M. Ulric Killion

Why not a Middle East nuclear weapon free zone?

2012-01-30T09:32:00.000-08:00

By M. Ulric Killion

Photo Source; Cover of the The New York Times Magazine, January 30, 2012; Illustration by Sean Freeman. Smoke photograph by Julian Wolkenstein; By Ronen Bergman, Will Israel Attack Iran?, New York Times, January 25, 2012.

As recently reported by the Tehran Times, “Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi has said that the proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East was first made by the Islamic Republic,” (Iran innovated idea of nuclear-weapons-free Middle East: FM, Tehran Times – Political Desk, January 17, 2012).

For many the latter statement might seem inconsequential. However, once one directly relates Foreign Minister Salehi’s statement to “The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” (Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT), his statement has broader regional and global implications (See The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – The text of the treaty).

This is because Salehi is addressing what might represent a “cross roads” for the future potentiality of the NPT.

It is noteworthy that Foreign Minister Salehi’s recent remarks were made on Monday, January 16, 2012, which was during a meeting with Jaakko Laajava, Under-Secretary of State in Finland’s Foreign Ministry. Laajava traveled to Iran in preparation for the 2012 NPT Review Conference, which Finland will host this year.

For those unaware, during the earlier 2010 NPT Review Conference, in New York, on 4 – 15 May 2009, the parties (or the NPT States Parties) to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) adopted a consensus document containing a 64-point Action Plan for nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)).

The Action Plan is intended to strengthen the pillars of the treaty regime, which are nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Photo Source: In Iran, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi meeting with Jaakko Laajava, Undersecretary of State in Finland Foreign Ministry; “Salehi also said that the Zionist regime is the only country in the region that possesses nuclear weapons, a fact which poses a major threat to security in the region. He added that the conference should focus on this issue and the fact that the Zionist regime shows no commitment to the International Atomic Energy Agency,” Iran innovated idea of nuclear-weapons-free Middle East: FM, Tehran Times - Political Desk, January 16, 2012.

More importantly, the Action Plan is also intended to serve as an initiative to convene an international conference in 2012 on the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, which concerns the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in that region. In other words, what now refers to a Middle East nuclear weapon free zone (MENWFZ).

The broader implications of Foreign Minister Salehi’s statement should now have become clearer, as also does a sort of mandate on the part of the United Nations (UN).

According to Sergio Duarte (High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, UN),

I view this Conference as especially important, both because the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East was part of the “package deal” that led to the indefinite extension of the Treaty, and because the NPT States Parties gave the UN Secretary-General several responsibilities concerning the organization of that event. In this sense, the fate of the initiative to establish a WMD-free zone in the Middle East clearly has ramifications far beyond the region itself. It has in some respects now become a global issue, whose fate has attracted the interest of all States (Sergio Duarte, How the NPT Stands in View of the Next Review Round, 59th Pugwash Conference on Science & World Affairs: European Contributions to Nuclear Disarmament & Conflict Resolution Workshop on Nuclear Disarmament, Non-Proliferation (after the 2010 NPT Review Conference), Berlin, Germany, 4 July 2011).

There are presently five nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) in the world, and four of these NWFZs are in the Southern Hemisphere. What generally characterizes a NWFZ is the designation of a region where countries have made a commitment not to manufacture, acquire, or possess nuclear weapons.

Photo Source: Ehud Barak, the Israeli defense minister, on right, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Ronen Zvulun/Reuters; “When I mentioned to Barak the opinion voiced by the former Mossad chief Meir Dagan and the former chief of staff Gabi Ashkenazi — that the Iranian threat was not as imminent as he and Netanyahu have suggested and that a military strike would be catastrophic (and that they, Barak and Netanyahu, were cynically looking to score populist points at the expense of national security), Barak reacted with uncharacteristic anger,” By Ronen Bergman, Will Israel Attack Iran?, New York Times, January 25, 2012.

According to the Arms Control Association, “The regions currently covered under NWFZ agreements include: Latin America (the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific (the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga), Southeast Asia (the 1995 Treaty of Bangkok) Africa (the 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba) and Central Asia (the 2006 Treaty of Semipalatinsk),” (Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) At a Glance | Arms Control Association).

As for the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East, or a Middle East nuclear weapon free zone (MENWFZ), there is a host of factors or influences rendering the formation of such an agreement (or treaty) a difficult task.

Such as the potential for U.S. military intervention; Israel’s policy of nuclear opacity, or in Hebrew, “amimut”; Israel’s non-signatory state status, pursuant to the NPT; the problem of Israel’s earlier introduction of nuclear weapons to the region; Iran’s right to peaceful use of nuclear energy (i.e., nuclear medicine), pursuant to the NPT; and the fear of Iran amassing nuclear weapons material in violation of the NPT (See M. Ulric Killion, Iran, nuclear weapons, and a common syntax and logic in nuclear discourse, December 8, 2010; M. Ulric Killion, Iran, nuclear weapons, and the effectiveness of economic sanctions, February 9, 2010).

In the interim, the world stands poised for a deadly confrontation, while the possibility of a MENWFZ presents a viable alternative to war with Iran, especially if Israel can be induced to become a signatory NPT state-party and shed its policy of nuclear opacity.

Happy Chinese New Year 2012 - Wishing you have more money! - 恭禧发财! - Gong xi fa cai!

2012-01-22T01:16:00.001-08:00

Celebrating the Year of the Dragon in Chinatown, Singapore 2012!

Photo by M. Ulric Killion, 2012-01-12

Understanding Republican (GOP) Elitism

2012-01-21T08:05:00.001-08:00

By M. Ulric Killion

Photo: Reuters/Rebecca Cook. “Recently, Atlas Shrugs blogger Pamela Geller -- who is a key player in the Fear Inc. report, decided to focus her anti-Muslim rants at a Muslim GOP candidate, David Ramadan, that former Reagan administration Attorney General and Ronald Reagan Chair in Public Policy at the Heritage Foundation Edwin Meese was helping to support in a local Virginia House of Delegates race,” Steve Clemons, Islamophobia Inc. Targets GOP Muslims, Too, The Atlantic, August 29, 2011.

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The Republic Conundrum: How can GOP candidates purport to speak for Americans, while vehemently in both speech and action seeking to deny them the grandest idea of all—an inclusive American society.

—M. Ulric Killion

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There is an interesting article recently written by Joseph Bafumi (Dartmouth College) and Joseph M. Parent (University of Miami), which is titled, “International polarity and America’s polarization.”

Their article is insightful and a compelling read, especially their reflections concerning America’s growing political polarization, particularly among elites.

While they do not provide us with definitive answers to the problem of growing political polarization, they did synthesize a complex problem with complex dimensions (i.e., polarization from international to domestic perspectives) for us.

In addition, their article sheds light on the relation between international polarization and domestic (American) polarization. The clearest example of this duality in the polarization processes can be seen in the recent shift in Republican thinking.

According to Sarah Wildman, the shift in Republican thinking, as seen in the speeches and statements (i.e., political discourse) of GOP candidates, resulted in “an unabashed embracing of a brand of anti-Islam rhetoric that is common among the far right leaders of Europe, and one that has become increasingly prevalent in American political discourse since the so-called ‘ground-zero mosque’ controversy.”

As Wildman explained, this variety of American political discourse actually threatened U.S.-Turkey relations (See Sarah Wildman, Perry’s out, but gaffes still poison GOP race, PBS, January 19, 2012, presenting a fuller discussion of anti-Islam rhetoric by Republicans and U.S.-Turkey relations).

While exploring the phenomenon of both international and domestic polarization processes, Bafumi and Parent (2012) presented a well substantiated case for much-needed empirical research addressing the historical problem of growing political polarization.

A clear example of the potential crises that the shift in Republic thinking can produce, for example, is the earlier mentioned case of U.S.-Turkey relations.

Source: Photo; “Mitt Romney's presidential campaign on Sunday disavowed a flyer that claimed he supported ‘equal rights’ for gay citizens and has long been reported to have been distributed by the Massachusetts Republican during his 2002 campaign for governor,” Sam Stein, Mitt Romney Campaign Disavows Pro-Gay Rights Flyer From 2002, Huffington Post, January 9, 2012.

For these reasons, the relevancy of their research and conclusions are obvious.

This is because, notwithstanding President Obama’s “inclusiveness” mission and its potential for promoting greater equality and justice in America, there is the present GOP campaign and its potential to promote greater political polarization, in terms of both international and domestic polarization.

For instance, there are the problems of the GOP’s politics of racism, “an unabashed embracing of a brand of anti-Islam rhetoric” or Islamophobia, and gay bashing or anti-gay bigotry (See Charles M. Blow, Newt Gingrich and the Art of Racial Politics, New York Times, January 17, 2012; No, Shariah Law Is Not Being Imposed In The US, Winning Progressive, December 26, 2011; 10 Quotes That Make Ron Paul Sound Racist, Addicting Info, September 7, 2011; M. Ulric Killion, Republicans fan the flames of America in crisis, January 7, 2012; Andrew Rosenthal, Republican Attacks Have Racist Undertones, New York Times, January 3, 2012).

Source: Photo; Santorum: ‘I don't call you a bigot, you shouldn't call me a bigot’, NECN.com, January 7, 2012; See also Suzanne Gamboa, Rick Santorum Rebuked By Urban League On Comments About Black People On Public Assistance, Huffington Post, January 6, 2012.

Then there is the issue of who are the elites or elitists that are actually responsible for promoting political polarization in America, though the answer seems obvious.

Granted, the GOP candidates will say they are not elitists. Rather, the GOP candidates, as they have done so in the past, will charge that the elitists are Obama, liberals, and Democrats.

For example, there is the earlier statement by Ron Paul, whom attacked President Obama as “a liberal elitist … [who] believes that he knows what is best for people,” (See Jacob Weisberg, Elitist Nonsense - The right's favorite scare word is "elitism.” What does it mean?, Slate, October 2, 2010).

Jacob Weisberg further writes of such misuses by GOP candidates of this French word (i.e., elitism), as follows:

When the rich former CEO of one of America's largest companies casts herself as a victim of elitism, we have surely strayed far from any literal definition of the term. So what do Republicans mean by this French word? Unlike the radical sociologist C. Wright Mills, who popularized the term to describe shared identity based on economic interests, Republicans use it with connotations of education, geography, ideology, taste, and lifestyle—such that a millionaire investment banker who works for Goldman Sachs, went to Harvard, and reads the New York Times is an elitist but a billionaire CEO who grew up in Houston, went to a state university, and contributes to Republicans, is not (Weisberg, 2010).

Weisberg actually presented several examples of misuses of the term, elitism, by both former and present GOP candidates (e.g., Ron Paul, Sharron Apple (the Nevada GOP nominee), John McCain, and Sarah Palin).

He eventually reached a critical conclusion that, “The problem with the GOP’s elite-bashing is not their definition but their contradictions,” (Weisberg, 2010).

Moreover, the GOP debates, if anything, are showing the American public a mind-blowing panoply of contradictions.

Finally, for these reasons, the article written by Joseph Bafumi and Joseph M. Parent, which is “International polarity and America’s polarization,” presents a must read for those interested in the growing crisis of American political polarization.

Source:

Joseph Bafumi and Joseph M Parent, “International polarity and America’s polarization,” International Politics (2012) 49, 1–35.

An Abstract of their article follows:

There is a growing consensus that the United States is undergoing a period of political polarization, particularly among elites. The causes of this polarization remain under-researched. We argue that shifts in the international distribution of power influence America's polarization. To demonstrate the argument, this article analyzes changes in power and polarization quantitatively and qualitatively from 1945 to 2005. A key finding is that greater relative power on the world stage substantially increases polarization and some of its correlates, like income inequality. The argument also measures the extent of international influence on domestic polarization and makes novel predictions on when and why polarization will fall.

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See also

Mariela Castro: “The U.S. government concerned and occupies the LGBT movement in Cuba” / “Al gobierno de EE. UU. le preocupa y ocupa el movimiento LGBT de Cuba”

2012-01-19T01:54:00.001-08:00

Fotos y video: Aday del Sol Reyes.

por Aday del Sol Reyes, especial de Cubasi.cu, 16 de Enero de 2012 --

La Habana será escenario del 23 al 26 de enero próximo del VI Congreso de Sexología, en su sede habitual del Palacio de Convenciones, bajo el lema “La educación sexual en los procesos de transformación social”.

A propósito de este evento y sobre el trabajo educativo que durante décadas ha llevado a cabo el Centro Nacional de Educación Sexual (CENESEX), Mariela Castro Espín, directora de ese centro accedió a conceder una entrevista exclusiva para CubaSí.

Licenciada en Psicología-Pedagogía y Máster en Sexualidad Mariela Castro es reconocida internacionalmente como figura activa en la defensa de los derechos de las personas lesbianas, gays, bisexuales, transexuales e intersex (LGBTI) en Cuba.

Desde noviembre pasado, la hija del presidente cubano Raúl Castro, se incorporó a las redes sociales, al abrir una cuenta en twitter, @CastroEspinM y el blog http://elblogdemarielacastro.blogspot.com , como una vía más para desarticular los prejuicios que se han establecido históricamente y desterrar la homofobia. . . .

[Photos and video: Aday of the Sun Kings Havana will host the 23 to 26 January next year the Sixth Congress of Sexology, in its usual venue of the Conference Center, under the slogan “Sex education in the processes of social transformation.”

About this event and educational work which for decades has conducted the National Center for Sex Education (CENESEX), Mariela Castro Espin, director of the center agreed to grant an exclusive interview CubaSí .

Bachelor of Psychology-Pedagogy and Sexuality Master Mariela Castro is recognized internationally as an active figure in the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) in Cuba.

Since last November, the daughter of Cuban President Raul Castro, joined social networks, to open an account on twitter, @ CastroEspinM and blog http://elblogdemarielacastro.blogspot.com, more as a way to dismantle the prejudices that historically have been established and banish homophobia. . . .] -- Translation by M. Ulric Killion.

Mariela Castro: “Al gobierno de EE.UU. le preocupa y ocupa el movimiento LGBT de Cuba”

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Note: According to Mariela Castro, the daughter of President Raúl Castro, the Cuban Revolution changed the lives of Cubans, including profound changes in their culture such as prejudices about sexuality. Known worldwide for her support and advocacy of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights in Cuba, she is hoping for a discussion of anti-discrimination legislation including sexual orientation and gender identity at the next Communist Party Conference, which convenes this month. She is also hoping for approval of a same-sex unions measure by the close of this year. In terms of social justice and social equality, her advocacy of LGBT rights could potentially serve to bolster a greater liberalization of other rights in other aspects of Cuban society and politics.

--M. Ulric Killion

Jon Huntsman, Jr., is the only viable GOP candidate

2012-01-11T00:34:00.000-08:00

by M. Ulric Killion

The GOP race for the presidency is undoubtedly troubling for most Americans. This is because from their various debates, slogans, quotes, and platforms, the GOP is generally showing Americans an excess in division (or disunion), inter-fighting, intolerance, and proclivity for divisiveness. All of which, during these dire economic times, are hardly the qualities that most Americans want or need in a president.

The only exception in this circus is Jon Huntsman, Jr. Today, when thinking about the possibility of Huntsman withdrawing from the race for the presidency, it dawned on me that he is really the only viable GOP candidate.

When considering the field of GOP forerunners, who really should Republican voters choose? It defies commonsense to select a forerunner who demonstrates a tendency to foster division, inter-fighting, intolerance and divisiveness. This inevitably presents the only viable choice of Huntsman.

This is because it is his experience that really sets him apart from the division, inter-fighting, intolerance, and divisiveness of the other GOP forerunners. America, as a whole, needs neither business managers nor “Ron Pauls”. It is critical to understand that Huntsman, unlike the other GOP forerunners, brings to the table invaluable experience in international diplomacy (or international relations), international economic relations and, more importantly, good relations with the People’s Republic of China. If you do not understand the importance of these qualifications, then you slept through the past ten (10) years.

Given these reasons, for America, as a whole, Jon Huntsman, Jr., is the only viable GOP candidate for the office of president.

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A Brief Introduction to Jon Huntsman, Jr.

Jon Meade Huntsman, Jr. (born March 26, 1960) is an American politician, businessman, and diplomat who served as the 16th Governor of Utah. He also served in the administrations of four United States presidents and is a candidate for the 2012 Republican presidential nomination.^[1]

Huntsman worked as a White House staff assistant for Ronald Reagan, and he was appointed by George H.W. Bush as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce and later as United States Ambassador to Singapore from 1992–1993. Huntsman served as Deputy United States Trade Representative under George W. Bush, launching global trade negotiations in Doha, Qatar in 2001 and guiding the accession of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China into the World Trade Organization.

Huntsman has also served as CEO of his family's Huntsman Corporation and was elected Governor of Utah in April, 2004 and won re-election in 2008 with nearly 78% of the vote. While governor, he also served as chairman of the Western Governors Association and as a member of the Executive Committee of the National Governors Association. On August 11, 2009, he resigned as governor to accept an appointment by Barack Obama as the United States Ambassador to the People's Republic of China. He submitted his resignation as ambassador on January 31, 2011, in order to explore a presidential campaign. . . .

>>See the full biography at: Jon Huntsman, Jr. - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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See also

Republicans fan the flames of America in crisis

2012-01-07T06:48:00.001-08:00

By M. Ulric Killion

Photo Source: Cheryl Senter for The New York Times, Mitt Romney at the Town Hall in Bedford, N.H., on Dec. 20, 2011; See, “Romney and his aides have designed his rhetoric to define pretty much all spending on entitlements, including provisions for the injured, unemployed, sick, disabled or elderly as benefits to the poor who, Romney implies, are undeserving”, Thomas B. Edsall, The Anti-Entitlement Strategy, New York Times, December 25, 2011.

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The Republican Conundrum — “how can a GOP candidate appeal to racists who don’t think they are racist without sounding racist?”

— Cheryl Contee (Jill Tubman), Gingrich and Santorum Saving Lazy, Shiftless Social Parasite Black Folks from Themselves - Jack & Jill Politics, January 6, 2012.

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One would think that the campaign strategies that we are recently witnessing by some Republican candidates ought to be ineffective. During American presidential elections, however, voters often seem more fickle than normal and even more gullible than one would expect. After-all, potential voters are really only hearing a red-herring-variety of arguments and positions, rather than real solutions about the real problems of America.

Photo Source: “The blogosphere piled up with headlines Thursday over a part of Newt Gingrich's campaign speech involving food stamps and the NAACP, which left the Gingrich campaign scrambling in defense to put Gingrich's comments in context”, Elicia Dover, Gingrich's NAACP, Food Stamp Remarks Stir Controversy, ABC News, January 6, 2012.

One would also think that by now the race card would have played itself out (See Republican Attacks Have Racist Undertones, January 6, 2012). Nonetheless, the controversial comments keep coming. For instance, we now have Newt Gingrich’s controversial comments, such as his food stamps comment; Mitt Romney’s controversial comments, such as his Anti-Entitlement Strategy; Rick Santorum’s pandering to “racist elements in the electorates,” such as his discourses of racial stereotypes and racial divisiveness; and even Ron Paul’s history of controversial comments.

Photo Source; “Texas Congressman and prospective 2012 presidential candidate Ron Paul revealed in a radio interview that he would not have ordered the mission that resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden almost two weeks ago”, Amanda Carey, Osama bin Laden Kill | Would Not Have Ordered, The Daily Caller, May 12, 2011.

This is because Ron Paul has long been a source of controversy and, equally so, a target of criticism. For example, one criticism of Ron Paul reads:

Somebody’s going to ask “Isn’t Ron Paul making a difference?” So I’m going to say, “Yes.” None of this is to say that right-fusionism of the Ron Paul variety isn’t now having an influence, or that none of it is good. I’m glad to see Paul spreading a few profoundly important ideas about foreign policy. But that doesn’t mean Paul’s decades of bilking paranoid bigots with bullshit prophesies of hyperinflationary race war was really a stroke of strategic genius after all. Or maybe it means it was. But that doesn’t make it right. I don’t think Paul would be where he is today without all those years of vile fear-mongering. And I don’t think anyone ought to get away with climbing up that evil ladder, kicking it away, then pretending he was born a thousand feet off the ground in the pure mountain air right there next to heaven. He knew what he was doing, chose to do it, and none of it can be justified by a little TV-time for salutary anti-imperialist and free-market ideas. I’d rather not be affiliated with a “movement” that includes him in even a conflicted way (See Wilkinson on Paul « Modeled Behavior, January 3, 2012).

“Morial [Urban League President] said Santorum made the statements to pander to racist elements in the electorate and should be ashamed. Santorum's spokesman did not immediately return telephone calls and emails Tuesday seeking comment,” Suzanne Gamboa, Rick Santorum Rebuked By Urban League On Comments About Black People On Public Assistance, Huffington Post, January 6, 2012; View the video.

The controversial comments of Rick Santorium are equally shocking for obvious reasons. Urban League President Marc Morial observed that Republican presidential hopeful Rick Santorum, “tried to leverage a stereotype about black people and public assistance programs to gain an advantage in the Iowa caucuses” (Gamboa, Huffington Post, 2012). During an interview, Marc Morial directly addressed the problem with Rick Santorium’s language of race and the use of race and/or racism in Iowa. An excerpt from the interview with Morial reads:

Morial pointed out that 84 percent of food stamp recipients in Iowa are white. Nationally, 70 percent of recipients are white, he said. Many people who receive public aid contributed to those programs as workers, Morial said.
“By falsely suggesting that people of color are a disproportionate drain on resources provided mainly by whites, Santorum deliberately fans the flames of racial divisiveness,” Morial said (Gamboa, Huffington Post, 2012).

Moreover, irrespective of the truth or falsity of such “irrelevant” comments, their “red herrings” fail to inform the American public about how they intend to revive the American economy and restore prosperity to the American people. While this obvious strategy undoubtedly bodes well for Obama supporters, the same is not true for the Americans who are actually in search of real solutions to real problems.

Photo Source: “President Obama is hoping to capitalize on his controversial decision to appoint Richard Cordray as director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “ Richard Bluey, Big Government, January 6, 2012; See also “Congressional Republicans have asked the Justice Department to weigh in on the legality of controversial recess appointments President Barack Obama made this week to install appointees to politically sensitive jobs overseeing consumer lending and the labor force,” Republicans press Obama on recess appointments, Reuters, January 6, 2012.

Yes, if one noticed, arguably the Obama administration is also guilty of sometimes employing red-herrings. The Obama administration admittedly appears not to directly attack many of the controversial comments of Republican forerunners. Nonetheless, one reasonably suspects that President Obama’s recent controversial appointment of Richard Corday as director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was an indirect response to the attention drawing controversies surrounding Republican Party candidates. In other words, the tactics employed also constitute yet another red-herring being cast into the political waters.

As for the Americans who are actually in search of real solutions to real problems, this does not speak well of American politics and the “American political party system.” This is because all of this ultimately leaves one wondering when did the right of every citizen, though the now less informed citizen, to withhold acclamation become a “watered-down” right.

Given recent events, if this is as good as it gets, then there is a serious crisis looming in both American politics and the “American political party system,” notwithstanding the social and economic crises awaiting real Americans in need of real solutions to real problems.

Last update: January 8, 2012.

The Plight of Cuban Refugees and U.S. Immigration Law

2012-01-04T23:58:00.001-08:00

By M. Ulric Killion

“Public Law 89-732”, A Short Film project in Los Angeles, CA by Justin Polk

This is an interesting project. The developers of the project intend to present a compelling story about Cuban refugees and U.S. immigration and U.S. immigration law.

The focus of the project is its namesake, which is “Public Law 89-732.” More specifically, “Public Law 89-732” is the (U.S.) Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA), which the U.S. Congress earlier enacted on November 2, 1996.

They also provided a short introductory video, which can be seen at this website:

http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/justpolk/public-law-89-732.

Photo source: Amazing Cuban Refugee Rafts that Dared the High Seas in Search of Freedom. “The Cuban refugee crisis has been an ongoing issue every since Fidel Castro took control in the 1950's;” The Toplist Beach: Amazing Cuban Refugee Rafts that Dared the High Seas in Search of Freedom, December 5, 2007.

Granted, in the United States, immigration is a controversial subject. This does not, however, take away from the compelling story that the developers intend to present, while exploring this controversial subject.

Additionally, from what I gathered after viewing the introductory video, the developers of this project are not standing on a soap box, if you will understand my meaning. Rather, they seem to intend only to explore the controversy by presenting a compelling story of a specific Cuban refugee and immigration.

In the same vein, I also do not intend to stand on a soap box and dictate the political preferences of those who will read this writing or view the introductory video. I think Abraham Lincoln said it best when he earlier said that even the thinnest pancake has two sides.

With that being said, the introductory video is well worth one’s time.

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The Role of the Chinese Renminbi in the Future of Global Finance – The Internationalization of the Chinese Currency

2011-12-06T07:57:00.001-08:00

By M. Ulric Killion

People’s Bank of China Governor Zhou Xiaochuan answers a question during a press conference in March 2010. The International Monetary Fund on Friday said it will hold a high-level conference of central bank governors in Shanghai next week to discuss ways to address the global financial crisis; Photo / Xinhua / Chen Jianli.

As earlier mentioned, “China Central Bank Governor Zhou Xiaochuan’s earlier call to replace the US dollar with a new global currency seems to be slowly gaining support in the international community” (M. Ulric Killion, Growing support for China Bank Gov. Zhou’s call for new “Global Currency”, April 1, 2009).

This month the Council on Foreign Affairs (CFA), in the “Beijing Papers” or CGS/IIGG Working Papers, presents, “A collection of papers examining the internationalization of the Chinese currency, the renminbi, as written for a symposium co-sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the China Development Research Foundation in November 2011.”

As for the subject matter of the symposium, it was a much-needed venting of the issues and controversy surrounding the internationalization of the Chinese currency, the renminbi (RMB, international code id CNY, Chinese Yuan). While many Western experts may not take the issue seriously, many Chinese experts deem the internationalization of China’s national currency, the renminbi, as inevitable.

Quoting from an earlier article,

According to the economist Jing Li (Capital University of Economics and Business, China), the internationalization of the RMB is inevitable. This arguable inevitability may well be mostly attributable to the reality, as described by Jing (2006), that, “The integration of Asia, and the growth of RMB as a regional key currency will challenge the current imbalanced international monetary system. This will improve the global currency structure, reduce the overdependence on USD, and promote the resource allocation efficiency in developing countries” (M. Ulric Killion, The “Big Three” Credit Rating Agencies plus the Chinese Dagong Global – A new Asian and International Reality, 2011; Jing Li, RMB as a Regional International Currency: Cost-benefit Analysis and Roadmap, Centre for European Studies, Fudan University, May 12, 2006.).

Additionally, the Chinese domestic currency once internationalized will have far-reaching influence. For example, some of these influences will widely range from affecting on-going debt crises and/or sovereign debt crises of developed countries, to challenging the efforts of the Bretton Woods Institutions, especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in assisting these struggling economies. One should also add that it will also inevitably challenge the credibility of the “Big Three” credit rating agencies (CRAs), which are Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s Corporation, and Fitch ratings (Killion, 2011).

Moreover, many Western experts see merit in China Central Bank Governor Zhou Xiaochuan’s earlier call to replace the US dollar with a new global currency (Killion, 2009, presenting a fuller discussion of Governor Zhou’s proposal).

For instance, some of the earlier growing support for replacing the U.S. currency included Joseph Stiglitz, a Columbia University economics professor; Marc Chandler, who is a currency strategist at Brown Brothers Harriman; and even U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner, when earlier expressing some openness about a new reserve system based on the IMF’s special drawing rights (SDRs) (Killion, 2011).

There is also C. Fred Bergsten (Director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics), who also earlier saw the merits of Governor Zhou’s proposal, especially the creation of an open-ended SDR-denominated fund.

According to Bergsten,

The substitution account would be a winning proposition for all concerned. The dollar holders would obtain instant diversification. The United States would avoid the risk of a free fall of the dollar. Europe would prevent a sharp rise in the euro. The global system would eliminate a potential source of great instability. These benefits call for the use of a global asset to make up any losses to the account from future falls in the dollar, such as creation of additional SDR or the IMF's gold holdings (including the sizeable US share of them). The main argument against such an account is that China has accumulated its dollar hoard of more than $1,000 billion by keeping its currency substantially undervalued, through massive intervention in the foreign exchange markets, and thus deserves no sympathy if it takes losses on those dollars. One might even suspect that the Chinese have mentally booked such losses as the implicit cost of the subsidy to exports and jobs achieved through their currency manipulation. But there is no sign that China will stop intervening, or that its surpluses will abate, even though the US external deficit has declined sharply, and its reserve build-up is thus likely to become even more threatening. Moreover, this is an ideal issue for China and the United States to develop the informal "G-2" partnership that is needed to provide global economic leadership to pass needed reforms at the existing multilateral institutions (M. Ulric Killion, Bergsten - We Should listen to Beijing's Currency Idea, April 15, 2009; C. Fred Bergsten, We Should listen to Beijing's Currency Idea, April 8, 2009 (Co-Ed in the Financial Times).

In these respects, the symposium sponsored by the CFR and the China Development Research Foundation on the subject matter of the internationalization of China’s domestic currency, the renminbi, lends additional credibility or a degree of seriousness to the issues and controversy surrounding China’s national currency. While doing so, the symposium on the internationalization of China’s domestic currency, though perhaps unintentionally, also lends credibility to the plausibility of its inevitability.

For all of these reasons and more, the following “Beijing Papers” or CGS/IIGG Working Papers warrant serious consideration. This is because the “Beijing Papers” are a must read for anyone interested in the issues and controversy surrounding the internationalization of China’s domestic currency, the renminbi.

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The “Beijing Papers” - CGS/IIGG Working Papers - 2011

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November 2011

What Drives CNH Market Equilibrium?

Author: Peter Garber, Global Strategist, Global Markets Research, Deutsche Bank

Overview

The recent rapid growth of the offshore renminbi market presents a puzzle for analysts of China’s development strategy. By allowing renminbi to flow offshore uncontrolled before loosening government controls over internal financial markets, Chinese officials are straying from the normal sequence of steps toward currency internationalization. Why might that be? In this Center for Geoeconomic Studies Working Paper, produced in association with CFR’s International Institutions and Global Governance program, Peter Garber seeks to answer that question by investigating what drives offshore renminbi markets and how they are evolving.

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November 2011

Historical Precedents for Internationalization of the RMB

Author: Jeffrey A. Frankel, James Harpel Chair for Capital Formation & Growth, Harvard University

Overview

The twentieth century saw the rise of the U.S. dollar, the German mark, and the Japanese yen as international currencies. Now the Chinese renminbi is on a similar course toward reserve currency status, but its path is deviating from those of its predecessors in both aim and intent. In this Center for Geoeconomic Studies Working Paper, produced in association with CFR’s International Institutions and Global Governance program, Professor Jeffrey Frankel explains how the renminbi’s ascent is without historical precedent and why China might be pursuing such an unorthodox strategy.

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November 2011

Renminbi Internationalization and China's Financial Development Model

Author: Robert N. McCauley, Senior Adviser, Monetary and Economic Department, Bank for International Settlements

Overview

Internationalization was a spontaneous outcome of the marketplace for the rest of the world’s major currencies, but China is breaking with history by making it official policy to steer the renminbi on a path toward reserve currency status. However, this managed internationalization occurs at a time when China’s financial development is still in a transitional phase featuring capital controls and other constraints on credit growth and allocation. In this Center for Geoeconomic Studies Working Paper, produced in association with CFR’s International Institutions and Global Governance program, Robert McCauley explores the policy challenges facing Chinese authorities as their pursuit of an internationalized renminbi threatens to undermine the effectiveness of their domestic financial market controls.

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November 2011

The Internationalization of the RMB: Opportunities and Pitfalls

Author: Takatoshi Ito, Professor, Graduate School of Economics and Graduate School of Public Policy, University of Tokyo

Overview

China is making swift strides toward internationalizing its currency, the renminbi, but it must be careful when sequencing these changes. Without the proper reforms, wide-open Chinese financial markets would be vulnerable to massive flows of foreign capital that could send China into the throes of financial crisis. In this Center for Geoeconomic Studies Working Paper, produced in association with CFR’s International Institutions and Global Governance program, Professor Takatoshi Ito examines the progress of the renminbi’s march toward international status and evaluates the possible paths forward.

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November 2011

The Future of International Liquidity and the Role of China

Author: Alan M. Taylor, Souder Family Professor of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics, University of Virginia

Overview

Financial crises in the 1930s and 1970s showed the world that economic instability results when demand for international liquidity allows a small number of countries to run up massive debts in their own currencies. Named for the economist who first described the scenario in the 1960s, this “Triffin Paradox” threatens the global financial system again today as demand for reserves has skyrocketed among emerging market economies. In this Center for Geoeconomic Studies Working Paper, produced in association with CFR’s International Institutions and Global Governance program, Professor Alan Taylor considers whether China might play a larger role in stabilizing the world economy by supplying a reserve asset of its own—an internationalized renminbi.

Beijing Papers - Council on Foreign Relations

China’s economic growth model – A recipe for growing too fast?

2011-12-05T02:16:00.001-08:00

By M. Ulric Killion

While China’s economic growth since 1990 is astonishing, China has a long way to go before it can beat or overtake the US economy. Despite the strong growth the Chinese economy still is relatively small compared to the US economy. So in that sense it may be premature to call China as the rising superpower. Emerging markets in Asia, Africa, etc. may not be able to consume as much of the Chinese goods as the US did simply because consumers in those markets do not have the purchasing power as Americans do. Chinese Exports: Can Emerging Markets Replace the U.S. Consumer?, Seeking Alpha, November 13, 2009; Photo / Source: Der Spiegel.

There is a recent (December 2, 2011) posting of an interesting article by Adam Ozimek, which is titled, “If there is a recipe for growing too fast forever, I have yet to see it”, at the Modeled Behavior blog. The article engendered a lively discussion on the Internet, and the comments also provide for interesting reading.

The focus of the article was on the sustainability of China’s burgeoning economic growth. For instance, an excerpt from the article reads,

Karl [Smith] defends Andy Stern on China by making a claim about economic growth that on the one hand I think is partly true, but I think he overstates the case. His argument is that it is possible for economies to grow too fast in some sense, because economic growth is not the same thing as welfare. You can take too much from current generations in the name of stimulating economic growth. Karl has made this point in the past more explicitly, pointing to China’s 40% savings rate outside the bounds of plausible optimal savings rate. This much I agree with, or at least I agree that it is possible and worth considering (I don’t know what the bounds of optimal savings are for China, or if they’re actually outside it). The problem is to use this to defend the notion that China can go too fast forever and use their current strategy to one day surpass us in per capita GDP.

As earlier stated the comments are also equally interesting because some of the comments even link the sustainability of Chinese economic growth with democracy. For example, according to one comment, “being a rich country requires democracy.”

For these reasons, both the article and comments are a compelling read; they also present several issues about the future sustainability of China’s economic growth.

First, the discussions challenge a seeming truism, if not tacit assumption, that China will overtake the U.S. economy in the new millennium. Quoting from an earlier article,

In the early 1990s, the World Bank predicted that in the early days of the new millennium, China would overtake the US as the largest economy in the world. In November 2006, as reported in the Wall Street Journal, former World Bank Chief James Wolfensohn warned Western countries of an economic future and altered balance of power dominated by China and India. Based on projections by investment bank Goldman Sachs, Wolfensohn predicted that within 25 years the combined GDP of China and India would exceed that of the G7 nations. China, by 2030 to 2040, would become the world’s largest economy. By 2050, “China’s current $2 tn GDP is set to balloon to $48.6 tn, while that of India, whose economy weighs in at under a trillion dollars, would hit $27 tn.” He also highlighted the recent and substantial investments of both China and India in Africa, as examples of how these two emerging giants are exercising their increasing global influence (M. Ulric Killion, “Regional Economic Integration: The Chinese Way,” The Analyst-Finance Magazine: Global Economy Special Issue, August 2008).

Second, the article and comments seem to ignore the reality that there are pristine models of neither capitalism nor socialism. All of which, in the real world, presents questions of how socialist “we” are, how capitalist “they” are, and vice versa. In this respect, there is also a problematic denial of the genuine possibility of what hails as a Beijing model, Beijing consensus, and even arguably the potential for China and its economic growth model actually presenting a possible evolution in the capitalist model (M. Ulric Killion, Post-global financial crisis: The measure of the “Beijing consensus” as a variety of capitalisms, MPRA Paper No. 26382, November 2010, discussing the varieties of capitalism theory in the context of the Chinese economy). In other words, China presents itself as a socialist-political polity pursuing capitalist-economic policies.

Third, the article and comments also arguably fail to recognize that China’s economic growth model, though many Western experts will disagree, stems from an inherent inevitability rather than choice in how best to modernize. This is because, “The initial choice of an open export-oriented strategy as the breakthrough point for reform had an inherent inevitability,” rather than being a blind imitation of other East Asian economies, and presumably other non-Asian economies (C. Pei and L. Peng, “Reform and opening up in the area of circulation: a retrospect,” Zhongguo Shehui Kexue [Soc. Sci. China], Vol. XXX, No. 1 (February 2009), 36-53).

Notwithstanding their detailed presentation regarding this inherent inevitability, Pei and Pang generally characterized both exported-oriented production and international capital investment as critical choices of China’s open strategy. Although China’s factor endowment advantage of labor (i.e., lower wages than neighboring economies) provided an incentive for international investors, the arrangements made in the course of trade system restructuring came to coincide with the investment strategies of international capital; thus, eventually presenting for China the historical opportunity of international capital’s industrial transformation (Pei and Pang, 2009).

Fourth and finally, there is the debt crisis of developed countries, which, as empirical studies suggest, will impact on the gross domestic product (GDP) of these countries. This also challenges the notion of what the article characterizes as China’s “catch up growth.” As Davide Furceri and Aleksandra Zdzienicka recently concluded, “Debt crises produce significant and long-lasting output losses, reducing output by about 10 percent after eight years. The results also suggest that debt crises tend to be more detrimental than banking and currency crises” (Davide Furceri and Aleksandra Zdzienicka, “How Costly Are Debt Crises?”, IMF Working Paper, No. 11/280, December 1, 2011).

For all of these reasons, in the end, one suspects that China will sustain its economic growth, while developed countries continue to struggle with debt crises and the aftermath of debt crises.

The “Big Three” Credit Rating Agencies plus the Chinese Dagong Global – A new Asian and International Reality

2011-11-20T08:48:00.000-08:00

by M. Ulric Killion

“Dagong Global Credit Rating Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Dagong") is a specialized credit rating and risk analysis research institution founded in 1994 upon the joint approval of People‘s Bank of China and the former State Economic & Trade Commission, People’s Republic of China, and is also a key credit information and credit solution service provider in China. As the most influential founder of China‘s credit rating industry and market, Dagong has all franchise qualifications granted by the Chinese Government, and is an official institution providing credit rating services for all bond issuers in China.”; Photo / Dagong website.

In a recently written policy brief entitled, “What Can and Cannot Be Done about Rating Agencies”, Nicola Véron (2011), a visiting fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, explored some of the modern problems of credit rating agencies (CRAs). He presented an excellent discussion of some of the critical problems surrounding these CRAs, especially the recent problems attendant to their often seemingly poor timing of downgrades (i.e., downgrading countries such as Greece and China).

A failing, if any, of his policy brief, or approach to examining the problems of CRAs is that he emphasized these issues in the context of the “Big Three” CRAs, which are Standard & Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s Corporations, and Fitch ratings.

In other words, his study or policy brief, though an excellent presentation, would have been more interesting with an inclusion of the issues and controversy surrounding China’s national currency—renminbi (RMB, international code id CNY, Chinese Yuan). This is because China and other countries are seeking to internationalize China’s national currency.

Véron admittedly did mention other CRAs; such as AM Best (US-based), Eagon Jones (US-based), Kroll Bond Rating Agency (US-based), Dominion Bond Rating Service (Canada-based), Japan Credit Rating Agency (Japan-based), and Rating & Investment Information (Japan-based), including the Chinese rating agency Dagong Global Credit Rating Co. (“Dagong Global”), which is the focus of this short writing.

However, Véron paid scant attention to the potential implications of the launch of Dagong Global. The only other mention of Dagong Global is in a footnote, which distinguishes Dagong Global from the other CRAs. This is because, unlike the other CRAs, it is not registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

Véron (2011) notes that,

Of this list, all except Dagong are registered with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which designates them as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs). A 2009 application for registration by Dagong was not accepted by the SEC (SEC 2011a, p.4). National units of AM Best, Dominion Bond Rating Service, Fitch, Japan Credit Rating Agency, Moody’s, and S&P are also registered in Europe and supervised by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).

“The European Commission has today released proposals to regulate Credit Ratings Agencies (CRAs). PES Press release 15/11/2011.” The Party of European Socialists (PES) have called the proposals ‘diluted’, with the main issue of establishing a European independent credit rating agency to oversee the agencies entirely absent from the final text. “Unchecked power and money is the big problem with Credit Rating Agencies”, said PES President Poul Nyrup Rasmussen. “Unfortunately, unchecked power and money is also a big part of EU lobbying, and it would seem that Ratings Agencies have been lobbying very hard to pre-emptively reduce the impact of the Commission’s proposals”; Photo, Worrying signs that Commission is already cowed by Credit Ratings’ Lobby as Barnier tables proposals | Europeans For Financial Reform, November 15, 2011.

Véron failed to mention, however, that the rejection by the US-SEC of the application of Dagong Global associates with allegations of bias. For this reason, both Dangong Global and the SEC issued press statements after the rejection of Dagong Global’s application for registration as a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO).

On September 25, 2010, Dagong Global issued a press statement “saying that its application for NRSRO status in the United States is rational and complies with rules and laws, and the contention by U.S. authorities that they are unable to handle cross-border oversight and regulation amounts to bias against Chinese credit-rating agencies. Dagong will not accept the NRSRO status at the price of betraying national sovereignty, according to the statement” (People’s Daily, 2010).

In reply, the SEC issued a statement on its official website; citing that the objection to Dagong Global’s application for registration as a NRSRO is because it cannot perform cross-border oversight and regulation of Dagong Global (People’s Daily, 2010).

On the issue of the cross-border oversight objection and/or problem, Dagong Global’s press statement also stated,

Dagong said that its application for the NRSRO status in the United States has completely been a type of market conduct. “We will absolutely not accept the one and only reason put forth by the SEC – that it cannot perform cross-border oversight and regulation.”

NRSRO refers to the qualification reviewed and approved by the SEC to allow a credit rating agency to conduct business in the United States.

Dagong said that the SEC has unreasonably denied the application of a Chinese credit rating agency that met application standards. It is not only against the rules of the American “Securities Exchange Act,” the “Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies Registered as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations,” and related international rules and laws but also resulted in a huge loss for Dagong.

“Dagong will consider conducting activities at the right time to protect its rights, including seeking legal actions against the SEC,” the statement read.

The statement went on to point out that as the largest creditor country of the United States, China owns a huge amount of financial assets in the United States, so having China’s own say in credit rating in the United States is significant to safeguarding the security of China’s overseas financial assets.

“The SEC’s deliberate denial is evidently aimed at preventing Dagong from gaining influence in the international credit rating market, and at maintaining the monopoly of three U.S.-based major credit rating agencies,” the statement read (People’s Daily, 2010).

A problem of the allegation of bias against China is that, in the context of a global economy, China’s national currency and its trade, finance, and monetary mechanisms enjoy dire relevancy.

According to the economist Jing Li (Capital University of Economics and Business, China), the internationalization of the RMB is inevitable. This arguable inevitability may well be mostly attributable to the reality, as described by Jing (2006), that, “The integration of Asia, and the growth of RMB as a regional key currency will challenge the current imbalanced international monetary system. This will improve the global currency structure, reduce the overdependence on USD, and promote the resource allocation efficiency in developing countries.”

It should be noted that as early as 2009 there were aggressive rumblings from China and other countries, including in the United States; when many were advocating replacement of the US dollar with a new global currency. It was earlier observed that, “China Central Bank Governor Zhou Xiaochuan’s earlier call to replace the US dollar with a new global currency seems to be slowly gaining support in the international community” (Killion, 2009).

For example, some of the earlier growing support for replacement of the U.S. currency included Joseph Stiglitz, a Columbia University economics professor, and Marc Chandler, who is a currency strategist at Brown Brothers Harriman.

Additionally, although both the Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke and U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner earlier rejected on March 31, 2009 the call to drop the dollar as the world’s key reserve currency” (Killion, 2009; Lesova, 2009), according to some news sources, Geithner earlier expressed some openness about a new reserve system based on the IMF’s special drawing rights (SDRs), though admittedly not specifically mentioning China’s national currency, the RMB.

Moreover, the failings of the “Big Three” for obvious reasons directly influence the receptivity of the RMB in the international monetary system, while also presenting a challenge to its receptivity.

Dai Daohua (Senior Economist at the Bank of China) earlier set forth both the major shortfalls of the “Big Three” and some of the choices available to China. In light of these shortfalls, according to Dai (2010), China faces two choices; China can either strengthen its own credit rating system or push for international credit rating reform.

For this reason, the success or failure of Dagong Global may have far-reaching implications, notwithstanding its potential to lure more Chinese investors (See, Cf., Tian, 2011; discussing Dagong Global’s first sovereign customer, which was the Republic of Belarus, and the potential lure of Chinese investors).

In other words, the growing role of China’s national currency in the international monetary system warrants serious consideration of the new Chinese CRA, the Dagong Global. This is because the launch of the China-sanctioned new Chinese CRA actually associates with growing responses to the failings of the “Big Three” CRAs, including, as Véron (2011) even recognized, the unreliability of the “Big Three.”

All of this speaks to the severity of the failings of the “Big Three” and China’s perception of the “Big Three,” while also prospectively serving to demonstrate that in future discussions about CRAs the potentiality of Chinese CRAs is due serious consideration.

References

Nicola Véron, What Can and Cannot Be Done about Rating Agencies, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Policy Brief – PB11-21, November 2011; A synopsis of his article reads:

The constantly developing global financial system needs better risk assessments than Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) have been collectively able to deliver during recent crises. More comprehensive public disclosure by issuers on their financial risks, which would not require intermediation by CRAs, is the best chance for new and better risk assessment methodologies and practices to emerge. To put it in a simplistic but concise way, what is needed is “a John Moody for the 21st century.” CRAs themselves can perhaps be somewhat improved by adequate regulation and supervision, but public policy initiatives that focus only on CRAs are unlikely to adequately address the need for substantially better financial risk assessments. If real progress is to be made towards a better public understanding of financial risks, it will have to involve innovative approaches that even well-regulated CRAs, on the basis of recent experience, may not be the best placed to deliver.

M. Ulric Killion, Growing support for China bank official’s call for new global currency, M. Ulric Killion's space, April 1, 2009; Alternatively, see M. Ulric Killion: Growing support for China Bank Gov. Zhou's call for new "Global Currency," April 1, 2009.

Chinese credit-rating agency denied entry by US authorities, claims bias, People’s Daily Online, Sept 26, 2010.

Jing Li, RMB as a Regional International Currency: Cost-benefit Analysis and Roadmap, Centre for European Studies, Fudan University, May 12, 2006.

Polya Lesova, Geithner, Bernanke reject China currency proposal, MarketWatch, March 24, 2009.

Dai Daohua, Credit Rating Agencies’ Reform and China’s Choices, Hong Kong Trader, Jun 30, 2010.

Wei Tian, Dagong gets first nation client, China Daily, November 9, 2011.

Iran and nuclear enrichment – Iran’s response to the new IAEA Report

2011-11-09T05:50:00.000-08:00

By M. Ulric Killion

A suspected uranium-enrichment facility near Qom in Iran. Photograph: Digital Globe/Reuters.

The following collection of articles is from the November 9, 2011 edition of the Tehran Times. This collection of articles stems from various official media sources in Iran. These articles present various responses and positions from Iran and its official media sources regarding the recent report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which addressed issues of Iran and nuclear enrichment. According to the IAEA, Iran had “accumulated more than 1,000 pages of documentation that led it to believe suspected nuclear weapons work was carried out under a "structured programme" until 2003, and that "some may still be ongoing” (Julian Borger, UN watchdog reveals 'serious concerns' about Iranian nuclear weapons research, guardian.co.uk, November 8, 2011).

-- M. Ulric Killion

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Tehran Times, Nov 9, 2011 --

Iran - Politics

Iran provides 20 answers to clarify ambiguities about its nuclear program

Political Desk - Wednesday, 09 November 2011

Iran's envoy to the IAEA Ali-Asghar SoltaniehIran's envoy to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Ali-Asghar Soltanieh has offered the...

Iran rejects IAEA report as 'politically motivated'

Political Desk - Tuesday, 08 November 2011

Iran has rejected the International Atomic Energy Agency report about the country's nuclear program for being politically motivated."The report of the...

IAEA report thrives on laptop of lies

Ismail Salami - Tuesday, 08 November 2011

The 'DG [director General] of all states, but in agreement with us' was how the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Yukiya Amano was...

'US dictated new IAEA report to Amano'

PressTV - Tuesday, 08 November 2011

As the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Yukiya Amano is set to release his latest report on Iran's nuclear case, an Iranian...

Amano's new report, repetition of unfounded claims

IRNA - Tuesday, 08 November 2011

Tehran, Nov 8, IRNA -- Western sources said about one month ago that the new report by the UN nuclear watchdog’s chief would include some evidence...

Iranian official in Moscow to discuss IAEA report, step-by-step proposal

Political Desk - Tuesday, 08 November 2011

TEHRAN – The deputy secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Baqeri, left Tehran for Moscow on Tuesday to hold talks with Russian...

Iran fully prepared to counter any attack: minister

Political Desk - Tuesday, 08 November 2011

TEHRAN – Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi said on Tuesday that the Islamic Republic is in full preparedness to counter any military attack against...

Chances slim for stiffer sanctions against Iran

Political Desk - Tuesday, 08 November 2011

UNITED NATIONS (Reuters) - There is little chance that the UN Security Council will impose tough new sanctions on Iran anytime soon.The reason for...

China donates $1.5 million to Colombia for defense and military investments / China dona a Colombia 10 millones de yuanes para la defensa

2011-11-02T22:12:00.001-07:00

by M. Ulric Killion

During a three-country tour of Latin America, General Guo Boxiong is promoting bilaterial ties between China and Latin American countries, while also donating millions of dollars (or yuan) for defense and military investments; Photo, October 28, 2011.

October 31, 2011 --

[During a three-country tour of Latin America, when visiting Cuba, Colonel General Guo Boxiong (Vice-President of China’s Central Military Commission) met with President Raúl Castro and military leaders. During his visit, General Guo promised to deepen bilateral ties, while also signing an agreement to donate $1.5 million (i.e., about 10 million yuan in Chinese currency) to the Colombian government for defense and military investments [“. . . . por parte de China a Colombia por valor de 10 millones de yuanes (un millón y medio de dólares.”)] -- Translation by M. Ulric Killion.

Los recursos serán destinados para la compra de equipos y material logístico.

[The funds will be used for the purchase of equipment and logistical material.] -- Translation by M. Ulric Killion

El ministro de Defensa, Juan Carlos Pinzón, se reunió este lunes en Bogotá con el Vicepresidente de la Comisión Militar Central de la República Popular China, Coronel General Guo Boxiong, con quien sostuvo una reunión en la que firmaron un acuerdo de cooperación entre Colombia y China.

En el encuentro entre los altos mandos militares y representantes diplomáticos de la República Popular China, se formalizó un acuerdo de asistencia militar gratuita por parte de China a Colombia por valor de 10 millones de yuanes (un millón y medio de dólares).

Se trata de un acuerdo similar a convenios anteriores que los Ministerios de Defensa de ambos países ya han ejecutado con los que las Fuerzas Militares de Colombia se han visto beneficiadas, teniendo en cuenta que los recursos donados son invertidos en dotación logística y material de intendencia. . . .

See China dona a Colombia 10 millones de yuanes para la defensa | ELESPECTADOR.COM

Chinese airlines, China’s market, and Boeing 787 cancellations

2011-10-19T01:18:00.000-07:00

by M. Ulric Killion

The following photo, which was taken on October 17, 2011, shows the cabin of a China Southern Airbus 319/320 aircraft at Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport, People’s Republic of China (PRC); Photo by M. Ulric Killion.

According to Wang Wen (China Eastern cancels order for Boeing 787s|Companies|chinadaily.com.cn, October 19, 2011), Chinese airlines are electing to focus on the acquisition of smaller commercial aircraft rather the Boeing 787s to serve China’s market.

According to Wang, “China Eastern Airlines Corp, the country's second-largest carrier by aircraft numbers, announced on Monday night it was canceling its order for 24 Boeing 787 Dreamliners in favor of 45 smaller 737s, which will be delivered between 2014 and 2016.”

Boeing Co delivered its first 787 Dreamliners on Sept 25, three years after the original delivery date. China Southern Airlines Co Ltd, Air China Ltd and Hainan Airlines Co Ltd have confirmed orders for 35 Dreamliners. SeongJoon Cho / Bloomberg.

Further Wang wrote:

“China Eastern will also return five A340-300s to Airbus SAS in exchange for 15 smaller wide-body A330s, which could be operated on domestic routes, Bloomberg reported. The total value of the A330s is $2.53 billion, the carrier said.

China Southern Airlines Co Ltd, Air China Ltd and Hainan Airlines Co Ltd also have confirmed orders for 35 Dreamliners. China Southern may scrap its 10 orders for the 787 after delivery of the first plane was pushed back to July 2012.”

However, Wang failed to mention that prior to Chinese airlines electing to acquire the smaller Boeing 737s (i.e., Boeing 737-700/800 aircraft ) rather the “Boeing 787 – Dreamliners”, many Chinese airlines were arguably earlier pursuing this market strategy.

For instance, airlines such as China Southern are presently using a smaller variety of Airbus aircraft. An example of the smaller variety of commercial aircraft that some Chinese airlines are currently using is the Airbus 319/320.

Will China’s State Secrets Law again rear its ugly head – Cheating and the credibility of exams for professionals

2011-10-07T23:18:00.000-07:00

by M. Ulric Killion

Song Fulai, who composed questions for the certified architect exam, was sentenced in Beijing in 2008 to 18 months in prison for leaking state secrets. The court found that he gave exam questions to his students during tutorials; Photo/provided to China Daily]; Cui Jia, Li Jing, and Duan Yan, Professional exams face credibility test, China Daily, September 30, 2011.

On September 30, 2011, the China Daily’s cover page reported a new level of unprecedented cheating via the internet for professional examinations. These are the professional examinations for certified public accountants (CPAs), doctors, lawyers, judges, and architects.

One suspects that level and intensity of the cheating on professionals exam is at least partially owing to the speed, depth, and perhaps even a certain degree of secrecy that associate with the mass communication naturally inherent in Internet communications.

Additionally, and presenting yet another force of influence, the seemingly growing level of cheating via the internet may also be attributable to low pass rates on professional exams. For instance, in China “the average pass rate for the full CPA exam is 10 to 15 percent” (Cui, Li, and Duan, 2011).

As for the National Judicial Examination for lawyers or judicial officers, during the past ten years, although “the passing rate has risen from 6.7 percent in 2002 to 20 percent last year” (Cui, Li, and Duan, 2011), the average pass rate of 20 percent is still a low rate.

The cover story also describes the various methods that employ in enabling cheating on these professional exams, while also noting the various costs, including the illegal profits.

Experts say there's an intricate chain of commercial interests behind professional qualification tests, and regulation is scattered among the ministries that oversee the different professions. The experts also say some individuals or companies are using those commercial interests to make illegal profits, in the process damaging the credibility of the exams (Cui, Li, and Duan, 2011).

It is even more noteworthy that despite the unprecedented level of cheating on professional exam, they have not been any recent arrest made in connection with cheating on professional exams. The latter admittedly may owe to the speed, convenient and secrecy of the Internet. For instance, as the China Daily reported,

But during the medical licensing examination, also on Sept 17 and 18, China Youth Daily reported that one Internet user received 20 questions from a source 90 minutes before a test on the second day and found them to be identical to questions in the test. Similar leaks had been reported in 2007 and 2009, the report said (Cui, Li, and Duan, 2011).

The cover page, although unintentionally, also provides a measure of Chinese law, in particular, China’s “Law on Guarding State Secrets” (i.e., State Secrets Law). This is due to professional qualification tests being governed by state regulations or laws, and administered by various state ministries in each profession such as the Ministry of Justice for lawyers, and the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development for architects.

The earlier mentioned conviction of Song Fulai provide a precedent for what will happen to those that persist in the illegal enterprise of cheating on professional exams. For Song, in 2008, the penalty was an eighteen (18) month prison sentence for leaking what the court in Chongqing characterizes as leaking state secrets.

Photo; Beijing Times via Leaked questions land exam writer in jail, December 18, 2008, Danwei.org).

According to the Beijing Times, on December 18, 2008, the designer of a certification exam was sentenced for a year and half for "deliberately leaking state secrets" (Beijing Times via Leaked questions land exam writer in jail, December 18, 2008, Danwei.org).

Song Fulai, a 55-year-old chief engineer at Beijing's Yicheng Municipal Engineering Company, took part in the design of the 2005 and 2006 National Construction Engineer Qualification Exam.

The court found that Song released exam questions to students in a study session he conducted in 2006 and was paid a total of 63,000 yuan. A fellow teacher received a year-long sentence that was suspended for one year (Danwei.org, 2008).

All of this actually presents the measure of Beijing’s enforcement of its infamous “Law on Guarding State Secrets” (i.e., State Secrets Law). Despite the 2010 amendment of the State Secrets Law, it continues to serve as a source of frustration for many. As earlier announced, the revised “Law on Guarding State Secrets” (i.e., State Secrets Law) went into effect on October 1, 2010. The National People’s Congress (NPC), on April 29, 2010, had earlier enacted the revised law.

The passing of the amended State Secrets Law, however, corresponded with a policy report on the Internet, which results in the amended State Secrets Law designedly intending to put in place broader and tighter controls over information stemming from the Internet and any other public information networks, notwithstanding other traditional forms of communication (HRIC | 中国人权 – 新《保密法》在当局发动全国性保密教育宣传运动中生效 / Nationwide State Secrets Education Campaign Launched as New Law Goes into Effect, October 1, 2010; M. Ulric Killion, China seeks public opinion on draft of new State Secrets Law, July 6, 2010).

The trials and tribulations of China’s “Law on Guarding State Secrets” have been many. For instance, the enforcement of the State Secrets Law associates with the Rio Tinto case (Qian Yanfeng, Employees in Rio Tinto case appeal terms, China Daily, April 8, 2010); the conviction and sentencing of Xue Feng, a U.S. geologist, to eight years in prison for buying confidential information about China’s oil industry (Theunis Bates, China Sentences US Geologist Xue Feng to 8 Years in Prison, July 5, 2010); and generally other bribery scandals in China (EO Editorial Board, EDITORIAL – The Nature of Bribery Scandals in China / 谁在播种商业贿赂恶之花, Economic Observer News, June 29, 2010).

From Song Fulai’s case, the Rio Tinto case, the trial of Liu Xiaobo, and now, again, the potential for new convictions for cheating on state exams via the State Secrets Law, we are witnessing the same problems with laws that suffer from overgeneralizations and over-broadness (i.e., the over-broadness of law) (M. Ulric Killion, China’s new censorship rules: text messaging and freedom of speech, January 18, 2010).

All of which is understandable, because laws designedly intending to extend broader and greater controls over information from the Internet and other forms of communication must necessarily compromise on issues of constitutionality, social and political legitimacy, and enforceability and efficiency in the administration of justice. For these reasons, the newly revealed instances of cheating on state exams and potential new convictions via the revised State Secrets Law may eventually serve as a certain measure of the revised State Secrets Law, especially concerning the issues of constitutionality, legitimacy, enforceability, and efficiency in the administration of justice.

This is because a recurrent theme or problem of an overgeneralized or over-broad law is that it, ultimately, never says what the “law is,”, notwithstanding legal issues such as fundamental fairness or due process of law.

China’s struggle with political freedoms and Internet freedom

2011-10-01T00:16:00.000-07:00

by M. Ulric Killion

On February 20, 2011, during “the anonymous call for a ‘jasmine revolution’ in China's major cities”, a man is arrested by police in front of Shanghai's Peace Cinema. Carlos Barria / Reuters; (Austin Ramzy, State Stamps Out Small ‘Jasmine’ Protests in China, Time Magazine, February 21, 2011).

A recent China Daily news article reported the keynote address of Wang Chen, Minister of the State Internet Information Office, at the opening of the 4th UK-China Internet Roundtable in Beijing on Sept 29, 2011. (Cao Yin and Zheng Jinran, Social network websites ‘pose a challenge’, China Daily, September 30, 2011).

The focus of Wang’s speech was the danger and/or new problems posed by social networking Internet sites such as Facebook and Twitter. According to Wang, the challenge of social networking via the Internet is that, “Many people are considering how to prevent the abuse of these networks following violent crimes that took place in some parts of the world this year” (Cao and Zheng, 2011).

A potential problem for China is that the Chinese-version of Twitter is the social networking site of Weibo, which presently enjoys a membership or enrollment of 300 million members or netizens. China’s total Internet users number more than 500 million, which, although only by innuendo, makes Weibo and its growing number of netizens a potential problem.

Further elaborating on the dangers of social networks, according to Wang, “Everyone involved should observe the law and safeguard the norms of social morality. The Internet should not be used to jeopardize the national or public interest, or the legitimate rights and interests of other citizens.”

Joining the chorus on the dangers of social networking was reportedly Xie Yungeng, a professor at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, whom also essentially agrees with Wang. Xie reportedly focused on the growing number of Internet users, especially teenagers or those young of age, turning to online and virtual worlds, thereby increasing the potential for them and/or the Internet to have a negative impact on real life (Cao and Zheng, 2011).

In all of this ceremony regarding the problems and dangers of the Internet, these spoke persons ignored the issues of freedom of choice and/or Internet freedom. Additionally, the association of the Internet with violent crimes that took place in other parts of the world (i.e., North Africa, Libya, Egypt, etc.) ignores the reality of the potential of the Internet or Internet freedom to promote democracy in action.

All of this leaves us with a reminder that what hails as the Tunisian revolution (a.k.a. “Jasmine Revolution”), which took place from December 2010 to January 2011, and ends with the ouster of longtime President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali is subject to different perspectives via different political preferences. From a Western perspective, especially Western media, the Tunisian revolution represented the struggle for better living conditions, and political freedoms such as freedom of speech, and impliedly Internet freedom.

Moreover, this is the gist of Wang’s concern with Internet freedom, especially a social network such as Weibo, which is the Internet home to about 300 million Chinese netizens. In February 2011, there were admittedly calls by activists to attempt to initiate a Chinese-version of a “Jasmine Revolution.” It was an unsuccessful call from activists, however.

As reported by the New York Times, the calls by activists did not hardly measure up to what earlier occurred in North African countries such as Tunisia and Egypt. First, the initial call by activists was for Chinese citizens to show or express their displeasure at the lack of reforms by silently meeting in front of department stores or other publics places (Ian Johnson, Calls for a ‘Jasmine Revolution’ in China Persist, The New York Times, February 23, 2011).

Secondly, and more importantly, unlike what happened in Tunisia and Egypt, during the weekend of silent meetings, China’s government “rounded up lawyers, activists and dissidents, increased online censorship and deployed massive numbers of police to quash any demonstrations” (Ramzy, 2011). Thus, putting an end to an intended “Jasmine Revolution” in China.

All of this ultimately leaves issues of greater political freedoms, democracy reforms, and Internet freedom on the back burner. In other words, earlier promises of greater democracy by many leaders remain pending, and in the far distant future.

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See also

“Eggs Under A Red Flag,” authored by Ulric Killion

2011-09-30T23:12:00.000-07:00

New Book Release!

List Price: $28.95

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Eggs Under A Red Flag

Authored by Ulric Killion

The book is a discussion about several aspects of Chinese culture. Even the title of the book, “Eggs under a Red Flag,” reflects the latter theme, because it presents an implied-query, which begs the question – so what about Chinese culture, the Chinese family system, and the Chinese people? The latter question also gives rise to a host of other issues and questions. One such issue or question is what the real stories behind the red flag are. For instance, these are the issues or questions that make us wonder why the Chinese people seem to excel in the sport of ping-pong, but not the sport of soccer; why Chinese cuisine seems to constitute an integral part of the lives of the Chinese people and their culture; why some Chinese men, officials or wealthy businessmen have second wives; and a host of other issues, questions, and stories. For these reasons, the book and its title, “Eggs under a Red Flag,” also presents the sub issue of what are the real stories behind the red flag. These are the issues, questions, and stores that actually penetrate the wall, symbol or symbolism of the red flag. Additionally, a penetration of the wall, symbol or symbolism of the red flag, inevitably reveals the real Chinese culture, Chinese family system, and Chinese people. As one source many years earlier wrote, “Young China, being wearied of the revolutionary ardors of its fathers, is going back to old China.” The latter may well be a truism because the real Chinese culture and Chinese people have always, although sometimes seemingly unrevealed or silent, stood behind the wall, symbol or symbolism of the red flag. From a Western perspective, the foregoing issues, questions, and stories also present issue of the successes of China in many facets of life, such as their successes in economics or burgeoning economic growth, and growing regional and international influence in both economics and diplomacy. This also presents issue of whether the West should learn more about Chinese culture, in order to more effectively engage China. This is because, in many of the critical aspects of life, society, politics, and economics, we ought to emulate many of China’s successes. The reasons are many such as the Chinese philosopher or Confucian Mengzi (Mencius) earlier advocating, “Rule a big country as you would fry a small fish.” Then in a more recent example, the former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew advising the United States to co-op Southeast Asian countries into its system via free trade agreements, while it has the bigger market, lest suffer the consequence of these countries drifting to China, which is where the real profits are. What all of this, at the end of the day, ultimately, says about Chinese culture is that the old is new again, as Chinese culture continues to regenerate itself throughout the generations to come. In other words, time changes, but actually nothing changes. The book explores Chinese culture, the Chinese family system, and the Chinese people.

Publication Date:

Sep 07 2011

ISBN/EAN13:

1466238178 / 9781466238176

Page Count:

180

Binding Type:

US Trade Paper

Trim Size:

5.25" x 8"

Language:

English

Color:

Black and White

Related Categories:

Social Science / Regional Studies

Eggs Under A Red Flag

The Spratly Islands Dispute – the South China Sea: China, Vietnam, and the Philippines

2011-06-24T01:28:00.001-07:00

by M. Ulric Killion

Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Philippines' Foreign Minister Albert del Rosario meet with reporters at the State Department in Washington Photo: AP. According to U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “We are concerned that recent incidents in the South China Sea could undermine peace and stability” (US ready to arm Philippines against rise of China, The Telegraph, June 23, 2011).

The dispute concerning issues of sovereignty over the South China Sea has a long history, notwithstanding the dispute over the East China Sea – the Senkaku Islands or Diaoyutai Islands (Diaoyutai Qundao). The Spratly Islands comprise about forty-five (45) islands. These islands are also occupied by military units from Vietnam, China, Taiwan, and the Philippines. There is even occupancy, though not a military occupancy, of an island by Brunei, which claims an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (i.e., the Law of the Sea) in the southeastern part of the Spratly Islands.

More recently, however, according to news media sources, the dispute presently centers on the sovereignty claims of China, Vietnam, and the Philippines.

For these claimants, the right of sovereignty symbolizes the right of access to much-needed natural resources, which includes the prize of access to potential oil and natural gas supplies. More accurately, these natural resources include fish, guano, and undermined oil and natural gas potentials.

The dispute between China and Vietnam is especially noteworthy, as both countries claim sovereignty over the Spratly archipelago (i.e., Spratly Islands). China is vehement in its stance that the claims of sovereignty by other countries to the Spratly Islands violate its sovereignty and maritime rights.

Photo / Dana Robert Dillon, U.S. Role in South China Sea Dispute, Paracel and Spratly Islands Forum, January 2008.

For this reason, Vietnam’s claim of sovereignty is noteworthy, and demonstrates the critical importance of access to natural resources. Although both Vietnam and China are communist regimes, the critical importance of access to potential natural resources still leaves them unable to resolve their differences concerning issues of sovereignty and maritime rights.

The dispute between China and Vietnam is especially interesting because, as the Oil & Gas Journal (2011) recently reported,

A subsidiary of Mitra Energy Ltd. has signed a production sharing contract with Petrovietnam Exploration Production Corp. for Block 45 on the eastern margin of the Malay-Tho-Chu basin off Vietnam.

Mitra’s subsidiary is operator with 70% interest in the block, which covers 4,677 sq km in 50 m of water 250 miles southwest of Ho Chi Minh city. Petrovietnam EP has 30% interest. The block is adjacent to Mitra’s existing PSCs on Blocks 46/07 and Block 51 in the well-established oil and gas province.

Acquisition of 270 sq km of 3D seismic was undertaken on Block 45 in April and May 2011 as part of the work program. Petrovietnam’s approval of the presignature seismic shoot allowed Mitra to take advantage of commercially attractive seismic vessel rates and optimum weather. Processing of the seismic data will take 6 months (Vietnam: Mitra gets Malay basin Block off Vietnam, Oil & Gas Journal, June 17, 2011).

Lying at the heart of this problem is that oil and natural gas exploration of the Spratley Islands is inevitable. In the search for much-needed access to oil and natural gas, while China and Vietnam are poised (i.e., resources and funding in place) to commence exploration and production, or joint E&P, the Philippines appear to be standing on the sideline as they did not take part in the earlier, though controversial, seismic survey.

File photo shows a Chinese national flag flying above structures built on stilts on Mischief Reef in the disputed Spratly Islands of the South China Sea. Hanoi normally treads carefully in its relations with its Chinese ideological ally, but the regional ambitions of its large neighbour have stoked a degree of apprehension in Vietnam. Photo / Vietnam, US display military ties amid China tension, France24, August 10, 2010.

In comparison, as early as 2006, the communist countries of Vietnam and China were even entertaining the prospect of a joint exploration and development of offshore blocks in the disputed Spratly Islands (PetroVietnam in Beijing, GlobalSecurity.org, September 13, 2006).

The Energy Tribune earlier described Beijing’s intended joint exploration and production as follows.

PetroChina holds 20 blocks in the South China Sea. They cover 127,000 square kilometers in the Qiongdongnan, Beibu Gulf, Zhongjiannan, South Weixi, and Beikang basins, some of which are subject to border disputes with Vietnam and Malaysia. The company has held back drilling plans in the Spratlys at the Huaguang Trough of the Qiongdongnan basin to avoid protest from Vietnam. China, which already battled with Vietnam in the area in 1974 and 1988, has been calling for the Spratly claimants to shelve their disputes and instead opt for joint exploration there (PetroVietnam in Beijing, Energy Tribune, September 13, 2001).

All of this, practically speaking, renders the claims of the Philippines increasingly tenuous. Then there is the issue of the United States, its support for the claims of the Philippines, and its geopolitical posturing concerning the Spratly Islands. On June 23, 2001, as news media resources reported, “The United States government is ready to provide assistance to strengthen the Philippine military, including external support for maritime defense, amidst the mounting friction with China on the disputed Spratly islands” (US ready to arm Philippines against rise of China, The Telegraph, June 23, 2011). According to U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “We are concerned that recent incidents in the South China Sea could undermine peace and stability” (The Telegraph).

Map showing disputed island groups in the South China Sea. Last week, Vietnamese foreign ministry spokeswoman Nguyen Phuong Nga denounced China for sending ships to carry out seismic studies in the Paracels zone, which "violated Vietnam's indisputable sovereignty".Photo / Vietnam, US display military ties amid China tension, France24, August 10, 2010.

A problem for the U.S. stance, geopolitical posturing, or even revival of Cold War tactics, is that both Vietnam and China are already in position to commence E&P, while the Philippines stood idle. By doing so, the Philippines are hardly in a position to seriously play catch-up on the path to E&P with either Vietnam or China.

Additionally, there is the commonality between Vietnam and China, they are communist regimes. As communist regimes, they may yet resolve their differences, and this will eventually serve to further frustrate the efforts of both the Philippines and US geopolitical posturing.

From China’s perspective, “The US is in no position to intervene as an outsider of the area,” said Xu Liping of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, adding that Washington has never before voiced such opinions. And “the issue is between China and related Southeast Asian countries, and to internationalize it (will) only make the issue more complicated” (South China Sea issues are hurt by US: Experts, China Daily/Associated Press, September 20, 2010, June).

As one source earlier observed,

Although Beijing persists in reminding all other claimant countries that the South China Sea is Chinese sovereign territory, China has been very careful about not officially demarcating its specific maritime claims. Thus, other countries can only infer China's specific claims from Beijing's statements and actions, and China retains the option to change or redefine its maritime border according to the situation (Dana Robert Dillon, U.S. Role in South China Sea Dispute, Paracel and Spratly Islands Forum, January 2008).

Moreover, it is unlikely that US hard power (i.e., military power) will resolve the current crisis of the Philippines. This is because neither the Philippines nor United States will actually employ military force in resolving this dispute. In the end, as earlier mentioned, all of this, ultimately, renders the claims of the Philippines increasingly tenuous.

_______________

Rising Tensions in the Spratly Islands – the South China Sea, and the Senkaku Islands or Diaoyu Islands (or Diaoyutai Islands) – the East China Sea

2011-06-23T18:08:00.000-07:00

Map showing disputed island groups in the South China Sea. Last week, Vietnamese foreign ministry spokeswoman Nguyen Phuong Nga denounced China for sending ships to carry out seismic studies in the Paracels zone, which "violated Vietnam's indisputable sovereignty". Photo / Vietnam, US display military ties amid China tension, France24, August 10, 2010.

The following collection of articles and essays address various aspects of the issues surrounding disputes in both the Spratly Islands – the South China Sea, and the Senkaku Islands or Diaoyu Islands (or Diaoyutai Islands) – the East China Sea.

– M. Ulric Killion

Whatever Happened to our Favorite Russian spy Anna Chapman

2011-06-17T14:25:00.001-07:00

Our favorite Russian spy Anna Chapman recently appeared in the news media. It appears that following a brief stint in the field of espionage she is now slated to serve as editor-in-chief of Venture Business News newspaper. Although it is difficult to imagine a connection, especially as a change in careers from the spy game to journalism, she will probably end up being a better journalilst than Russia spy.

-- M. Ulric Killion

_______________

The relevant news clip follows.

Anna Chapman © RIA Novosti. Ruslan Krivobok.

Russian spy Chapman to Head Business Newspaper

MOSCOW, June 1, 2011, RIA Novosti -- Anna Chapman, detained for espionage and deported from the United States last year, was appointed editor-in-chief of Venture Business News newspaper.

"I've become the chief editor. It's a small newspaper," Chapman told RIA Novosti. She admitted to have no plans yet on her future job at the newspaper.

In a statement published on the newspaper's website, Chapman promised to significantly increase the circulation and improve multimedia and the overall content produced by the newspaper.

As editor-in-chief, Chapman will be in charge of the new column Field News, discussing major events in the venture and investment business in Russia and abroad.

The former spy said she would like to head the newspaper to "promote a positive image of young entrepreneurs, innovators, and technological business managers." Otherwise, she believes, it will be difficult to create an innovation economy in Russia.

Chapman and ten other Russians were arrested in the U.S. in June 2010 on suspicion of espionage. In July, they were returned to Russia in exchange for four men accused by the Kremlin of spying for foreign intelligence services in Russia.

In October 2010, Chapman became an advisor with no fixed office hours for Fondservicebank President Alexander Volovnik. In December, she joined the Public Council of Young Guard youth movement of the United Russia party.

Starting in January, she became a TV host of REN TV's World Mysteries with Anna Chapman show.

In an interview to BBC in March, Chapman said she would like to produce 3-D TV programs and manage charity projects.

Russian spy Chapman to head business newspaper | Russia | RIA Novosti

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Costa Rica ratified FTA with China

2011-05-31T11:28:00.000-07:00

by M. Ulric Killion

Chinese dancers perform during the inauguration of the new national stadium in San Jose, the capital of Costa Rica, March 26, 2011. [Photo/Agencies]; Source: Xinhua.

China continues to make inroads into Central American and South American markets. For instance, on May 31, 2011, Costa Rica's Congress finally ratified a free trade agreement (FTA) with China, which has been pending since 2007.

The ratification evidences bilateral cooperation between the two countries, including Costa Rica’s diplomatic recognition or adherence to the “one-China policy”. As concerns the latter, Costa Rica’s diplomatic recognition came with an expensive price tag.

This is because Costa Rica’s recognition of the “one-China policy” directly relates to China earlier agreeing to purchase $300 million worth of Costa Rican bonds. The purchase presented a strong incentive for Costa Rica to shift its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China (Graham Browley, Cash Helped China Win Costa Rica’s Recognition, New York Times, September 12, 2008).

As the New York Times reported, “The deal shows that China is using its $1.8 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, the world’s largest such cache of foreign currency, to further its political goals, despite promises that it would not do so” (Browley, 2008).

More recently, there is the joint refinery project between the two countries, and also China helping Costa Rica build the new Costa Rican National Stadium. China constructed the new stadium at a cost, or perhaps more accurately a donation, of 83 million “China dollars”. (Costa Rica wishes to further cooperation with China, Xinhua, March 7, 2011; El Congreso de Costa Rica ratifica el TLC con China, EFE, 31-5-2011).

(L-R) China's National People's Congress Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee Chen Changzhi, Costa Rica's President Laura Chinchilla, and Costa Rica's former president Oscar Arias react after the ribbon-cutting ceremony to inaugurate the new national stadium in San Jose, the capital of Costa Rica, March 26, 2011. [Photo/Agencies], Source: Xinhua.

According to the terms of the FTA, 65 percent of Costa Rican products will enter China tariff-free; there will be a 29 percent tariff reduction periods of 5 years, and 2 percent in ten years, and 1 percent for 15 years, while a remaining 3 percent is excluded from the FTA.

Costa Rica also exported tariff-free immediately 63 percent of its products, a 4 percent tariff reduction is deferred for 5 years, 22 percent in ten years, 2 percent in 15 years, while 9 percent of production in China is excluded under the FTA (El Congreso de Costa Rica ratifica el TLC con China).

_______________

See also

El Congreso de Costa Rica ratifica el TLC con China, EFE, 31-5-2011 --

San José - El Congreso de Costa Rica aprobó hoy en segundo y último debate el Tratado de Libre Comercio (TLC) entre este país y China, uno de los principales acuerdos bilaterales alcanzados tras la apertura en 2007 de las relaciones diplomáticas.

El TLC fue aprobado en una votación de 32 a favor y 13 en contra, con 45 legisladores presentes de los 57 que conforman la Asamblea Legislativa, dijo el presidente del Congreso, Juan Carlos Mendoza, durante la sesión de hoy.

Algunos diputados de oposición mostraron su rechazo al TLC al presentar argumentos como que China no es un socio comercial de confianza, que produce a costos muy bajos, que viola derechos humanos y que muchos de sus estándares de calidad productiva no son de fiar.

La ministra costarricense de Comercio Exterior, Anabel González, afirmó en un comunicado que la aprobación del tratado demuestra la importancia que como país otorgan al "mejoramiento de las condiciones de vida de los costarricenses, a la generación de empleos, a la consolidación del acceso de los productos que se exportan a China".

"China constituye, sin lugar a dudas, un poderoso motor para impulsar el crecimiento de la economía mundial. Costa Rica debe ser partícipe de este proceso y aprender de la capacidad de China de transformarse y adaptarse a las necesidades del entorno", manifestó la ministra.

La presidenta costarricense, Laura Chinchilla, urgió la semana pasada a los diputados para que aprobaran el acuerdo antes del 1 de junio, con el fin de notificar a China y que el TLC entre en vigencia en ambos países el 1 de julio.

China establece dos fechas al año para la entrada en vigor de acuerdos de este tipo, el 1 de julio y el 1 de enero, pero la otra parte debe cumplir sus procedimientos internos al menos un mes antes de cualquiera de esos días.

El Tratado prevé que el 65 por ciento de los productos costarricenses ingresarán de inmediato sin aranceles a China, el 29 por ciento con plazos de desgravación de 5 años, el 2 por ciento de diez años, y el 1 por ciento de 15 años, mientras que el 3 por ciento restante fue excluido del convenio.

China exportará a Costa Rica inmediatamente sin aranceles el 63 por ciento de sus productos, 4 por ciento lo hará con plazos de desgravación de 5 años, el 22 por ciento en diez años, el 2 por ciento en 15 años, mientras que un 9 por ciento de la producción china fue excluida del Tratado.

Según datos del Ministerio de Comercio Exterior de Costa Rica, el intercambio comercial con China ascendió en 2010 a 1.274,5 millones de dólares, 13,8 % menos que los 1.478,7 millones de dólares registrados en 2009.

Costa Rica y China establecieron relaciones diplomáticas en junio de 2007 y el TLC es uno de los logros bilaterales más importantes, al igual que un proyecto de una refinería conjunta y el nuevo Estadio Nacional de Costa Rica, construido con una donación china de 83 millones de dólares.

bilaterals.org | El Congreso de Costa Rica ratifica el TLC con China

Rousseff reafirma que Suramérica es la prioridad de su política externa

2011-04-30T07:48:00.000-07:00

EFE – mié, 20 abr 2011 --

[Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff said that Brazil will focus its foreign policy on South American integration and bolstering ties with the BRICS countries in a speech last week. According to Rousseff, “There’s no room for the discord and rivalry that separated us in the past.” She was specifically addressing what she deems to be the region’s most politically and economically powerful country; referring to the countries of Latin America. -- Translation by M. Ulric Killion].

Rousseff reafirma que Suramérica es la prioridad de su política externa.

"Suramérica seguirá siendo prioridad de la política externa de mi Gobierno. Dejé clara esa prioridad al hacer en Argentina mi primer viaje al exterior", afirmó Rousseff en un discurso que pronunció en la ceremonia de conmemoración del Día del Diplomático.

"No hay espacio para las discordias y las rivalidades que nos separaron en el pasado. Los países del continente se convirtieron en valiosos socios económicos y políticos de Brasil", agregó la presidenta, que asumió su mandato el 1 de enero pasado en sustitución de Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, su mentor político.

Según la gobernante, a diferencia de otros países que sufrieron con la crisis económica mundial, los de Suramérica tuvieron el año pasado un crecimiento económico promedio del 7,2 por ciento y se convirtieron en un "polo dinámico de crecimiento mundial".

"Hoy, cuando conmemoramos veinte años de la firma del Tratado de Asunción, que creó el Mercosur, tenemos mucho a festejar. En ese período, el comercio dentro del bloque saltó desde 4.300 millones de dólares hasta 44.000 millones de dólares", afirmó.

La presidenta dijo que el Mercosur consiguió transformar una simple iniciativa de integración comercial en un modelo de integración más profundo para todos los países de la región.

Agregó que los cuatro socios originales del Mercosur (Argentina, Brasil, Paraguay y Uruguay) destacan entre las cinco economías de América Latina que más crecieron el año pasado. . . .

Rousseff reafirma que Suramérica es la prioridad de su política externa - Yahoo! Noticias

The crisis in Arab states: the political, the social, and judiciary

2011-03-26T01:08:00.000-07:00

by M. Ulric Killion

Rebel fighters gather in Ajdabiyah, Libya, where the battle against Gaddafi forces continues. Yuri Kozyrev / Noor for TIME. Even Under Allied Air Bombardment, Gaddafi Forces Outgun Rebels, by Abigail Hauslohnner/Benghazi, TIME, Mar 23, 201.

1. Growing Crises

The ongoing crises in Arab states serve as a reminder of a recent re-reading of an earlier translation by J. Harvey Lomax of Leo Strauss’ Notes on Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (1932). Despite the earlier publication date and a period corresponding to an interwar period (1918-1939), especially a distinctive interwar period of Germany and German legal theory or scholarship, the insights of both Strauss and Schmitt as set forth in this earlier writing continue to enjoy relevancy for the modern era. (“Notes on Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political”. (English trans. by J. Harvey Lomax of “Anmerkungen zu Carl Schmitt”, 1932.) In Heinrich Meier, Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss: The Hidden Dialogue, trans. J. Harvey Lomax. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1995. Reprinted in Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, ed. and trans. George Schwab. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1996, 2007).

This includes a modern relevance that extends to the onset of a new decade that is distinctively, demonstrating a growing discontent by citizens of several Arab nations; from Egypt to Yemen, and other Arab states. The Middle East, or more particularly, many Arab states are struggling with potential political upheavals that challenge the political, old institutional arrangements, and even the culture and/or ideational meanings that vested these institutional arrangements.

A case in point is a recent article written by Dr. Darius Jahanian (The first declaration of human rights in Ancient Persia, Tehran Times, February 24, 2011). In this brief writing, and in the context of Arab culture and ideations, he is essentially describing the origin of human rights. For instance, on October 4th, 539 BC, as Dr. Jahanian (2011) explained, the Persian king, Cyrus the Great, issued the first declaration of human rights in Ancient Persia. When describing the origin of the first declaration of human rights, he further writes,

One of the significant events in ancient history is the conquest of Babylon by the Persian king, Cyrus the Great. On October 4th, 539 BC, the Persian Army entered the city of Babylon, which was then the capital of the Babylonian state (in central Iraq). This was a bloodless campaign and no prisoners were taken. Later, on November 9th, King Cyrus of Persia visited the city. Babylonian history tells us that Cyrus was greeted by the people, who spread a pathway of green twigs before him as a sign of honor and peace. Cyrus greeted all Babylonians in peace and brought peace to their city.

On this great event, Cyrus issued a declaration, inscribed on a clay barrel known as Cyrus’s inscription cylinder. It was discovered in 1879 by Hormoz Rassam in Babylon and today is kept in the British Museum. Many historians have reviewed it as the first declaration of human rights.

The Babylonian annals, as well as the first section of the Cyrus’ inscription, shed light on the religiopolitical plight that had angered the people of Babylon and why they invited Cyrus’s military campaign. Evidently, the Babylonian king, Nabonidus, eliminated the festival of the New Year and Nebo (one of the gods) was not brought into the city, and Bel (another god) was not taken in the procession of the festival. Also, the worship of Marduk, the king of the gods, was changed to an abomination and Nabonidus tormented the inhabitants with unbelievable oppression and forced labor. . . .

On this historical turning point, by order of Cyrus, all the captive nationalities held as slaves for generations in Babylon were freed and the return to their homeland was financed. Among the liberated captives were 50,000 Jews held in Babylon for three generations whose return toward the rebuilding of their temple in Palestine, a policy that was followed by Darius and his successors. Some of the liberated Jews were invited to and did settle in Persia. Because of such a generous act, Cyrus has been anointed in the Bible. He is the only gentile in the Bible, who has been titled Messiah, an is mentioned explicitly as the Lord’s shepherd and his anointed (Messiah). Other references to Cyrus are attested in Isaiah where Cyrus is called by name and given a title of honor; he is also called to rebuild the God’s city and free His people and is chosen, called and brought successful by God.

What took place after the victory in Babylon was contrary to the standard of the time. . . . (Jahanian, 2011).

Jahanian’s brief writing, at least in the context of Arab culture, presents a clear example of the culture relative or even clear example of the variety of cultural or ideational meanings that associate with institutional arrangements.

In terms of the pending crises, however, presenting a distinguishable feature of the crises, the fact of Arab culture alone appears not to delimit the geographical and ideological boundaries of potential crises. Thus, it is actually the problem of a crisis that may potentially transcend the geographical and ideological boundaries of an Arab world.

The obvious result, as a potential challenge to Western presumed social goods such as democracy and liberalism, are growing crises that might engender corresponding crises in what characterizes the larger community of what Alfred Sauvy characterizes as a “Third World”, or even his reconceptualization of Abbé Sieyès’s third estate (tiers monde), which is from Sieyès classic What is the Third Estate (Qu’est-ce que le tiers-état?, 1789). More importantly, in a modern context, this larger community or modern third estate characterizes the economically, underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, Oceania, and Latin America.

In the 1950s, Sauvy, though a disputed issue, is generally credited with earlier coining the phrase “Third World”. When describing the origin of the term “Third World” and the controversy surrounding Sauvy as its originator, Leslie Wolf-Phillips wrote:

The first matter to be settled by the discussion was the origin of the term ‘Third World’. I had suggested that it appeared to have originated with Alfred Sauvy in 1952, but Worsley brushed this aside: ‘In the second edition of my The Third World (1967), I pointed out (p 302) that Claude Bourdet had used the term at least as early as April 1949 (citing John T Marcus’ Neutralism and Nationalism in France. New York: Bookman Associates, 1958, p 33). Hence, Mr Wolf-Phillips’ statement that Alfred Sauvy ‘coined’ the term in 1952 is incorrect. Who actually first coined and used it might be discoverable in Paris.’ Muni did not contest the attribution to Sauvy, but Joseph Love firmly supports it: ‘Alfred Sauvy, the French demographer and economic historian, did coin the term “Third World”. Contrary to the assertions in Peter Worsley’s article . .. John Marcus ... does not say that Claude Bourdet originated the phrase, nor does Worsley himself even say this in the second edition of his The Third World. . . Love gives the source of the term as in an article ‘Trois Mondes, une planete’ in L’Observateur (Paris) 14 August 1952, and draws attention to the book published by Sauvy’s colleagues at the Institut National des Etudes Demographiques in 1956-Le Tiers Monde: Sous-developpement et developpement—which is dedicated to Sauvy and which credits Sauvy with introducing the term ‘Third World’ (p 369). My own investigations since the 1979-80 Third World Quarterly series of articles support the original attribution to Sauvy and the exact dating by Love. (Leslie Wolf-Phillips, Why ‘Third World’?: Origin, Definition and Usage, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Oct., 1987), pp. 1311-1327).

Despite this controversy, most generally recognize Sauvy as coining the phrase, the “Third Word”. He did so when alluding to the people of the “Third Estate” or, as generally known during the French Revolution, the commoners. In his article ‘Trois Mondes, une planete’ in L’Observateur (Paris, 1952), Sauvy concluded by exclaiming, “...car enfin, ce Tiers Monde ignoré, exploité, méprisé comme le Tiers Etat, veut lui aussi, être quelque chose” [“...because at the end this ignored, exploited, scorned Third World like the Third Estate, wants to become something too”].

During the French Revolution, these commoners notably rebelled against both the priests of the First Estate and the nobles of the Second Estate. When so alluding to these commoners (or the Third Estate), Sauvy was essentially calling on the newly independent, impoverished former colonies of the world to stand up and assert their own distinctive identities.

According to Sauvy, as previously mentioned, “Like the third estate, the Third World is nothing, and wants to be something.” (Ho Kwon Ping, The silent revolution in my backyard, The Straits Times, p. A26, January 19, 2011). For many, at the 1995-Bandung Conference, Sauvy’s analogy of the third estates and former colonies, thus, his conceptualization of a Third World, would later serve as a rallying cry that results in the creation of an Afro-Asian alliance of the non-aligned (i.e., Non-Aligned Movement, NAM) (Joelien Pretorius, Non-alignment in the current world order: the impact of the rise of China, Strategic Review for Southern Africa (May 2008)).

The Non-Alignment Movement or the NAM, as Joelien Pretorius (2008) explained, seeks to challenge Western ideals and materialism. Pretorius (2008) described this “spirit of Bandung” or “non-alignment” as follows.

NAM’s priorities may have changed as global discourses, such as those characterising the Cold War era, evolved, but its purpose has largely stayed the same. This purpose is traced back to the Bandung Conference, which seeded the spirit of non-alignment among African, Asian and Middle Eastern countries and, subsequently, other ‘Third World’ countries more generally that grappled with fitting into world affairs whilst maintaining autonomy. The concept ‘Third World’ is important to form an understanding of what is meant by the ‘spirit of Bandung’ or non-alignment, which informed the Belgrade Conference in 1961 where NAM was formed. The concept ‘Third World’ has both a materialistic and an ideational/cultural meaning. In materialistic terms, Marc argues that “if the affluent industrial countries of the modern world are grouped into those of the ‘West’ and those of the ‘East’, ... then the poor countries constitute a ‘Third World’ whose small command over resources distinguishes them from both”. (8)
The ideational/cultural meaning of the term “stressed the importance of the formation of a Third World consciousness, formed by common ideas, and an awareness of a common history, in relation to the West. Thus, in some accounts the Third World has existed because it provided an identity that was important to those both inside and outside its borders” (9) (Pretorius, 2008).

For Pretorius (2008), the Non-Alignment Movement also continues to enjoy a modern relevancy. “NAM’s priorities may have changed as global discourses, such as those characterising the Cold War era, evolved, but its purpose has largely stayed the same. This purpose is traced back to the Bandung Conference, which seeded the spirit of non-alignment among African, Asian and Middle Eastern countries and, subsequently, other ‘Third World’ countries more generally that grappled with fitting into world affairs whilst maintaining autonomy” (Pretorius, 2008).

Consequently, as Pretorius (2008) still recently maintains, the “NAM’s pursuit of self-determination and independent national development still justifies the movement’s existence despite the end of the Cold War, although its agenda has been adapted according to evolving interpretations of the post-Cold War order”. Such as the new challenges that associate with what many perceive as US hegemony, the processes of globalisation, and even the rise of modern China.

In a post-Cold War era, the citizens of the world are now facing old problems with new names, but under new conditions. This is the problem of growing crises, as earlier mentioned, that may potentially transcend the geographical and ideological boundaries of an Arab world; from Egypt to Yemen, and other Arab and non-Arab states.

For example, notwithstanding a continuing challenge to Western presumed social goods, in China there is a call by “jasmine organizers” for rallies every Sunday, HRIC | 中国人权 - Jasmine Organizers Call for Rallies Every Sunday / 茉莉花组织者呼吁周日再集会, February 22, 2011). There is also the potential, though remote possibility, for similar protests in North Korea (Can the Jasmine Revolution spread to N. Korea?, The Chosun Ilbo (English Edition), February 25, 2011).

2. The Political

Leo Strauss (1932) goes to the heart of Carl Schmitt’s project when he writes:

The treatise by Schmitt serves the question of the “order of the human things” (95), that is, the question of the state. In view of the fact that in the present age the state has become more questionable than it has been for centuries or more (23 f.), understanding the state requires a radical foundation, “a simple and elementary presentation” of what the basis of the state is, which means the basis of the political; for “the concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political” (Der Begrff des Politischen. Mit einer Rede iiber das Zeitalter der Neutralisierungen und Entpolitisierungen neu herawgegeben von Carl Schmitt (Munich and Leipzig, 1932).

When summarizing the thoughts of Schmitt, as Strauss (1932) explained, “the political precedes the state”. Schmitt after considering the state in a historical context, especially in the context of Western culture and civilization, eventually reinterprets or redefines the classical meaning of the state.

Schmitt, however, distinguishably appears to maintain, as closely as practicable, an allegiance to the classical theory of the state or keeping faith with its basic tenets, while also challenging other relatively, modern interpretations of the classical theory. For instance, one could reasonably conclude that Schmitt’s theoretizations challenge the notion or meaning of the state as manifests in the writing of the French jurist and public law (le droit public) specialist Léon Duguit.

In his classic Law in the Modern State (1919) (Léon Duguit, Les Transformations du Droit Public (University of Michigan Library; Paris, 1913)), Duguit characterized the problem of the French Revolution as being attributable to the abstraction of the nation or state as a person that possesses a subjective right in the power to command, which is the classical concept (or theory) of sovereignty. He perceived this abstraction as problematic, however. This is because the classical concept or theory had rendered the personality subordinate to both the organized state and its public law (i.e., the Staatsrecht of the Germans).

Duguit also subscribed to a contagion effect of what he deems the dogma of the French Revolution, the principle of national sovereignty, or simply, the myth of national sovereignty. The dogma of the French Revolution had overturned the foundations of old monarchical Europe and inspired every political constitution of constitution-writing nations throughout the modern world.

Harold J. Laski, in his introduction to Law in the Modern State, described Duguit’s work, as especially concerning his challenge or opposition to the classic theory of the state or sovereignty, as a magistral protest. In opposition to Duguit’s thesis, however, there has always been the classical theory of the state, which generally holds that there must be some unchallengeable source of public authority or power, lest citizens will be without an effective guarantee of public order.

Nonetheless, Duguit, in his sociology of law approach, and even seemingly, though surprisingly, political rather then juristic argument, especially the problematic potential denial of the existence of rights, still urged that a useful theory of the state can only built upon the lone fact of social interdependence. From the relationships of this social interdependence, he further hypothesized a system of duties for each actor, person or individual relative to his/her respective function or functions.

In this particular respect, notwithstanding similarities to Schmitt’s decisionism, Strauss also reminds us of the critical importance of Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan (1946) to Schmitt’s theoretizations. This is because, in this context, Schmitt’s conceptualization of the political, though for many veiled amidst theorizations concerning his decisionism or decisionistic theory, is actually addressing the critical problem of social order.

Alternatively stated, Strauss, though unintentionally, is reminding us of the classical problem of society stemming from the Hobbesian problem of order (i.e., how to create a stable social order) (Hobbes, 1946). In this respect, Strauss also reveals the critical importance of Hobbes’s Leviathan, and its attendant issues of both the political and power, to Schmitt’s theoretizations (i.e., his decisionism or decisionistic theory).

There is also the issue of political turmoil, especially in the form of force or violence, as a means of democracy promotion. The contagion effect of what occurred in the Middle East begs the question of whether we are witnessing democracy in action, or simply, “mob rule” or “mobocracy “(See cf., M. Ulric Killion, Democracy on Trial: From Kyrgyzstan and “Mobocracy”, to China and “Proletariat Democracy”, April 17, 2010).

Generally speaking, it is difficult to justify “mob rule” as a tool (or means) to promote democracy. Mob rule is problematic for obvious reasons. This is because the concept of “the mob” is contra distinguishable to the ideal of democracy. In modern times, “mob rule” represents the decline rather than fostering of democracy.
The concept of “the mob”, as Jerzy Chlopecki (The Decline of the Democracy. The Mob and its leaders, Thought, Aug. 24, 2009) explained, “was introduced into the social science by Hannah Arendt. It was exactly the mob that constituted the social basis for fascism.”
Arendt’s definition or understanding of concept of “the mob” clearly challenges the idea of a modern “mob” (i.e., “the mob”) being capable of actually promoting democracy. . . .
“The mob needs an enemy to hate somebody. The mob rejects also an acknowledged and legitimate authority clearing the ground for a demagogue to appear.”
For these reasons and other reasons set forth in his short writing, Chlopecki, after first characterizing “mob rule” as “mobocracy”, contends, “The mobocracy does not derive from democracy itself, but from its decline” (Killion, 2010).

Additionally, there are, admittedly, contra distinguishable positions to this notion of “mob rule” or “mobocracy” constituting the decline rather than fostering of democracy.

In terms of the history of Western democracy or liberal democracy, there are, actually, many instances of political turmoil, in the form of force or violence, serving as a means of democracy promotion. This is because, as Larry Catá Backer, succinctly observed,

Yet the mob has played a role in democratic politics in any number of ages. From the politics of the late Roman Republic and the deployment of the mob controlled by Publius Clodius Pulcher to mass democracy and its colored revolutions. In its rightist forms it might even be said to color the current political activities of Sarah Palin and the Tea Party Movement in the United States (See Larry Catá Backer, Form and Function in Constitutionalism--Diverse Perspectives on the Kyrgyzstan Experience. Law at the End of the Day, June 6, 2010; discussing the Decree of the Provisional Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on the Referendum (Nation wide vote) on adoption of the New Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic and Draft Constitution.).

Moreover, notwithstanding issue of whether political turmoil, in the form of force or violence, represents democracy in action, in the aftermath of political turmoil there are seemingly universal dilemmas confronting new rulers, which are critical in shaping new regimes. This is because they will ultimately influence the forms and shapes of new institutional arrangements – the political, the social, and judiciary.

3. The Rulers

Then there is the relevancy of Carl Schmitt’s theoretizations to the political turmoil occurring in Arab states; from Egypt to Yemen, and other Arab states, and potentially, non-Arab states (i.e., the call for rallies by jasmine organizers in China, and possibly North Korea). Hubert Rottleuthner demonstrated Schmitt’s continuing relevancy in modern times when addressing an elemental problem confronting new rulers in the aftermath of political upheavals (Hubert Rottleuthner, Legal Positivism and National Socialism: A Contribution to a Theory of Legal Development, Vol. 12, German Law Journal, No. 1 (2011), pg. 100-114).

In the aftermath of political upheavals, this is the problem, actually, confronting the political, the social, and the judiciary. In this context, and borrowing from David Kennedy’s conceptualization of the social, or arguably perhaps even his Weberian association with the social, the social perhaps more so pertains to legal thought or theory, rather than an exclusive sociological meaning (Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal Rationality, or Max Weber’s Sociology in the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought, 55 Hastings L.J. 1031 (2004). It seems a truism that the political always stands steadfastly, more autonomous than the both the social and the judiciary.

In regards to the social as a mode of legal thought, as Duncan Kennedy (2004) explained,

The inventors of the “social” include Jhering, Ehrlich, Gierke, Gény, Saleilles, Duguit, Lambert, Josserand, Gounot, Gurvitch, Pound, and Cardozo.2 They had in common with the Marxists that they interpreted the actual regime of the will theory as an epiphenomenon in relation to a “base,” in the case of the Marxists, the capitalist economy, and in the case of the social, “society” conceived as an organism. . . .
Because the will theory was individualist, it ignored interdependence and endorsed particular legal rules that permitted anti-social behavior of many kinds. The crises of the modern factory (industrial accidents) and the urban slum (pauperization), and later the crisis of the financial markets, all derived from the failure of coherently individualist law to respond to the coherently social needs of modern conditions of interdependence. From this “is” analysis, they derived the “ought” of a reform program, one that was astonishingly successful and globalized even more effectively than classical legal thought, through many of the same mechanisms, but also because the social became the ideology of many third-world nationalist elites (Kennedy, 2004).

More importantly, in the face of growing crises in Arab states, it is the practical problem, as succinctly stated by Rottleuthner (2011), of what should be done with the old administrative apparatus, including the social and judicial apparatus, following the upheaval of the political.

Hubert Rottleuthner (2011) succinctly stated the predicament of new rulers as follows:

A fundamental problem for new rulers following political upheavals consists in deciding what should be done with the old administrative apparatus, including the judiciary. Apparently, the promulgation of new norms is not sufficient to convert the old judiciary to the new, politically desired path. Legality may be “the mode of functioning of the governmental machinery” (C. Schmitt) – but only in normal times. New rulers face the dilemma of either taking over the old personnel with their traditional attitudes and loyalties, in order to maintain social order, or to fire the unreliable personnel (which is still somewhat mild), without immediately having a substitute available, which can give rise to more or less significant disturbances of function.

Some might, admittedly, find it objectionable to find an appropriate analogy in the Weimar Republic, especially when considering the plight of new rulers in Arab states. After all, during this earlier period some, such as the German Communist Party, even denounced the Weimar republic as bourgeois and capitalistic. Then there was the threat to the very existence of the Weimar Party by what would become a Nazi Party led by Adolf Hitler. Finally, the eventual consolidation of Hitler’s power corresponded with the suspension of the Weimar Constitution and his ascendancy to the both the presidency and a dictatorship, the purging of internal rivals to the Nazi Party, and a modern totalitarian society that came complete with the persecution of both Jews and Christians (Totalitarianism 1920-1939).

Despite such objections, Rottleuthner’s earlier observations still serve as a reminder of the ongoing crises in Arab states. For example, following a military coup in Egypt, there has been a great deal of anticipation concerning what form or model of government, including judiciary, will prevail.

From a Western perspective, there is not a shortage of pundits prescribing to a theory of the success of democracy or liberal democracy. This is a viewpoint arguably reflecting an ideological longing to buttress earlier theses espousing the surrender of illiberal nations, and their attendant ideologies (i.e., ideational/cultural meanings), to more liberal-oriented ideologies and cultural meanings.

These are the theories, philosophies, and even ideologies, earlier emanating from academics and scholars such as Francis Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington, and John Mearsheimer. “After the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington, and John Mearsheimer each presented a bold vision of what the driving forces of world politics would be. The world in 2010 hardly seems on a more promising track — a reminder that simple visions, however powerful, do not hold up as reliable predictors of particular developments” (Richard K. Betts, Conflict or Cooperation? Three Visions Revisited, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2010).

Is it reasonable to suggest that Schmitt’s conceptualization of “the political” is synonymous or even near- synonymous with the “driving force of world politics”?

Richard Betts (2010) writes:

“Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slave of some defunct economist,” John Maynard Keynes once wrote. Politicians and pundits view the world through instincts and assumptions rooted in some philosopher’s Big Idea. Some ideas are old and taken for granted throughout society. For most Americans, it is the ideas of the liberal tradition, from John Locke to Woodrow Wilson, that shape their thinking about foreign policy. The sacred concepts of freedom, individualism, and cooperation are so ingrained in U.S. political culture that most people assume them to be the natural order of things, universal values that people everywhere would embrace if given the chance.
In times of change, people wonder more consciously about how the world works. . . . (Betts, 2010).

Rottleuthner (2011), though admittedly unknowingly and only by analogy, presented a practical and pragmatic solution to the previously mentioned predicament of new rulers. There is an obvious drawback to his suggestion, however, especially considering its efficacy.

This is because Rottleleuthner’s opinion concerning the predicament of new rulers, though unknowingly and only by analogy, proffers a solution to a predicament that suffers from the inherent, limitations of cultural and ideational meanings; in particular, Western culture and ideologies. This is a consequence of liberalism or liberal democracy historically, though a problematic consequence, actually prescribing Western liberalism or Western liberal democracy.

When addressing the problem of new rulers, Rottleleuther was specifically focusing on the plight of rulers for the new Weimar Republic (i.e., Weimarer Republik, 1918-1933). In resolving the predicament of new rulers, Rottleleuther observed that the new rulers, at least in the new Weimar Republic, elected to pursue the first alternative. In other words, they decided to simply take control of the entire staff of the imperial judiciary (i.e., Rottleleuthner’s first alternative --“taking over the old personnel with their traditional attitudes and loyalties”).

By doing so, and in terms of a larger picture or even a more macro perspective, various personnel and officials actually demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with the new Weimar Republic. Additionally, in this real reality of the polity, the social, and judiciary, it was cooperation prompted by the need to provide basic necessities for the people (i.e., prevent starvation); prevent civil war or strife; and prevent a victory for the Bolsheviks and occupation by others. In other words, the real reality rather than ideology was prompting cooperation. This is because, as alternatively explained by Rottleleuther (2011), “No democratic‐republican convictions were behind it.” Moreover, according to Rottleleuther,

In this connection, the history of the Weimar Republic can be reconstructed as one of permanent and unresolved tensions between the legislative and judicial powers. In view of Radbruch’s thesis what is most interesting here is the attitudes of the legal staff. For the empirical analysis of such attitudes, legal sociology has developed a varied set of instruments in recent decades (questionnaires, interviews, content analysis, etc.), especially within the framework of research on the administration of justice, many of which are not readily available in an historical inquiry” (Rottleuthner, 2011).

4. Liberal Democracy

Then there is the related relevancy, or perhaps even conditionality, of liberalism in enabling rulers to resolve a crisis (i.e., the predicament of new rulers) by practical and pragmatic solutions. Notwithstanding the eventual advent of a modern totalitarian society in Germany, which came complete with the persecution of both Jews and Christians (Totalitarianism 1920-1939). The predicament of new rulers transitioning to the new Weimar Republic and then to government by a Nazi Party led by Hitler present exemplary instances of liberalism enabling the resolution of crisis.

This is because, as Strauss (1932) observed, in an unliberal world Hobbes accomplished the founding of liberalism, while Schmitt in a liberal world undertook its critique. The theoretizations of Schmitt are, of course, distinguishable from those of Hobbes. For instance, there are their distinguishable approaches to the state of nature. “For Hobbes, it is the state of war of individuals; for Schmitt, it is the state of war of groups (especially of nations). For Hobbes, in the state of nature everyone is the enemy of everyone else; for Schmitt, all political behavior is oriented toward friend and enemy” (Strauss, 1932). Lying at the core of their theoretical distinctions is the polemical intention of Hobbes’s definition of the state of nature. Additionally, “Hobbes’s foundation for the natural-right claim to the securing of life pure and simple sets the path to the whole system of human rights in the sense of liberalism. . . .” (Strauss, 1932).

Conversely, Schmitt’s response to the state of nature, Hobbes’s polemical intentions, and Hobbes’s founding of liberalism is the presentation of an unpolemical meaning. In other words, “The position of the political results in the unpolemical description of the political. As such, the position opposes Hobbes’s polemical description of the state of nature” (Strauss, 1932). Strauss wrote:

Schmitt gives the following answer to this question: The political is a basic characteristic of human life; politics in this sense is destiny; therefore man cannot escape politics (36 f., 66f., 76 ff.). The inescapability of the political is displayed in the contradiction in which man necessarily becomes entangled if he attempts to eliminate the political. This effort has a prospect of success if and only if it becomes political; that is, if it is “strong enough to group men into friends and enemies,” if it thus “would be able to drive the pacifists into war against the nonpacifists, into a ‘war against war.’” The war against war will then be undertaken as “the definitively final war of humanity.” Such a war, however, is “necessarily especially intensive and inhuman” because in it the enemy is fought as “an inhuman monster . . . that must be not only fended off but definitively annihilated” (37). But humanity cannot be expected to be especially humane and, therefore, unpolitical after having just put behind it an especially inhumane war.

Nonetheless, and despite Schmitt’s famous, though problematic, friend and enemy categorizations, at the end of the day, Schmitt’s affirmation of the political actually affirms liberalism. This is because, as Strauss (1932) explained, Schmitt’s affirmation of the political eventually proves to be a liberalism, though with an opposite polarity. More importantly, as such, Schmitt’s statement that “the astonishingly consistent . . . systematics of liberal thought” has “still not been replaced in Europe today by any other system” (70) proves to be true (Strauss, 1932).

5. The Conclusion

In the face of political turmoil, all of this arguably presents universal conclusions about the choices of new rulers. There are also the earlier mentioned nuances, which serve to distinguish cultures and ideologies or ideations. As earlier stated, the growing crises, especially in Arab states, present a challenge to Western presumed social goods such as democracy and liberalism. Additionally, these are growing crises occurring in what, more accurately, characterizes the larger community of a Third World or Sauvy’s third estate. This is a larger community of states that characterize the economically, underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, Oceania, and Latin America.

This also demonstrates the delimiting force of shared commonalities of Western cultures and societies, such as the inherent limitations of cultural and ideational meanings, including Western liberalism and liberal democracy. Strauss’s earlier observation also begs the question of whether it is still true that liberalism, including its variant forms, has “still not been replaced in Europe today by any other system.” Given the theoretizations of modern academics and scholars (i.e., Fukuyama, Huntington, and Mearsheimer), including urgings for adoption of more liberal, more democratic polities in Arab and non-Arab states, it seems reasonable to suggest that liberalism or a variant form has not been replaced.

Moreover, in Western cultures and societies, these shared commonalities (liberalism and liberal democracy) fostered the peaceful resolution of crises confronting new rulers (i.e., Rottleleuthner’s first alternative --“taking over the old personnel with their traditional attitudes and loyalties”). Conversely, in the context of non-Western cultures and societies, there historically does not exist a link with the basic tenets of Western liberalism. Thus, the invocation of Western liberalism or liberal democracy into non-Western socio-political scenarios should hardly be conducive to promoting the peaceful resolution of crises confronting new rulers.

In other words, in anticipation of new rulers in Arab states peacefully, electing Western liberalism or liberal democracy in transition, it is difficult to conceive of a peaceful election such as a Rottleleuther-first-alternative. An observation, though sadly, that derives from the earlier mentioned, delimiting force of shared commonalities of Western cultures and societies, such as the inherent limitations of cultural and ideational meanings, including liberalism and liberal democracy. All of this will ultimately affect what form or shape the political, the social, and judiciary will take in the aftermath of political turmoil.

Happy Chinese New Year! Wish you have more money! 恭禧发财!!

2011-02-02T00:18:00.000-08:00

Photo by M. Ulric Killion, 2011-02-02 --

Happy Chinese New Year - 2011 is the Year of the Rabbit

2011-02-01T22:48:00.000-08:00

by M. Ulric Killion

Iran, oil, and nuclear weapons: Is there an ‘optimistic’ prospectus?

2011-01-26T21:48:00.000-08:00

by M. Ulric Killion

Photo/Iran denies its uranium enrichment programme is aimed at developing nuclear weapons [EPA]; Turkey hosts Iran nuclear talks - Middle East - Al Jazeera English.

In terms of the geopolitics of oil and gas, and the Islamic Republic of Iran (“Iran”), OilEdge characterized what many deem the pending crisis of Iran, and borrowing from the title of its article, as “an oil giant being held back” (Review: Iran – an oil giant being held back, OilVoice, December 8, 2010). In the opening sentence or even salvo of its article, OilEdge appropriately queries: “Is Iran about to embark upon a ‘new era’ in terms of its oil industry, as Oil Minister Masoud Mir Kazemi suggests?” In response, OilEdge speculates “possibly so.”

An Iranian government facing international sanctions begs the question of the source of OilEdge’s optimism. As OilEdge similarly observed, the fourth round of the imposition of international sanctions against Iran in June 2010 also “begs the question whether the nation is starting to feel the pinch?” These questions are relevant because there is an abundance of reasons for pessimism.

The UN Security Council Sanctions

First, and as previously mentioned, in June 2010 the UN Security Council imposed a fourth round of sanctions against Iran for refusing to curtail its nuclear programme. Adding to Iran’s problems, following UN-imposed sanctions against Iran, Western allies imposed additional, unilateral sanctions targeting Iran’s energy sector.

As for the effectiveness of these international sanctions, the varying opinions seem to routinely fall along the line of Western vs. non-Western observers. For instance, according to OilEdge (OilVoice, 2010), Undersecretary of State William Burns perceives the sanctions as dearly costing the Islamic regime, which is to the tune of $60 billion in lost energy investments. In 2010, US officials generally believed that the force of the recent sanctions would drive Iran back to the negotiating table (OilVoice, 2010).

Iran's chief negotiator, Saeed Jalili, with the EU's Catherine Ashton before the nuclear talks began in Istanbul. Photo: Salih Zeki Fazlioglu/Pool/EPA; Iran nuclear talks start in Turkey | World news | guardian.co.uk.

In fact, in January 2011, Iran did return to the negotiating table. On January 21-22, 2011, the United States and five other global powers began a new round of negotiations at the Ciragan Palace in Istanbul, Turkey, to discuss Tehran’s controversial nuclear program. The United States and the five global powers comprise the so-called G5+1 group, which are, more specifically, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council including the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France, plus Germany.

During the two-day talks, the United States and its allies typically voiced concerns that Iran is enriching uranium beyond its peaceful needs and trying to build a nuclear weapon. In response, Iran typically refused to halt its program, while maintaining that its enrichment is for civil purposes only. (Steven Erlanger, Little Progress Is Seen in Iran Talks, NY Times, January 21, 2011).

In this seemingly evolving impasse, while Western diplomats hope to persuade Iran to engage in a full-swap plan that will exchange the country’s low-enriched uranium for fuel for a research reactor, analysts opine that Iran will instead focus on pushing a general discussion on global disarmament (Iran nuclear talks start in Turkey, Guardian.co.uk, January 21, 2011).

Whether one will assess the two-day talks as a success or failure, however, seems also to routinely fall along the line of Western vs. non-Western observers. For example, Western observers and media sources generally perceived the talks as a failure. This is because Western media sources variously described the two-day talks and their potential in the language of “little hope” (See cf., “Six world powers open negotiations with Tehran with little hope of breakthrough”, Guardian.co.uk, 2011) and “little progress” (See cf., Erlanger, 2011).

Then there is the perspective of Iran and its allies. For instance, and in contradistinction, Iran, actually, described the two-day talks and their potential in a more positive language. Notwithstanding positive amenities that associate with a much-needed general discussion on global disarmament, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad perceived the talks and their potential as paving the way to both hope and progress.

As the Tehran Times (Iran-5+1 talks can yield agreement: Ahmadinejad, Tehran Times Political Desk, January 24, 2011) reported:

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has said that the future rounds of talks between Iran and the 5+1 group could yield a good agreement. He made the remarks in the northwestern city of Rasht on Sunday, in reference to the meeting between Iran and the 5+1 group (the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany) held in Istanbul on Friday and Saturday.

Iran’s Oil Industry “Before and After” Sanctions

Secondly, there is the current state or even economic health of Iran’s oil industry. This presents questions of the current state of the oil industry after four rounds of UN-imposed sanctions and attendant unilateral sanctions of Western allies.

The history of Iran’s energy sector before the imposition of UN-sanctions is one of a struggling oil economy. In terms of the geopolitics of oil and gas, especially using oil as a weapon, as early as 2005, and perhaps even earlier, Iran has been the world’s fourth-largest oil exporter and the second-largest producer in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Ulric Killion, Modern Chinese Rules of Order: Paradox of Law and Economics, 2007, Chapter 9). This is a world ranking that clearly demonstrates the potentiality of oil and gas as a weapon.

During this earlier period, however, Iran’s energy sector was far from being in good economic health, and a potential Iranian threat of using oil as a weapon would have been more bark than bite. This is because the earlier era was one of a dim energy future for Iran, and, according to analysts, a future that could potentially grow dimmer. In 2006, the projections for Iran’s oil energy were generally as follows.

According to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), by 2010, Iran’s oil production could fall short of earlier planned projections, by as much as half a million barrels per day. Gholam Hossein Nozari, director of NICO, announced, “We are not close to the 5.0 million bpd target of the fourth [five-year, from 2005 to 2010] plan.” Nozari attributes Iran’s production problems to lackluster investment in aging oil fields, because “more than 80 percent of the current total oil output is being provided from aged oil fields that need serious investment to increase production.” Despite oil production estimated at about 3.9 million barrels daily, Tehran still needs additional investments in the oil industry. According to Mohsen Yahyavi, deputy chairman of the energy committee of Iran’s parliament or majles, the oil industry needs some $100 billion investment over the next two decades. Yahyavi stated, “Oil, gas, and petrochemical projects need huge investment and we will seek domestic and international investments.” In terms of the geopolitics of oil, “More than 70% of the increase in oil demand comes from developing countries (notably China and India), which see average annual demand growth of 2.5%.” Many predict that the oil supply, which a small number of Middle East producers increasingly dominate, will peak within a decade. Countries such as Iran and Iraq have the potential to expand oil production, while Saudi Arabia remains the largest producer. A critical concern is whether non-OECD countries will make investments in increasing oil production. Non-OECD countries may choose to deliberately develop their production capacities slowly and non-responsively to an increasing global oil demand. The latter would be the consequence of either capital shortages that prohibit oil producers from investing in expanding capacities or a slower growth in OPEC oil production that drives up global oil prices (Killion, 2007).

President Barack Obama and his national security team met earlier today in the Situation Room at the White House with Undersecretary of State Bill Burns (right) as Burns departs for P5+1 (five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) talks with Iran in Geneva on Thursday (January 21, 2011).

The latter prospectus of Iran’s oil industry parallels, at least in results intended by both the UN-imposed sanctions and unilateral sanctions of Western allies, the general perception of Undersecretary of State William Burns and others that the sanctions are wrecking economic havoc on the Islamic regime, “to the tune of $60 billion in lost energy investments” (OilVoice, 2010).

The problem is that these earlier forecasts (prospectus) from 2006 are subject to the routinely, inherent limitations of drawbacks attendant to forecasts concerning all types of investments, including investments in the oil industry. This also brings us to the question of the current state or economic health of Iran’s energy sector, especially the oil industry. It is also here that we will discover the source of OilEdge’s optimism concerning Iran’s oil industry (OilVoice, 2010), an optimism that is contra distinguishable from the general perception of Undersecretary of State Burns and others.

As OilEdge (2010) earlier observed, despite UN-imposed sanctions and unilateral sanctions of Western allies, in 2010, Iran’s oil industry remains key to the Middle East and to the world at large. OilEdge (2010) described Iran’s importance to the world as follows.

Iran is already the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC) second largest oil producer, and until recently it was also the third largest producer of oil globally (before Iraq recently claimed to have taken this position, demoting Iran to fourth spot). Oil reserves in Iran were recorded at 138 billion barrels in 2009, some 10% of the world total. However, the nation’s proven oil reserves have reportedly risen by around 9% to 150.31 billion barrels this year, partly driven by new discoveries, according to the minister. Furthermore, an Iranian state energy firm announced a major discovery of around 34 billion barrels in associated oil reserves at an offshore gas field in the Gulf last month, sending Iran’s total proven reserves rising once again. Trailing only Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, Iran’s revenue from oil exports reached $69.1 billion last year.

Nonetheless, despite OilEdge’s optimism concerning Iran’s oil industry, their analysis still concedes that the UN-imposed sanctions, including unilateral sanctions of Western allies, are having a dramatic effect on Iran’s capacity to develop its energy sector. This is because the international sanctions, though they may well serve political purposes or goals, are hampering Iran’s ability to “invest in upgrading its refineries to raise gasoline output – the International Energy Agency commented in an October report” (OilVoice, 2010). Additionally, “UN and EU sanctions pose a sizeable threat to the participation of foreign firms in the oil and gas sector. Indeed, the sanctions have prompted the likes of Royal Dutch Shell, France’s Total, Italy’s Eni SpA and Norway’s to stop investing in the country” (OilVoice, 2010).

Conclusion: The “Optimistic” Prospectus

Finally, though the international sanctions are hampering the oil sector’s ability to reach its full potential, OilEdge still remains optimism in its review of Iran’s oil industry. This is because, according to OilEdge (OilVoice, 2010), “it is not all doom and gloom.” OilEdge (OilVoice, 2010) optimistically writes:

Despite the sanctions and the recent withdrawals, Iran does have a mechanism in place that is designed to prevent overseas operators from shying away. The Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act (FIPPA) provides some protection to foreign investors and allows relatively good terms for the repatriation of profits earned.

Perhaps the biggest factor holding the Iranian oil industry back is that the nation’s existing oil fields have a natural decline rate of around 13% per annum, creating a growing shout for substantial upgrading and modernisation. Investment in enhanced oil recovery is required to raise the below average recovery rates of less than 30%. To put a figure on just how loud these cries for investment are, the Iranian government has said that its oil and gas sector will need around $500 billion of investment to 2026 in order to boost production. The sooner that sanctions are lifted, the sooner this issue can be addressed head-on.