MenSAb Global Views

Poor Questions, Why?

2011-01-27T16:41:00.000-08:00

“I shall call the innocent multitude, I shall show them their poverty.” – El Filibusterismo, Jose Rizal

There are questions that are better unasked and left unanswered. In the same light, that there is a precariously thin line between a stupid question and a notable one. Invariably, we don’t know which one to ask, and yet we expect excellent answer somehow.

Why are we poor?

It is never a covert practice of public officials to accept bribes, acquire lavish lifestyles, and plunder the people’s money. If they have spent millions for their election in office that doesn’t in any way offer a substantial compensation, where do they source their payback? I would like to believe that these politicians are simply generous and sincere in their desire to serve the public.

Woe to the people who have been betrayed and still willing to be victims, and shame to those who have done such acts. Now no less than a governor is pointing a finger to a president allegedly receiving bribed money from gambling lords. Bereft with evidences, the allegation is likely to stay like a liquid looking for a container. Soon it will evaporate if we continue to shrug it off. (Wake up, we are being cheated straight-faced.)

Is it why we are poor? Most of us dread interviews especially a job interview. It is not that we don’t want to get a job but we are scared to tell someone how we badly need one. It is usually the rhetoric questions that discourage us to finally dress up decently, carry that old bio-data, enter the door of uncertainty, sit down with other rivals thinking similarly that they are much more qualified, hear their family name called with the bourgeoisie sound, face the unassuming interviewer who hold our future, respond unreadily to the familiar questions, walk out the room with failing hope, and expect a call even if we have no phone at home. No days would pass without recalling which questions we might have answered wrong. “Can you tell me about yourself?” That’s it. We should have answered correctly this way, we are poor and we are unemployed and we need this job. Is it hard to speak about? Because it is the truth and the other painful truth is that we don’t have a “padrino” to boot.

Why are we poor then?

It does not make sense if we see billboards declaring, “Sorry for the inconvenience, this is where your taxes go.” We can accept the inconvenience thing because we are very much used with it but the hardest pill to swallow is the alleged recipient of our taxes. The culture of corruption in our society particularly in the public sector is endemic. The structure, the system, the values, these all contribute to bring about and breed corruption. Sometimes we are partly to blame for we succumb to the greedy system by giving bribes. The cycle of blaming syndrome, that no one will give if no one receives and that no one will receive if no one gives, is not going to help in combating corruption.

What kind of basic services, just the most basic ones, can we expect from our government if we lose 20% of our national budget to corruption every year, says the World Bank. The Bank also identifies a number of recommendations to fight corruption in our country; reducing opportunities for corruption through policy reforms and deregulation, reforming campaign finance, increasing public oversight, reforming budget processes, enhancing sanctions for corruption, developing partnerships with the private sector, improving meritocracy in the civil service and supporting judicial reforms.

If South Korea could jail former presidents convicted with corruption, why can’t we just investigate our own? If it does happen, I suppose we are now prepared to liberate ourselves from poverty.

The beatitudes of poverty, that bestow blessedness because the Kingdom of God is ours, are purely expressions of the vicarious suffering and not earth-shaking protests of the real suffering. The illusions of that promised happiness do not constitute real happiness we are supposed to enjoy while on earth. Mysticism, spiritualism, and religion intend to rationalize the miserable conditions of the poor, and we, the innocent and trusting poor in our shallow discernment, find the means of escape from poverty and oppression through them. They have been quite successful in having us believed that our liberation from oppression lies not on this world, that our freedom from poverty is not of this world.

Another world must be truly possible.

What is the question again?

Our poor memory tends to make us repeat the same mistakes. But this time, never again.

Participative Governance on Urban Development in Naga City, Philippines

2011-01-14T14:27:00.000-08:00

“He is the same as me, yet I am not him. Only if you understand it in this way will you merge with the way things are.” – Tung-Shan (807-869)

One of the key ingredients of development is participation of the peoples. Naga City in the Philippines has institutionalized this through the Naga City People's Council (NCPC).

Paving the Road of Dialogue

The NCPC, being the nucleus of representation of various sectors in the city, has called on the concerned sectors namely; the business, urban poor, city government, and NGOs to discuss the current issues besetting the city such as land conversion, expropriation, resettlement sites, and among others relative to urban poor concerns, business interest, and the city’s policies on urban development. It was quite clear to all sectors present that the dialogue will not result to a draft of policy direction of the city in view of the issues raised. Rather, it would open more rooms for discussion, brainstorming, and convergence of the different points of view.

Three Lanes of the Road

City Government. The programs and policies in urban development of the city are premised on its pursuit of the common good for all sectors. Every sector is a vital part and parcel of its vision for development, thus the NCPC was formed. In an event that one sector feels marginalized in favor of other sectors, it should not be construed that the former is less important than the latter in terms of resources from the government. The city assures all sectors that there would be given their due.

For example, the Naga City government has no choice but to expropriate the land should there be an impending demolition order in the given urban poor settlement. The city government’s act of expropriation should not be interpreted as a case of favoring the urban poor over the landowner. In a given circumstance like this, the city government’s best decision is to deliver justice to the majority who need the land more than the landowner. As Magsaysay aptly explained, “Those who have less in life should have more in law.”

For example, in one meeting, the Urban Poor Affairs Office (UPAO) presented 4 options for the city to act upon with regard to the issues affecting the urban poor. These options are the negotiated purchase, the land swapping scheme, the land sharing scheme, and the expropriation of properties. The last option is the last recourse. The city therefore does not automatically expropriate a land without exhausting first the 3 options. Anyhow, there are cases that should be treated as an exemption than a rule so must not be defined as a precedent to any case.

Engagingly, a member of the Naga City Urban Development Housing Board (NCUDHB) asserted that before the city endorsed an expropriation proceeding, it should consider first the affordability of the land by the occupants. He cited a case where the land in question is a high-priced property which could cost from P300,000 to P400,000 for each occupant-family. The assertion was well taken by the city official present.

Business Sector. The apprehension was unanimously shared by the business people that in such case – expropriation would become the policy direction of the city and a precedent to settle land issues. Their reason was primarily anchored on the city’s declaration of a specified area as part of growth corridor. The city, according to them, contradicted itself when it decided to expropriate the land for the urban poor when it had identified the area, sitting along the national road, as potential investment site. They feared that the city’s decision could send a wrong signal for prospective business investors. They also noted that politicians already aiming for public office since election will be held in 9 months time could use cases like this for propaganda.

Urban Poor Sector. As the informal sector of society, they want to live decently as part of the growing society. Topping all concerns, they reiterated their need to have a shelter of their own that is livable, accessible by transportation, has means to earn a livelihood, to do their share in the development of the community. They asked to be regarded as partners in development and not impediment of the same.

It is widely accepted now that economic capital alone does not bring about development. Social investments through housing, health, education, are essential in developmental goals.

Hope at the End of the Road

Recognizing the diverse interests of the sectors present in the dialogue, it was difficult to come up with one statement of principle relative to these issues. The differences in the concept of development appended the indifference among each sector’s interest. But then if there was one thing that the dialogue had gained, it was the motion to willingly look into the areas where each sector could compliment each other’s interest. The fact that this kind of dialogue had happened, it was not too much to hope for a point of concurrence among sectors of society to make Naga indeed a “Maogmang Lugar.” That, I think, will supersede conflicting interests among/between sectors of society particularly Naga City, Philippines.

We Know It's Christmas

2010-12-23T14:45:00.000-08:00

We bring a felled tree or a plastic that resembles a pine tree inside our homes. We wrap it with blinking lights, colored balls, a star or angel on top, and other ornaments. Below the tree are gifts, miniature of the manger where Christ was born with Joseph, Mary, and the three kings.

We put yellow lights around our houses or around a living tree in front of our houses. The surroundings become brighter because of these extra lightings in the neighborhood.

We buy and prepare gifts to be given to special and dear family members, relatives, godsons and goddaughters, and friends.

We receive invitations to parties.

We sing songs that resonate with the gladness and merriment of our hearts.

We go to Masses. In the Philippines, there are nine Masses early in the morning leading to the eve of Christmas.

In all of these, what makes an ordinary tree turn into a decorated one? What makes the lights around the tree and houses starry and sparkling? What makes the gifts different this time of the year? What makes parties special this season? In all of these transformations, Christmas tree, Christmas lights, Christmas gifts, Christmas parties, we remember the CHRIST that was born on this day.

Notably, many of us would have a simple tree inside their homes, simple lights around their houses, simple gifts given to and/or received from dear ones, and simple parties to socialize and celebrate. It is because they find similar meanings to these as those grand things.

However, some of us would have none at all of these things. It is not because they could not find and afford tree, lights, gifts and parties; rather it is because they are constrained to have these things shown in public. Christians in Iraq are not going to show any public signs of celebration of Christmas, otherwise they are putting risks on their lives. The insurgents linked to Al-Qaida have threatened Christians for more attacks after the October 31 siege of a Catholic Church where 52 people died. Christians in the country are fleeing to be able to practice what they believe in.

Let us remember this Christmas day our Christian brothers and sisters in Iraq and other countries who confront threats and persecutions when practicing their beliefs including the observance and celebration of the birth of Christ. Let us pray for peace to prevail on everyone's heart.

Yes, we know it's Christmas. Not because of a tree, lights, gifts, and parties. We know it's Christmas because we let Christ reign in our hearts who gives us joy and consolation, no matter what.

Merry CHRISTmas to all!

Critical Reflection on Enlightenment and Modernity, Rationality, and Emancipation Within Culture

2010-06-13T04:34:00.000-07:00

The sweeping far-right wind that has been blowing Europe these days deserves another look on the philosophical, cultural and historical framing of the recent events such as the ascension to power by the Conservatives in the United Kingdom, gain of parliamentary seats of right-wing parties in France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, and lately Slovakia. Is this a critical juncture in Europe where the common currency is being troubled by debt-problems and its regionalism being questioned?

Let us take a look then at what's happening in Europe during one of its finest critical point in history - enlightenment and modernity.

The transformations and changes happening in Europe between 16th and 19th centuries such as the invention of printing press, rising of nation-states, colonialization of new lands, standardization of time, development of linear perspective, among others led to demand new ways of looking at, understanding and explaining things and events through the social science (Pertierra; 1997).

This preoccupied many great thinkers to theorize on the phenomena of changes. They set a “wide-ranging system of ideas that deals with the centrally important issues of social life” known as sociological theory (Ritzer; 1988). Two forces that shaped and brought about the development and rise of sociological theories – the social and intellectual forces of that time. One of those intellectual forces was the Enlightenment from which this essay reflects upon based on the article of Michel Foucault, What is Enlightenment? Then it proceeds with the major sociological theories of Max Weber in The Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalism and Jurgen Habermas’ Aspects of the Rationality of Action. In the last part of the essay would be the reflection on Raul Pertierra’s Emancipation Within Culture. This essay attempts to present the location and contribution of the said articles in the anthropological and sociological knowledge that we have.

Foucault’s What is Enlightenment?

The title is the same question answered by Immanuel Kant’s Was ist Aufklarung in 1784. It was basically a reflection of a great thinker on his own present. At that time, present was conceived in three forms; 1) as an “era of the world distinct from the others through some inherent characteristics, ” 2) a sign of a forthcoming event, 3) “a point of transition toward the dawning of a new world.” And Kant departed from this conception. He saw the present as an “exit” or “way out” from the state of “immaturity” described as letting the others direct or lead in an area where one is unable to make use of his/her reason when it is called for. For example in Kant’s article, when a book does the understanding for a person, that person is in a state of “immaturity.” Lazinesss and cowardice are the reasons cited by Kant for this “immaturity.” So he proposed a motto or instruction for Enlightenment – Aude sapere, “dare to know,” or “have courage to use your own reason.” For Kant, he characterized Enlightenment as both a task and obligation, individually and collectively. He also distinguished the private use of reason and public use of reason. On one hand, when one is a “cog in a machine” or plays a role in society, he make a private use of reason in determined circumstances and ends in view. When one, on the other hand, uses reasoning as a reasonable being and for reasoning’s sake, it is a public use of reason that must be free.

Foucault (1984) summarized what Kant’s description of enlightenment as; “ the moment when humanity is going to put its own reason to use, without subjecting itself to any authority; now it is precisely at this moment that the critique is necessary, since its role is that of defining the conditions under which the use of reason is legitimate in order to determine what can be known, what must be done, and what may be hoped….. Enlightenment is the age of the critique.” This, for Foucault, characterizes the “attitude of modernity.” Although modernity has been referred to as an epoch in history, sandwiched between premodernity and postmodernity, Foucault would like to picture it as an attitude rather than an epoch of history. By attitude, he meant “a mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the end, a way of thinking and feeling; a way too of acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task. A bit, no doubt, like what the Greeks called an ethos.”

He cited Charles Baudelaire to further describe this attitude of modernity as “characterized in terms of consciousness of the discontinuity of time: a break with tradition, a feeling of novelty, of vertigo in the face of the passing moment, ” the heroization of the present is regarding it very highly and imagining it other than what it is, and as “ a mode of relationship that has to be established with oneself,” inventing and reinventing oneself. And the fourth which Foucault added, these characterizations of modernity can be produced through art.

If this attitude or ethos of Enlightenment and modernity is a critique of our historical era, it has its stakes which are the differentiated capabilities and the growing autonomy vis-à-vis power relations, homogeneity which organizes the way and purpose things are done, systemacity which is mediated by our relationships with others and ourselves, and generality which bears the practices and discourses. We may then refuse to accept whatever it presents to us as alternative. We must constantly question and pose historical inquiries that converge truth and liberty wherever and whenever possible. These inquiries must be tested and based on contemporary reality. The philosophical ethos espoused here involves analyzing and reflecting on the limits of the knowledge but they should not hinder us from transgressing. This transgression may take the place of discontinuity or break from tradition. Giddens (1999) stated that, “the idea of tradition then is itself a creation of modernity.” He further said that traditions are invented recently for diverse reasons. One of which, according to Giddens, is to “give continuity and form to life,” and that there seems to be a “symbiosis between modernity and tradition” – one needing the other to protect and justify its existence.

Going back to Kant’s description of Enlightenment as an “exit” or “way out,” it is like we are inside a theater or cinema surrounded by darkness, distracted and absorbed by the reality flashed on screen different from what we know of it; but a little red sign flickers that invites us to a way out in case of fire. This fire represents the changes and ruptures of routines. Truly, it feels good to be staying forever inside a cinema. It entertains us and makes us forget our problems for a time being. Or we are just afraid to confront our own shadows that cause us prefer to hide in the darkness? Kant reminded us that the enlightened is not afraid of shadows. Being afraid of the shadows seems natural, but in reality it can be critically interrogated. To do this, it takes a philosophical attitude which Foucault propounded, a critique of who we are, an analysis of our limits imposed on us and an experiment or project of transcendental possibilities.
Rationality

Two prominent works of sociological theorists on rationality form the discussion of this part; Max Webber and Jurgen Habermas.

Weber’s Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalism

Weber started by citing circumstances that manifested Western civilization as the source of various developments with significant value and recognition as valid today. Some of these developments were the codification of books, rational jurisprudence, harmonious music, perspective in art, rise of a modern state with written constitution, laws and administration, among other things that had to do with astronomy, architecture, view of history, literature, etc. Included in these developments was the “most fateful force in our modern life, capitalism.” He asserted that capitalism is not in any way identical with unlimited greed for gain; rather it is identical with continuous renewal of profit through continuous capitalistic enterprise. The economic action through capitalistic undertakings of continuous operations of an enterprise was differentiated from the speculative acquisition of profit from wars, piracy, exploitation of subjects, election, etc. The former was being the legal and systematic pursuit of profit. There were other things that brought about this Western capitalism such as the organization of free labor, the separation of business from the household, rational bookkeeping, the notion of personal property, rational structures of law and administration by trained officials or bureaucracy, and the utilization of scientific knowledge in modern science particularly mathematics.

Then the question as to why in the West did this exacting capitalism emerge remains unsettled to a large extent. For example, the opening of a public library, the offering of scholarships, the introduction of new business courses in a local university, the passage of a resolution increasing the subsidy for education would not greatly explain satisfactorily the growing number of entrepreneurs in a certain town. There must be the fundamental shift in the disposition of the town folks toward business engagements to be able to explain the phenomenon and this new conduct. And Weber recognized that the magical and religious forces and the ethical ideas of duty had been the most essential influences on conduct of men/women, on the “development of economic spirit or ethos of economic system.” With this, the spirit of capitalism was associated with the “rational ethics of ascetic Protestantism especially Calvinism.”

Certain religious ideas such as proficiency in a calling as work, expression of virtues of honesty, frugality, punctuality, and industry, avoidance of life’s pleasures, and gaining wealth as a sign of an election of the saved were informing this ethic of capitalistic culture. Weber identified traditionalism in both the laborers and entrepreneur as anti-spirit of capitalism. Traditional laborers were those of pre-capitalistic labor that was interested in earning the usual rate no matter how attractive the opportunity to earn more. The employer’s wish of efficiency and high productivity by means of increased labor rate went to naught in the arms of traditional laborers. As compared with capitalistic labor, workers were responsible and released from counting the rates and income with maximum comfort and minimum effort. In this case, labor is performed as a calling. However, the traditional entrepreneurs, on one hand, were concerned with the satisfaction of needs, that is acquisition of goods necessary to meet the needs. Capitalistic entrepreneurs on the other hand acquired goods and profit untied by the limits set by needs. They sought to gain profit rationally and systematically. Traditionalism persisted for a while but the process of rationalization of areas of life destroyed it. Some features of modern economic life were the extended the productivity of labor, labor for a rational organization providing service and goods for humanity, calculated future, and direction with foresight

It has been acknowledged that “rationalization lies at the heart of Weber’s substantive sociology” (Ritzer; 1988). “By rationalization he meant the process of making life more efficient and predictable by wringing out individuality and spontaneity in life” (Adams and Sydie: 2002). This is why he did not see actions as fragmented but patterned within civilizations, institutions, organizations, strata, classes, and groups (Ritzer; 1988). He was interested in understanding the meaning, causes, and consequences of action (Adams and Sydie: 2002). There were 4 types of meaningful social action for Weber (1925); 1) instrumental rational action “occurs when the end, the means, and the secondary results are all rationally taken into account and weighed, 2) value-rational action is based on a “conscious belief in the value for its own sake,” 3) affectual action or emotional action, 4) traditional action is “determined by ingrained habituation.” His theory was a search for rational action.

While Weber’s capitalism was seen as a response to Marx’s analysis of capitalism and both were interested in discovering the historical causal relationship that had resulted to the current state of modern society, he however refused to consider the “material factors could explain every aspect of social reality” (Adams and Sydie: 2002). In Weber’s view, ideas especially religious ideas were critical aspects of action (ibid). Protestant ethic as an idea system was linked with another system of ideas, the spirit of capitalism (Ritzer; 1988). “In other words, two systems of ideas are directly linked in this work” (ibid). But he failed to link the rational action with the idea systems.

“Unlike Marx and Durkheim who both projected optimistic outcomes in the transition to modernity, Weber rejects the Enlightenment’s view of evolutionary progress and happiness. Instead, he projects a ‘polar night of icy,’ a highly rational and bureaucratically organized social order, an ‘iron cage’ in which people are trapped” (Farganis: 1993). Furthermore, “despite these rationalizing trends, Weber believes that the complexity of social life ultimately outstrips the ability of the social sciences to fully comprehend it” (Tucker; 1998). Sadly, we are supposed to be liberated by reason, Weber saw the opposite.

Habermas’ Aspects of the Rationality of Action

Habermas’ point of departure was Weber’s approach to rationality of action. For Weber, action is treated as purposive activity. Habermas argued that this approach was just coming from one point of view to appraise actions as rational and that there were other aspects of rationality of action. Applying the model of purposive-rational action in a specific context, its description as rational includes the judgment that the choice of means of the subject/agent seems valid and appropriate given the circumstances and limits of knowledge. Weber used “rational” and “rationalization” to refer to expressions of utterances, opinions, and actions which could justifiably be given reasons. “The rationality of opinions and actions is measured against validity claims that are based on reasons.”

At another level, Weber talked about systems-rationality of capitalism, state bureaucracy, and law but fell short in linking them with rationality of action. The social systems theorists like Parsons and Luhmann dissuaded from the rationality of the subjects bringing about the system, instead they elaborated on the system’s capacity to accommodate changes in the environment.

Weber’s typology of action makes a distinction in purposive-rational, value-rational, affectual, and traditional actions. An example using this typology would be going to school. Various reasons can be given for it. For traditional action, it is because my parents and siblings and almost everybody go to school. For affectual action, I go to school because I have fun in school with my classmates and I enjoy my stay there. For value-rational action, my reason for my going to school is to get education I need in life. And for purposive-rational action, I go to school to finish my studies, get my diploma to enable me to land a decent job in preparation for my future. With this model of action, it discounts social relationship as a reference point and “considers only the end-means relationship of a teleologically conceived, monological action to be capable of rationalization.” With this perspective, what could be considered rational are only those aspects of action that have “observable success of a causally effective intervention into an existing situation.” So Habermas introduced the concept of “communicative action” to draw out other aspects of the rationality of action that Weber ‘s action theory did not cover.

The purposive-rational action of Weber is geared toward the attainment of its goal and that other consequences of action are minor conditions for success. Habermas called this goal-oriented action as instrumental action wherein “we consider it from the aspect of following technical rules and evaluate the degree of efficacy of the intervention into a physical state of affairs,” whereas the other is called strategic action “when we consider it from the aspects of following rules of rational choice and evaluate the degree of efficacy of influencing the decisions of rational opponents.” In contrast to these success-oriented actions is the communicative action which is geared toward reaching an understanding. This understanding leads to an agreement which is not imposed but based on common conviction which can be criticized.

Referring to human language as the telos for reaching an understanding, actions oriented toward understanding can be analyzed from the model of the speech act. However, “a speech act can be contested, that is, rejected as ‘invalid’, basically from three aspects: from the aspect of the truth that the speaker claims for a proposition, from the aspect of the truthfulness that the speaker claims for the expression of his feelings, needs, wishes, intentions, etc., finally from the aspect of the rightness that the speaker claims for his action with reference to a given normative context.” Communicative actions can be contested as untrue, untruthful, and normatively wrong. In any case, it wishes to be understood in the first place. For analysis purposes, the pure cases of speech acts are ideal. Here Habermas was referring to “constative speech acts in which elementary prepositional sentences are employed,” “expressive speech acts in which elementary first person sentences appear,” and “institutionally bound speech acts correlated only with one simple and well-defined norm.” Each of these foregoing speech acts bears an attitude; a) objectivating attitude wherein a neutral observer reacts to something in his/her external world, b) expressive attitude wherein a subject reveals something of his/her inner world, c) conformative attitude wherein a member acts in an expected way in his/her social world. To illustrate this clearly, a comparative table below is presented taken from the Habermas’ article.

Types of action Action orientation
Basic attitudes
Validity claims Relations to the world
Strategic action Oriented to success objectivating (efficacy) External world
Constative speech act Oriented to reaching understanding Objectivating Truth External world
Expressive self-representation Oriented to reaching understanding Expressive Truthfulness Inner world
Normatively regulated action Oriented to reaching understanding Norm-conformative Rightness Social world

In addition with the “catelogue” of pure types of action, Habermas also provided additional categories aside from the above table that “are intended to make analytic problematics plausible” in explaining the aspects of rationality of action he postulated earlier.

Pure types of action
Types of knowledge
Forms of argumentative examination Models of transmissible knowledge
Constative speech acts Empirical-theoretical knowledge Theoretical discourse Theories
Purposive-rational action (strategic) Technically and strategically utilizable knowledge Theoretical discourse Technologies strategies
Expressive action Aesthetic-practical knowledge Therapeutic and aesthetic critique Works of art
Normatively regulated action Moral-practical knowledge Practical discourse Legal and moral conceptions

Habermas indicated two advantages of the theory of communicative action that could contribute in understanding the processes of social rationalization; 1) “with the pure types of action, we would have explained exactly those aspects under which action can be rationalized, that is, criticized and improved insofar as they incorporate ‘knowledge,’ 2) “with the concept of communicative action, we would have gained a non-arbitrary viewpoint from which a social system of institutions can be appraised as more or less ‘rational.’

In Beiner’s Rescuing the Rationalist Heritage (n.d.), it is noted that “Habermas still adheres to an Enlightenment concept of reason,” about its liberating character or in Kantian word – an ‘exit’ to immaturity. This is why “he feels constrained to affirm Weber’s rationalization process and the modern forms of life that go with it” (ibid) which is the ‘iron cage.’ Pertierra (1988) describes the work of Habermas as “the most ambitious attempt to develop the emancipatory potential of reason.” Indeed, Habermas’ theory of communicative action breaks away from the rationalization envisaged by Weber as monological action. Habermas highlighted the social relationship we’re in, and so the cooperation of the other is taken into account. His communicative rationality involves this Other who enters into partnership with the other Other in an honest relationship and undistorted communication to be able reach an understanding.
Pertierra’s Emancipation Within Culture

Numerous usages of the word culture proliferate in the world today. Pertierra (1998) discusses the uses and anthropological meaning of culture and draws evocative examples from the Philippines as well as from the world. He traced the improvement of various definitions of culture from E. Tylor’s “complex whole” (1871) to Kapferer’s “set of principles” (1988). “Other anthropologists see culture as an invisible lens through which we see reality,” thus it includes “primordial categories” transferred through non-conscious and non-rational processes of language, myth and art. Combining the features of earlier definitions, culture is seen as “a set of ideas, values and practices as well as an orientation and predisposition toward a life-world.” He also added that we have to see culture as “incomplete, contested, inconsistent and never fully established.”

The modern conditions with mass media and institutions generate a “standardization of culture.” Filipinos and Americans are said to be sharing a common culture (i.e. English language, consumerism, movie craze). Culture is not anymore tied with particular territory (i.e. Chinatown, cuisine). It becomes deterritorialized. Some anthropologists contended that culture shapes our world (cultural determinism). Others believed that no two cultures are alike due to different experiences of the world (cultural relativism). There is also the view that culture is distinguished between high and low culture. The former associated with the rich exemplifies the best thoughts, ideas produced by society while the latter pertains to the popular culture linked with the working class. “Hence, class antagonisms express both economic and cultural divisions.” Modern conditions cause diasporas and cultural dispersions. Millions of Filipinos are working abroad due to the difficulty of earning a living here and shortage of decent job opportunities. Pertierra also delved into Philippine culture(s). Religion of course was noted first through the folk beliefs and practices such as anting-anting, aswang, pasyon, penitensya, etc., and how religion encroaches into broad areas of life of the Filipinos. He also cited the insistence of Filipinos in the principle of reciprocity (utang na loob). Come this May election, this principle of reciprocity will come into play which can decide the outcome of a local post. In the Spanish colonial times, the revolt was largely seen as local resistance than national struggle.

The Philippines has many local languages. The introduction of Filipino as the national language is a national prescription by the State. “Since culture always involves both consent and constraint,” the use of Filipino is reserved to formal functions except for the Tagalog-speaking regions. What remains largely in use in everyday life is the local language. In the territorially administered cultures, we confuse our cultural identity with political allegiance. An example given in our class was about the celebration of EDSA 1 as declared a non-working holiday by the government but in Ilocos, people went to work because they could not observe an event that toppled their Apo.

Pertierra showed how culture could be a medium for the representation of self and other. Through cultural presentations, the identity for self and other is represented by the performances. However these performances become routinized, conventional and predictable so much so that they dull our sense of identity. There are artists though who are experimenting with indigenous forms of presentations (i.e. Grace Nono, Joey Ayala). Another very good example given by Pertierra is the awarding of exemplar individuals who contributed in one way or the other on the enrichment of national culture. With that, we were projecting a national culture of exemplariness. “We may identify with it, but only vicariously. In contrast, a local culture is a lived experience.” He also noted how we have limited notion of culture through our sense of the future. While the postmodernists visualize the future as present constitutive, our “imagination is overdetermined by its colonial past as well as constrained by its understanding of culture.” There was once a journalist who described the Philippines as “damaged culture” by way of negative instances of public behavior of Filipinos. Instead of a damaged culture, “one should point out the inefficient, corrupt or non-existent structures of government.”

Our ideal, our future and aspiration are very much informed by culture. “Since culture shapes our perception of the world, it also affects our response to and our location in it,” whether we allow ourselves to be enslaved by the “iron cage, ” or work for our emancipation by confronting the complexities of social life.
Concluding Note

This essay started with the Enlightenment and its promise of liberation from self-induced tutelage. It was seen as one of the intellectual forces that influenced the development of sociological theorizing and that set the tone for modernity. In modernity, Weber postulated the rationalization process and its consequences for modern life in which man/woman would be trapped in “iron cage.” Habermas took off from where Weber left and continued the work on rationality of action. Habermas put again reason in central stage of theorizing. He introduced the theory of communicative action with which he brought back the emancipatory component of reason, just like in the Enlightenment. Then, Pertierra located culture and its uses and its lack and surplus of meanings in the emancipation process of man/woman which the Enlightenment had promised from the start – using culture as a tool and object critique.

References:

Adams, Bert and R. A. Sydie (2002). Classical Sociological Theory. California: Pine Forge Press. Beiner, Ronald (n.d.). Rescuing the Rationalist Heritage. Farganis, James (1993). Readings in Social Theory: The Classic Tradition to Post-Modernism. USA: McGraw-Hill, Inc.

Foucault, Michel (1997). What is Enlightenment. The Politics of Truth. Ed. Sylvere Lotringer. USA: Semiotext(e).

Giddens, Anthony (1999). British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Reith Lecture on Tradition.

Habermas, Jurgen (1979). Aspects of the Rationality of Action. Pertierra, Raul (1988). The Rationality Problematique: An Anthropological Review of Habermas’ The Theory of Communicative Action Volume 1. Social Analysis No. 23, August 1988.

____________ (1998). Emancipation Within Culture. Public Policy. October/December 1998.

Ritzer, George (1988). Sociological Theory 2nd Edition. Singapore: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company.

Tucker Jr., Kenneth (1998). Anthony Giddens and Modern Social Theory. London: Sage Publications.

Weber, Max (1998). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. trans. Talcott Parsons. California: Roxbury Publishing Company.

War, Peace and Democracy: Enough of Rhetorics

2010-04-23T08:27:00.000-07:00

"This essay revisits the classical argument of democratic-peace in reference to more recent political events, including the US and UK led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and concludes that democracy in and of itself is an insufficient indicator of a given state's likelihood of engaging in war. The message of this argument takes on an extra dimension of meaning in light of the recent conflict in Georgia." (Peace and Conflict Monitor, 2008)

Today, more states are embracing democracy than three decades ago.[1] In 2006, there were 77 democratic states compared to 49 anocracies[2] and 34 autocracies (Hewitt et. al., 2008, p.13). What does it mean to the peace and security of the world? Is the world getting more peaceful as more democracies are emerging? Indeed, there is “a distinct downward trend” of the number of both internal and interstate active armed conflicts (Ibid, 2008, p.12). However, the downward trend is attributed not to the rise of democratic states, but to the end of Cold War period.

According to Thomas Hobbes[3] and Immanuel Kant (cited in Behler, 1986, p.276), the state of nature or natural state is a condition of war. Both philosophers treated peace as something to be established and endeavored by man/woman. Thus, how do we get out of this state of nature (condition of war)? Or how do we achieve peace?

To achieve peace, Kant proposed a league of nations, a federation of republican states under the law of nations which both secures and constrains freedom of states. In Kant’s idea, the expansion of this league would bring perpetual peace.

Is democracy a way out of this state of nature? Or does democratization (democracy has to start somewhere and sometime) reinforce this state of nature? The democratic peace proposition answers the first question positively. Ray (1998) believes that democracy causes peace. On the other hand, Mansfield and Snyder (2005) favor the second question. I shall attempt in this short essay to find out which of the two questions stands in scrutiny and analysis as more convincing and compelling to believe.

The ambivalence of the relationship between democracy and war could be highlighted in the global war on terror launched by the United States and its allies in the aftermath of 9/11 terrorist attack. The US-led alliance against terrorism has come to believe that preventive wars might be necessary to “build the ‘infrastructure of democracy’ abroad” (Mansfield and Snyder, 2005, p.1). This belief led to the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq which at the time of the invasion were under despotic regimes. Wars were waged in the name of introducing democracy to these two countries. The premise of those wars was that democracy would bring freedom, security and peace to the two countries and to the world. After the invasion, democratic processes started to roll with elections leading the way. The expectations and hopes of these processes did not materialize as the conditions of Afghanistan and Iraq have been implicitly that of civil war which is a picture of Hobbesian and Kantian state of nature.

What is war?

The standard definition of war has come from the Correlates of War (CoW) project which helps further research on the topic.[4] It puts definitive measure to war as a conflict where at least 1,000 battle deaths are recorded in a given year (Mansfield and Snyder, 2005, p.91; Ray, 1998, p.31). This definition includes interstate, extra-systemic, and intrastate wars. For this essay, I make no distinction between interstate, extra-systemic, and intrastate wars. All of them deserve to be called “war”.

What is democracy?

As a system of government, democracy has four key elements; free elections to choose or replace a government, peoples’ participation in politics and civic life, human rights protection, and a rule of law that is equally applicable to all citizens.[5] A state that possesses these four key elements is said to be a democratic state.

To measure democracy, Mansfield and Snyder (2005) consider states to be democratic when there is competitive competition of political parties or groupings in the election, when the head of the government is popularly voted into office, and when “constraints on the executive are more than ‘substantial,’ based on Polity scale” (p.77).

Democracy and peace

There is a general consensus that no democracies have ever been at war against each other. The basic idea and reason is that “democracy is an important cause of peace” (Ray, 1998, p.27). Even Mansfield and Snyder (2005) agree with this when they argue that “a root cause of the democratic peace is that democratic institutions make government authorities accountable to the average voter” (p.51). So the leaders of democratic states would not risk their position or office by going to war because they could always be voted out of their offices by own citizens who would carry the brunt of war.

Democracy is not an absolute category, however, and there are many nations transitioning into (or out of) democratic institutions. Mansfield and Snyder (2005) argue that countries experiencing such transitions are actually “more likely than other states to become involved in war”, especially “countries undergoing incomplete democratization with weak institutions” (p.67).

Perhaps the most fundamental question that begs to be asked of the democratic-peace concept is: does democracy stop war from happening? Obviously it does not. Democratic states have initiated and engaged in plenty of wars. Just count the number of modern wars that the US and United Kingdom (UK), two known champions of democracy, have been involved in. I remember two world wars, Korea, Vietnam, the Falklands, Iraq, Afghanistan, and many others. Thus, democracy does not stop wars, and it does not offer us a way out of the Hobbesian state of nature.

Democracy and war

If democracy does not stop war, then does it go to war? I would say, yes! Even though democracies do not fight each other, “they fight and initiate wars about as often as non-democracies” (Mansfield and Snyder, 2005, p.49).

What about those democratizing states or incomplete democracies? Are they really prone to war? As mentioned earlier, Mansfield and Snyder (2005) argue that they are at a higher risk of going to war than either democratic or autocratic states. There are key features that make these democratizing states more likely to go to war. These are weak institutions and strong nationalistic sentiments. An example cited in the book, Electing to Fight, is the Falklands war between Argentina and Britain. The authors consider Argentina as “an incompletely democratizing initiator of the war” (p. 219).

In actual fact, however, Argentina was not democratizing at the time when the war was launched, although it was expecting an election. The war was more of an effort by the Argentina’s junta to hold on to power, than the result of any democratizing processes.

Carothers (2007) and McFaul (2007) are similarly critical of the assertion of Mansfield and Snyder. Carothers cites Francis Fukuyama’s comment that many wars in Europe for the last 500 years have had something to do more with state-building than democracy. McFaul, on the other hand, simply does not buy the arguments made by Mansfield and Snyder. He points convincingly to theoretical, methodological and empirical flaws of the thesis on democratization leading to war. One of the flaws McFaul cites is the mislabeling of those cases that are supposed to be “regime collapse or a return to autocracy” as democratizing states (p.164). He reviews the examples used in the book, such as France under Napoleon III and the Prussia case. McFaul hardly considers these cases as democratizing states, and I agree with him on this point. France was hardly a democratizing state when Napoleon III took power through a coup.

The evidences to support the argument that democratization causes states to be more war-prone have thus been undermined by Carothers and McFaul, and we are left with the conclusion that there is no direct relationship between democracy and war.

Conclusion

As an international peace student, there is a value though in the arguments of Mansfield and Snyder, in spite of the valid criticisms the book has received. There is always soe value in shedding light on the causes of war. For Mansfield and Snyder, it is democratization that has something to do with war. For realists, it is about geopolitics and self-interest. For pragmatists, it is greed. For freedom fighters, it is oppression and marginalization. For me, wars have peculiarities that make it difficult to categorize them grandly. Although I have special interest in understanding wars, I have come to abhor war which is the worst enemy of peace. However, war also makes peace possible and desirable.

Having reviewed the arguments for and against the concept of democratic-peace, I think the relationship between democracy and war is ultimately neutral and indeterminate. Democracy neither leads us out of our warlike and belligerent methods of dealing with conflict, nor does it particularly reinforce the condition of war.

Democracy by itself is not enough to begin or end a war; rather we must look to intermediary forces, such as economic and environmental pressures, untamed nationalism, the marginalization of minorities, and clampdowns on culture and religion.

References

Carothers, T. (2007). Misunderstanding Gradualism, Journal of Democracy, 18(3), 18-22.

Hewitt, J. et. al. (2008). Peace and Conflict 2008: Executive Summary. Maryland: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland.

Kant, I. (1986) [1795]. Perpetual Peace. In E. Behler (Ed.). Immanuel Kant: Philosophical Writings. New York: Continuum, pp.270-311.

McFaul, M. (2007). Are New Democracies War-Prone? Book review of Mansfield and Snyder (2005), Journal of Democracy 18(2), 160-167.

Mansfield, E and J. Snyder. (2005). Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Ray, J. (1998). Does Democracy Cause Peace? Annual Review of Political Science 1, 27-

[1] From 1973-2004, “there were 179 instances of democratization, defined as countries moving from either Not Free to Free (25 cases) or Not Free to Partly Free (154 cases), as determined by Freedom House rankings” (McFaul, 2007, p.161).

[2] Anocracy is a “middle category of regimes having a mix of authoritarian and democratic institutional features” (Hewitt, et. al, 2008, p.13).

[3] See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hobbes-moral/ for an elaboration on Thomas Hobbes’ philosophy.

[4] See http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ for the project history of CoW.

[5] See http://www.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/iraq/WhaIsDemocracy012004.htm for the whole lecture on what is democracy?

Previously published on http://www.monitor.upeace.org/archive.cfm?id_article=540

That 2007 October Referendum in Costa Rica

2009-11-08T17:59:00.000-08:00

As a graduate student of the UN-mandated University of Peace (UPeace) in Costa Rica, I was accredited as an international electoral observer by the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones (Electoral Tribunal) in the historic referendum in Costa Rica.

It was not only the country’s first referendum; it was also the world’s first referendum to seek the people’s approval of a free trade agreement or Tratado Libre de Commercio (TLC), in this case the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) with the United States.

As I prepared to go out that Sunday morning to begin my task as an observer, my host brother told me he had already voted. That was how I learned that polling stations opened as early as 6AM, particularly in Ciudad Colon.

Most of the 27 international observers from UPeace were staying in Ciudad Colon, from where a bus brought us to Raddison Hotel in San Jose, capital of Costa Rica, for a briefing before going to the polling stations.

Few cars were plying the streets of San Jose. Most shops were closed. Cars were concentrated and parked near the churches and polling stations that day. Most cantones (towns) in Costa Rica have their church, government hall, school, and plaza close together.

Polling stations were inside the schools. Outside there were the unmistakable booths of the YES and NO camps. Vendors of campaign paraphernalia, drinks and snacks were stationed close by.

People were free to express their stance on the issue by wearing campaign T-shirts, pins, caps, even henna tattoos on their faces and bellies. Voters arrived with their kids and family. Children and young people played football inside the school or simply ran and played around. People greeted each other left and right, exchanging pleasantries in congested narrow hallways with a festive, jovial atmosphere.

I had witnessed a huge gathering of those who opposed the TLC in downtown San Jose before the referendum date. It was estimated that more than 100,000 people were in attendance - the biggest assembly in a country of just over four million people.

A human sea wearing the colors pf their flag poured through the main street of San Jose. Music blared from loud speakers and a drum and a bugle corps and people bounced to the rhythms. Vendors sold food and souvenirs. It was a festival yet also a protest against TLC.

People were attentive to the speeches, intermittently applauding with a deafening chant of NO T-L-C. My heart pumped rapidly and I felt weak.

When voting, people had to look at their names on the voters’ list posted outside a polling room. Each list had a maximum number of 700 voters. Only three at a time were allowed inside the polling room. Inside voters presented their national ID or cedula with pictures. Then they got a ballot and filled in their choice.

With my scant Spanish, I managed to chat with one voter outside a school. I asked him if he lives near the polling station. The man said that his place is far, but he was waiting for a bus commissioned by the Electoral Tribunal to fetch and pick voters from far places. I then saw a bus coming with Si (Yes) posters on its front and sides. The man got inside the bus and waved at me when he got his seat.

After visiting three schools, we decided to go to the office of the Electoral Tribunal. We saw a hundred people queuing inside, either to have their new cedula or to renew it.

In the evening, we were invited to the announcement of a preliminary result at the Electoral Tribunal office. Outside the building were about 20 young people who were shouting NO T-L-C. People inside the building were unmindful of what was going on outside. At 9 PM, the tribunal announced that the Si (YES) was leading the No by a slim margin of 51.6% to 48.4% of nearly 60% turn out. The referendum is required to have at least 40% turn out make its results binding.

There was an immediate celebration of the Yes camp at the La Sabana Park but also some reports of burning posters and street signs by unidentified people in the city. But no killings related to the referendum were reported.

The president of the country and a Nobel Peace Laureate, Oscar Arias, called on the No camp for reconciliation. (Arias, who had served as president once before (1986–1990), won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1987 for fostering peace talks that eventually ended the civil wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua. – Editor) However, some people in the No camp rejected this and cited electoral fraud and anomalies.

To be part of this political exercise in a foreign country especially Costa Rica, was quite an experience – a fair, peaceful and orderly election. Costarrinces take pride in what they have become and what they could offer the world, besides abolition of their army.

Source: http://politics.inquirer.net/view.php?db=1&article=20071030-97694