Lonely Soldier: Memoir of an American in the Israeli Army

noreply@blogger.com (Adam Harmon) — Sat, 25 Apr 2009 19:49:00 +0000

Living in a Democracy. Working in an Autocracy.

I recently took part in a planning session at work. The team had been debating competing approaches for nearly twenty minutes when a member of our executive team expressed his preferred tactic. Discussion ended instantly. The team aligned itself with the executive as if his opinion meant more than any other – and outweighed all others combined.

I work for a large global high tech company, but this dyanmic – where subordinates reflexively defer to the judgement of managers – is the norm at American organizations of all sizes and across all industries.

Despite the common misconception, smaller organizations aren’t more progressive or agile than larger ones just because they have fewer layers of bureacracy. In fact, they are often more hierarchical than their larger competitors. Whether your organization has 100,000 employees or 10, there’s a 100% chance that your organization is essentially autocratic and feudal.

Between American political correctness and a US culture that encourages acquiescence to superiors, it is hard for people to openly contradict colleagues, scrutinize managers, and give equal weight to opinions expressed by those at the lowest level of authority. This dynamic leads to avoidable missteps, missed opportunities, stifles debate, discourages innovation, limits options considered, and inhibits the ability of an organization to make vital course corrections rapidly.

A strong hierarchy benefits an organization in the short-term, but most research suggests that long-term success depends on decentralized decision-making.

As Americans, we are proud to live in a country where everyone – irrespective of socio-economic standing – is equal under the law and where the majority rules. But we abdicate these principles and rights the moment we enter the workplace. To achieve the level of business agility, operational excellence and long-term competitiveness that ambitious organizations seek, personnel at all levels of the organization need to have an equal voice in decision-making.

Given our culture, it may seem like a waste of time and a little bit dangerous to give a new employee with 1 year of professional experience the opportunity to critique and re-shape a CEO’s 5-year plan, but this is the kind of dramatic change in corporate culture that is required to achieve business agility and be competitive in the 21st century.

I am not calling for a corporate Tea Party, promoting mob rule, suggesting we elect CEO’s by popular vote, or believe we should abandon modern corporate organizational structures that have served us well for decades.

But a new approach is needed. For over a decade, there have been efforts to transform traditional organizations – that are based on 19th century thinking and 20th century management systems – into learning organizations and high performance cultures. Despite the substantial amount of resources invested and executive sponsorship, progress has been limited to incremental improvements in niche areas like decision-making, accountability, innovation, or leadership development.

Leading experts have been unable to fully realize and implement their vision of high performance. To a large extent, this is because they lack a real world example of a large organization that epitomizes the characteristics of a learning organization and a mature high performance culture.

As a result, corporations, government agencies, and the military are left without clear guidance on best practice approaches or a proven method for transforming organizations into high performance cultures.

One organization does epitomize the character traits and organizational behaviors of a learning organization and mature high performance culture, but it isn’t a corporation and it isn’t based in the US. It is a well-known foreign organization that has successfully employed this model for over 60 years – the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

Although counter-intuitive, the IDF is more agile and less formal than a Silicon Valley start-up. A private and a general are on a first-name basis. The IDF systematically and continuously empowers a private to impact the organization’s strategy and tactics. And as is well-known, the IDF has demonstrated an uncanny ability to consistently adapt quickly, learn from mistakes, and defeat emerging threats.

The IDF has a traditional hierarchical structure – that is responsible for creating strategy, setting priorities, managing processes, ensuring unity of effort, running operations, and overseeing growth. At the same time, the IDF has a parallel bottom-to-top framework that has equal influence over all decision-making.

Generals can’t adopt new strategies without the endorsement of the privates who will be implementing those policies in the field. Privates and Sergeants are also duty-bound to critique the strategies and tactics that are championed by their superiors. Most briefing sessions – where senior leaders explain their plan to subordinates –lead to changes in strategy, tactics, and even force structure due to questions and suggestions by soldiers of the lowest rank. Privates, who are on a first name basis with Generals, are trained to think critically and encouraged to constantly scrutinize their leaders.

The relatively seamless integration between these two decision-making frameworks – one that is top-to-bottom and the other which is bottom-to-top – enables the IDF to rapidly adjust to changes in the competitive environment. This capability also enables the IDF to replicate success across the entire organization and nearly eliminate risk of repeating past failures.

A culture that encourages decision-making through consensus, as opposed to an organization chart, creates additional challenges for leaders, but it also requires subordinates to perform at a much higher level than would otherwise be expected.

Within the IDF and the Israeli public, there is widespread recognition that the bottom-to-top framework is the locus of all innovation, the key to quality decision-making, and the engine for ensuring continuous competitive advantage over the IDF’s opponents. This recognition makes it easy for senior leaders to trust subordinates and respect them as equals.

As compared to any other large organization, the IDF benefits from an unrivalled level of trust between the senior leadership and the lowest ranking members of the organization. This is the result of another cultural trait that is unique to the IDF – public accountability of failures, mistakes, and misjudgments.

In most organizations, individuals at all levels within a hierarchy fear public exposure of mistakes because they assume that missteps will reflect poorly on their judgment and will potentially place their professional growth at risk. The IDF emphasizes the criticality of public accountability and has created a system that encourages new recruits, young officers, and generals to clearly identify errors and discuss lessons learned. This system dramatically improves the relationship between leaders and subordinates while helping to ensure that an organization doesn’t replicate past mistakes.

The IDF, which operates on a scale that is comparable to the world's largest corporations, is not perfect – no organization is – but it has achieved success and leadership in a field that requires constant adaption. Its unique culture empowers soldiers to think critically and take command – as opposed to just following orders.

For organizations that are attempting to transform themselves into a learning organization with a high performance culture or are focusing on leadership development, the IDF provides insights that extend well-beyond standard research on these topics. In addition, the existence of a real-world example may enable leading practitioners in this field to move beyond the relatively narrow scope of current efforts and finally achieve the fundamental changes they have sought for over a decade.

noreply@blogger.com (Adam Harmon) — Thu, 08 Jan 2009 22:08:00 +0000

French Ceasefire Surrenders Opportunity for Strategic Victory

Israeli military and political leaders have acted wisely in the planning and execution of this operation. They have clearly learned from mistakes made during the 2006 conflict with Hezbollah, but Israeli leaders seem to be on the verge of missing the opportunity to achieve a strategic victory – to end Hamas rule in Gaza and eliminate its military organization.

Contrary to popular opinion, there are military solutions to political problems. The US military surge in Iraq created the conditions for stability and political progress in Iraq. Likewise, the continuation of the current IDF operation in Gaza will create conditions for political progress between Israelis and Palestinians. Ironically, the calls to stop fighting and start talking will lead to further bloodshed – and not just between Israelis and Palestinians. The strongest voices in favor of a ceasefire are from countries that are thousands of miles away from the actual conflict. Those neighboring governments most affected by Hamas rule over the Gaza Strip – the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Egypt – are not nearly as keen about the ceasefire and have both been very critical of Hamas.

For the PA, the internationally recognized government and leadership of the Palestinian people, Hamas is the organization that removed it from power in Gaza by way of a military coup. During the first day of the Israeli operation, a leading member of the PA stated that they would be ready to take control of Gaza if Israel dislodges Hamas. For Egypt, Hamas is an armed off-shoot and strong supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Mubarak regime’s primary political competitor. And all Sunni Arab regimes considered moderate by the western world – from Saudi Arabia and Jordan to Bahrain – would view the destruction of Hamas as a valuable blow to the growing Iranian Shi’a threat.

The French ceasefire proposal would actually ensure the survival of an organization that is officially designated – by the French, the European Union, and the United States – a terrorist organization.

Even a brief ceasefire provides Hamas with time to reorganize, plan, reassert control over Gaza, and ready itself for future attacks. Hamas will not be satisfied with being the de facto rulers of Gaza. The West Bank -- where analysts believe Hamas would already have control if it were not for the Israeli military presence in the area – is next. Future attacks on Israel are assured and attempts to destabilize moderate regimes like Jordan and Egypt are likely.

A ceasefire only postpones the inevitable conflict between Israel and Hamas. Better for Israel to finish off Hamas now than wait until later, when Hamas has become more powerful – politically and militarily. A ceasefire under current conditions would greatly enhance Hamas political clout, just as it did for Hezbollah. And no matter what controls are discussed, Hamas will re-arm.

Given the recognition by foreign governments that Israel is justified in its determination to neuter Hamas military capabilities and the fact that the destruction of Hamas is also in the vested interest of Israel’s Arab neighbors, Israel has the legitimacy required to replicate the successful strategy of Operation Defensive Shield.

As with Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, Israel should call up an additional 20,000 reservists and deploy them alongside 15,000 members of its standing army. Together, these ground forces will be able to rapidly dominate Gaza. Once Hamas is removed as a threat, the PA will immediately assert itself as the legal authority to administer the rebuilding of Gaza. Arab nations like Saudi Arabia and Western donor nations will welcome PA control over Gaza and will donate funds to enable reconstruction. The PA would not reject the opportunity to regain control over Gaza because of the perception that it relied on – and therefore would become associated with -- an Israeli military operation to achieve this goal. The desire to be the sole ruler of all Palestinian people again would override this concern and the PA would counter-balance this perception by its statements and actions. No one will mistake the PA for an Israeli surrogate – in many ways this type of arrangement between the PA and Israel in the West Bank today.

While the PA military and police forces – especially those trained recently by US General Jones – assert control over Gaza, IDF forces would need to continue conducting pinpoint operations to ensure that Hamas is unable to reconstitute itself. As with the West Bank today, Israeli intelligence and infantry units would conduct these ongoing counter-insurgency operations while the PA administers the day-to-day life of the Palestinian civilian population, including coordination with Israel to open the border crossings. The Israeli military operations would be continuous, but they would not necessarily require a base of operations with Gaza once PA forces enter.

To ensure the legitimacy of the PA, planned elections for 2009 should go ahead, but with one small change. Organizations that fail to meet the international standards for a Palestinian government – the willingness to accept prior agreements signed by the PA, the recognition of Israel, and the renunciation of terrorism – will not be able to participate in Palestinian national elections. This will eliminate Hamas from the process and ensure that the current PA leadership the opportunity to finalize a peace agreement with Israel and significantly improve the lives of the Palestinian people.

The cost in Israeli lives to dismantle Hamas and essentially liberate the Gaza Strip for the Palestinian Authority may be high. As a reserve soldier who would likely participate in that operation, I believe that the long-term security gained for both Israelis and Palestinians would justify the cost.
If instead, Israel and the international community revert to policies that have consistently failed in the past, we will have missed a historic opportunity to create a catalyst for peace, will weaken the position of moderate Arab nations, and strengthen the determination of Islamic radicals to confront the West.

noreply@blogger.com (Adam Harmon) — Sun, 04 Jan 2009 03:09:00 +0000

When To Cease Fire

The Israeli military has racked up several remarkable achievements in the last week, but the hard part is still ahead of us – and I’m not just referring to the ground invasion. Israeli leaders must withstand the mounting pressure to halt the operation prematurely.

Moments after Israel launched its operation, European leaders were calling on Israel to stop. They were not alone. Leaders and groups from across the world are calling on Israel to halt its military operations. The response of these nations and groups are reflexive and expected. This is how the West reacts to violence in the Middle East. The mantra is “Stop fighting. Start talking.”

That’s a nice sentiment when you’re at café, university, park, or government office thousands of miles away from the actual conflict. Egypt borders both Israel and Gaza. They explicitly blame Hamas, have shown considerable understanding of Israel’s actions, and call on Hamas – not Israel – to unilaterally halt its attacks. Palestinian leaders in the West Bank bluster, but they were eager to mention on the first day of Israel’s operation that they are ready to take control of Gaza if Israel dislodges Hamas.

The governments most affected by Hamas rule over the Gaza Strip – the Palestinian Authority and Egypt – aren’t suggesting that Israel engage Hamas in dialogue. They understand something that much of the Western world has still failed to internalize – you can’t convince Islamic radicals to stop being Islamic radicals. I am not suggesting that Islamic radicals aren’t rational. They are very rational and many of their leaders are politically sophisticated. It’s just that their strongly held beliefs – which are essentially incomprehensible to a Western mind that has detached itself from religious and ideological thinking – lead them to see Israel as a cancer and the West as a poison that must be eradicated at all costs.

No one is going to convince the Hamas leadership to live side-by-side with Israel in peace and harmony. That is never going to happen. If they agreed to live side by side with Israel – something they have rejected continuously – they wouldn’t be Hamas anymore. That’s why nothing can be gained by entering into dialogue with them and that’s why violence is sometimes necessary. In this case, conflict between Israel and Hamas might be critical to the achievement of peace between Israel and the Palestinians. The destruction of Hamas and the subsequent re-introduction of Palestinian Authority control over Gaza would enable forward momentum in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process that is currently not possible.

Even a brief ceasefire provides Hamas with time to reorganize, plan, and ready itself for additional attacks. A longer ceasefire – that leaves Hamas intact as the de facto rulers of Gaza – only postpones the inevitable conflict between Israel and Hamas. Better for Israel to finish off Hamas now than wait until later, when Hamas has become more powerful.

The cost in Israeli lives to dismantle Hamas and essentially liberate the Gaza Strip for the Palestinian Authority may be high. As a reserve soldier, who is likely to put on his uniform in the weeks to come, I can honestly say that achieving that objective would justify the cost.

At this stage, taking away Hamas control over Gaza is not the stated objective of the Israeli government. Their goals are more modest. They want to cause Hamas to re-evaluate their strategy of firing daily rockets at Israeli cities. There is precedence for this approach. In 2004, Israel caused Hamas to re-evaluate its strategy of sending suicide bombers into Israeli cities by killing Hamas leaders Yassin and Rantisi in quick succession. It is possible that today’s Hamas leaders, fearing for their lives and realizing that they are in danger of losing political power over Gaza, will meet Israel’s minimum requirement – which is to stop firing rockets and mortars at Israeli cities.

If that is the primary goal of Israel’s leadership, then they should not deploy Israeli ground troops en mass. Instead, they should continue conducting pinpoint missions that are aimed at specific Hamas leaders and institutions until the remaining Hamas leaders give in.
This approach could give Israel another year of relative quiet in the South, but the country will be eventually forced to deal with Hamas since the Palestinian Authority is unable to reconstitute itself in Gaza on its own. The cost in human life will be lower today – for both Palestinians and Israelis – than in the future. Also, success in Gaza will serve to augment Israeli deterrence with Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran. A strong Israeli deterrence is what keeps future wars from occurring.
Israeli political and military leaders must resist calls – by either foreign interested parties or internal audiences – to accept ceasefire proposals that don’t meet the minimum requirement of an immediate cessation of hostilities on the part of Hamas and a mechanism for ensuring that Hamas does not re-arm.

To achieve that end, the Israeli military can either continue targeted killings of high ranking Hamas officials while destroying Hamas symbols of power until the organization concedes defeat or the Israeli military must employ enough combat troops to enable rapid IDF domination of the Gaza Strip.

noreply@blogger.com (Adam Harmon) — Mon, 05 May 2008 02:53:00 +0000

Thousands of Palestinians Marching to Israel from Lebanon. That’s Good News for Peace.

According to media reports, Palestinian Authority leaders will stage a media event on May 14th that is meant to embarrass Israel. They are encouraging 100,000 Palestinians in Lebanon to march to the border and stage a protest.

Given that this is Israel’s 60th Independence Day, media outlets around the world would embrace the juxtaposition. If the march takes place and everyone fills their role as expected, the Palestinians will bask in the glory of their misery as seemingly hard-hearted Israelis refuse them entry. Meanwhile, protests throughout the West Bank and elsewhere will call for the end of the “occupation.”

It’s ironic, because Israel is under continuous attack from the Hamas government ruling Gaza and from terror organizations supported and celebrated by the Fatah government ruling the West Bank. The key word in the previous sentence is “government.” In all the calls to end the “occupation,” Israel’s detractors ignore the fact that Palestinians have been actually ruled by their own representatives since 1993. That’s nearly 15 years. Moreover, those very same people marching toward Israel would be citizens living in Palestine today, had the Palestinian Authority come to terms with Israel seven years ago at Camp David.

PA Deputy Minister Ziad Abu Ein, who drew up the plan, calls on Palestinians to “invade” Israel. He says that his plan is to unilaterally implement UN Resolutions 194 – which states that refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbors should be allowed to do so.

Instead of enabling the Palestinian Authority to create a media circus that only serves to increase the misery of their people, Israel should fully embrace this plan. Israel should work with the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and the Lebanese government to facilitate the stated desire of these people to reach Palestine.

Lebanon, which has refused to give citizenship and full rights to these people for decades, will very likely support this initiative. And UNRWA, which provides identity cards and social services for the Palestinians living in Lebanon, will be able to provide Israel with information and documents that will help ensure that individuals who pose security risks are denied access. The Palestinian Authority, which has invited these people to join their brethren, should welcome them. Although it would require a massive effort on Israel’s part, it would be possible for the Israeli security forces to vet individuals, issue new ID cards, and transport them to Jenin. Thereafter, the Palestinian Authority can determine how best to house, employ, and integrate these new immigrants – much as Israel has done since before its founding.

The Palestinian Authority has dubbed this plan, “The Initiative of Return and Coexistence.” If it goes according to plan, divisiveness and disappointment will only increase. The Palestinian Authority prefers to resettle these people within Israel’s borders, just as many Israelis would prefer to retain complete control over key cities in the West Bank that are historically significant to the Jewish people, but that isn’t going to happen. Both Israelis and Palestinians are going to have to settle for a practical solution.

If Palestinians living in Lebanon walk or ride to the border as part of this initiative, Israel should welcome them, bring them to one of the major cities controlled by the Palestinian government that invited them, and wish them every success in building a thriving nation like Israel.

noreply@blogger.com (Adam Harmon) — Tue, 27 Nov 2007 04:49:00 +0000

Rethinking the US Army
Interesting article by Peter Spiegel and Julian E. Barnes of the Los Angeles Times.

Although it is vital for us to rethink the US Army, I would be concerned about the consequences of creating a force that, according to the quote from Lt. General Caldwell, “…do not do direct action, they do not command and control combat forces, they are not a combat force….” The IDF doesn’t get everything right and it’s not exactly an apples-to-apples comparison, but the primary urban warfare training cadre that provides the initial instruction to all Israeli special forces/operations units also conducts operations on a regular basis to keep skills sharp and curriculum relevant.

This is an expression of an Israeli training methodology that typically integrates real-world experience with instruction. For example, by the first month of basic training, soldiers conduct low-probability-of-contact operations - such as patrols, manning checkpoints, and reconnaissance on relatively pacified villages. This is meant to gradually prepare soldiers for more complex operations and speed integration of newly acquired skills. You practice navigation and surveillance techniques on base during the day and conduct short-range reconnaissance at night.

I agree with Col. Nagl’s assessment that being a trainer/advisor “…requires a different mindset.” As we all know, the best sniper doesn’t always make the best shooting instructor. Being a great trainer requires a set of interpersonal and organizational skills that are independent of subject matter expertise. Teaching an individual to shoot, orienteer, employ communication equipment, and make a tourniquet can be taught well by people with limited field experience. In Israel, female soldiers without combat experience train soldiers on tanks, mortars, and sniping techniques. But you can’t fully instruct or evaluate skills like patrolling, manning checkpoints, counter-IED measures, and CQC in a training facility alone. People who are great at target selection during simulations are not necessarily the most reliable members of a team when in the field because, as we all know, there is a big difference between on-base exercises/simulations and real-world operations - in terms of complexity/psychological pressure and how an individual responds to it. For this reason, a trainer/advisor needs to provide insights, support, and evaluate the competency of commanders and individual soldiers in the field.

Another concerning thought that surfaced in the article was the idea, as stated by Col. Nagl, that “We don't want to do the fighting; we want our friends to do the fighting.” I don’t diminish the genuine importance of having local partners who are able to stand up on their own and assert control/authority over their territory. And believe creating a mechanism to quickly train/stand-up/buttress a local partner is of vital importance to current and future conflicts. That said, US military forces are still going to take a leading role in ensuring public security and defeating threats in most current and future conflicts - at least for an extended period of time while a local partner is trained up (we can’t assume that we’re going to have the capability or foresight to train up these local partners in time to forestall an outbreak of violence). For this reason, even if we were to establish a force dedicated to the training of US partners, it would not change the need to make other changes to force structure, leadership development, training methods, training curriculum, strategies, etc that will enable the US military to become even more effective practitioners of COIN and asymmetric warfare.

Perhaps I’m giving these sentiments, as expressed by Col Nagl, more weight than he intended, but thinking that the US military will forestall conflict and/or empower weak states primarily by training up local forces minimizes the complexity of most any future conflict we’re likely to encounter.

For example, even if we successfully cycle hundreds of thousands of local Iraqis through a highly improved training regimen and give them the highest rating in terms of ability to conduct a wide range of operations that ensure public safety, it does not necessarily follow that the Iraqi government will use this military force in an ethnically neutral way that promotes national unity, undercuts sectarian strife, diminishes the negative influences of countries like Iran, or changes the perception of the US as an occupying power that exerts undue influence over Iraq.
Certainly, improved US training capabilities will increase the military capabilities and professionalism of partners, but that does not necessarily mean that they are going to take decisive action. Without the right political framework, clear direction from a central government, and extensive civilian agreement on national priorities, it may not matter how well our partners are trained. As an organization, they still may not perform as we’d expect and like them to in the field because their effectiveness will depend not only on their ability to fight, but also on their legitimacy in the eyes of the civilian population, the political will of civilian leaders, and the belief by individual soldiers/commanders that orders received reflect both personal and national interest.

For that reason, the role of US diplomats, US civil affairs personnel, media, NGOs, etc will continue to play as vital a role as our highly-dedicated trainers/advisors in making sure that a partner’s military reaches the level of professionalism desired and demonstrates a willingness to take on the hard tasks that lead to a desirable political end-state. As a result, the military will still need to acquire new competencies, consider changes to force structure/resource allocation, and dramatically increase the level of “jointness.” Although this may be self-evident, I am a little concerned that the creation of a dedicated training corps is being perceived as a game-changing solution that mitigates the need to make many of the far-reaching changes that have been proposed and studied over the last few years.

For instance, will any new model give equal weight to non-kinetic capabilities - like development, civil affairs, and strategic communications - that are as vital to the successful prosecution of counter-insurgency, nation-building, and/or stability operations as the number of boots on the ground?

In many current and future conflicts, development projects that improve quality of life can be critical to the success of the overall mission. But since these NGOs and development agencies are unable to secure their work environments or personnel, many projects never get implemented. If these projects were considered a critical component of a battle plan or military campaign, the necessary security and logistics required for implementation would be more readily available. As long as these non-kinetic elements are not integrated within the overall strategy from the outset and included in operation plans, many of them will not be accomplished. And this could have a negative impact on the mission as a whole. For this reason, it may be incumbent on the US military to either dramatically increase its competency in this area or, at least, better integrate with the NGOs/development organizations during the strategy development and operation planning phases.

That said, Lebanon may be a good laboratory for testing how far the training and arming of a local partner - as the primary role of the US military - can go in helping to establish central authority. With some help, the Lebanese Army recently asserted control over the weakest population segment and succeeded in destroying the infrastructure of a very small militia. In and of itself, this was a big first step for this fractured country. It’s possible that this military, if further strengthened with more arms, training, and direct support, could assert control over more hotly contested territory with larger and more lethal militias like Hezbollah. I’m not sure they could, in the near term, even make the attempt without direct military support from the US, Israel, or an Arab-led coalition. Recent comments by anti-Syrian parliamentarians like Walid Jumblatt and Hariri suggest that the Lebanese believe this to be true. Unlike Iraq, Lebanon (despite the fractured nature of the country and perhaps because of exhaustion after decades of civil war) may have a clear majority of citizens that would welcome a strong, relatively secular government that asserts central control. In this way, Lebanon is not as complex as Iraq. It may just require increasing the capabilities of the existing military, encouraging leaders to continue to publicly resist Syrian/Iranian influence, and position operations as the best path to achieving the national unity that is strongly desired by civilians throughout the country.

In the future, one would expect that there will be a wide range of situations and conflicts that will require the support, if not outright intervention, of the US military. In some cases, like Iraq, the full spectrum of US political, economic, and military levers will be required. Other cases, like Lebanon, may mostly require the supply of additional arms and military training in order to achieve the desired political end-state. And there will be the majority of cases whose requirements will be somewhere in between. For instance, US support for a western-leaning government may take the form of providing logistical support and security for ongoing development projects that are critical to achieving political goals.

Although improving training capabilities is certainly important and valuable, I see it as being only one of several equally important areas where the US military needs to reallocate resources and enable change. And for what it’s worth, I do think that trainers/advisors need to fight alongside their trainees in order to evaluate the relevance of curriculum, measure troop capabilities, provide immediate feedback, and demonstrate support.

noreply@blogger.com (Adam Harmon) — Sun, 21 Oct 2007 02:56:00 +0000

Political Consequences of Military Operations in the Long War: The Israeli Perspective, 2000-2007.
I first gave this lecture at the US Army's 2007 Combat Studies Institute Symposium. This presentation details Israeli central political objectives between 2000 – 2007, key military operations and the associated political consequences, lessons learned, implications for the US military, and what Israel should learn from US experience in Iraq. This presentation is based on my experiences with the Israeli Special Forces between 1990-2003 and consulting for the US military between 2003-2007. It includes a 6 month estimate on the political situation and likely military operations.

View The Presentation

noreply@blogger.com (Adam Harmon) — Tue, 28 Aug 2007 19:34:00 +0000

Recycled Solutions Won’t Stop the Cycle of Violence

Once again, Israelis and Palestinians are on the verge of another international conference, more confidence building measures, and leaders are making statements designed to prepare Israelis and Palestinians for political concessions. It could be 1991 just before the Madrid Conference, 1993 after Oslo, 2000 at Camp David, Wye River, Sharm el-Sheikh, or Taba.

Instead of a Nobel Prize winning Rabin-Arafat handshake on the White House lawn, Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and Palestinian President Abbas talk quietly in Jericho about security coordination, reducing the Israeli military presence in the West Bank, and a final status agreement. Israeli and Palestinian leaders seem to think that it’s possible and advisable to turn back the clock to 2000, but the same obstacles to peace still remain, new challenges have emerged, and the last seven years of conflict have lessened public readiness to make peace.

By merely retracing the steps taken by their predecessors, today’s leaders virtually guarantee that the cycle of violence will continue and that their citizens will needlessly endure additional years of bloody conflict.

Ironically, the deal has already been struck, if not signed. The Palestinians will have a contiguous state that spans the West Bank and Gaza. Israel will give up a portion of its territory to make that possible. In exchange, the Palestinians will accept that an equal amount of West Bank territory will become part of Israel. In addition, the Palestinians and Israelis will share Jerusalem and a just solution for Palestinians living abroad will be found. This is inevitable, but it will be further delayed years, if not decades, because Olmert and Abbas continue to follow a process that is unnecessary and fundamentally flawed.

Today, as with the 90’s, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has two tracks. One track focuses on confidence building measures like the removal of checkpoints, prisoner releases, economic aid, members of terror organizations symbolically relinquishing arms, and limited security cooperation. Meanwhile, another track concentrates on the broader core issues like national borders, Jerusalem, and the future of Palestinians living abroad. In theory, the process builds momentum for peace and progress on one track helps support movement on the other.

Unfortunately, Oslo demonstrated that this step-by-step, drawn-out process does not work in the real world. History shows that Palestinian opposition groups, acting to derail the process and challenge the Palestinian Authority leadership, will carry out a number of terror attacks that force an Israeli military response. As the frequency of Palestinian attacks and the tempo of Israeli military responses increase, political concessions are harder to make. The inevitable failure to achieve results on the confidence building track undermines the entire process. In the end, political progress halts and violence intensifies.

In the 90’s, Hamas suicide bombers played a key role in making the Oslo Peace Process drag on for over seven years. Now Hamas controls Gaza and is strengthening its position in the West Bank. Meanwhile, Abbas is even losing control over Fatah-sponsored terror groups, like the Al-Aksa Brigades. Today’s relative calm will not last long.

For this reason, it is vital that Israeli and Palestinian leaders take immediate steps to dramatically change Israeli-Palestinian relations. A true rapprochement between these two nations is possible, but it will require a willingness on both sides to take genuine risks.

The key to success depends on a Palestinian leadership that is willing to fully embrace collaboration with Israel. Palestinian Authority leaders must make a steady stream of public announcements and enact policies that enable the Palestinian people to understand that the era of Israeli-Palestinian conflict is over and has been replaced by a strategic alliance that is critical to the establishment of a Palestinian state.

The centerpiece of this alliance will be the training of a professional Palestinian military by Israeli soldiers and a comprehensive economic development program for the West Bank and Gaza that is jointly administered by the Palestinian Authority and Israel.

The risks are clear. Palestinian Authority leaders would become politically vulnerable at a time when they need all of their strength to consolidate power. Moreover, opposition groups may consider Palestinian Authority leaders legitimate military targets. In addition, Palestinian leaders would have to relinquish their strongest propaganda tool, the rhetoric and policies of a resistance movement. For Israel, the risks include the very real possibility that a much improved Palestinian military would be more difficult to subdue if the conflict resumes. Also, given that Palestinian soldiers have attacked Israeli soldiers during joint patrols in the past, Israeli soldiers would face the possibility of being shot by presumed allies during training and joint operations.

The benefits are equally clear. Without the assistance of a robust external military force, the western-leaning Palestinian Authority will not gain central control over all of its people and it will soon lose its battle with radical groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Israel is the only country in the world that has both the military capability and the willingness to take on Hamas. Working together, the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli military can defeat the radical Islamic organizations and keep them from rising again.

Further, Palestinians need to see Israelis in new, positive ways that are condoned by Palestinian political and cultural leaders. Israel has a better track record than Europe when it comes to managing development projects and stimulating an economy that lacks natural resources. Given Israel’s capabilities, deep interest, and the need to transform Israeli-Palestinian relations, Israelis should be collaborating directly with Palestinians on development projects, not just interested parties from Europe and America.

Any dramatic step forward would require the active support of American and European leaders. Moreover, Palestinian leaders would need assurance that neighbors like Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt as well as Gulf states like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, UAE, and Kuwait all vocally support the Palestinian alliance with Israel against radical Islamists and avidly refute any suggestion of capitulation or weakness on the part of the Palestinian Authority. They must be willing to broadcast on their national radio and television news programs images of Israeli and Palestinian soldiers squaring off together against radical groups like Hamas, while providing commentary that supports those efforts. After all, the de-legitimization of radical groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad are in their national interests as well, given the growing strength of similar groups in their own countries.

The Palestinian people are the most free, secular, homogenous, and educated population in the Arab world. They want a central, democratic, and relatively secular government. If the radical Islamists are not defeated soon, this will never be achieved. And even though Israelis have built a thriving economy and one of the most liberal democracies in the world, the country yearns to live in peace with its neighbors.

Israelis and Palestinians can both achieve their national aspirations. All it takes is the willingness to collaborate and end this cycle of violence.

noreply@blogger.com (Adam Harmon) — Thu, 19 Apr 2007 03:15:00 +0000

On Iraq and Iran, America is Asking the Wrong Question

Democrats, Republicans, and Independents all want the US to succeed in Iraq, but there is wide variance of opinion when it comes to defining success. And even when people agree on what success means, there is often disagreement over the best way to achieve the desired end result.

I would argue that the failure of the current administration to execute a viable strategy for Iraq and the inability of White House opponents to formulate a widely acceptable alternative plan is a direct result of our political discourse being too narrowly focused on Iraq and Al Qaeda. This does not bode well for any emerging policy for Iran.

Over the last five years, the public has been asked to focus on the details - troop levels, casualties, money spent to rebuild Iraq, sectarian violence, enemy combatants, terror warnings, and nuclear proliferation - at the expense of a debate on a larger, far more essential issue. Should America continue to be the world’s policeman and the chief evangelist for democracy?

It is taken for granted that America is responsible for curbing the influence of unruly regimes and resolving knotty issues between aggrieved groups. The US embraced this role throughout the 20th century. But America needs to examine whether this is still aligned with our interests and whether we are still willing to act like the leader of the free world.

The lack of public debate on this critical question leads decision-makers to take half-measures that make it impossible to achieve stated goals. President Bush wants to diminish the threat of Islamic radicalism by implanting democracy in the Middle East, but does not have the political strength to dramatically increase the size of the military to ensure that we have enough boots on the ground. Forced to rely on manpower levels that essentially pre-date Iraq and Afghanistan, the US can only muster 20% of the troops required to provide security and ensure stability in Iraq. This is why the US may be on the brink of failure in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, White House opponents who want to withdraw US troops quickly are unable to gain overwhelming bi-partisan support for their position because they can’t openly articulate how this policy reversal ensures the long-term prosperity of America, outweighs our post-invasion responsibility for the well-being of Iraqi citizens, and makes the US more secure.

Both those in favor of continuing the US presence in Iraq and those against it are in a bind. Those in favor value American leadership in the world, but are afraid to ask the American people to make the sacrifices necessary to keep it. Those against it believe that diplomacy and greater focus on the home front is the best way to keep America secure, but they are afraid to tell the American people that this approach comes with a price - diminished US power and influence in the world.

The lack of public discourse almost guarantees that we won’t be number one anymore. US prestige will be lost if we continue to fight with insufficient forces or if we withdraw in defeat. But America doesn’t have to be number one. We may be better off being more like Britain, France, Denmark, and Canada. After all, these countries are thriving, secure, and beloved by much of the world.

And if a consequence of America reducing its role in the Middle East is that Islamic radicals take control of Iraq and Saudi Arabia or even sweep across the entire region, this won’t really matter to the United States because we will no longer see ourselves as a lone superpower responsible for remaking the world in our image. Like our allies in Europe and Asia, we’ll only care about the uninterrupted flow of oil. And that shouldn’t be a problem. Whether the Middle East remains under the control of kings and dictators or starts being ruled by a single mullah, the region will still depend on the sale of oil to the West.

American oil conglomerates may see their revenues decrease as US power diminishes, but our country can’t make decisions based on their profit margins. And Israel’s challenges will grow exponentially, but they will overcome those difficulties and continue to thrive.

But if America decides to be the leader of the free world, the US must change the way it approaches Iraq, Islamic radicalism, and nuclear proliferation. America will need to project overwhelming power and irresistible influence without hesitation.

For our adversaries, this is all-out war. America will only achieve victory and assert its leadership when the US population and industry are more directly involved in the effort.

Most experts agree that 150,000 troops in Iraq are not sufficient. Many think that deploying 450,000 soldiers would enable security and stability in Iraq. But additional forces would also be required for Afghanistan and we need to be ready to face unexpected threats and challenges.

If America is going to retain its position as global leader, hundreds of thousands, perhaps even several million additional soldiers and public servants will be needed to project power abroad, provide economic development services, and protect the homeland. This would require people recruited from the private sector or conscription as part of a mandatory national service.

But before American leaders make any more decisions that have far-reaching consequences, the country must determine what kind of country it wants to be in the 21st century. Until this essential question is answered, American will not be able to champion its interests and respond effectively to the situation in Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, North Korea, and Darfur.

And as the 2008 Presidential election gains momentum, citizens should demand that candidates provide a clear vision of America’s place in the world.

Perhaps the British have provided a model for America. Although they displayed undeniable weakness when faced with Iranian military provocation, the British were savvy enough to have their soldiers returned unharmed by Easter. Beyond the reminder that Britain no longer strides the world’s oceans like a behemoth, life in Britain will move forward unfazed. But that is to be expected, the British people gave up on being an empire long ago.

noreply@blogger.com (Adam Harmon) — Thu, 15 Mar 2007 08:03:00 +0000

LA Times: Israel Bashing Diatribe

To be honest, I don't know what disturbed me more about this article , the way the writer twisted and abused the substance of George Orwell's essay or his invective against Israel.

Read it yourself : In the War of Words

My response:

Dear Editors -

Saree Makdisi’s article is Orwellian. But not in a way Orwell would have liked. He quotes from “Politics and the English Language” and in then personifies the behavior that concerned Orwell in that very essay. Instead of using language to enable clarity of thought, he compiles a “mixture of vagueness” and demonstrates how muddled thinking becomes when “the concrete melts into the abstract.” Instead of engaging the question of “recognition” fully, directly, and honestly Makdisi reiterates half-truths and canards that border on doublespeak.

Given the lack of facts to support anti-Israel arguments these days, people like Makdisi and former President Carter believe they have only one option left -- personify Orwell’s fears by using inflammatory words like “Apartheid” and by making abstract arguments that can influence the uninformed.

Makdisi attempts to give credence to a simplistic view of the Israeli-Arab conflict through familiar cliché and sins of omission that demonstrate a bias that poisons his world-view.

The Israeli demand that the Palestinian government recognize Israel is not based on Israeli sentimentality. In 1993, the Israeli government allowed Palestinian leaders to form a government in the West Bank and Gaza . In return, Israel , the US , and Europe demanded that the Palestinian government renounce terrorism and recognize Israel ’s right to exist.

Instead of focusing on today’s issues, Makdisi proffers the old canard about Israel’s borders, makes a how-many-angels-can-dance-on-the-head-of-a-pin argument relating to whether the Palestinian Authority qualifies as a state or not, and then appeals to emotion by asking how a Palestinian could ever recognize Israel given the history between the two peoples. In doing so, he fails to acknowledge that Palestinian leaders already recognized Israel ’s right to exist nearly fourteen years ago. That recognition was the basis of the peace process and the hope that Israelis and Palestinians could one day live in peace. The problem is that the current Palestinian government has reneged on that agreement.

And this is why nothing is being asked of Israel in return. The reason is simple. Israel has already given and is still waiting to receive. It gave the Palestinian leadership the opportunity to govern their own people in their own land. And it has given up all of Gaza . In return, it has received more suicide bombers and daily rocket attacks.

A just peace between Israelis and Palestinians is possible. But true reconciliation will only occur when both sides recognize each other’s right to exist. Israel has already recognized the Palestinian right to have a state in the West Bank and Gaza . It was even ready to sign on the dotted line seven years ago. Recognition is not, as Makdisi suggests, a mere “palliative and therapeutic function.” The failure of the Palestinian leadership to recognize Israel ’s right to exist is the primary reason why this conflict continues. But it can also be the starting point for new hope.

noreply@blogger.com (Adam Harmon) — Thu, 15 Mar 2007 07:42:00 +0000

Time Magazine: Unfair Description of Checkpoints

Read Article: No Room for Civility at Checkpoints

My Response
As an Israeli soldier who has served in the West Bank, I found Jamil Hamad's article particularly irksome. Checkpoints serve a specific military purpose. They enable security forces to verify documents and help keep terrorists from entering civilian centers. After all, this is a border crossing - from a territory that supports and harbors terrorists to the country they target. Even Switzerland has border control. Why should Israel, a country under constant attack, be any different?

Also, checkpoints work. That's why they are employed by police and military forces around the world - including the Palestinian Authority.

The experience Hamad describes can hardly be described as humiliating. It is a source of frustration at best. No one likes to wait in line for an hour or two. But every Palestinian knows that these policies are meant to save lives. Wouldn't most people agree to stand in line for two hours if they knew that it helped save lives and preserve peace? And even if someone were so completely heartless and racist to believe that saving Jewish lives weren't worth the wait, they would still have to contend with the fact that terror attacks cause great injury to Palestinians as well.

I certainly agree with Hamad that checkpoints can be and should be more efficient. But civility between Israeli soldiers and Palestinians is the norm, not the exception. And most every Israeli soldier -- even those born in NH -- know the key Arabic phrases that enable communication.

noreply@blogger.com (Adam Harmon) — Fri, 12 Jan 2007 17:01:00 +0000

A Military Surge Will Not Shock and Awe
The current debate over the value of a military surge suggests that decision-makers finally understand that we can’t achieve our strategic goals without having more boots on the ground.

The number of additional soldiers being discussed ranges between 20,000 – 40,000. This would bring the total number of coalition troops in Iraq to about 200,000. This is a large force, but it is actually only 50% of the troops required. According to the Brookings Institute, about 400,000 troops would be needed to stabilize Iraq. This isn’t just an academic exercise. General Shinseki told U.S. decision-makers more than three years ago that several hundred thousand troops would be required for post-war Iraq, but the administration chose not to listen.

The administration and the military can turn things around and Iraq can still become a success story, but this will only happen when decision-makers recognize that the escalating violence and lawlessness over the past three years is the direct result of deploying too few troops.

Hopefully the recent appointment of a new Secretary of Defense will bring new thinking and these estimates will be taken seriously because stability and security in Iraq will remain an unfulfilled goal until there are at least 400,000 foreign soldiers who are tasked with keeping the peace.

Israel’s recent history demonstrates the critical importance of having enough boots on the ground. In 2002, when suicide bombings steadily increased until they became nearly daily events, the Israeli military swept into the West Bank with about 20,000 reservists and took control. By deploying enough ground forces for Operation Defensive Shield and by maintaining troop levels over the years, Israel has reduced attacks by over 90%. For the U.S. to have the same level of physical coverage over Iraq as Israel has over the West Bank, the U.S. would need approximately 500,000 troops.

Compare Israel’s success in 2002 to its failure to achieve key objectives in Lebanon last summer. In 2006, the Israeli military deviated from its proven strategy and severely limited the number of troops allowed to enter Lebanese soil. As a result, Israeli troops were able to clear towns, but unable to hold them. Further, even though the Israelis won every firefight, they did not achieve complete control over Lebanese territory. This is very similar to the U.S experience in Iraq. Recognizing that the strategy failed, the Israeli military is preparing to enable the deployment of large-scale forces if it becomes necessary in the future.

We must keep in mind that our enemies can do the math. They know that it took over 6,000 U.S. troops to secure a city the size of Fallujah, even though the Mehdi Army quickly melted away alongside the civilian population. If the individual who is considered to be "the most dangerous accelerant" of sectarian violence in Iraq, Muqtada al-Sadr, orders his men to stand and fight, the number of U.S. forces required to take control of Fallujah could triple overnight. One man can tie down a significant number of the additional troops sent over and al-Sadr knows it. Worse, U.S. forces are dealing with multiple sources of violence. Trouble doesn’t spike in one spot at a time. If al-Sadr turns up the heat, the U.S. will still have to contend with Sunni insurgents, criminals, and Al Qaeda.

If the size of the coalition presence in Iraq remains seriously understaffed, those who oppose U.S. nation-building efforts will continue to stall development projects, terrorize citizens, target Iraqi officials, and attack U.S. forces. An additional 40,000 troops will not significantly impact the security or stability of the country.

We’ve arrived at a turning point in Iraq and what happens next will directly impact U.S. security and its place in the world for decades to come.

With enough boots on the ground and a comprehensive strategy for nation-building, Iraq can still become a success story. But a stable, unified, and prosperous Iraq will only arise if 400,000 – 500,000 soldiers are deployed across the country.

The additional troops shouldn’t come from the U.S., which already bears the brunt of the burden. The U.S. must remind Europeans that a destabilized Middle East will harm their interests more than our own and we must convince them to share the burden more equally. And within the region, instead of focusing on the countries that are trying to thwart us at every turn, as has been suggested by the Iraq Study Group, we should turn to Saudi Arabia and other gulf states that have a vested interest in a stable Iraq. They know that a US withdrawal will devastate the region and should be willing to provide soldiers, police, and other useful personnel like translators. And Egypt, which has one of the most powerful military forces in the region, is eager to demonstrate its leadership to the Arab world. We should let them.

The Coalition of the Willing, which has provided token political and military support over the years, must be transformed into a United Front that is deeply committed to Iraq’s stability.

The manpower needed is available and there is wide consensus that a stable Iraq is in everyone’s interest. We just have to ask nicely and say thank you. Surely, we wouldn’t let pride keep us from enabling our soldiers to achieve their mission, providing the Iraqis with the security required for nation-building, and giving Middle Eastern countries a chance to actively participate in the stabilization of their own region.

noreply@blogger.com (Adam Harmon) — Fri, 12 Jan 2007 16:58:00 +0000

What if Bush is Right?
Given the false claims regarding WMD, the cynical blurring of Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein, the hubris of deploying only 20% of the troops needed for post-war stabilization, and the daily loss of life, it’s easy to be a critic of US policy in Iraq.

After more than three years of increasing violence, it is abundantly clear that U.S. and Iraqi forces are not going to create stability in Iraq. And at last, the US government is ready to reevaluate its strategy. This is a good thing.

But the highly partisan debate – both domestically and internationally – has stymied thinking. U.S. leaders, European politicians, Middle East rulers, and UN diplomats have only come up with two solutions. U.S. forces should either stay or they should go.

Ironically, there is wide consensus that a reduction in US military presence in Iraq will cause the country to fall further into chaos until a civil war either fragments the country or enables a winner to take all. In either case, the Sunni-Shia violence in Iraq – that is already to some extent a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia – will likely spill across the rest of the region.

Frustration with this administration’s failure to achieve economic, political, or military results makes people eager for a solution. Any solution. And in a political environment that seems to suggest that we either have to stay the course or get out of dodge, the latter certainly seems the most sensible choice.

But what if President Bush is right and we must achieve victory in Iraq.

Iraq had nothing to do with the War on Terror before we arrived, but it does now. The US must remain completely engaged in the creation of a thriving, stable democracy in Iraq. Not only because of a kindergarten logic that dictates that we clean up our mess before we leave, but because failure will encourage nations challenging the U.S. to follow through on plans that will make the world less stable and Islamic radicals will redouble their efforts against Western culture through terrorism and intimidation.

We’ve arrived at a turning point in Iraq, but what happens next will directly impact U.S. security and its place in the world for decades to come.

The choice is not between staying or going, it’s between an escalating violence that extends beyond the region or increasing the number of boots on the ground. That leaves us with only two questions. How many and where from.

The number of troops required is already known. General Shinseki told U.S. decision-makers three years ago that we’d need several hundred thousand troops. The Brookings Institute has estimated that at least 400,000 soldiers would be needed, based on the size and population of Iraq.

Those numbers aren’t just part of an academic exercise. Between 2000-2002 there was a steady up-tick in suicide bombings within Israel, culminating in daily attacks by the spring of 2002. Israel launched Operation Defensive Shield to retake control over the West Bank using 20,000 reservists. By maintaining troop levels over the years, Israel has reduced the number of successful Palestinian attacks by over 90%. To have the same level of physical coverage over Iraq as Israel has over the West Bank, the U.S. would need approximately 500,000 troops. A surge of 20,000-30,000 additional troops – which represents only a 15-20% increase – is too small to have a net positive impact on stability.

The Iraq Study Group – which is comprised of 9 politicians, 1 judge, and no military strategists – recommends withdrawal and a regional conference with all the players. Dozens of these conferences have been tried before without result. Just ask Mr. Baker about Madrid. Besides, if we don’t have the power, the influence, or a strategy to effect positive change in Iraq, what makes us think we can fix the region as a whole? The US military has a number of forums, like the Unified Quest Seminar Series, that bring together experienced military, law enforcement, and development professionals to discuss strategy and tactics. The findings of these seminars need to play a more prominent role in planning.

Instead of opening up a diplomatic channel that will enable Iran to achieve its nuclear ambitions and Syria to regain control over Lebanon, diplomatic efforts should focus on gaining commitments for additional troops on the ground.

And with additional troops, the U.S. will finally be able to focus attention on our primary task, which is nation-building. Earlier this year, the US State Department considered absorbing USAID in order to streamline US development projects throughout the world and better align these projects with US foreign policy. Great idea. Wrong agency. Instead of merging USAID with the State Department, we should tightly integrate USAID with the military. Development projects in Iraq fail because the country lacks security. And as Catch 22 would have it, Iraq lacks security, in part, because development projects aren’t able to improve the lives of the country’s citizens.

Instead of making the reduction of violence in a particular town or region a battalion’s mission, let’s make the successful implementation of a regional school system the primary military objective. And make a countrywide development strategy the framework for the military, whereby military plans serve mainly to facilitate logistics and provide security for these programs.

We must remind the Europeans that a destabilized Middle East will be harmful to their interests and we must convince them to share the burden more equally. And within the region itself, instead of focusing on the countries that are trying to thwart us at every turn, we should turn to Saudi Arabia and other gulf states that have a vested interest in the success of Iraq. They already know that a US withdrawal will devastate the region and may be willing to participate. And Egypt, which has one of the most powerful military forces in the region, is eager to demonstrate its leadership to the Arab world. We should let them.

We don’t need a Coalition of the Willing that provides token political and military support. We must lobby for committed allies who understand the importance of success and who want Iraq to succeed just as much as we do.

With enough boots on the ground and a comprehensive strategy for nation-building, Iraq can still become a success story.

noreply@blogger.com (Adam Harmon) — Mon, 09 Oct 2006 04:21:00 +0000

Why Woodward and America Need To Listen to Kissinger

Given the rising sectarian violence and the inability of either US or local forces to create stability in Iraq, it’s easy to be a critic of the US strategy in the Middle East. You don’t need to read the National Intelligence Estimate to know that victory looks less likely with each passing day.

So when Bob Woodward writes that Henry Kissinger is telling the President that “victory is the only meaningful exit strategy” in Iraq, most readers will agree with Woodward’s assessment that Kissinger is mired in the past and “fighting the Vietnam war again.”

And Kissinger might be, but that doesn’t mean that he’s wrong.

To some extent, Woodward mocks Kissinger for contending that “the problem in Vietnam was that we lost our will.” Whether or not this was true for Vietnam, it must not be true for the Middle East.

Today, most critics of the administration’s policy in Iraq suggest that US forces should withdraw from the region as soon as possible. This would be disastrous for the US because it would further embolden and empower anti-Western forces in the Middle East.

Our leaders need to reassess their strategy and develop a more effective, comprehensive approach to the challenges we face, but the citizens of Western nations must do their part as well

Citizens must leave no doubt in the minds of our enemies that we will do whatever it takes to make sure that the Iraqi people live under a free and stable government and that we are as committed to defending our own open culture as Islamic fascists are to spreading their repressive one.

Critics suggesting that US troops should leave Iraq need to take a close look at what happened after Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000. Even though Hezbollah was on the defensive due to the success of Israeli military operations led by Egoz and despite the fact that the withdrawal was actually part of a comprehensive political process that included a peace treaty with Jordan and the implementation of the Oslo Accords, Syria and Iran celebrated Israel’s withdrawal as if they had achieved a strategic victory. Some analysts even contend that the failure of the Camp David talks – that took place just two months after the Israeli withdrawal – resulted from a reviving of Arafat’s belief that he could extract more concessions through violence than negotiations.

Within just a few months of Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, Hezbollah was taking up positions several yards from the border with Israel, Syria was tightening its grip on Lebanon, Iran extended its reach by supplying Hezbollah with hundreds of millions of dollars as well as sophisticated weapons, and Palestinian terrorists launched almost daily attacks against Israeli citizens.

The surge in activity by extremists did not the result from a change in perception regarding Israeli military capabilities. Rather, there was a belief that the Israeli public had lost the will to fight and, out of fear for casualties, would restrain the military.

Ironically, recent events in Lebanon demonstrate that a country can achieve its strategic objectives even when its military fails in its mission. But this can only happen when the public exhibits a clear willingness to endure attacks and keep fighting.

While Hizbollah celebrated its ability to keep firing rockets and the mere fact of its survival, the Lebanese people were crying out for the fighting to stop. By contrast, the Israeli military and political establishment made a litany of mistakes that hindered success on the ground, but the Israeli public – especially those who were at the most risk – demonstrated that they would endure whatever was thrown at them and urged their leaders to continue fighting for as long as it took.

In the aftermath of the war, the Lebanese people are questioning the actions that brought about the conflict and are concerned about the consequences of renewed fighting. The Israeli people are asking why their military wasn’t empowered to do more and are mainly making sure their leaders do a better job next time.

As a result of the Israeli public’s clear expression – during and after the conflict – of their willingness to endure any attack and continue fighting for as long as necessary, the Lebanese people, Hizbollah, Syria, and Iran know that the full power of the Israeli military will be unleashed in response to another attack and that any new attack will not bring them any political advantage.

For this reason, despite the critical errors made by the Israeli political and military leadership in July, Hizbollah’s forces are no longer arrayed yards from the Israeli border, there is worldwide recognition that the regional instability caused by the Iranian-Syrian-Hizbollah alliance must be put to an end, and an increasing number of Lebanese groups are calling for the dismantling of Hizbollah as a separate military force. Israel has wanted this since 2000.

The Israeli experience should demonstrate that gaining public support for the ongoing clash between the West and Islamic fascists can’t just be about internal politics because our enemies are mostly listening to what is said by average citizens, not our leaders.

And for this reason, the citizens of the West must make clear that their demands for a better strategy and a more effective management of the war should not be misconstrued to mean that they are not resolved to fight until victory is achieved.

It might seem that the West is engaged in a war of choice, but the war will not end by bringing our soldiers home. The battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan are of our own making, but the only way out is for the citizens of Western countries to make clear that they are willing to endure any difficulty and make any sacrifice in order to ensure victory.

This is a war of wills and we are standing eyeball to eyeball with an intractable enemy who understands how we think and how our political systems work. We must not blink.

noreply@blogger.com (Adam Harmon) — Thu, 21 Sep 2006 19:37:00 +0000

The New Zionist Interview

The New Zionist is an online news and discussion forum that deals with the future of Zionism, Israel, and the Jewish People. The editors were kind enough to invite me to answer a number of questions relating to my military service, current events in the region, and to provide predictions relation to the future of Israel as well as the Jewish-American community.

Read the interview in full by visiting: www.newzionist.com

Here is a sample of the Q&A:

NZ: You state that you wonder if Israeli restraint only encourages more violence

AH: As someone who identified with the center-left throughout the 80’s and 90’s, I can’t help but wish that recent history had not provided ample data points to suggest that Israeli policies of restraint were based on an overly-optimistic assessment of the Palestinian, Lebanese, and Syrian leadership. Especially throughout the 90’s – during the Oslo Peace Process and negotiations with Syria – Palestinian terror and Hezbollah activity increased at an alarming rate. At the time, I believed that we were experiencing the last gasp of reactionaries who would eventually be sidelined by moderates who wanted a true rapprochement with Israel.

Also, I didn’t worry about Hezbollah victory speeches when Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000. Arab leaders are masters at self-congratulation in the aftermath of their defeats. But the continuing militancy of Hezbollah after Israel’s withdrawal and Arafat’s decision to spark a second Intifadah made it clear that my more cynical friends – who believed that we should be paying closer attention to what Arab leaders were saying in Arabic and not English – were right. The terrorists were not just using incitement and murder to gain more power within their own societies, they were – and still are – the vanguard of a culture that refuses to acknowledge Israel’s right to exist and believes that Western values make us weak. As a result, they have interpreted our outstretched hands as a sign that the Israeli people in particular – and the West in general – does not have the will or ability to defeat them.

NZ: One of the most interesting aspects of the book is how different the IDF is as compared to the American Military. Whether it is true or not, the American Military has an image of blind faith in your superior, abusive sergeants, and massive air assaults. More recently, the image of the American Army is of a group of soldiers racing through the streets of Baghdad in broad daylight on the back of a Humvee with a documentary film crew riding along. What do you think are the main differences between the Israeli and the American Army?

AH: First and foremost, national service is compulsory in Israel. While most highly motivated American high school students are trying to gain entrance into Ivy League schools, their Israeli counterparts are testing to join elite infantry, air force, and intelligence units. As a result, Israeli military units select from a much larger pool of qualified candidates than the American military. This enables Israel to constantly increase standards for acceptance at a time when the American military is lowering the bar.

Of course, as people who have served in the military can attest, being one of the “best and the brightest” doesn’t necessary mean that you’re going to be a fantastic soldier. And more importantly, it’s valuable to note that soldiers who lacked many advantages growing up or who weren’t stellar scholars during school may well demonstrate an aptitude in the field that is far superior to their well-heeled peers. As I mention in my book, I have served with some smart people who were dumb soldiers and others who barely completed high school who I would completely trust with my life once we were in the field.

But the combination of mandatory service and the high concentration of over-achievers in the Israeli military has created a culture that is more adaptive than the US military. By adaptive, I refer to the fact that the Israeli military highly encourages change in a way that is very different from the US military. In the Israeli military, new recruits are taught to ask questions and provide constructive criticism. This forces commanders to lead by example and by gaining consensus from his team, as opposed to leading through fiat, as is done in the US military. This keeps commanders on their toes and creates a conduit for new ideas and innovations that make the military more effective over time, while creating the short-term benefit of avoiding missteps that may occur when decisions are made by a single individual.

Another interesting difference is that the Israeli military training methodology features a level of on-the-job training that is rather unique. Israeli soldiers, at the beginning stages of their training, are tasked with relatively low-intensity missions – manning a checkpoint on a secondary road, conducting an ambush in a place where there is a low probability of engaging the enemy, patrolling relatively quiet streets, etc. The consequence is that the proficiency of soldiers and commanders are tested in an evolutionary way that enables superiors to decide whether they are suitable for more complicated tasks, soldiers are able to better understand how their training relates to the real-world, and the gradual introduction to more complicated scenarios increases effectiveness while reducing associated stress. By contrast, American soldiers only experience real combat after completing their training in full.

Read the interview in full by visiting: www.newzionist.com

noreply@blogger.com (Adam Harmon) — Tue, 12 Sep 2006 14:32:00 +0000

Why the West is Losing the PR Wars in the Middle East

The recent conflict between Israel and Lebanon led many to re-ask a question that was first posed after the US declared war on terror. How is it that the West – whose media dominates the world – is unable to compete with communication strategies devised by people who live in caves and bunkers?

Ultimately, the West is losing the battle for hearts and minds because we aren’t playing by the same rules as our enemies. Western officials are governed by a set of principles that compel them to deliver information that is, to the best of their knowledge, accurate. Western media, for its part, strives to provide their audience with relatively objective reports. To achieve this, the Western media typically gives both sides of an argument an equal opportunity to deliver its point a view.
These conventions of Western culture are to be celebrated. They are critical to prosperity, mitigate substantial abuse of power, and provide the weak with protection from the powerful. But our opponents – Islamic radicals – do not play by these rules. They only care about achieving their objectives and do not see anything wrong with deceiving their own people. Why would facts matter, if a lie helps you achieve God’s will. For this reason, Islamic radicals see that fabrications and manipulations as useful tools that help motivate their constituency while also discouraging Western willingness to act against them.

It’s as if the West fights by the Marquees of Queensberry rules of engagement while our adversaries stick to the law of the jungle. It’s a cage match, but the West doesn’t seem to know it. And if the gloves don’t come off, the West may be beaten into submission.

More than any other culture, the West should understand that everyone loves a winner. Concepts like “fair play” and “balance” make sense when you’re trying to create a free and prosperous world where everyone gets a fair shake, but it has no place in a war.

In WWII, allied government officials and media did not try to understand Hitler’s point of view. The allies did not give the German leadership radio time and column space to plead their case. He and his cohorts were condemned by all and Nazi propaganda was mocked at every opportunity. Furthermore, the allies created and distributed their own propaganda for internal and external consumption.

It is a conundrum. How can the West – its governments, media, and intellectuals – compete with the freedom-to-lie that enables our enemies to be more effective communicators? While the West seeks facts to educate audiences to make informed decisions, our enemies concoct stories to compel audiences to take specific actions. It doesn’t matter if any civilians were actually killed, call it a massacre. It doesn’t matter if US soldiers even entered a mosque, describe how it was desecrated.
In some ways, the West is shackled by an openness that encourages a full range of opinions to be heard and a standard that compels public figures to speak the truth, but these norms are central to democracy and our culture. If we were to give these up – and accept changes that empower officials to deliberately misinform in order to confound the enemy and silence voices of dissent in order to project unwavering determination – we may defeat our enemies but also lose Western culture as we know it.

Since the West can not change its standards and cultural norms, the West must take the following actions to combat and undermine the communication strategies of its enemies:

1. Our people must be made to understand that we are engaged in a cultural war that imperils our future. Most people in Western countries still don’t quite believe that there are 40,000 suicide bombers waiting to attack the enemies of Islam and that President Ahmadinejad, as reported by Al Jazeera on December 14, 2005, believes they will win because millions of Muslims are willing to become martyrs “while the infidel youths, loving life and fearing death, hate to fight.” Given our own values and hopes for our own children, we assume it is hyperbole. We assume that the Iranian President is only after gaining and maintaining power in his own country and that this talk of world domination is merely rhetoric. But radical Islamic leaders won’t mind the chaos and the loss of life because they believe it will ultimately lead to a victory for Islam. We must begin to think and act as if we were in a fight to the death – because we are.

2. We must compel Arab countries that claim to be our allies – Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt – to raise their standards to meet our own. As autocrats, they use the same tools of incitement and deception as our enemies in order to deflect internal criticism and control their populations. They must understand that claiming to be moderate and Western-leaning is no longer good enough. Now, they have to act like it. Public and private media must adhere to the same professional standards as their Western counterparts and government officials must communicate more openly about the real threats to their sovereignty. After all, these countries are equally threatened, if not more, by radical Islam than the West. They must understand that failure to change will place their heads, quite literally, on the chopping block. If Al Jazeera wants to be the “CNN of the Middle East,” then its producers and reporters must differentiate between stories that incite and those that inform.

3. Irrespective of whether changes in the Middle East occur overnight or not at all, the West’s new Manhattan Project must be the establishment of a more robust Voice of America that integrates the development and distribution of movies, TV shows, news, and online media that will be perceived as being as authentically Arab as Al Jazeera. Within the Arab world there are thousands of talented individuals who want to the Middle East to become a secular, open, prosperous region that provides opportunities for personal growth and expression for all people. The West should create a platform that enables these individuals to communicate a message that undermines radical Islam and the culture of hate that permeates the region. In addition, the West should use every method at its disposal to block the broadcast and dissemination of information that incites against Western values – even if that includes the jamming of programs delivered via satellite and the shutting down of websites that serve as recruiting grounds for radicals.

Our enemies understand the importance of public relations and they use it to motivate their youth to become soldiers in a holy war, to cow secular Arabs who want a better life for their children, and keep the West from gaining credibility in the region. The West can beat Islamic radicals at this game, but only if we play by the same rules as our enemy.

noreply@blogger.com (Adam Harmon) — Tue, 29 Aug 2006 01:34:00 +0000

3 Myths That Hindered Israeli Success

As a writer, I admire the power of myth and recognize the important role it plays in culture. But as an Israeli citizen and reserve soldier who may be called to fight, it is disturbing to see how myth-making influences policymakers.

It is relatively easy to forgive the media for its role in distributing propaganda and making quick-draw assessments. After all, news organizations, in order to survive, need provocative content to increase audience size and boost advertising revenue.

Likewise, you can’t fault Arab leaders and their apologists for making false assertions that deflect blame, deny responsibility, and assert false victory. Arab leaders aren’t interested in self-criticism – totalitarian regimes never are – and their apologists would much rather blame European colonization, Israel’s existence, and American policy for all their woes. It’s far easier to blame others than to take responsibility for the sectarian violence, abject poverty, intolerance, militancy, radicalism, and abuse of women.

By comparison, Israelis are intensely self-critical. This approach drives innovation and opens the way for change, but it also keeps the country’s leaders – and therefore Israel’s allies and enemies alike – from recognizing important truths. Leaders are supposed to be able to differentiate between critical and irrelevant information when making decisions. Unfortunately, the Israeli political and military leadership failed their country and Western democracies because they gave credence to three myths that have gained status akin to fact because they have been widely circulated and often repeated by the media.

As a result, leaders have chosen a path that does not increase Israeli security or enhance regional stability. A critical mistake has been made, but it can be corrected. If it isn’t, the position of Islamic fascists will be greatly enhanced in the Middle East and around the world.

Israeli leaders acted as if they believed these three myths:

1. Operation Peace for the Galilee was a disaster for Israel. Throughout the 70’s, Israel was shelled and attacked by a powerful militia – the PLO – which was based in Lebanon after a failed attempt to overthrow the Jordanian government. In 1982, the Israeli government called up its reserves and used its full force against the PLO. Arafat was literally shipped to Tunis. Israeli cities in the north became safe. The invasion proved that a terrorist infrastructure can be dismantled if overwhelming force is employed. But public perception of success changed as the mission itself and the challenges faced evolved after the Israeli military established a security zone in Southern Lebanon. Israeli leaders today failed to distinguish between the results of the military offensive and the challenges faced by long-term occupation. The fact that Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz was a former leader in the Peace Now movement that advocated Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon may have influenced his inability to differentiate between the two, but he was not alone. Especially given the success of Operation Defensive Shield in 2002 – where the military also estimated that thousands of Israeli soldiers may die – it is unfortunate that Israeli leaders did not have the wisdom to understand that sustaining losses was critical to achieving a vital strategic goal. As usual, the Israeli civilian population was well ahead of its leaders. They demonstrated willingness to endure Hezbollah’s missiles for as long was necessary for the military to achieve its mission. Unfortunately, the Israeli government was too cautious and unwilling to take the necessary risks that ultimately would have led to success.

2. Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000 because of Hezbollah. As a guerilla organization, Hezbollah engagements against Israel were negligible until 1991. They weren’t even the most powerful Shia militia, until – thanks to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard – they overcame the more secular Amal. In 1991, their use of anti-tank missiles and roadside bombs led to an increase in Israeli casualties. Initially, the IDF fielded more forces in Lebanon to limit Hezbollah’s ability to conduct missions. As a result, the number of Israeli soldiers killed and wounded decreased dramatically. In 1995, the IDF fielded a new unit, called Egoz, which focused exclusively on anti-guerilla tactics. Egoz put Hezbollah on the defensive and the perceived threat from Lebanon was diminished. The success of Egoz influenced Israel’s decision to withdraw, but the decision was mainly the result of revitalized efforts to reach negotiated settlements with its neighbors. Israel signed a peace treaty with Jordan in 1994 and the Oslo Peace Process seemed on the verge of success when Israel removed its troops from Lebanon in May 2000. As expected, Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon was celebrated as if it were a victory for Hezbollah, when it really was a testament to the fact that they longer posed a significant threat. This may be another myth, but it has been said that the belief that Israel was defeated in Lebanon brought about the second Intifadah and Palestinian rejection of the settlement reached at Camp David several months later. Especially when the people of the Middle East are manipulated by government incitement to hatred as a method for deflecting internal dissent, Israeli military actions must always gain a clear victory that no amount of propaganda can reduce to failure. If Israel allows itself – out of its own tendency for self-criticism – to act tentatively and remain fearful of how it is perceived by an international community that does not have its best interests at heart, Israel will fail to secure its future and will have no one to blame but itself.

3. Ceasefires lead to peaceful conflict resolution. UN sponsored ceasefires rarely lead to conflict resolution, but negotiated settlements between two sovereign nations do. This is especially true with Lebanon because the country has been fractured and relatively decentralized since the start of its civil war in 1975. Even prior to the civil war, the Lebanese people did not completely control their own destiny. Since the PLO was the strongest militia in Lebanon, UN resolution 425 in 1978 didn’t stop the PLO from shelling Israeli towns. And after Israel sent the PLO packing, the Syrians and Iranians took control. That’s why the ceasefires in 1993, 1996, 2002, 2003, and 2005 did not create change. And that’s why it isn’t surprising that this year’s resolution, 1701, has already become neutered of meaning by the Lebanese Prime Minister, who has reneged on the most important element of the agreement, and the international community, which has significantly lowered the number of soldiers it will field and weakened the UNIFIL’s mandate. The resolution states that Southern Lebanon must be “free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the government of Lebanon and UNIFIL,” but Hezbollah will now retain its arms in Southern Lebanon. Furthermore, not only will the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL refrain from destroying existing weapons caches, they won’t keep new weapons from entering Lebanon. UNIFIL will become larger, but it won’t become more effective or enable Lebanon to become the thriving, free, and democratic country its people asked for during the Cedar Revolution in 2005. Recent events in Southern Lebanon will be celebrated by Islamic fascists as if they had stormed the beaches of Normandy. And if the western world – whether through a strong Israeli military response or an international force – fails to demonstrate that it has the desire and ability to fully implement UN resolutions 1559 and 1701, it will be taken as yet another sign that secular, liberal democracies do not have what it takes to fight and defeat Islamic fascism. Islamic radicals around the world are watching and their next step will be a direct response to our future actions or inaction.

noreply@blogger.com (Adam Harmon) — Tue, 29 Aug 2006 01:31:00 +0000

Israel & Hezbollah: Week 1

Along with many Americans and people around the world, I watch current events in the Middle East with great interest and concern. I worry over the loss of civilian lives on both sides of the conflict and I wonder when the region will finally know peace.

I approach the situation not as a political pundit, an academic, or interested outside observer, but as a soldier who could find himself serving in Lebanon or Gaza if the Israeli military needs to call up more reserve units.

Living and working just outside of Washington DC, I rely on the same news broadcasts as everyone else for information. And like others who have a personal connection to Israel or Lebanon, I gain additional tidbits from friends who live in the midst of the conflict.

It’s difficult to watch Israeli citizens suffer and not be part – even if only in a small way – of ensuring their security, but as of this writing, my reserve unit hasn’t been called up. Unlike Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, when Israel dismantled the Palestinian terror infrastructure in the West Bank and re-established military control over the area, there hasn’t been a large call-up of reserves. Up until now, the ground offensive in Lebanon and Gaza has been relatively limited in scale and the government has only authorized a minimal call-up of reservists.

That leaves me in DC, living as if I were still in Jerusalem. I pay close attention to the news, keep in touch with members of my unit, try to focus on work, tend to the needs of my pregnant wife, and attempt to enjoy the good things that happen each day. But mostly I’m waiting to be put to use and do my part.

Watching the images of soldiers making their way to Bint Jbail from my air conditioned home, I can almost feel the heat and dust of Lebanon during summer. I remember what it’s like to trudge across that hilly country wearing body armor that keeps in body heat more effectively than it keeps out bullets and a heavy assault vest that becomes light only after you use up ammunition engaging the enemy.

The mayor of Kiryat Shmoneh, a border town that has been under constant attack, spoke on Israeli TV recently. He told Israelis living in the relative safety of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem not to worry. “We’re ready to stay in the shelters for as long as it takes. Just let the army do its job.”

The willingness of Israelis to endure the shelling and the steady progress of the Israeli military demonstrates to radical Islamists like Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran that western democratic nations have the will and the ability to defeat them.

A ceasefire at this stage – that does not include the immediate disarmament of Hezbollah – will be construed as capitulation on the part of Israel and the western world. This would feed the belief that the west will retreat when attacked. Failure to act decisively against Hezbollah will further embolden Syria, Iran, and radical Islamists in Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, and Indonesia as well as those living in the US and Europe.

If Hamas and Hezbollah are perceived as having won even the slightest concession from Israel or the international community, they will become stronger than ever. In fact, their mere survival as an organization will be celebrated as if it were a tremendous achievement of their own making – as opposed to the result of international concern for the impact this war is having on Lebanese civilians. And this expansion of radical Islam’s influence may silence once-moderate voices in the Middle East who will fear that the West won’t protect them.

It should be remembered that there has been a de facto ceasefire in place since Israel left Lebanon six years ago. Hezbollah and Iran used this time fortify military positions with underground bunkers and sophisticated equipment. Since 2004, Lebanon and the world community have called for Hezbollah to be disarmed. If the ceasefire that is being proposed by the UN and some European countries were to begin today, what would Hezbollah do? It has refused to disarm for two years, why would it do so now when a ceasefire proves that their strategy of hiding amongst civilians enables them to maintain power. If the proposed ceasefire takes place, Hezbollah will regroup and Iran will understand that the West’s is making empty threats against its nuclear ambitions.

The Israeli military has suggested that it needs seven to ten more days to complete its mission. I’m skeptical that Israel can accomplish in three weeks what the world couldn’t in two years. And I’m concerned that the timetable is being driven by political concern regarding probable international pressure for Israel to halt its offensive. Israel is capable of defeating Hezbollah militarily and it should be allowed to set its own timetable – whether it takes seven days or seven weeks – and it should do so with the full support of leading Western nations.

For only then will the supporters of radical Islam in the Middle East – Hezbollah, Hamas, Al Qaeda, and Iran – understand that the West has the strength to endure any attack and the endurance to do what it takes in order to defeat them. And when Israel does succeed, not only will Lebanon finally have a chance to become, once again, the Switzerland of the Middle East, but we may be closer to regional stability than we’ve been in decades.

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Over the last twenty years, the problem of radical Islam has grown exponentially. The current battle between Hezbollah and Israel is just one part of a much larger, more complex problem, but it does force a decision. When attacked by radical Islamists, what does a Western nation do? Do you negotiate in the hope that you’ll gain a few more years of quiet or do you take the necessary actions that ensure your enemy’s defeat?

Hezbollah as a military organization can be defeated by force of arms. And in this confrontation, it is vital that Israel, as representative of the Western, democratic world, demonstrate the ability to endure attacks and the will to defeat them. Accomplishing this, the West sends a powerful message to those who would seek our destruction. Failure sends an equally powerful message that will encourage our enemies to attack us and makes it more difficult for existing allies in the Middle East to remain supportive of American values and goals

noreply@blogger.com (Adam Harmon) — Tue, 29 Aug 2006 01:03:00 +0000

Embracing Change: The Israeli Military Culture and Training Methodology

I read “Future Leader: The Journey of Developing (and Nurturing) Adaptability, The Future is Now,” written by Mr. Donald E. Vandergriff and published by the Future Center, with great interest. It was particularly fascinating to me because the approach proscribed for the development of future military leaders reminded me so much of my own past.

I was born, brought up, and educated in the United States, but in June 1990 I moved to Israel. Four months later I was serving with an Israeli paratrooper unit. My preconceptions of military culture and training were largely based on US war movies. Like most conscripts – be they American or Israeli – the day-to-day reality of military life is far different from the world imagined.

I was chiefly surprised by the relatively collegial atmosphere. I expected to be yelled at, have my personal space invaded, to be insulted, and even to be humiliated by commanders. I was not prepared for sergeants and officers who acted like nurturing mentors. They ran us into the ground, but they did it by encouraging us to succeed. Instead of trying to break us down in order to re-build us, they worked to understand our particular strengths and provide us with opportunities to excel. More importantly, they empowered us to figure out on our own the best way to accomplish our tasks.

Vandergriff writes that the US army wants to create “leaders of character who are ready, willing and able to make the right decisions in the face of adversity, be it the enemy, subordinates, peers or superiors, on and off the battlefield.” This statement also accurately describes the Israeli military ethos.

The concepts that lay at the heart of Vandergriff’s six-week Adaptive Leadership Course (ALC), the competencies valued by the program, and the behavior of the course instructors closely resembles the Israeli model.

Evaluating his experiment, Vandergriff lists several observed benefits and limitations of the course. According to Vandergriff, the course improves pattern recognition skills, decision-making, communication skills, and leadership development. The limitations include a difficulty simulating operating environments, failure to capture the on-going interactive nature of tactics or decision-making, the belief that the course works best only at the company level, and the inability to effectively apply the program to special operations.

Vandergriff’s evaluation of the benefits and limitations associated with his experiment at the Georgetown ROTC provide a valuable glimpse at the potential impact these concepts can have on a soldier’s development, but to gain a more comprehensive understanding of how the implementation of these concepts increases combat readiness, critical thinking, and the establishment of a learning organization, researchers may want to examine the Israeli training methodology more closely. For the Israeli military, these concepts are at the core of the military culture – from a soldier’s first moments during induction, throughout every stage of training, and even during real-world operations.

By fully integrating these cultural concepts with training and operations, Israeli soldiers gain all the benefits associated with critical thinking without suffering from the same limitations described by Vandergriff.

Selection and Training: It’s Always a Question of Character
As many people know, military service in Israel is compulsory. As a result of the tight integration between the military and civilian population, the values most admired by combat units are well-known. This, to some extent, enables a certain level of self-selection on the part of potential recruits. Recruits whose character reflects these traits gravitate toward combat units, while those who are self-aware enough to know that their temperament won’t meet expectations find alternative ways to fulfill their obligations.

Although it might seem counter-intuitive, physical strength and stamina are not highly valued. For instance, when recruits test for the paratroopers, officers evaluating performance mark down how many push-ups, pull-ups, and sit-ups a recruit achieves within a fixed period of time, but this information is mainly used as a baseline for gauging a recruit’s performance throughout the day-long entrance exam.

Throughout the testing, each group of recruits – anywhere between twenty and thirty individuals – is required to complete a number of tasks. The tasks can be as simple as running from Point A to Point B within thirty seconds. To complete the task, the recruits must run the distance and assemble in a series of rows before the allotted time elapses. The group will run back and forth as many times as are necessary until they succeed to complete the task on time. During these sprints, evaluators, who are aware of the individual strengths and weaknesses of each recruit, look to see if the stronger runners help other members of the group and monitor the resolve of those who are not as physically fit as their peers.

At other times, the group is given relatively complicated tasks – like finding a way to use a few pieces of provided equipment to get the entire group on the other side of a concrete wall without touching the wall. During these types of examinations, evaluators look to see which members of the group actively participate in the problem solving.

In addition, the testing process includes a series of physically draining tasks – carrying stretchers weighted with sand and continuous runs up and down hills with weight on shoulders – which are simply designed to provide the unmotivated with an opportunity to quit.

Evaluators attempt to identify recruits with high levels of determination (as evidenced by the willingness to continue despite obvious physical difficulty), team-players (demonstrated by helping others and active participation in solving group problems), thinkers (established by taking an active role in discussions and problem solving), and who demonstrate throughout the testing process a friendly, positive attitude.
Interestingly, an individual who exhibits remarkable athletic ability and coordination, but who is not perceived as having the valued character traits will not be selected to serve with the paratroopers.

Throughout the 14-18 month training period, commanders continuously monitor the behavior of recruits. Recruits who fail to demonstrate these desired character traits are not punished. Rather, officers, sergeants, and members of their own unit will impress upon them the value of these character traits through non-threatening, one-on-one discussions. If a recruit’s behavior improves, he is not explicitly rewarded. Those who fail to adopt the desired traits will either ask to leave the unit voluntarily or they might be asked to leave by commanders. Those who most closely embody the desired character traits are given additional responsibilities – such as communications, field medicine, sniper – for which they are esteemed within the unit and within society at large.

Typically, recruits who complete the entire training process leave the company-sized training group for one of four options.

1. Attend officer-training course. Depending on suitability, officers train new recruits or return to serve as officers within the battalion or division. Suitability to train new recruits is determined by demonstrating core character traits.
2. Attend non-commissioned officer training course. Depending on suitability, staff sergeants train new recruits or return to serve as sergeants within battalion.
3. Sent for additional training before returning to serve within battalion or division.
4. Sent directly to the battalion in order to serve with the primary assault group, reconnaissance, mortars, or anti-tank group. Suitability for each is determined by individual’s demonstrated aptitude during training.

Just because a recruit has demonstrated high levels of proficiency during training and combat missions does not mean that he is considered a suitable candidate for leading the next-generation of recruits. In fact, an individual’s personality and character traits are far more important than his technical proficiency.

First and foremost, leaders are expected to be smart, precise, innovative, hard-working, resolute, and likeable. Physical stamina and coordination are recognized as valuable traits that merely play a secondary importance to a soldier’s success.

Transforming Recruits Into Adaptive Leaders
From the very first day, new recruits discover that their actions as individuals directly impact the group. This idea is reinforced before, during, and after every training exercise and every activity. From the first moment recruits wake up, prior to every meal, between every training exercise, before going to sleep, and throughout the night, commanders devise creative ways to reinforce this idea. Although sprinting from point A to point B until the group completes the activity on time together is a favorite, recruits are asked to organize assault vests in rows prior to a lesson in tactics, set up targets prior to a training exercise, or organize the contents of their kitbags for inspection within a defined period of time.
In each instance, recruits are never told how to complete the task. They are only told the desired end-state and given a set period of time to accomplish the task. As a group, the unit must figure out the best way to achieve its goal on time. Units can repeat these mundane tasks literally ten times – often much more – before they work together effectively to complete the task on time. For much of a recruit’s first three months in the military, it seems as if life if measured in an endless series of tasks that he and his group are trying to complete in thirty seconds.

Recruits are also provided with a rationale for this focus on accomplishing tasks on time. Early on, recruits are told that this experience is meant to mirror the real world, where the success of a mission and the lives of people could depend on a unit being somewhere or accomplishing something by a specific time.

By the end of basic training, there is no longer any need to drill this concept into the minds of recruits. The lesson is learned. Proof of success is found when the unit consistently completes tasks on time.

Throughout those first few months, each recruit is provided ample opportunities for leadership. These opportunities manifest themselves in the form of helping to organize and support group efforts to complete tasks on time as well as within the context of training exercises.

Even at the earliest stages of fire and maneuver drills, where a three-man team attacks defended positions that lie ahead, recruits are only given basic instructions regarding their objective and the safety precautions they must take throughout the exercise. The leader of the three-man team is determined by the team itself. This individual gives the initial commands at the outset of the exercise, but a dialogue between the members of the small team – regarding what is seen and what next steps should be taken – is typical. To some extent, hitting the targets is a secondary goal behind learning how to communicate and act effectively as a small unit.

During basic training, most exercises focus on developing skills at the level of squad and platoon. Since the Israeli military understands that a unit’s commander may be killed in the first moments of any engagement, other members of the unit – even young recruits – should be comfortable taking command. For this reason, a unit’s commander if often “killed” or “wounded” during training exercises. Although the military has a clear chain of command – whereby a lieutenant takes over when a captain is wounded, etc – the military does not train recruits to wait for the next in line to take command. Rather, recruits are trained to understand that any one can take command and that the person closes to the issue – with a visual on attackers for instance – should feel empowered to direct the actions of other members of the team.

Fir instance, in a scenario where a commander – who leads from the front – is incapacitated, the radioman who is right behind him or the sniper on his left would be a far better position to direct the unit’s fire and maneuvering than another officer or sergeant who has been managing the force from the rear. But more important than the real-world implications of enabling a unit to react more quickly to contact with enemy fire, soldiers learn at the earliest stages of their lives as soldiers that they can and should be making command decisions.

As soldiers move further along in basic training and beyond, soldiers increasingly take on roles that are further up the chain of command. As a result, soldiers at every rank become more aware of how their unit’s actions fits within the larger strategy, increase their ability to coordinate with other forces taking part in operations, and become used to making command decisions.

Creating a Learning Organization
As Vandergriff points out, skills honed in a classroom or on the training ground don’t necessarily translate to the stress found in the field. This is not an issue for the Israeli model, which purposely places new recruits in operational environments during early stages of training.

This model serves two purposes. First, it enables commanders and soldiers to identify individuals who are not suited for the stress of combat at the earliest possible stage. Although officers and sergeants are all battle-tested, that doesn’t always mean that they are prepared to lead men into combat. Likewise, even the most technically proficient soldiers do not always function effectively when in the field. By gradually increasing the complexity of missions – from foot patrols in relatively calm environments and sweeps of villages to ambushes and arrests of wanted terrorists – the military is able to identify who is fit and who is not. If commanders or soldiers are not able to overcome the challenges that make it difficult for them to function in hostile environments, they transfer to support units.

Second, this enables soldiers to gradually gain experience with real-world combat situations and slowly gain the ability to deal with the related stress, learn to integrate what is experienced to improve techniques during training, and gives them the confidence to trust their own judgment.

An important facet of the Israeli training model is that debriefings are taken very seriously. They are employed at the end of every exercise and every action – whether it’s a brief fire and maneuver exercise by a three-man team, the arrest of a wanted individual, or a division-wide operation. From the very beginning, recruits are encouraged to ask questions – even ones that are critical of the purpose or nature of the exercise. During these debriefings, commanders don’t just take the time to answer every question, but use the forum as an opportunity to create an informative discussion regarding key strategic, tactical, or cultural issues that may arise. The goal of these discussions is to improve effectiveness by clarifying roles, exposing missed opportunities, and advancing new ways to solve the problems encountered. During these discussions, the group attempts to achieve consensus regarding best practices.

As recruits gain more experience, both by way of additional training and real-world experience, they increasingly feel comfortable voicing opinions that are different from their commanders and commanders feel more inclined to take their soldier’s feedback into account during future planning. Beyond increasing a soldier’s comfort with thinking critically, the dialogue between commanders and soldiers makes the adoption of new methods and techniques more likely. As new ideas evolve at the level of squad and platoon, there is a framework that enables, in fact encourages and rewards, lower echelon commanders who promote new ideas up the chain of command.

Furthermore, the Israeli military has a systematic program for the cross-pollination of new ideas and techniques. In Israel, officers and sergeants who are selected to train and lead new recruits often have served in different units. For instance, a company commander for the paratroopers may have served as the commanding officer of an elite reconnaissance unit associated with the Air Force, Shaldag, and some of the staff sergeants may have served with other elite units, like the Israeli SEAL unit, Commando Yami. Likewise, individuals who served with the paratroopers might end up training new recruits that have joined either the Golani or Givati brigade.

As with every military, each of these units have their own culture and slightly different methods for training and executing tactics. By enabling soldiers from different units to work together to train new recruits, the Israeli military facilitates the emergence of a constantly evolving culture that combines the best elements of each unit and that embraces change as the best way to achieve the common goal of creating a more effective fighting force.

noreply@blogger.com (Adam Harmon) — Tue, 29 Aug 2006 00:59:00 +0000

Broadening the Concept of Information Warfare

From the purported placement of pro-coalition articles in the media, the embedding of reporters with troops, and the pervasive use of Information Warfare (IO) in the field, it’s clear that the US understands the importance of shaping perceptions locally, internationally, and on the home front.

Certainly, these activities influence the understanding of individual events, but existing methods have failed to alter the local perception of the US as occupier, the low opinion of US policies held by a majority of people around the world, and the growing belief in the United States that the war in Iraq is a losing proposition that is being badly mismanaged.

This inability to shape critical perceptions of US policy results from the US failure to develop a clear message that is consistently communicated at all levels and that takes into consideration the multiple audiences it must influence.

Clearly, any strategy must take into account the likelihood that a policymaker will misspeak (characterizing US efforts in Iraq as a crusade) or that mistakes on the ground (mistreatment Iraqi citizens) will occur. There are always going to be hiccups and any IO strategy will have to take into account those possibilities and be so pervasive that incidents that reflect poorly on the US will be perceived – by all audiences – to be a clear deviation from the wider vision being propagated.

But even in a perfect world, where everyone says the right thing at the right time, no one is misunderstood, and every individual working on behalf of the US fulfills his or her duty flawlessly, today’s concept of IO would still be too narrow to play a significant role in the defeat of our current and future enemies.

When done well, current IO campaigns can successfully counter and mitigate the impact of specific insurgent claims against coalition soldiers (by disproving false assertions of misbehavior of troops at a mosque), they can call attention to successful operations that demonstrate US military or Iraqi police capabilities (and the ancillary weakness of the insurgents), and they can even promote the success of US development programs, but even a sustained drum beat of pro-coalition news will not reframe the debates taking place in Iraq, in the US, and around the world regarding the US presence in Iraq. More importantly, they do not significantly weaken our opponents, widen the circle of those who support our mission, nor compel individuals at all levels of government and the military to act as if failure is not an option.

Similar to the marketing and public relations activities of a small start-up company, US IO campaigns tend to focus on the features of its products (every time an Iraqi battalion or police unit is certified ready for duty) and feels the need to promote every modest success within a specific vertical (the installation of a water pump that supports village X in area Y). These efforts are very inward looking – how product cool.1 is different than cool.2 – monologues that attempt to tell people all the cool things about their product. But a company’s target audience, even those who will directly benefit from all of those features, are only want to know how cool.1 and cool.2 improves their lives. Even a company that has superior technology will fail unless it transitions to a marketing and PR strategy that clearly demonstrates how its products benefit customers.

Even if the US military were to keep its IO strategy relatively narrow, it still would need to mirror the best practices of leading global brands like Coca Cola, GE, Cingular, and Microsoft to succeed in its mission.

At the heart of any successful mass communication strategy is the development of a clear message that reflects the capabilities of your organization while encapsulating the dreams of your customers. That’s why taglines like “Bring good things to life” and messages like “Raising the bar” increase consumer confidence and ensure the success of these companies.

But developing a coherent message is only the first step. It’s vital that every message and action delivered by members of an organization conform to the communication plan. Moreover, the members of an organization should be asking themselves, their colleagues, and their superiors whether planned actions live up to the brand they are trying to build. Successful organizations have members who are constantly asking questions like “Are we bringing good things to life? and “Does this demonstrate that we’re raising the bar?”

In short, the IO must promote the US as if it were a brand and employ the same strategies and tactics of mass communications that leading global companies use to get their message across to a variety of audiences. This will require a comprehensive, multi-year, adaptive communications plan that is developed with the input of the appropriate DoD, intelligence, and federal civilian organizations. The plan would include segmentation by the various constituent audiences and the roll-out would be sequenced to ensure maximum effect in the short-term as well as the achievement of long-term objectives.

To succeed, extensive coordination is required. Although members of various agencies and organizations currently meet to coordinate planning and the execution of joint projects, the US still lacks a true integration of purpose and plan. Despite the chain of command within the military, the hierarchy within US civilian organizations, and the communication tools that are readily available, true synergistic relationships have yet to be established. Currently, the level of integration is dependent on the personalities, capabilities and resources available to commanders in the field. Even as the military becomes more modular and the resources available in any given area won’t change every time battalions replace each another, greater integration is needed to ensure that the actions taken and the messages delivered by every organization – at all levels – is consistent with the communications platform that is at the core of the IO strategy.

Also, US military and civilian organizations will be working alongside NGOs. NGOs will have their own agendas and may even be disinclined to assist US organizations that are attempting to achieve stability by way of addressing security concerns and by way of development programs. Just like leading global companies, the US must look upon every organization working within a field of operation as a potential partner and competitor. For this reason, programs that are designed to develop positive working relationships –that are based on mutual self-interest with NGOs – must be established.

Organizations that typically prefer not to be directly associated with the US and even those who tend to propagate messaging that undermines US objectives can be influenced. The Microsoft Partner Program (MSPP) is a wonderful example of transforming competitors into partners who can be monitored and influenced. Instinctively, companies in many markets are wary of Microsoft, but at the same time tens of thousands actively participate in the MSPP because it provides tools, support, and a framework that provides value to their organizations in a variety of ways – including networking opportunities, improving brand credibility by association, access to business intelligence, and lead generation. From Microsoft’s perspective, a monitoring of the partner program exposes them to critical trends, relationships, product positioning, and new business opportunities. By creating a framework of collaboration – at which they are the center – they mitigate competition, create new opportunities for their company, and increase the reach of their brand exponentially.

By adopting the Microsoft partner strategy, and even some of the tactics, the US military could establish a framework that enables closer coordination with organizations that are currently wary of developing ties with the US and transform potential critics into advocates.

In the November-December 2005 issue of Military Review, Lieutenant Colonel Garry J. Beavers, U.S. Army, Retired, offered the following definition of IO: “Offensive and defensive information operations that convey true, unclassified information about military opera¬tions and the information environment to external audiences.” In his view, Public Affairs (PA) – which “develops information for internal (US and coalition) audiences while supporting an information campaign designed to reach external audiences – should function as a separate apparatus. But given the ubiquity of electronic, cable, and satellite means of distribution, external and internal audiences typically consume the same information today. CNN distributes Aljazeera. Iraqis watch President Bush speaking to an audience in Columbus Ohio. Indonesians read and respond to articles posted on Haaretz.com – a website supported by a leading Israeli newspaper.

Realizing that every communication must reach a variety of audiences is essential to the success of an IO strategy, but in today’s world you need a single communication platform that speaks to each audience simultaneously. In this way, every communication, from the high-level ten second pitch (the sound byte-level rationale for war, for instance) to the ground-level detailed conversations (discussions between a battalion commander and a local leader) must be in complete synchronization. As with leading global brands, the US needs to think in terms of the tagline, the elevator pitch, messaging, market segmentation, customer profiles, direct marketing, guerilla marketing, viral marketing, and partnering.

But broadening the US concept of IO requires more. It’s not just about transforming the US into the most beloved brand on planet Earth. America’s enemies aren’t fighting for narrow political or economic interests. They are motivated by broad ideological and religious imperatives. In his recent letter to President Bush, the President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, made it clear that liberalism and Western-style democracy “have not been able to help realize the ideals of humanity.” This echoes Sayyid Qutb, the intellectual father of Islamic fundamentalism, who has written, “Western civilization has nothing else to give humanity....The dominance of Western man has reached its end. The time has come for Islam to take the lead.” And these thoughts reverberate in coffee houses around the Muslim world and virtual communities on Orkut that unequivocally support bin Laden and insurgent actions in Iraq.

Insurgents engage coalition forces in combat, but untold numbers are fighting against the concept of modern western civilization. The United States and her allies are fighting a determined enemy that can be beaten, but not broken by current means at the military’s disposal. Given the typical length of time required to defeat an enemy in an asymmetric conflict, endurance is critical to achieving victory. Current and future enemies will all have a long-term strategy. They will think and plan in terms of decades and centuries, not months and years. In order to receive the resources the military needs – in terms of materials, manpower, and authority – Western civilian populations must understand that this struggle poses an existential threat.

Israel, which has endured steady conflict with its neighbors since its independence in 1948, demonstrates the value of achieving a tight integration between the civilian population and military community. Certainly, this integration benefits from mandatory conscription and yearly reserve duty of men from all sectors of society. But this sense of shared purpose has been seriously tested over the last seventeen years (since the onset of the first Intifada). Despite the deep division within the country regarding Israeli military and political control over the West Bank and Gaza, motivation for service in combat units and reserve duty participation remains high.

The country continues to produce successive generations of youth who are eager to join frontline units – thereby making entrance to the best units as competitive as gaining acceptance to the best universities in the West – and the country maintains an extraordinary large (given the size of the general population) reserve force. Even during the most heightened period of political discord, this did not change. In fact, levels of participation and motivation have only continued to grow. In part, this is because Israelis widely believe that they are under an existential threat from their Arab neighbors. Therefore, even if a majority of the population disagrees with the policies and military tactics employed in the West Bank and Gaza, there still remains widespread agreement that the Israeli military needs to maintain its competitive edge against its potential enemies. And as a result, even those people who disapprove of government policies encourage their sons and daughters to participate in the military. Moreover, even people who disapprove of government policies, continue to train and serve with their reserve units.

Simultaneously creating and leveraging an Israeli civilian culture that is tightly integrated with the Israeli military culture, the Israeli military takes pains to establish a direct connection between a soldier’s training and nearly four thousand years of Jewish history. As a result, Israeli soldiers don’t just see themselves as protectors of the modern country of Israel, they see themselves as filling an essential role that has kept the Jewish people safe for thousands of years. When Israeli soldiers shout “never again” during their swearing in ceremony, they are harking back to the defenders of Masada in 72 CE, remembering the Warsaw ghetto uprising, and know that the future of the Jewish people, wherever they are in the world, depend on their vigilance and determination.

Israeli commanders and soldiers do not perceive themselves as merely serving narrow political and economic interests or as simply performing tasks that increase the country’s security. Soldiers are conscious of the real-politic rationale and the real-world effect of their actions, but at the same time they are made to understand that every action they take directly impacts the future of their nation. For instance, failure to capture a terrorist doesn’t just possibly lead to the death of fellow citizens; it may also cause peace negotiations to end. Or the inadvertent killing of a Palestinian civilian through negligence could spark riots that create a spiraling chain of events that leads to war. Causing soldiers to understand that every action they take has the potential for catastrophic consequences eliminates the possibility of failure as an option.

Israel has long recognized the value of integrating its IO and PA. Of course, that does not mean that Israel has distinguished itself as consistently providing an effective IO strategy. That said, the Israeli IO strategy that took shape during Operation Defensive Shield in 2002 demonstrates the impact of an effective strategy.

Prior to this period, the Israeli IO strategy resulted in a politically divided country, increased hatred of Israelis by Palestinians, extensive political pressure being placed on Israel by the US and other Western nations that severely limited the military’s freedom of action. Here is the summation of the Israeli IO between 1989 and 2002.

These lands were thrust on us by war. This is our ancestral land and we have as much right as anyone to settle it. We are willing to negotiate land for peace, but we have no credible partner. When we have a partner, we’ll give up control of the land. Until then, we will administer these territories in a way that is just and humane.

The failure of the Israeli IO during this period is demonstrated by the lack of acknowledgement on the part of Israelis, Palestinians, or the international community regarding the fact that the lives of the Palestinian people had been improved dramatically by Israeli administration of the West Bank and Gaza.

Israel established six universities and empowered these institutions to select their own curriculum – thus making them some of the freest in the Middle East. In addition, Israel permitted a free and open press as well as the election of mayors in major cities decades before the Oslo Accords. In addition, the Palestinian economy grew rapidly and health conditions improved dramatically.

Even when Israel let PLO leaders return, allowed them to establish the Palestinian Authority, and relinquished administrative and military control over most of the West Bank and Gaza as part of the Oslo Accords in 1993, the Israeli military and intelligence community was under tremendous internal and external pressure to restrain its activities. This occurred despite a sharp rise in terrorism that led to heavy civilian losses in Israel. Interestingly, the Palestinian political leadership and paramilitary forces retained freedom of movement and action throughout this period.

The tangible and measurable improvements to the standard of living and quality of life in the West Bank and Gaza were mostly ignored by the Palestinian population and the world community. And while the failure on the part of the Palestinian leadership to meet its obligations was met with understanding in Israel and the world, Israel remained under tremendous pressure to accede to Palestinian political aspirations.

In this way, the failure of the Israeli IO strategy between 1989 and 2002 directly impacted the way in which the conflict unfolded and limited Israel’s freedom of action. In fact, for more than twenty years, Israel attempted – at various stages and in different ways – to win the “hearts and minds” of the Palestinian population. Every attempt failed to bridge political gaps or reduce the level of violence on the ground. In fact, violence increased as the Palestinians approached their political goals.

This all changed when the Israeli government adopted a new IO strategy prior to the launching of Operation Defensive Shield. A central component of the Israeli strategy was the development of a central narrative that galvanized Israeli public support for security policies, ensured freedom of action by mitigating international pressure, and demoralized the enemy. The Israeli IO strategy communicated the following:

The Palestinians have rejected a fair offer of peace. Since then, Israeli citizens have been bombarded by murderous attacks. For nearly ten years, Israel has restrained itself, but now it has reached a point where it must protect its citizens.

The primary difference between the old and new IO strategy is that Israel developed a clear message that focused on its universally accepted right to protect its citizens. This message was not complicated by an assertion of territorial rights over the West Bank and Gaza. The IO made it clear that Israeli actions were being taken only to protect the lives of its civilian population.

For the Israeli military, the IO strategy was essential the successful launching of Operation Defensive Shield. As a result, the emergency call-up of reserves (the largest call-up since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982) was met with overwhelming public support. In fact, the Israeli military had large numbers of people, who were not obligated to serve, coming to induction centers around the country in order to volunteer. Not only did the IO strategy establish internal cohesion, but it also mitigated external pressure. Prior to this period, a large-scale deployment of the Israeli military in the West Bank and Gaza was not feasible. Moreover, the success of Operation Defensive Shield has enabled the Israeli military and intelligence community complete freedom of action. As a result, Israel is able to conduct counter-insurgency operations continuously without concern for international or domestic pressure to pull back.

Certainly, the successful implementation of the tactics in the field was crucial to the success of the strategy. If, as had been feared at the operation’s outset, that thousands of Israeli soldiers would be killed or wounded during the re-occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, Israeli public support may have evaporated. As a strategic tool, IO can shape the battlefield – the number and type of soldiers a military can field, freedom of action, and the number and type of combatants a military will face – and help ensure that the aftermath leads to victory, but soldiers still need to defeat the enemy they face. As always, the fate of war depends on the actions taken by individual soldiers on the ground.

Given the freedom of action they needed, the Israeli military and intelligence community have reduced the number of successful Palestinian attacks by 90%, decreased the number of citizens killed by 70%, and lowered the number of wounded by 85% in the same time period.

In addition, a poll conducted by Beirzeit University in October 2005, after the completion of the Israeli disengagement plan, shows a significant reduction in Gaza of Palestinian support for groups that commit terrorist acts. Also, according to the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR), Palestinian attitudes regarding violence, especially suicide attacks, have dropped sharply to its lowest level in seven years. Support for suicide attacks have dropped from 77% in 2004 to 29% in 2005.

Currently, Israel continues to evolve the IO strategy in such a way as to create a political and military advantage over the Palestinians. The recent disengagement from Gaza serves to undercut the main element of the story of occupation that Palestinians rely on for political leverage. By disengaging from Gaza, Israel takes a first step toward changing the way it is understood by its own citizens and the world.

The success of the new political party in Israel, Kadima, whose platform commits its members to take actions that fulfill the vision promoted by the Israeli IO strategy, demonstrates the enduring nature of a successful IO strategy. And today, four years after its re-occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, the Israeli military conducts counter-terrorism operations in Gaza and frames them as purely defensive without concern for external or internal pressure.

The Israeli IO strategy is not comprehensive enough to serve as a template for the US, but the elements that promote internal cohesion and deeper integration between the civilian population and the military community may serve as a basis for discussion. For instance:

• The US military must be perceived as being more than a force employed by political, security, and economic drivers to safeguard the prosperity of the American people and ensure their defense.

• The members of the US military, at all levels, must see themselves primarily as playing a vital role in the wider narrative of democracy and freedom. US soldiers and civilians must come to view today’s military as the guarantors of peace, prosperity, and liberty that didn’t just start with the minutemen, but harks all the way back to the small Greek navy that defeated the Persian armada at Salamis.

• The missions soldiers are asked to undertake and their behavior at all times must be aligned with the wider national culture in order to heighten the sense of duty, increase the motivation to succeed, and further integrate the military with the civilian population.

• An IO strategy must be based on an unassailable universal ideal or a clearly defined and immediate existential threat that can not be refuted or subverted.

• An IO strategy must also take into account the fact it will be appropriated and contextualized over time. For this reason, the narrative constructed must be acceptable and meaningful to citizens at home, soldiers in the field, allies abroad, and the indigenous population which we aim to protect or support.

In addition, US planners must move past the assumption that greater economic, political, religious, and cultural freedom will lead an indigenous population to embrace our presence, adopt our worldview, and reduce friction between competing groups in the region.

Beyond the example of the Palestinian reaction to the economic and political benefits they gained from the Oslo Peace Process, the Iraqi reaction to US presence in Iraq serves as another example of the limitations of a strategy that is based on “winning hearts and minds.”

Even though the United States and her allies have freed the Iraqi people from the rule of a brutal dictator and despite the billions of dollars in US treasure spent, the more than two thousand US lives lost, and over fifteen thousand US soldiers wounded on their behalf, the United States is still perceived by our closest allies in Iraq as a benevolent occupier.

The US sees itself as a liberator and hopes to win “hearts and minds” through every day interactions between US representatives – both civilian and military – as well as good works carried out by NGOs, USAID, and the US military. Unfortunately, after three years, the insurgency has become increasingly sophisticated and the number of enemy combatants has grown. In fact, during the recent elections, even our supporters took part in a joint statement of all Iraqi factions that specifically cited that attacks against US soldiers was permissible.

The US has improved the lives of millions, but a single image transmitted by Aljazeera that reflects Arab preconceptions regarding US immorality or suspicions regarding US motivations can undermine efforts to establish a shared vision of the future, increase our enemy’s rate of recruitment, and damage US civilian support for the military.

Even prior to the march to Baghdad, the US placed a great deal of value on democratization, legitimization of pro-US Iraqi political leaders, massive reconstruction projects that were meant to improve the lives of the average Iraqi citizen, and ROEs that were designed to minimize civilian casualties.

Unfortunately, the Iraqi people perceive the US as an occupier despite the positive impact the US has had on their lives. A recent assessment by Ken Pollack at the Brookings Institute suggests that political progress will not decrease insurgent motivation. He believes that the US military will need to confront a growing insurgency for many years to come if the US remains committed to the idea of creating a stable, democratic Iraq.

Also, John Lynn, writing for the Small Wars Center for Excellence published in Military Review, that the US can not win the hearts and minds of the Iraqis. Lynn suggests that the US can only provide security and work to establish trust.

Many factors have contributed to the Iraqi people’s reaction to the US presence. Certainly the years of anti-US propaganda to which Iraqi citizens have been bombarded for decades through local and regional media contributed to the Iraqi people’s response.

For this reason, US planners must develop a comprehensive and flexible IO strategy that adopts the best practices of leading global brands, evolves throughout the life of our presence within an area of operation, and takes into account the policies of democratic countries that have enabled integration between their military and civilian populations.

noreply@blogger.com (Adam Harmon) — Tue, 29 Aug 2006 00:55:00 +0000

Publishers Weekly
Starred Review. Released at a time when soldier memoirs seem to be a dime-a-dozen publishing phenomenon, Harmon's entry should be celebrated as much for what it isn't as what it is. This is an even-paced, detailed, deliberate account of a sincere New Englander's move to Israel in 1990, where he enlists as a paratrooper just before the beginning of the Gulf War. Despite his weak grasp of Hebrew, Harmon graduates from basic training and soon finds himself guarding the country's borders and volunteering for raids against known and suspected terrorists. Throughout his service in the West Bank and Lebanon, he maintains a measured tone sympathetic to the hardships of neighboring Palestinians, even as he's called back from civilian life following an upswing in violence. For such a strictly chronological account-not merely day-to-day but at times moment-to-moment-Harmon's work is surprisingly captivating. Though he isn't always able to distinguish between pertinent and expendable information, Harmon's voice is so consistent and genuine that it's impossible not to identify with his steadfast journey. An illuminating account of a much-covered conflict, this is a memoir for anyone who wants a look behind the daily headlines.

noreply@blogger.com (Adam Harmon) — Tue, 18 Jul 2006 01:21:00 +0000

On WPR's Kathleen Dunn Show:

Download the audio clip from the show

noreply@blogger.com (Adam Harmon) — Tue, 18 Jul 2006 01:10:00 +0000

Jerusalem Post reviews "Lonely Soldier":

A Few Good Men, by Ralph Amelan.

On my occasional tours of reserve duty, I would gaze from my guard post at the night sky, brushing up on my astronomy and making sure a meteorite did not fall on our platoon. It's a thankless job, but someone has to do it. Yet it is not the stuff that publishable military memoirs are made of.

Chapter headings such as "Potatoes I have Peeled," "Boots I have Polished" (now there's a short chapter), "Things My Commanding Officers Have Called Me" (a somewhat longer chapter, sadly); well, they do not set a reader's pulse racing.

Ideally, you need to tell tales of struggle and achievement, of hardships overcome, of enemies fought and defeated, of character formed. And Adam Harmon, in Lonely Soldier (the too-literal translation of chayal boded) seems well placed to tell such a tale.

He was bitten by the Zionist bug as a teen. After completing his undergraduate studies in America, he left his family and moved to a kibbutz, joining the army only five months later at the end of 1990. After trying out for various elite units, he ended up in the paratroops, and most of the book is the story of his service there over the following 18 months, including undergoing punishing training and subsequent reserve duty.

He saw some action, ambushing terrorists and successfully capturing one as well. But Harmon's theme is simple: how an ordinary Jewish-American college kid rose to the physical and mental challenge of front-line service in the Israeli army and acquitted himself with honor.

He is entitled to be proud. The book, written in the present tense, is engagingly frank about his unequal battle with the Hebrew language and his doubts about making a success of his service. He captures well in simple language the day-to-day grind of training, and any IDF veteran is bound to be reminded of aspects of his time in the army, including things he would prefer to forget. If Harmon's drive to prove himself and to live up to the highest professional standards occasionally feels obsessive, it should be remembered that this is a real part of the military world.

Read the full article.

noreply@blogger.com (Adam Harmon) — Tue, 18 Jul 2006 01:07:00 +0000

Booklist review:

"This well-told tale of an American Jew in the Israeli army adds notably to our knowledge of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) during the 1990s. Harmon traveled to Israel during his college years and decided on a permanent move after graduation. He was fit enough to be accepted for the elite parachute and recon units, donning an IDF uniform for the first Gulf War and the second intifada. Thereby he adopted the perspective of being early on the scene when terrorism struck the local shopping mall, riots arose outside a favorite nightclub, and a pitched battle was only a commute away. He provides many vivid portraits of fellow soldiers in the world's most reticent army but not much on weapons and tactics, for which the IDF is no doubt grateful. His attitude is that of an observant Jew and a strong Zionist, and with passion and clarity he enlightens us about a crucially significant fighting force not covered with this kind of intimacy by the general media."

-Roland Green
Copyright © American Library Association. All rights reserved

noreply@blogger.com (Adam Harmon) — Tue, 18 Jul 2006 00:55:00 +0000

Bing West offers advance Praise:

“This book transcends place and nationality to reveal the essence of soldierly virtues–tough, decent, honest, and accepting of continuous hardships and solitary duties at low pay. As a soldier, Harmon would wince at such praise. But it’s true. This is the story of what makes a real soldier.”

–Bing West, author of "No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah"

Bing West's website, check it out.

No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah

The March Up: Taking Baghdad with the United States Marines

noreply@blogger.com (Adam Harmon) — Tue, 18 Jul 2006 00:29:00 +0000

My first book, "Lonely Soldier: The Memoir of an American in the Israeli Army", is now available on Amazon