the Origination Clause.  PLF should start making this argument.

American Thinker originally published this article.

¹ As the Senate and House are equal chambers of Congress, one could argue that the Origination Clause’s requirement that Senate amendments must be “on” House bills also requires House amendments to be “on” Senate bills.

² Researcher’s Note: I obtained this joint rule from the Journal of the House of Representatives of the United States, which, along with the Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, may be the best record of the First Congress’s proceedings.  See the House’s journal entry on April 17, 1789. Some congressional records don’t list this joint rule regarding bill amendments as a rule from 1789′s Joint Rules of the Two Houses.  However, this discrepancy may be because of poor recordkeeping in Congress.  One example of a poor congressional record is this Senate record (scroll to page 4) from 1790 that lists 1789′s Joint Rules Between the Houses but excludes the joint rule regarding bill amendments.  I obtained this Senate record from Early American Imprints. Regardless, later congressional records, such as this entry (see footnote 2) from Hinds’ Precedents of the House of Representatives of the United States, Volume IV (1907), list this joint rule regarding bill amendments as originating from 1789.  Thus, it’s clear that Congress passed this joint rule in the First Congress.

Once among the 10 wealthiest countries in the world, Argentina has been declining for decades due to the lack of economic freedom. Dictatorships under the appearance of democracy have made Argentina’s economy one of the world’s most oppressed ones. According to the Heritage Foundation’s 2013 Index of Economic Freedom, Argentina ranks 160^th out of 177 countries.

But why should Americans care?

Last February in the Washington Times, Nita Ghei called Argentina a textbook example of what a country’s economy shouldn’t be like. With the following passage, Ghei warned that the United States could be following Argentina’s footsteps:

Here in the United States, the problem is eerily similar. We enjoy great abundance of natural resources and a historic dominance over rival economies. Yet our government is squandering this bounty, headed on a course of reduced economic freedom. At least we still have time to learn from the mistakes of others before we share the Argentine fate.

The Argentinian government even tries to hide its damage to the economy.  For instance, the government redefined “inflation” to hide actual inflation.  Also, the government impairs Argentineans from traveling abroad. As Argentinean pesos are almost useless in foreign countries, an Argentinean citizen planning to visit the United States usually needs to purchase U.S. dollars for his or her trip. However, according to the rules of Argentina’s Federal Administration of Public Income, citizens can no longer purchase U.S. dollars.  This policy is tantamount to saying “You’re banned from leaving Argentina!”

U.S. citizens working in Argentina face a similar situation, as the Argentinean government is banning them from converting their earnings in pesos to U.S. dollars. This policy prevents workers from controlling their legitimate income.  It’s now the Argentinean government that decides how workers, whether Argentinean or American, can spend their income.  As an American, can you imagine not having the liberty to travel beyond U.S. borders with your own money?

Recently, Argentineans have made some amazing achievements, such as Argentinean Cardinal Mario Bergoglio becoming the new Pope and Princess Máxima Zorreguieta Cerruti becoming the next Queen of the Netherlands.  However, the Argentinean administration’s socialist tendency remains a burden for the country’s economy, which unfortunately has few stories of successful entrepreneurs, investors, and small business owners.

As with many other European and Latin American countries, Argentina is following a socialist path.  But rather than producing a state of equality where everybody has the best opportunities to progress, this social path makes everyone equally poor.  Well, maybe not everyone is equally poor, as the political leaders progressively increase their wealth.

Could the South American trend toward socialism reach the United States?  While many Americans value civil liberties, watch out! Economic freedom in America is also under fire, and economic freedom is necessary for personal freedom.  Nevertheless, Americans shouldn’t be hopeless.  Not at all!  Let’s go liberty, let’s go property! Hear, Americans, the sacred cry: Freedom! Freedom! Freedom!

-Union General William Sherman, 1863

Should the U.S. government or military censor wartime information in national security’s name? In my recently published article “Avoiding Bloodshed? US Journalists and Censorship in Wartime” in War & Society, I argue the answer is no and that any withholding of wartime information by U.S. journalists should be voluntary.

Focusing on World Wars I and II and the Korean War, Vietnam War, and Persian Gulf War, my article also examines censorship of U.S. journalists in wartime and, from war to war, trends in types of censored information. My article further answers whether any censorship has avoided bloodshed or been legitimate.

I begin with World War I because it was the first U.S. war with large-scale censorship. During earlier American wars, such as the Revolutionary War and Mexican War, communications and printing were slow and so journalists couldn’t keep up with war’s pace. Thus, for the most part government and military officials were unconcerned with wartime reporting. However, by the Civil War many journalists used telegraphs, so news spread more quickly. Multiple reports of war information, such as battle plans, angered such Union generals as William Sherman. Nevertheless, in the Civil War there was no official, widespread censorship of war information. In the Spanish-American War, military personnel routinely censored journalists’ telegraphs for mentions of “projected movements of bodies of troops, naval vessels, and transports.”

In World Wars I and II and the Korean War, Vietnam War, and Persian Gulf War, the government or military used varying methods of censorship.  For instance, in World Wars I and II the government suppressed journalists with the Espionage Act of 1917, which banned publication of such information as “false statements with intent to interfere with the…success of the military”; the Post Office blocked the distribution of publications in the U.S. mail; and military personnel censored thousands of journalists’ communications sent through the war zones.  In the Korean War and Persian Gulf War, journalists in war zones had to submit all their articles, photos, and videos for censorship review before publication.  During the Vietnam War, a federal court blocked several newspapers from publishing articles about the Pentagon Papers that disclosed, among other revelations, decisions by U.S. officials to secretly escalate the war.  These injunctions ranged from five to fifteen days.

Nevertheless, in all five wars the government or military did perhaps most censorship with long lists of censorship rules that the government or military forced journalists to follow. For instance, in World War II the lists for journalists operating in the United States were called the Code of Wartime Practices for the American Press (for print journalists) and Code of Wartime Practices for American Broadcasters (for radio broadcasters). These lists banned revelation of such information as troop movements, statistics on critical war supplies, and locations of bomb shelters in the United States. The government forced compliance with these lists by threatening more censorship of journalists in general using the Espionage Act, the Post Office’s mail censorship, and other methods. For journalists operating in war zones, the military had a separate list that prohibited release of such information as inaccurate information, information embarrassing to the United States, and effects of enemy fire on targets in war zones. Journalists who violated the military’s rules faced possible detainment, expulsion from a war zone, or suspension or revocation of accreditation to cover war operations.

In each war, much and sometimes perhaps most censorship was unrelated to protecting national security. For instance, in World War I a court convicted communist leader Rose Stokes of violating the Espionage Act for writing in the Kansas City Star, “I am for the people[,] and the Government is for the Profiteers.” In World War II, the Post Office blocked issues of X-Ray (Indiana) in the U.S. mail after it declared Pearl Harbor “sunk the hopes of Jewry in this country — and the world forever, Amen and Amen.” In the Vietnam War, President Lyndon Johnson ordered the Federal Bureau of Investigation to investigate CBS broadcaster Morley Safer for “[c]ommunist ties” after he reported a story critical of U.S. Marines fighting in Vietnam.

From war to war, there has been little consistent consensus expressed in censorship rules on specific types of war information.  As my article’s Appendix shows, of 120 types of information that the government or military censored between the five wars only the following five (4%) types of information were in censorship rules in all these wars:

• Information on future military operations/military plans/secret war plans
• Movements of troops, warships, fighter planes, ships, or rails
• Statistics on critical war supplies
• Effectiveness of the enemy’s camouflage, cover, deception, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures
• Aerial photos/views of sites of military importance

Most specific reporting restrictions lasted only one or two wars. For example, the Vietnam War had several rules unique to that conflict, including bans on revealing the number of air strikes and identification of enemy weapon systems used to down friendly aircraft.  And in only World Wars I and II, the rules banned mention of harbor defenses and merchant ships’ departure times. Why was there so little consistency from war to war? Among other reasons, changes occurred from war to war in the types of threats facing the U.S. military, homeland, civilians, or allies (e.g., artillery, submarines, or A-bombs).

Numerous censorship rules from World Wars I and II and the Korean War may now seem excessive or silly, such as rules banning mention of information that is inaccurate, injurious to the morale of U.S. citizens, embarrassing to the United States, or that vilifies U.S. armed forces. Nevertheless, throughout all five wars many of the censorship rules were legitimate and surely have avoided bloodshed, such as rules banning mention of troop locations, information about U.S. harbor defenses, activities of friendly guerillas, and operations and methods of U.S. intelligence in war zones.

Regardless, my article concludes that to most legitimately ensure safe reporting and avoid censorship of information unrelated to national security in any future U.S. wars, the U.S. government or military should do the following:

Without forcing journalists or threatening to force their compliance…the government or military [sh]ould issue all journalists… a list of potentially dangerous types of war information. Such a list would have no stipulations mandating journalists agree to censorship rules to cover war operations or, if there were violations, that journalists face possible detainment, expulsion from a war zone(s), or suspension or revocation of accreditation. There could be no censorship of journalists in the United States or war zones by, say, threatening enforcement of the Espionage Act or having a review system of correspondents’ articles, videos, and photos by public affairs officers. In such a war, rules’ rationales, such as Sun Tzu’s following rationale for concealing war plans in The Art of War, may help journalists distinguish when it would be safe versus possibly dangerous to report certain war information:

The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points; and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few.

Thus far in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the government has issued U.S. journalists operating in the United States no censorship rules. Nevertheless, throughout both of these wars journalists operating in Afghanistan and Iraq have been following censorship rules that the Department of Defense (DOD) and military devised. The rules have banned release of such types of information as details of search and rescue missions, the effectiveness of improvised explosive devices, and identifiers of enemy prisoners of war. Of course, these journalists have been under the usual threat of losing access to cover war operations for rule violations. However, it’s not too late for the DOD and military to issue all U.S. journalists a voluntary list of “censorship” rules for rest of these wars.¹

¹ Some readers may be alarmed that this article espouses absolute freedom for journalists to report war information, even if a report could hurt national security.  However, as I’ll argue in a future article, the past censorship of war information by the U.S. government and military has violated the original meaning of the First Amendment’s “freedom of…the press.” My suggestion that, in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and any future U.S. wars, the government or military should issue journalists a voluntary list of “censorship” rules would comport with this original meaning. Readers who may want the “freedom of…the press” to have a national security exception should be prepared to ignore the original meaning of “freedom of…the press” and accept other violations of press freedom.

For one, the Constitution permits capital punishment if there’s “due process” of law.  However, this punishment is inconsistent with the “unalienable” right to life that the Declaration of Independence articulated:

[A]ll men…are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.

Also, Ron Paul once aptly said, “Government should never be able to do anything you [as an individual] can’t do. If you can’t steal from your neighbor, you can’t send the government to your neighbor to steal for you.” This guiding principle, although perhaps imperfect in application for such situations as jailing murderers, can be applied to capital punishment. If individuals can’t kill for revenge or punishment, then the government shouldn’t be able to do so.

Furthermore, states have imposed capital punishment on some innocent inmates. Just consider Kirk Bloodsworth, a Marylander convicted in 1984 for raping and killing a 9-year-old girl in Baltimore. He spent nine years in prison, serving two on death row. In 1992, he arranged for DNA testing, which revealed his DNA didn’t match the DNA found at the crime scene.

Lastly, capital punishment by a state isn’t necessarily a “just” punishment for murderers. At the very least, as Murray Rothbard argued in The Ethics of Liberty, the victim’s heirs and not the state should decide if the murderer should receive death as punishment.

Maryland and other states continue to violate the right to life in other ways, such as with legalized abortion and euthanasia. However, Maryland’s repeal of capital punishment is a positive step.

However, my opponents’ charge does contain an element of truth. I seek to impose my political views, which my religion helps shape, on others through legal means. This inclination is common, since most people involved with American politics seek to impose their political views on others.

Different factors help shape everyone’s political views. For instance, some people’s views are influenced by their love of the environment, their childhood experiences, historical figures they admire, and even celebrities. Religion is just one of many factors that affect one’s political views.

Some of my opponents argue that the First Amendment prohibits any religious influence on government. However, the First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” The First Amendment prohibits the establishment of a government religion and protects individuals’ liberty to practice and profess their religion. The First Amendment does not say that the government must exclude religious influences from the political sphere.

Of course religious principles will have some influence on the formation of law, since law is largely an extension of societal morality. Many laws are expressions of moral principles. For example, laws against assault and murder are based in part upon the moral principle that residents must respect the lives of their fellow citizens.

The opportunity to express one’s political views regardless of which factors, such as religion, helped shape these views is a feature of America’s political system. I believe in a society that supports the right to life, a definition of marriage that encourages the formation of families, and an economic system that promotes free enterprise and personal charity towards the disadvantaged.  I work diligently to persuade my fellow citizens to help express my political views in laws.

However, I wouldn’t seek to pass a law against, say, abortion just because God or my Church commands that abortion is immoral. I support pro-life laws primarily to protect the right to life, and my pro-life views are shaped by my belief in basic human rights, the need for societal self-preservation, my religion, and other factors.

My ideological opponents may get outraged that religion influences my political views and that other individuals’ religion may influence American law. But these opponents should note that my views are shaped by many factors besides my religion. At the very least, these opponents should be aware that their irreligion influences their political views.

Paul’s filibuster was an amazing event to behold and a production that Hollywood’s top writers could not have scripted more perfectly. Paul embodied the importance of taking a stand in his enduring effort to defend the Constitution and Americans’ liberties. His opening comments, which follow, laid the groundwork for the next 13 hours:

I rise today to begin to filibuster John Brennan’s nomination for the C.I.A. I will speak until I can no longer speak. I will speak as long as it takes, until the alarm is sounded from coast to coast that our Constitution is important, that your rights to trial by jury are precious, that no American should be killed by a drone on American soil without first being charged with a crime, without first being found to be guilty by a court.

Paul continued to outline what he sees as the drone program’s danger: the possibility of the government or military killing American citizens who are non-combatants on U.S. soil without due process of law. Paul reminded his listeners that the drone program’s “sentence first, verdict afterwards” mentality is better suited for Alice’s Wonderland than America the Beautiful. He went on to caution that, when Americans lose the due process of law, “…basically what you have is an unlimited imperial presidency.” He also cautioned, “Don’t think if you give the president the power to kill Americans that it’s a temporary power.” Governments rarely relinquish power.

Paul requested that President Barack Obama give him direct and clear clarification on drone use in the United States. When Obama provided no response, Paul continued his crusade in defense of life, freedom, and Americans’ liberties. In the end, Paul did not stand alone. Citizens nationwide tweeted their encouragement and thanks for Paul’s efforts, and the filibuster became a bipartisan discussion about the importance of protecting liberty. During the filibuster, senators from around the country stepped up with long-winded questions for Paul, giving him breaks from constant speaking and helping his cause.

Conspicuously missing during the filibuster was the malice and name calling so often found in Congress. Paul even spoke several times of his great respect for President Obama, calling him a “champion of civil rights.” Paul reminded everyone listening that the filibuster was not about stopping a Democratic president’s nominee, as Paul had in fact supported several of Obama’s previous nominations.

The filibuster also remained remarkably on topic. Paul, and senators who stood to show him support, read relevant letters of correspondence from constituents and government memos, pages worth of #StandWithRand tweets, and pertinent quotes from Shakespeare, Ronald Reagan, and several poets. Unlike previous filibusters from other senators, Paul never sank to reading aloud information from a phone book.

I rarely suggest that we should use a member of Congress as a model of behavior, but today I make an exception. Paul was classy and strong. He picked up a torch with no guarantee that others would help him carry it. We would live in a better world if we all stood as courageously, honestly, and confidently for our beliefs and our liberties as Paul did yesterday.

Widespread concern over the loss of basic liberties is coming up late in Obama’s presidency. Citizens are losing ground. However, as anyone who enjoys good baseball games (such as ones between the Yankees and the Red Sox) knows, a game is not always over at the bottom of the ninth inning. Paul’s filibuster may not have garnered Obama’s immediate response about drone use —the administration waiting until today to respond, but Paul may have gotten us into extra innings in the fight for liberty. Let’s make them count.

Original version originally published on The Modern Advocate.

I agree with a recent argument by Father Shenan J. Boquet, President of Human Life International, that “Not only is this latest accommodation not acceptable, the entire [ObamaCare] law is still an affront to human rights, especially the right to life.  The entire law must be abolished[.]”

However, I was shocked by Father Boquet’s suggestion that “HHS Secretary [Kathleen] Sebelius has almost unlimited power to make any changes to the rules as needed, with little oversight from Congress.” Really? Can an agency’s secretary regulate people as she pleases?

Nevertheless, Father Boquet’s quote that shocked me the most was the following:

While it appears that some additional entities may be provided relief from the unjust mandate, others, such as for-profit business and not-for-profits whom the administration deems insufficiently religious, are still subject to coercion.

Which of America’s Founding Founders stated that only “religious enough” people can enjoy freedom? Which constitutional standards does HHS even use to establish that, if an employer doesn’t qualify as “religious,” then the employer can have only a small amount of liberty?

I think the only answer to my above questions is that according to ObamaCare and HHS, Americans aren’t religious enough to be free and shouldn’t be free enough to be religious.  An interesting paradox!

If HHS invents a scale that could weigh my conscience, then I’ll provide my employees with contraceptives and abortifacients.

The New York State Catholic Conference argues this “no discrimination of abortion rights” provision could “permit state regulators…to require support for abortion from any agency or institution licensed or funded by the state.” As the state grants medical licenses, New York could deny licenses to — and thus shut down — such institutions as Catholic and other hospitals or clinics that refuse to support abortion. New York could also deny these institutions Medicaid payments and other funding, which some of these institutions need for financial stability.

Other provisions in New York’s RHA would establish abortion on demand in New York. For instance, the RHA would permit abortions until birth, allow public funding of abortion and repeal the requirement of parental notifications for minors’ abortions.

New York didn’t invent reproductive health acts. The state of Washington and six other states have passed RHAs that have such allowances as late-term abortions and public funding of abortions. However, to date only Washington has passed a “no discrimination of abortion rights” provision. Also, since 1989 members of Congress have attempted to pass versions of a freedom of choice act (FOCA), which have contained many of the same provisions as New York’s RHA.

For instance, California Sen. Barbara Boxer’s Freedom of Choice Act of 2004, which died in committee, permitted late-term abortions. Also, this act declared, “A government [the federal government or state and local governments] may not…discriminate against the exercise of…[abortion] rights…in the regulation or provision of benefits, facilities, services, or information.”

If enough states pass reproductive health acts similar to New York’s, there could be momentum for the U.S. Congress to pass a freedom of choice act. However, passing a freedom of choice act has proven difficult. It seems more likely the U.S. Congress would simply pass a “no discrimination of abortion rights” law using Ms. Boxer’s above provision from 2004 or a similar provision. Congress could even amend Obamacare by replacing its provisionsallowing health care plans to have “Voluntary Choice of Coverage of Abortion Services” with a “no discrimination of abortion rights” mandate. Such a mandate would leave America with only health care providers who offer or refer for abortions.

It is not too far-fetched to say New York’s “no discrimination of abortion rights” provision could eventually become national policy. Just consider the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) contraception/abortifacient mandate. Despite the so-called “accommodation” for religious liberty passed in early February, HHS is forcing Catholic and other religious employers to fund or help provide their employees’ contraception and abortifacients through health insurance plans.

In 1996, West Virginia became the first state to mandate that health insurance must include contraceptives. By 2010, 25 other states, such as Maryland and Colorado, passed similar contraception mandates. When HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius announced the HHS contraception/abortifacient mandate in January 2012, she said, “This rule is consistent with the laws in a majority of states which already require contraception coverage in health plans…”

Pro-lifers nationwide must recognize the threat to life and liberty in New York’s “no discrimination of abortion rights” provision. Groups such as New Yorkers for Life have been working to overturn the act, but there is much more to be done. Pro-lifers must oppose New York’s reproductive health act and, at the very least, defeat the “no discrimination of abortion rights” provision. If not, this provision could spread to other states and eventually become national policy.

The Washington Times originally published this article.