Russia’s increasing influence in this region and EU’s political gridlock concerning the adaptation to the new geostrategic reality can lead to a reduction of EU’s influence in its immediate neighborhood.

The EU is currently engaged in its first real soft power battle against Russia, which is historically a hard power. It is a battle between EU values-oriented dogma and the Russian geo-strategic actions, in other words, it is a clash of civilizations, where a victory in Vilnius means a victory in the post-Vilnius era and a failure in Vilnius means a non-existent post-Vilnius era for the EaP.

It is also a battle between our tedious pedagogy and “support” for our strategic interests. Whether we succeed or lose, the Vilnius Summit will determine the kind of global player EU really is: a self-indulgent teacher of misunderstood values or a global fighter with geo-strategic interests.

The EaP began with the actions undertaken by the EU in defining an interest area and building strategic, economic, political and cultural relations with the countries that were part of it. Its aim was to consolidate its eastern neighborhood by deepening the bilateral relations between the EU and six eastern states, as the relations between those countries have a significant impact on the promotion of the EU security agenda in that region.

However, instead of building the EaP in order to achieve this purpose, the EU failed to fulfill this objective, focusing instead on passing the blame on its neighboring countries for failing to adopt its values. Nonetheless, the success of the EaP should not be an outcome of the convergence of EU values; the Association Agreements and DCFTAs should instead drive this convergence.

Be it political indecision in matters of foreign affairs or EU’s inability to think strategically, the situation in which we find ourselves now is problematic to say the least. The strategic importance of maintaining stability in EU’s neighborhood at this point supersedes the adoption through force of EU values.

At the forthcoming Vilnius Summit the entire geo-strategic equilibrium between the Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Asiatic areas will be at stake. In that context, EU’s strategic association with countries part of the EaP is crucial and the centerpiece of this strategy is Ukraine.

When considering the importance of maintaining a geo-strategic equilibrium in this area, Russia truly understands the game that is being played, by exerting pressures on Ukraine to refuse the association with the EU. It is important to understand that Russia is not doing anything wrong in its attempt to weaken EU’s influence in the region; it is merely following its interests.

In this light, Russia’s opposition puts the Vilnius Summit in a new geo-strategic perspective. As the geostrategic context has changed, the benchmarks imposed on Ukraine should be changed as well in order to take account of this.

Thus, it is vital for the EU to strike a balance between the promotion of its values and an effective strategy in its neighborhood, based on the new geostrategic context.

A provisional implementation of the Association Agreement before or after the Summit with or without a signature is not the solution to this problem.  This compromise goes against the values that the EU itself decided to promote in Ukraine.  Can we then say that the situation has come to a point where instead of them adopting our values, we are now adopting “their values” so heavily criticized? And if this situation were to materialize, what will the EU’s response be if the temporary neutral Ukraine (better said secluded) will respond to the EU proposal by as well provisionally joining the Eurasian Union?

Moreover, it will neither be a way out for the EU from the red line it imposed on Ukraine, in the form of the release of Yulia Tymoshenko. It will not be an excuse for endangering the EU’s geostrategic interests, risking the economic and strategic security of 500 million EU citizens or deny to the 45 million Ukrainian citizens the benefits that would steam from such an agreement, all solely based on the situation of one person.

EU has no other choice in its Eastern Partnership than to deepen the relations with the other partner countries, while these countries have indeed other choices. The EU is not the single regional power trying to extend its influence. EU has plenty of time to wait for all its conditions to be met, but has only one neighborhood, while its partner countries (like Ukraine), even though they do not have much time, they do have alternatives.

Countries of the EaP experiencing the EU integration process have already taken advantage of these alternatives. The last one to do so is Armenia. Its decision to join the trade and political union with Russia has taken EU leaders by surprise.

Yerevan’s decision to join the Eurasian Customs Union is more important from a political point of view than from an economic one. It represents a blow to EU’s interests in the region and illustrates EU’s incapacity to support those interests with concrete actions.

This outcome represents another example of EU Eastern policy fiascos following the implementation of the mistaken concept “more for more”. For neighbors having alternative threats and opportunities, this concept is pushing them to give more to those who actually press them more rather than to those who promise more for an indefinite future.

We are currently risking a similar outcome as with Armenia with regards to Azerbaijan. This country has an important regional role in the energy security, geo-economic, geo-strategic and cultural fields and unlike Armenia or Belarus, it is still open for a strategic partnership with a political ally who is ready to help rehabilitate its territorial integrity and consolidate its geo-political security, as its present neutrality cannot continue forever. However, the EU is keeping the “door” provided by the association agreement closed.

Furthermore, the regions where Azerbaijan plays a strategic role are of a strategic importance not only for the EU, but also for other regional powers.

In this context, the failure to finalize the negotiations of an Association Agreement with Azerbaijan, claiming that the promotion of the EU strategic interests should wait until “the European values” are adopted and implemented, will neither help EU win the geo-strategic game nor promote its values.

It is time that the EU admits that only by taking decisive actions at Vilnius, will the Union maintain its influence in the region and win the geostrategic race. However, rejecting the signing of Association Agreements in Vilnius, will lead to the downfall of the EaP, which will become then “the Association that denied associations with valuable partners”.

Moreover, if Vilnius fails, there will no longer be an institutional barrier to the world disorder (what happened with Armenia will have been just the beginning).

The EU credibility is also at stake here, as it will lose its first real battle as a soft power. This will no doubt severely damage its foreign policy future actions.

In this new strategic context and taking account of the importance of the EaP countries, Vilnius has to be the summit that sends a message to the world. It has to say that EU is well aware of its interests and can act in a cohesive manner when its security and interests are at stake.

The EU must strive to make sure that this upcoming ‘battle’ in Vilnius will not be lost. It is thus time for the EU to understand that not going forward in this Summit will not signify a punishment towards neighboring countries that did not comply with EU values, but will rather mark the beginning of the collapse of our already wounded EaP foreign policy.

In my opinion, a debate on euro-scepticism should be conducted at the highest EU political levels, as an acknowledgment of the growing concerns regarding the future of the European Project, shared by the followers of this movement. Such a debate should be based on the understanding that Euro-scepticism, as an idea, is neither anti-European nor nationalistic. It is actually an expected reaction towards an EU which is not living up to its citizen’s expectations.

Many euro-sceptic arguments exist, and examples can be pointed out across Europe.  Among these arguments one could find EU’s democratic deficit or the alleged impossibility of building a trans-national democracy, discrimination against certain member states or their citizens, hegemonic temptations of the main European national protagonists, the oligarchic character of the Euro-bureaucracy, lack of a true trans-national solidarity, unfairness of the most developed European nations towards the less developed ones, distrust induced by unsettled historic debts etc.

All these arguments and many more form the reason for which I think that we should not ignore the Euro-sceptic movement or raise our voice in hopes that theirs will not be heard. History has seen time and again that a growing gap between a nation’s ruling class and its people and a lack of similar understanding of common goals, only lead to its collapse.  Moreover, in EU’s case, this is accentuated by the fact that we do not live in a political union, where democratically elected representatives, through a EU wide suffrage, are accountable to their electors. We live in a union where decisions taken at the EU level affect more than 500 million people, citizens that have little say in this process. We live in a Union which has increasing economic and social costs, a Union that is not treating all Member States equally, but is rather strengthening the core, while the periphery is nothing more than a test bed for Brussels-made policies.

Against this background, we should not wonder why euro-scepticism is growing in the EU. We should ask ourselves the question: Why isn’t euro-scepticism even bigger?

Therefore, the era of polite, soft approaches (not to offend the European Commission or other Member States) should end. We must change the belief that the European Institutions and their employees live in an Ivory tower, far away from the EU citizens’ problems. We should move away from hypocrisy and deception and put everything that we know, and everything that we have acknowledged from what we have witnessed, in an accurate context.  It is time to take off the kid gloves and analyse the causes of Euro-scepticism.

The federalists’ ultimate objective and the founders’ desire of an ever-closer union must be put in balance with the vicissitudes of reality. We will not be able to advance if we do not start a proper debate that will allow us to build a well-informed framework that can be used as an information source for decision makers and as a dissemination tool for increasing understanding of euro-scepticism and finding possible solutions.

Any progress towards the settlement of the controversies in the Western Balkans and especially in normalizing the relation between Serbs and Kosovars is welcomed. Nevertheless, one should be aware that sometimes the ambiguities that facilitate solutions, which might work on the short term, might be sources of even more complicated problems on the long term.

The current agreement is nothing more than an incomplete list of principles. Moreover, in order to proceed with signing it, negotiators have intentionally left out sensitive issues (i.e. energy, telecom), which are crucial for the self-sustainability and the economic independence of Kosovo.

The largest part of the agreement is dedicated to the self-governance of the North Kosovo municipalities, where ethnic Serbs are in a majority. Thus, the progress of the self-determination of Kosovo is linked to the progress of the self-determination of the Kosovar Serbs, who, according to the agreement, receive territorial administrative autonomy on ethnic bases.

In the short term, this might facilitate the international recognition of Kosovo and the EU integration of Serbia. However, in the medium and long term, it will make the establishment of the criteria of cohesion for Kosovo’s statehood almost impossible and will undermine the coherence of the state entity.

Therefore, like never before, this agreement asks for speeding up the process leading to the full normalization of the situation in a way which should alleviate all ambiguities and make Kosovo`s self determination sustainable, fair, legal and acceptable to all. In reaching this objective, the envisaged solutions should be placed in the regional context and the EU membership should not be used as a means of pressure for obtaining territorial, constitutional and security concessions.  Otherwise, the agreement recently reached will be just another ticking bomb placed under the Western Balkans’ pounder barrel.

In this agreement, the Kosovars want to see the recognition of their state in its territorial integrity by Serbia, since the Serbian municipalities will then be connected to Kosovo’s administrative institutional network.

The Serbians want to see a re-affirmation of their authority over territorial parts of the self-determined Kosovo, without recognizing Kosovo’s self-determination.

For the EU, this is an historic achievement. If improperly dealt with, it can become an historic misunderstanding with dangerous consequences. This is the beginning of the beginning only.