• Quantum technologies provide a huge opportunity for the UK, which could become a global leader in a market predicted to be worth over £90 billion in the next decade.
• The National Graphene Institute has discovered the world’s purest silicon, and now researchers are working to use these pure samples as prototype quantum computers.
• To secure the UK’s place as a future quantum superpower, the government must continue to invest in: R&D, training, commercialisation of innovation, and in building and maintaining infrastructure.

Quantum technologies today 

Quantum physics is already key for our everyday technologies. Innovations such as semiconductor chips, which are essential for our phones and computers, are built upon quantum effects. Such technologies underpin our present ‘information age’ and we are now seeing the emergence of a new generation of technologies going beyond these, where the nature of the ‘information’ itself obeys the laws of quantum physics, often referred to as Quantum 2.0. 

Quantum technologies maximise the use of quantum effects in information processing to harness tremendous advantages, offering enhanced sensing and imaging, secure communications, novel materials, new tests of fundamental physics, and a profoundly novel and efficient form of computation. The potential applications span across the sciences and beyond, presenting both fantastic opportunities –  including greater medical diagnostic power and accelerated pharmaceutical drug discovery –  alongside immense risks and implications for national security, such as robust navigation, unbreakable encryption for secure communication, and faster decryption for codebreaking purposes. 

From the outset, the UK has been at the front of quantum technologies research. From the inception of quantum, scientists based in the UK have made many of the groundbreaking discoveries at the heart of the field. The Government established the National Quantum Technologies Programme (NQTP) in 2013, which supports valuable innovation and commercial initiatives such as the national ‘Quantum Hubs’ and the National Quantum Computing Centre. Published in 2023, the UK now has a National Quantum Strategy with five key missions. UK researchers remain at the forefront of quantum technologies research, and the UK is home to a vast number of quantum technologies start-ups. 

At present, we are seeing the realisation of proof-of-concept devices, from sensing to computing, and are now on the cusp of practical applications of some of these technologies. Beyond research capabilities and dedicated start-ups, we are now seeing significant investment from venture capitalists and major players in the technology industry, such as Google and Microsoft. Yet, there remain many obstacles to overcome before the full potential and benefits of quantum technologies are realised, from fundamental algorithmic design, through significant engineering challenges, to ensuring a capable quantum workforce.

Quantum at The University of Manchester 

From the breakthrough discovery of Graphene in 2010, to the establishment of the National Graphene Institute (NGI), The University of Manchester continues to boast a strong pedigree in 2D materials research. Research from The University of Manchester has discovered the world’s purest silicon; such freedom from impurities provides an excellent platform for engineering qubits, the fundamental building blocks of quantum computers. A major focus of ongoing research is in scaling up this purification process and furthering the use of these samples as prototype quantum computers. 

Systems theory – that is, how we model the interactions between a system and its surroundings – is a further strength. Not only can this help us in the design of viable hardware for quantum technologies, but it also gives us a clearer picture of the noise effects that plague and limit the capabilities of current quantum computers. With more sophisticated models of this noise, we can learn both how to mitigate against it and how to harness it for beneficial applications in complex systems modelling, such as weather, climate, and traffic. 

Research from The University of Manchester is also exploring how photons – the elementary unit of light – can be used to create and probe quantum phenomena. Hosted at the Photon Science Institute, these experiments build tools to generate, control and detect light down to the single photon level, and use light to control matter for the development of quantum sensors and observe microscopic processes at extreme length and time scales. 

The establishment of the new Centre for Quantum Science and Engineering (CQSE) at The University of Manchester aims to ensure that quantum research strengths work to boost synergistic connections, furthering our status as a prime venue for quantum research, attracting and training key talent in the field, and placing us in a leading role in bringing forth the new quantum technological frontier. 

Securing UK quantum leadership  

The proposed benefits of quantum technologies have been predicted to stimulate a global market in excess of tens of billions GBP, with the economic benefits of quantum computing alone in the region of £1 trillion. Present investment in the field, though substantial, still pales in comparison to these numbers. With the UK now on the brink of practical quantum advantages – particularly in terms of timekeeping, imaging, and sensing – there remain theoretical and engineering challenges to realising the full potential of quantum technologies, and their powerful applications. Like the industrial revolution, the quantum revolution will not be a singular point, but a constant period of rapid innovation and development. To ensure continued UK quantum leadership throughout, we must continue to invest in advancing cutting-edge quantum research and development (R&D). 

The UK needs a quantum-ready workforce, not just for developing future quantum technologies, but also to ensure these are used to their full potential in practice. This means building an effective training pipeline, not just for quantum scientists, but also for end users of quantum technologies more broadly. Quantum as a field is all too often presented as mysterious and incomprehensible for non-experts, creating a perceived high entry barrier. To combat this, support is needed for the development of training programmes designed to demystify and simplify quantum technologies for non-scientists, and the introduction of quantum modules into digital technologies upskilling programmes. Such training will create the necessary quantum-literate workers for the UK to be a leading quantum era economy. 

The UK National Quantum Technologies Progamme (NQTP) is a £1 billion dynamic collaboration between industry, academia and government. The NQTP supports five quantum hubs, each championing key domains within quantum technologies – such as quantum computing (QCI3) and sensing and imaging (QuSIT) – acting as beacons for their respective areas. To further the impact of the programme, regional quantum hubs should be created to focus on initiatives that cross quantum specialisations and combine the breadth of expertise from the domain-based hubs, supporting local research networks to pool expertise and resources. The N8 group of Northern universities currently runs semi-annual ‘Northern Quantum Meetings’ for research dissemination and collaboration formation, and agreements exist between these universities for quantum technologies research infrastructure. New regional cross-quantum hubs should be established, building on this blueprint, and should bring in key players in the Northern quantum industry, such as IBM Quantum and PsiQuantum in Daresbury and Aegiq in Sheffield. In line with both missions set out in the NQTP, and plans for economic and regional growth as laid out by the Starmer Government, the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) should work collaboratively with the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) to establish a Northern Quantum Powerhouse Hub to further unify, co-ordinate, and grow such activities to solidify the North – and the UK’s – quantum leadership. 

The UK’s Quantum Missions set out an ambitious vision for UK quantum leadership. Realised, this will place the UK as one of the world’s future quantum superpowers, but this requires continued investment: in R&D, people and training, commercialisation of innovation, and in building and maintaining infrastructure.  

With the necessary investment and approach, the UK has the potential to become a leading nation of the forthcoming quantum revolution, capturing great benefits for society, industry, and national security. 

• The staggered rollout of UC between 2013 and 2018 is associated with worsening population mental health and higher mental health-related healthcare use.
• By 2018, this equated to around 113,000 additional cases of depression, 30,000 extra mental health-related hospital admissions and attendances, and 1.29 million more antidepressant prescriptions each year, with combined annual costs of £2.84 billion.
• Proposed reforms to welfare spending must consider the wider health impact, with provisions to mitigate and avoid replicating the effects of UC.

Universal Credit (UC) was introduced to simplify the benefits system and strengthen work incentives. It replaced six means-tested benefits with a single monthly payment, alongside a digital-first application process, a minimum five-week wait for the first payment, and a unified system of work-search requirements. It now supports over 7.5 million people, more than 18% of the UK’s working-age population.

Yet welfare design is not only about employment and public spending. It also shapes health. The level, timing and conditions of financial support influence income security, stress, and people’s ability to manage work and daily life. Simplification and clearer work incentives can support employment, and good work is often good for health. But where support creates instability or financial strain, it can have the opposite effect. Welfare policy therefore has direct implications for demand on NHS services.

Our research links the rollout of UC across England to worsening population mental health and rising mental health-related use of NHS services. This matters now. The Government’s Get Britain Working agenda aims to reduce economic inactivity, and reshape employment support and health-related benefits. But if welfare delivery increases stress and mental ill-health, it risks weakening progress on employment while adding avoidable pressure to the NHS.

How did UC rollout affect mental health?

The staggered rollout of UC across England from 2013 to 2018 meant different areas were exposed at different times. This allowed us to compare outcomes before and after UC was introduced in each area.

Using national small-area administrative data, we tracked three outcomes: clinical diagnoses of depression, antidepressant prescribing, and mental health-related hospital admissions and attendances. Because the data cover entire neighbourhoods, the results capture population-wide impacts, including both direct effects on UC recipients and wider spillovers within households and communities.

We found that earlier exposure to UC was associated with worse mental health outcomes. At a national scale, by 2018, this translated to approximately:

• 113,742 additional depression cases per year.
• 29,993 additional mental health-related hospital admissions and attendances per year.
• 29 million additional antidepressant prescriptions per year.

Overall, the combined effects on healthcare and quality of life amounted to £2.84 billion in costs each year. These are not small side effects. They represent substantial downstream pressure on the NHS and significant costs borne by individuals, families and communities.

Why did this happen?

The patterns we observe are consistent with a simple pathway: financial strain and uncertainty increase the risk of mental ill-health, which in turn increases healthcare use and can make it harder to sustain employment.

Several design features of UC may contribute to this dynamic.

First, the start of a claim can be financially destabilising. A minimum five-week wait for the first payments, combined with deductions to repay advances can create sustained cash-flow pressures.

Second, administrative demands can create barriers. The digital-first claims process and complex evidence requirements may lead to delays, confusion and anxiety, particularly for people with limited digital access or literacy.

Third, UC formalised and intensified conditionality. With some exceptions under the Work Capability Assessment, claimants are expected to meet agreed work-search or work-preparation commitments, often for up to 35 hours per week, with the risk of sanctions if requirements are not met. While designed to encourage labour market participation, these expectations may be particularly difficult for people with fluctuating health conditions or emerging mental health problems who are not adequately supported.

These pressures may create a feedback loop. Policies intended to strengthen work incentives may, for some groups, increase stress and worsen mental health, making it harder to find and keep work.

This matters because mental ill-health carries large personal, social and economic costs. Long-term sickness is now a major driver of economic inactivity in the UK. If welfare design contributes to worsening mental health, it could widen existing health inequalities and work against wider policy goals on sustained employment and reduced pressure on NHS services.

Proposed reforms to health-related benefits further underscore the stakes. Recent modelling suggests that tightening eligibility for Personal Independence Payments could concentrate financial losses in more deprived constituencies and in areas with lower life expectancy. If reforms reduce support in places with the greatest health needs, there is a risk of widening inequalities and increasing demand on NHS services.

Policy implications: putting health at the centre of welfare reform

The Government’s reform agenda recognises the need to connect employment support with health support. Our findings highlight several considerations for policymakers as welfare reforms continue to evolve:

1. Reducing hardship at the start of a claim. Shortening or bridging the wait for the first payment, minimising avoidable delays, and reviewing deduction practices could reduce acute financial strain.
2. Conditionality may need to be carefully rebalanced for people at risk of poor health outcomes. Strengthening clinically informed safeguards and ensuring work-search expectations are realistic where mental health vulnerability exists may help reduce harm. The Pathways to Work model stresses flexible, tailored support for people with health conditions – adaptive conditionality is a key element of this.
3. Designing welfare systems for accessibility and dignity. Expanding supported non-digital routes and simplifying processes could reduce administrative stress for vulnerable claimants.
4. Integrating welfare and health support locally. Stronger links between welfare services and health support may help identify and assist people experiencing mental health difficulties earlier, particularly through local partnerships. This should build on the WorkWell initiative, connecting welfare services with social prescribers, counsellors, and mental healthcare providers.
5. Considering health impacts more systematically in welfare policy appraisal. Reforms are often evaluated primarily on employment and fiscal outcomes, but they can also have significant implications for population health and NHS use.

As Parliament considers reforms to health-related benefits and employment support, it is important that these wider system effects are considered. If financial losses are concentrated in more deprived, less healthy places, there is a real risk of increasing health inequalities and demand on already stretched NHS services.

A broader lesson

UC will remain central to the UK social security system and to any strategy to “Get Britain Working”. But welfare reform can carry a hidden health and healthcare bill.

If delivery choices increase stress and mental ill-health, the NHS will feel the consequences, and employment goals may become harder to achieve. Welfare policy is therefore labour market policy and public health policy at the same time, and recognising this connection is essential if we are to build a system that supports economic participation while protecting population wellbeing. The WorkWell initiative is a positive start, linking employment support with physical and mental health services for those living with illness or disabilities – but the same support must be made available for all welfare claimants. Work is widely recognised as a social determinant of health. Now policymakers must give the same recognition to the pathways to work.

• The current funding model for general practices in England includes a weighted component, based on registered patients’ age and gender, among other factors.
• However, this formula has not been updated since 2004, and was based on data from a small number of practices.
• A new formula uses richer, more recent data, combined with new weighting criteria, to more closely reflect the needs of patients.

General practices in England are funded through a mixed payment system. Around 60% of payments are based on the number of patients registered with a practice, weighted by their needs (weighted capitation). Other payments are based on the services delivered, either by volume, or by quality on a range of indicators, while additional payments support operations, such as for premises or IT.

The weighted capitation component is informed by the Global Sum formula (also known as the Carr-Hill formula), which seeks to predict practices’ workload through measures of population needs. It also adjusts for the costs of providing services in different locations, such as those with high prices, or rural areas. The formula has not been updated since 2004, and there are long-standing concerns that it does not adequately reflect current needs, particularly those of practices in more deprived areas.

The 10 Year Health Plan for England committed to a review of “how health need is reflected in nationally determined contracts”, including Carr-Hill. This review was launched in October 2025 and is currently ongoing.

An updated workload formula accounting for morbidity

A key element of Carr-Hill is the workload weights, estimated using patient data from under 5% of general practices in 2004. Workload was defined as appointment time with patients of different general practice professionals. It considered only age, gender, new registration, and whether the appointment took place at home or in a nursing home. A separate area-level adjustment was applied based on rates of long-standing illness and under-65 mortality in the local areas. Despite attempts to revise it and more recent formulae used for allocations, the formula used for practice payments has not been updated for over 20 years.

Our research at The University of Manchester proposes an updated, refined approach to calculate workload weights using more recent, nationally-representative patient-level data from electronic health records, which now cover over 20% of patients and general practices in England. Workload weights were generated based on patients’ age; gender; new registration; ethnicity; deprivation; and long-term conditions (LTCs), such as diabetes, asthma, or arthritis.

The use of richer data from electronic records allowed us to separate variations attributable to patients’ and practices’ characteristics, and to estimate workload driven by patients’ need characteristics. One advantage is that the updated measure of workload would be needs-based and not reflect differences in practice capacity and productivity.

We found estimated workload increases with age, deprivation, and for patients with LTCs. The inclusion of LTCs increases workload differentiation between patients, adding weight to younger patients in less deprived areas and older patients in more deprived areas. It also better reflects, on average, the higher needs of practices serving patients in more deprived areas.

Comparing updated to Carr-Hill workload weights

We obtained updated needs-based estimates of workload for each general practice in England, using weights from the updated formula and publicly available data on the number and characteristics of patients in each practice in 2024. For each practice we acquired a measure of “weighted-patient” – derived from the latest practice data and the updated weights – summarising the needs-based workload per average patient relative to the national average. The average payment per-patient per-year, excluding the cost-adjustment for differential input prices across different areas (also called Market Forces Factor, MFF), was £92.66, varying from £86.72 in the least deprived decile to £99.91 in the most deprived.

Weighting payments to account for different health needs leads to a slight reduction in these figures, ranging from £89.69 in the least deprived decile, to £96.40 in the most deprived. This suggests that current payments per-patient are relatively higher for practices serving patients in more deprived areas, even after adjusting for needs reflected in workload.

Carr-Hill weighted-patients were on average higher than the updated ones for practices serving patients in more deprived areas. This was likely driven by the separate area-level adjustments for long-standing illness and under-65 mortality. We attempted to isolate the workload component of Carr-Hill by removing the MFF component, though we could not remove the cost adjustment for rurality. The Carr-Hill weight on practices serving populations in more deprived areas was even higher after removing the MFF.

Comparisons of average weighted-patient by practice deprivation decile

Adapted from paper.

Aligning payments to updated workload weights

It is possible to uplift payments per weighted-patient to the level of better funded practices to rebalance the distribution without reducing payments for any of the practices. This would require additional funding. For example, it would require approximately £10 per-patient – or £678 million in total – to uplift payments to the level of the 10% best funded practices in 2023/24 (an increase of 11% in the total capitation payments in that year).

Average payment per-patient by practice deprivation decile under different uplift scenarios (2023/24)

Adapted from paper.

Policy implications

The core principle of needs-based capitation is the distribution of payments in proportion to patient need. The Carr-Hill formula is outdated and does not reflect needs accurately.

The workload weights of the general practice formula should be replaced with a version which can be routinely updated to reflect changing needs and accounts for a richer set of patient characteristics, ensuring that practices are better resourced for the populations they serve. Our updated estimates provide a more precise and differentiated measure, reflecting higher workload for practices serving patients with higher levels of morbidity and in more deprived areas. National primary care electronic records should be made accessible and used to continue routinely improving workload estimates.

Remaining concerns about under-funding of practices in deprived areas should be considered separately. For example, they could be addressed by adjustments to other elements of the formula, such as a re-evaluation of the MFF adjustment or separate adjustments to account for specific additional needs associated with deprivation. Moreover, if the objective was to increase resources for practices serving populations in more deprived areas, the distribution of the remaining non-capitation payments could also be re-considered. It is likely that any changes to the formula will require additional funding, because simply redistributing existing resources may lead to a reduction in care in some areas, and can be practically unfeasible.

A modern health system depends on funding models that can keep pace with the changing needs of its population. Our evidence shows Carr‑Hill no longer reflects the realities of morbidity, deprivation, and patient complexity across general practices. Using richer, nationally representative electronic health records offers a more accurate and equitable basis for allocating resources, particularly for practices serving communities with higher levels of long‑term conditions and deprivation. Yet an improved formula cannot, on its own, resolve persistent under‑funding in deprived areas; this will require parallel reconsideration of other components, as well as a willingness to invest additional resources where they are most needed. As the government’s review progresses, the adoption of an updated, data‑driven approach to workload estimation offers a critical opportunity: to ensure primary care funding aligns more closely with patient need, and ultimately to strengthen the fairness, sustainability, and effectiveness of general practice across England.

Statement of conflict of interest

This project was supported by the Health Foundation (FR-0006010). This project concluded prior to the launch of the government review into the GP funding formula in October 2025.

The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily the funders of the original or subsequent research.

The co-authors of this research, who also contributed to this article, are: Dr Shaolin Wang, Dr Yiu-Shing Lau, Dr Michael Anderson, Professor Evan Kontopantelis, and Professor Matt Sutton.

• Two women a week are killed in England and Wales by a current or ex male partner.
• Evidence shows that faith-based organisations (FBOs) can play a vital role in supporting women, particularly those from ethnic minority backgrounds.
• Policymakers should build on this by ensuring FBOs are integrated into domestic violence and abuse strategies and pathways.

Domestic violence and abuse (DVA) is a pervasive public health issue affecting over one-third of women globally. In the UK, ethnic minority women face unique and compounded barriers to disclosing abuse and accessing support services. These barriers can be compounded by immigration status. Despite policy advancements, these women often remain underserved due to systemic, cultural, and institutional challenges. Faith-based organisations (FBOs) and community networks emerge as pivotal, yet underutilised, support systems for all women, particularly for women from migrant and ethnic minority backgrounds who have a faith affiliation.

Barriers to disclosure

Research from The University of Manchester found that women with insecure immigration status or those dependent on their partners for residency are often deterred from seeking help due to fear of deportation, destitution, or losing custody of their children. This fear is exacerbated when both the victim and perpetrator are subject to immigration control.

Furthermore, socialisation from countries of birth and subsequent acculturation within the UK were also found to be significant barriers to domestic abuse disclosure among migrant and ethnic minority women, as gendered norms, expectations of family privacy, stigma, and mistrust of statutory systems are often reinforced rather than alleviated through the migration and settlement process.

The role of faith-based organisations

In the absence of extended family, women often form surrogate support networks through religious or community affiliations, which can be leveraged for intervention. Research at The University of Manchester shows that FBOs and community leaders are often the first point of contact for women experiencing abuse. These organisations provide culturally familiar and trusted spaces for disclosure.

New research with women from the Nigerian diaspora in the UK shows that FBOs can serve as both a resource, and a barrier in themselves. FBOs played a crucial role for women suffering DVA from an intimate partner, providing moral and spiritual support. For women who had moved from a collectivist culture in Nigeria to a largely individualistic one in the UK, FBOs and faith leaders were a source of trusted support and one of the first places women turned for help. However, this reliance on FBOs could sometimes constrain women’s ability to seek formal help, with moral counsel sometimes framed through the lens of religious teaching that maintaining a marriage was the most important priority – though other faith leaders advised that nobody should be compelled to stay in an abusive relationship.

Similarly, FBOs may lack the training or resources to respond effectively, and their involvement is not systematically integrated into statutory service frameworks. Faith leaders acknowledged their lack of awareness of existing DVA services, with one leader saying:

“If I know more about what social services and other organisations do, it will help lessen my own burdens in terms of knowing where to refer people to…”

Other leaders expressed a desire for more information and training around DVA to enhance their knowledge.

Policy implications and recommendations

During the COVID pandemic, FBOs were essential frontline services, often acting in partnership with local authorities to provide foodbanks and information-sharing networks. Local authorities and devolved mayoral authorities should now build on these spontaneous collaborations to integrate faith-based and community organisations into existing DVA response frameworks. FBOs and ethnic community groups need recognition from local and devolved government as frontline responders in DVA cases. Training, funding, and formal referral pathways should be provided to enable these organisations to support victims effectively.

The 2025 VAWG Strategy highlights the important role of the VCSE sector in shaping and delivering VAWG strategies – FBOs are an important part of this as trusted cultural institutions with a diversity of experiences. While in the longer-term an updated VAWG strategy should adopt an intersectional policy framework, in the short- to medium-term, it is vital that local policymakers recognise the compounded vulnerabilities faced by ethnic minority women and adapt interventions accordingly by building on what already works to help them access existing services.

The Ministry for Housing, Communities, and Local Government should set out parameters for working together between statutory/social services and FBOs. As part of this, local and combined authorities should develop local partnerships between statutory services and FBOs to build trust and improve service uptake. Cultural competency must be enhanced in statutory services, through mandatory cultural sensitivity and anti-discrimination training for frontline workers in police, healthcare, and social services. Community liaison officers or cultural mediators should be employed to bridge gaps between services and ethnic minority communities.

By acknowledging the central role of faith, community, and immigration dynamics, policymakers at all levels can design more inclusive, effective, and equitable interventions. Strengthening partnerships with FBOs, enhancing cultural competency, and removing systemic barriers are essential steps toward ensuring that all women – regardless of background – can access the support they need to live free from violence, while reducing the health inequalities gap by improving access to health and social care systems.

• Most software still relies on insecure foundations, making systems, infrastructure, and data increasingly exposed to cybersecurity threats and supply-chain attacks.
• Researchers at The University of Manchester are advancing software compartmentalisation by breaking applications into isolated components to contain attacks.
• Governments and industry should promote compartmentalisation through updated cybersecurity frameworks and training programs to help move security from reactive fixes to proactive, design-based solutions.

Today many aspects of our lives rely on computer systems, and recent breaches show that the level of cyber resilience is not where it needs to be. Strengthening cybersecurity is essential to protect economies and critical infrastructures, as well as personal and business data from evolving threats. In 2025, supply-chain attacks represent one of the fastest-growing cybersecurity threats: they proliferate because software is increasingly composed of diverse components with varying levels of security and trustworthiness. The widespread use of memory-unsafe programming languages is another prominent issue, resulting in a range of well-known and common coding errors that malicious actors routinely exploit. According to cybersecurity agencies from the UK, US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, 70%+ of software still relies on memory-unsafe languages. Addressing these threats requires changes in common software engineering practices.

What is software compartmentalisation?

Software compartmentalisation is a defensive programming practice in which an application is broken down into isolated pieces (compartments) communicating through well-defined and secured channels. This differs from other protections by assuming that vulnerabilities are always a possibility: an attacker taking over part of the application through a vulnerability will be confined to the containing compartment, limiting the damage they can cause to the rest of the application. Compartmentalisation has proven its efficiency at containing many forms of attacks and is more relevant than ever in the context of increasing concerns about software supply chains attacks and memory safety. Although this practice has been known for over twenty years, it is currently only deployed in a handful of specific production software examples.

If it works, why hasn’t compartmentalisation reached the mainstream?

Research at The University of Manchester has found that the engineering costs required to implement or retrofit software compartmentalisation are too high. These costs, as well as the security benefits of compartmentalising, are also hard to predict and measure, discouraging prospective developers. Also, current approaches to compartmentalisation lack flexibility, due to the highly diverse security and performance requirements of modern hardware and software. Finally, significant challenges lie in retrofitting compartmentalisation into the billions of lines of existing software code, something that requires a high degree of automation.

Our research has made progress tackling certain parts of these challenges. We proposed FlexOS, which is an operating system designed with flexible compartmentalisation in mind, composed of components that can be isolated at configurable granularities (adjustable levels of detail and scope), via a range of hardware protection mechanisms, with various data sharing strategies and further optional software protections.

On testing, we found that adapting FlexOS – with a further microprocessor designed to enhance the security benefits of compartmentalisation – reduced the performance and engineering costs.

We also studied the problem of securing cross-compartment interfaces when compartmentalisation is retrofitted in legacy software – an issue vastly overlooked by past compartmentalisation research. Our research has also shown there is no agreed definition of the field of software compartmentalisation among academic and professional communities, resulting in research output falling short of what compartmentalisation really needs to be reach the mainstream. To tackle this, we have characterised and classified more than 200 research works into an organised knowledge base – a paper that evaluates, systematises, and contextualises existing knowledge – on the topic of compartmentalisation. The outcome is a unified model providing a framework for defining, understanding, and implementing this practice.

A future for compartmentalisation?

Compartmentalisation can play a key role in the much-needed shift from reactive to proactive software security, and aligns well with the recent recommendations made by the National Semiconductor Strategy regarding security by design, computer systems memory safety, supply chain security, among others. There is a role for policymakers to play to help bring compartmentalisation to the mainstream and unlock its safety benefits for a broader range of applications.

Much of the expertise in the field lies in academia, however the security problems compartmentalisation can address occur in the industrial and public sectors. That gap can only be bridged by strong collaborations between academic, industry and public actors, and lessons for future collaborations can be learnt from the Digital Security by Design programme, that successfully integrated several years of compartmentalisation research within industry products. Our software compartmentalisation framework should be integrated into an updated Cyber Assessment Framework – a collection of cyber security guidance for organisations that play a vital role in the day-to-day life of the UK. This would help increase awareness outside of academia about compartmentalisation, and the security issues it addresses.

Training in compartmentalisation needs to be developed, presenting concretely what this practice involves, how to apply it, and what its costs and benefits are. These materials should target different actors with variable degrees of expertise, for example developers, system administrators, and government (for example intelligence agencies such as GCHQ). This training can be implemented by developing professional development certifications and government-backed learning resources to encourage its use.

An interesting starting point would be to explore how compartmentalisation can be related to emerging methods used to consider the safety of integrated software components, for example the Software Bill Of Materials. This is an often-cited tool which lists the component parts and software dependencies of a software package and is designed to help vendors and developers better understand the open source and third-party components it may contain.

The development of standard methods to report identified vulnerabilities should also be encouraged, along with a classification of high-level compartmentalisation vulnerabilities categories. In line with the research objectives listed above, we also need the development and use of standard metrics to assess, compare, and estimate the costs/benefits of compartmentalisation.

The use of compartmentalisation can be encouraged further by pushing for minimum requirements based on these standard metrics for software used in various settings, and should be introduced in government departments, starting with teams working with particularly sensitive data.

Software compartmentalisation has shown itself to be highly efficient in the fight against modern cyber threats, yet this practice remains little known and underused. This needs to change, urgently.

• Children who read for pleasure regularly achieve higher attainment across subjects and show stronger wellbeing outcomes.
• Despite strong international reading test performance, the enjoyment of reading among children in England continues to decline.
• Policy should treat reading for pleasure as a core educational entitlement supported through schools, libraries, early years settings and families.

A growing gap between reading attainment and reading enjoyment

Reading is widely recognised as a foundation of educational success. Over the past decade, policy in England has prioritised early reading attainment through structured phonics instruction and national assessment. These policies have contributed to improvements in decoding outcomes and international comparisons of reading performance.

While reading for pleasure is referenced within the National Curriculum, which states that pupils should develop the habit of reading widely and often for both pleasure and information, there is comparatively little policy guidance or structural support to help schools embed it in practice.

As a result, its implementation often depends on individual schools or teachers rather than being supported as a consistent national priority. Evidence submitted to the UK Parliament Education Select Committee’s Reading for Pleasure Inquiry highlights how this gap leaves schools navigating reading engagement without consistent national support. It also suggests that improved test scores have not been matched by positive attitudes towards reading. Survey data show a steady decline in children’s enjoyment of reading and in the proportion who read daily in their free time.

Reading for pleasure is strongly associated with educational outcomes. Longitudinal research shows that children who read regularly for enjoyment make greater progress in vocabulary, writing and mathematics even when socioeconomic background is taken into account. Reading frequently exposes children to a wider range of language, ideas and knowledge than formal instruction alone can provide.

Literacy success is therefore not driven by technical reading skills alone. Children who see themselves as readers are more likely to read voluntarily, choose more challenging texts and develop stronger comprehension over time. Yet current education policy tends to prioritise what is easiest to measure, such as decoding and comprehension, rather than the motivational and cultural dimensions of reading that sustain literacy over the long term.

Reading motivation is shaped by culture, identity and access

Reading for pleasure is shaped by social and cultural contexts as well as individual ability. Children’s motivation to read is influenced by whether reading is visible, valued and socially meaningful in their environments.

In schools where teachers talk about books, read aloud regularly and create time for voluntary reading, pupils are more likely to see reading as an enjoyable and shared activity. Professional development that strengthens teachers’ knowledge of children’s literature can play an important role in building classroom reading cultures.

Access to books is equally critical. Children are more likely to read when they can choose texts that reflect their interests, cultures and identities. A wide range of formats, including graphic novels, picturebooks, poetry and audiobooks, can also increase accessibility for emerging readers and children with special educational needs. However, access to reading materials remains uneven. Many schools lack dedicated budgets for libraries or book collections, and reductions in public library provision have disproportionately affected disadvantaged communities. Children from lower-income families are also less likely to own books at home.

These disparities matter because reading for pleasure is not evenly distributed across the population. Enjoyment of reading declines with age and varies across socioeconomic background, language background and special educational needs. Children who face the greatest structural barriers to accessing books are often those who would benefit most from sustained opportunities to read for pleasure.

Reading for pleasure is a policy issue, not a classroom extra

Despite strong evidence, reading for pleasure often remains marginal in policy discussions. It is frequently framed as an optional enrichment activity or something that will naturally follow once children have mastered reading skills. In reality, reading motivation develops within social and institutional contexts. Schools, libraries, families and community organisations all contribute to children’s reading cultures.

Where these systems work together, reading becomes part of everyday life. Where they do not, opportunities to read shrink.

Improving reading engagement, therefore, requires coordinated policy action across multiple sectors. Treating reading for pleasure as a whole-system issue rather than a classroom initiative would allow policymakers to address the structural conditions that shape children’s reading lives.

Policy priorities for rebuilding reading cultures

A renewed approach to reading policy should recognise that literacy development and reading enjoyment are mutually reinforcing.

• Recognise reading for pleasure as a core literacy outcome. The Department for Education should ensure that national literacy policy explicitly includes reading enjoyment alongside decoding and comprehension. Monitoring children’s attitudes towards reading can help identify whether literacy improvements are sustainable over time.
• Invest in school libraries and book access. School libraries are vital infrastructure for reading engagement, yet provision remains inconsistent. Ring-fenced funding for school libraries and trained librarians would help ensure that all children can access diverse and high-quality reading materials regardless of where they live.
• Support teachers as reading role models. Professional development that strengthens teachers’ knowledge of children’s literature can help build classroom reading cultures and position teachers as visible reading role models.
• Strengthen links between schools, libraries and communities. Public libraries remain essential for equitable access to books and reading spaces. Partnerships between schools, libraries and family hubs can help sustain local reading cultures. Local authorities play a key role in coordinating these partnerships, providing funding and shared spaces, promoting equitable access, and supporting community outreach to ensure all families can engage with reading.
• Prioritise sustainable, reading-for-pleasure-focused approaches. Existing reading volunteer models often place financial (e.g. DBS costs) and practical burdens on schools and tend to support book-banded reading rather than reading for pleasure. Alternative initiatives could be reading dogs or intergenerational reading partnerships. Where book donation schemes are promoted, they should be structured around children’s literature expert curated lists to ensure quality and reduce workload for schools.
• Start early – The foundations for reading engagement are established well before formal schooling. Policies that support shared reading in early childhood through early years settings, health visitors and family hubs can help children develop positive reading identities from the start. Partnerships with publishers can also be useful here. If DfE establishes these partnerships, publishers could provide schools with books in government brokered partnerships.
• Develop an evidence-informed national reading policy and guidance. Clear national guidance should include curated, diverse text recommendations to support schools’ reading provision. This should be developed in collaboration with expert organisations.

A long-term investment in educational equity

Reading for pleasure is one of the strongest predictors of educational success available to policymakers. It is relatively low cost and benefits children across academic, social and emotional domains. Enjoyment of reading cannot be mandated. Instead, it develops in cultures where books are accessible, reading is socially valued, and children are given time and agency to read.

If England is serious about improving literacy and narrowing educational inequalities, reading for pleasure should be treated as a central component of education policy rather than a peripheral one.

• The transition to 6G creates challenges around spectrum allocation, infrastructure demands, energy consumption, and risks of widening the digital divide.  
• Research led by The University of Manchester explores advanced access techniques, signal processing, and energy-efficient network designs to improve spectrum efficiency and reduce environmental impact.
• Policymakers must act early to allocate new spectrum bands and incentivise energy-efficient technologies to ensure equitable nationwide 6G access through targeted regulation and investment. 

This future network will not merely be an evolution of 5G; the vision is a foundational platform capable of supporting truly immersive experiences like holographic communication, pervasive artificial intelligence (AI) integration, and advanced applications supporting diverse sectors from healthcare and manufacturing to transportation and environmental monitoring.

Given the long lead times required for policy development, spectrum allocation (allocating specific frequency bands for the different services), and infrastructure deployment, it is crucial for policymakers and regulatory bodies to engage now, to shape 6G’s development and ensure it serves social and economic goals effectively.

Getting from spectrum to society

The advent of 6G brings with it a unique set of challenges and opportunities. The sheer scale of expected data traffic and the need for ultra-high reliability necessitates access to vast amounts of radio frequency spectrum. 6G is anticipated to utilise much higher frequency bands, including sub-THz and THz frequencies (a kind of ‘superfast lane’ of wireless, ranging from roughly 100 GHz to 10 THz), which are currently largely unexplored, underutilised, and lack clear regulatory frameworks. Establishing how these bands will be allocated, licensed, and managed globally and nationally is a fundamental task that requires urgent attention to prevent bottlenecks and ensure efficient use.

Deploying networks capable of delivering 6G’s promises may involve new infrastructures requiring significant investment, potentially impacting urban planning and raising concerns about aesthetics and environmental footprint. The integration of AI into the network architecture introduces complex questions around data privacy, security, algorithmic bias, and network control that fall squarely within the regulatory domain. There is also the critical challenge of ensuring that the benefits of 6G are accessible to all, bridging rather than widening the digital divide, and supporting a diverse range of innovative use cases safely and effectively. Proactive policy is needed to guide investment, foster competition, ensure security, and establish the necessary legal and ethical guidelines for this advanced technological era.

At The University of Manchester, research that sheds a vital light on the technical feasibility and potential implementation strategies for the underpinning of these advanced 6G networks is taking place. Already, this research has made significant contributions to the understanding and application of advanced multiple access techniques, such as Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access (NOMA). These findings are highly relevant to policy discussions around spectrum efficiency (how well you’re using the available radio frequencies), as NOMA explores ways for multiple users to share the same frequency and time resources simultaneously. This means potentially increasing network capacity and accommodating the massive connectivity demands of 6G, without requiring equally vast amounts of new spectrum. Similarly, research in areas like advanced signal processing and interference management is crucial for realising the potential of exploiting higher frequency bands like sub-THz, where signals behave differently, and interference is a complex challenge. Providing insights into how sophisticated signal processing algorithms can overcome these technical hurdles will enable the effective integration of sensing (detecting information) and communication at extremely high data rates.

Our research is also exploring energy-efficient network architectures and novel transmission techniques, directly addressing concerns around the environmental impact of vastly expanded network infrastructure. In combination, these research areas provide critical data and theoretical frameworks that can inform regulatory decisions on spectrum access, network deployment strategies, and performance standards by demonstrating what is technically achievable and how network resources can be optimised for efficiency and capacity.

Shaping 6G through proactive policies

Shaping 6G through proactive policies Based on the evolving technical landscape of wireless communications, several key policy recommendations emerge for the successful and beneficial development of 6G.

Regarding spectrum allocation and management, The Office of Communications (Ofcom) must prioritise the identification and clearing of sub-THz and THz frequency bands for future mobile use. Drawing from research on advanced spectrum sharing techniques, flexible and dynamic spectrum management frameworks should be developed, in partnership between Ofcom and The Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), with input from both industry and academia. These frameworks should enable more efficient use of both new and existing spectrum resources, reducing wastage and working with legacy systems and other services, moving beyond rigid, exclusive licensing models where appropriate.

The ambitious target proposed for 6G is that it should have a 100 times greater energy efficiency compared to 5G, meaning 6G must transmit significantly more data for the same amount of energy. Sustainability needs to be deeply integrated into the design of 6G from the outset and incorporating intelligent network management which is able to adapt the network resources to traffic demands, putting unused components into sleep modes and even turning off entire cells during low-traffic periods, will be necessary. For such ambitious targets to be achieved, there is a role for government to incentivise the telecommunications industry to adopt and deploy green communication technologies and low-energy network architectures to significantly reduce power consumption.

Targets, efficiency, policies and ways forward

A multi-pronged approach using a combination of incentives and disincentives is likely to be effective. These could include policies such as reduced corporation tax, or enhanced capital allowance in proportion to their investments into more energy-efficiency approaches or equipment, grants and subsidies in the form of direct funding for relevant research and development, with additional market incentives such as green bonds and carbon credits. As for disincentives, these could include setting stricter limits on energy consumption, carbon taxes, and tying licensing and renewals to certain energy efficiency requirements.

Setting clear, ambitious targets for energy efficiency and potentially supporting research and pilot projects in areas like energy-neutral network nodes could drive the development and adoption of sustainable 6G infrastructure aligned with net-zero emission goals.

To ensure digital inclusion and accessibility, government must implement proactive policies to guarantee equitable 6G rollout across urban, rural, and underserved areas, preventing the exacerbation of the digital divide. This could involve targeted subsidies for infrastructure deployment in commercially challenging areas, mandates for infrastructure sharing among operators, and promoting public-private partnerships. Universal service obligations should be updated to define and ensure access to high-speed 6G connectivity as a baseline, supported by policies to promote affordability for all citizens.

Concerning use-case specific regulations, recognising that 6G will enable transformative applications, policymakers and regulators need to establish cross-sector dialogues and develop agile regulatory frameworks. For airborne platforms like unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and high-altitude platform systems (HAPS) integrated into communication networks, coordination with aviation safety and airspace management bodies is paramount.

For critical ultra-reliable, low-latency (quick response time) services such as remote surgery and autonomous vehicles, new performance guarantees, certification processes, and liability frameworks must be developed in collaboration with relevant industry and safety bodies. For smart city infrastructure, urban planning policies need to evolve to facilitate the dense deployment of smart technology, ensuring seamless and efficient urban connectivity while addressing privacy and security concerns.

The transition to 6G presents immense potential for technological advancement and for society. Realising this potential requires proactive and informed policy and regulatory action to be taken. By understanding the technical underpinnings through ongoing research, particularly in crucial areas like spectrum utilisation and energy efficiency, policymakers can develop frameworks that facilitate innovation, ensure equitable access, prioritise sustainability, and enable the safe and effective deployment of transformative applications that 6G promises to deliver.

Ignoring these challenges now means risking the UK’s ability to seize the opportunities and avoid the pitfalls in the coming 6G era.

• Britain’s strength lies in its advanced research capabilities; however, turning these strengths into industrial capacity will require sustained momentum.
• Researchers at The University of Manchester’s National Graphene Institutedemonstrate the specialised research and development capability the strategy seeks to harness.
• The UK must commit to a sustained, well‑funded national strategy, prioritising domestic fabrication and stronger support for heterogeneous integration.

The strategy acknowledges that the world runs on chips, that the supply chain is fragile (such as the automotive industry grinding to a halt following chip shortages), and that relying too heavily on manufacturing hubs in potentially volatile regions is risky business. It also avoids delusions of grandeur, acknowledging that pouring tens of billions into building massive state-of-the-art silicon factories to compete with global giants was never realistic for the UK.

Instead, the strategy focuses on Britain’s genuine strengths: world-class chip design and intellectual property, cutting-edge research in our universities, and a particular knack for advanced ‘compound’ semiconductors, which are used in things like radar and high-efficiency power electronics.

The plan promises action: up to £1 billion over a decade (a figure that looked modest even in 2023 compared to US and EU spending), an advisory panel, better access to design tools and prototyping for start-ups, and efforts to boost skills and protect our technology from falling into the wrong hands through the National Security and Investment Act.

However, now the question is one of momentum. Is the UK decisively carving out its niche in compound semiconductors and next-generation design? A strategy document alone doesn’t build an industry or secure a supply chain. It needs relentless drive, a faster funding rollout, and perhaps a bolder ambition backing those niche strengths.

Britain has the brains and the heritage in semiconductor innovation, and the government’s strategy provides a map. Now it needs to put its foot down and drive, ensuring this smart focus translates into tangible industrial success and national resilience before the global landscape shifts again. The silicon clock is ticking.

Building a blueprint for more secure computing

The UK’s National Semiconductor Strategy acknowledges that we can’t outspend global giants on mass silicon fabrication. We do, however, have opportunities for research and development. The University of Manchester, with facilities like the National Graphene Institute and expertise in areas such as advanced chip design and compound semiconductors, represents the sort of specialised R&D capability the strategy rightly champions.

Fundamental hardware decisions echo through our entire digital lives, and radical shifts in architecture are possible, and indeed necessary, to meet evolving demands – whether for performance, energy efficiency, or, critically today, security.

The semiconductor strategy also highlights the security risks inherent in semiconductor technology. My work on the Digital Security by Design (DSbD) initiative took a different approach, one that directly addresses a core pillar of the strategy: protecting the UK against security risks. We championed the CHERI principles – Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions – which build security into the processor’s instruction set, the basic language the hardware speaks. It provides fine-grained memory protection, making devastating vulnerabilities like buffer overflows, which hackers have exploited for decades, practically impossible at the hardware level. We built the prototype Morello board, a tangible demonstration of this.

The technology works and is deployable. It is possible to run existing code, often with just a recompile, on CHERI-enabled hardware and instantly eliminate vast swathes of security flaws. This isn’t just about preventing attacks; it’s about reducing the colossal burden of patching, freeing up developers, and ultimately building more trustworthy systems – essential if the UK wants to lead in critical technologies.

However, proving the technology works is only half the battle. The strategy and a recently published UK Government policy statement correctly identified market dynamics as a challenge, and we now face the critical hurdle of adoption. Concerted action is needed to signal that secure-by-design hardware isn’t a ‘nice-to-have’ but an essential requirement.

Foundational change is possible, and we have a viable blueprint through semiconductors for a more secure digital future, one that aligns perfectly with the UK’s strategic goals. We’ve demonstrated the UK’s capacity for deep-tech innovation in semiconductors. Now, we need the collective will to translate that blueprint into the bedrock of our digital infrastructure. The National Semiconductor Strategy provided the map; it’s time to accelerate the journey, something the government’s funding can support.

Building on strong foundations

The UK’s National Semiconductor Strategy correctly identifies the nation’s strengths and the right direction of travel. However, to protect and truly capitalise growth around these advantages, and build a resilient and thriving semiconductor ecosystem, a more decisive, robust, and integrated approach is now essential.

The bedrock of the UK’s current semiconductor expertise, from the foundational principles of DSbD to the advanced capabilities in compound semiconductors, lies within our universities and research institutions. These are engines of innovation, training grounds for future talent, and the source of the intellectual property that underpins our strategic advantage. Yet, this vital sector of higher education research is facing significant headwinds, and the financial model which leaves universities increasingly reliant on project-based funding is inherently precarious. Despite the mechanisms put in place post-Brexit, collaborative research with EU counterparts continues to face challenges, hindering the free flow of knowledge and expertise.

What is heterogenous integration, and how can it help?

While the focus on compound semiconductors is a valuable starting point, the Government’s support for design capability must embrace a broader vision centred on heterogeneous integration. This means actively promoting research and development into methods and technologies that allow for the seamless integration of diverse semiconductor components and technologies from different design groups into a single device. This includes combining the power management through compound semiconductors, the high-speed communication and novel computation capabilities of photonics, and the intelligence and control offered by traditional silicon-based digital designs.

By strategically investing in research that fosters this synergistic combination, the UK can achieve significant advancements and develop highly differentiated, competitive semiconductor solutions. This approach would also protect and scale specialist businesses, preventing their inevitable integration into large international companies, as happened previously when specialist IP businesses were absorbed by mega-businesses capable of producing today’s leading chips.

The UK Government should invest in a national mainstream fabrication facility focused on immersion DUV lithography. This should be capable of producing the predominant chips used by UK business and academic research, at around the 65nm to 28nm scale. This would mitigate supply-chain shocks by providing a UK source of critical chips over the bulk international sources. It would also support research and innovation, particularly in support of heterogeneous integration, by providing a platform for developing advanced semiconductor solutions that combine compound semiconductors, photonics, and traditional silicon-based designs.

Critically, this capability could unlock economically viable academic research, especially for integrating leading-edge AI chiplet-based technologies, while also supporting evolving concepts such as cryoCMOS (Complementary Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor) technology. This is designed to operate at cryogenic temperatures, typically near or below -269°C, which is particularly relevant in the field of quantum computing, where many components require extremely low temperatures to function, essential for unlocking the potential of quantum computing and its integration with classical semiconductor-based computing. This investment would also stimulate economic growth, create high-value jobs, and foster the development of a skilled workforce in the UK semiconductor industry.

A sustained approach and strategy

Semiconductor research, especially for design prototyping and implementation analysis, dictates non-typical innovation cycles and does not align with current funding arrangements. Maintaining critical research knowledge and experience is essential to realise impact and advance innovation. A sustained approach doesn’t just prevent loss – it creates a robust foundation for cumulative experience and innovation, allowing insights from one project to directly inform and accelerate the next. This will therefore secure a decisive competitive advantage in a rapidly evolving sector of research while also increasing the attractiveness of UK-based research activities over those available in the EU and beyond.

By implementing these recommendations, the Government can move beyond simply having a smart focus, to delivering a truly impactful and resilient semiconductor strategy. The UK possesses the intellectual capital and the innovative spirit. Now, it needs the sustained investment, a secure academic research sector, and strategic support to translate that potential into tangible industrial success and secure its place at the forefront of the global semiconductor landscape.

The time for decisive action is now.

• The new Policing White Paper commits to a wide range of reforms and improvements to policing. Delivery is reliant on enormous predicted -but unmapped and unproven- cashable savings (£350m from procurement reform) and capacity gains (6 million hours freed up by AI alone).
• Research from The Productivity Institute at The University of Manchester warns that technology only delivers productivity gains when it solves the right bottlenecks — a condition the White Paper cannot currently guarantee.
• A four-point roadmap is identified to strengthen the foundations that the White Paper needs to succeed.

Overhaul and reform

Our submission to the Public Accounts Committee, drawing on The Productivity Institute’s research into police productivity and public sector innovation, warns that the government’s plans must account for two economic realities:

First, technology and reform only improve productivity if they genuinely resolve bottlenecks in the delivery chain. If applied elsewhere, they may simply add cost. For example, consider a police force where the lack of capacity to process seized mobile phones and laptops is a constraint. Adding hundreds of neighbourhood officers without expanding the ability to process these additional devices will not improve public safety. In fact, it may degrade it — more officers mean more arrests and more devices feeding into the same bottleneck, creating longer queues for victims and suspects.

Second, technology rarely delivers immediate gains. Forces must divert time and money into retraining staff, integrating new systems with legacy infrastructure, and resolving the inevitable issues that follow any major change in equipment or software Only once those costs are absorbed does performance begin to recover and eventually improve. Economists call this pattern the “Productivity J-Curve”, because overall productivity is at first negatively affected by the new technology, until enough complementary assets are deployed to make the technology work as intended. For a service already operating on strained budgets and depleted reserves, that dip is not a minor inconvenience. It is a period of serious vulnerability to premature budget cuts that the White Paper currently makes no provision for.

Recommendation 1: Collect Quarterly Bottleneck Reports

The proposed Police Performance Framework may promise greater accountability, but accountability is only meaningful if underperformance can be accurately diagnosed. The Public Accounts Committee warns that the Home Office currently lacks the data to do this.

Part of the problem lies in the limits of what data are being collected. A decline in output metrics like arrest rates can show that a force is struggling but provide limited insight as to why.

To resolve this, the Home Office should mandate quarterly Bottleneck Reports from Deputy Chief Constables. These concise statements would identify the specific operational constraints that local leadership judge to be most detrimental. Whether the primary blockage lies in Crown Prosecution Service delays or legacy IT failures, identifying these bottlenecks provides the context missing from raw quantitative data. This would allow the Government to effectively target its interventions rather than applying generic solutions to specific local problems.

Recommendation 2: Systematically Collect Data on Internal Capabilities

Technology does not drive productivity on its own. What matters is whether a force actually knows how to identify the right problems, choose the right solutions, and embed them in everyday practice. The skills that an organisation uses to do this also determine whether a force can successfully navigate the J-Curve or simply get stuck with the costs without ever reaping the benefits. Our recent research which reviewed the academic literature on innovation and public sector management, identified twelve foundational capabilities that determine whether an organisation can make this transition successfully – five that a single leadership team can build directly, and seven that require collective action across the sector as a whole.

The White Paper’s National Workforce Strategy will still leave the Home Office without visibility on which forces possess these capabilities. It should therefore systematically audit forces against this framework. Additionally, the Home Office should establish a confidential reporting channel for managers to flag where progress is impeded by cultural or structural weaknesses. To prevent gaming, this data must not be used for operational or HR decisions. It should serve exclusively to map capability gaps.

Recommendation 3: Keep Innovation Separate from Operations

The government proposes to merge the College of Policing’s strategic services into a new National Police Service alongside the National Crime Agency’s operational services. This is a serious mistake.

Innovation culture and operational police culture can pull in opposite directions. Effective knowledge creation requires tolerance for failure, flat hierarchies, and rigorous experimentation. These are precisely the qualities that high-stakes and high-pressure operational environments squeeze out. Fold the College into a national operational force and its knowledge-building function will likely be the first casualty when a crisis hits — not necessarily because of malice or managerial incompetence, but because of the ordinary logic of institutional prioritisation.

The government must therefore maintain innovation support as a structurally distinct function with its own governance, accountability structures, and a protected budget well above the 0.2 per cent currently allocated to the College of Policing.

Recommendation 4: Incentivising the Transition

The funding formula review offers an opportunity to redesign the incentives that drive police leadership. The new formula must align financial rewards with the behaviours required for productivity growth.

The Home Office should reward management teams that successfully increase organisational capability or provide insightful Bottleneck Reports. Forces that feel penalised for transparency will simply conceal problems rather than surface them, undermining the diagnostic value of the framework entirely. Shifting incentives toward capability building would therefore encourage the transparency and long-term thinking the Committee found lacking.

Navigating towards safer streets

The government’s Safer Streets mission is ambitious, and the White Paper provides many of the necessary architectural changes needed to achieve it. However, the evidence provided by the Public Accounts Committee shows that the foundations for this transition are currently weak.

The Home Office currently lacks the data, capability insight, and funding mechanisms to guarantee success. Without addressing these foundations, the projected efficiencies may not materialise and the government’s plans could be dangerously exposed.

• Genomics-informed healthcare is a lynchpin of the 10 Year Health Plan, with the potential to deliver personalised medicine for every NHS patient.
• However, new research shows that endemic misreporting of genetic data, alongside fragmented NHS databases, risks undermining the UK’s leadership.
• Adopting new international standards – and creating a single national infrastructure for reporting of genetic sequences – will reduce costs and improve patient outcomes.

As global competition and strategic investment in large-scale genomic programmes accelerates, the UK’s ability to benchmark its performance and guide industrial strategy now depends on the quality, consistency and international comparability of its genomics data.

For the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC), genomic-led personalised care forms one of the five “Big Bets” of the 10 Year Health Plan. Undiagnosed rare diseases – often genetically inherited – cost the NHS around £3.4 billion between 2008 – 2018. A shift to a comprehensive genomic screening service would reduce this cost through earlier diagnosis, building on the ambitions of the 5-year Rare Diseases Framework. Beyond healthcare, the Office for Life Sciences (OLS) and the Department for Science, Innovation & Technology (DSIT), need reliable foundations for the indicators underpinning policy – economic metrics, adoption measures, R&D investment patterns, and the comparative performance of the UK’s genomics sector.

Yet one of the most fundamental weaknesses in genomics data remains largely unrecognised in policy discussions: widespread inaccuracy and inconsistency of data in genomics databases and literature. The Human Genome Organization (HUGO) has highlighted the widespread failure to adhere to clinical standards for genomic data in manuscripts submitted to leading journals and clinical databases. A series of studies involving The University of Manchester revealed the persistent and universal nature of these errors which, if corrected, will directly improve clinical diagnosis. The most recent investigation showed that, despite the availability of tools to correct errors, clinical literature and databases continue to receive inaccurate and incomplete data.

This problem has profound implications for the UK’s ability to generate trustworthy indicators, compare its performance internationally, and develop evidence-based health policy. Variants misnamed in publications or databases cannot be linked across datasets, feed reliably into analyses, or support the economic and clinical insights required by government.

Crucially, accurate databases are a vital component of the 10 Year Plan’s shift towards a genomics-based health service. A clinician cannot provide an accurate diagnosis of a genetic disease or risk-factor without being able to search for evidence  relating to that variant. Additionally, globally accepted diagnostics standards state that misnamed data should be treated as less trustworthy. The result is an unstable data ecosystem that undermines the UK’s ambition to produce world-class evidence for policy and healthcare.

A new standard

In response, an international coalition has been formed to deliver a new global professional-standard. The consortium includes two organisations which will ensure the standard is directly embedded into UK healthcare and research practice; the Association for Clinical Genomic Sciences (ACGS), the operational backbone of NHS genome interpretation; and the European Molecular Genetics Quality Network (EMQN), standards and quality schemes directly govern UK diagnostic laboratory performance. Their involvement guarantees that the final standard will be implemented across the NHS – but the gauntlet laid down for policymakers is how quickly this happens.

This moment matters profoundly for UK policy. The Government’s evidence sources provide vital insights into employment, turnover, investment flows, and international rankings in biosciences and health technology, and life sciences competitiveness. But the genomics sector now requires deeper, more granular indicators: measures of genomic R&D intensity, the true pipeline of genomics-based innovations, NHS adoption rates, regulatory timelines specific to genomics, and the economic contribution of precision medicine. None of these indicators can be reliably produced without consistent genomic variant data. The UK cannot comprehensively assess its competitive position, nor the return on investment in genomics, if the underlying genetic data is internationally incompatible.

A rapid move to align national genomic datasets, NHS reporting pipelines, research publications and regulatory evidence with the international standard would increase the reliability and comparability of the UK’s genomics indicators. It would strengthen the evidence base used by DSIT to shape genomics policy, enhance OLS’s ability to analyse sectoral performance, and allow the UK to benchmark accurately against global competitors. It would also support regulatory reform by enabling the MHRA, NIHR and NHS England to make decisions based on consistent, technically robust genomic evidence.

More broadly, adopting the standard early would reinforce the UK’s status as a scientifically serious and internationally aligned genomics nation. It would support the expansion of genomic manufacturing and R&D capabilities and help attract investment into UK genomic facilities by reducing uncertainty around data quality and regulatory expectations. For industry, it would create a predictable, high-quality environment for innovation. And for the NHS, it would mean more accurate genomic reports, higher diagnostic yields and more efficient use of genomic testing capacity, supporting the aims of the 10 Year Plan.

Building data sharing and reanalysis into health policy

Accurate data is the keystone to building an effective genomic health service, but it is not the only piece of the puzzle. Currently, genomic data within the NHS is not routinely shared between Trusts, while Genomics England also maintains its own database. The UK’s fragmented approach to data sharing risks falling behind emerging leaders like Brazil, where a new genomics service – based on Genomics England – seeks to go further in building a federated service, improving progress in precision medicine for its diverse population. The ‘analogue to digital’ focus of the 10 Year Plan – alongside the new standards for recording data and a government ambition to become a global leader in clinical trials – presents an opportunity to harmonise data collection and sharing in UK healthcare. DHSC, DSIT, and OLS should jointly lead on the creation of a standard format for genomic data reporting.

The new standard presents a further opportunity to learn from international best-practice. Brazil intends to operate a national reanalysis service, providing diagnoses and treatment to patients with previously undiagnosed genetic diseases. UK policymakers should adopt this ahead of the rollout of the full genomics health service in 2035, to ensure that the health and economic burdens of undiagnosed illness are reduced as soon as possible.

The release of the new standard offers a strategic moment for the UK to rebuild its genomic data foundations. By embedding internationally harmonised variant reporting and data sharing across research, clinical practice, policy datasets and regulatory evidence, the UK can strengthen its global competitiveness, support the development of new and more sophisticated genomics indicators, and ensure that DSIT and OLS have the robust, high-quality data required to shape the next decade of life sciences policy.

If the UK wishes to remain at the forefront of genomics, the accuracy, consistency and availability of its data must be considered a national strategic asset. The science is ready, the professional societies have acted, and the policy window is open. The next move belongs to government.