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   <title>The Long War Journal Threat Matrix</title>
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   <id>tag:www.longwarjournal.org,2013:/threat-matrix/15</id>
   <updated>2013-05-25T14:50:34Z</updated>
   
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   <title>EIJ leader discusses Salafi jihadism in Sinai</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/LongWarJournalThreatMatrix/~3/2HCywUYoFi4/eij_leader_discusses_salafi_ji.php" />
   <id>tag:www.longwarjournal.org,2013:/threat-matrix//15.52733</id>
   
   <published>2013-05-25T04:01:25Z</published>
   <updated>2013-05-25T14:50:34Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Nabil Naim, an Egyptian Islamic Jihad leader, said that there are about 1,000 al Qaeda-linked terrorists currently in the Sinai. Naim denounced the Salafi jihadists as "foolish people" and suggested a relationship between them and the Muslim Brotherhood. </summary>
   <author>
      <name>David Barnett</name>
      
   </author>
   
   <category term="36" label="Egypt" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="1414" label="Egyptian Islamic Jihad" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/">
      <![CDATA[In a recent interview with <em>Asharq al Awsat</em>, Nabil Naim, a leader in Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and a former associate of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, said that the kidnappers of seven Egyptian security personnel, who were released earlier this week, are linked to al Qaeda. Naim also provided information on the Salafi jihadists operating in the Sinai. 

<a href="http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=12595&article=729632&search=%E4%C8%ED%E1%20%E4%DA%ED%E3&state=true#.UZ-Uu6KPvhI">According to Naim</a>, Salafi jihadists in the Sinai Peninsula have "sent messages to [al Qaeda emir Ayman] al Zawahiri" noting their desire to establish an al Qaeda branch in Egypt. While Naim did not say whether Zawahiri responded positively, he reiterated his belief that Zawahiri is not as charismatic as bin Laden. 

While it is unclear as to what "messages" Naim is referring to, in recently revealed communications between Muhammad Jamal al Kashef, the head of <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/11/more_al_qaeda_links.php">the Nasr City terror cell</a>, and al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri, Jamal said that he had formed "<a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/02/communications_with.php">groups for us inside [the] Sinai</a>." 

Thus far, authorities in Egypt have failed to identify or arrest any of the kidnappers. Most observers, including Naim, have suggested that the al Tawhid Wal Jihad group was behind the abductions. Fourteen members of the Salafi jihadist group were sentenced to death, including Ahmed Abu Shita, who <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57585612/egypt-troops-in-sinai-sweep-mistakenly-hit-funeral/">some reports</a> have said is believed to be tied to the recent kidnapping, last September. 

According to Naim, members of the al Tawhid Wal Jihad group come from various governorates in Egypt as well as the Gaza Strip. Naim further said that there is cooperation between the group and similar groups in Gaza, such as the Popular Resistance Committees' al Nasser Salah al Deen Brigades, and Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem. 

Naim suggested that the number of Salafi jihadists in al Tawhid Wal Jihad and similar groups in the Sinai is around 1,000. Naim had <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-08/egypt-launches-security-operation-to-purge-sinai-of-militants.html">previously said</a> that there were no more than 500 al Qaeda-linked terrorists in Egypt. According to Naim, the media gives them too much attention for their size and the people in the Sinai dislike the Salafi jihadists. "[T]hey are hated and the tribes renounce their practices, and had the army been given a free hand in the area, it would have wiped them out," Naim said.

With regard to the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi jihadists, Naim said that "there is a relationship" between the two. "The ruling regime does not want to lose these groups ... it wants to contain them, probably to use them at a certain time," he said. According to Naim, the Muslim Brotherhood could use the Salafi jihadists "against their opponents" in the future.]]>
      
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<entry>
   <title>Obama pulls back in fight against al Qaeda</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/LongWarJournalThreatMatrix/~3/7G5VfyzGh48/obama_pulls_back_in_fight_agai.php" />
   <id>tag:www.longwarjournal.org,2013:/threat-matrix//15.52725</id>
   
   <published>2013-05-24T12:27:15Z</published>
   <updated>2013-05-24T18:17:37Z</updated>
   
   <summary>As al Qaeda's network has expanded the US is returning to a pre-9/11 mentality. </summary>
   <author>
      <name>Thomas Joscelyn &amp; Bill Roggio</name>
      
   </author>
   
   <category term="191" label="Al Qaeda" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/">
      <![CDATA[President Obama's speech yesterday which outlined his vision of the future of the fight against al Qaeda and allied groups was <a href="http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/strategic-retreat_618785.html">a long time coming</a>. You can <a href="http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/full-text-obamas-future-our-fight-against-terrorism-address_728945.html">read the entire transcript here</a>.

There are a number of items in the speech that we can refute, in great detail, but we won't. The most important issue is that this administration is seeking to withdraw from the fight against al Qaeda and return to a pre-9/11 posture. This should come as no surprise, as Obama has from the beginning of his presidency called for the end of US involvement in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and after the Abbottabad raid in May 2011, touted the death of Osama bin Laden (and, subsequently, some of his lieutenants) as the end of al Qaeda.

The crux of this argument is excerpted below:

<blockquote>Today, the core of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan is on a path to defeat. Their remaining operatives spend more time thinking about their own safety than plotting against us. They did not direct the attacks in Benghazi or Boston. They have not carried out a successful attack on our homeland since 9/11. Instead, what we've seen is the emergence of various al Qaeda affiliates. From Yemen to Iraq, from Somalia to North Africa, the threat today is more diffuse, with Al Qaeda's affiliate in the Arabian Peninsula - AQAP -the most active in plotting against our homeland. While none of AQAP's efforts approach the scale of 9/11 they have continued to plot acts of terror, like the attempt to blow up an airplane on Christmas Day in 2009.

Unrest in the Arab World has also allowed extremists to gain a foothold in countries like Libya and Syria. Here, too, there are differences from 9/11. In some cases, we confront state-sponsored networks like Hizbollah that engage in acts of terror to achieve political goals. Others are simply collections of local militias or extremists interested in seizing territory. While we are vigilant for signs that these groups may pose a transnational threat, most are focused on operating in the countries and regions where they are based. That means we will face more localized threats like those we saw in Benghazi, or at the BP oil facility in Algeria, in which local operatives - in loose affiliation with regional networks - launch periodic attacks against Western diplomats, companies, and other soft targets, or resort to kidnapping and other criminal enterprises to fund their operations.</blockquote>

And a bit later:

<blockquote>Lethal yet less capable al Qaeda affiliates. Threats to diplomatic facilities and businesses abroad. Homegrown extremists. This is the future of terrorism. We must take these threats seriously, and do all that we can to confront them. But as we shape our response, we have to recognize that the scale of this threat closely resembles the types of attacks we faced before 9/11.</blockquote>

As we have said many times in radio interviews and during debates: What we are witnessing with respect to al Qaeda's operations today in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa is very similar to what we witnessed in the decade prior to 9/11-- attacks on US embassies and military facilities, jihadists fighting local insurgencies, attacks on and kidnappings of Westerners, etc. Except that, prior to 9/11, al Qaeda's footprint was far, far lighter than it is today. In the 1990s, al Qaeda was active in Afghanistan; its operatives were participating in the insurgencies in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Southeast Asia; and the group maintained a network throughout Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.

Today, al Qaeda continues to operate in Afghanistan (claims that al Qaeda has been defeated in Afghanistan fall apart when you look at Kunar and Nuristan, for starters); it has an extensive network in Pakistan and has metastasized within the plethora of jihadist groups there; it is conducting active insurgencies in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Mali, Algeria, Nigeria, and Somalia; and it maintains networks in all of the areas where it existed prior to 9/11. 

As al Qaeda's network has expanded, it now has more resources to draw upon to conduct such attacks. And even though al Qaeda hasn't successfully executed a major attack on US soil since 9/11, the operatives it selects to conduct such attacks will come from more diverse backgrounds. For instance, if, 11 years ago, someone had said that individuals from Belize or Niger could be used to attack the US, the suggestion would have been ridiculed. When Umar Farok Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian, attempted to blow up a plane over Detroit on Christmas Day, 2009, the reality set in that al Qaeda isn't merely an Arab phenomenon.

This administration assumes that local insurgencies will remain local and that their efforts will be focused on the "near enemy," or the local governments they oppose, vs. the "far enemy," most notably the United States. But this is a major misunderstanding of al Qaeda, its guiding philosophy, and how it has operated historically. Al Qaeda has always focused most of its efforts to fight the near enemy, and has culled certain operatives from this cadre of seasoned fighters to plan and conduct attacks against the West. 

Just as al Qaeda's network has expanded, the US is now seeking to pull back from the war. For instance, the drone strikes, which have killed some of al Qaeda's most senior 'legacy' leaders, will be reduced considerably, despite the fact that al Qaeda is replenishing its leadership cadre with experienced jihadists, some from Pakistan. Also, Obama touts that he has ended the war in Iraq and will do the same in Afghanistan. But the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will not end as US forces are withdrawn; only US involvement in those wars will end. Iraq is returning to a pre-surge state of violence; al Qaeda in Iraq is resurgent, and its affiliate in Syria, the Al Nusrah Front, is a potent force. Few people believe that the Afghan government can prevent the Taliban, which remains closely allied with al Qaeda, from retaking some areas it controlled as late as 2009.

Ultimately, this administration, like the last, has no comprehensive policy to deal with the threat posed by al Qaeda and its allied groups. There is no strategy to deal with state sponsors of terror groups (primarily Pakistan, Iran, and Syria); al Qaeda's and allied groups' ability to exploit the situations in ungoverned spaces; and finally, and most importantly, the radical Salafi jihadist ideology that remains attractive to a small but consequential segment of the Muslim world. ]]>
      
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<entry>
   <title>Pakistani Taliban claim credit for deadly attack in Quetta</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/LongWarJournalThreatMatrix/~3/pVD_AI6ETwY/pakistani_taliban_claim_credit.php" />
   <id>tag:www.longwarjournal.org,2013:/threat-matrix//15.52711</id>
   
   <published>2013-05-23T18:01:10Z</published>
   <updated>2013-05-23T22:00:56Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan spokesman Ihsanullah Ihsan "proudly" claimed responsibility for today's deadly bombing in Quetta, Pakistan that killed at least 11 members of an elite police unit. </summary>
   <author>
      <name>LWJ Staff</name>
      
   </author>
   
   <category term="12" label="Pakistan" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="24" label="Taliban" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/">
      <![CDATA[<center><div><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100">  <tr>  <td width="100%" class="tableborder" style="border-bottom-style: none; border-bottom-width: medium"><img src="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/assets_c/2013/05/Pak_blast_Quetta_05232013_AP-thumb-560x372-1947.jpg" width="560" height="372" alt="Pak_blast_Quetta_05232013_AP.jpg" class="mt-image-none" style="" /></td>  </tr>  <tr>  <td width="100%" class="tableborder" style="border-top-style: none; border-top-width: medium"><p align="center" class="imagetext"> Pakistani security forces comb through the burnt wreckage of a vehicle in Quetta, following a deadly roadside bomb attack targeting a police convoy on May 23, 2013. The explosion killed at least 11 police and two civilians. Photo by the <em>Associated Press</em>.</td>  </tr>  </table> </div></center>

The Tehrik-e-Taliban-e Pakistan (Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, or TTP) claimed responsibility for today's deadly roadside bomb attack in the city of Quetta. Pakistani authorities confirmed that 11 members of a newly created elite police unit and two civilians were killed after a rickshaw packed with explosives detonated as a security convoy passed by. At least 20 others were wounded, and authorities cautioned that the death toll could rise. 

Additional details were reported by the <A href="http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/05/23/3412160/police-car-bomb-kills-12-in-southwest.html#storylink=cpy"> <em>Associated Press</em></a>:

<blockquote>The rickshaw was packed with around 100 kilograms (220 pounds) of explosives and was parked alongside a road in the city [Quetta]. It was detonated by remote control when a vehicle carrying members of the police's special forces team passed by, said senior police officer Fayaz Sumbal.

Eyewitness Irshad Ali said the blast "was so loud, we thought something had fallen from the sky." The bomb completely destroyed the police vehicle, leaving little more than twisted sheets of metal.

The special forces unit that was targeted was put together months ago to deal with increasing incidents of kidnappings and shootings in Baluchistan, said Sumbal.</blockquote>

The TTP were quick to claim the attack. "We proudly claim responsibility for Thursday's blast in Quetta and the target was local police," Taliban spokesperson Ihsanullah Ihsan <a href="http://news.yahoo.com/roadside-bomb-kills-13-southwest-pakistan-062348550.html">told <em>Reuters</em></a>. "The Balochistan police recently arrested and killed some of our colleagues belonging to the Swat Taliban."

The TTP were heavily involved in orchestrating a series of bombings prior to Pakistan's national elections held on May 11, including a bloody twin bomb attack in Karachi targeting the election office of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) party. That attack killed at least three people and wounded 34 others, <a href= "http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2013/05/2013541784603913.html"><em>al Jazeera</em> reported</a>. 

Prime Minister-elect Nawaz Sharif has repeatedly called for engaging the Taliban in talks to help end the rising militancy, but the TTP have so far rebuffed these efforts. The TTP, which had initially called for conditional peace talks with the Pakistani government on Feb. 3,<a href="http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-22903-TTP-may-revive-talks-offer-to-Sharif-govt"> temporarily suspended</a> the offer on March 20, 2013.]]>
      
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<entry>
   <title>More Palestinian kidnapping plots thwarted by Israel</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/LongWarJournalThreatMatrix/~3/dMt8Vu4BaA8/more_palestinian_kidnapping_pl.php" />
   <id>tag:www.longwarjournal.org,2013:/threat-matrix//15.52672</id>
   
   <published>2013-05-21T20:46:22Z</published>
   <updated>2013-05-21T22:09:32Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Israeli authorities announced the arrest of 14 Palestinian terrorists from two separate terror cells operating near Hebron. One cell, which was tied to Hamas, had nine members and was planning a kidnapping operation. The other cell, affiliated with Palestinian Islamic Jihad, had five members. </summary>
   <author>
      <name>David Barnett</name>
      
   </author>
   
   <category term="118" label="Hamas" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="1155" label="Islamic Jihad" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="8" label="Israel" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="131" label="Palestinian Territories" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/">
      <![CDATA[Israeli authorities today announced the thwarting of a number of kidnapping plots by Palestinian terror groups in recent months. Two separate cells operating near Hebron, one tied to Hamas and another tied to Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), had plans to carry out terror attacks against Israelis that included kidnappings. 

<a href="http://www.idf.il/1283-19015-en/Dover.aspx">According to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)</a>, the members of the PIJ Jihad cell had planned "to approach a hitchhiking station, open fire on Israeli soldiers or civilians waiting there and then kidnap them." Those arrested from the PIJ cell were Motaz Muhammed Taleb Abido, Bashir Aid Muhammed Zahda, Hazem Auni Muhammed Tawil, and Abdullah Muhammed Ata Abido. 

Cell members Hazem Tawil, Motaz Abido, and Abdullah Abido had previously served time in Israeli prisons for terror-related activities. According to the IDF, Motaz Abido is a "senior operative of Islamic Jihad in the Hebron area" and was responsible for recruiting other members of the cell. 

The Hamas cell was comprised of at least nine members and led by Nadel Mazen Balut. According to the IDF, the cell "intended to kidnap and murder an Israeli, hide his or her body and then negotiate for the release of prisoners."

It is unclear exactly how far along in their planning each cell was at the time of the arrests. An explosive device was found in the possession of members of the Hamas cell, however. 

Today's announcement comes almost a fortnight after <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/05/israel_exposes_new_hamas_kidna.php">Israeli authorities announced the arrest of members of a Hamas cell</a> in the West Bank that was planning to kidnap and kill Israeli soldiers, among other terror activities. 

Since January the Shin Bet has tallied over <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/04/abduction_attempts_of_israeli.php">30 thwarted kidnapping attempts</a> in the West Bank, according to recent Israeli media reports. By contrast, in all of 2012, there were 24 thwarted attempts in the West Bank. <a href="http://www.shabak.gov.il/SiteCollectionImages/english/TerrorInfo/2012AnnualSummary-en.pdf">According to the Shin Bet's 2012 annual report</a>, one-third of the approximately 100 "significant attacks" it thwarted from Gaza, the West Bank, and within Israel in 2012 were kidnapping attempts.

One IDF officer recently conceded that while Israeli authorities "have been able to thwart the kidnapping attempts ... the scope is extraordinary, and it is clear we will not be able to foil these attempts forever."

In recent months, Israeli authorities have exposed a number of Hamas terror cells in the West Bank. <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/03/hamas_interior_minister_behind.php">On March 13</a>, the Shin Bet revealed that Hamas' Interior Minister Fathi Hammad has been at the forefront of the terror group's efforts to carry out terror attacks in the West Bank, including kidnappings, suicide bombings, and rocket attacks.

Less than two weeks earlier, authorities announced the <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/03/hamas_terror_cell_in_hebron_ex.php">arrest of members of a Hamas cell in Hebron</a> that "intended to carry out various terror attacks -- but were arrested before executing their plans." On Feb. 6, Israeli authorities reported the <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/02/islamic_jihad_threatens_to_kid.php">thwarting of a Palestinian Islamic Jihad kidnapping plot.</a>

In late January, Israeli authorities announced the <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/01/israeli_authorities_uncover_ha.php">arrest of approximately 20 Hamas terrorists</a> who were trying "to establish a local headquarters in Hebron" and were "planning to kidnap an IDF soldier." ]]>
      
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<entry>
   <title>Prominent anti-Taliban police chief killed in western Afghanistan</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/LongWarJournalThreatMatrix/~3/dA-U9t1xb_w/prominent_anti-taliban_police.php" />
   <id>tag:www.longwarjournal.org,2013:/threat-matrix//15.52630</id>
   
   <published>2013-05-19T17:38:13Z</published>
   <updated>2013-05-19T18:14:36Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Taliban assassins killed the Khak-i-Safid district police chief in Farah province on Friday night. Khak-i-Safed police forces have been conducting an effective counterinsurgency campaign in the area since last year. </summary>
   <author>
      <name>LWJ Staff</name>
      
   </author>
   
   <category term="2024" label="Afghan National Security Forces" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="6" label="Afghanistan" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="1523" label="ISAF" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="24" label="Taliban" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/">
      <![CDATA[<center><div><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" width="100">  <tr>  <td width="100%" class="tableborder" style="border-bottom-style: none; border-bottom-width: medium"><img src="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/assets_c/2013/05/Abdul Ghani-thumb-560x372-1929.jpg" width="560" height="372" alt="Abdul Ghani.jpg" class="mt-image-none" style="" /></td>  </tr>  <tr>  <td width="100%" class="tableborder" style="border-top-style: none; border-top-width: medium"><p align="center" class="imagetext"> Khak-i-Safed District Governor Abdul Khalik eats with chief of police 2nd Lt. Abdul Ghani after a transition shura in Khak-E-Safed district, Farah province, Afghanistan, Feb. 23, 2013. Abdul Ghani was killed by Taliban gunmen on May 17, 2013. (U.S. Marine Corps Photo by Sgt. Pete Thibodeau/Released).</td>  </tr>  </table> </div></center>

A prominent ant-Taliban police chief in western Afghanistan, 2nd Lieutenant Abdul Ghani, was shot and mortally wounded by Taliban assassins late on Friday night, according to Afghan officials. Abdul Ghani served as the police chief for the Khak-i-Safid district in Farah province, and was best known for leading an effective crackdown against Taliban insurgents in the restive district, eliminating key Taliban leaders and disrupting insurgent activities since last year.

Some additional details were reported by <a href="http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2013/05/18/district-police-chief-gunned-down-farah"><em>Pajhwok Afghan News</em></a>:

<blockquote>Khak-i-Safid district police head 2nd Lt. Abdul Ghani was shot dead by two motorcyclists in the Charbagh area of the provincial capital.

Farah Civil Hospital Director Dr. Abdul Hakim Rasuli said Ghani was brought to the hospital in wounded condition. However, he succumbed to his critical injuries on the way to the PRT medical facility in the city.

The Taliban, meanwhile, claimed responsibility for killing Ghani, who recently survived two assassination attempts during this past year.</blockquote>

Farah province was part of the <a href=http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2012/12/12/security-farah-districts-transitions-afghans>third phase of the transition</a> of security responsibility from the International Security Assistance Force to Afghan control, and responsibility for five of Farah's 10 districts -- including Khak-i-Safid -- was transferred to Afghan security forces on Dec. 12, 2012. 

Within two weeks of the transition, Abdul Ghani was <a href="http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2012/12/31/senior-cop-among-6-hurt-farah-blast">targeted</a> by the Taliban in a roadside bomb attack. The blast tore through Ghani's police truck as he and his men traveled through the Dahna-i-Khost area of Khak-i-Safid district, injuring police chief Ghani along with five policemen. 

The assassination of Abdul Ghani has been a longstanding objective for Taliban militants active in Farah province, and his death will undoubtedly impair the Afghan government's ability to continue its counterinsurgency campaign in the Khak-i-Safed district. 


]]>
      
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<entry>
   <title>Former 'head' of al Qaeda in Italy an 'organizer' of Ansar al Sharia rally</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/LongWarJournalThreatMatrix/~3/j8uRXykg-_I/ansar_al_sharia_tunisias_third.php" />
   <id>tag:www.longwarjournal.org,2013:/threat-matrix//15.52583</id>
   
   <published>2013-05-17T16:44:49Z</published>
   <updated>2013-05-17T22:49:13Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Agence France Presse interviewed Sami Ben Khemais Essid, describing him as one of the "organizers" of Ansar al Sharia Tunisia's planned conference this weekend. Essid was formerly the "head" of al Qaeda's operations in Italy, according to the US State Department. </summary>
   <author>
      <name>Thomas Joscelyn</name>
      
   </author>
   
   <category term="191" label="Al Qaeda" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2004" label="Ansar al Sharia" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="3190" label="Ansar al Sharia Tunisia" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="229" label="Italy" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="150" label="Tunisia" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/">
      <![CDATA[Ansar al Sharia Tunisia's third annual congress is scheduled for this weekend, but the Tunisian government has declined to grant the group a permit for the gathering. Two days ago, <em>Agence France Presse</em>  (<em>AFP</em>) <a href="http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/0/71539/World/0/Tens-of-thousands-to-attend-Tunisia-Salafist-meeti.aspx">interviewed</a> an Ansar al Sharia leader named Sami Essid to get his reaction to this development. <em>AFP</em> described Essid as "one of the organizers" of the rally. 

Essid said that Ansar al Sharia plans to move forward with the gathering despite interference from the Islamist government. "On Sunday, we will God willing hold our congress and there will be more than 40,000 of us in Kairouan," <em>AFP</em> <a href="http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130515/tunisia-bans-salafist-groups-annual-congress#2">quoted</a> Essid as saying. "We do not need any authorization to organize our meeting."

<em>AFP</em> did not offer many details about Essid, other than to say he "is close to the hardline group's fugitive leader" Seifullah Ben Hassine, a.k.a. Abu Iyad al Tunisi. Who is Essid? He is almost certainly the same man known in the West as Sami Ben Khemais Essid, a notorious al Qaeda operative who was convicted in Italy of plotting to attack the US Embassy in Rome. 

I wrote about Essid's Ansar al Sharia role and al Qaeda dossier previously. [See <em>LWJ</em> report, <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/11/from_al_qaeda_in_ita.php">From al Qaeda in Italy to Ansar al Sharia Tunisia</a>.] In my piece, you can see pictures of Essid alongside Ben Hassine at an Ansar al Sharia rally. 

You can read the UN's designation page for the al Qaeda-linked Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG) <a href="http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE09002E.shtml">here</a>. That UN page mentions Essid's role within the TCG, which was co-founded by Ben Hassine.  A <a href="http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/italianalqaidacellfactsheet.aspx">US Treasury Department page</a> lists Essid as one of the "terrorist leaders designated for their close operational ties to Al Qaeda." 

And below, I've included a screen shot from the State Department's <em>Patterns of Global Terrorism</em> report for 2001. The report included a special section on Essid's terrorist role, saying he "headed al Qaeda operations in Italy."   

<a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/assets_c/2013/05/Sami Ben Khemais Essid Graphic-1920.php" onclick="window.open('http://www.longwarjournal.org/assets_c/2013/05/Sami Ben Khemais Essid Graphic-1920.php','popup','width=570,height=560,scrollbars=no,resizable=no,toolbar=no,directories=no,location=no,menubar=no,status=no,left=0,top=0'); return false"><img src="http://www.longwarjournal.org/assets_c/2013/05/Sami Ben Khemais Essid Graphic-thumb-570x560-1920.jpg" width="570" height="560" alt="Sami Ben Khemais Essid Graphic.JPG" class="mt-image-center" style="text-align: center; display: block; margin: 0 auto 20px;" /></a>

<em>Magharebia</em> has also <a href="http://magharebia.com/en_GB/articles/awi/features/2013/05/14/feature-01">published some quotes</a> from Essid on Ansar al Sharia Tunisia's upcoming congress. I included those quotes in <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/05/tensions_continue_to.php">a piece</a> earlier this week. According to <em>Magharebia</em>, Essid criticized Tunisian interior minister Lofti Ben Jeddou for interfering with Ansar al Sharia's plans.

"He has declared war on Muslims in Tunisia," Essid said of Ben Jeddou. As in <em>AFP</em>'s account, <em>Magharebia</em> reported that Essid vowed Ansar al Sharia Tunisia's third annual congress will be held as planned on May 19. However, Essid said, the group's leader will not be in attendance.

"Abu Iyad (Hassine), a leader of Ansar al Sharia who is wanted by the security forces, won't attend the third annual congress of the group," Essid said. "The only reason for that is that he loves Tunisia and doesn't want to confuse his supporters if he gets arrested by the security forces before them."

In its account of Essid's interview, <em>AFP</em> added the following observation concerning last year's Ansar al Sharia rally: 

<blockquote>Thousands attended Ansar al Sharia's gathering in 2012, some in Afghan military garb, waving swords and chanting slogans that included: "We are all children of Osama (bin Laden)."</blockquote>

Shocking, I know. ]]>
      
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<entry>
   <title>Satellite imagery of Israeli airstrike at Damascus airport released</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/LongWarJournalThreatMatrix/~3/Vdc69271kEc/satellite_imagery_of_israeli_a.php" />
   <id>tag:www.longwarjournal.org,2013:/threat-matrix//15.52584</id>
   
   <published>2013-05-17T01:00:00Z</published>
   <updated>2013-05-17T02:33:17Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Israeli TV has released satellite imagery from the aftermath of an Israeli airstrike at Damascus International Airport earlier in May. </summary>
   <author>
      <name>David Barnett</name>
      
   </author>
   
   <category term="8" label="Israel" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="80" label="Syria" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/">
      <![CDATA[
<a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/images/Damascus%20Airport%20Outline%20of%20Strikes.jpg"><img alt="Damascus Airport Outline of Strikes.jpg" src="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/assets_c/2013/05/Damascus Airport Outline of Strikes-thumb-560x328-1923.jpg" width="560" height="328" class="mt-image-center" style="text-align: center; display: block; margin: 0 auto 20px;" /></a>On May 15, <a href="http://www.mako.co.il/news-military/security/Article-d1871d63f09ae31004.htm&sCh=3d385dd2dd5d4110&pId=565984153"><em>Channel 2</em> (Israel) released</a> a couple of satellite images of the alleged Israeli airstrike at Damascus International Airport on May 3. The released images show that at least two locations were struck in the attack, which <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/05/israel_reportedly_st.php">reportedly targeted Fateh-110 surface-to-surface missiles from Iran</a>. 

<a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/images/Damascus%20Airport%20Israel%20Airstrike.jpg"><img alt="Damascus Airport Israel Airstrike.jpg" src="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/assets_c/2013/05/Damascus Airport Israel Airstrike-thumb-560x351-1925.jpg" width="560" height="351" class="mt-image-none" style="" /></a>

The areas in question, which are on opposite sides of the airport complex, appear to have been completely destroyed in the attacks, according to the images dated May 6. Satellite images of the attack near the Scientific Studies and Research Center (Centre D'Etudes et de Recherches Scientifiques) in Jamraya on May 4 have not yet been released.

The release of the images from the airport in Damascus came on the same day that a senior Israeli official warned that Israel was considering additional strikes against advance weapons systems inside Syria. "Israel is determined to continue to prevent the transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah. The transfer of such weapons to Hezbollah will destabilize and endanger the entire region," an Israeli official <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/16/world/middleeast/israeli-official-signals-possibility-of-more-syria-strikes.html">told the <em>New York Times</em></a>.

<a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/images/Damascus%20Airport%20Israel%20Airstrike%202.jpg"><img alt="Damascus Airport Israel Airstrike 2.jpg" src="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/assets_c/2013/05/Damascus Airport Israel Airstrike 2-thumb-560x355-1927.jpg" width="560" height="355" class="mt-image-none" style="" /></a>

Since the start of the uprising against the Assad regime, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) has conducted at least three airstrikes in Syria, two of which were carried out earlier in May. 

In late January, <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/01/israeli_reportedly_s.php">the IAF reportedly struck targets</a> near the Scientific Studies and Research Center (Centre D'Etudes et de Recherches Scientifiques) in Jamraya. According to reports, the IAF targeted a weapons convoy, which included Russian-made SA-17 antiaircraft missiles, near the facility. Like the strike that occurred at Damascus International Airport in May, the January attack was reportedly carried out by <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/04/israeli_air_force_struck_ssrc.php">Israeli aircraft that never actually entered Syrian air space</a>. 

While some reports of the January strike suggested that the SSRC facility itself was targeted and "flattened," <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/02/satellite_images_reveal_unscat.php">satellite imagery released on Feb. 6 revealed</a> that the facility, known for its ties to Syria's chemical weapons program, was relatively unscathed. The images did show a burnt road near the facility, possibly indicating the location of the Syrian weapons convoy when it was hit, however.

Although Israeli officials have not taken official responsibility for any the alleged strikes, they have repeatedly warned that they are prepared to act in Syria to prevent Hezbollah and other terror groups from obtaining advanced weaponry. In a recent <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22195508">interview with the <em>BBC</em></a>, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said, "We are prepared to defend ourselves if the need arises and I think people know that what I say is both measured and serious."]]>
      
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<entry>
   <title>Fallujah Awakens: Marines, Sheikhs and the Battle Against al Qaeda</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/LongWarJournalThreatMatrix/~3/cj89VTQAucM/fallujah_awakens_marines_sheik.php" />
   <id>tag:www.longwarjournal.org,2013:/threat-matrix//15.52564</id>
   
   <published>2013-05-16T15:28:27Z</published>
   <updated>2013-05-17T01:18:27Z</updated>
   
   <summary>The story of the tribal "Awakening" and counterinsurgency campaign in the famous battleground.</summary>
   <author>
      <name>The LWJ Editors</name>
      
   </author>
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/">
      <![CDATA[<br><a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1612511287/ref=as_li_tf_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=1612511287&linkCode=as2&tag=thlowajo-20"><img alt="FA350.jpg" src="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/images/FA350.jpg" width="350" height="525" class="mt-image-center" style="text-align: center; display: block; margin: 0 auto 20px;" /></a>

We are pleased to announce the publication of Bill Ardolino's book <em><a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1612511287/ref=as_li_tf_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=1612511287&linkCode=as2&tag=thlowajo-20">Fallujah Awakens: Marines, Sheikhs and the Battle Against al Qaeda</a></em>. Based on hundreds of interviews with 138 Iraqi and American subjects conducted over the past five years, the book details the Sunni tribal "Awakening" and the US Marine counterinsurgency campaign that helped secure the area during 2006-2007. The book has earned a coveted "<a href="http://publishersweekly.com/978-1-61251-128-3">starred review</a>" from <em>Publishers Weekly</em>:

<blockquote>Headlines trumpeted the 2004 Battle of Fallujah, when Marines defeated Iraqi insurgents and al-Qaeda fighters in brutal urban battle, but few reports noted that rebels soon returned and resumed their attacks. An embedded reporter at the time, Ardolino (associate editor of the Long War Journal) delivers a brilliant, detailed description of events in 2007, when Marines, tribal leaders, and local Iraqis worked together to again eject the insurgents--hopefully, this time, permanently. The author is wise to remind readers that al-Qaeda was never terribly popular in Iraq; it espoused a form of Islam considered violent and unfamiliar, "even by conservative Fallujan standards," and its success required vicious retaliation against uncooperative Iraqis. Even so, many refused to help the radical group, opting instead to side with American forces for a variety of personal and political reasons. Ardolino describes one Marine battalion near Fallujah that achieved remarkable success by enlisting the aid of an ambitious young sheikh nicknamed "Dark." Combining eye-witness accounts of political frustrations, the dangers of the "irrepressible and deadly creativity" of insurgents, and sympathetic portraits of the locals, Ardolino's is an outstanding account of the winding down of a resoundingly unpopular war.</blockquote>

<em>Fallujah Awakens</em> provides a rich look at counterinsurgency efforts in Fallujah and brings to life key events that were mere abstractions in media coverage. For instance, Bill vividly describes a chemical attack against Iraqi civilians in the village of Albu Aifan, reconstructing the event in minute-by-minute detail that highlights the barbarity of al Qaeda in Iraq. The ramifications of that attack, and the Marines' response to it, proved to be a critical turning point for the war in Fallujah.

Since 2006, Bill has provided outstanding reports as an embedded journalist for <em>The Long War Journal</em>, observing operations firsthand in Fallujah, Habbaniyah, and Baghdad in Iraq, and in Musa Qala, Now Zad, Delaram, Kabul, Sabari, Khost City, and Panjwai in Afghanistan. The editors of <em>The Long War Journal</em> strongly encourage you to <a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1612511287/ref=as_li_tf_tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=9325&creativeASIN=1612511287&linkCode=as2&tag=thlowajo-20">support Bill and purchase <em>Fallujah Awakens</em></a>. All author proceeds from the first edition will be donated to the Semper Fi Fund to benefit injured service members.]]>
      
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<entry>
   <title>Another look at a green-on-blue attack</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/LongWarJournalThreatMatrix/~3/B-aMXKKaCCk/another_look_at_a_green-on-blu.php" />
   <id>tag:www.longwarjournal.org,2013:/threat-matrix//15.52563</id>
   
   <published>2013-05-15T17:39:44Z</published>
   <updated>2013-05-16T00:21:27Z</updated>
   
   <summary>A deeper examination of just one of the 76 insider attacks on Coalition forces in Afghanistan since January 2008 suggests that the role of Taliban infiltration and motivation in these attacks has been underreported.</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Lisa Lundquist</name>
      
   </author>
   
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/">
      <![CDATA[On Sept. 15, 2012, the <a href="http://www.dvidshub.net/news/94790/isaf-casualties#.UZPMOMrmxBk">International Security Assistance Force issued a press release</a> which stated that "[f]our International Security Assistance Force service members died today in southern Afghanistan following an insider attack suspected to involve members of the Afghan police," and said the incident was under investigation.
The dates on the ISAF release indicated the attack took place that same day.

The following day, <a href="http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2012/09/16/4-foreign-soldiers-killed-insider-attack"><em>Pajhwok Afghan News</em> provided</a> a bit more detail: 

<blockquote>Four foreign soldiers and a policeman were killed in the attack that occurred in the Mizan district of Zabul province, the deputy police chief, Col. Ghulam Gilani Farahi, told Pajhwok Afghan News.

The provincial police chief and other security officials visited the scene to investigate the incident, Farahi said, adding that more details would be shared with the media after the investigation was completed.

Meanwhile, the Taliban said four US soldiers were killed and several others wounded when a policeman loyal to the movement opened fire on them. Several policemen also suffered casualties when US troops returned fire, they added.</blockquote>

Beyond those two mentions, little if nothing was reported by ISAF or the Afghan and US media about the incident.

But the Taliban <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2012/09/taliban_highlight_recent_insid.php">issued two statements on Sept. 16 about the attack</a>: a Twitter posting by a Taliban representative claiming that the Zabul attack had been carried out with the aid of seven Afghan policemen who were retaliating for the film "Innocence of Muslims"; and a statement on the Taliban's website by spokesman Imran Khalil claiming that an Afghan soldier opened fire on a group of US soldiers in the Mizana district of Zabul province, killing four US soldiers and severely wounding others, as well as killing "a number of agent policemen."

Eight months later, Adam Ashton, a reporter for the <em>Tacoma News Tribune</em>, <a href="http://www.thenewstribune.com/2013/05/12/2594057/news-brief-12mizanp1.html">has uncovered more about what happened that night</a>, based on interviews with members of the 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment unit from Lewis-McChord base who were deployed in Zabul's Mizan district at the time, as well as family members of those deployed. 

What he found is that the green-on-blue incident in Zabul was a carefully premeditated attack on six US troops at a vulnerable observation post by a team of six Afghan policemen working with them that night. The small US team had been shifted to the post a few weeks before the planned handover of the district to Afghan forces, even though Taliban forces were still significantly active in the area. Assessing factors involved in the attack, Ashton wrote: "A group of Afghan police either joined the security force with the intent of killing Americans from the inside, or they bowed to pressure from the Taliban to do so." 

After the shooting, five of the attackers escaped, and one Afghan policeman lay dead. Two American survivors of the incident differed as to how he was killed; one said the policeman had been killed by a US soldier after the Afghan police had opened fire; another maintained that the policeman had been shot by his Afghan colleagues for failing to join in the attack on the Americans.

The incident was investigated by both the Afghans and the Americans, and in its wake, the Afghan police lieutenant responsible for recruiting and daily operations in Mizan was fired, according to Ashton.

Disturbingly, however, results of the US military's investigation still have not been released. 

The consequences of this blue-on-green attack have been both immediate and long-term. After the attack, partnering between US and Afghan forces was first stopped altogether. The Mizan attack, <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/08/green-on-blue_attack.php">and another that day</a>, appear to have been the catalysts for the US Army to shut down the military's partnering with the Afghan National Security forces throughout Afghanistan. 

"[T]he ambush near Combat Outpost Mizan was so severe, and it followed so many other similar attacks, that it led the Army to shut down partnered operations with Afghan forces for two weeks," Ashton writes. "This undermined the transition to Afghan control of the country -- the very reason for the sustained US presence in what has become America's longest war."

Partnering resumed on a reduced basis at the end of September, and stricter vetting of new Afghan forces was imposed. But previously positive relationships between Afghan forces and their US mentors grew more tense and difficult. Now-retired Colonel Charles Webster, who commanded all US forces in Zabul and southern Kandahar provinces at the time, said: "In Mizan, the attack disrupted a spirit of cooperation between US and Afghan forces that [had] lasted throughout the deployment." 

The reduced cooperation between US and Afghan forces stemming from insider attacks such as the Mizan incident has affected the overall progress of the security transition, not only in Zabul but all across Afghanistan.

And as Ashton writes, "The betrayal in Mizan still burns among the soldiers who knew the fallen men."]]>
      
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<entry>
   <title>Ansar al Sharia Tunisia member: 'Rome shall be conquered'</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/LongWarJournalThreatMatrix/~3/XQsop86OviM/ansar_al_sharia_tunisia_member.php" />
   <id>tag:www.longwarjournal.org,2013:/threat-matrix//15.52553</id>
   
   <published>2013-05-15T01:32:07Z</published>
   <updated>2013-05-15T02:09:00Z</updated>
   
   <summary>In a video posted online on April 30, Sheik Kamel Zarouq, a member of Ansar al Sharia Tunisia, endorsed al Qaeda's global jihad.  </summary>
   <author>
      <name>Thomas Joscelyn</name>
      
   </author>
   
   <category term="191" label="Al Qaeda" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2004" label="Ansar al Sharia" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="3190" label="Ansar al Sharia Tunisia" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="3616" label="Kamel Zarouq" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="150" label="Tunisia" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/">
      <![CDATA[<img alt="Kamel Zarouq.JPG" src="http://www.longwarjournal.org/Kamel%20Zarouq.JPG" width="643" height="393" class="mt-image-center" style="text-align: center; display: block; margin: 0 auto 20px;" />

Sheik Kamel Zarouq, a member of Ansar al Sharia Tunisia, gave an address which was posted online on April 30. MEMRI has posted <a href="http://www.memritv.org/clip/en/3831.htm">parts of the video</a> as well as a <a href="http://www.memritv.org/clip_transcript/en/3831.htm">transcript of excerpts</a> from the video. You can also view the video <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wWvQ9Yk6_2w">on YouTube</a>.

Zarouq's talk is consistent with much of Ansar al Sharia Tunisia's propaganda in that he explicitly endorses global jihad. 

"I would like to declare loud and clear that the Al Nusra Front, Ansar Al Sharia, Al Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq, and the mujahideen in Somalia, in Mali, and in Algeria - we all stand united against the enemies," Zarouq says. 

The Al Nusra Front is al Qaeda's affiliate in Syria. The Islamic State of Iraq is al Qaeda in Iraq's political front. The mujahideen in Somalia are led by Shabaab, an al Qaeda affiliate. In Mali, the mujahideen are led by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which also operates inside Algeria. And al Qaeda is, well, al Qaeda. 

Another excerpt from MEMRI's transcript of Zarouq's talk reads: "Our goal is to support the Islamic nation, to support our religion, to elevate the shari'a, and to spread the law of Muhammad. Our goal is to pull the nations out of darkness and into light. Our goal is to instate the shari'a, and regain Andalusia and Jerusalem."

Zarouq quotes the Prophet Muhammad as saying, "Rome shall be conquered." To which he adds: "Rome will be conquered in our days."

Finally, MEMRI produced this quote from Zarouq: "This is the age of the Muslims. Gone are the days of secularists and of democracy. We are looking down upon them. We are looking down upon them from above. They are beneath us."]]>
      
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<entry>
   <title>Hamas and Salafi jihadists at odds over rocket fire from Gaza into Israel</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/LongWarJournalThreatMatrix/~3/CcjJSwrxFkY/hamas_and_salafi_jihadists_at.php" />
   <id>tag:www.longwarjournal.org,2013:/threat-matrix//15.52503</id>
   
   <published>2013-05-12T00:53:12Z</published>
   <updated>2013-05-12T02:06:02Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Tensions between Hamas and Salafi jihadists in the Gaza Strip continue as members of the Hamas-run Field Control Force prevent rocket launchings from Gaza by Salafi jihadists.</summary>
   <author>
      <name>David Barnett</name>
      
   </author>
   
   <category term="118" label="Hamas" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="131" label="Palestinian Territories" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/">
      <![CDATA[Salafi jihadists in the Gaza Strip are complaining about the Hamas-run Field Control Force, which has increased deployment in the Gaza Strip to prevent the firing of rockets into Israel from Gaza. 

Sources recently told <em>Al Ayyam</em> that "a few hundred" members of the Field Control Force have been deployed along the northern and eastern borders of the Gaza Strip. The forces are particularly concentrated in areas from which Palestinian terror groups' rockets and mortars are generally fired.

<a href="http://www.al-ayyam.com/article.aspx?did=215152&date=">According to <em>Al Ayyam</em></a>, the Field Control Force "has managed to foil many attempts to fire rockets [from Gaza into Israel] over the past two weeks." Since the end of Operation Pillar of Defense in November, at least 37 rockets and mortars have been launched from Gaza toward Israel. The majority of these have been fired by Salafi jihadist groups. A number of the rockets and mortars have failed to reach Israeli territory and landed in the Gaza Strip, however. 

Tensions between Hamas and the Salafi jihadists in the Gaza Strip have increased over recent weeks, in particular since the <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/04/msc_in_jerusalem_mem.php">targeted killing by Israel of Hithem Ziad Ibrahim Masshal, a well known jihadist, on April 30</a>. 

On May 1, the Ibn Taymiyyah Media Center (ITMC), a jihadist media unit tied to the Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC), released a statement to jihadist forums which seemed to suggest that the<a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/05/itmc_some_hamas_elements_are_s.php"> Salafi jihadists believe Masshal was set up by elements within Hamas</a>. This matches the claim of an April 30 statement from a Facebook page for supporters of Salafi jihadists in Gaza suggesting that it appeared <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/04/hamas_arrests_more_jihadists_a.php">Masshal had been offered "on a golden platter" to Israel by Hamas</a>.

On the same day as Masshal's death, <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/04/hamas_arrests_more_jihadists_a.php"><em>Asharq al Awsat</em> reported</a> that Hamas was increasing its efforts to stop rocket fire from the Gaza Strip toward Israel. Members of Hamas' al Qassam Brigades have been "deployed in the border areas of the Gaza Strip replacing policemen with the aim of preventing the firing of rockets from Gaza," the report stated. In addition, al Qassam Brigades members have reportedly "set up fixed and mobile roadblocks" to search cars and find those firing the rockets. <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/05/msc_in_jerusalem_officials_eul.php">Another recent report from <em>Al Ayyam </em>similarly stated</a> that Hamas has warned Salafi jihadist groups in the Gaza Strip that those who fire rockets at the current time will be arrested and that the firing rockets should not occur "without a general national consensus" on the issue.

<a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/05/tensions_mount_between_salafi.php">On May 2</a>, Hamas' Interior Ministry announced the arrest of six Salafists, four of whom were accused of stealing rockets from other terror groups in the Gaza Strip. The ITMC condemned the announcement and said those detained had been arrested only because of their beliefs. Five days later, the ITMC accused members of the Field Control Force of firing on and injuring at least one Salafi jihadist in the northern Gaza Strip.
]]>
      
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<entry>
   <title>'Iranian citizens' reported killed in ISAF airstrike</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/LongWarJournalThreatMatrix/~3/A-BNTCT6TCo/iranian_citizens_reported_kill.php" />
   <id>tag:www.longwarjournal.org,2013:/threat-matrix//15.52486</id>
   
   <published>2013-05-10T17:57:27Z</published>
   <updated>2013-05-12T02:28:07Z</updated>
   
   <summary>The strike took place last week in the western province of Farah, which borders Iran. ISAF confirmed the strike took place but would not discuss the details.</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Bill Roggio</name>
      
   </author>
   
   <category term="6" label="Afghanistan" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="191" label="Al Qaeda" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="22" label="Iran" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="24" label="Taliban" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/">
      <![CDATA[Last week, Afghan news outlets reported that ISAF aircraft killed a Taliban commander, two "Iranian citizens," and several fighters in an airstrike in the Pusht Rod district in Farah province on the Iranian border. The raid in Farah was confirmed by Farah's provincial spokesman, but ISAF did not include the strike in its operational reporting.

The Taliban commander was identified as Mullah Qadir, who,<a href="http://www.khaama.com/top-taliban-leader-killed-with-two-iranian-citizens-in-farah-1390"> according to <em>Khaama Press</em></a>, "is accused of the deadly attacks which took place in Farah province recently." That very likely is a reference to <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/04/taliban_suicide_assa_14.php">the April 3 suicide assault on a courthouse in Farah City</a>, where upwards of 44 people were killed.

Today, ISAF finally confirmed to <em>The Long War Journal</em> that "there was an operation conducted in Farah province on May 1st."

According to ISAF, "the operation was intended to prevent an imminent threat," but "for operational security reasons we cannot discuss the specific details of this operation at this time."

<a href="http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/10365-nato-air-strike-kills-eight-taliban-insurgents"><em>TOLOnews</em> reported</a> that "the insurgents were targeted while they wanted to explode a truck full of explosives in Bala Bolak district of Farah province."

ISAF contacted <em>The Long War Journal</em> on May 11 (one day after report post was published) and provided the following information on the operation:

<blockquote>On May 1st, Afghan intelligence officials received reports that a complex attack was imminent in Farah Province. A truck with more than 3000 kg of explosives was being prepared for movement to a target area densely populated with civilians.  As a frame of reference, the truck bomb used in the Oklahoma City terrorist attack had just over 2,200 kg of explosives - and that detonation killed nearly 200 people, injured more than 600, and damaged more than 300 buildings within a sixteen-block radius.  Once the Taliban began moving the truck to its intended target, it was destroyed with a precision strike.  Eight insurgents were killed, including two members of the cell that are also thought to have attacked the Farah courthouse complex in early April.</blockquote>

The identities of the Iranians were not disclosed, and it is unclear if they were Iranian foreign fighters linked to al Qaeda and/or the Taliban, or if they were members of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps - Qods Force. Iranians, along with "Arabs," were reported to have been <a href="http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2013/04/01/foreign-fighters-among-9-dead-drone-strike">killed in an ISAF airstrike on April 1</a>.

Iran, through Qods Force's Ansar Corps, is known to sponsor al Qaeda and Taliban groups in western and southern Afghanistan [see <em>LWJ</em> reports, <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/08/iranian_qods_force_c.php">Iranian Qods Force commanders linked to Taliban: US Treasury</a>, and <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/07/treasury_targets_ira_1.php">Treasury targets Iran's 'secret deal' with al Qaeda</a>]. ISAF officials have also directly linked Qods Force to several of the Taliban commanders.</p>

ISAF has targeted Iranian-supported Taliban commanders in at least 14 raids in western Afghanistan between June 2009 and February 2011, according to Coalition press releases compiled by <em>The Long War Journal</em>. ISAF inexplicably stopped reporting on raids against Iranian-supported Taliban commanders in early February 2011; <em>LWJ</em>'s queries to ISAF on this subject have gone unanswered [see <em>LWJ</em> report, <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/08/taliban_suicide_assa_9.php">Taliban suicide assault team kills 36 Afghans in western city</a>].]]>
      
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<entry>
   <title>Jihadists launch 3 suicide attacks in Mali</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/LongWarJournalThreatMatrix/~3/k_flRKnBnzA/jihadist_launch_3_suicide_atta.php" />
   <id>tag:www.longwarjournal.org,2013:/threat-matrix//15.52470</id>
   
   <published>2013-05-10T12:22:27Z</published>
   <updated>2013-05-10T14:29:56Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Jihadists have launched 12 suicide bombings and assaults in Mali since the beginning of February.</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Bill Roggio</name>
      
   </author>
   
   <category term="436" label="Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2708" label="Ansar Dine" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="223" label="Mali" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2767" label="Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="334" label="Niger" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/">
      <![CDATA[Jihadists in Mali launched three separate suicide attacks today against Malian and Nigerien troops in two towns outside of Gao. <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/10/us-mali-attack-idUSBRE9490DT20130510"><em>Reuters</em></a> has some details on the attacks:

<blockquote>The attacks took place between 4 and 5 a.m. in Menaka and Gossi, near Gao - the first major town freed from the control of Islamist fighters during a French-led military intervention earlier this year.

"The first attack targeted Nigerien soldiers in Menaka. A car bomb entered the (military) camp, but the soldiers ... destroyed the vehicle which exploded," Lieutenant Colonel Souleymane Maiga told Reuters.

"At the same time in Gossi, three suicide bombers on foot attacked a checkpoint. Again the soldiers ... shot at them. The three bombers were killed," he said.

Another suicide bomber was killed as he tried to enter the military camp in Gossi, Maiga said, adding that the injury to the Malian soldier was not serious.</blockquote>

While no group claimed credit for the attack, it was likely executed by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, or Ansar Dine, or a combination of fighters from those groups.

Note that one of the attacks was a suicide assault (a group of armed suicide bombers attacking a target). Jihadist groups in Mali have executed several attacks of this kind in the past; <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/03/jihadists_launch_suicide_assau.php">the last one was on March 21 in Timbuktu</a>. The suicide assault is a common al Qaeda and Taliban tactic that is frequently used in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and in other theaters.

While today's attacks were not particularly well-executed (only one Malian soldier was wounded in the attack, and the rest of the suicide bombers were killed), the jihadists in Mali are sending a message to Malian security forces and African Union troops that are preparing to deploy in the north: The attacks will continue, and the jihadist groups are not leaving anytime soon.

According to a count by <em>The Long War Journal</em>, there have been 12 suicide attacks in Mali, including the three attacks today, since France intervened in mid-January to halt the takeover of Mali by AQIM, MUJAO, and Ansar Dine. The first suicide attack was conducted on Feb. 9 in Gao. Attacks have also taken place in Timbuktu, Kidal, and Tessalit. Three of those suicide attacks have been claimed by MUJAO. French and Malian forces are still fighting to reestablish control of northern Mali, which was seized by the al Qaeda-linked groups in March 2012.]]>
      
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<entry>
   <title>Salafist clerics preach on the streets of Tunisia</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/LongWarJournalThreatMatrix/~3/C7jXDnyb0vI/salafist_clerics_preach_on_the.php" />
   <id>tag:www.longwarjournal.org,2013:/threat-matrix//15.52452</id>
   
   <published>2013-05-09T20:30:23Z</published>
   <updated>2013-05-09T21:23:02Z</updated>
   
   <summary>Tunisia is seeing an influx of radical preachers from outside the country. The leader of Ennahda suggested the Salafists do this more than one year ago.</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Bill Roggio</name>
      
   </author>
   
   <category term="3190" label="Ansar al Sharia Tunisia" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="150" label="Tunisia" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/">
      <![CDATA[<em>France24</em> reports on a disturbing trend in Tunisia, where radical preachers, some from outside the country, are flooding public spaces, "to promote their vision of religion." According to Messaoud Romdhani, the vice president of the Tunisian League for Human Rights, the supposedly secular Islamist Ennahda political party and the government support the influx of preachers from outside the country. <a href="http://observers.france24.com/content/20130509-preachers-take-over-public-spaces-tunisia-sousse-sfax-imam-speakers-religion-ennahda-salafism-radicals-">From <em>France24</em></a>:

<blockquote>These practices are being encouraged by the wave of preachers visiting Tunisia from the Gulf or the Middle East. Even though some of them have extremist views, these foreign imams often come to Tunisia with the blessing of the government or the Islamist party Ennahda, the party in power, which accommodate and welcome them.</blockquote>

Interestingly enough, in January 2012, Rachid Ghannouchi, the co-founder and current leader of Ennahda, counseled Salafists to bide their time by improving their religious infrastructure. One of the things Ghannouchi suggested was for the Salafists to "invite religious preachers" to spread the word [see <em>LWJ</em> report, <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/10/moderate_islamist_le.php">'Moderate' Islamist leader in Tunisia strategizes with al Qaeda-linked Salafists</a>; emphasis added below]:

<blockquote>"The secularists are still controlling the media, economy and administration," Ghannouchi warned the Salafists, according to <em>Magharebia</em>. "Therefore, controlling them would require more time." He advised the Salafists to "create television channels, radio stations, schools and universities" to increase their influence.

Ghannouchi also warned that "the police and army's support for Islamists is not guaranteed, and controlling them would also require more time." He continued: "I tell our young Salafists to be patient.... Why hurry? Take your time to consolidate what you have gained."

"The Islamists must fill the country with associations, establish Qur'anic schools everywhere, <strong>and invite religious preachers because people are still ignorant of Islam</strong>," Ghannouchi stated.</blockquote>]]>
      
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<entry>
   <title>Free Syrian Army fighters defecting to Al Nusrah Front</title>
   <link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/LongWarJournalThreatMatrix/~3/IIK1bUS8lUI/free_syrian_army_fighters_defe.php" />
   <id>tag:www.longwarjournal.org,2013:/threat-matrix//15.52444</id>
   
   <published>2013-05-09T14:20:25Z</published>
   <updated>2013-05-09T15:18:04Z</updated>
   
   <summary>More than 3,000 Free Syrian Army fighters as well as entire units have defected to al Qaeda's affiliate in Syria, yet the US government seems determined to fund the FSA.</summary>
   <author>
      <name>Bill Roggio</name>
      
   </author>
   
   <category term="2640" label="Al Nusrah Front" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="191" label="Al Qaeda" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="2375" label="Free Syrian Army" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="80" label="Syria" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="3488" label="Syrian Opposition Council" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   <category term="218" label="United States" scheme="http://www.sixapart.com/ns/types#tag" />
   
   <content type="html" xml:lang="en" xml:base="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/">
      <![CDATA[<em>The Guardian</em> reports that large numbers of fighters and even entire units from the Free Syrian Army are defecting en masse to <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/04/al_nusrah_front_lead.php">the Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda's affiliate in Syria</a>. One FSA commander reported that more than 3,000 of the group's fighters have defected to Al Nusrah over the past several months. <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/may/08/free-syrian-army-rebels-defect-islamist-group">Read the full article</a>; here is an excerpt:

<blockquote>Illustrating their plight, FSA commanders say that entire units have gone over to al-Nusra while others have lost a quarter or more of their strength to them recently.

"Fighters feel proud to join al-Nusra because that means power and influence," said Abu Ahmed, a former teacher from Deir Hafer who now commands an FSA brigade in the countryside near Aleppo. "Al-Nusra fighters rarely withdraw for shortage of ammunition or fighters and they leave their target only after liberating it," he added. "They compete to carry out martyrdom [suicide] operations."

Abu Ahmed and others say the FSA has lost fighters to al-Nusra in Aleppo, Hama, Idlib and Deir al-Zor and the Damascus region. Ala'a al-Basha, commander of the Sayyida Aisha brigade, warned the FSA chief of staff, General Salim Idriss, about the issue last month. Basha said 3,000 FSA men have joined al-Nusra in the last few months, mainly because of a lack of weapons and ammunition. FSA fighters in the Banias area were threatening to leave because they did not have the firepower to stop the massacre in Bayda, he said.

The FSA's Ahrar al-Shimal brigade joined al-Nusra en masse while the Sufiyan al-Thawri brigade in Idlib lost 65 of its fighters to al-Nusra a few months ago for lack of weapons. According to one estimate the FSA has lost a quarter of all its fighters.

Al-Nusra has members serving undercover with FSA units so they can spot potential recruits, according to Abu Hassan of the FSA's al-Tawhid Lions brigade.

Ideology is another powerful factor. "Fighters are heading to al-Nusra because of its Islamic doctrine, sincerity, good funding and advanced weapons," said Abu Islam of the FSA's al-Tawhid brigade in Aleppo. "My colleague who was fighting with the FSA's Ahrar Suriya asked me: 'I'm fighting with Ahrar Suriya brigade, but I want to know if I get killed in a battle, am I going to be considered as a martyr or not?' It did not take him long to quit FSA and join al-Nusra. He asked for a sniper rifle and got one immediately."</blockquote>

Keep in mind that earlier this year, the US government estimated that the Al Nusrah Front had more than 10,000 fighters in its ranks.

Despite the growing popularity of the Al Nusrah Front and mass defections of Free Syrian Army fighters and units to Al Nusrah, as well as <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/03/free_syrian_army_com.php">top FSA leaders expressing their support for the al Qaeda group</a>, the US government seems determined to fund the FSA and the umbrella Syrian Opposition Council, <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/12/us_adds_al_nusrah_fr.php">whose leader opposed the US's designation of Al Nusrah as a terrorist group</a>. With mass defections of FSA forces to Al Nusrah, there is no better way to ensure that US funds and weapons will fall into al Qaeda's hands.]]>
      
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