My Essay Blog

Viewing the Super Bowl in Different Perspectives

2011-04-01T20:41:00.000-04:00

If Emile Durkheim, Karl Marx, and George Herbert Mead were alive today and watching last Sunday’s Super Bowl XLIV, they would have probably enjoyed it with similar passions. However, even if all three were rooting for the same team, each one of them would be seeing the game with different perspectives.

Take Emily Durkheim, for example, a proponent of the functionalist sociological perspective which regards “sports as an almost religious institution that uses ritual and ceremony to reinforce the common values of a society” (Schaefer 18). Durkheim most likely would be admiring the patriotism, accomplishments, and competiveness of such young athletes, such as Malcolm Jenkins from the New Orleans Saints, or Pierre Garcon from the Indianapolis Colts. Furthermore, Durkheim would perhaps inform the young fans about how important it is to be involved in sports to maintain a physical well being. Durkheim would also commend both teams since, because of their performance; they were able to bring together many members of many communities together in the stadium as well as across America.

On the other hand, Karl Marx, an advocate of the conflict sociological perspective which argues “that the social order is based on coercion and exploitation” and that “sports reflect and even exacerbate many of the divisions of society” (Schaefer 18), would not keep his focus on the well being of the athletes, as would Durkheim, but at the profits that such sports can formulate. Marx would probably see the Super Bowl as an opportunity to increase profits for businesses in the Miami area and big businesses in advertisements. Marx, as a conflict theorist, would also probably tell the fans surrounding him that it is fine to once in a while enjoy a Super Bowl, or perhaps the Olympics, but not to over-do-it by ignoring their personal problems and social issues. Marx would conceivably reflect on does people that, because of the injustice of some societies, are not able to make it to the NFL, or participate in such events due to economical struggles.

Unlike Durkheim’s functionalist perspective, and Marx’s conflict views, the interactionists, such as George Herbert Mead, are more interested in the shared understanding of everyday behavior. As mead seats in the front row watching the Colts take a beat by the Saints, he would probably also notice a father and his son cheering for their favorite team. Mead might commend the father and tell him how great it is for him to show his son the sports, and that if he continues to introduce sports to his son one day the son will be one of the best players. Mead might also notice the team players from either side and see that despite their racial differences they are able to effectively communicate and trust each other. Mead might see this as an opportunity for people to get together and enhance their communication.

Perhaps Durkheim, Marx, and mead would end up arguing in the attempt to defend each unique perspective, but in the end they would agree upon that there is more to sports than just exercise or recreation.

Canto IX, Supplemental

2011-03-31T21:18:00.000-04:00

Canto IX, Supplemental

By DonFerrer

The third pouch of the eighth circle was where

I saw the soles each with a dancing flame,

though my attention was caught by the reddest pair.

I approached the shade perchance to know its name

“was I mistaken? Have you come down to take my place[i]?”

Said the one that perforated ground hid his shame.

And I to him: “No, the one from Wadowice[ii] is at a higher space,”

“but tell me, are you Julius replacing Alexander?”

I asked the shade that underground hid his face.

“If it’s the third of the Julius[iii] the one that you ponder,

because of the betrayal of Innocenzo[iv] his beloved guest

he has won a spot at a place much lower and much colder[v].

I ranked two-fourteen[vi] and sentenced to undergo this pest

awaiting two be replaced by him ranking two-six-five[vii]

until then out of fire my sole will have its crest.”

[i] Here Pope Alexder VI thinks that Pope John Paul arrived.

[ii] Wadowice is the birth place of Pope John Paul

[iii] Meaning Pope Julius the third

[iv] Pope Julius the third is said to have an affair with Innocenzo

[v] The Frozen Lake

[vi] Alexander VI was Pope n.214

[vii] Pope Benedict XVI is n.265 and will be sent to the eighth circle because of the profits he has made during his papacy.

How has Globalization Influenced Me?

2011-03-31T21:10:00.001-04:00

With the fast growth of technology globalization has made a big impact in my life. Unlike my parents and grandparents who were raised in Dominican Republic with few, if any, technology available to them and with minimal diversity, I was raised in a diversified country were technology was constantly growing. Being exposed to different cultures meant being exposed to different beliefs and different values. Furthermore, being exposed to technology, such as the internet, meant being exposed to instant information.

My parents were raised as Christians and for the most part that was the only religion they knew. Everyone in their community was a Christian whether it was Catholic, Mormon, or the like. Although the internet was on the road to Globalization during my parents’ era, it was impossible for them to afford it in Dominican Republic, so the information they had was minimal. I, on the other hand, was raised in a community were religion was diversified. Some of my friends growing up worshiped Buddha, while others were fixed in science and believed there is no God, but in evolution. All this different religions created a form of curiosity within me, and with instant information just a click away forced me to do research and judge my own beliefs.

Globalization has also influenced the way I communicate. Growing up as a child I remember going outside to play with my friends, or inviting my friends over to play Super Nintendo, or Playstation. A few years later Xbox, and Playstation evolved to online gaming and I no longer needed to invite my friends over because we were able to play the same game in the comfort of each other’s home and communicate through headsets that includes a microphone for talking, and a speaker for listening. Not only was I able to play with my friends without having them present in my home, I was also able to make new friends from around the world. I once met a friend in New York, whom once in a while sent me invitations to join his game, and another from London, who likewise occasionally invites me to play with his “clan”.

A functionalist theorist would view this fast growing technology as an opportunity to establish online communities, and institutions. Such community may include the Education website which teachers and students can use. On the other hand, a conflict theorist would view how problematic and disturbing unsupervised internet usage can be for a child. One of these problems may include predators looking for vulnerable children surfing the web. While the integrationists view the forms of communication available in through the internet. The internet allows a person to chat with his brother across country, or find out what’s going on around the world.

In conclusion, globalization has influenced me in many ways. I will never see religion as my parents see it because of the availability of other religions around me. I no longer have to accept what a person that seems to have more knowledge than me tells me, because if I tend to disagree, I can always find the fact with a click of a button. These are just a few ways in how globalization has influenced me.

Burning Passion, Burning Love

2011-03-31T18:54:00.002-04:00

The story of Dido and Aeneas in The Aeneid, is a story of a queen that fell in love with a Trojan hero. In The Aeneid, Venus, the goddess of love, sends down her son, Eros, disguised as Ascanius, Aeneas’ son, so that Eros who is the god of sexual love can work his charm around the queen making her fall in love with Aeneas. Venus succeeds in making Dido fall in love with her son, the Trojan hero, but Dido’s passion for Aeneas ruled over her reason and leads her to her destruction.

In the contrary, the story of Sita and Rama in The Ramayana, is a story of a young prince who falls in love-at-first-sight with a young women who also falls in love-at-first-sight with him. In The Ramayana, Rama and Sita are gods that descended down to earth in human form. On earth Rama and Sita were unaware that they were reincarnated as human beings and the moment the laid eyes on each other they fell in love, but unlike the story of Dido and Aeneas the love Rama and Sita fell was a heavenly one and not merely a sexual desire.

In both stories, the story of Dido and Aeneas in The Aeneid and the story of Sita and Rama in The Ramayana, the lovers are forcefully separated. In The Aeneid, Mercury, the son and messenger of Jupiter, was sent down to earth to tell Aeneas that he can no longer remain in Carthage because he was “losing sight of future towns the fate ordain” (p.103). Aeneas had to proceed to Italy because it was the fate of his son to be ruler of that land and if he stayed in Carthage he would be disobeying what was proposed by Jupiter. In The Ramayana, Sita was captured in the forest and was taken to Ravana’s island where she was being held prisoner by the demon king.

In The Aeneid, Dido felt betrayed by Aeneas because after all the love she showed him and publicly made him her lover bringing shame to her kingdom he decided to sail to Italy leaving her behind. The burning passion, the embarrassment she would face, and knowing that she would no longer spent time with Aeneas or even a seed planted in her, lead her to a suicidal death.

In The Ramayana, since Sita was held hostage and had to reside in a stranger’s home Rama decided to free her from all her marriage duties and let her be free to do what she wants; however, Sita is not ready to let go of Rama and to proof her loyalty to him she jumped into a pile of sticks which fire reached the size of a tree. (p.149)

Both, Dido and Sita, were prepared to give their lives in the absence of their lovers. Dido, that was pierced by the common love and desired Aeneas jumped into the fire because she couldn’t bear the flame that was burning her inside. Sita too jumped into the fire because if she wasn’t worthy for Rama she would rather not be alive, however, the love that Sita felt for Rama wasn’t common but heavenly and the god of fire recognized her loyalty and took Sita out of the fire and “presented her to Rama with words of blessing” (Ramayana 149).

Embryonic stem cells

2011-03-31T18:48:00.000-04:00

Embryonic stem cells, as their name suggest, are derived from human embryos. These cells are grown in laboratory, which is known as cell culture. Embryonic stem cells have the potential to become any cell type in the body, which make them very special. Furthermore; since these stem cells have the potential to become any cell type in the body, it means that they also have the potential to replace damaged tissues. However, although stem cell research can result in great scientific and medical gains, pro-life activists and many religious groups argue that it is immoral and unethical to destroy human embryos in the name of medical science—making the human embryonic stem-cell research topic very controversial.

Shirley Wright, an assistant professor of biology at the University of Dayton in Ohio, points out that “Embryonic stem cells form at a very early stage in human development…” (352). She also notes that these embryonic stem cells “are first clearly recognizable about five to seven days after fertilization, when human embryo forms a structure called a blastocyst” (Wright 352). She argues that at this stage there is little indication that this fluid-filled sphere “could develop into a complete person” (352).

But from where are embryonic stem cells harvested and why are these cells so special? According to Wright, “in November 1998, the world learned that human embryonic stem cells had been successfully grown in cell culture” (352). Cell culture is the process by which cells are grown in controlled conditions in a laboratory. Wright also suggests that these “undifferentiated human cells have the potential to develop into any cell type in the body,” furthermore, “people with illnesses or injuries requiring the replacement of tissue—any tissue—need not worry about finding a suitable donor” (352). She argues that since these stem cells have the potential to develop into any cell type, they also have the potential to replace damaged tissues.

There are many potential good that could come from therapy using harvested human cells, Wright points out some of them, “”people need no longer suffer the consequences of heart attacks, Alzheimer’s disease or diabetes when compatible heart tissue, neurons and pancreatic cells can be grown in a culture dish” (352). She argues that such visions could be fulfilled with stem-cell technology. As a son-in-law of a woman who suffers from high blood pressure, who miraculously was able to find a suitable kidney donor for her transplant that ended years of painful dialysis sessions, stem-cell technology is very important to me. If genetics play a role in high blood pressure, my wife and her offspring have a slight chance of inheriting high blood pressure, but she might not be as lucky as her mother. But if the vision of replacing damaged tissues with harvested human stem cells is fulfilled, then the need to wait for a suitable donor would no longer be necessary.

Alas, although stem-cell technology can result in great scientific and medical gains, there are some moral and ethical concerns, as Wright acknowledges, “about setting the boundaries for this research” (360). She claims that some people “argue that it is unethical to harvest embryonic stem cells from human embryos because human life has not been respected” (361). Furthermore, Wright also claims that assuming more cells will need to be collected “some fear that companies will support in vitro fertilization clinics and abortion clinics for the acquisition of embryos and aborted fetal tissue” (361).

Furthermore, there are others such as Patrick Lee, director of the Franciscan’s Institute of Bioethics and author of “Abortion and Unborn Human Life’” who argues the immorality of destroying human embryos and early fetuses, and claims that people are intrinsically valuable because of who they are, essentially, a human and physical organism; therefore, he states, “what is intrinsically valuable (as a subject of rights) comes to be at conception” (Lee 250). He adds that it is wrong to kill someone at any developmental stage, including at the fetus and embryo stage when he outlined that “what makes it wrong to kill you or me now would also have been present in the killing of you or me when we existed as adolescents, as toddlers, as infants, but also when we existed as fetuses and embryos” (Lee 250). Lee urges that human embryo and fetus have the capacity for higher mental functions, although, they cannot immediately perform such acts. He claims that embryos and fetuses are members of a natural kind, as oppose to canine or feline embryo, and that if they are not prevented by some intrinsic cause they can develop the capacity for mental functions.

Lee’s argument regarding the moral status of embryos and fetuses, however, is challenged by Jeffrey Reiman, professor of philosophy at the American University in Washington, D.C., who contends that “Lee confuses the nature of a process with the nature of its result,” and that “a process of quantative change can produce a change in substance” (1 of 14). Reiman claims that although a human fetus and a rational person, as he calls it, share the same essential properties, which are being a physical organism, but are not the same substance “because they do not share all the same essential properties” 3 of 14). So, in contrary to Lee, Reiman suggests that embryos and fetuses do not have the moral status as an adult human because they lack the essential trait of rationality.

As a person who is neither pro-life nor pro-choice to an extreme, I believe that the government should be more rational. In most States, abortion is allowed within the first trimester. Within that time frame embryonic stem cells are able to be captured and cultured. If the mother has made a legally allowed decision to abort the embryo or fetus, wouldn’t it make sense to allow scientist to experiment on a soon to be discarded embryo, as long as it only has the “potential” to become a person. Moreover, if such researches can one day lead to the cloning of necessary tissues and neurons that might save millions of Americans, isn’t it fair to say that stem cell research should be federally funded.

Fortunately, on November 11^th, 2007, Marie McCullough, a staff writer for the Philadelphia Inquirer, reported a major stem-cell advance. She reported that “two studies reprogrammed human skin cells, a step that could overcome ethical concerns” (A1). In her report two separate research teams “announced that they had reprogrammed ordinary skin cells to behave like embryonic stem cells...” (A1). Such breakthrough is of great importance because, as McCullough reports, it “could overcome ethical and scientific obstacles to the dream of regenerative medicine” (A1). Although this breakthrough is still at a very early age, it is really promising. If Thompson, a scientist at the University of Wisconsin, and Yamanaka, another scientist working on a similar project from the University of Kyoto in Japan, are successful reprogramming skin cells and giving them the characteristics that make embryonic stem cells so valuable, implies that scientist will no longer need to destroy five-day-old human embryos trying to obtain stem cells, thus, ending the ethical and moral debate.

Works Cited

Wright, Shirley J. "Human Embryonic Stem-Cell Research: Science and Ethics." American Scientist 87.4 (1999)

Lee, Patrick Abortion and Unborn Human Life The Catholic University of America Press (1996)

REIMAN, JEFFREY "THE PRO-LIFE ARGUMENT FROM SUBSTANTIAL IDENTITY AND THE PRO-CHOICE ARGUMENT FROM ASYMMETRIC VALUE: A REPLY TO PATRICK LEE." Bioethics 21.6 (2007)

McCullough, Marie "Major stem-cell advance reported." Philadelphia Inquirer, The (PA) 21 Nov. 2007

Human Embryonic Stem Cells

2011-02-21T09:56:00.000-05:00

Works Cited

Wright, Shirley J. "Human Embryonic Stem-Cell Research: Science and Ethics." American Scientist 87.4 (1999)

Lee, Patrick Abortion and Unborn Human Life The Catholic University of America Press (1996)

REIMAN, JEFFREY "THE PRO-LIFE ARGUMENT FROM SUBSTANTIAL IDENTITY AND THE PRO-CHOICE ARGUMENT FROM ASYMMETRIC VALUE: A REPLY TO PATRICK LEE." Bioethics 21.6 (2007)

McCullough, Marie "Major stem-cell advance reported." Philadelphia Inquirer, The (PA) 21 Nov. 2007

Education in the New England Colonies

2011-01-24T08:12:00.000-05:00

In the New England colonies (Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and Connecticut), many people shared similar values, which made it possible to establish town schools. In particular, two laws moved New Englanders in the direction of town schools. The Massachusetts Act of 1642 required that parents and master craftsmen with apprentices be monitored to ensure that children were learning to read and understand religious principles. The Massachusetts Act of 1647, sometimes referred to as Old Deluder Satan Act, required towns to educate youth so they might thwart (put a stop to) Satan’s trickery. To produce Scripture-literate citizens, every town of fifty households had to employ a teacher of reading and writing, and every town of one hundred households had to provide a grammar school to prepare students for continuing study at Harvard University.
Many settlers in the northern colonies were Puritans who followed the teaching of John Calvin, a Swiss religious reformer. Calvin believed God was omnipotent and good, whereas human being were evil and helpless, predestined for either salvation or eternal torment. Schools were to produce literate, hardworking, frugal (economical), and respectful men and women who could resist temptation. Calvin saw children as savage and primitive creatures [who] needed training and discipline to achieve a life of social conformity and religious commitment.
Colonist living in southern cities experienced a life style quite different from colonist in other areas of the country. Northern cities were densely (Heavily) populated trading centers. Merchants, who where key people in the community; offered an array (selection) of goods and services not found elsewhere, ships brought both goods and ideas from England and Europe that seldom (rarely) made their way south. Overall, city dwellers on the eastern seaboard were among the best informed and sometimes the most influential of the colonists. In addition, many schoolteachers in the North were better educated than teachers in other parts of the country (Blum et al., 1993) (Education the Practice and Profession of Teaching Fifth Edition).

The Many Discussions of Personhood

2011-01-22T22:00:00.000-05:00

In this paper I wish to bring out the different points of views concerning the entity resulting from conception and at which point between conception and birth should that entity be recognized as a human person. The union of sperm and egg is the beginning of human life, no one disagrees with that, no one can also disagree—as Alexandre Mauron puts it in the Encyclopedia of Bioethics 3rd Edition—that “Between birth and death, the human organism is a person, equipped with the full measure of basic human rights” (2: 707). The topic that has been a controversial question, however, is not who is entitled to human personhood, but at which point—from fertilization until birth—do human rights accrue to the unborn?
Some people such as William Westmiller, the chairman of the Republican Caucus and cofounder of the Canadian Libertarian Party, suggest that Personhood begins at birth. Westmiller suggests that there is only one characteristic unique to personhood, which is the capacity to reason and that “a person is a living human. So is fetus. But, so is any other cell on our bodies” (westmiller 1 of 5). He puts forward that every cell containing human DNA has the potential to develop into a complete person; therefore, he claims that we cannot use words such as “human” or “living” as a definitive characteristic of a person. Westmiller proposes that the entity resulting from conception at no point, between fertilization until birth, have the capacity to reason; therefore, since they do not have any rational thoughts, they have not fully realized personhood. Westmiller suggests, in his argument that personhood begins at birth, that we are either human beings or we are not, because we cannot be two things at once. He suggests that “a ‘person’ is a human being. Not a human might-be, or a human used-to-be, but a homo-sapien with the capacity to reason” (1 of 5).
Westmiller also argues that personhood exists despite impaired capacity. He proposes that “there is a difference between having a capacity and the exercise of that capacity,” because even if someone loses the ability to reason or was born with a disability—such as mentally impaired—it does not necessarily means that they lost or don’t have “the capacity for rational thoughts” (1 of 5). He proposes that just as much as someone suffering from a persistent irreversible vegetative state, has past from having the human conditions to not having human condition, since government can no longer assume responsibilities over them, so is the same with an embryo or a fetus. The person in a vegetative state is a human-used-to-be, and embryos and fetuses are human-might-be, so it should be up to the guardian to assume the responsibility—for the defense of natural rights—when a person is dependent on another for nourishment and sustenance.
Although William Westmiller suggests that the capacity to reason is the only characteristic that is unique to every human being and distinguishes every person, that a potential person—according to him—is, in fact, not a person, that even “a dead skin cell…has all the genetic potential, given the proper environment, to become a person”(Westmiller 1 of 5), and that personhood exists despite impaired capacity, there are others such as Maureen L. Condic, an assistant professor of neurobiology and anatomy at the University of Utah—that argues against Westmiller’s argument, and suggests that the human personhood begins in the first weeks of pregnancy. Condic suggests that “the critical difference between a collection of cells and a living organism is the ability of an organism to act in a coordinated manner for the continued health and maintenance of the body as a whole” (2 of 6). Condic suggests that just because organisms are composed of living cells, it does not necessarily mean that living cells, such as a dandruff flake, constitute an organism. Condic entails that an embryo is more than just a living cell, because even dead bodies have live cells, however, the living cells of a dead body cannot function in a coordinated manner; therefore, they are incapable of growing and maturing as would an embryo. Condic discusses further that human embryos are “living human beings precisely because they possess the defining feature of human life that is lost in the moment of death…” (2 of 6).
Moreover, in contrast to Westmiller, Condic proposes that the ability to reason is not the only characteristic that separates human beings from all other living things. According to Condic, if we determine that an embryo is not entitled to personhood just because the entity does not have the capacity for rational thoughts, then we should also not consider a newborn or a child born with a disability a person, but perhaps only about twenty percent human. She goes on to explain that the argument regarding personhood based on ability, form and preference, should not be applied to embryos because they too have all this abilities that just need developments, and if we are to apply them to the unborn, then we should also apply them to persons lacking some of the qualities of a grown person; rather, Condic suggests, that we should view embryos, and especially later fetuses with the same moral status of a person as we also view someone with a disadvantage. She proposes that “Embryos are genetically unique human organisms, fully possessing the integrated biologic function that defines human life at all stages of development, continuing throughout adulthood until death” (4 of 6). Condic suggests, therefore, that although the fetus does not have the capacity to reason, or is not fully formed—such as a normal child—it should be considered a person; furthermore, she suggests that those laws that allows abortions at this prenatal stage should be revised. Condic quoted Abraham Lincoln regarding an argument based on form, ability, and preference that were put forth during his time to justify the institution of slavery, it said:
It is color, then; the lighter having the right to enslave the darker? Take care. By this rule, you are to be slave to the first man you meet with fairer skin than your own.
You do not mean color exactly? You mean the whites are intellectually the superiors of the blacks, and, therefore, have the right to enslave them? Take care again. By this rule, you are to be slave to the first man you meet with an intellect superior to your own.
But, say you, it is a question of interest; and, if you can make it your interest, you have the right to enslave another. Very well. And if he can make it his interest, he has the right to enslave you… (Condic 4 of 6)
In this statement, Lincoln was comparing blacks to fair skinned persons and explaining how problematic it can be to strip the moral status of a person to someone lacking all the qualities that one might assume makes a human being a person; Therefore, Maureen suggests, if embryos are denied the status of a human being based on form, ability, or choice, the same arguments can be turned against adult humans with imperfect forms and/or with limited abilities.
Condic’s arguments regarding the status of an embryo, however, is challenged by Michael J. Sandel—a professor of government at Harvard and former member of the President’s Council on Bioethics—who suggests that embryos do not deserve the moral status of persons and that “the notion that an embryo…has the same moral status as a person can be challenged on further grounds” (Sandel 2 of 5). Sandel suggests that as much an acorn is not an oak tree, the same applies to human embryos and human beings. He proposes, in contrast to Condic, that despite the entities developmental continuity, it only has the potential to become a human being and should not be given the status of persons. He goes on to explain his argument on why people should not deem the entity resulting from conception to be a human being—such as a newborn baby. He argues, in regards to the use of embryo in stem cell research, that “if harvesting stem cells from a blastocyst were truly on a par with harvesting organs from a baby, then the morally responsible policy would be to ban it, not merely deny it federal funding” (Sandel 2 of 5). Sandel proposes that embryos are not persons, because if they were persons then all doctors who are legally allowed to perform abortion—in accordance to the law—should be seen as murderers because they would be murdering a human being; rather, people should not view abortions or stem cell research as infanticide because the entity is only a potential human being, as could any other human living cell.
Apart from Condic, there are others, such as Patrick Lee, director of the Franciscan’s Institute of Bioethics and author of “Abortion and Unborn Human Life’” whom argues against Sandel’s oak tree and acorn analogy, and claims that people are intrinsically valuable because of who they are, essentially, a human and physical organism; therefore, he states, “what is intrinsically valuable (as a subject of rights) comes to be at conception” (Lee 250). He adds that it is wrong to kill someone at any developmental stage, including at the fetus and embryo stage when he outlined that “what makes it wrong to kill you or me now would also have been present in the killing of you or me when we existed as adolescents, as toddlers, as infants, but also when we existed as fetuses and embryos” (Lee 250). Lee urges that human embryo and fetus have the capacity for higher mental functions, although, they cannot immediately perform such acts. He claims that embryos and fetuses are members of a natural kind, as oppose to canine or feline embryo, and that if they are not prevented by some intrinsic cause they can develop the capacity for mental functions. But what does Lee asserts when he claims that embryos are intrinsically valuable? Well, if embryos were not intrinsically valuable, but instrumentally valuable, then, according to Lee, it would be ok to kill embryos, fetuses, but also infants, as long as they can be replaced. Lee insists that personhood begins at conception because “…what is intrinsically valuable as a subject of rights—and so can rightly be called a ‘person’—comes to be at conception” (263).
Lee’s argument regarding the moral status of embryos and fetuses, however, is challenged by Jeffrey Reiman, professor of philosophy at the American University in Washington, D.C., who contends that “Lee confuses the nature of a process with the nature of its result,” and that “a process of quantative change can produce a change in substance” (1 of 14). Reiman claims that although a human fetus and a rational person, as he calls it, share the same essential properties, which are being a physical organism, but are not the same substance “because they do not share all the same essential properties” 3 of 14). So, in contrary to Lee, Reiman suggests that embryos and fetuses do not have the moral status as an adult human because they lack the essential trait of rationality, which was also mentioned earlier by William Westmiller, whom also argues that embryos and fetuses do not have rational thoughts, as opposed to an adult human. Reiman adds that Lee fails to mention that embryos and fetuses are identical to the adult human because its rationality; however, Lee’s argument was not synthesized upon rational thoughts, but on what he considers to be intrinsically valuable as a subject of rights. Reiman declares that the rational capacity to care for one’s life is the threshold level that separates a fetus from a “rational person,” and since the fetus lacks this capacity the entity should not have the moral status of personhood. Reiman concludes in his Substantial Identity and Asymmetric Value argument that “persons refers to the substances we are, not the things we are. And thus persons begin when physical organisms gain the essential trait of rationality…”(12 of 14).
Many others, however, base the moral status of the fetus based on different debates. Take Thomas A. Shannon, professor of religion and social ethics in the department of Humanities and Arts at Worcester Polytechnic Institute and author of Genetic Engineering: A Documentary History, for example, whom has examined four social context which offer different views of fetal status. Shannon argues that some technical and medical developments, such as the Assisted Reproduction (AR), have impacted the views on early fetus. He claims that “in AR, this entity is the prize of a quest that begins with a desire for a child and ends in a laboratory at the cost of enormous psychological and physical strain and at least tens of thousands of dollars” (Shannon 416). In this procedure, he claims, the child-to-be is valued with great feelings of joy when the preimplantation embryo is successful, and the parents feel they have the valued object of their desires. Another breakthrough in medical developments which according to Shannon has impacted the views on fetuses is the growing practice of fetal surgery. According to Shannon it is possible to perform surgical procedures on the fetus within the uterus; therefore, “the perception that this practice conveys is that the fetus not only has some degree of worth, but can be a legitimate patient” (Shannon 416). The final medical and technical development that Shannon mentions is the New Born Intensive Care Units (NICU). The NICU, Shannon adds, functions as an artificial uterus and has saved the lives of thousands of premature newborns. This is important to Shannon because the fetus is viewed in a different light, although it costs hundreds of thousands for the average stay in such units it proves that it is worthwhile saving a premature neonate. But medical breakthroughs are not the only subjects in debates that Shannon mentions; he also mentions the debates on courts. He suggests that many criminal charges have been brought upon women who abused drugs during their pregnancy. This, he contends, means that the fetal value is strong enough to be the basis ground of legal procedures. He also adds that it also suggests a perception of fetal value when involuntary cesarean sections take place for the well being of the fetus which could mean, back to Shannon’s point, that it is a good argument to see the fetus as a patient, which come to his first question in debates: “In order to be a patient, is it necessary to be a person” (417)? If it is necessary to be a person in order to be a patient, then Shannon claims that since patients are persons and some fetuses are patients then fetuses should be considered person, or at least share in the rights of a patient. The problem with this is that not all patients have the moral status of personhood. Take the Terry Schiavo case, for example, that led to her death by dehydration. When doctors announced that she was diagnosed with a persistent vegetative state, her husband decided that she should not live under life support, while her parents argued—in vain—against her husband’s decision.
I shall not continue with Shannon’s other arguments since, for the most part, they are based on fetuses being seen as patients, rather, I will proceed with Jeff McMahan, professor of philosophy at Rutgers University, who claims that no person existed as embryos and that by killing an embryo is not killing a person. This he argues in defense of stem cell research. He suggests that if a child or an adult were once an embryo, their nature was very different from what it is as a human child or adult; therefore, their moral status was correspondingly different. But he claims that persons were never embryos, at least at a very early stage in the embryo development. McMahan quoted Alexander McCall, who he claims is a well-known novelist and law professor, McCall wrote:
At an early point in its development, the embryo can divide into twins or remain a single individual. This is important because one might say that before that stage has been reached, we do not have an identifiable individual. It is only when the embryo can no longer divide in this way that we can say that there is a separate person there, if we’re going to use the language of personhood, because we do not know whether there is going to be a separate person or two persons. (McMahan 177)
McMahan claims that the common argument that embryos cannot be a unique human been until after the possibility of twinning has passed has been mistaken. He claims that just because an entity can twin is no reason to think it is a unique individual. He claims that personhood begins “when the fetal brain develops the capacity for consciousness…” (186). This happens, according to McMahan, between twenty-two and twenty-eight weeks after conception.
With so many debates regarding the moral status of the unborn at any point between fertilization until birth, it is hard to take a position because of all the valid points on each side. It is valid that a person needs the capacities to reason in order to have the qualities of personhood. However, it is also legitimate not to base all the qualities on reasoning because even at birth some children are born with that disadvantage. One should also keep in mind that first trimester abortions is not, and should not, be considered “infanticide” for the reason that the court of law allows such procedures. Nonetheless, just because first trimester abortion is allowed by the court of law it does not suggests that the entity does not have any qualities of personhood during the first weeks of conception because the entity, in a way, can posses the potentiality to become a person.
This has led to my conclusion on taking John P. Lizza’s side, a professor of philosophy at the Kutztown University of Pennsylvania, who argues on the critical issue of the moral status of the embryo, and suggests that not all embryos have the capacity to become a person. Lizza claims that “some human embryos may lack the potential to become a person that others have” (Lizza 380). He synthesizes that if X is potentially Y, then it must be possible for X to be Y, however, it is not determined by definitions thus leaving some X or embryos without the qualities of Y or personhood. Lizza proposes that there are degrees of potentiality among the human embryos, and since the human embryos have different degrees of potentiality then they should also have different moral status. By different degrees of potentiality Lizza is referring to the physical possibilities and logically possibilities. It is logically possible that a male sperm has the potential to become a person. Having protected sex eliminates all the possibilities of the disposed sperm to become a person. During in vitro fertilization, it is logically possible for all the fertilized eggs to become a person, but only those inserted in the women uterus will have the potential to become a person. The rest, if discarded, will no longer posses the potentiality to become a person. Quoting Joel Feinberg, Lizza uses a pile of dehydrated orange juice analogy to explain potentiality, and states:
That the powder is potentially orange juice (just add water). However, it is potentially many other things as well. All that we have to do is adjust the conditions. For example, since we could add flour, eggs, and yeast, and then bake it, it is potentially orange cake. Feinberg correctly observes that this sense of ‘potentiality’ is so ‘promiscuous’ as to be practically useless (380-381).
This, according to Lizza, is the difference between physical and logical potentiality. Lizza suggests that one can have the potential to become something, having the possibilities to become it, is something else.
But why do I agree with John Lizza and his position on the moral status of an embryo? Well, I’ve come to the conclusion that until the human race advances more in science, we will remain oblivious to such questions. I know that I am a person, equipped with the full measures of basic human rights. I also agree that it is impossible to have the potential to become a person if the entity lacks the possibilities; therefore, it wasn’t until it was physically possible for me, as an unborn entity, to have the capacity in developing into a human person, that I gained the qualities of personhood. I have learned that it is possible to abort; in fact, it is permissible by law for a woman to abort during the embryonic stage of the entity. I disagree with others, such as William Westmiller, who uses the acorn and oak tree analogy. Westmiller uses science fiction language when he suggested that any human cell in our body have the possibilities of becoming a human being. I agree with the many researchers that support stem cell research because, as John Lizza proposed, some entities lack the moral status of personhood. I understand that a developing child is precious and valuable, that the moment his heart starts to pound and the parents are able to hear it during the ultra sound, it is a very memorable event. I also understand that sometimes and especially at the very early stages of pregnancy, it is not the same feeling of belonging that one has towards the entity. If my wife becomes pregnant the morning after an unprotected sex, and decides she wants to use a morning-after-pill, it is not same as her being pregnant for several weeks and deciding on an abortion even if it is permissible by law.
Did I find an answer on when did I, a person, came into existence between fertilization until birth? No, I did not find an answer. I did however, learned that to some extent the entity has or should have the qualities of a person.

2011-01-22T17:46:00.000-05:00

Lysistrata Sex Strike: Why did it Worked?

Lysistrata was an Athenian woman that decided to form a strike, which included all women to live at home without sex, until the war between Athens and Sparta was over. The question here is: Why did such strike work in ancient Greece? In Aristophanes’ play, Lysistrata, a war between the sexes breaks out when a group of men find out that a group of women have seized the Acropolis and locked themselves inside (20). In the play, the men were carrying sticks, while the women were bearing bowls; the men planned to attack with fire, while the women planned to put out the flames with water; the men were mostly focused on war, hate and enmity, while the women searched for peace, love and union. But regardless of their differences, there was one thing they had in common—both, men and women alike, recognized the joys of sex.
In the excerpt from Plato’s Symposium, Aristophanes, the character, argues that the God of love “is the best friend of men” and “the great impediment to the happiness of the race” (5). Furthermore, Aristophanes claims that in the original human nature the sexes were “three in number; there was man, woman, and the union of the two,” he further explains that the original human had two faces, four arms, four feet, four ears, and two privy members, until an enraged Zeus, because of their corruption, decided to split them in half (5). Aristophanes also states that “after the division…they were in the point of dying from hunger and self-neglect, because they did not like to do anything apart” (6). These claims are important because it tells us that in order to achieve happiness one cannot overlook the power of Love, and it shows us why humans have the desire to be loved, specifically from his other half.
It seems that the desire, or otherwise necessity for love, unison, and sex was clearly understood by Lysistrata, thus, making it the weapon of choice. Even the oath that was performed by the women, which traditionally would involve the slaughtering of an animal, was performed with a bowl, wine, and a wine skin, hence, avoiding further killings which would go against their beliefs (Aristophanes 16). Furthermore, it appears that Lysistrata somehow recognized that the drive to come together would be more powerful than war because knowing that it will be as painful for the women as it would be for the men to resist sex she convinced the women to avoid having sex until the men came to reason—to end the war. On the other hand, it appears as if the men has underestimated the power of love; and with arrogance pursues war and destruction as it is portrayed in Aristophanes play, Lysistrata, when a group of old men attempt to attack, with sticks set on fire, the older women that locked themselves in the Acropolis (20-21). The women realizing that groups of old men want to reduce them to ashes pray to Athene, the goddess of war, wisdom, and strength, not to destroy the men, but to help them carry water to extinguish their fire (Aristophanes 23).
Aristophanes, in Plato’s Symposium, warns us about the evils of opposing Love, and the happiness of pursuing and desiring of the whole, which he calls ”love” (7). In Aristophanes’ play, Lysistrata, the sex strike works because the men are desperate to take their wives to bed (72). The reason why the men are so desperate to have sex with their wives is because, as Aristophanes claims in Plato’s Symposium, the “desire of one another which is implanted in us, reuniting our original nature” (6).
In the end, because of the desire to be with the other half, love will prevail, unison will overcome enmity, and peace will triumph over war. Men’s fire, in time, will be extinguished by water, and hate conquered through love. Just like the primeval men, in Plato’s Symposium, were “dying from hunger and self-neglect…” (6), the men in Aristophanes’ Lysistrata, could no longer endure their erections and were desperately mad to be mating (72). So just like the primeval man found satisfaction when they were finally able to mate, the Greek men had no other choice but to choose peace to meet their satisfaction, so in the end the drive to come together is more powerful than war, and that is why the sex strike worked.