But what if we go about tampering with this scale? For one, you get Franco Moretti’s idea of distant reading. Rather than hunkering down with a book and a cup of coffee, distance readers renders details of a massive number of texts into piles of statistical data. This is literary scholarship with no reading necessary; the book itself disappears. Instead you get graphs. One of Moretti’s visualizations shows the emergence of the market for novels in Britain, Japan, Italy, Spain, and Nigeria between about 1700 and 2000. The wild spikes in popularity look like fish hooks, even as each country’s bibliophilia caught on at different times. So computation plus visualization allow us to get a more complete, birds eye view of cultural trends than intensive reading of a few works lumped in a canon.

To some advocates of cultural analytics, this pattern tracing relieves us from foraging for meaning. If we can toss interpretation out the window and allow algorithms to do the work we’re physically incapable of – if we let the machine read for us – then we won’t fumble around with our blind, historically polluted human assumptions. The human is dethroned as the privileged center of understanding; patterns can emerge that can show us what we would never have been aware of otherwise. This shift in scale radically changes the kinds of questions we can ask, and the types of answers we get.

But according to Hayles this new trend introduces an unnecessary binary: close readings that dig out meaning in a book’s narrative on the one hand; meta or sub level syntax revealed through thousands of text on the other. Hermeneutic interpretation vs pattern. Hayles thinks it’s more complicated. What we actually get from new computational methods – of using algorithms, computer programs, and databases to analyze cultural objects – is a distributed cognition system, part in the head of a person, part in the computer. Meaning and analysis, data and narrative are mutual supports. We shouldn’t altogether toss out the traditional humanities. Anyway, someone still has to decide what makes a well-designed algorithm or an interesting pattern.

She illustrated this point using the book Only Revolutions, whose author deliberately “contaminated narrative with database”. The book forces you to read it by turning pages in revolution, since each page contains a poem written in diametrically opposite directions. Hayles and her students created algorithms to discern words author Danielewski never uses in the work. By feeding the computer a massive list from English literature, plus the Only Revolutions text, they arrives at a ‘nix list’ of forbidden words: or, see, say, nor, seem, than, they, as, either, like, matter, mean, neither. The art to this type of literary analysis, she claimed, is to find analytic parameters that will reveal interesting patterns.

Hayles’ example is a new type of close textual reading that unearths patterns consciously designed by the author – who himself could only make such an intricately symmetrical work with aid of a computer. But what about finding narrative intention on a macro scale, a la Moretti’s distant reading, or Lev Manovich’s work at UC San Diego that seeks patterns among thousands of amateur flickr photos the authors themselves are totally unaware of?

What these larger patterns might hint at, said Hayles, is Nigel Thrift’s concept of a collective, technological unconscious. These are cultural assumptions that aren’t explicitly articulated by a single person but take concrete form through creative and artistic practices. After all, if we’re using the same technology, we all share its design limitations, the unconscious constraints it places on the form and content of cultural works. Any software program embodies assumptions about what constitutes narrative and sequence. But these assumptions only become obvious if we zoom out to observe patterns over time, and we require computational methods to reveal it. We only now have the tools to carry out this kind of distant cultural reading.

So what does that mean for the computational turn? If we’re all in an information intensive environment, altering the content of our attention and products of our attention, maybe cultural analytics can help us understand what our current technological unconscious has to ’say’ about itself. Close reading alone – so old school – just won’t do the trick anymore.

Call of Duty Modern Warfare 2, which now holds the record for biggest launch spectacle in history across all forms of entertainment and best selling first person shooter ever[1], is the culmination of a long tradition of war video games. Which game heralded this tradition is subject to dispute. The first popular one is mainly considered to be Wolfenstein 3D. Many scholars are attempting at placing video games within an appropriate scientific paradigm. Scientific analysis done by literary and film scholars have been discredited due to the lack of medium specificity. Video games are, according to the bulk of scholars, in need of a separate body of theory. An autonomous paradigm that does not rely on narrative, structural or any other existing theory, this need follows the fact the fact that games are fundamentally different from previously studied media. Jesper Juul argues that narrative analysis does not apply to videogames because of the fact that games are non-narrative: “Games and narratives share some structural traits. Nevertheless my point is that: Games and stories actually do not translate into each other in the way that novels and movies do” (Juul: 2001, p. 10).  From a humanities perspective I would not even agree with novels and movies translating into each other as easily as Juul suggests, let alone games and narratives.

The bulk of the video game theorists seem to agree that the theory applied to previous media analysis does not fit; “They continue to fit a square peg into a round hole” (Pearce: 2002, p. 2). Or as Peter Aarseth puts it: “The cautious search for a methodology which we should have reason to expect of reflective practitioners in any field, is suspiciously absent from most current aesthetic analyses of games ” (Aarseth: 2003, p.1). One of the main struggles seems to be between ludology and narratology, this despite the fact that a broad spectrum of theorists, from over more than 200 disciplines, are trying to place videogames within a paradigm (Aarseth: 2003, p. 2). There is no general consensus in the way games should be studied. There is consensus about the fact that games are fundamentally different than previous media and that videogames are becoming increasingly relevant as an object of study.

There is also an expanding body of literature describing the possible effects of videogames. A lot of these stem from psychologists and sociologists. This work will build on this existing literature regarding the negative behavioral effects of war video games. It focuses on the blurring boundary between the real and the virtual and theorizes the possible role of war video games within culture. I want to argue approaching war video games with a methodology that is medium specific but also treating the war video as an autonomous genre. The main focus will initially be on the specific desensitizing effects war games might have. There are several studies regarding video games and the possible effect on violent behavior. The initial assumption is often connected to already achieved results in television analysis. I want to critically discuss some of these ideas, and through combining them with other media theories, try to push forward to understanding why the war video game is in need of a separate theoretical toolset that takes into account its uniqueness as a game, but also specifically as a war game.

First I will discuss some theoretical approaches towards game studies, then I will focus on the specific desensitizing effects war video games might have according to recent studies, finally I will suggest a dialectical materialist approach to understanding war video games. This will be advocated by placing them in a broader perspective and discussing the way video games might function in society. This function will be theorized along concepts of militarization, megaspectacle, and ludification of culture.

The cultural effects of videogames, a discussion of recent studies

A couple of months ago the Army Experience Center[2] in Philadelphia was officially opened. This was accompanied with many protesters judging the motives of this centre. The AEC is publicly owned by US defense initiatives. The official mission statement was a new definition of the American Army brand. The centre focuses on high tech modern warfare, within it are several virtual simulations and popular war video games that children can play to gain insight in the ‘real army experience’. The protesters focused mainly on the minimum admission age, which is thirteen.  In their opinion the games offered a misrepresentation of what war is about, and about the real consequences of war. The picketers argued that children do not know the difference between the games and real war, and that the centre was a recruitment tool based on false truths of clean technological warfare. It was said to be preparing the world for joystick warriors that are militarized without parental consent. Many veterans also joined the rallies and were actively stressing the difference between real war and virtual war, according to these the spectacular image of war as portrayed in the games were evil misrepresentations of reality. The question remains however, how different are they really? Looking at the perception and experience of war in modern times, which blur the boundary between the virtual and the real, one wonders to what extent it is still relevant to distinguish the former separate realms. I also wonder to what extent the fears of these protesters are founded to begin with. Do we really not understand the difference between a game and reality anymore? Could these former separate realms be converging?

The relation between video games and violence has been analyzed by many theorists. The tradition of linking the seeing of violent imagery and acting violent has many precedents in psychology. The main focus of violent image analysis however has been on television. By 1975 there were already eighty elaborate studies on the effects of TV violence on aggressive behavior. In 2001 this number has reached over one thousand (Carnagey & Anderson: 2004, p.4). The same studies in television have been used as arguments for the correlation between games and real-life violence. Ludology condemns narratology for trying to fit a square peg into a round hole, similarly one could argue that applying the conclusions of television violence studies to video games is the same theoretical misconception. The differences between television and video games are vast. An argument made by psychologists in the nineties was: videogames are less violent because they don’t carry the same reality effect that television does. Due to inferior graphics video games were perceived as less realistic. Arguably this argument is no longer relevant in a time of verisimilitude created by full High Definition graphics[3]. One could argue that in the light of the reality discourse, its importance in video games (particularly in war games), and the exponential growth in video graphics technology, that video game imagery can be perceived of as realistic, or even more realistic than television today. The point I am making here is that this argument is somewhat outdated. More relevant differences however are: the stress on active involvement and character identification within video games, the higher frequency of violence within games and the reinforcement of violent acts within these games (Carnagey & Anderson: 2004, p. 6).

The above mentioned factors (among others) make video games unique in character and fundamentally different from television. Therefore conclusions made within television studies are not applicable and should merely serve as a foundation for hypothesis. One of the common models used by psychologists to study aggression is the general aggression model (GAM). Without getting too deep into specifics this model can be seen as independent of the type of media analyzed. It can be fruitfully used to study the way games might influence behavior negatively. The model describes a cyclical interaction between the person and the environment. It measures how stimuli influence the three main aspects of the human mind state: cognition, affect and arousal (Carnagey & Anderson: 2004, p.12). Several studies done by psychologists based on this model show correlation between violent video games and increases in violent behavior. Of course correlation is not causation, however there is still a general consensus within social studies and psychology regarding specific effects of violent games, such as an increase in aggressive cognition and affect and a decrease in prosocial behavior[4] (Carnagey & Anderson: 2004, p. 7). The main critiques of the above described studies are that the sample groups are too small, the differences between games are neglected and that no longitudinal studies are done (Carnagey & Anderson: 2004, p. 12). To this I would like to add that the research does not specify which games are used and why.

Another important concept related to aggression and video game violence is desensitization. Some psychologists argue that prolonged exposure to violent imagery can desensitize an individual to real-life violence. Desensitization is an ambiguous term. It has been used by many fields which uphold different definitions of the concept: an increase in aggressive behavior, a flattening of affective reactions, a reduction in sympathy for victims, a reduction in perceived guilt and many other definitions exist. I suggest using the definition that best suits the consequences of video game exposure; desensitization in a recent game study done by psychologists is defined as: “a reduction in emotion-related physiological reactivity to real-life violence” (Carnagey et. al.: 2007, p. 490). Before continuing I would like to point out that desensitization is not per definition a negative phenomenon. Systematic desensitization can eliminate unwanted behavior like fear and anxiety (like fear of spiders or other phobia). Recent studies showed that the US military has also used video games to create effective desensitization to violence for the purpose of training American soldiers (Grossman & DeGaetano: 1999, p. 23). This desensitization can be a good thing; if you want to create a better emotionally equipped soldier or one that is less prone to post traumatic stress disorder it would seem that a selectively desensitized warrior is a better warrior. The keyword here is selectively. It is a known fact that soldiers are desensitized to certain things to improve results in war: “There is an important body of literature on the desensitizing of killers in the twentieth century warfare” (Power 2007: p, 281).  Marcus Power suggests extending the debates on desensitizing soldiers by focusing on war video games (Power 2007: p, 282). An interesting study would be the effects of these games on the behavior of soldiers. The effects on children or the general public linked to desensitization seem to be a great source of concern. Clearly there is a difference between desensitizing a trained soldier to certain things and desensitizing the general consumer public playing video games for fun. Given the fact that the same media (war video games) are used in different contexts, it seems important to analyze exactly what the consumer is being desensitized to and how, maybe even why.

In a unique study performed by Nicholas Carnagey, Craig Anderson and Brad Bushman for the department of psychology in Iowa, the causal relation between video games and desensitization has been examined for the first time[5]. The study extended on the above described General Aggression Model. Desensitization was similarly defined; a reduction in emotion-related physiological reactivity to real-life violence. The heart rate and galvanic skin response were monitored and used to measure the decrease in physical arousal. Participants played either a violent or a non-violent game for twenty minutes before watching a ten minute video tape containing real-life violence. The conclusion was clear-cut: “The present experiment demonstrates that violent video game exposure can cause desensitization to real-life violence. In this experiment, violent games players were less physiologically aroused by real-life violence than were non-violent game players” (Carnagey et. al.: 2007, p. 491-495). This study can also be partly discredited; I could not find what games where used and why. Also the use of real-life video images seems to indicate a trust in response to video images as representative for a response to actual violence. One could argue that all that is proven here is the relation between video game violence and its influence on the reaction to violent video images. The causal relation between violent video images and violent behavior is still not conclusively determined; it seems unjust to take this hypothesis as the foundation for utterances regarding the relation between video games and human behavior. It could be seen another case of the square peg being forced into the round hole. However, studies still indicate a possible correlation between videogames and actual desensitization to violence and the above described one is the first to yield concrete results with regards to specifically video games (Carnagey & Anderson: 2004, p.8).

For future analysis it might also be fruitful to focus solely on war video games and research the effects on soldiers and or consumers. It might be more interesting to analyze the desensitization by war video games with regards to actual war instead of video images. The conditions of this experiment however would require actual war violence; this could be considered as immoral. A possible solution to this could be performing the same study on soldiers that are already active in a war. The measurement of desensitization is of course a complicated concept linked strongly to definition and methods used.  However, correlation between playing violent video games and getting desensitized to particular violent phenomena has been indicated in the above described research.

As I stated above, when it comes to desensitization the keyword is selective. Another relevant worry related to desensitization caused by video games is the negative impact on a soldier’s perception of reality. Studies have suggested that soldiers get charged by games and this also happens in real war. This can create a ‘disconnect’ between the real and the virtual leading to killing without any consideration of the consequences in a: “hyper adrenalized disconnect” (Seal: 2003, p.2). The same study done by  Cheryl Seal also discusses the effective use of video games in avoiding PTST (post traumatic stress disorder). This study suggests that desensitization takes place by playing war video games, but it also warns for its dehumanizing effects. Soldiers can get more violent because of the blurring boundary between the virtual and the real: “In this high-tech rehearsal for war, one learns how to kill but not to take responsibility for it, one experiences death, but not the tragic consequences of it” (Derian: 2000, p. 774).  James Derian discusses a closing gap between the digital and the virtual: “as the confusion of one for the other grows, we now face the danger of a new kind of trauma without sight, without tragedy, where television wars and video war games blur together” (Derian: 2000, p. 774).  Imagine playing a game of chess in which all pawns are connected to human lives, but the realization of this is absent. This resembles the scenario in the movie war games, in which Matthew Broderick is determining the actual fate of the world in a nuclear war, all the while thinking he is playing a virtual game which turns out to be grounded in the real. Without understanding the difference between virtual and real certain scary scenarios might indeed develop.

Whether or not video games desensitize players to real-life violence is not an easy question. The answer depends strongly on the definitions used and the individuals being studied. That video games operate in a way that is fundamentally different than television however is generally agreed upon (Aerseth, Pearce). The same goes for the blurring of the virtual with the real in a converging world. The current struggle with defining the virtual as part of or as separate from the real can be seen as indicative of its ambiguous status. Augmented Reality and other technologies will possibly only increase this struggle. The war video game is unique in this light, for the blurring of the real with the virtual caused by a war video game has completely different cultural implications than say the blurring done by a game like Guitar Hero. The relation between the war game, actual war and the reality effect that is strived for within these games create a unique set of circumstances which have implications that go beyond any other genre of games produced by the culture industry. The fact that interfaces in real war machines match interfaces used in video games is an eloquent example of this different unique condition which needs critical assessment.

I would like to elaborate further on the difference between traditional media and video games, and the importance of critical game analysis, by briefly discussing the didactic potential of videogames. Along with psychologists stressing the dangers of video games are theorists that stress the positive potentials of video games. James Paul Gee[6] describes in what ways video games can teach, and how this learning is different and arguably more effective than traditional learning. Certain principles (also stemming from psychoanalysis) employed by video games ensure effective learning potential according to Gee. The regime of competence principle results in a simultaneous feeling of pleasure and frustration which makes concepts that need to be learned challenging but still interesting, while the principle of expertise challenges players to attain certain skills that are momentarily needed while afterwards having to undo all that mastery in the next level where players are forced to adapt and learn new things (Gee: 2003, p. 134). These principles combined with specific game properties like situational learning and identification create a powerful medium that is unique in its didactic abilities. They illustrate that games have a potential to teach and thus do good, by the same logic it can also have the potential to teach unwanted things and thus do wrong. In light of the above it seems of great importance to critically study what war video games teach us. The didactic potential combined with the possible desensitizing effects and the blurring of the real with the virtual creates an obvious potential danger in video games. It is important to analyze video game content and the context of production of the popular war video games, in order to gain insights to the way they operate in popular culture. In the next part I will discuss methodological approaches to studying games and plea for a specific method for the war game by placing the genre of the war game within a larger context. I will discuss how it may function culturally by using theoretical concepts of militarization, megaspectacle, and the ludification of culture.

War video games, how should they be studied?

In his work discussing the methodological approaches to game studies, Eespen Aarseth discusses the model devised by Lars Konzack to analyze video games; a model that divides video games in seven layers in order to analyze technical, aesthetic and socio-cultural perspectives. (Aarseth: 2003, p. 2).  Aarseth claims the Konzack model is one of the most concise and comprehensive for studying video games. To this he adds that the model: “is best used as an open framework, where the analyst can choose any 2-4 of the seven layers to work with, and ignore the rest”. The complete analysis of all layers is redundant and does not serve the conciseness of a research. According to the hypothesis and the object of study a method should be devised, in other words it is dependent of the researcher and its interests. Treating the war video game, in particular the first person shooter war video game as a separate genre, one should stress the socio-cultural aspects and not the other layers as theorized by Kozack. With regards to researching the specific desensitizing effects as described above one could argue it to be the most relevant dimension. The unique character of the war video game, which comes into being in a specific context of production and its unique under-theorized function in society, should be studied socially and culturally.

I propose using a dialectic-materialist approach in order to analyze the specific function and role in society. Materialist because it is a result of a unique context of production, dialectically because the resulting effect of the war video game is not predetermined by definition, it comes into being by an active negotiation between the production and the consumption side of its existence. The cultural effects of these games have been theorized by many, I want to suggest analyzing the games along the lines of these thoughts which are founded in critical theory. This of course is not to say that aesthetics or the technical aspects of war games are irrelevant to their possible effects. It would seem logical however that the war video game should be discussed from a socio-cultural angle and should also take into account the unique context of production that exists in war video games. In the following part I elaborate on this specific context of production and discuss other theoretical notions regarding the recently theorized specific socio cultural effects of war games.

I shall connect the war video games with larger cultural trends theorized as: the concept of militarization, the concept of the megaspectacle, and the ludification of culture. By discussing these concepts I try to sketch an image of how the war game is perceived by critical game theorists and why the war game analysis should take into account specific cultural functions and a specific context of production. This could best be achieved through a critical dialectical materialist approach. This way its means of productions can be connected with its possible function within society, without neglecting the dialectical nature of culture.

Theorizing war video games; the plead for a dialectic-materialist approach

The first uniqueness of the war video game is founded in the way it comes into being. The unique context of production is what James Der Derian calls: “the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network, the post industrial cousin of the military-industrial complex” (Power: 2007, p. 274). This unique complex (MIME-NET for short) between the American Army, industry and the entertainment industry is often linked to specific war games and war related consumerism. It is the only one of its kind, combining industry, entertainment and military. It is often held responsible for negative effects this consumerism based on war related matter, many war games are direct spawns of this collaboration and many others are associated with it. As a genre the war game is particularly connected with it, much more than other commercial games.

Many theorists have critically analyzed the MIME NET and it has been held responsible for a larger cultural phenomenon in which the war video game is only part of: the militarization of popular culture. Militarization can be defined as: “The shaping of civilian space and social relations by military objectives, rationales and structures” (Power: 2007, p.273). According to theorists, militarization works in a twofold manner; being based on a productive economy of fear, but also (and arguably more importantly) based on an economy of desire (Power: 2007, p.374). War video games should be placed within this larger perspective, as functioning to further militarize popular culture through aesthetics: “Digital war games invite Americans to ‘participate in a militarism of consumption and pleasure’, and they do so by presenting a clean, sanitized and enjoyable version of war for popular consumption, obscuring the ‘realities’, contexts and consequences of war” (Power: 2007, p.273). James Der Derian calls this virtuous war, pointing out to the virtualization of violence and “the ascending of war to an even higher plane, from the virtual to the virtuous”. Within virtuous war the difference between virtual and real cannot be made, and the art of war is a virtual affair, one that is no longer grounded in the real.

Another way to look at the war video game is through the theoretical notion of the spectacle as it is recently redefined by Douglas Kellner: “Under the influence of a multimedia image culture, seductive spectacles fascinate the denizens of the world and consumer society and involve them in the semiotics on an ever-expanding world of entertainment, information, and consumption, which deeply influence thought and action” (Kellner: 2009, p. 3). This “permanent opium war” also seems to be fuelled by an economy of desire; its strong persuasive power can be resisted only by the view. The war video game is also a spectacle; if we look at the worldwide release of Modern Warfare 2 we get an indication of its magnitude. Kellner, in his work on cultural media megaspectacles (spectacles that become defining moments of their era), does however leave us with a side note regarding megaspectacles; this is that spectacles are also highly unpredictable. In this he differs from Guy Debord. According to Kellner there is always room for contestation. Whereas arguably Gubord considers this room a mere formality, the drowning effect of the hegemony created by the status quo is absent in the approach offered by Kellner. In video games this room could of course be considered as the realm of modding, but also merely denying protocol or ideal story lines as one plays. The questions that remain of course are to what extent is this being done? And to what extent is it even relevant?

The world constructed by war video games could arguably be seen as a persuasive megaspectacle that combines conventions of the movie spectacle with the spectacle of macho-militarism. In this the war game is unique; the already known spectacles of militarism and Hollywood style movie spectacles are combined, remediated if you will, in the war video game. It only takes one glance at the game’s success and how the game is played online to realize the extent of the spectacle’s persuasiveness. This is not to say that exceptions and contestations do not exist, I myself am a very active player of Call of Duty Modern Warfare 2 and contend that this essay can be considered a contestation of the spectacle. But it seems that not contesting is the rule. The combination of the unique context of production, the social trend of cultural militarization and the persuasiveness of the megaspectacle are arguments for the separate treatment of the war video game. It is a unique genre that needs an approach that takes all the above into account. The role of the MIME NET should not be taken lightly. The above described factors also stress the importance of a proper understanding of the genre, for it may be causing harmful effects that are unknown, effects beyond desensitization, larger than this particular subjective effect that introduced this essay. For if the virtual and the real become inseparable in the art of war, the results could be devastating. Real life knows no continues. Game over is game over.

At this point I would also like to introduce the research done by Joost Raessens, Jos de Mul and Valerie Frissen on the play element in culture: “Because digital technologies seem to stimulate ‘playful goals’ or the play element in culture, we investigate the ways in which mobile phones, the Internet, and computer games not only facilitate the construction of these playful identities but also the advance of the ludification of culture in the spirit of Johan Huizinga’s Homo Ludens” (Raessens: 2009, p. 3). According to their thesis new media are furthering our understanding of our identity through elements of play. If we look at the war video game with the idea that it is play, and not myth or narrative that forms our identity, we might want to critically analyze what this identity is, and how much it is steeped in military rationale. We also should ask ourselves to what extent the game metaphor is becoming our principle instrument of understanding the world, and how this might function in a militarized society.

Arguably this analyzing of our own identity as being formed by metaphors of play and being part of a spectacle is becoming harder because of its increasing persuasiveness and naturalness. The main point I want to make however is that we need a critical understanding of the cultural function of the war game, the war game needs to be understood as a separate genre. This because of its unique context of production and its under theorized function within popular culture. Walter Benjamin warned us for the aesthetic rendering of politics; his warning was that it culminates to only one thing: war. I propose that the current danger lies not in the aesthetic rendering of politics, rather the concept of war being rendered aesthetically. The question remains however, in what will it culminate?

[1] Shack Network < http://www.shacknews.com/onearticle.x/61215>

[2] <http://www.thearmyexperience.com/>

[3] This argument was made in 2004, the graphic capability at that time was less than one billion polygons per second. Since then the reality discourse has dominated the genre of war games and significant progress has been made regarding graphics (Carnagey and Anderson: 2004, p. 5)

[4] Helping victims or people in general

[5] Other studies have shown correlation between TV violence and desensitization. This is the first to show the possible link between specifically violent video games and desensitization.

[6] Research has also been done by Kurt Squire, David Shaffer, David Hutchison and many other theorists stressing the didactic potential of video games.

Literature

Aarseth, Espen. Playing Research: Methodological approaches to games analysis. University of Bergen, 2003

Carnagey, N. & Anderson C. Video game exposure and aggression, a literary review. In: ‘Minerva Psichiatrica’. Vol. 45; No.1; 1-18, 2004

Carnagey, N. Anderson, C. & Bushman, B. The effect of video game violence on physiological desensitization to real-life violence. In: ‘Journal of experimental Social Psychology’. Vol 43; 489-496. 2007

Derian, James der. Virtuous war/virtual theory. In: ‘International Affairs’. Vol. 76; 4; 771-788. 2000

Gee, J.P. What video games have to teach us about learning and literacy. New York Press, 2003

Grossman, D. & Degaetano, G. Stop teaching our kids to kill: a call to action against TV, movie and video game violence. New York Crown Publishers, 1999

Juul, Jesper. Games Telling Stories? A brief note on Games and Narratives. In ‘Game Studies’. Vol. 1, issue 1. July 2001

Kellner, Douglas. Media Spectacle. New York Roatledge, 2003

Power, Marcus. Digitized Virtuosity: Video War Games and Post 9/11 Cyber-Deterrence. In: ‘Security Dialogue’. Vol. 38; No 2; 271-286

Raessens, Joost. Playful Identities or the Ludification of Culture. In: ‘Games and Culture’ Vol 1;  52-57. 2006

Seal, Cheryl. Was the Excessive Violence of US Troops in Iraq fueled by Military Funded Computer Games? In: ‘The Baltimore IMC’. (accessed 14 January 2019) <http://baltimore.indymedia.org/newswire/display/3836/index.php>

Mr. Blow started his presentation by telling an anecdote about a reporter from a big city interviewing a farmer about his three legged pig, whereas the reporter didn’t understand why in heavens the farmer would want a three legged pig, the farmer praised the bravura of the pig which had saved him and his wife from a terrible fire but the reporter frustrated insisted once more “But why the 3 legs?” and the farmer went: “Well you wouldn’t eat a pig like that all in one day , would you?”. This funny story was more powerful than the coffee served and served the purpose of putting the audience in a receptive mood to hear what Mr. Blow had to tell.

The presentation was about “Finding his way back to basic” and he introduced the Info viz theme by confessing that he no longer believed in most of the things he used to believe when it came to info graphics. The confession reached a superior level when he said that he felt that on a certain point they, the New York Times (NYT), were suffering from info lust, they were filling the holes on pages instead of filling gaps in understanding, they were consumed with the wrong arguments, instead of being focused on the readers’ needs they were doing it for their own pleasure. This was followed by what I would hold as the motto of his presentation: “Beautification is not communication”.

Substance and purpose are the big arguments that they were missing while distracted by the trivia. After sharing his ideas about the meaning of info graphics, he told us stories with graphics.

Stories about politics, about religion, about guns and how the number of purchases rose four months after Barack Obama was elected, on an anxiety build where probably people thought there was a revolution coming; about dating and how twelve graders who don’t date frequently finally overtook those who always date – he called this the hookup culture,  which says ”let’s have sex a couple of times and if I really like you, I will take you out”.

Mr. Blow’s presentation was inspiring up to the point of putting me on my way to the NYT info graphics and interactive department, and here are some links that I found interesting:

The New York Times Visualization lab

Geography of a Recession

A Peek Into Netflix Queues
Vancouver’s Olympic Venues
Leading to an Oscar Win
Olympic Pictograms Through the Ages
Full results, but recounts to Come
Turning a Corner?
How Different Groups Spend Their Day

Projeto Alavanca, where I have worked for several months, is an organization based in São Paulo, a in low-income community (favela) called São Remo. The organization strives to community development and social inclusion by offering several (free) educational activities, thus reducing the illiteracy level within the community.

What I particularly liked about the organization is their focus on (new) media activities, by offering courses in graphic design, arts, journalism and communication theories. They stress the importance of using ICT for educational purposes to make the children familiar with new technologies, aiming to bridge this digital gap, and argue that nowadays a person cannot be considered as literate unless he is digitally literate as well. A person who doesn’t know the basics of ICT will have difficulties to function in today’s society.

The collaborators within the organization are encouraged to actively participate in the organizational processes (many of the employees are members of the community, but also foreign volunteers), as since 2006 they started to use diverse open source applications in the daily project work, as wikis, groupware, trac, content management system, moodle and php-list.

Although this is a very interesting step forward – many NGOs still maintain a very traditional, vertical structure, not willing to adapt to new technologies, the implementation of these alternative applications also made them face the deficits and restrictions of the existing solutions. They argue that there is a lack of software or web-based applications (online platforms, social networks, etc.) that seriously allow or promote online collaboration, information sharing or distribution among NGOs. Also, commercial software is very expensive and many organizations admit the lack of competences to adopt existing open source solutions. Open source software is not always very user-friendly. Furthermore, NGOs often lack ICTs of good quality. On average, NGOs suffer data loss due to computer breakdowns five times a year[1]!

Such problems are mainly an effect of inefficiency within the organizational structures of NGOs; they fail to recognize new possibilities, or lack a proper working space, financial resources, employees/volunteers and technologies. According to some research they conducted among local NGOs, they usually don’t have a space (online) to share information or present their results, establish partnerships and get volunteers and donors involved. Moreover, the rare use of ICTs in the non-profit sector creates a lot of inefficiency.

Projeto Alavanca recognizes the need of better alternatives that enhance internal organizational structures of NGOs. As NGOs usually depend and involve diverse interest groups, a highly efficient information architecture is essential. Existing alternatives, such as Ammado, Better Place or Blackbaud are either paid (very expensive) or lack an extensive diverity of system functions.

Therefore, they are now developing open source software (NPOffice) that offers a basic information architecture that fits such organizations; supporting the whole third sector from fundraising to project implementation and evaluation in an efficient manner. It is a web-based software, which offers multi-platforms and integrates several other applications. For instance, it allows them to compare results with other organizations in order to encourage mutual learning and they can share and distribute information and knowledge available at the project; such as educating materials and course descriptions, but also business plans. This allows other organizations to easily access and use this information for their own (educational and organizational) purposes.

Eventually they want to donate NPOffice to all their assisted NGOs to set the software as a standard for all the organizations and foundations, and thus generate a basis for quality, exchange and comparison.

The software can also be used for instituations of development and donors; it facilitates finding NGOs they would like to support and/or evaluate their efficiency. They argue that these institutions play a role to establish the software at the market. Furthermore, donors can find NGOs they would like to support as they can easily compare several NGOs, and thus make sure that an organization is very efficient. Finally, volunteers (local or foreign) can find NGOs that fit their interests and they can easily contact the organizations. Also, they not necessarily have to work at the organization’s office, but can easily work from their homes.

They are aware of sceptics, people that don’t see the advantages or stick to familiar software and applications. Furthermore, we might argue whether NGOs would be willig to openly share their information, knowledge and administration. Allthough they don’t have commerical/competitive purposes, they might be afraid of abuse. However promising, I think, is their initiative to set up a website that helps the São Paulo NGOs to discuss software needs and vote upon priorities. They provide questionnaires for organizations to describe their current use of ICTs and the possible deficits. Parallel to the website development they will approach other NGOs via mail, forums and on-site-visits in order to encourage them to take part in the discussion. Finally, the website will show investors the importance of financing the future software development. A huge number of organizations that discusses their ICT needs gives a strong argument to invest in NPOffice.

Their intention to serve the whole non-profit sector, first in São Paulo and on a broader scale eventually, with an informational system that allows NGOs to enhance their organizational structures, to me sounds like a very interesting initiative. As they say, they want to improve non-profit results with business intelligence, and I think such a horizontal and networked, open structure can be very fruitful. Read their business plan presentation for a more extensive description of their ideas.

The NMMA is a one-year residence program undertaken in English at UvA in the heart of Amsterdam. Students become actively engaged in critical Internet culture, with an emphasis on new media theory and aesthetics, including theoretical materialist traditions and practical information visualization trends. Our permanent faculty are recognized experts in their fields, who are committed to their students.

Call for applications (.pdf)

‘Problems are not a monopoly of the South and solutions are not a monopoly of the North’^[1]. Particularly the latter part of this quote struck me, since within many studies on developmental aid and ICT4D (Information and Communication Technology for Development) prevails the idea that the solutions will come from the north, that is, from the developed countries. However, the (technological) inequality, often called the digital divide, is a consequence of the increasing (digital) technologies in developed countries. Ironically we are now trying to solve this problem with the same technology that has caused the inequality in the first place, upholding the idea that ‘our’ western solutions are the most appropriate.

The problem is that the digital divide is not only a matter of unequal distribution of technology; it is a complicated economic, social and political issue, whereof the rules need to be changed before actual development and the fight against inequality can be accomplished. ICTs do not play a determining role in this process. To my opinion we should move beyond the idea to use ICTs for societal and economical development and first start to focus on its potential to locally improve the lives of excluded and on how it can bring about social transformation for a particular user. Thereby we should rethink questions such as ‘what does it mean to be digitally included and what are the advantages for the to be included?’ or ‘to what state of being should we strive in the process of digital inclusion?’ and it is of great importance and interest to observe how cultural and social values and characteristics are reflected in the local appropriation and use of technology, instead of simply overloading the excluded with the newest (western) ICTs.

In Brazil, a country that has embraced FLOSS and adapted government policy on copyrights (see RIP, a Remix Manifesto), many projects and initiatives (governmental and non-governmental) aim at digitally and socially including marginalized groups by offering them access to digital technologies, e.g. cybercafés, school labs offering free computer access, etc. Several projects based on the same principle, which are widely spread throughout the country, use alternative technology to achieve social transformation for marginalized groups and minorities whereby digital inclusion goes beyond simply providing access to excluded groups, but tends to ‘improve’ the quality of their lives.

Those initiatives work from a bottom-up process, encouraging the excluded to develop their own ICTs independently from western interests. An example is the project called MetaReciclagem, which teaches and stimulate users to remanufacture hardware and garbage to create appropriate technology that runs free and open source software, pursuing a participative methodology for education, social engagement and innovation[2]. They argue that digital inclusion does not consist of simply providing access to the Internet and it, in that manner, will certainly not enhance social engagement and innovation; neither does it close the digital divide.

Instead of teaching a user how to co-op with basic ICTs, they rather stimulate the formation of people who can create technologies that are appropriate to their values, norms and cultural beliefs, and which improve the quality of their lives and the life within the local communities eventually[3].

One of the basic principles of the initiative is the stimulation of entrepreneurship, self-management and the creation of mini-companies and corporations, thus encouraging autonomic communities. The use of alternative appropriated technology and FLOSS should encourage and complete this process. They learn how to create something they actually ‘need’, something that fulfils their needs, based on the philosophy of the ‘free movement’; creating free technologies and software, independent from western hard and software companies and their licenses on intellectual property and in a sense circumventing the capitalist logic of the Internet. Therefore, the (re)use of garbage and hardware and FLOSS play an essential role within this project and thus distinguishes the initiative from many other attempts to achieve digital inclusion.

The project is broadly applied in Brazil for over five years now, and I think it is time to answer the above questions in order to move on within the general debate on digital inclusion, which has, to my opinion, come to and ever repeating ‘everybody needs to be connected’, and for those who claim that digital inclusion is nothing more then ‘digital capitalism looking South’ the main argument remains that ‘FLOSS is the solution’. However, there is a lack of case studies done on the appropriation of alternative technologies and the way in which social transformation and self-autonomy is achieved within the process of digital inclusion. It is, therefore, of great importance that we reconsider the above questions, locally, instead of speculating how to bring those excluded into ‘our space’, that is, the space of the included. A case study on one of the bases of the MetaReciclagem project, called Projeto Puraqué, located in the south of the Amazon, will hopefully bring me new perspectives on the digital inclusion debate.

[2] Felipe Fonseca – Sica – Mapping e-culture in Brazil (2008)

[3] Interview with co-founder Felipe Fonseca

Distribution

The process of traditional newspaper development and distribution goes something like this:

• 10 pm, the journalist finishes the story.
• 12 pm, the story gets moderated by an editor and put in a news format.
• 1 am, the content is transferred to the printing press.
• 3 am, the news papers are distributed to thousands of agents.
• 5 pm, the paperboys deliver the papers to the customers.

Due to circumstances in this chain of events, the distribution of newspapers can easily be distorted. Think of: weather, accidents, malfunction in the printing press. In case of a non delivery due to these circumstances the customer contacts customer support and the front office agent subsequently channels the complaint towards the regional distributor. He will, in turn, summon the paper boy to redeliver the newspaper. If the newspaper is out of stock, the customers do not receive the newspaper, but will get a refund.

Future distribution of newspapers could have a model similar to the distribution of internet modems. One applies Locative Media, in this case e-paper (A3 format), on a free-loan base and subscribes to news and other content. This content will be distributed digitally every morning. No more logistical nightmares! No more printing press deadlines, failures, delays and overhead hustle.

The process of future newspaper development and distribution is as follows:

• 10 pm, the journalist or news-enthusiastic amateur covers stories on the fly using social media (blogs, micro blogging).
• 12 pm, the story is moderated instantly by an editor and exported as a file in a proper news format.
• 1 am, a batch file will be uploaded to several news-servers using a distributed network.
• 5 am, e-papers are contacted via a wireless modem (or 3g technology) by several servers using P2P technology and a secure connection.

Costs

I know at first hand that the expenses derived from the traditional physical medium (distribution-, printing press expenses) are roughly 50% depending on the distribution chain in the Netherlands. There are expenses to be made for (1) the distribution of a newspaper that is sold over the counter and (2) at the door of the subscriber. One corporation does, in this case, represent the industry as a whole, because they all suffer the same burden. The burden of ‘analogue’ distribution costs. Obviously, the initial costs of a digital distribution model and the investments are significant, but will certainly equal the distribution costs. So, cutting the distribution costs is essential for the news corporations to stay ahead of its digital competition.

Environment

Mechanical reproduction of newspapers will be another thing of the past. On a global level, this conversion will have a significant positive effect on the environment. Ink is very harmful and newspapers are drenched in it. E-papers also make use of ink, but e-papers are not disposable. Today’s distribution of news papers is mostly done by cars or other fossil fuel based transportation. Digital reproduction will make fossil fuel based transportation obsolete, which in turn decreases the CO2-emission. Of course, the development and fabrication of e-papers will not be completely CO2-neutral, but it is a step in the eco-friendly direction.

Introduction

Cory Doctorow’s novel ‘Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom’ describes a future world based on post-scarcity economy, in which everything is free. ‘Whuffie’ is the name for an abstract personal currency, based on reputation, motivating people to pursue a useful and creative lifestyle. The ‘Whuffie’ number is equivalent to a person’s social status in society, for instance, you lose points when being rude or committing a crime, you gain points when helping someone cross the street or composing a brilliant symphony. The most striking is every person having a brain implant, which enables them to interface with ‘the Net’, giving them the possibility to check everyone’s ‘Whuffie’ instantly and wirelessly.

In our contemporary society, we don’t possess the means to explicitly define or compare social status as the people in ‘Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom’ do. Nonetheless, looking up to or down on people, comparing people or finding motivation to act by other people’s social status in the most broad sense is very real; social status is a timeless phenomenon. ‘The Net’ obviously bears a resemblance to the Internet, which in Doctorow’s novel is a platform for status comparison; it enables social status to be embedded and used as a currency in real life. Social networks on the web also serve as a platform for defining one’s identity or individualism (Donath, boyd 2004; Ito et al. 2010) and to identify one’s position within a group or community of (likeminded) people; virtual communities (Smith, Kollock 1999). These processes are intimately related to (attainment of) social status.

The social network profile could be compared to the brain implant in Doctorow’s novel, being a link between the identity of the user it represents to the larger whole of available profiles; ‘the Net’, being the social network site as a possible accelerator for status comparison. The ‘Whuffie’ could then be compared to the social status captured in or radiating from a profile.

Sociological literature discussing general (offline) social status often focuses on the social-economic status of individuals (Hollingshead 1975; Lin 1999), having education, occupation and income as its foundations. Processes of interaction then constitute a scale of status comparison, for instance casual conversation. However, in contemporary society, community is not conceptualized anymore in terms of physical proximity but in terms of social networks (Smith, Kollock 1999, p. 17), which extend through communication technologies. With online social networks it is possible to establish and nourish relationships out of one’s physical reaching space, establishing evolving standards of status. Many scholars describing online social networks especially focus on youth subcultures in social networks as MySpace, Facebook and Friendster (Ito et al. 2010; boyd 2008). Social network analysis is highly focused on teens because of their early adoption of networked technology, highlighting the desire to engage in publics (boyd, 2008). Herein, online status is directly linked to popularity, constituted in number of friends, ‘top friends’ ranking lists, number of comments and physical attractiveness in photos. Doctorow also mentions a similar idea in his work of fiction: “Us oldsters who predate Whuffie know that it’s important; but to the kids, it’s the world.” (Doctorow 2003, p. 23) Nonetheless, online social network status is also very relevant for people somewhat older, for instance young urban professionals engaging in career related interaction via social network site LinkedIn. More developed social-economic status, comes at a certain age; “education changes during […] youth, but it generally stabilizes in the adult years. […] Occupation may change in the early years of adult life, but it also tends to become stable as a person grows into the late twenties and on into the thirties.” (Hollingshead, 1975)

In this paper I compare offline to online social-economic status, especially directed at professional social network site LinkedIn. I compare sociological accounts of social-economic status in communities to online accounts of status in virtual communities. Questions posed include the following: How is social-economic status constituted online? How do users of LinkedIn compare social-economic status? How do they influence each other by it? An important starting point is viewing online communities as ‘real’ communities and the Web as a reflection of offline culture, as an argument for connecting sociological literature to the Web. Among authors supporting this are those of the Digital Methods Initiative (Rogers, Stevenson, Weltevree, 2009) and Smith and Kollock (1999). The main limitation of this study is the body of literature handling online social network status being mainly applied to online teen and youth culture behavior on social network sites as MySpace, Facebook and Friendster (Donath, boyd 2004; boyd 2008; Ito et al. 2010). I will refer to these authors, because some realizations also apply to this paper, but it is important to note that there are multiple gaps between subculture analysis by aforementioned authors and this paper, for instance, in subject age, occupation, education, income and motivation to network. This constructs the difference between online social status and online social-economic status (although there is some overlap). To illustrate this difference I compare the main header on professional social network site LinkedIn; “Over 55 million professionals use LinkedIn to exchange information, ideas and opportunities: Stay informed about your contacts and industry, find the people & knowledge you need to achieve your goals and control your professional identity online.”[1] with the headline of social network site Friendster; “Friendster helps you stay connected with everything that matters to you: Friends, family and fun! It’s free to join, so go on, see what all the fuss is about!”[2] Both sociological literature on status and social-economic status as expressed by the ‘Whuffie’ are more relevant when compared to status expressions on professional social networking sites as LinkedIn than to social networking sites mainly directed at ‘fun’ social interaction as Friendster.

My main question for this paper is:

To what extent do professional social networking sites as LinkedIn enable explicit social-economic status comparison?

With this main question I have the following sub questions, which I will answer in the chapters following:

How to define (social-economic) status?
How to attain and build status on social networking sites?
How are virtual communities and peers affected by status?

Defining Status and Status Attainment

In ‘The Four Factors Index of Social Status’ Hollingshead defines status as ‘the positions individuals or nuclear families occupy in the status structure of a given society’ (Hollingshead, 1975). The four factors used in Hollingshead index are; education, occupation, sex and marital status. Education and occupation are herein mainly linked to income and an explicit position in societies hierarchy by job-position. A more specific social-economic status definition by Clauss-Ehlers reads; “a position on an economic hierarchy based upon income, education, and occupation” (Clauss-Ehlers, 2006). This professional factor is especially important when speaking of not only social status but also of economic status. It is important to note that when linking this definition to online social-economic status as expressed by LinkedIn, we speak of an individual’s position in society only, not of a family’s.

In ‘Social Networks and Status Comparison’ Lin defines status attainment as ‘a process by which individuals mobilize and invest resources for returns in socioeconomic standings’ (Lin 1999, p. 467). In this definition resources are referred to as goods in society valued by normative judgments of how these goods correspond with being wealthy or powerful (meaning goods in the most broad sense, for instance, skills, money or a acquaintance’s authority position acting as a social resource for finding a job.) These resources can be deployed for increasing one’s social-economic status.

Attaining and Building Online Status

Social network sites are relatively new channels of communication, one would say we have been given a choice to participate or not. However, numerous authors describe the opposite, we find ourselves in a situation in which new social conventions are formed around the use of communication, resulting in a situation where one is almost expected to be a member of online social network sites. For instance, Donath and boyd describe that we live in a world in which communication is instant, ubiquitous and mobile and access to information and communication is a key element of status and power (Donath, boyd 2004). Not taking part in these new technological possibilities might devaluate one’s potential in increasing status; one may risk exclusion. Social network sites both function as spaces where new bonds are forged and as showcases of connections. The function of the social network profile as an integral piece of presenting the user can especially be linked to status-attainment. Connections can be lined among the resources identified in the definition of status attainment as mentioned above.

Furthermore, a profile can be viewed in the context of connections, hereby providing information about the user. “Social status, political beliefs, musical taste, etc., may be inferred from the company one keeps” (Donath, boyd, 2004). Secondly, establishing relations with people already in the network of some of your own connections can make one surer of establishing a trustworthy relationship. Having an extensive social network can be both a sign of status as a means to increase in chances for safe connection. Important to realize is that people who share much in common are more likely to get connected. This idea of ‘homophily’ or ‘birds of a feather stick together’ (boyd 2005) and its consequences will be discussed later on in this paper.

As I wrote earlier, there is an increasing adoption of social networking sites among youth, which can explain online status considerations in general. “These sites function as social hangout spaces for teens, social network sites are home to the struggles that teens face as they seek status among peers” (boyd, 2008, p. 226). Teens use these sites to nourish existing friendships and to develop new ones, but also to seek attention and create drama among peers. Social network sites both change and intensify the ways teens experience drama and negotiate status. An important factor in status development is both the public display of connections, comments, profile information and photo’s as the profile’s owner awareness of this public display (Donath, boyd 2004). This openness of information (often a profile is completely open to existing connections and a user can opt for exposing information to strangers) creates an opportunity for active identity and status building; it creates a tension between self-presentation and (assumed) audience opinion. “Impression management is certainly crucial for identity management and for the construction of oneself online, it requires a level of awareness of others’ reactions” (boyd, 2002).

The open display of connections has parallels to the casual dropping of (high status) names in conversation, used for raising one’s own status and positioning oneself in hierarchy or discovering if a common bond (for instance, an overlap in acquaintances) exists between two people. However, in casual conversation, one could feel free to exaggerate, or to show off with impressive, but unverifiable, facts. This also happens on social network sites. “Teens want to be validated by their broader peer group and thus try to make themselves look cool […]. Even when status is not necessarily accessible for them in everyday life, there is sometimes hope that they can resolve this through online presentations” (boyd, 2008). An online status does not necessarily indicate the existence of the same offline status, at least in youth subculture. It is possible to fake parts of your profile information or creating fake connections, increasing reputation. “Online, identity is mutable and unanchored by the body that is its locus in the real world” (Donath, boyd 2004). This could direct at online status being more fluid and less concretely linked to offline status. On LinkedIn one could easily create false education and occupation info or create a fake profile for Bill Gates and connecting with him, heavily increasing the apparent social-economic status of the profile owner. However, the gains of deceiving someone can be quite low and the costs quite high. For instance, making a business deal or taking on a job on false grounds can ruin one’s status. It is much more important for people to be able to rely on their belief in other’s identity.

The use of connections as a showcase for one’s identity can act as a check of identity claims, thus affirming status. Connections that one knows read profile info. By being directly linked to a profile and being displayed as a connection, profile info gets implicitly validated. Furthermore, LinkedIn includes testimonials, called ‘recommendations’. With this function one can receive compliments about past work, suggesting the profile owner to be adequate in his particular activity. The profile owner can also recommend connections himself. This function has its own section on the website, directly linked to connections, further increasing connection and profile reliability, subsequently increasing status. The recommendation function is a way to build sympathy among connections and thus ensuring co-operation. “The power of reputation to enforce co-operative behavior lies not in confrontation with the subject, but in conversation surrounding him” (Donath, boyd 2004). Open display of connections and the recommendation function could be directly linked to the definition of status attainment as mentioned above. Investing resources (complementing connections on, for instance, skills or experience) can lead to increased socioeconomic standing by having a better relationship to connections, increasing the chance for a business deal or job and increasing income, or by the profile owner simply getting a recommendation from a connection himself.

Online Status and Connections in Virtual Communities

People seek status out of very basic evolutionary reasons, according to Wilkinson; “higher rank individuals would have greater access to material resources and the highest quality mates, increasing the proportion of their genes in future populations” (Wilkinson 2006, p. 5). Strong motivations of increasing status are due to natural selection and evolution. Therefore, struggle with status always exists within communities, being closely related to hierarchy deference and dominance, expressing identity/personality and in the end, as Wilkinson argues, to survival of the fittest. Status has an organic biological and evolutionary basis. However, status has developed in our contemporary society, it is for instance derived of excellence in a particular domain of activity without being strongly based on superior physical force: “For example, paraplegic physicist Stephen Hawking […] certainly enjoys high status throughout the world” (Wilkinson, p. 6). This differentiation in status expressions constitutes the variability in which status can appear in modern society, which is also an argument for supporting increase of status through connecting with a variety of individuals with different talents or expertise. Status attainment therefore demands processes of peer interaction and active deployment of one’s ties in community.

Social resources can be accessed through direct and indirect ties (Lin 1999, p. 468). The example of using a connection’s authority position for defining status attainment illustrates that resources can be borrowed via connections in community, emphasizing the importance of valuable connections. The acquaintance in the definition’s example is an indirect tie for increasing status. LinkedIn especially provides connection with indirect ties, not always physically within reach of the profile owner, but accessible when needed. LinkedIn provides a concrete keeping in touch with connections and maintaining relationships, which could be valuable in the future, from both sides. LinkedIn functions as an interpersonal channel, of which Granovetter concluded in ‘The Strength of Weak Ties’; “those who used interpersonal channels seemed to land more satisfactory and better jobs” (Granovetter, 1974).  Furthermore, Granovetter distinguishes weak and strong ties. Strong ties being ties with people one has many commonalities with, weak ties being connections with people one has only one or a few commonalities with, in social circles less accessed or less like one’s own. It is hypothesized that as a whole weak ties tend to form bridges that strengthen one’s network. Via weak ties one can access information in social circles not likely to be available in one’s direct surroundings (Granovetter, 1973) thus enriching one’s social network and increasing its potential. Valuable information therefore especially is available through professional social network sites as LinkedIn, by the direct and stable connection with weak ties. One might even consider if the term weak tie still applies. LinkedIn could transform weak ties into strong ties, since any connection (and potential resource for status attainment) is always only a few clicks away.

On the other hand, the supposed main purpose of social networking sites is connecting to new people with which one shares a common ground (similar characteristics as lifestyle, hobbies, taste in music, job, etcetera) (Donath, boyd 2004) and therefore empowering homophily; “it is through this commonality that one can find security in one’s views, feel validated and supported, and have the kind of environment that fosters motivation and joy. […] people do not have to defend their minority status” (boyd 2005). Out of an evolutionary perspective, this safety is indeed important; people are used to residing in communities of likeminded individuals, because this gives them the highest chance of survival. However, contemporary technology gives us the possibility to reach beyond our physical reaching space, offering chances of connection with a wide diversity of audiences. We have been given the possibility to transcend the homophilous environments in which we feel secure. This means we can learn and be influenced in multiple directions, enriching experience and status as never before.

LinkedIn, however, is one of the least open social network sites. Connecting with a stranger is not very common. When adding a new contact a profile owner must select one out of six options; how do you know [contact’s name]? Colleague, Classmate, We’ve done business together, Friend, Other, I don’t know [contact’s name]. Underneath is a message saying; “Important: Only invite people you know well and who know you.”[3] Furthermore, if you do invite people you don’t know recipients can indicate they don’t know you. This has repercussions, since LinkedIn will from then on always ask for a to-be-added contact’s email address. LinkedIn’s main reason for this is to keep the online professional networks it empowers relevant; no infinite numbers of friends, only valuable contacts. Thus, one could argue for LinkedIn being a relatively homophilous environment. However, LinkedIn does provide a profile owner to connect to a connection’s connections; view profiles, send messages, suggest valuable contacts, search for references, etcetera. Linkedin is closed down enough to ensure reliable connections, by only allowing connecting to individuals a profile owner knows and interaction with a connection’s connections, but open enough for growing one’s network in a valuable way, being a environment fostering increase of status. Profiles on social networking sites mainly indicating as being only for ‘fun’ as Friendster or MySpace tend do devalue contacts by having so many of them it seems to become both insincere and useless (boyd, 2008).

Online Status Comparison and LinkedIn Functionalities

Aspiring a higher position in status hierarchy is a natural instinct, as discussed earlier in this paper. Wilkinson describes life is a competitive climb on the ladder of status (Wilkinson, 2006), out of different capitalistic, materialistic or ideological reasons. People compare status because this supplies them with hierarchical information; what is my position in society? And subsequently; what could I do to make it to a higher step?

Let’s look at the different functions of Linkedin, which are indications of identity and status. Linked to Clauss-Ehlers definition of social economic status, I will especially pay attention to education and occupation (income is, of course, private info). Linked to Donath and boyd’s and boyd’s analyses of social networks I will especially pay attention to number of connections and other identity specific parts as profile photo, along with personal information, recommendations, ‘what are you working on?’ and functions alike.

Sample Linkedin User Profile Page

Self-presentation is faceted on LinkedIn.  An identity is subdivided into different secluded sections. The main profile section includes name, current position and location and a profile photo (which cannot be enlarged, seemingly to minimize possible effects of physical appearance). Directly under this is an overview of the profile; current occupation, past occupation, education, number of recommendations, number of connections and (company or portfolio) websites. These different profile parts are set out more detailed further down in the profile.

A LinkedIn profile covers all aspects named in Clauss-Ehlers definition of social-economic status, it highlights them by putting them at the top of the page. Except income, which is presumably too private for mentioning.

Important to realize is that LinkedIn does not represent identities as whole; they get chopped up into manageable pieces, which enables LinkedIn users to compare the pieces apart from the whole. “These foci organize the structure of social networks because they are the circumstances and reasons people meet each other and form ties with each other” (Donath, boyd 2004). Online, identity is subdivided and categorized. This fragmented nature of the LinkedIn profile constitutes a faceted identity, leading to a differentiation of impressions a profile can give. These different parts of one’s identity, seemingly divided into various aspects, lead to a different notion of identity, and thus, status. The different parts of the profile owner’s identity have a greater chance of appealing to people yet to connect with than the identity as an inseparable whole. Furthermore, by comparing different profile parts, rather than the profile as a whole, relative positions become clear. To establish a link with my introduction; the ‘Whuffie’ as a number of total status gets subdivided into smaller units, which enable subdivision specific cross-profile comparison.

LinkedIn chops up status and identity into measurable and comparable units. This enables concrete comparison between different profiles, based on different parts of socio-economic status. Individuals are aware of this; “Awareness empowers individuals, as it gives them the ability to understand their position in a given system and use that knowledge to operate more effectively. In social interactions, people want to be aware of their own presentation, of what is appropriate in the given context, and how others perceive them. […] these two components are essential for interpersonal contextual awareness” (boyd 2002). The contextual awareness boyd discusses is highly relevant to LinkedIn. People actively construct their identity, with heightening of status in mind.

The previously mentioned ‘recommendations’ function extends the subdivision, emphasizing certain sources of one’s status in the profile, creating a preference for certain foundations of status (for instance, a particular position or education). A profile owner can actively focus on certain subdivision by, for instance, recommending weak ties in social circles (concerning that particular position or education) and asking for a recommendation in return. Thus, a profile owner can focus on a desired status subdivision through recommendations. Another function enabling a specific focus is ‘what are you working on?’, in which one can simply fill in one’s current professional activity. This can be a means to keep connections up to date and possibly renew interaction. The activity message can also be implicitly directed at certain connections, further enabling shifting of focus. A relatively new functionality is linking Twitter accounts to LinkedIn, enabling a live feed of tweets, this is comparable to the workings of ‘what are you working on?’.

Previous statements of the strength of weak ties, mutable identity and subdivided status, imply connections being based on small areas of common ground in subdivisions of the profile, which the profile owner actively constructs to radiate social-economic status. These subdivisions in status provide weak tie connections to be made more easily. This enhances use of subdivisions in the profile, going hand in hand with LinkedIn’s closed nature in connecting to new people. Weak tie connections may only know some aspects of the profile owner’s identity, assuming other claims in the profile being true because they do not know about them. This creates a tension between offline social-economic status as a whole, and, online, based upon subdivision in the LinkedIn profile. Donath and boyd also signalize this: “The type of information that flows through a tie, whether about the person or about the world at large, depends on the focus that brought them together and on the shared facets of their identity” (Donath, boyd, 2004).

Online status seems to be more flexible than online status, being able to shift its appearance when coming across different social environments; interaction with contacts from different social circles. Considering LinkedIn being a community especially empowering connection of weak ties, online status seems to be not an exact entity like the ‘Whuffie’, but a transforming whole of different parts, appearing anew to each connection’s eyes. Furthermore, a profile owner can shift the focus of the profile to privilege particular weak ties. This already gets specified on the homepage of LinkedIn; “control you professional identity online”.[4] Through active management of only identity “one writes one’s social-economic status into being.” (boyd, 2008)

Through this online status management one can effectively pursue goals in professional life, with relatively little effort. Connecting to related individuals, in whatever broad sense, is always at hand, as is active status comparison. While communication gets increasingly computer mediated, the computer becomes almost as a limb to humans. “In today’s society, access to information is a key element of status and power and communication is instant, ubiquitous and mobile” (Donath, boyd 2004). When we are mobile and ubiquitously connected, what exactly is the difference between checking someone’s ‘Whuffie’ through a brain implant and checking someone’s social-economic status on a professional network site through a mobile Internet connection? Next to the interface, maybe the only difference is the exact number of the ‘Whuffie’ being self-explanatory and LinkedIn profile info needing interpretation.

Conclusion

To conclude; my main question was:

To what extent do professional social networking sites as LinkedIn enable explicit social-economic status comparison?

Social-economic status as based upon education and occupation is explicitly materialized in profile info on LinkedIn. Through a whole of weak tie connections (meaning connections with which the profile owner only has few commonalities) which form a bridge, connecting to otherwise unavailable social circles become a possibility. LinkedIn’s possibilities of staying in touch with weak ties, along with functions as ‘recommendations’, may be reforming the definition of ‘weak tie’. Therefore, social economic status has the opportunity to grow beyond offline only accounts of social-economic status. Through active construction of online identity, the subdivided nature of self-presentation via profile info provides explicit status comparison between different subdivided profiles and thus, between different profile owners. This gives opportunities for personal growth of the profile owner and a higher relative position in society’s hierarchy.

[2] Friendster homepage headline on 11-01-2010 (www.friendster.com)

[3] Note on LinkedIn’s add connection page 13-01-2010

[4] LinkedIn homepage header on 14-01-2010 (www.linkedin.com)

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