The Mount Washington Avalanche Center invites applications for the position of Professional Observer. Successful candidates will be responsible for supplying backcountry snowpack observations within the MWAC forecast area to our forecasting team.

As a MWAC Pro Observer, you will deliver timely, professional-level observations to fill data gaps in the MWAC’s Presidential Range forecast area. Observations will exclusively concentrate on backcountry areas with unmitigated avalanche risks. 

Responsibilities:

The primary responsibility of the Pro Observer is to communicate with the MWAC forecast team to analyze snow, provide weather, and avalanche observations, and determine current and future trends in avalanche danger. In addition, providing assessment of current avalanche danger compared to posted forecast levels will be a key function of the role. Each observer is responsible for a minimum of two backcountry observations per week. 

Observation requirements and locations will vary based on the needs of the MWAC forecast team. The MWAC forecast team will communicate observational needs to the Observer’s Network. Observations may be submitted to the MWAC through email. At a minimum, observations must be relevant to pertinent avalanche concerns and submitted on a timely basis. Some examples of the observations that may be recorded are: snow height, taken at many locations throughout a tour; full snow profiles; and various test profiles on multiple aspects and elevations throughout a valley. Observers will be asked to provide photos and/or videos of observations that will be incorporated into the next day’s forecast to help illustrate conditions and concerns to the general public. Observers may also be asked to submit blog posts to the MWAC website.

Minimum Qualifications:

• Certificate of completion – Recreational Level 1 avalanche course
• Certificate of completion – Avalanche Rescue Course
• Current CPR and First-Aid certification (WFA or higher preferred)
• Experience observing and recording snow, weather, and avalanches using Snow, Weather, and Avalanche Guidelines (SWAG)
• Ability to safely travel in snow-covered mountainous, technical terrain.
• Valid driver’s license
• Strong written and verbal communication skills
• Strong photo and video collection skills

Desired Qualifications:

• Professional avalanche training (Professional Level 1 certification or higher)
• Wilderness First Aid or Wilderness First Responder certification.
• Thorough knowledge of avalanche hazards and a minimum of five years of experience traveling in backcountry avalanche terrain.

Compensation:

This part-time position will be compensated based on the number of observations produced but is estimated at $150 per week for 3 – 4 months during the 2023-2024 winter season. 

Other benefits include: 

• Feedback, time, and mentorship with the MWAC forecasting team. 
• Worker’s Compensation protection 
• WMNF Parking Pass

Selection Process:

Shortlisted candidates will be invited for an interview and may be required to demonstrate skills as part of the selection process.

To apply, send a resume, cover letter, and 1 professional reference to: Patrck.Scanlan@usda.gov

The application deadline is October 31 and applicants can plan to be notified in mid-November.

Overview:

On Saturday, April 15, 2023, a snowboarder attempting to descend the Tuckerman Ravine Headwall, lost control resulting in a fall into one of the deep, open waterfall holes that forms each year from water runoff and melting. The person ultimately was uninjured and able to extract themselves from the hole after about 10 minutes. This incident and near-miss highlights a dangerous and high-consequence springtime hazard that has injured and killed visitors in past years. 

Events:

Saturday, April 15, 2023 was a classically busy spring day in Tuckerman Ravine full of skiers, snowboarders, and hikers. An estimated 3000 people visited Tuckerman Ravine throughout the course of the day. For the most part, skiers and riders were enjoying warm temperatures, soft snow conditions, and plenty of sunshine. 

Throughout the day, a handful of aggressive skiers were descending over the Tuckerman Ravine Center Headwall, which at the time was one of the most technical and hazardous features in the ravine. The people descending in this area were encountering mandatory drops over cliffs, ice flows, and open waterfall holes in the snowpack. Knowingly or not, descending this area means accepting very high levels of risk. 

In this instance, a snowboarder began descending one of these “lines” before losing control in the incredibly technical terrain, falling past a couple ledges, and ultimately into one of the main open waterfall holes in the snowpack. You can see the full video of this incident here. 

Luckily, the snowboarder landed on a rock ledge about 15 feet into this large hole and was able to stop himself from falling further down into the hole, which extended well out of view to an unknown depth. Uninjured, he was able to remove the snowboard and use an ice ax to climb up out of the hole.

Takeaways:

At a distance, the takeaways from this incident seem relatively obvious – traveling above large open holes in the snowpack in highly technical terrain has extremely high consequences and little margin for error. However, there are several nuances to this hazard and this location that are worth pointing out for the goal of education and preventing these accidents in the future. 

Spatial reference and perspective:

In steep backcountry terrain, especially if it is unfamiliar, awareness of where you are in relation to certain terrain features can be very challenging. Referencing a terrain feature on the way up and scouting a route can be helpful, but when the perspective completely flips looking down the fall line, and it’s easy to lose spatial reference. This phenomenon is compounded by steep convexities, where “blind” entrances are common. The Tuckerman Headwall is a great example of terrain where spatial reference is challenging without an intimate knowledge of the terrain. 

Risk and margin for error:

Remember: You control your own level of risk by choosing when, where, and how you travel in the mountains. Think critically about route choices and the potential consequences of each option. Fully understanding the consequences of a hazard and the ability to maintain control over your exposure to that hazard will help maintain your acceptable margin error when taking on risk in the mountains. 

Waterfall holes and glide cracks:

As warm temperatures, rain, and water runoff continuously melt snow during spring, it is common for large,deep holes and cracks to form in the snowpack. There are a few mechanisms of formation including concentrated water runoff falling onto the snowpack, snow becoming undermined from water runoff below the snow surface, and from snowpack movement (also called creep) and separation. Sometimes, these cracks and holes are reminiscent of a crevasse, which are formations specific to glaciers. These openings in the snowpack can be very deep (over 50 feet) and large enough for a person to fall into. In most cases, these openings have no reasonable exit until the snow completely finishes melting. Here are a couple key points about this hazard:

• Glide cracks can be seen as horizontal lines in the snow pack from a distance. It is best to distance yourself from these features because the surrounding snow can be weak, undermined and connected to the same crack. 
• Deep holes often appear as depressions in the snowpack from a distance.  They are often found next to or below rock buttresses and boulders where water collects and melts snow from the surface. 
• In the route planning process, it is important to identify where these could be found and to make sure there is a way to avoid them. 
• Traveling above these features increases the consequences of a fall. 
• Fresh unsupportive snow can mask the openings.

Read more about the many other springtime mountain hazards here.

The answer to all of these questions is probably yes, which means we have a choice of which surfaces to travel on.

Often after a tiring climb up a 1000’ ski run or a technical climbing route, the last thing we think about is what is under our feet and often the easiest thing to do is find the softest places to step and the path of least resistance. For fragile alpine flowers and vegetation, this can be a death sentence.

A common response to mentioning vegetation trampling is, “the plants have survived the harshest weather conditions on the planet, I don’t think stepping on them is any worse.” Unfortunately, this is not true. Alpine vegetation, including a handful of plants that grow nowhere else in the world, has done an incredible job at adapting to the harshest winter environment on the planet over thousands of years. These adaptations allow even the smallest flowering plants to survive through hurricane-force winds, deep snowpacks, sub-zero temperatures, and all types of precipitation. Unfortunately, these plants have not had thousands of years to adapt to the patterns and impact of backcountry skiers and off-trail wanderers and even a couple bootprints can be catastrophic for these fragile species.

To see specific details on some of these plants, check out this article.

Trampling and disturbance of alpine vegetation is most commonly seen adjacent to trails and in high traffic areas including Mount Washington, around huts and shelters, near the Auto Road, and increasingly, we are seeing this disturbance at the top of most of our popular ski runs. Trampling is no one individual’s fault, but rather a product of our community travel habits in the mountains. Sure, Tuckerman has been dealing with this issue for years (and it shows) but with a huge increase in use to other ravines and more remote zones, we have a critical chance to evolve our travel behavior as a community.

WHAT CAN WE DO?
Most of the ski lines and climbing routes in the Presidentials are not right next to a trail, so traveling off-trail to access these routes is normal. How we do this as a community is incredibly important for the health of these ecosystems and luckily, there are a few critical steps we can take to drastically mitigate alpine plant trampling.

• Like the Leave No Trace principle says, travel and camp on durable surfaces. For us, this means walking on snow, rock, and trail whenever possible. We know how awkward it can be to walk on alpine schist in hard boots – just think of it as a little extra training and get your poles out for balance.
• Unless there is significant snow coverage, lose the idea that your approach route will be in a straight line. It will likely not be straight nor the path of least resistance. It might add a little distance and time to your day, but the mitigation of your negative effect on the ecosystem is well worth the cost of a few extra steps.
• Talk to your group about this ethic, and spread the word.
• Consider not going to a super remote objective that has all but melted out, and instead wait until there is good coverage. It’s not going anywhere!

As the Mount Washington Auto Road opens up this year and many folks will take advantage of this mechanized ski access, Great Gulf is one of the areas where we see this impact most in addition to the Eastside ravines. If you do find yourself driving your car up to top-access big mountain skiing, we ask that you please use your fresh legs to take an environmentally-conscious approach to your line, which might include a winding route and lots of rock hopping.

Some of the area on the sides of the Auto Road is flat and appears to be good for parking. However, the Auto Road restricts parking to the designated pull-offs and lots in order to mitigate the impact on the alpine zone.

Just as different climbing and skiing areas across the country have written and unwritten ethics and rules, we would love to see the White Mountain backcountry community wholeheartedly adopt this ethic as the “norm” of backcountry and spring backcountry skiing in our alpine zones. Like the adage, “you don’t know what you got until it’s gone,” we are incredibly lucky to have amazing ski terrain on our public lands right here in New Hampshire. For current and future generations, let’s take care of it.

Overview:

On Wednesday, March 15th 2023 at approximately 10:00 am, a skier unintentionally triggered a large avalanche on Wildcat B in Carter Notch. They were caught, carried, and critically buried for over 6 minutes before being extracted by a partner and found uninjured. The party of two was able to self-evacuate from the incident. This avalanche path is just 2.5 miles away from the Mount Washington Avalanche Center Presidential Range forecast area. The avalanche danger for the Presidential Range was rated HIGH at middle and upper elevations. 

Accident Summary: 

Early in the morning on March 15th, three skiers (Skier A, Skier B, and Skier C) ascended Wildcat Ski Area with the intent of continuing across Wildcat Ridge Trail to access a landslide terrain feature on the east side of Wildcat B in Carter Notch. At the top of Wildcat Ski Area, before continuing to the hiking trail, Skier A accessed the updated MWAC avalanche forecast and read the forecast aloud to the group. Skier A felt that the objective was too risky given the conditions and decided not to continue. Skier A encouraged Skier B and Skier C to reconsider the objective and descend Wildcat Ski Area as a safe alternative. Skier B and Skier C made the decision to continue on the ridge trail to Wildcat B to access the original objective without Skier A. Before splitting up, Skier A loaned their avalanche beacon to Skier B who forgot this piece of rescue equipment. At that point, Skiers B and C both had an avalanche rescue kit: beacon, shovel, and probe. 

Once at the top of the intended ski objective, Skiers B and C decided to continue and ski one-at-a-time. Skier C began descending and triggered a large soft slab avalanche at the steepest part of the slope, in an area where a steep ice bulge often forms. They were caught in the moving debris and carried over 500 vertical feet down a narrow, constricting gully. They came to rest fully buried, except for their hand, and were trapped and unable to move under the avalanche debris. 

Skier B took out the borrowed avalanche beacon and began a search for their missing partner descending the track of the avalanche. They did not acquire a signal. The reason for not acquiring a signal is unknown. As they approached the debris, they noticed Skier C’s hand visible above the surface of the snow. This clue allowed them to quickly pinpoint their partner’s location and begin digging. Skier B was able to successfully extract their buried partner, who was conscious and not injured. Skier C was completely buried for a total of 6.5 minutes, when Skier B uncovered and secured their airway. After a total of about 15 minutes, Skier C was fully extracted. 

Avalanche Summary:

Type: Soft Slab

Trigger: Skier, unintentional

Aspect: East

Slope Angle: 42 degrees

Size: R5 / D2

Elevation: 3750 feet

Sliding Surface: New / Old Interface

Vertical Fall: 550 feet

Width: 50 feet

Crown Depth: 12 inches

Debris Depth: 9 feet

The slope where this avalanche occurred was formed by a summer-time landslide which cleared trees and earth in the main part of the drainage. This event from many years ago created a terrain feature that collects significant amounts of snow and is vulnerable to avalanche hazard. The east-facing slope has a tubular characteristic and is generally very narrow. The top of the avalanche path is at an elevation of 3800’ and the bottom of the runout is at an elevation of approximately 3000’. The starting zone of this terrain feature is generally 50 – 60 feet across with an average slope angle of 41 degrees and a maximum slope angle of about 50 degrees. The track of the path is about 25 feet across with an average slope angle of 42 degrees. The runout zone widens slightly, but is still a halfpipe-shaped slope, which compounds the depth of avalanche debris. The approximate depth of avalanche debris in this incident was 9 feet. 

Backcountry Avalanche Forecast:

*Though this incident occurred outside the Presidential Range forecast area, it is important to note that avalanches can happen when snow falls on any steep terrain over 30 degrees. This area shares many of the same characteristics of avalanche paths just 2.5 miles away included in the forecast area.*

The Mount Washington Avalanche Center forecast on March 15, 2023, rated the avalanche danger in the Presidential Range at HIGH above 3,000 feet in elevation on all aspects. Wind slab avalanches were highlighted as the primary avalanche problem on all aspects and elevations with loose dry avalanches highlighted on all elevations and aspects below treeline. The expected size of wind slabs was small to very large (D1-3) and likely to be triggered naturally or from the weight of a person. Loose dry avalanches were listed as possible, and generally small in size (D1 – D1.5). The Bottom Line section of the forecast stated:

Natural and human triggered avalanches are likely on all aspects and elevations. Moving through, under, or adjacent to steep terrain will be dangerous today with avoidance being the best strategy.

A link to the full avalanche forecast from March 15 can be found here.

Weather and Snowpack Summary: 

Prior to the 3/13 – 3/15 storm, several days of high pressure, high winds, and mild temperatures had created a generally stable snowpack that was firm in most places. Between Monday, March 13th and Wednesday, March 15, the Mount Washington Observatory recorded 13.5 inches of new snow, the Hermit Lake snow plot recorded 23 inches of new snow, and the Harvard Cabin snow plot recorded 19 inches of new snow. 

On the 13th, the avalanche danger was rated LOW; on March 14th, the avalanche hazard was rated CONSIDERABLE; on March 15th, the avalanche danger was rated HIGH. This increasing trend was consistent with the onset of snow storm conditions and subsequent redistribution of snow by high wind speeds.

New snow beginning on the 13th fell on relatively light winds from the southeast before shifting to the north and northwest on the 14th and 15th. This combination created new wind slabs on many aspects with significant redistribution of snow to southerly and easterly aspects once the winds shifted. Summit winds had an average speed of 57 mph on the 14th and 51 mph on the 15th. Average wind direction was north. New wind slab depth was variable but was able to grow multiple feet in many areas and displayed strong-over-weak characteristics. These slabs with weak structure were resting on an old snow surface that was firm and scoured in many locations. The hardness change of this new/old interface, the depth of new snow, and the strong-over-weak structure of new slabs were the dominant contributing factors in this avalanche. 

Comments:

One of the main reasons we share details about avalanche accidents is for education and awareness for the greater community with the hopes of becoming collectively safer. In return for sharing this information, we ask that any comments are civil, non-judgmental, and constructive.

The outcome of this event had serious potential to be fatal and the Mount Washington Avalanche Center staff is happy that the group of two skiers skied away from this event uninjured and hopefully learned several important lessons. 

• Avalanches can occur in any terrain where snow with a weak layer, a steep slope, and a trigger are present, even if that terrain is outside of a designated avalanche forecast area. Recognizing this terrain takes knowledge and skill and taking an avalanche course is a great place to begin to build that foundation. 
• Always have rescue gear that is familiar to you and that you have practiced with if entering avalanche terrain. Don’t forget a proper beacon function check before entering avalanche terrain. Like in this incident, you or your partner’s life may depend on it. 
• Listen to every member of your group when making decisions. Fully talk through objections or differences of opinion when making go/no-go decisions. Consider heuristic traps that tempt you to make decisions that may put the lives of you and your partners at risk. 
• Read and apply the avalanche forecast to your terrain choices. On a HIGH danger day, safe terrain options are extremely limited and “outsmarting” the avalanche problem is like rolling loaded dice. 

Overview:

At about 12:00pm on Saturday, February 25, a party consisting of one skier and one snowboarder was involved in an avalanche incident on The Lip area of Tuckerman Ravine. One of the members of the team was caught, carried, partially buried, and uninjured. The avalanche was a large, hard slab and had the destructive potential to bury and kill a person. The avalanche danger for the day was rated CONSIDERABLE with wind slab as the primary avalanche.

Events: 

*MWAC Forecasters interviewed the party about the incident and it should be noted that due a slight language barrier, there is still some uncertainty around the party’s decision-making process*

On the morning of February 25, the team of two created a plan to ascend the Lion Head Trail with the intention of descending a to-be-determined route in Tuckerman Ravine. They stopped at Pinkham Notch Visitor Center to read the current avalanche forecast before their approach. Both members of the group had previous backcountry experience in multiple snow climates and mountain ranges. Both people were carrying avalanche rescue equipment including a beacon, shovel, and probe. 

After passing the top of Lion Head, the party looked for the path of least resistance to descend into Tuckerman Ravine. This terrain choice ended up being The Lip, a steep, southeast facing convexity that rolls over into Tuckerman Ravine.

The snowboarder descended the constriction point and steepest part of the route first, then pulled off to the skier’s left side of the slope and waited for their partner to descend the same section. This stopping point was near the area of rock and ice that separates The Lip and Sluice terrain features. Though the snowboarder moved outside of the direct fall line of The Lip, they were still on a similar, connected slope. 

With the snowboarder stopped to the side of the fall-line, the skier began descending the steepest and most constricted part of The Lip. During this part of the descent, they triggered a thin wind slab, which caused some debris to start to fall down the slope, and continued skiing. Just after, a hard slab fractured underneath the skier and propagated diagonally out in both directions. The skier was able to stop above the crown line, while the snowboarder was entrained by the hard debris, which slid down into and through Chicken Rock Gully into the Tuckerman Ravine floor. The snowboarder came to rest at the edge of Lunch Rocks and was partially buried to their waist. The party was able to self-extricate and did not sustain any injuries. 

There were several witnesses of this incident and two of them captured good-quality video of the avalanche. 

Avalanche Statistics:

Type: Hard Slab

Trigger: Skier, unintentional

Aspect: Southeast

Slope Angle: 45 degrees

Size: R2 / D2

Elevation: 4800 feet

Sliding Surface: New / Old Interface

Vertical Fall: 400 feet

Width: 125 feet

Debris depth: About 5 feet maximum

Snowpack: 

On February 17, the Mount Washington Summit reported a high temperature of 38 degrees F. Additionally, 0.28 inches of precipitation fell as mostly rain and freezing rain during that 24-hour period. The subsequent refreeze in the following days created a very hard melt/freeze crust layer that can still be found buried 3 or more feet below the surface of the snow where there has been an adjacent layer of soft snow, facets, and graupel. This crust has acted as one of the bed surfaces in the most recent natural avalanche cycle. 

Some slight snow accumulation continued for the next several days until a more significant winter storm event began on the night of February 22nd. On February 21st and 22nd, prior to the storm, sunny conditions, mild temperatures, and significant radiation gain into the snowpack on southerly aspects fostered a process of radiation recrystallization. This formed a thin crust layer with adjacent faceting of the snow in many areas and also acted as one of the bed surfaces in upcoming avalanche activity.   

On February 22nd – 24th, new snow and wind drove wind slab development across east-facing and south-facing avalanche terrain and resulted in several natural avalanches during and immediately post storm. The thin crust layer was buried 1 – 2 feet down in most lee terrain. The February 17th melt/freeze crust was buried roughly 3 or more feet deep in lee terrain. See the observations page for more information about this activity. 

In the case of this human-triggered avalanche, it appears that the thin facet layer from Feb. 21 and 22 failed first under the weight of one (or two) skiers before stepping down into the deeper instability (soft snow above February 17th crust). This snowpack setup, as well as the increased sensitivity of new wind slabs drove the hazard rating decision for that day which was CONSIDERABLE at middle elevations and MODERATE at upper elevations. 

Summary:

When interviewing the group, it was not completely clear that they had understood the avalanche forecast or the location of that day’s avalanche problem. They were navigating with a map but did not have familiarity with the terrain in Tuckerman Ravine. They chose to enter this terrain with a false assumption of stability, which ultimately proved to be inaccurate. This incident, and especially the quality video that goes along with it, is a great example of the characteristics and danger of a hard slab avalanche. 

We are happy that the party was not injured and has learned from this experience. We hope that this near miss is also a great learning opportunity for other backcountry enthusiasts who travel in this terrain. What if this party skied the slope in the same conditions but didn’t trigger this avalanche?  What would they have told themselves about how the day went?  What would they have told others asking about skiing the same thing? What if the runout was a funnel-shaped terrain trap? It is worth reflecting on questions like these while also thinking about our own terrain choices and travel techniques to minimize risk for ourselves and for others.

At approximately 5:00pm on Tuesday, May 3rd, two hikers called 911 after descending into Tuckerman Ravine and becoming stranded in the Lip / Sluice area. 

Incident

Two Mount Washington day hikers estimated that they reached the summit of Mount Washington around 4:00pm via the Lion Head Trail to Tuckerman Ravine Trail and began their descent soon after reaching the summit. Instead of taking the same route down the mountain, the hikers decided to continue down the Tuckerman Ravine Trail towards the Lip area of the Ravine. They noted that they could see the shelters at Hermit Lake and thought that traveling through Tuckerman Ravine may save some time, as it was becoming late in the day. 

The hikers glissaded in a seated position at the top of the lip where the angle remains low. As the angle steepened, and they approached the apex of the convexity, they continued downhill on foot diagonally toward the Sluice. They continued to a point at which they felt it was unsafe / not possible to go either up or down. The hikers were not equipped with mountaineering equipment such as crampons or an ice ax.

The hikers scrambled/slid down to a small rock and vegetation outcropping, where they called 911 for help. While trying to assess the best way to go up or down, hiker #1 began intermittently sliding down the slope, eventually giving into the slide and sliding/falling down, without injury, to the floor of the ravine. Hiker #2 remained underneath the outcropping.

Response

New Hampshire State Police notified USFS Snow Rangers of the incident at 5:15pm. Without rescue resources in the immediate area, calls were made to Mountain Rescue Service and Androscoggin Valley Search and Rescue for additional assistance. 

At approximately 8:00pm, two small rescue teams were dispatched to the scene. The first team consisted of one Snow Ranger and two members of Androscoggin Valley SAR who used the Mount Washington Auto Road to access the Alpine Garden Trail and ultimately the location of hiker #2. This team located and descended the glissade track of the stranded hikers and used verbal cues to locate hiker #2, who was without a headlamp or flashlight. The hiker was found to be scared and cold but uninjured. The team took steps to secure and warm the hiker and equip them with mountaineering equipment. The team belayed the hiker up to the top of the ravine before walking across the Alpine Garden to the Auto Road, where a NH State Parks vehicle was waiting. 

At the same time, the second rescue team, consisting of one Snow Ranger and two members of Mountain Rescue Service, ascended the Tuckerman Ravine Trail from Pinkham Notch. The team located Hiker #1 who was hunkered down inside of a rescue cache at the base of the ravine, prepared to spend the night. After a medical assessment revealing no injuries, the party descended the Tuckerman Ravine Trail back to Pinkham Notch. Both hikers and rescue teams were off the mountain by 12:30am. Heavy rain began falling in the Presidentials slightly after 12:00 midnight. 

Discussion

Incidents like this one are fairly common in the springtime on Mount Washington. Mild, snowless conditions in the valley have yet to translate to the higher elevations and hikers are often misled by the valley weather conditions. Additionally, trails across the Presidentials in steep terrain are still covered in deep snow, effectively turning many trails into mountaineering routes requiring specialized equipment and skill in order to travel safely. Fortunately, this incident had a positive outcome for everyone involved, but other similar historical incidents have not ended with the same positive outcome. 

Red line indicates approximate path of the fall. Photo is from a previous year.

Events:

On Saturday March 26, 2022, a 25 year old male (Patient) took a 500’ fall while attempting to ski the skier’s left side of Chute.  The patient reported that the cause of the fall was due to one of his ski bindings releasing in the upper part of the run.  The videos of the event showed that the patient became airborne for over 50 vertical feet after he hit the rocks to the side of Chute and then continued to tomahawk down the slope to the ravine floor.  The released ski and both poles were not recovered.  Several people ran up to the patient to help where he came to rest.  USFS Snow Rangers and Mount Washington Volunteer Ski Patrol were practicing high angle litter rescue on the adjacent slopes and were able to respond quickly.  The patient remained lying supine until Snow Rangers and Ski Patrol arrived, but he was conscious and stated he never lost consciousness.

Patrol assisted the patient while snow rangers managed the scene.  The initial assessment of the Patient found an alert and oriented 25 year old man, with some pain, tenderness and abrasions.  The patient’s helmet was cracked in several places.

Due to other skiers coming downslope dangerously close to the patient and rescuers, and several parties high in the terrain above the rescue, the scene was deemed unsafe.  The decision was made to expedite transport and walk the patient to a safer location.  Prior to moving the patient, another head to toe exam was done by another rescuer and findings were consistent with the first exam.  The patient stated he was comfortable to walk himself downhill.

Snow Rangers and Ski Patrol assisted putting the Patient’s crampons on and the Patient’s friend assisted with gear.  Once up and moving, the Patient remained alert and oriented and his overall range of motion and movement was unguarded.  The Patient and Ski Patrol walked slowly down to Hermit Lake and the USFS Ranger Cabin for further assessment.

A secondary exam was performed, the patient was rewarmed and then transported by snowmobile to Pinkham Notch where the Patient and friend left in their personal vehicle to go to the local Emergency Room.  Later findings from the ER were consistent with initial examinations.

Analysis:

The patient and his party had come prepared with crampons, ice axes and were able to safely climb the desired ski run.  However, because of an equipment malfunction the result was a sliding fall impossible to arrest on the icy snow surface.  The weather that day was cloudy and cold and there was no chance of the snow warming for spring skiing conditions.  Several other people in the bowl that day also had long sliding falls but these were less consequential.

Sliding falls have proven to be very dangerous in Tuckerman Ravine.  Skiers often overestimate their ability to self arrest and under estimate the speed in which they accelerate on icy terrain.  Skiing in Tuckerman Ravine often requires an acute awareness of abilities and equipment, coupled with the understanding that even small mistakes can have serious consequences on an unforgiving snowpack.  Even if this skier had an ice axe in hand, it’s unlikely that any attempt to self-arrest would have changed the outcome. The practiced ability to self arrest is important for mountain travel; however, effective use of this skill is limited to softer surfaces at lower angles.  Often the best way to protect yourself is to simply not fall. In practice this means recognizing the icy, hard, snow conditions, and dialing back terrain choices to match abilities and for a wider margin of error.

Type: Hard Slab

Trigger: Artificial, Skier

Size – Relative to Path: R3

Size – Destructive Force: D2

Slope Aspect: Southeast

Start Zone Elevation: 5000

Average Slope Angle: 40 degrees

Slope Character: Convexity in Sluice Gully

Summary Description

On the morning of March 4, 2022 around 11:30am a skier triggered an avalanche while skiing Sluice in Tuckerman Ravine. They were caught, carried about 300 feet, not buried, and uninjured, coming to rest on top of the debris pile above “Lunch Rocks.”

Avalanche

The skier accessed the top of Sluice by climbing up Right Gully and traversing to the top of the ski line before descending.

The hard slab avalanche was triggered at a thin spot in the slab near the Sluice icefall, partway down the line. The fracture propagated roughly 40 feet above the skier and 75 feet laterally in each direction. This avalanche was D2, R3 in size with a maximum crown depth of 3 or 4 feet. The width of the avalanche was estimated at 150 feet with an estimated track length of 450 feet. In the track of the avalanche, areas of frozen bed surface were exposed, indicating that the avalanche stepped down to the February 22nd rain crust and entrained slabs formed earlier that week. The crown line wrapped around the ridgeline towards The Lip and in the other direction toward the mouth of Right Gully.

Snowpack and Weather

Shortly after the incident, forecasters performed instability tests nearby on a similar elevation and aspect which yielded reactive results on a weak interface around 45cm below the snow surface. Test results were ECTP10 and ECTP11. Slab hardness was 4-finger with a similar hardness below the weak interface. Multiple other parties reported reactive and touchy sensitivity at the same weak interface buried between 30 – 50cm below the snow surface.

The setup for this avalanche problem and this incident began on February 22nd when the summit of Mount Washington reported 0.78 inches of rain with an additional 0.32 inches of rain the following day. A subsequent drop in temperatures refroze the snow surface into a very hard crust layer in the days following this weather event. Over the next 10 days leading up to March 4, a total of 25 inches of snow equaling a total of 2.38 inches of water was reported on the summit. Prevailing west and northwest winds loaded this snow and drove wind slab formation over this same period. Many natural avalanches were observed in this 10-day period, with several slopes on similar aspects avalanching multiple times and becoming re-loaded with wind-blown snow.

A break in snowfall on February 28th allowed wind and sun to slightly stiffen the current snow surface, creating a thin density change and the future bed surface for avalanches over the next 3 days. On March 1st, 2nd, and 3rd, a total of 10.3 inches of snow fell on northwest winds and continued slab formation. Initial snowfall after the 28th fell on calm winds before wind speed and snowfall gradually increased, creating a subtle strong-over-weak character to this slab.

Visibility and sun returned on March 4th and large recent avalanches on Center Headwall and The Lip in Tuckerman Ravine became visible at sunrise. Slab failure and propagation was consistently being seen on the aforementioned thin mid-slab interface where there was a slight change in density within the greater wind slab. Generally, this was found 30 – 50cm below the snow surface, but was buried deeper in wind-sheltered pockets of terrain, like Sluice.

On March 4th, the avalanche danger was CONSIDERABLE at middle elevations and MODERATE at upper elevations for the Presidential Range. The primary avalanche problem was wind slabs on northeast-facing through southwest-facing slopes with a likelihood of possible and a destructive size estimate of D2. Sluice is a southeast-facing slope with an average slope angle of about 40 degrees that sits within the middle and upper elevation bands. Click here for the full March 4th avalanche forecast.

Analysis

This avalanche is a great example of thin spot triggering with effective propagation to slopes above and around. Like in this case, if a crack is able to propagate above your head high on the slope above you, it can be hard or impossible to escape the debris flow.

The skier writes “I skied 10 slow, smooth, short radius turns which felt firm and stable. On the 8th turn, propagation took place 40’ behind me and I soon felt the steep slope give way underneath. I proceeded to point my skis straight to ride it out but by now was fully engulfed by the avalanche while being swept 350’ below. During the slide I was fortunate to remain on the top of the snow before finally coming to a sitting upright stop in a soft pile of snow debris with one ski on and the other a few feet behind.”

They go on to say, “On March 4th, my decision making failed and I should have known better. The forecast stated it clearly to ‘not rule out the possibility of triggering a large, firm slab – all it takes is finding a weak spot over a rock to get it sliding.’ I underestimated the weaknesses of this slab in correlation to current conditions and features.”

Additionally, this accident highlights the high degree of spatial variability that is associated with the Presidential Range forecast area, largely driven by high wind and steep avalanche terrain. Our direct-action avalanche cycles offer heightened danger shortly after snow and wind events, but continuous high winds after the initial storm often lead to stubborn slabs that are hard to trigger. This seems to have been what the skier was expecting, as this is a common scenario in this zone. However, in this case, slight nuances of loading patterns and layering subtleties within the slab as described above meant that higher slab sensitivity persisted longer than what longtime local skiers might be used to.

Lastly, making the decision to ski solo decreased the skier’s margin for error even further by not having a partner that could extract them in case of a full burial, provide care in case of injury, or act as another voice in the decision making process. At face value, skiing solo should not be considered a mistake, but rather a choice that can compound consequences of an accident in an avalanche or injury scenario.

On Sunday May 30, at approximately 1:20pm, a Mount Washington Volunteer Ski Patroller radioed the USFS lead snow ranger to report that a skier had taken a sliding fall down a 35 degree snow slope into Lunch Rocks. A short time later, the ski patroller made contact with the patient, and the small group of skiers who were rendering aid, and determined that the patient required immediate evacuation due to the nature of the injuries. Just prior to this contact, a bystander had triggered a distress signal via InReach that alerted State Police and NH Fish and Game at 12:40pm of the accident. At 2:20pm, after determining no other air ambulances were available, a flight briefing with USFS personnel concluded and by 3:45pm, a helicopter departed Weymouth, Mass.

At 2:45pm a Gorham EMS ambulance and UTV started up the Sherburne Ski Trail in order to render paramedic level care and to provide a means of patient transport. Concurrently, the ski patrol and USFS snow ranger coordinated an effort to move the patient in a litter with belay 2 rope lengths to the floor of the Ravine and then down to Hermit Lake via a very steep trail, arriving at 4:00pm. Weather factors made local air ambulance services unable to fly, but the US Coast Guard 1st District was available for the mission. At 5:00pm, under a low ceiling at 4,500’, a Coast Guard Jayhawk arrived at Hermit Lake and hoisted the patient and a paramedic for the flight to the Level 1 trauma center in Portland.

Analysis: 

The father of this father and son team has years of experience skiing in Tuckerman Ravine, but like many “old school” skiers, tends to forget his helmet while skiing in the backcountry. This was the pair’s third run of the day in the limited remaining snow in the Ravine for which they chose the lower portion of Sluice. The pair climbed to the highest point of snow remaining and the father slipped, sliding 400’ or more into the jagged rocks currently exposed adjacent to the Tuckerman Ravine Trail, known as “Lunch Rocks”. (This area sees one of the highest concentrations of sliding fall and icefall incidents anywhere in the Presidential Range.) The pair was not wearing crampons, which can be insurance against hard snow or obscured icy patches.

One of the more important lessons of this incident comes from the bystanders who assisted. This group of 20-30 years olds jumped in to assist, suffering in the cold drizzle to render first aid and then carry the litter to Hermit Lake where they then waited patiently to confirm that they wouldn’t be needed to carry the litter should the helicopter fail to arrive. Anyone having an accident would be lucky to have this group of solid individuals to assist them.

The efforts of the Mount Washington Volunteer Ski Patrol and the AMC Hermit Lake caretaker were also impressive with three veteran patrollers doing what they do to keep an injured person from succumbing to their injuries and to the elements. Be sure to thank a patroller and the caretaker when you see them. Thanks as well, to the NH Fish and Game officers and Gorham EMS personnel for their efforts in this mission.

-Frank Carus, Lead Snow Ranger