Hafiz Saeed Khan, the Taliban's emir in Arakzai. Image from the SITE Intelligence Group.

The leader for the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan in Arakzai said the Taliban were instrumental in imposing sharia, or Islamic law, in the tribal agency, and vowed to "continue to fight the army."

Umar Studio, a propaganda outlet for the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, released a videotape interview with Hafiz Saeed Khan, who was described as the leader of the group in Arakzai. The interview was released on jihadist web forums in mid-April, but was dated September 2011, according to the SITE Intelligence Group, which translated the video.

In the interview, Khan said that until the arrival of a significant number of mujahideen, the Taliban had a strong core of supporters in the Mamuzai area in Arakzai that was prepared to impose sharia in the tribal agency, but "the only problem was the absence of a unifying and implementing force." The establishment of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan in late 2007 and its growth in Arakzai, which at the time was led by Hakeemullah Mehsud, now the terror group's top emir, allowed for the imposition of sharia throughout the tribal agency in December 2008 [see LWJ report, Taliban consolidate control in Arakzai tribal agency].

Khan said that the tribal elders posed the "biggest hurdle" to the rise of the Taliban and the imposition of sharia. The Taliban's solution was to liquidate the tribal leaders who opposed them.

"In the struggle for sharia, the tribal elders of this area were the biggest hurdle for us," Khan said. "Some of the tribal elders fled the area and some of them were killed."

The Arakzai Taliban followed the same strategy that the Taliban perfected in North and South Waziristan [see LWJ report, Anti-Taliban tribal leaders assassinated in Pakistan's northwest]. This strategy was exported to other tribal agencies and even in settled districts in the Northwest, such as Swat and Dir, and is still in use. Tribal leaders who oppose the Taliban are brutally liquidated. The Taliban execute the leaders and dump their bodies on the roadside with notes pinned to their chests branding them as "US spies" and traitors. The bodies are often mutilated and beheaded.

The Taliban have made very public examples of local leaders who have dared to resist. In December 2008, the Swat Taliban executed a local tribal leader named Pir Samiullah, then returned to the village to dig up his body and hang it in the town square. The villagers were warned not to remove his body or they would face the same fate [see LWJ report, Video: Taliban execute Swat tribal leader].

With the tribal opposition out of the way in Arakzai, the Taliban's main enemy became the Pakistani military and government, according to Khan.

"As soon as the internal problems faded away, we faced external problems from the government and the Pakistani army," Khan said. "The army wants us to follow the un-Islamic laws of Pakistan, but we will not give in. We continue to fight the army."

The Pakistani military has battled the Movement of the Taliban Pakistan in Arakzai since 2009. The military has conducted numerous airstrikes and operations in Mamuzai and other regions in Arakzai, but has been unable to eject the Taliban from power.

The Taliban in Arakzai was previously led by Akhunzada Aslam Farooqui, who took control of the Taliban after Hakeemullah was promoted to lead the entire Taliban movement in Pakistan's tribal areas and in the northwest in the summer of 2009. Farooqui was described as the "patron-in-chief" of the Taliban in Arakzai and a "close friend of Mullah Mohammad Omar" back in 2001. At the opening of Operation Enduring Freedom, Farooqui promised to have 12,000 tribesmen to battle US forces in Afghanistan and offered support such as sanctuary and weapons and ammunition. He has claimed to personally lead 7,000 Taliban fighters.

Another senior Taliban commander in Arakzai is Mufti Ilyas, who leads Taliban forces in Darra Adam Khel and is a deputy to Hakeemullah Mehsud. He commands a group that is assigned to assassinate Shia leaders.

Kaid al Dhahab, the new AQAP emir for Baydah province. Photo from The Yemen Post.

The US targeted two local leaders of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in the central province of Baydah today. The AQAP leaders survived the strike, but five fighters are reported to have been killed.

Today's drone strike, the ninth by the US in Yemen this month, targeted Kaid al Dhahab, AQAP's emir in the province of Baydah, and his brother Nabil, who is also a senior leader in the terror group, according to The Yemen Post.

The remotely piloted Predators or the more deadly Reapers targeted Kaid and Nabil as they were traveling in a convoy in Rada'a, a city in Baydah that was under AQAP control earlier this year. The drones killed five AQAP fighters and wounded four more, according to The Associated Press. US intelligence officials told The Long War Journal that Kaid was the target of the strike.

Kaid took control of AQAP in Baydah after his brother, Tariq, was killed in February by another brother, Hazam, a senior tribal leader in the town who was concerned that Tariq's affiliation with AQAP would incur the wrath of the Yemeni government. Before he was killed, Tariq had seized control of Baydah, raised al Qaeda's banner, sworn allegiance to Ayman al Zawahiri, and warned that "the Islamic Caliphate is coming."

Kaid and Nabil were tasked with regrouping AQAP's forces in Baydah after Tariq's death. The two leaders are also the brothers-in-law of slain AQAP leader and ideologue Anwar al Awlaki.

US strikes in Yemen

The US has now carried at least nine drone strikes in Yemen this month. The last confirmed strike took place on May 19. Other recent airstrikes are believed to have been carried out by the US also, but little evidence has emerged to directly link the attacks to the US.

US is known to have carried out 22 airstrikes against AQAP in Yemen so far this year; one in January, six in March, and at least six more in April, in addition to the nine already in May.

Since December 2009, the CIA and the US military's Joint Special Operations Command are known to have conducted at least 37 air and missile strikes inside Yemen, including today's strike in Baydah province. [For more information on the US airstrikes in Yemen, see LWJ report, Charting the data for US air strikes in Yemen, 2002 - 2012.]

The pace of the US airstrikes has increased as AQAP and its political front, Ansar al Sharia, have taken control of vast areas of southern Yemen. AQAP controls the cities of Zinjibar, Al Koud, Jaar, and Shaqra in Abyan province. The terror group also holds Azzan in Shabwa province.

The Yemeni military has launched an offensive to retake the cities and towns held by AQAP. Heavy fighting has been reported in Zinjibar, Jaar, and Lawdar. Hundreds of AQAP fighters, Yemeni soldiers, and civilians have been reported killed during fighting in recent weeks.

Since the beginning of May 2011, the US is known to have carried out 32 airstrikes in Yemen. This year, the US appears to be targeting both AQAP leaders and foot soldiers in an effort to support Yemeni military operations against the terror group. AQAP has taken control of vast areas in southern Yemen and has been expanding operations against the government, with raids on military bases in locations previously thought to be outside the terror group's control.

Three senior AQAP operatives have been killed in the 22 strikes so far this year. The most recent strike that killed a senior AQAP leader took place on May 6, when the US killed Fahd al Quso in a drone attack in Shabwa province. Quso, who has been described as AQAP's external operations chief, was involved in numerous terrorist attacks, including the 2000 suicide attack on the USS Cole that killed 17 US sailors. The US obtained the information leading to Quso from a Saudi operative who had penetrated AQAP.

On Jan. 31, US drones killed Abdul Mun'im Salim al Fatahani near the city of Lawdar in Abyan province. Fatahani was also involved in the suicide attack on the USS Cole, as well as the bombing that damaged the Limburg oil tanker in 2002. AQAP said that Fatahani had fought in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The US also killed Mohammed Saeed al Umda (a.k.a. Ghareeb al Taizi) in an April 22 drone strike on a convoy in the Al Samadah area of Marib province. Prior to the downfall of the Taliban regime in 2001, he had attended the Al Farouq military training camp in Afghanistan. Umda served as a member of Osama bin Laden's bodyguard in Afghanistan before returning to Yemen, and was involved in the October 2002 suicide attack on the French oil tanker Limburg. He escaped from a Yemeni jail in 2006.

US intelligence officials believe that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula poses a direct threat to the homeland. The latest AQAP plot against the West, involving an underwear bomb that is nearly undetectable and was to be detonated on an airliner, was foiled earlier this month. The terror group has planned multiple attacks against targets in the US. A strike in Yemen last year killed both Anwar al Awlaki, the radical, US-born cleric who plotted attacks against the US, and Samir Khan, another American who served as a senior AQAP propagandist.

In one raid, the combined special operations team targeted an unnamed "al Qaeda leader" and called in an airstrike in the Dangam district, according to an International Security Assistance Force press release. The al Qaeda leader "facilitates the movement of weapons, equipment and insurgents," and "procures and transports supplies for insurgents throughout the province," ISAF stated. One "insurgent" was reported killed in the airstrike.

In the other operation, the combined Coalition and Afghan force targeted "a senior al Qaeda leader" and launched another airstrike in the Watahpur district, according to ISAF. The al Qaeda leader "coordinates and directs insurgent attacks against Afghan security forces and Coalition troops throughout eastern Afghanistan." He also "supplies weapons and equipment to insurgents." Two "insurgents" were killed in the strike.

Al Qaeda operatives and leaders often serve as embedded military trainers for Taliban field units and impart tactics and bomb-making skills to these forces. In addition, al Qaeda frequently supports the Taliban by funding operations and providing weapons and other aid. [See LWJ report, Al Qaeda's paramilitary 'Shadow Army' for more information on al Qaeda's role in Afghanistan.]

Today's announcement of the targeting of the two leaders is the first ISAF press release noting the capture, death, or targeting of an al Qaeda operative since Jan. 30, when an al Qaeda facilitator was captured during a raid in the eastern province of Paktia.

ISAF Joint Command's press desk has previously told The Long War Journal that the lack of reporting on raids against al Qaeda "should not be misinterpreted as lack of operational rigor against those entities."

"ISAF continues to conduct combat operations against the spectrum of insurgent forces through-out Afghanistan year-round," IJC press desk stated on Jan. 30.

Background on al Qaeda's stronghold in Kunar

Kunar is a known haven for al Qaeda and allied terror groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Six months prior to his death, Osama bin Laden issued instructions to his chief of staff, Atiyah Abd al Rahman, to relocate "hundreds" of commanders and fighters from North Waziristan to Kunar, Nuristan, Ghazni, and Zabul provinces in Afghanistan to avoid targeting by US drone strikes. Bin Laden's letter to Atiyah was dated Oct. 21, 2010. [See LWJ report, Bin Laden advised relocation of some leaders to Afghanistan due to drone strikes in Waziristan.]

It is unclear if bin Laden's instructions were followed, but several al Qaeda leaders and operatives were killed, captured, and targeted in those four provinces after the letter was written. Bin Laden said that "Kunar is more fortified due to its rougher terrain and the many mountains, rivers, and trees and it can accommodate hundreds of the brothers without being spotted by the enemy."

For years, the rugged, remote Afghan province of Kunar has served as a sanctuary for al Qaeda and allied terror groups. The presence of al Qaeda cells has been detected in the districts of Asmar, Asadabad, Dangam, Marawana, Pech, Shaikal Shate, Sarkani, Shigal, and Watahpur; or nine of Kunar's 15 districts, according to press releases issued by the International Security Assistance Force that have been compiled by The Long War Journal.

Despite the known presence of al Qaeda camps in Kunar, US troops abandoned several combat outposts in Kunar in late 2009 after major attacks on remote bases. US Army commanders said that the outposts were closed or turned over to Afghan forces as part of a new counterinsurgency strategy to secure population centers. The Taliban have gained control of several districts in Kunar since US forces withdrew from those bases.

But as the US military began drawing down its forces in Kunar in late 2009, it acknowledged that al Qaeda camps were in operation in the province. ISAF noted these camps and bases when it announced the death of an al Qaeda leader during a raid on a base in late 2009, as well as in a press release announcing the deaths of two senior al Qaeda operatives in 2010. On Dec. 1, 2009, ISAF announced that Qari Masiullah, the al Qaeda chief of security for Kunar province, was killed during an operation in Kunar. Masiullah ran a training camp that taught insurgents how to use and emplace IEDs that were used in attacks on Afghan civilians and Afghan and Coalition forces throughout the provinces of Nangarhar, Nuristan, Kunar, and Laghman.

On Oct. 11, 2009, US forces targeted an al Qaeda base in the mountains in Pech. The raid targeted an unnamed al Qaeda commander known to use a mountainside base near the village of Tantil to conduct attacks in the Pech Valley. The al Qaeda leader, who was not named, and his cadre are also known to facilitate the movement of "foreign fighters" from Pakistan into Afghanistan. ISAF uses the term 'foreign fighters' to describe operatives of al Qaeda and allied terror groups from outside Afghanistan.

In September 2010, ISAF identified another al Qaeda camp in Kunar, when US aircraft bombed a compound in the Korengal Valley. Among those killed in the strike were a senior al Qaeda commander and two operatives. Abdallah Umar al Qurayshi, a Saudi, was a senior al Qaeda commander who coordinated the attacks of a group of Arab fighters in Kunar and Nuristan provinces and also maintained extensive contacts with al Qaeda facilitators throughout the Middle East. The other two operatives also killed in the strike were Abu Atta al Kuwaiti, an explosives expert; and Sa'ad Mohammad al Shahri, a longtime jihadist and the son of a retired Saudi colonel.

Special operations teams have been hunting top al Qaeda leaders and its network in Kunar and Nuristan for years. In the summer of 2010, ISAF announced it was hunting Qari Zia Rahman, who serves as the Taliban's top regional commander in the northeast and as a senior military leader in al Qaeda. He operates in Kunar and Nuristan, as well as across the border in Pakistan's tribal agencies of Bajaur and Mohmand. In 2010, Rahman and his network were the targets of three large conventional operations and multiple special operations raids.

Omar Hammami, the American terrorist who has served as a Shabaab military commander, propagandist, recruiter, and fundraiser, recently released a statement calling for jihadists to declare a global Islamic caliphate.

Hammani's statement was posted on May 25 in four parts [Part 1, 2, 3, and 4] by a jihadist known as "somalimuhajirwarrior," or "foreign Somali warrior," on a YouTube website. The lecture is titled "In Defense of the Khilaafa: The Next Stage."

The release of the lecture took place just one week after Hammami, who is known as Abu Mansour al Amriki, published part 1 of autobiography, in which he recounted his life in the US, his path to jihad, and his time with the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia. The autobiography refuted the rumors that he was executed early last month by Shabaab for releasing a video in which he claimed his life was in danger. Shortly after the release of the video, Shabaab quickly denied that the group presented any danger to Hammami.

In the lecture released on May 25, Hammami said that the establishment of the global caliphate is critical to prevent the West from dividing and conquering the disparate jihadist movements and defeating them individually. He cited a RAND study from 2006 that said al Qaeda's ideology is its center of gravity and that suggested methods for causing the jihadists a strategic defeat.

The conclusions of the RAND report are "absolutely correct," Hammami said, according to a transcript of his statement provided by the SITE Intelligence Group.

"So to bring the point home, it's obvious to all that after the death of the Prophet ... this monumental collective action of establishing [monotheism] on the earth can only truly be done properly through the vehicle known as the [Caliphate]," he said. "This means that the Muslims worldwide must unite under the leadership of one Muslim leader called the Khalifa [Caliph]. This then is the reality of the ideology of al Qaeda and al Qaeda, the ideology of the global jihadists, and the ideology of every truly sincere Muslim. This is also the ideology that truly scares the pants and socks off the [disbelievers]."

Hammami noted that a key conclusion of the RAND paper is that the West must break local Islamist insurgencies from the global jihad.

"[A] prong of the RAND strategy for defeating al-Qaeda is to break the links between the global and local jihads," he said. "In other words, they want to cause disunity among the Ummah and keep us from establishing the Shariah of the Prophet ... as a unified group under one single leader."

Hammami cautioned that "internationalization brings costs as well as benefits," and compared the problems with the current global jihadist movement to the "international communist movement during the previous century."

"Contradictions inevitably arise between the global vision promulgated by movements' theoreticians and the national agendas that many local cadres naturally pursue. Excluding this friction could be a part of an effective Western counter strategy," Hammami said.

He warned that human nature may interfere with the overarching goals of the global jihadist movement, and local or regional jihadists may view the global jihadists as a "burden" to their cause.

"So what then of a situation in which a certain land of jihad reaches a level of supremacy in its region, where it finds itself no longer in need of the benefits of being part of the global jihad, but rather instead, it begins to see such ties as a burden," Hammami stated. "Although it may keep some of the global rhetoric, it may actually begin to stand in the way of outside operations or the creation of new jihadi fronts? Worse still, what if multiple lands of jihad in different regions reach such a level simultaneously? Shall we simply rely upon human nature and wait for one side to simply yield power to a unified authority and instinctively guide the Muslims to unity?"

Hammami then said that the "mujahideen" must balance the goals of "freeing Islamic lands and administrating them in accordance with Shariah ... while still keeping our eyes squarely on the goal of spreading the jihad globally." He said that current jihadist groups "have begun specializing in only one of these two fields, either focusing entirely on spreading the jihad globally or focusing entirely on establishing Shariah in one particular land."

He observed that the jihad "has become made up of a conglomerate of local jihadi fronts" and that the global jihadists, such as himself, "are left without any political capital in which to steer the jihad."

Hammami stated that the solution to this problem is the creation of a global caliphate, under a new name. He suggested discarding the name "al Qaeda" and the various Islamic States, and appointing a Caliph with a "more global outlook." He advocated that the Caliph should be from the Quraish tribe, the one into which the Prophet Mohammed was born in Mecca, Saudi Arabia:

Therefore, in conclusion, I propose to the mujahideen of the world that we unite no longer under our old names which can only encompass a certain region or a certain class of the Ummah. Instead, we should unite under an all-inclusive name that also has a firm basis in the Shariah. This will be a method of not only uniting the mujahideen, but it will also turn the jihad truly into a jihad of the entire Ummah. Of course, this name is not the global insurgency, or al-Qaeda, or the Islamic State of such and such country, or the such and such movement. No! This name is no other than the rightly-guided [Caliphate], it is inclusive of the entire Ummah, and it is the name which has the most evidence from the Quran and Sunnah.

With this new name we will not only find a method of unifying our efforts of expanding the jihad and establishing the Shariah in different lands, but we will also find a solution to the matter of who truly has authority over deciding the direction of the jihad. We will finally have an authority with greater powers than simply giving the order for deciding which particular front or operation has strategic priority. This, of course, requires that we have to have a [Caliph] who not only controls land but also has a global perspective of the jihad. Having land under his control will obviously give him the missing political capital discussed earlier, and his position as [Caliph] will also give him added weight and credibility from Shariah. Similarly, his position will also force him to have a more global outlook, because his authority stretches the globe.

Of course, human nature dictates that we are naturally more inclined to supporting our own tribe or people, and we are more interested in freeing and administrating our homeland. I understand that, and in response to that, I propose that we choose a [Caliphate] that is from the core of the Muslims lands and from the tribe of Quraish.

Hammami then proceeded to address various perceived criticisms of his arguments. He even denied ever being a member of the Hizb ut-Tahrir, a radical political party that calls for the establishment of a global caliphate. He also said that those who claim that his proposal would divide the Muslim world are wrong, because "the Ummah is already divided and a much eviler form of division could be on the horizon if we sit and do nothing."

Finally, he argued that the mujahideen have played into the West's trap because they have failed to promote the caliphate and that accordingly the Muslim world is unfamiliar with the "concept." He attributed the lack of acceptance of the Taliban's Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan, and al Qaeda's Islamic State of Iraq, to the mujahideen's failure to educate the Muslim world on the importance of a global caliphate.

"The Muslims will always remain unaccustomed to the idea of [Caliphate] for as long as we, and I mean the mujahideen especially, continue to hide the concept from them. The longer we stray away from it, the longer we implicitly agree with the [disbelievers], who assert baselessly that the [Caliphate] is a figment of our imagination," Hammami said. "We have to remember that the state of the Taliban was met with severe criticisms from the Muslims, just like the Islamic State of Iraq was met with sneers."

The Taliban announced the death of Jamil ur Rahman (or Jamil al Rahman bin Sa'adullah) in a statement released on May 23 on the Pashto-language section of Voice of Jihad, and then again on May 25 on the Arabic-language section, according to the SITE Intelligence Group.

"We received with deep sadness the news of the martyrdom of the deputy governor of Nuristan province in the formations of the Islamic Emirate, the well-known knowledgeable and jihadi personality, the venerable sheikh, Jamil al-Rahman, along with his closest friend, the heroic commander Abdul Hakim, at noon today, Wednesday, 23/5/2012, in an American airstrike in the village of Hashmuz in Wanat Waygal district of Nuristan province," the Taliban statement said.

The Taliban said that Jamil's death was "a big loss to all the mujahideen of the Islamic Emirate, and the citizens and the whole Muslim world," and then extolled his "martyrdom," and vowed to "retaliate."

"Every mujahid with determination in the Islamic Emirate has pledged to retaliate, Allah willing, for all the martyrs and the oppressed," the statement continued.

The Taliban provided a brief bio of Jamil, noting that he was born "in a religious family" in Hashmuz, the same village where he was killed, and "completed his studies in different religious schools in Pakistan."

"In addition to teaching Shariah sciences, he had a strong and effective role in the previous jihad and he remained a commander for several fronts," the statement said. The Taliban said that Jamil was "assigned by the Command of the Islamic Emirate as the deputy governor of Nuristan province, where he continued his jihadi mission until the last moments of his life...."

The International Security Force announced Jamil's death on May 23, and described him as "a senior insurgent leader in Nuristan province" who "provided leadership and support to insurgent forces throughout Nuristan and Kunar and coordinated insurgent activities across eastern Afghanistan." The governor of Nuristan confirmed the deaths of Jamil ur Rahman and Abdul Hakim, and noted that Jamil was the Taliban's deputy shadow governor [see LWJ report, ISAF kills Taliban's deputy shadow governor for Nuristan].

Jamil served under Dost Mohammed, the longtime shadow governor for Nuristan who is tied to al Qaeda. ISAF killed Jamil just one week after a Taliban liaison to the Peshawar Shura, which commands operations in Nuristan, was captured. The Taliban liaison also served under Dost Mohammed.

Much of Nuristan is either under Taliban control or is contested. The province serves as a safe haven for al Qaeda, the Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, and other regional terror groups.

The unmanned Predators or the more heavily armed Reapers fired a pair of missiles at a compound in the Mir Ali area of North Waziristan in the middle of the night, Geo News reported. Pakistani intelligence officials said that 10 "militants" were killed in the strike, according to Reuters.

No senior al Qaeda, Taliban, or members of allied terrorist groups operating in the area have been reported killed in the strike. Mir Ali is known to host a variety of foreign and domestic Pakistani terror groups.

Today's strike in Mir Ali is the second in two days, and the third strike this month. The US launched the two latest strikes just one day after it failed to convince Pakistan at a NATO summit in Chicago to reopen the supply lines to Afghanistan. Pakistan closed the supply lines following the Mohmand incident in November 2011, in which US troops killed 24 Pakistani troops. The Pakistani soldiers were killed after they opened fire on US troops operating across the border in Kunar province, Afghanistan.

The US has carried out just 15 strikes so far this year. Three took place in South Waziristan, and 12 in North Waziristan. Eight of the strikes in North Waziristan have been executed in or around Miramshah, and two have been in Mir Ali.

The program has been scaled down from its peak in 2010, when the US conducted 117 strikes, according to data collected by The Long War Journal. In 2011, the US carried out just 64 strikes in Pakistan's border regions. With only 13 strikes in the first five months of 2012, the US is on a pace to carry out just 36 strikes in Pakistan this year.

The US has launched more strikes in Yemen (21) against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula than in Pakistan so far this year. The US only launched 10 airstrikes in Yemen in 2011, versus 64 in Pakistan last year.

Mir Ali is a terrorist haven

The Mir Ali area is in the sphere of influence of Abu Kasha al Iraqi, an al Qaeda leader who serves as a key link to the Taliban and supports al Qaeda's external operations network. Taliban leader Hafiz Gul Bahadar and the Haqqani Network also operate in the Mir Ali area. Moreover, Mir Ali is a known hub for al Qaeda's military and external operations councils.

Since Sept. 8, 2010, several Germans and Britons have been reported killed in Predator strikes in the Mir Ali area. The Europeans were members of the Islamic Jihad Group, an al Qaeda affiliate based in the vicinity of Mir Ali. The IJG members are believed to have been involved in an al Qaeda plot that targeted several major European cities and was modeled after the terror assault on the Indian city of Mumbai in 2008. The plot was orchestrated by Ilyas Kashmiri, the al Qaeda leader who was killed in a US drone strike in June 2011.

Mir Ali also hosts at least three suicide training camps for the the Fedayeen-i-Islam, an alliance between the Pakistani Taliban, the anti-Shia Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and Jaish-e-Mohammed. In early 2011, a Fedayeen-i-Islam spokesman claimed that more than 1,000 suicide bombers have trained at three camps. One failed suicide bomber corroborated the Fedayeen spokesman's statement, claiming that more than 350 suicide bombers trained at his camp.

Prior to this year, the US has been pounding targets in the Datta Khel, Miramshah, and Mir Ali areas of North Waziristan in an effort to kill members involved in the European plot. Al Qaeda and allied terror groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Jihad Group, the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and a number of Pakistani and Central and South Asian terror groups host or share camps in the region. These groups are given aid and shelter by Taliban leader Hafiz Gul Bahadar and the Haqqani Network, a Taliban subgroup run by Siraj and Jalaluddin Haqqani.

Despite the known presence of al Qaeda and other foreign groups in North Waziristan, and requests by the US that action be taken against these groups, the Pakistani military has indicated that it has no plans to take on Hafiz Gul Bahadar or the Haqqani Network. Bahadar and the Haqqanis are considered "good Taliban" by the Pakistani military establishment as they do not carry out attacks inside Pakistan.