I traveled to Turkey in March, as part of a class in public diplomacy, sponsored by George Mason University's Center for World Religions, Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution.  During the trip, the class met with Syrians who were engaged in the early, non-violence movement.  We also met with Turkish officials and academics, and visited a Syrian refugee camp in Nizip, Turkey.  It was, to say the least, and interesting experience. I came to the class with boat-load of professional skepticism, and left with a much deeper appreciation of the immense complexity of the regional situation, from the geopolitical to the deeply personal perspectives. 

Pre-trip research made me realize that Syria has been in a state of conflict since 1963, and to some extent that conflict has been "spilling over" since then. Whether it was the energy and idealism of the nonviolent activists or the former members of the Fighting Vanguard who went on to be some of the most influential jihadis of the movement. These exiles and expats have been playing a long, slow game against the Assad regime since at least the 1970s, with Muslim Brotherhood members being the most prominent of the group.

My counter-jihad career began, in ernest, in 2003, during brief stint as an FBI analyst. It was there that I was introduced to former members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, and not in a good way. I'm unable to discuss the details of that experience, but my public skepticism about potential post-Assad governments is inspired by my experiences during that early period.  If you've read my blog you'll know that I'm not a fan of the MB in general, but the Syrian branch inspires a particularly acute antagonism. As a result, I rarely mention them. 

I've been in the middle of a personal Syria project for a few weeks, primarily as an effort to "find" a possible masters thesis idea. It was during this work that I came across the UK's Foreign Office correspondences accessible through the Adam Matthew Archive.  The Syrian branch of the MB is little known, especially in English.  Thomas Friedman and Robert Fisk seem to be the most prominent filters of "common" knowledge on the Syrian MB. The group's real history seems lost in the mists of Syrian instability. 

To add a little more to the short bin of English-language historical knowledge of the group, I'm reproducing some of the passages on the group from years of FO correspondence, between 1947 and 1956.  It's not much, but I suspect some of this information on a few of its early leaders is "new" to writers studying the group:

From a 25 February 1947 weekly report of political activities of the Syrian government, an account of the aftermath of a visit from Egyptian MB student rep, Mustafa Mumin: 

"In the course of conversation with the oriental secretary Muhsen Bey Barazi, head of the President's Cabinet, remarked that the President was very displeased with the Egyptian Charge d'Affaires and the members of his staff for their activities among the Ikhwan al Muslimeen, particularly in connexion with the visit of Moustafa Mu'min (representative of the university graduates of the Egyptian Moslem Brethren) when one of the sheikhs of the Syrian Ikhwan made a speech in the Omayyad Mosque violently attacking British policy over the Sudan. The sheikh in question has been informed that he will be banished if any repetition occurs and Sheikh Moustafa Sebai, President of the Syrian Ikhwan al Muslimeen, has been told by the President that the Ikhwan al Muslimeen must not interfere in matters concerning international politics. The oriental secretary took the opportunity of mentioning the forthcoming visit of the Ashigga delegation, who are due to reach Damascus in a few days to present their views on the future of the Sudan. Muhsen Barazi gave an assurance that they would not be allowed to speak in the mosques nor to cause demonstrations but said that it would be hard to prevent the press from becoming violent in view of the freedom of expression which it was the policy of the present Government to allow. The oriental secretary pointed out that it would be most unfortunate if the Ashigga representatives were able to mislead the public by a press campaign into the view that they represent anything other than a very small proportion of Sudan opinion."

Among the annual correspondences regarding Syria, the FO published biographies of notable social and political actors, "Leading personalities in Syria."  Several MB leaders show up on the list in successive years, including 1956:

"36. Dawalibi, Ma'ref

Born 1907 in Aleppo. Moslem. A lawyer. A graduate of the Syrian University, he also holds a Paris University Doctorate of Law. From 1936 to 1938 he was a member of the National Party and was active in both Aleppo and Damascus. During the war was in France at the time of the German occupation and was in close touch with the ex-Mufti Haj Amin Hussaini, Rushid Ali al Keilani and the other pro-German Arabs. Collaborated with the Vichy Government. Helped the ex-Mufti to escape from France in 1946 Elected to Parliament in 1947. he left the National Party and joined the Popular Party in 1948. Member of the Moslem Brotherhood. Elected to the Constituent Assembly in November 1949. Appointed Minister of National Economy in the Cabinet formed by Khalid al Azm on 27th December 1949. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in May 1950.

While in Cairo in April, 1950, made a statement indicating that the Arabs would prefer to become a Soviet Republic rather than be judaized as a result if American pressure. This statement caused something of a sensation and was the signal for a noisy demand in Syria, chiefly by the Moslem Brotherhood, for a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Although the statement did him harm in responsible Syrian circles it boosted his popularity among the masses. Minister of National Economv under Nazim Qudsi (q.v.), 23rd to 27th March, 1951. After the fall Hakim's (q.v.)  Government on 10th 'her he managed to form a Government. at the second attempt, on 28th November, but on 29th November its members were imprisoned by General Shishakli.  Released in April 1952. but later taken into custody again. Refused to take the oath of non-participation in politics as a civil servant (lecturer at Syrian University) and was accordingly dismissed in May 1952.  Released from prison by General Shishakli as an act of clemency in June 1953 of Shishakli was restored to his position in the university and was appointed Minister of Defence in Sabri Assali's coalition Cabinet March-June 1954 which fell partly as a result of the bad relations between Dawalibi and the army. Returned at the head of the poll for Aleppo as a Populist in the 1954 elections.

Poses as fanatic Moslem, is popular and a fair speaker. A trouble-maker, he is reputed to have Left-wing tendencies and ambitions to become President of the Republic."

"81. Mubarak, Muhamad

Born 1912 in Damascus. Sunni Moslem. Son of the late Abdul Qadir Mubarak (of Algerian origin), who was a prominent member of the Arab Academy, Damascus. Graduate of Syrian University, faculties of law, arts and sciences. Also holds a licence in literature from the Sorbonne. A teacher in the Government secondary school of Damascus, he later became an inspector of education. Leading member of the Ikhwan al Muslimeen and elected to Parliament in 1947 as their candidate. Elected to the Constituent Assembly in November 1949 as one of the candidates of the Islamic Socialist Front. Appointed Minister of Public Works in the Cabinet formed by Khalid al Azm in December 1949. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in May 1950. After Ma'ruf Dawalibi's Cairo statement in April 1950 Muhamad Mubarak, together with Shaikh Mustafa al Sibai and the rest of the Islamic Socialist Front, began publicly to advocate a rapprochement between the Arab States and the Soviet Union, and called for a treaty of friendship between Syria and the Soviet Union. They later ceased this clamour and even made statements against Communism. Allied with People's Party in 1951. Mubarak became Minister of Agriculture in Hassan Hakim's Government, August to November 1951, and in Ma'ruf Dawalibi's Government, 28th to 29th November. 1951. Imprisoned in January 1952 by General Shishakli when he and Mustafa Sibai showed signs of preparing to call out the mobs ostensibly in support of Egypt but really to upset or embarrass the regime. Officially resigned from the Brotherhood early in 1954 but this seemed to make little difference to his continuous political activity. He was persistently referred to as a Brotherhood candidate. Appointed as Syrian Minister at Tehran but, being returned for Damascus in the 1954 elections, he did not proceed."

 

"108. Sibai, Mustafa, Shaikh

Born in Horns about 1915. Moslem. Studied at Al-Azhar University, Cairo, where he was when Rashid All's rebellion took place in 1941. He was accused of having distributed a circular in Cairo calling on the Egyptian people to support the movement, was arrested by the Egyptian police and detained for some two months without trial; deported from Egypt and interned by the British authorities in Palestine at Sarafand for seven months. Repatriated to Syria, where he was again interned for two years, first at Mieh-Mieh and then at Rashaya; released early 1945, when he began to take a strong interest in the Moslem Brethren. Since 1946 he has been director of the Arab Institute in Damascus (a school run bv the Moslem Brethren). He is controller-general of the Moslem Brethren in both Svria and the Lebanon, and was one of the principal editors of El Manar newspaper, the mouthpiece of the Moslem Brethren until*its suppression in April 1949. El Manar reappeared in November 1949. Elected to the Constituent Assembly in November 194 chief representative of the newly-formed Islamic Socialist Front (= Moslem Brethren), of which he is the main spokesman. In 1950 together with Muhamad Mubarak publicly advocated a rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

Imprisoned by General Shishakli early in 1952 when he and Muhamad Mubarak showed signs of preparing to call out the mobs ostensibly in support of Egypt but really to upset or embarrass the regime. Re-elected in 1954 as Head of the Moslem Brotherhood in Syria after a split in the Brotherhood ranks had been healed during the visit to Syria in the summer of 1954 of Hudeibi, the Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood in Egypt. Did not stand in the 1954 elections for Parliament in which the Brotherhood was ostensibly neutral. Was prominent towards the end of 1954 as a consequence of the many demonstrations in Syria protesting against the attack by the Egyptian Government on the Brotherhood in Egypt. He is accused of being more interested in politics than in religion."

In October, Marianne, a French weekly, reported on the existence of two training camps in Tunisia and little government interest  in addressing the issue.  The Tunisian government denied the report.  I found a translation of the original article, excerpted below.

Meanwhile this is causing nightmares to the great Algerian neighbor. In Algiers, the border with Tunisia has become a matter of great concern. Within the space of a few weeks, two major operations have highlighted the scale of the danger. A major jihadist network from Tunisia was dismantled at Annaba. Near Tebessa, the Algerian security forces apparently found ground-to-air missiles from Libya, having passed via Tunisia, where jihadis no longer even bother to conceal themselves.

For instance, an incredible carnival of God's warriors was held in Kairouan, under Abou lyad's auspices. This man used to be one of Bin Ladin's lieutenants and organized the attack on Commander Masud in Afghanistan. He was identified recently during the attack on the US Embassy in Tunis. At Kairouan, this man convened members of Ansar Al-Charia, his jihadist group formed in 2011.  Several thousand men came from all over the country, most of them youngsters, dressed in Afghan style, with white qamis (long robes) or jeans, T-shirts, and designer trainers. The flag of the Islamic caliphate flew triumphantly, while Mokhta Jebali, president of the Tunisian Front of Islamic Organizations, declared. "People fear jihadis because our enemies have destroyed our image. But, by definition, a Muslim is a jihadi. The Prophet was the greatest mujahid." The ecstatic crowd wanted only one thing -- to reach the assigned destinations for Tunisia's mujahedin, in the North and South, Watched by to a former Guantanamo detainee, 3,000 supporters of holy war chanted: "Obama, Obama, we are Usama!" This was the slogan shouted on 14 September during the attack on the US Embassy.

In order to show that the Tunisia's youth are ready to fight, the organizers held displays of "zamaktel tounsi," a Tunisian martial art, which can now be learned at Ansar Al-Charia camps. Youngsters were fascinated by the "combatants," with camouflaged faces, demonstrating it. The recruitment drive was underway. Out in the open. "Since Ben Ali's fall, we have experienced a euphoric mood, without worrying about the Salafists," one secular intellectual complained. "We despised them and never imagined that they could pose a danger to the country. Now, here they are, trained, armed, and gathered into militias." Obsessed with the huntfor members of the former regime, Tunisians refused to see that the radical Islamists were making headway.

The first warning sign may have come from reports of the death of Imad, the youngster from Bizert, near Benghazi, during the lighting against Al-Qadhafi’s regime. "At that time," we were told by Mounir, a architecture student, "we told ourselves that he was just a young man who had died for the sake of democracy, whereas these were in fact the beginnings of a jihadist international expected to fight wherever their chief demands."

Now not a week goes by without reports that a young Tunisian has died "a martyrs death" in Syria. Young jihadis start their training in Tunisia and go on to complete their combat raining in such lands of jihad as Syria, Mali, or Libya. One sign of the times is the fact that jihadis' families are no longer regarded with disapproval. Mounir noticed this when he went to offer his condolences following the death of a childhood friend "on God's path" in Aleppo: "this modest family, at one time socially marginalized, has gained a new status and is held up as an example."

In April 2002, the FBI warned banks in northeastern states of a “physical attack”: 

"The United States government has received unsubstantiated information that unspecified terrorists are considering physical attacks against US financial institutions in the Northeast -- particularly banks -- as part of their campaign against US financial interests," the FBI said in a statement.

"While the FBI has no information about any specific plot or threats to any specific institution, out of an abundance of caution, an alert has been transmitted to law enforcement and to financial institutions."

It was the second warning of its kind made by federal officials this week. The first was prompted by an anonymous telephone call received Sunday from the Netherlands through Canada that later turned out to be a false alarm.

The alert focused on Washington and the states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont and Virginia.

The FBI said the decision to issue the alert followed was made after if consultations with the Department of Justice, the Office of Homeland Security and the Treasury Department.

Attorney General John Ashcroft explained the US government was not asking the banks to close, or urging people to stay away from them.

"We are alerting law enforcement, financial institutions, and the American people to be vigilant, and to be aware of anything that appears suspicious," he said in a statement. The attorney general said he was not aware of any specific threat to any specific financial institution.

But he pointed out that during the war against terrorism, the United States had developed numerous sources of new information and was constantly analyzing and assessing intelligence received from them.

Ashcroft did not disclose what theses sources of new information were.

But a US official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the information that prompted the warning came in part from Abu Zubaydah, the suspected chief of al Qaeda operations, who was captured in Pakistan and turned over to US authorities earlier this month.

The official emphasized, however, that the FBI was accurate in qualifying the information it had received was unsubstantiated.

US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said last week Zubaydah was "a fountain of knowledge" about al-Qaeda's operations.

Following the warning, a local news station sent a reporter into the branch office of a regional bank on K Street and interviewed the manager about the warning. That warning, like so many to follow, faded into memory. Except, perhaps, for the branch manager who had his 20 seconds of local fame, thanks in part to Abu Zubaydah.  

Then in July 2004, Pakistan arrested Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani outside of Rawalpindi, along with 15 other suspects “from Africa.” Along with the suspects, came the requisite laptops and portable drives.  Soon after the arrest, authorities recovered reconnaissance reports that made it clear that al-Qaida possessed a well-developed plot to attack “banks.”  Not your local branch, however, but major financial institutions like the World Bank. 

The Guardian reported at the time:

"This was a planning proposal in the pre-operation phase, including surveillance and plans for attacking. It was typical of a group-level operation that needs to be approved at Bin Laden's level," the source said. It is unclear whether these attacks had been approved.

The buildings apparently named as targets were the Citigroup Centre and the Stock Exchange in New York, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank buildings in Washington, and Prudential Financial's headquarters in Newark. Police in each city were searching cars and lorries approaching the buildings yesterday. In New York, the Holland tunnel, leading to Manhattan's financial district, was closed to heavy commercial vehicles.

US intelligence officials quoted in the US press say the new information shows that scouting had been done to identify security in and around these buildings; the best places for reconnaissance; how to make contact with employees who work in the buildings; traffic patterns; and locations of hospitals and police departments.

Some of the reconnaissance was extremely detailed, even including the number of pedestrians who walked past on each side of the street in a minute. Reconnaissance is thought to have been carried out over several years, both before and after the attacks of September 11 2001.

A US intelligence official told the Guardian yesterday the new information provided a "remarkable level of clarity" about al-Qaida operations.

The official, speaking anonymously, said that the new intelligence included "extensive information about activities that have taken place - about the casing and surveillance of the targets, their vulnerabilities and perceived vulnerabilities, the optimal ways to carry out an attack and to bring down buildings, types of security personnel ... it's very detailed."

The intelligence official added: "The indications are that has been a very longstanding effort on the part of al-Qaida. It dated to before September 11, and probably continues to this day."

US officials, quoted in the Washington Post, said that al-Qaida scouts had found that one of the buildings being cased had three male security guards but that only one carried a weapon. "Getting up to the higher floors is not very difficult if you go there midweek, as I did," one of the scouts reported, according to the seized computer files.

The author of those reports? Dhiren Barot, aka Issa al-Hindi.  His audience? Khalid Sheik Mohammed.  Al-Hindi had UK citizenship, and perfect jihadi credentials. Trained and indoctrinated at LeT camps in Pakistan in the 1990s, he fought Indian troops in Kashmir.  He later move on to train in al-Qaida recruits in Afghanistan.  Al-Hindi traveled to the US, recorded extensive video of Stock Exchange buildings in New York City.  In 1998, Bharot wrote Army of Madinah in Kashmir, an auto-biographical account of his time with the LeT in Kashmir.  Al-Hindi was arrested in the UK in August 2004.

In al-Hindi, we see one of the strongest connections between LeT and AQ.  However, it's not the only one.  Piece together disparate plots from the US, UK and Australia, and a broader (if still unclear) picture hints at a long-term collaborative effort between the two groups.  LeT and AQ’s relationship pre-dates 9/11, and suggests a level of cooperation that could be the primary reason AQ survived after the loss of its safe haven in 2001.  I wonder if we even considered that contingency before or immediately after the Taliban fell.  

Between 2002 and 2008, there were numerous incidence where the open source line between LeT and AQ seemed to blur.  KSM dispatched Issa al-Hindi to America to scope out “banks.”  Sajid Mir sent Willie Brigitte to Australia.  Suspects in Operation Pendennis trained in LeT camps; Hamid Hayat trained in a “militant” camp  in Pakistan for an attack on "financial institutions" in the United States.  Were these AQ plots? LeT plots? Who was behind this seemingly ongoing effort to create havoc in major western cities?  Are they still active?

Were there any operational connections between the plots? Any shared strategy?  Shared resources?   There’s also this lingering question about Abu Zubaydah and his interrogators.  How much did he know about the Banks plot? Was he evading his interrogators in April 2002?  Did they misinterpret him?  Could we have uncovered it sooner?  I doubt there are ready answers to these questions.  However, the disparity between what we knew in 2002 and what we discovered in 2004 will always bother me.  It represents a dangerous gap in knowledge that may have led to an major terrorist attack had it not been for Ghailani's arrest.  

Despite billions of dollars thrown at our intelligence community, we're still relying on luck.

In May 2009, Abu Abdullah Ahmed, leader of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) then newly-established "political committee" ("Comité Médiatique" in the French release), sat down for an interview with AQIM’s media wing, al-Andalus Media.  The interview leads with a question on the foundation of the "political committee," but then moves into a discussion of the group’s experiences during its transition from GSPC to AQIM.  It’s brief, and not very detailed, but it may also be one of the only first-hand insights into what it means to become al-Qaida.

[Please note: the formatting is mine; the translation is not.  For a different translation, go here.  For the video itself...go to http://www.youtube.com/user/aqsa988]

Question 2: Nowadays two years have passed since your organization joined Al-Qaida. What are your achievements during this period of time? What is your assessment of the development of the battle between you and your enemies internally and externally?

[Ahmed] "Yes two years or more have passed since the joining. These two years were a blessing to us. Praise be to God¨ the most significant achievement is that we took the battle from its domestic framework to its regional dimension and its international affiliation after the radical change of the international policy which is in the alliance of the war on Islam whichcannot be confronted through the domestic struggle. The organization has melted in the global jihad order. The Islamic Maghreb front has become the front of the comprehensive confrontations against the global Crusader alliance in the Islamic Maghreb. In addition to this great achievement¨ there are many other achievements. On the military level, we attacked the enemy on its own ground and crushed its arrogance. Every day, the lions of the lofty Atlantic are dealing to the enemy one crushing defeat after another.

"On the political level, the organization obtained the support of the ummah in the Islamic Maghreb. The vital evidence is that the young men from our neighboring countries are coming to the land of steadfastness and jihad in Algeria while the apostate regimes are suffering from a suffocating isolation among the public circles.

"Anyhow, the project is still in its very beginning and it needs the contribution of the sincere people of knowledge and experts to meet the ambitions of our loved ummah that is looking forward to recovering its leading role to save humanity from the corruption of the man-made methodologies and the greediness of the usurper capitalism which came to its end and led the world to the abyss.

Question 3: Recently, there are some people who cast doubt on the group's change from being a state group -- Salafi Group -- to a regional organization; the Al-Qa'ida in the Land of Islamic Maghreb. They said that it is just a formal change that does not exceed the change of the name. What is your response to these doubts?

[Ahmed] "Yes, actually we hear some people reiterating such false words which are refuted by reality and logic. The mujahidin perspective of the struggle now is different from theirs before. Their strategy which they carry out now after drafting it in the first meeting is not the same strategy practiced by the Salafi Group. Even the field tactical means, the objectives list, and priorities are not the same at all. Moreover, the leadership structure of the organization now is no longer the previous one since we introduced our immigrant brothers from the Islamic Maghreb countries into the Shura Council of the organization which was not the case 14 years ago. These are four important differences that can refute these doubting arguments. The fair observer of the jihadist march during the days of the Salafi Group and the phase of joining [Al-Qa'ida] till today realizes clearly that there is a radical change which is not denied but by a spiteful, stubborn, or ignorant person who was befooled by the enemies' delusions.

"Herein, there is a very important point that must be addressed; namely, the first ones to put forth these doubts were the apostates in Algeria. They are still insistent on confirming this claim through their official statements and through their media trumpets in some of the intelligence newspapers. Furthermore, we were informed by reliable sources that the apostates issued instructions to newspapers, forcing them to use the old name; the Salafi Group for Call and Combat, while covering the news of the mujahidin. "Many biased journalists implemented the desires of the apostates although this completely contradicts journalism. Otherwise, how come they give a jihad ist organization a name different from its official and announced name? This is only to please the Ministry of Interior. Is this not an abominable charlatanism and collusion to deceive public opinion?

"In fact, the apostates realize the scale of sympathy that the Islamic ummah have for the organization after joining Al-Qa'ida. They also realize how grave the organization of Al-Qa'ida in the Land of Islamic Maghreb with the current name and new strategy and, therefore, they are unsuccessfully trying to cast this doubt and continue to impose the old name upon the media as a desperate attempt to water down the dilemma that befell them out of a clear sky while they were unprepared for it.

Question 4: Does the policy of the Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb fall in line with the general strategy of the mother organization, or is it independent?

[Ahmed] "O brother! Islam, with its grandeur, liberates the minds and the bodies, and jihad engenders creativity and inventiveness. Al-Qa'ida is a faculty of jihad and a source of inspiration. He who cannot assimilate these dimensions, cannot understand the methodology of Al-Qa'ida, which has become today, by the grace of God, like a good tree whose root is in the land of pride, Khorasan - Afghanistan - and whose branches reach the entirety of the land of Islam, to cast shadow everyday over more and more Muslims, and burn the infidels and the hypocrites, until it purges the whole lands of Islam, from Andalusia to China.

"Answering your question, I say: Since we are part of the Al-Qa'ida, it is normal that our policy is part of it, complements and supports it, and goes in line with it. All the mujahidin, in all places, espouse one policy and have cohesive stances, which are not conflicting, praise be to God. The secret is that they are founded on the same ground and derived from the same sources, namely [God's] Book and the Prophetic tradition, following the approach of the pious ancestors.

"Nevertheless, there could be a margin available for independency, when dealing with issues and specifics of a particular society or country, however, this should not be considered an evidence of disagreement with the general strategy and the overall guidelines of the mother organization.

Question 5: How do you explain the ever-increasing voices of some of the critics who insist that your organization goes up against the directions of the mother Al-Qa'ida organization, as it focuses on the internal enemy [Algerian forces]? Some of your antagonists even claim that Shaykh Usama Bin-Ladin, in person, is not pleased with your strategy?

[Ahmed] "Dear brother, this is mere falsehood and fabrication that fall under the heated campaign waged against us by some hireling writers. The notion of separating between the internal enemy and the foreign enemy, amid the international campaign against Islam, is unfounded. In theory, infidelity is one religion; but, on the practical level, the issue is subjected to other military and strategic factors, among others. The mujahidin in the Islamic Maghreb get the honor to fight both the internal and the foreign enemies, according to the specificity of their countries and their reality. As to our esteemed amir, the lion of Islam, Shaykh Usama Bin-Ladin, may God preserve him, we have the advantage of his backing and support, and we challenge any of those who claim that our Shaykh is not pleased with our policies, to give us a single word proving the verity of their claim."