Heidi Smith, PhD

From Modernism to Metamodernism: The Absurdity of the Normal in Contemporary Governance

noreply@blogger.com (Unknown) — Mon, 05 Oct 2026 02:11:11 +0000

Modernism was built on an extraordinary promise: that human beings could understand the world, organize it rationally, and progressively improve it. Science could replace superstition. Bureaucracy could replace arbitrariness. Expertise could replace patronage. Planning could overcome disorder. Economic development could move societies from poverty toward prosperity, while increasingly sophisticated institutions would make governments more predictable, efficient, and accountable.

This intellectual architecture profoundly shaped modern public administration and political economy. Governments became organizations to be studied, measured, rationalized, and improved. Budgets could be balanced. Administrative procedures could be standardized. Public servants could be professionalized. Markets could be regulated. Development could be planned.

Yet contemporary governance increasingly reveals the limits of this modernist confidence.

Climate change, financial instability, technological disruption, political polarization, institutional fragmentation, corruption, migration, geopolitical competition, and widening inequality all challenge the assumption that political development follows a predictable trajectory. Rather than progressing steadily toward increasingly rational forms of governance, societies frequently move forward, backward, and sideways simultaneously.

The result is not simply institutional failure. It is something more intellectually unsettling: the growing difficulty of knowing what institutional success should even look like.

This is where metamodernism becomes useful as a framework for understanding contemporary governance.

The Modernist Promise

Modernist political thought assumes that there is some relationship between knowledge and progress. If societies acquire better information, develop stronger institutions, and design more rational policies, governance should improve.

Public administration embodies this aspiration particularly clearly.

Budgets translate social priorities into numbers. Bureaucracies translate political decisions into administrative action. Regulations translate collective concerns into enforceable rules. Indicators translate complicated social realities into measurable outcomes.

Much of twentieth-century development policy followed this logic.

Governments were encouraged to construct modern bureaucracies, professional civil services, independent regulatory institutions, decentralized governments, transparent procurement systems, modern budgeting frameworks, and increasingly sophisticated systems of public accountability.

Development itself became imagined as a relatively linear process.

Poor societies would industrialize. Administrative capacity would increase. Education would expand. Political institutions would mature. Markets would deepen. Eventually, developing countries would converge toward institutional arrangements associated with wealthy democracies.

The intellectual attraction of this framework is understandable. Modernism gives policymakers confidence that problems can be identified, diagnosed, and ultimately solved.

But the contemporary world rarely behaves according to such orderly assumptions.

When the Linear Normal Disappears

The idea of the "normal" depended heavily upon expectations of stability.

Governments could design policies because policymakers assumed that tomorrow would resemble today closely enough for planning to remain meaningful.

Yet contemporary governments operate under increasingly persistent conditions of uncertainty.

Financial crises emerge across borders within hours. Artificial intelligence transforms bureaucratic processes faster than governments can regulate them. Climate disasters turn what were once hundred-year events into recurring fiscal risks. Supply chains shift because of geopolitical competition. Migration alters local service demands. Political movements dismantle administrative structures that previous governments spent decades constructing.

The challenge is therefore deeper than policy uncertainty.

The very assumption that governance eventually returns to equilibrium becomes questionable.

Traditional public finance models frequently presume that governments operate within relatively stable institutional structures. Revenues are projected. Expenditures are planned. Debt sustainability is calculated. Regulations are designed under assumptions about how firms, citizens, and governments will respond.

But what happens when institutional instability itself becomes permanent?

The modernist idea of normalcy begins to collapse.

Instead of governing toward equilibrium, governments increasingly govern through continuous disruption.

Postmodernism and the Destruction of Certainty

Postmodernism attacked precisely the assumptions upon which modernist confidence rested.

Where modernism searched for universal principles, postmodernism emphasized difference.

Where modernism trusted expertise, postmodernism interrogated who possesses the authority to define expertise.

Where modernism constructed institutional narratives about progress, development, democracy, and rational government, postmodernism revealed the political interests embedded within those narratives.

This critique was enormously valuable.

Institutions are never purely technical. Budgets distribute power. Bureaucracies privilege some forms of knowledge over others. Development programs define which communities are considered developed and which are considered deficient. Administrative statistics determine which populations become visible to the state.

Postmodernism forced scholars to examine these assumptions.

Yet endless deconstruction creates its own dilemma.

If every institution represents power, every narrative disguises interests, every measurement contains bias, and every claim to progress can be deconstructed, what remains as the intellectual foundation for collective action?

Cynicism can become politically paralyzing.

Governments still have to govern.

Roads must be constructed. Schools must operate. Taxes must be collected. Debt must be serviced. Water must be distributed. Environmental risks must be regulated.

Citizens may distrust institutions while simultaneously depending upon them.

This contradiction lies at the heart of what I call the absurdity of the normal.

The Absurdity of the Normal

Consider a municipal budget.

Officials gather before citizens, journalists, and legislators to present a document describing projected revenues, expenditures, infrastructure projects, financing mechanisms, and fiscal priorities.

The language is reassuringly modernist.

Fiscal discipline.

Transparency.

Decentralized autonomy.

Responsible borrowing.

Sustainable infrastructure.

Strategic investment.

Each concept implies that government is rational, measurable, and controllable.

Yet everyone participating in the process may simultaneously understand that reality is much more complicated.

Revenue projections may depend heavily upon transfers from the central government. Political incentives may favor visible infrastructure projects rather than long-term maintenance. Municipal administrations may change personnel after elections, eliminating institutional memory. Financial intermediaries may offer loans that shift fiscal costs toward future governments. Accounting systems may satisfy formal reporting requirements while revealing surprisingly little about actual government capacity.

The budget therefore occupies two realities simultaneously.

It is both a genuine administrative instrument and a political performance.

The mayor performs accountability.

The opposition performs scrutiny.

Financial institutions perform technical rationality.

Citizens perform participation.

International organizations perform institutional modernization.

None of these performances is necessarily fraudulent. Indeed, many participants may sincerely believe in the institutions they represent.

But they are operating within institutional structures that everyone recognizes as incomplete.

Here lies the absurdity.

We continue behaving as if institutions possess the coherence promised by modernism even while possessing a thoroughly postmodern awareness of their fragility.

From Postmodernism to Metamodernism

Metamodernism provides a possible conceptual response to this contradiction.

It does not restore modernist certainty.

Nor does it reject postmodern skepticism.

Instead, metamodernism oscillates between them.

One of its defining ideas is metaxis: existing between positions without fully resolving the tension separating them.

Hope exists alongside doubt.

Sincerity exists alongside irony.

Idealism exists alongside skepticism.

Progress remains desirable even when its inevitability has disappeared.

This oscillation describes contemporary governance remarkably well.

Public officials frequently understand that institutional reforms will be incomplete while nevertheless pursuing them.

Researchers understand the limitations of quantitative indicators while continuing to measure public-sector performance.

Citizens understand that democratic systems are imperfect while demanding greater democratic accountability.

Policymakers know that anti-corruption institutions cannot eliminate corruption but continue constructing mechanisms capable of reducing it.

This is not necessarily hypocrisy.

It may instead represent a distinct form of political rationality.

We act without certainty.

Institutional Pragmatism

A metamodern approach to governance therefore suggests what might be called institutional pragmatism.

Institutional pragmatism begins with an uncomfortable proposition: institutions are necessary, imperfect, and continually unfinished.

Rather than designing institutions under assumptions of permanent equilibrium, policymakers should design them for adaptation.

Rather than asking only whether an institutional model represents international best practice, policymakers should ask how that model interacts with historical legacies, local political incentives, administrative capacity, federal structures, informal institutions, and rapidly changing economic conditions.

The objective becomes neither utopia nor resignation.

It becomes informed idealism.

We construct anti-corruption systems while recognizing that corruption will adapt.

We establish fiscal rules while recognizing that governments will search for mechanisms to circumvent them.

We decentralize authority while recognizing that subnational governments differ dramatically in administrative capacity.

We regulate markets while recognizing that technologies and firms will evolve faster than regulatory statutes.

We encourage transparency while recognizing that publishing data does not automatically create accountability.

The metamodern policymaker consequently operates within a peculiar intellectual position.

One must behave as if institutions can improve while remembering that no institutional architecture will ever be complete.

Mexico and Institutional Hybridity

Mexico offers an especially illuminating environment for examining these tensions because its institutional structure incorporates multiple historical periods simultaneously.

Highly sophisticated financial regulations coexist with enormous differences in local administrative capacity.

Digital platforms coexist with paper bureaucracies.

Competitive democratic institutions coexist with political practices inherited from earlier periods.

Federal decentralization exists alongside strong fiscal dependence upon the central government.

Progressive constitutional and social commitments coexist with persistent inequality and uneven state capacity.

These contradictions are sometimes interpreted simply as incomplete modernization.

But that interpretation assumes that there remains a single institutional destination toward which Mexico—or any other country—is inevitably moving.

A metamodern perspective suggests something different.

Hybridity may not represent a temporary stage before institutional convergence.

Hybridity may be the permanent condition of contemporary governance.

Mexico is therefore not simply "behind" some imagined institutional endpoint.

It is navigating the same broader problem facing governments throughout the world: how to exercise authority, maintain legitimacy, finance public services, and construct institutional capacity under conditions in which political, technological, economic, and environmental structures continually change.

Governing After Certainty

The movement from modernism through postmodernism toward metamodernism ultimately changes the fundamental question of public administration.

Modernism asked:

How can we design rational institutions?

Postmodernism asked:

Whose interests and assumptions are hidden inside those institutions?

Metamodernism asks:

How can we continue building institutions once we understand both their necessity and their limitations?

This may be one of the defining governance questions of the twenty-first century.

The answer cannot simply be a return to technocratic optimism. The world has become too visibly complex for that.

Nor can the answer be permanent cynicism. Governments still have to act.

Instead, contemporary governance requires an intellectual posture capable of holding contradictory realities simultaneously.

Institutions matter, although institutions fail.

Data matter, although data are incomplete.

Expertise matters, although experts possess biases.

Markets matter, although markets create inequalities.

Decentralization can strengthen democracy while simultaneously creating opportunities for fiscal irresponsibility.

Regulation can protect societies while producing unintended consequences.

Administrative reform can strengthen states without ever completing the project of state-building.

This is the metamodern condition.

We know the budget is partly a political narrative.

We know the institution is partly a performance.

We know the model is an approximation.

And nevertheless, tomorrow morning, someone must open the spreadsheet, calculate the revenue, decide how much money can be borrowed, determine which road will be constructed, and explain those decisions to the public.

That is not merely absurdity.

It is governance after certainty.

The challenge is no longer to recover the comforting modernist belief that perfect institutions can be constructed. It is to develop institutions capable of learning, adapting, and retaining legitimacy precisely because we understand that perfection is impossible.

In that sense, metamodernism does not abandon the modernist desire for progress.

It makes that desire more modest, reflexive, and perhaps ultimately more useful.

We govern as if improvement is possible, while knowing that improvement is never final.

That tension—between skepticism and commitment, between irony and sincerity, between institutional fragility and institutional necessity—may define the political economy of our era.

Bounded Accountability: When Social Promises Meet Fiscal Limits

noreply@blogger.com (Unknown) — Wed, 30 Sep 2026 00:52:55 +0000

Bounded Accountability: When Social Promises Meet Fiscal Limits

By Heidi Jane M. Smith

When a public benefit fails to arrive, whom should citizens hold responsible? The official administering it, the legislature authorizing its budget, or the government controlling the revenue? And what happens when people understand a benefit as a social right, but the institution responsible for delivering it lacks the resources to fulfill that obligation?

These questions connect the historical development of welfare states to bounded accountability. In Incumbency Bias, Luis Schiumerini uses this concept to explain how citizens evaluate governments under limited information. People assess what officeholders deliver, but institutional arrangements and external circumstances also shape that delivery. Accountability can therefore be active without fully distinguishing an official’s decisions from the conditions under which those decisions are made.

Reading this argument alongside Andrés Biehl Lundberg’s work on welfare states raises a complementary question: How were the obligations, expectations, and fiscal constraints underlying those judgments created in the first place?

Social expectations have a history

In the excerpt discussed here from Latin American Welfare States in Comparative Perspective, Biehl contrasts relatively universal, tax-funded concessions in Scandinavia and Australasia with selective arrangements in the Southern Cone. His argument concerns more than the distribution of benefits. It concerns the relationships those benefits establish among workers, employers, and the state.

According to the excerpt, universal institutions gave workers a stake in maintaining a shared arrangement. Selective systems organized protection through occupational categories, political connections, and state patronage. These arrangements could separate those demanding expanded benefits from those eventually bearing their costs. Biehl also emphasizes that these outcomes were not inevitable: identifiable coalitions chose among historical alternatives.

Schiumerini examines a different part of this relationship. Political institutions establish an office’s responsibilities and help anchor citizens’ expectations; fiscal institutions shape the resources and discretion available to meet them. The historical creation of social obligations and the contemporary attribution of responsibility are thus connected—but they are not the same process.

Barrington Moore’s Injustice adds another dimension. Its examination of why people endure adverse circumstances at some moments and challenge them at others directs attention to moral codes and reciprocity. Applied to this discussion, the question is not only whether a benefit was delivered, but what people believe its delivery signifies: an entitlement, a reciprocal obligation, or protection associated with a particular relationship. This is an interpretive connection between the works, rather than a shared model explicitly advanced by their authors. (Routledge)

Supporting an institution is not the same as supporting its government

One distinction follows from this comparison: commitment to a welfare institution does not logically entail loyalty to the incumbent administering it.

A citizen can defend a pension entitlement while criticizing how it is managed. Another can value a benefit while disputing how its costs are distributed. Support for a program, acceptance of its financing, confidence in its administration, and attachment to a political party are separate judgments.

This distinction matters when interpreting Biehl’s claim that universal institutions create enduring stakeholders. What becomes durable—the entitlement, the financing arrangement, the institution, or the governing coalition? Schiumerini similarly distinguishes between personal and partisan incumbency effects, emphasizing that responsibility can be attributed differently to officeholders and their organizations.

Electoral continuity alone therefore cannot establish that citizens have accepted a shared fiscal obligation. Nor does political turnover, by itself, demonstrate rejection of the welfare institution.

The fiscal state connects promises to delivery

My 2014 review, “State Building and Taxation in Latin America,” identified a related distinction: explaining the selection of a tax policy does not establish whether it can be implemented effectively. Administrative organization, collection, enforcement, and relations among levels of government require their own analysis.

This provides a connection between welfare-state history and bounded accountability. A government may be assigned an obligation without controlling every resource needed to fulfill it. Equally, identifying a constraint does not settle whether that constraint is justified, who created it, or who can change it.

For Mexico, the comparison suggests investigating particular programs and historical agreements rather than assuming a single national bargain. Who establishes an entitlement? Who finances it? Who administers access? Which authority do citizens understand to be responsible? These are questions for empirical investigation, not conclusions that can be transferred automatically from the countries examined in either book.

A further distinction is essential: what citizens believe the state ought to provide is not identical to what they expect a particular administration can deliver. A demand can exceed current institutional capacity without being an informational mistake. Citizens may understand the constraint and still contest the arrangements producing it.

Behavioral explanations cannot replace institutional analysis

Bounded accountability should not become shorthand for irrational citizens. Schiumerini explicitly builds his explanation around instrumentally rational people making electoral choices with incomplete information.

Our article, “Advancing Social Equity Through Nudging,” offers a complementary caution: responses that appear to reflect individual biases may instead reflect environmental constraints or structural disadvantage. Behavioral interventions can change the setting in which people make decisions, but they cannot independently resolve the structural conditions limiting those decisions. The article presents a conceptual review, not a test of Schiumerini’s electoral theory.

A feminist extension would ask whose contributions and constraints enter the analysis at all. Does the account of social obligation include unpaid care? Does receiving a benefit establish independent access to resources and meaningful opportunities to challenge administrative decisions? These questions extend the comparison; they are not findings established by the excerpts.

Taken together, the works suggest examining how social obligations are formed, how institutions acquire the capacity to fulfill them, and how citizens assign responsibility for the results. Bounded accountability concerns the limits of that final judgment. Welfare-state history helps explain the arrangements being judged.

The central question is not simply whether governments deliver. It is how entitlement, contribution, capacity, and responsibility are connected—and whether citizens can see and contest those connections.

Metamodernity: Framing the New Cultural Epoch

noreply@blogger.com (Unknown) — Fri, 11 Sep 2026 20:50:39 +0000

Metamodernity: Framing the New Cultural Epoch

In the broad sweep of Western cultural theory, we have long talked of the modern and the post-modern. Modernity, roughly from the Enlightenment through to the mid-20th century, was marked by faith in progress, universal truths, rationality, mastery of nature, and the grand narrative of science and emancipation. Post-modernity, emerging in the latter half of the 20th century, challenged these certainties: doubt replaced faith, fragmentation replaced coherence, irony replaced sincerity, and metanarratives were declared dead (Lyotard).

However, many scholars now argue that we have moved beyond post-modernity into a new cultural condition—metamodernity. The term, introduced by Vermeulen & van den Akker in their “Notes on Metamodernism” (2010), signals a cultural sensibility that oscillates between modernist hope and post-modern scepticism, rather than simply rejecting one or the other. As they argue, the “meta-” prefix conveys a “between and beyond” stance: not a full return to modern optimism, nor a permanent dwelling in postmodern irony, but a kind of dynamic flux (Vermeulen & van den Akker, 2010). (See also analyses in recent literature on metamodern aesthetics and culture. )

Thus, metamodernity is both a sensibility and a structural condition: people yearn for meaning and sincerity yet remain acutely aware of contingency, irony and collapse; institutions aim for renewal, but face uncertainty, risk and hybridity. In this sense, what we once considered “normal” in modern society—steady progress, stable institutions, linear development—now appears absurd, because the logic of normalcy no longer fits the oscillating, uncertain, contradictory realities of our time.

Post-Modern Philosophy and the Roots of the Absurd

Post-modernism sought to deconstruct the certainties of modernity: the stable subject, the universal truth, the grand narrative of history. It emphasised plurality, fragmentation, reflexivity, pastiche and irony. Jean-François Lyotard captured this when he described postmodernity as “incredulity toward metanarratives.” In other words, for post-modern thought, the idea that one story (history, reason, progress) could explain everything was dead.

Yet postmodernism had its costs: if everything is fragmentation, parody, uncertainty and irony, then sincerity becomes suspect, commitment becomes ironic, institutions become simulations. In many cultures, the feeling emerged: “we have deconstructed reality, but now we don’t know what to build.” The “normal”—the taken-for-granted rhythms of institutions, progress, trust, meaning—is revealed as unstable, even absurd.

Metamodernity seeks to respond to that vacuum. It accepts the postmodern critique of modernity—but it also reopens the possibility of truth, sincerity, hope, responsibility. It holds both irony and sincerity, scepticism and commitment, oscillating rather than choosing one. It is, as some define it, a “pragmatic idealism” (Vermeulen & van den Akker, 2010). In other words, we act as if we can make meaning, yet we know we may fail; we hope, although we recognise risk; we build, though we suspect fragility.

Thus the “normal” (in the sense of modern stability) looks absurd because it is anchored in a logic that no longer holds. If the modern project promised smooth progress, and the post-modern project exposed its fallacies, metamodernity observes that we now live not in crisis alone but in oscillation. The institutional, political and social “normal” is no longer coherent—it is fractured, contradictory, but lived. The absurdity lies in the fact that what was once normal (stable growth, trust in institutions, elite-driven rationality) now unravels—even as we still speak its language.

Metamodernity in the Mexican Context: The Absurdity of “Normal”

Applying metamodern logic to Mexico reveals how the “normal” of institutions, politics and culture has become absurd.

1. Institutional Flux and Oscillation

Mexico’s political and financial institutions were shaped by modern expectations: a technocratic state, rational regulation, stable growth, linear trajectories of development. But by the 1990s and 2000s, the old certainties crumbled. The Zapatista uprising (1994) signalled indigenous and alternative visions outside the modern national narrative. It challenged the one-size institutional logic—and offered a paradoxical mix of hope and critique (Munck, 2000).

In recent governance cycles, Mexico exhibits metamodern oscillation: for instance, the expectation of bold reform and social investment coexists with cynicism about effectiveness; progressive rhetoric coexists with a legacy of corruption; civic optimism coexists with systemic fragility. The institutional normal of stable elites no longer holds—but the system persists in its own contradictory way. Hence the “normal” is absurd.

2. Cultural Hybridities and Reflexivity

Mexican culture is already hybrid by heritage (Indigenous/Mestizo/modern), but in the metamodern era this hybridity becomes reflexive: citizens expect authenticity yet recognise simulation; local identities yet global flows; digital activism yet institutional impotence. Cultural forms (music, literature, art) reflect this oscillation: sincerity and irony intermix.

The logic of “normal” national culture—steady modernisation, homogenising progress—gives way to an absurd normal that acknowledges the local/indigenous depth (see Bonfil Batalla’s México Profundo) while still operating in a neoliberal global frame. The state tries to be inclusive, but structural exclusions persist; the narrative is hopeful, yet the practice uneven. The result: normality becomes self-contradictory, hence absurd.

3. Financial Regulation, Development and the “Absurd Normal”

Mexico’s financial regulatory history can also be viewed through a metamodern lens. The modern period expected strong central regulation, stable growth, institutional coherence. Yet the 1982 nationalisation of banks, the 1994-95 crises, and ongoing challenges with subnational debt reveal that the institutional “normal” expectations failed to adapt fully.

Today, Mexico faces oscillations: the regulation seeks to integrate global norms (Basel accords, financial inclusion) while simultaneously managing legacy domestic fragility and inequality. The logic: we must regulate for stability and innovate for inclusion; we must fix past debts and enable future growth. This dual logic undercuts a single “normal” approach and gives rise to the sense that the regulation’s effectiveness is absurdly stretched between poles of modern certainty and post-modern scepticism.

For example, when municipal debt becomes a national concern, or when public–private partnerships promise both efficiency and raise governance risks, the “normal” expectation of simple regulation breaks down. The absurdity is in expecting institutional coherence when the reality is hybrid governance—part modern technocracy, part post-modern uncertainty. In this sense, the normal is absurd because the logic behind it is fractured.

Why This Matters

Understanding metamodernity matters for Mexico—and any society experiencing similar transitions—for several reasons:

It helps explain the mismatch between expectation and experience. Citizens expect reform, development, transparency—but experience fragmentation, contradiction and incompetence. Metamodernity explains why this gap exists: because we live between logics.
It invites new frameworks of action. Instead of expecting institutions to simply deliver modern-style progress, or focusing only on deconstruction (post-modern), metamodernity invites oscillation, hybrid strategies, acknowledgement of limits and hope. For regulators, cultural leaders and policy-makers, this means designing for flux, resilience, paradox.
It reframes the absurd as structural, not personal. When Mexican citizens feel that institutions are absurd—promising one thing, delivering another—they are experiencing the structural logic of metamodernity rather than simply corruption or failure. It is the “normal” inside an oscillation of expectations that appear absurd when compared to modern certainty.
It provides a language for navigating transition. Mexico is undergoing multiple transitions—digital, social, financial, cultural. Metamodern logic provides a vocabulary: not stability, but oscillation; not certainty, but engagement; not irony or naivety, but informed idealism.

Conclusion

In sum, metamodernity marks a cultural and structural shift from the certainties of modernity and the sceptical deconstruction of post-modernity into a condition of oscillation, hybridity, hope and awareness of fragility. In this new logic, what once counted as “normal” becomes absurd—not because institutions fail, but because the logic of normalcy no longer aligns with the lived reality of flux, contradiction and reflexivity.

In the Mexican case, we see these dynamics clearly: institutions built on modern design now operate amid cultural and economic hybridities; citizens expect sincerity amid paradox; financial regulation is asked both to stabilise and innovate. The “normal” modern expectation of predictable progress and stable governance doesn’t fit—hence the absurdity emerges: the normal looked wrong because the logic behind it no longer holds.

Acknowledging this offers a more honest platform for reform: not by trying to restore a modern normal that has vanished, nor by remaining stuck in post-modern irony, but by embracing the metamodern condition—designing institutions, culture and regulation that can live with oscillation, hope and scepticism in equal measure.

References

Munck, R. (2000). Postmodernism, politics, and paradigms in Latin America. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
Vermeulen, T., & van den Akker, R. (2010). Notes on metamodernism. Journal of Aesthetics & Culture, 2(1).
“A Brief Introduction to Metamodernism.” (2015). Metamodernism.com.
“Cultural and Historical Boundaries of Metamodernism.” (2025). ResearchGate.
Glassett, Z. N. (2024). Neoliberalism and metamodernism in Central America and Mexico. Kansas ScholarWorks.
Bonfil Batalla, G. (n.d.). México Profundo: Reclaiming a Civilization.

From Research Question to Public Conversation: What Happens When Academic Work Enters the Media?

noreply@blogger.com (Unknown) — Fri, 11 Sep 2026 19:58:43 +0000

From Research Question to Public Conversation: What Happens When Academic Work Enters the Media?

One of the most rewarding parts of academic research is seeing a question move beyond the seminar room, the dataset, or the working paper series and enter a wider public conversation. That happened recently with our working paper:

Alejandra Villegas & Heidi J. Smith. 2026. “Who Pays Bribes? Gender, Education, and Petty Corruption in Mexico, 2011–2023.” Working Paper Series Sobre México, 2026009, Sobre México. Temas en economía. Read the working paper here

The paper asks a deceptively simple question: who pays bribes in Mexico, and why? But the answer is not simple. The question touches on gender, education, bureaucratic discretion, state-citizen interactions, and how people experience public institutions in everyday life.

Our central argument is that reported bribery should not be interpreted as a direct measure of personal honesty. Instead, it reflects people’s exposure to public procedures, contact with authorities, access to bureaucratic spaces, and vulnerability to discretion. In this sense, corruption is not only a problem of individual morality. It is also a problem of institutions, procedures, inequality, and power.

The findings attracted media attention because they challenge a common public assumption: that women are simply “less corrupt” than men. Our study does not support that easy conclusion. Rather, it suggests that men and women may experience corruption differently because they interact with the state in different ways.

This distinction matters. If women report paying fewer bribes, that does not necessarily mean they are more honest. It may mean that women are less exposed to certain procedures, economic activities, permits, property transactions, business dealings, police interactions, or public offices where bribery is more likely to occur.

That is the broader contribution of the research: it shifts the debate from morality to structure.

The media coverage helped translate a technical research question into a public issue. Different outlets emphasized different aspects of the study.

La Crónica de Hoy highlighted the relationship between gender, education, and everyday corruption, helping bring the paper’s main argument to a broad national audience. Prensa IBERO framed the study as a challenge to the idea that women are naturally less corrupt, which is one of the most important public misunderstandings the paper addresses. Grupo Animal emphasized the gendered experience of corruption and the question of who pays more bribes in Mexico. Azteca Noticias presented the findings in a more accessible news format, asking directly whether men or women are “more corrupt” and using that question to open a broader discussion about what the data actually show.

This is exactly what public dissemination can do well: it takes a research question and makes it legible to people outside the academy.

At the same time, media attention creates responsibility. Academic findings can easily be simplified, exaggerated, or turned into headlines that miss the nuance. That is why researchers need to participate actively in the translation of their work.

In our case, the key point is not that one gender is morally superior to another. The key point is that corruption is experienced through unequal relationships with the state. Bureaucratic discretion, administrative burdens, access to services, gender roles, labor-market participation, and educational pathways all shape who is more likely to encounter situations where a bribe is requested or paid.

This is also why the topic matters for public policy. If corruption is structured through procedures, discretion, and unequal access, then anti-corruption policy cannot rely only on punishment or moral appeals. It must also simplify procedures, reduce arbitrary decision-making, improve transparency, strengthen complaint mechanisms, and understand how different groups encounter the state.

For me, this project is part of a broader research agenda that connects gender, corruption, public administration, and political economy. It asks how institutions distribute burdens and opportunities unequally. It also asks how everyday interactions with the state reveal deeper structures of power.

A strong research agenda does not begin with a media headline. It begins with a real puzzle: something that existing explanations do not fully resolve. In this case, the puzzle was why gender differences appear in reported bribery and how those differences should be interpreted.

The media coverage showed that this puzzle matters beyond academic debates. It matters to journalists, students, public officials, civil society organizations, and citizens who want to understand why corruption persists and how inequality shapes daily life.

That is the value of connecting research to public discussion. Academic work can offer evidence, nuance, and conceptual clarity. Popular media can help make that work visible, accessible, and socially relevant. When the two are connected carefully, research can contribute not only to scholarly debates but also to public understanding.

References and media coverage

Villegas, A., & Smith, H. J. M. (2026). Who Pays Bribes? Gender, Education, and Petty Corruption in Mexico, 2011–2023. Working Paper Series Sobre México, 2026009, Sobre México. Temas en economía.
https://ideas.repec.org/p/smx/wpaper/2026009.html

Villegas, A., & Smith, H. J. (2026, September 3). ¿Quién paga sobornos en México? Género, educación y corrupción cotidiana. La Crónica de Hoy.
https://www.cronica.com.mx/nacional/2026/09/03/quien-paga-sobornos-en-mexico-genero-educacion-y-corrupcion-cotidiana/

Cortés, J. L. (2026, August 8). ¿Quién paga más sobornos en México y por qué? Estudio de la IBERO ofrece una nueva explicación. Prensa IBERO, Universidad Iberoamericana Ciudad de México.
https://prensa.ibero.mx/es-MX/nota/las-mujeres-son-menos-corruptas-que-los-hombres-estudio-ibero-cuestiona-esa-idea

Martínez, A. (2026, August 8). Mujeres y hombres ante la corrupción: quién paga más sobornos en México. Grupo Animal.
https://grupoanimal.mx/sociedad/mujeres-hombres-corrupcion-sobornos-mexico

Morales, O. (2026, August 4). ¿Quiénes son más corruptos, los hombres o las mujeres? Un estudio de la IBERO lo revela. Azteca Noticias.
https://www.tvazteca.com/aztecanoticias/quien-paga-mas-sobornos-en-mexico-estudio-la-ibero-revela-que-influye-realmente/

Azteca Noticias. (2026). ¿Quiénes son más corruptos, los hombres o las mujeres? Un estudio dice que los hombres…[Facebook post]. Facebook.

Mujeres y hombres ante la corrupción: quién paga más sobornos en México. (2026). Yahoo Noticias.

Administrative State Theory, Managerial Elites, and the Institutionalization of Morena’s Hegemony

noreply@blogger.com (Unknown) — Tue, 30 Jun 2026 21:32:25 +0000

Below is the way I understand the comparison for Mexico: Marini helps explain the attack on autonomous/technocratic institutions; Burnham helps explain the defeat of the PRI-PAN managerial class; the “virtue” debate helps explain AMLO and Sheinbaum’s different ways of holding power.

1. The two books give us two lenses

John Marini’s Unmasking the Administrative State is useful for understanding the populist critique of bureaucracy. In Marini’s view, modern administrative institutions become a “fourth branch” of government: expert-led, insulated, hard to discipline electorally, and able to govern without direct popular accountability.

In Mexico, this maps onto AMLO’s attack on what he called the neoliberal technocratic order: autonomous agencies, electoral authorities, transparency bodies, courts, regulators, expert commissions, and the policy networks built during PRI and PAN governments. The argument was not only that these institutions were inefficient. It was that they were morally illegitimate because they protected elite interests.

James Burnham’s The Managerial Revolution gives the second lens. Burnham says modern societies are ruled not only by owners or elected politicians, but by managers: technocrats, bureaucrats, corporate executives, policy experts, administrators, and institutional operators.

In Mexico, this helps explain why the PRI-PAN era could be seen as a managerial regime. Power was exercised through parties, ministries, autonomous institutes, fiscal rules, regulatory agencies, business associations, electoral institutions, courts, universities, think tanks, and internationalized policy elites. The PRI and PAN did not simply govern through elections; they governed through a whole class of administrators and policy managers.

AMLO’s political achievement was to convince many voters that this managerial class was not neutral. He recoded it as la mafia del poder, the old regime, the neoliberal elite, or the conservative bloc.

2. AMLO as charismatic anti-managerial politics

AMLO’s power was not primarily legal-rational in the Weberian sense. It was charismatic, plebiscitary, and moralized. He governed through a constant contrast between el pueblo and los corruptos, between popular virtue and elite decadence.

This is where the “virtue” discussion matters. AMLO’s politics was built around moral virtue: austerity, honesty, closeness to the people, rejection of privilege, and denunciation of corruption. His phrase “primero los pobres” gave the project an ethical center.

But AMLO also practiced Machiavellian virtù: the strategic capacity to win, discipline allies, control the agenda, punish adversaries, and reshape institutions. He was not only preaching morality. He was building power.

That combination was crucial:

Moral virtue gave legitimacy. Machiavellian virtù gave operational power.

This is why AMLO was able to overtake the PRI and PAN. He did not simply beat them electorally. He delegitimized their governing class. He made the PRI-PAN technocratic order appear not as expertise, but as corruption, privilege, distance, and betrayal.

3. The fall of the PRI and PAN as a crisis of managerial legitimacy

The PRI and PAN lost not only because Morena had better candidates. They lost because their governing formula stopped working politically.

The PRI had long claimed managerial competence: control, negotiation, stability, experience, and statecraft. The PAN claimed alternation, legality, fiscal responsibility, markets, and democratic correction. But by 2018 and then 2024, many voters associated both parties with corruption, inequality, insecurity, and elite continuity.

The 2024 election confirmed that collapse. Claudia Sheinbaum won the presidency decisively, and Morena with its allies won broad congressional control. The IPU reports that Morena and allies won 364 of 500 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 83 of 128 Senate seats, while the opposition coalition won 128 and 41 respectively. (IPU Parline) The INE identifies the 2024 federal process as Mexico’s largest election, with federal elections and elections across all 32 entities. (Instituto Nacional Electoral)

So the PAN and PRI were overtaken because they lost three things at once:

They lost moral authority.
They could no longer convincingly claim to be cleaner, more democratic, or more responsible.

They lost managerial authority.
Their promise of competence was damaged by corruption, violence, inequality, and weak public services.

They lost narrative authority.
AMLO gave voters a simpler and more powerful story: the old regime stole from the people; Morena would return power to the people.

4. Sheinbaum is not simply AMLO 2.0

Sheinbaum inherits AMLO’s movement, but she represents a different synthesis.

AMLO was the charismatic founder. Sheinbaum is more technocratic, disciplined, scientific, and administrative. She therefore sits between Burnham and Marini in an interesting way.

On one side, she continues AMLO’s anti-neoliberal, anti-old-regime project. She supports the Fourth Transformation and benefits from AMLO’s moral narrative.

On the other side, she is herself a kind of managerial figure: trained, technical, programmatic, policy-oriented, and institutionally disciplined.

So Sheinbaum’s challenge is paradoxical:

She must preserve AMLO’s charismatic moral legitimacy while turning Morena into a governing managerial apparatus.

That means the movement moves from charisma to administration. AMLO seeded power through narrative, loyalty, social programs, and confrontation. Sheinbaum has to institutionalize that power through budgets, party discipline, courts, governors, infrastructure, security policy, and federal-state coordination.

This is where Mexico’s future becomes very important.

5. The judiciary reform as “seeded power”

The judicial reform is the clearest example of how power is being seeded into the state. The reform was published in the Diario Oficial de la Federación on September 15, 2024, changing constitutional provisions related to the federal judiciary. (Diario Oficial de la Federación) It replaced the appointment-based system with judicial elections and reshaped the structure of judicial authority. (Wikipedia)

From the Morena perspective, this is democratic virtue: judges should be accountable to the people, not insulated elites.

From a Marini-style perspective, this is an attack on an autonomous legal-administrative institution that had become too distant from democratic control.

From a Burnham-style perspective, this is the displacement of one managerial class — legal elites, judges, court administrators, constitutional lawyers — by another power bloc linked to the new governing coalition.

The concern is that the reform may not democratize power as much as reallocate power. The 2025 judicial election had very low participation. INE judicial election data showed around 13% participation for the Supreme Court vote. (computospj2025.ine.mx) Human Rights Watch argued that the electoral process undermined judicial independence. (Human Rights Watch)

That means the key question is not only whether judges are elected. The question is: Who organizes the lists, who informs voters, who mobilizes turnout, who controls nominations, and who benefits from low-information elections?

That is how power is seeded.

6. Virtue politics in Mexico: morality versus institutional design

The danger in virtue politics is that moral legitimacy can replace institutional accountability.

AMLO’s project says: we are virtuous because we represent the people against corrupt elites.

The opposition says: institutions are necessary because no leader or party is virtuous enough to govern without checks.

Burnham would ask: which elite is actually managing the system?

Marini would ask: are unelected institutions blocking democratic sovereignty?

A public administration scholar should add a third question: what institutions can create accountability regardless of who claims moral virtue?

This matters because both sides can abuse the language of virtue.

The PRI and PAN claimed technocratic virtue: expertise, stability, professionalism, fiscal responsibility.

AMLO and Morena claim popular virtue: honesty, redistribution, austerity, anti-corruption, sovereignty.

But neither moral claim is enough. Virtue must be institutionalized through audit capacity, transparency, courts, professional bureaucracy, local capacity, open data, and enforceable rules.

Without that, virtue becomes a weapon.

7. Future trends: how power will be ceded or seeded

The most important trend is the move from electoral victory to institutional embedding. Morena has already won the presidency and Congress. The next phase is about embedding power in courts, governorships, local governments, bureaucracies, welfare networks, unions, public procurement systems, and regulatory bodies.

A second trend is the decline of the PRI-PAN as a national governing alternative. The Wilson Center has described the lack of competition among traditional parties, especially PRI and PAN, as a serious concern for democratic resilience. (Wilson Center) Recent reporting also shows the PAN attempting yet another reinvention after the failure of the anti-Morena coalition with the PRI. (El País)

A third trend is that Morena may be dominant but not fully institutionalized. This is important. Morena has electoral strength, but it still depends heavily on AMLO’s legacy, social programs, candidate discipline, local brokers, and allied parties like the PVEM and PT. One recent analysis argues that Morena remains structurally fragile at the municipal level and has lost many municipalities it once won, even while dominating nationally. (El País)

A fourth trend is the rise of new managerialism inside Morena. Morena began as an anti-managerial movement against technocrats. But once in power, it must create its own managers: policy experts, party operators, governors, judicial candidates, military administrators, infrastructure planners, welfare bureaucrats, and media strategists. Over time, the Fourth Transformation may produce its own managerial class.

A fifth trend is the tension between Sheinbaum’s technocratic identity and Morena’s populist coalition. Sheinbaum may want disciplined administration, climate and energy planning, fiscal management, and scientific legitimacy. But Morena’s political machinery also depends on mobilization, symbolic confrontation, loyalty, and distributive politics.

8. The big theoretical conclusion

Marini helps us see why AMLO and Morena attack autonomous institutions: they frame them as undemocratic barriers to popular sovereignty.

Burnham helps us see why the PRI-PAN order collapsed: it became a managerial regime without enough moral legitimacy.

The virtue debate helps us see the central contradiction of the Fourth Transformation:

AMLO used moral virtue to destroy the legitimacy of the old managerial class. But Morena now needs Machiavellian virtù to hold power and managerial competence to govern. Sheinbaum’s presidency is the test of whether charisma can become institution without becoming another closed elite regime.

So the future of Mexican power will depend on whether Morena can move from charismatic legitimacy to institutional legitimacy.

The key question is:

Will power be ceded democratically through accountable institutions, or seeded inside the state through party dominance, loyal courts, controlled bureaucracies, and weakened opposition?

That is the central issue for understanding Mexico after AMLO and under Sheinbaum.

APA citations

Burnham, J. (1941). The managerial revolution: What is happening in the world. The John Day Company.

Diario Oficial de la Federación. (2024, September 15). Decreto por el que se reforman, adicionan y derogan diversas disposiciones de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, en materia de reforma del Poder Judicial.

Human Rights Watch. (2025, September 1). Mexico: Electoral process undermines judicial independence.

Instituto Nacional Electoral. (2024). Proceso electoral federal 2023–2024.

Inter-Parliamentary Union. (2024). Mexico Chamber of Deputies: June 2024 election results.

Jiménez, N., & Olivares, E. (2025, June 2). Participan 13% de votantes en la elección judicial: INE. La Jornada.

Machiavelli, N. (1998). The prince (H. C. Mansfield, Trans.). University of Chicago Press. Original work published 1532.

Machiavelli, N. (1996). Discourses on Livy (H. C. Mansfield & N. Tarcov, Trans.). University of Chicago Press.

Marini, J. (2019). Unmasking the administrative state: The crisis of American politics in the twenty-first century. Encounter Books.

Schiff, S. (2022). The revolutionary: Samuel Adams. Little, Brown and Company.

Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology (G. Roth & C. Wittich, Eds.). University of California Press.

Wilson Center. (2024). Tipping the scales: The decline of Mexico’s opposition and the unclear future of its democracy.

Mexico Represents a Strategic Case the great Powers Competition

noreply@blogger.com (Unknown) — Tue, 09 Jun 2026 17:48:17 +0000

The Politics of Three: State Capacity, Global Competition, and Mexico's Strategic Role Between the United States and China

The emerging geopolitical competition between the United States and China is often portrayed as a struggle between two great powers competing for economic influence, technological leadership, and geopolitical dominance. While this framing captures important dimensions of contemporary international relations, it obscures a critical reality: the consequences of great-power competition are ultimately mediated through domestic institutions. The most important question is not simply whether the United States or China prevails, but rather how countries positioned between these powers transform external pressures into opportunities for development.

Mexico occupies a unique position within this global contest. Through the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), Mexico is deeply integrated into the North American economy. Simultaneously, it has become increasingly connected to China through trade, supply chains, manufacturing inputs, and foreign investment. As a result, Mexico represents a strategic case for understanding how middle-income countries navigate competing global powers while pursuing their own development objectives.

This perspective suggests a shift away from viewing international political economy as a binary contest. Instead, Mexico can be understood as a third institutional space where the contradictions of globalization, industrial policy, and geopolitical competition are negotiated. In this sense, the analytical importance of Mexico extends beyond its national boundaries. It provides a window into how states manage external economic pressures while attempting to preserve autonomy, development, and democratic governance.

The literature on state capacity offers a useful framework for understanding these dynamics. Evans (1995) argued that development depends not simply on markets or states, but on the ability of public institutions to coordinate economic activity while maintaining autonomy from private interests. Similarly, Fukuyama (2013) emphasizes that the effectiveness of government depends on institutional capacity rather than the size of the state. These insights suggest that the benefits of foreign investment, trade integration, and industrial policy are contingent upon the ability of governments to regulate, coordinate, and monitor economic actors.

This question is particularly relevant for Mexico. My earlier research on municipal debt markets, fiscal federalism, and subnational governance demonstrates that local governments possess highly uneven levels of administrative and fiscal capacity (Benton & Smith, 2017; Smith & Benton, 2017). These differences influence how governments manage debt, provide public services, and respond to external economic shocks. They also suggest that Mexican states and municipalities will vary significantly in their ability to absorb the opportunities generated by nearshoring and foreign direct investment.

The recent relocation of manufacturing from Asia to North America illustrates this challenge. Nearshoring has created unprecedented opportunities for Mexican states to attract investment, generate employment, and integrate into global supply chains. Yet these benefits are not distributed evenly. States with stronger infrastructure, more effective bureaucracies, and greater fiscal capacity are likely to capture a disproportionate share of investment. States with weaker institutions may struggle to translate investment into sustainable development. Consequently, the central question is not whether foreign investment arrives, but whether institutions possess the capacity to govern it effectively.

This issue becomes even more complex when considering Chinese investment. Much of the contemporary debate presents Chinese capital as either a threat to U.S. interests or a source of economic opportunity. Such perspectives often overlook the importance of domestic institutions. As Gallagher (2016) argues, the developmental effects of Chinese engagement depend heavily on national regulatory frameworks and state capabilities. The same investment can generate innovation, infrastructure, and employment in one context while producing dependency, corruption, or regulatory capture in another.

From this perspective, Mexico becomes an ideal laboratory for studying the interaction between global competition and local governance. Chinese investment enters through ports, industrial parks, logistics corridors, customs facilities, and manufacturing supply chains. Yet these investments are ultimately governed by subnational institutions. Governors, mayors, public administrators, and local bureaucracies become the actors responsible for translating geopolitical competition into economic outcomes.

This insight connects directly to the literature on corruption and governance. Corruption is often treated as an individual moral failure, but institutional scholars have increasingly emphasized its structural dimensions (Rothstein & Varraich, 2017). Weak accountability systems, opaque procurement processes, and limited administrative capacity create opportunities for corruption regardless of the origin of investment. Consequently, anti-corruption policy should be understood not merely as enforcement, but as institutional capacity building. Stronger budgeting systems, professional bureaucracies, transparent procurement processes, and effective oversight mechanisms are essential components of sustainable development.

The same logic extends to education and public administration. Research on social equity and public finance education demonstrates that technical skills alone are insufficient for effective governance (Wooldridge & Smith, 2024). Public officials increasingly require competencies that integrate ethics, social equity, fiscal management, and strategic planning. In a world characterized by global competition and complex supply chains, the ability to govern effectively becomes a developmental resource in its own right.

These observations point toward a broader research agenda centered on what might be called institutional absorption capacity. Future research should investigate why some Mexican states successfully convert foreign investment into development while others do not. It should examine how fiscal federalism influences the distribution of nearshoring benefits across regions. It should explore the role of customs administration, logistics infrastructure, and subnational governance in mediating global competition. It should also analyze how gender, corruption, and bureaucratic capacity shape developmental outcomes.

Such an agenda would connect several strands of literature that are often treated separately: international political economy, state capacity, fiscal federalism, corruption studies, and public administration. More importantly, it would reposition Mexico as a central case for understanding the future of development in an era of geopolitical competition.

Ultimately, the key question is not whether the United States or China will dominate the twenty-first century. Rather, it is whether countries such as Mexico can build the institutions necessary to transform external competition into domestic development. The answer depends less on the intentions of global powers than on the quality of governance at home. State capacity, fiscal institutions, administrative professionalism, and democratic accountability remain the critical variables that determine whether globalization produces dependency or development.

In this sense, Mexico is not merely a participant in global competition. It is the institutional arena in which the future relationship between development and geopolitics is being tested.

References

Benton, A. L., & Smith, H. J. M. (2017). The impact of parties and elections on municipal debt policy in Mexico. Governance.
Evans, P. (1995). Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation.
Fukuyama, F. (2013). What is governance? Governance.
Gallagher, K. P. (2016). The China Triangle: Latin America's China Boom and the Fate of the Washington Consensus.
Rothstein, B., & Varraich, A. (2017). Making Sense of Corruption.
Smith, H. J. M., & Benton, A. L. (2017). The role of metropolitan cooperation and administrative capacity in subnational debt dynamics. Public Budgeting & Finance.
Wooldridge, B., & Smith, H. J. M. (2024). Developing social equity competencies: Strategies for public budgeting and finance curriculum. In Teaching Social Equity in Public Administration.

Claudia Sheinbaum has found her scapegoat --A response

noreply@blogger.com (Unknown) — Mon, 08 Jun 2026 16:37:23 +0000

Resesponding to León Krauze opinion that Mexico’s Claudia Sheinbaum has found her scapegoat (June 3, 2026) is only partially right to warn that sovereignty can become a political instrument, but his argument overlooks a critical reality: sovereignty in Mexico has always been a double-edged sword. Mexico can invoke nationalism and defend its autonomy, yet its economic structure remains deeply intertwined with—and dependent upon—the United States.

The article suggests that President Claudia Sheinbaum is constructing a narrative in which U.S. pressure can be reframed as foreign interference. There is certainly evidence that nationalist rhetoric has become more prominent. However, the argument is weakened by factual developments that have already overtaken some of the claims. Krauze refers to a sitting governor allegedly connected to organized crime who had been indicted by U.S. authorities. Since then, that governor has taken leave from office and is currently under house arrest in Mexico while awaiting extradition proceedings and trial in the United States. This suggests that Mexican authorities are not simply refusing cooperation, but are navigating a politically and legally complex process within the framework of bilateral judicial relations.

More importantly, the debate about sovereignty cannot be separated from the economic realities of North America. Mexico’s prosperity is inseparable from the United States. More than 80 percent of Mexican exports are destined for the U.S. market, making the United States by far Mexico’s most important trading partner. In 2025 alone, Mexican exports to the United States exceeded $545 billion, representing the overwhelming majority of Mexico’s export sector.

The dependency extends beyond trade. The United States is also Mexico’s largest foreign investor. According to the U.S. State Department, U.S. foreign direct investment stock in Mexico exceeded $236 billion, while U.S. investors continue to account for roughly 45 percent of annual foreign direct investment flows into the country.

These realities mean that Mexico’s independence is, paradoxically, rooted in economic interdependence. Any Mexican administration—whether nationalist, conservative, or progressive—must operate within structural constraints created by trade, investment, migration, energy integration, and shared supply chains. The question is therefore not whether Mexico can assert sovereignty, but how far it can do so without jeopardizing the economic foundations upon which that sovereignty rests.

This is where ideology alone provides an insufficient explanation. It is tempting to frame the current tensions as a clash between Morena’s nationalism and Washington’s demands. Yet a political economy perspective suggests a different question: who are the veto players that actually hold the cards in Mexico’s economy?

The answer includes multinational firms, export-oriented manufacturers, financial markets, U.S. investors, business associations, and state governments whose revenues depend heavily on North American integration. These actors possess significant leverage because they influence employment, investment decisions, and economic growth. Their preferences often matter as much as ideological commitments coming from political leaders.

This dynamic becomes even more important under the Trump administration’s radical realignment of the global economy. Uncertainty surrounding tariffs, USMCA review provisions, industrial policy, and the future of global supply chains has already begun to affect investment calculations. Recent data show that while Mexico continues to attract record levels of foreign direct investment, new investments have slowed considerably, with a growing share consisting of reinvested earnings rather than fresh capital commitments.

As a result, the central issue is not whether Sheinbaum is using sovereignty as a political shield. The more important question is whether Mexico’s governing coalition can maintain economic confidence while simultaneously escalating nationalist rhetoric. Sovereignty remains an essential principle of democratic governance, but in a deeply integrated North American economy, it cannot be exercised in isolation from the interests of those actors whose investments, exports, and employment sustain the Mexican economy.

The challenge facing Mexico is therefore not simply defending sovereignty against external pressure. It is balancing political autonomy with economic realities in an era when the rules of globalization themselves are being rewritten.

Pero Remesas, vigilancia financiera y el futuro de la integración monetaria de América del Norte

noreply@blogger.com (Unknown) — Mon, 08 Jun 2026 16:35:57 +0000

La reciente orden ejecutiva emitida por el presidente Donald Trump para restringir el acceso a servicios financieros a personas sin un estatus migratorio legal verificado podría representar mucho más que una política migratoria o bancaria. Podría convertirse en un punto de inflexión en la economía política de América del Norte, con consecuencias para las remesas, el federalismo fiscal, la inclusión financiera e incluso para la futura arquitectura de coordinación monetaria regional entre México y Estados Unidos.

La medida surgió bajo el argumento de que las transferencias transfronterizas de bajo monto han sido utilizadas para financiar terrorismo, narcotráfico, evasión fiscal y otras actividades ilícitas. Aunque la orden no prohíbe directamente las remesas, sí incrementa la probabilidad de que bancos e instituciones financieras intensifiquen la vigilancia sobre las transacciones de migrantes. Las instituciones financieras podrían solicitar documentación adicional, retrasar transferencias o incluso rechazar operaciones relacionadas con personas que no cuenten con un estatus migratorio regularizado. Además, el Departamento del Tesoro estadounidense recibió instrucciones para desarrollar estándares más estrictos de reporte e identificación en los próximos 180 días.

Este desarrollo es importante porque las remesas ya no son un flujo financiero marginal. México continúa siendo el segundo mayor receptor de remesas del mundo después de India. De acuerdo con el Banco de México, las remesas alcanzaron cerca de 62 mil millones de dólares anuales en 2025 y representaron aproximadamente entre 3.6% y 4% del PIB mexicano (Banco de México, 2026; Banco Mundial, 2025). En estados como Michoacán, Guanajuato, Zacatecas, Oaxaca, Puebla y Jalisco, las remesas constituyen una fuente central de ingreso para los hogares y de estabilidad económica local.

Las cifras recientes ya sugieren crecientes presiones sobre estos flujos. Banxico reportó que las remesas cayeron a 4 mil 590 millones de dólares en enero de 2026, reflejando disminuciones anuales asociadas con la incertidumbre entre migrantes y un entorno de mayor endurecimiento migratorio en Estados Unidos. Al mismo tiempo, el número de transacciones de remesas disminuyó cerca de 4% durante el primer trimestre de 2026, aunque el valor promedio de las transferencias aumentó ligeramente (Banco de México, 2026). Analistas de BBVA y del Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) han relacionado estas tendencias con el temor creciente entre trabajadores indocumentados ante las políticas migratorias y de deportación impulsadas por la administración Trump.

Las implicaciones van mucho más allá de las finanzas de los hogares. Las nuevas restricciones financieras podrían interactuar profundamente con el sistema de federalismo fiscal mexicano. México opera bajo uno de los arreglos fiscales más centralizados de la OCDE. Los estados y municipios dependen ampliamente de las transferencias federales —participaciones y aportaciones— mientras poseen capacidades limitadas para generar ingresos propios. Como resultado, choques externos que afectan el consumo de los hogares pueden convertirse rápidamente en crisis fiscales subnacionales.

Si los flujos de remesas se debilitan, los estados altamente dependientes de la migración podrían experimentar reducciones en el consumo local, la actividad comercial y la economía informal. Aunque las remesas son transferencias privadas, indirectamente sostienen bases tributarias locales mediante gasto en vivienda, transporte, servicios, educación y pequeños negocios. Una contracción de las remesas, por tanto, debilita el dinamismo económico local y puede incrementar las demandas de programas sociales a nivel estatal.

Esta dinámica genera una descentralización asimétrica. Los estados absorben las consecuencias sociales de los choques económicos mientras el gobierno federal conserva la mayoría de las herramientas fiscales y la autoridad recaudatoria. Los gobernadores podrían volverse cada vez más dependientes de transferencias discrecionales federales para estabilizar sus economías locales, reforzando así la centralización política bajo la presidencia.

El tema es particularmente relevante porque las remesas se han convertido en una de las principales fuentes de divisas para México, superando incluso a los ingresos petroleros en varios años recientes. Según Banxico y estimaciones internacionales, cerca del 96% de las remesas mexicanas provienen de Estados Unidos, siendo California y Texas responsables de casi la mitad de todos los envíos. Esto significa que cambios en la regulación bancaria estadounidense pueden moldear directamente las condiciones económicas dentro de municipios mexicanos.

Paradójicamente, una regulación más estricta también podría fortalecer sistemas financieros informales. Históricamente, la vigilancia financiera excesiva tiende a expulsar a poblaciones vulnerables fuera de las instituciones bancarias formales. Los migrantes que temen ser vigilados podrían recurrir cada vez más a:

transferencias en efectivo,
sistemas informales de envío,
plataformas fintech fuera de la supervisión bancaria tradicional,
criptomonedas,
cooperativas comunitarias,
o intermediarios de pago no regulados.

Este resultado debilitaría precisamente la transparencia que las autoridades estadounidenses buscan fortalecer. En lugar de mejorar la trazabilidad, la sobrerregulación podría generar sistemas financieros paralelos y fragmentados operando más allá de la supervisión estatal.

Dicha fragmentación podría tener importantes implicaciones geopolíticas para América del Norte. México podría responder fortaleciendo su soberanía financiera doméstica. Instituciones como el Banco del Bienestar podrían desempeñar un papel más importante en la distribución de remesas y en la promoción de inclusión financiera independiente de las redes bancarias dominadas por Estados Unidos. México también podría acelerar discusiones sobre infraestructura de peso digital, sistemas alternativos de pago o mecanismos bilaterales de compensación financiera con socios regionales.

Esto no necesariamente implicaría una separación monetaria respecto de Estados Unidos. Más bien, podría fomentar una mayor coordinación monetaria regional. En este contexto, un marco monetario norteamericano no se parecería a la Eurozona ni a una unión monetaria formal. En cambio, podría involucrar mecanismos coordinados de gobernanza financiera, incluyendo:

sistemas interoperables de pagos digitales,
estándares armonizados contra lavado de dinero,
acuerdos bilaterales de liquidez,
regulación coordinada de remesas,
y líneas swap de emergencia entre la Reserva Federal y el Banco de México.

Esta coordinación adquiere relevancia creciente porque la integración económica norteamericana ya funciona mediante flujos altamente interconectados de comercio, trabajo y capital. El T-MEC ha intensificado la integración manufacturera, especialmente en sectores como el automotriz, semiconductores y electromovilidad. Al mismo tiempo, la migración y las remesas continúan sosteniendo millones de hogares en México.

Sin embargo, la trayectoria actual revela una contradicción. América del Norte se integra económicamente a nivel corporativo mientras se fragmenta social y financieramente a nivel de hogares. Las grandes empresas multinacionales mantienen acceso privilegiado a mercados de capital integrados y protecciones comerciales, mientras las poblaciones migrantes enfrentan creciente vigilancia y exclusión financiera.

Esto crea lo que podría denominarse una “integración dual”: sistemas productivos altamente integrados coexistiendo con sistemas laborales y de remesas cada vez más securitizados.

Los riesgos políticos son significativos. Si los hogares migrantes pierden confianza en los canales bancarios formales, la base social de la integración norteamericana podría debilitarse. Las remesas no son solamente transferencias financieras; representan mecanismos de seguro social que conectan comunidades a través de las fronteras. En algunos municipios, las remesas financian educación, salud, vivienda e incluso proyectos de infraestructura pública mediante programas como “Dos por Uno”, donde las contribuciones de migrantes son igualadas por gobiernos estatales y federales.

Al mismo tiempo, el gobierno federal mexicano podría intentar centralizar respuestas frente a estas presiones. Una mayor dependencia de programas federales de bienestar, iniciativas de banca digital y sistemas centralizados de transferencias podría fortalecer la influencia presidencial sobre estados y municipios. Esto coincide con tendencias más amplias observadas en administraciones recientes hacia una mayor centralización fiscal y administrativa.

En última instancia, el debate sobre las remesas está evolucionando hacia un debate sobre soberanía, ciudadanía y gobernanza financiera. Lo que inicialmente parece una política de control migratorio podría terminar redefiniendo la arquitectura de las relaciones económicas de América del Norte.

Si las tendencias actuales continúan, el resultado más probable no será un sistema bancario completamente descentralizado en el sentido de las criptomonedas. Más bien, América del Norte podría avanzar hacia un sistema híbrido caracterizado por:

mayor vigilancia financiera en la parte superior del sistema,
prácticas financieras fragmentadas e informales en la base,
mayor intervención estatal en sistemas de pago,
y crecientes tensiones políticas sobre quién tiene acceso legítimo al sistema financiero.

El futuro de la integración norteamericana podría depender menos de aranceles y tratados comerciales que de quién puede acceder al sistema financiero mismo.

Referencias (APA)

Banco de México. (2026). Estadísticas de remesas familiares. Sistema de Información Económica. Recuperado de https://www.banxico.org.mx/

BBVA Research. (2024). México: Las remesas crecerían más del doble que la economía mexicana en 2024. Recuperado de https://www.bbvaresearch.com/

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). (2024). Understanding the impact of remittances on Mexico’s economy and safeguarding their future impact. Washington, DC: CSIS. Recuperado de https://www.csis.org/

El País. (2025). Golpe al 96% de las remesas que recibe México: las consecuencias del gravamen de EE UU. Recuperado de https://elpais.com/

Mexico News Daily. (2026). Remittances to Mexico are up 1.4% in 2026 after freefalling in 2025. Recuperado de https://mexiconewsdaily.com/

World Bank. (2025). Personal remittances, received (% of GDP) – Mexico. World Development Indicators. Recuperado de https://data.worldbank.org/

Baker Institute for Public Policy. (2022). How remittances impact the economies of Mexican states and municipalities. Rice University. Recuperado de https://www.bakerinstitute.org/

Necessary Conditions for Public Policy and the Limits of Democracy

noreply@blogger.com (Unknown) — Mon, 13 Apr 2026 02:44:00 +0000

Necessary Conditions for Public Policy and the Limits of Democracy

Public policy is often normatively associated with democratic governance, under the assumption that policies emerge from inclusive deliberation, representation, and accountability. However, this association, while analytically useful, can obscure a more fundamental conceptual distinction: the existence of public policy is not contingent upon democracy. Rather, public policy emerges wherever governing authorities engage in institutionalized, intentional action to address collectively recognized problems. Democracy, in turn, shapes the quality, legitimacy, and responsiveness of these policies, but it is not a necessary condition for their existence. This essay argues that public policy requires a core set of institutional and functional conditions—problem recognition, intentionality, institutionalization, resource allocation, and implementation capacity—while also examining the limitations and potential negative outcomes associated with democratic systems.

I. Necessary Conditions for the Existence of Public Policy

1. Recognition of a Public Problem

At its most basic level, public policy presupposes the identification of a problem that is understood to affect a collective rather than an individual. This process of problem recognition is not neutral or automatic; it is socially constructed and politically mediated. As Aguilar Villanueva (1996) argues, problems do not exist independently of the agendas that define them. Instead, actors compete to frame issues in ways that justify state intervention.

Importantly, this condition is not exclusive to democratic systems. Authoritarian regimes also identify and prioritize public problems—such as economic instability, public health crises, or security threats—albeit through more centralized and less contestable processes. The key requirement is not pluralism, but recognition: a problem must be defined as public in order to justify policy intervention.

2. Intentional State Action

A second necessary condition is intentionality. Public policy involves purposive action by governing authorities, rather than ad hoc or reactive decisions. Méndez (1993) conceptualizes public policy as a “strategic package of actions,” emphasizing that policies are not isolated decisions but coordinated efforts aimed at addressing a defined problem.

This distinction is crucial. Not all state actions qualify as public policy. For example, spontaneous or purely symbolic decisions lack the strategic coherence necessary to be considered policy. Intentionality implies planning, prioritization, and the articulation of objectives.

Again, democracy is not required for this condition. Non-democratic regimes frequently engage in highly strategic and coordinated policy interventions, particularly in areas such as industrial policy, infrastructure development, or social control.

3. Institutionalization

Public policy requires an institutional framework through which decisions are made and executed. Institutions—formal and informal—structure the behavior of actors, define roles and responsibilities, and establish procedures for decision-making and implementation.

Neo-institutionalist scholarship highlights the importance of institutions as both constraints and enablers of policy action (Fontaine, 2015; North, 1990). Without institutionalization, policies cannot be sustained over time or applied consistently across cases. Institutions provide the continuity and predictability necessary for policy processes to function.

Crucially, institutionalization is not synonymous with democracy. Authoritarian regimes often possess highly developed institutional apparatuses, including bureaucracies, planning agencies, and enforcement mechanisms. What differs is not the presence of institutions, but their degree of autonomy, accountability, and inclusiveness.

4. Allocation of Resources

A defining feature of public policy is the allocation of public resources. Policies involve decisions about how to distribute financial, human, and administrative resources in pursuit of collective goals. Without such allocation, policies remain rhetorical or symbolic.

Resource allocation also reflects underlying power dynamics. As Lasswell (1951) famously framed it, politics is about “who gets what, when, and how.” Public policy operationalizes this distribution through budgets, programs, and regulatory frameworks.

This condition further reinforces the independence of policy from democracy. Resource allocation occurs in all political systems, although the criteria and transparency of allocation vary significantly. In non-democratic regimes, allocation may be driven by elite interests or regime survival rather than public welfare, but it nonetheless constitutes policy action.

5. Implementation Capacity

Finally, public policy requires the capacity to implement decisions. This includes administrative competence, bureaucratic organization, and, in some cases, coercive power. Weber’s conception of the state as holding the monopoly of legitimate violence underscores the importance of enforceability in policy action.

Policies that cannot be implemented remain aspirational. In many developing or weak institutional contexts, the gap between policy design and implementation is a central challenge. As Levitsky and Murillo (2010) argue, the problem is often not the absence of formal rules, but the lack of compliance and enforcement.

Implementation capacity is therefore a necessary condition for policy existence, even if imperfect. Without it, policies may exist formally but fail substantively.

II. Democracy as a Transformative but Non-Necessary Condition

While democracy is not required for the existence of public policy, it fundamentally transforms its character. Democratic systems introduce mechanisms of participation, accountability, and contestation that shape how policies are formulated, implemented, and evaluated.

Democracy enhances legitimacy by linking policy decisions to citizen preferences. It broadens inclusion by allowing multiple actors to influence the agenda. It strengthens accountability through electoral competition and institutional oversight. These features contribute to what Dahl describes as polyarchy: a system characterized by contestation and participation.

However, these benefits do not define the existence of policy itself. Rather, they define its normative quality. A policy in a democratic system is expected to reflect public interest, whereas a policy in an authoritarian system may primarily reflect regime interests.

III. Negative Outcomes and Limitations of Democracy

Despite its normative appeal, democracy is not without significant limitations. In practice, democratic systems can produce suboptimal policy outcomes due to structural and institutional constraints.

1. Short-Termism and Electoral Cycles

One of the most widely discussed limitations of democracy is its tendency toward short-termism. Electoral incentives encourage politicians to prioritize policies with immediate, visible benefits over those with long-term payoffs. This dynamic is particularly evident in public spending patterns, where governments increase expenditures before elections to signal competence to voters (Drazen & Eslava, 2010).

As a result, critical investments in areas such as infrastructure, education, or institutional reform may be underfunded or delayed. Public policy becomes reactive rather than strategic, undermining long-term development.

2. Policy Fragmentation and Gridlock

Democratic systems, especially those with multiple veto players, often face challenges in achieving policy coherence. Legislative fragmentation, partisan polarization, and coalition politics can lead to gridlock, where necessary reforms are delayed or diluted.

Wehner (2010) and Hallerberg (2009) highlight how fragmented political systems struggle to coordinate fiscal policy, resulting in inefficiencies and inconsistencies. In such contexts, the multiplicity of actors can hinder decision-making rather than enhance it.

3. Capture by Interest Groups

Democracy does not guarantee equal representation. Organized interest groups, particularly those with economic resources, can exert disproportionate influence over policy outcomes. This phenomenon, often referred to as policy capture, can distort policy priorities away from the general interest.

In many cases, policies reflect the preferences of powerful actors rather than the broader population. This undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of democratic governance.

4. Clientelism and Informality

In contexts with weak institutions, democracy can coexist with informal practices such as clientelism, patronage, and corruption. Rather than promoting accountability, electoral competition may incentivize the distribution of targeted benefits in exchange for political support.

This dynamic is particularly relevant in parts of Latin America, where formal democratic institutions coexist with informal networks that shape policy outcomes (Levitsky & Murillo, 2012). The result is a hybrid system in which democratic procedures do not necessarily translate into effective or equitable policies.

5. Inequality in Representation

Finally, democracy may reproduce existing social and economic inequalities. While all citizens formally have equal voting rights, differences in resources, education, and access to information can create unequal influence over policy processes.

As a result, marginalized groups may remain underrepresented, and policies may fail to address their needs effectively.

Conclusion

Public policy does not require democracy for its existence. Its necessary conditions lie in the recognition of public problems, intentional state action, institutionalization, resource allocation, and implementation capacity. These elements define policy as a structured form of governance, independent of regime type.

Democracy, however, transforms public policy by shaping its legitimacy, inclusiveness, and accountability. It introduces mechanisms that can improve policy responsiveness and adaptability, but it also generates its own set of challenges, including short-termism, fragmentation, and vulnerability to capture.

Understanding this distinction is essential for both theoretical clarity and practical analysis. By separating the existence of public policy from its normative qualities, scholars and practitioners can better assess the strengths and weaknesses of different governance systems. Ultimately, the challenge is not merely to produce policies, but to ensure that they are effective, equitable, and responsive to the societies they are meant to serve.

References

Aguilar Villanueva, L. F. (1996). Problemas públicos y agenda de gobierno. Miguel Ángel Porrúa.

Dahl, R. A. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and opposition. Yale University Press.

Drazen, A., & Eslava, M. (2010). Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and evidence. Journal of Development Economics, 92(1), 39–52. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2009.01.001

Fontaine, G. (2015). El análisis de las políticas públicas: Conceptos, teorías y métodos. Anthropos.

Hallerberg, M., Strauch, R., & von Hagen, J. (2009). Fiscal governance in Europe. Cambridge University Press.

Lasswell, H. D. (1951). The policy orientation. In D. Lerner & H. D. Lasswell (Eds.), The policy sciences: Recent developments in scope and method (pp. 3–15). Stanford University Press.

Levitsky, S., & Murillo, M. V. (2010). Variation in institutional strength. Annual Review of Political Science, 12, 115–133. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.091106.121756

Levitsky, S., & Murillo, M. V. (2012). Building institutions on weak foundations: Lessons from Latin America. Cambridge University Press.

Méndez, J. L. (1993). La política pública como variable dependiente: Hacia un análisis más integral de las políticas públicas. Foro Internacional, 33(1), 111–144.

North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge University Press.

Wehner, J. (2010). Institutional constraints on profligate politicians: The conditional effect of partisan fragmentation on budget deficits. Comparative Political Studies, 43(2), 208–229

Freedom Is Not Enough

noreply@blogger.com (Unknown) — Sun, 22 Mar 2026 23:45:06 +0000

Freedom Is Not Enough: Ignatius, Liberalism, and the Search for a Meaningful Life

One of the central achievements of modern political philosophy, especially in the work of John Rawls, is the defense of freedom in pluralistic societies. Rawls sought to answer a fundamental problem: how can individuals with deeply different beliefs, values, and worldviews live together peacefully and fairly? His answer was to construct a framework of justice grounded in neutrality, where the state does not impose a single vision of the good life. Instead, individuals are left free to pursue their own understanding of what makes life meaningful.

This approach reflects a deep and historically grounded concern. The liberal tradition emerges in response to centuries of religious wars, ideological conflict, and coercion. Its underlying fear is clear: if one group imposes its vision of truth or the good life on others, the result is domination, exclusion, and violence. Liberalism therefore protects individuals by limiting what can be imposed collectively. It creates a space where freedom can exist without fear.

However, this achievement comes with an important limitation. While liberalism is extraordinarily effective at protecting freedom and ensuring fairness, it is largely silent on a crucial question: what is freedom for? It guarantees the conditions for choosing, but it does not offer guidance on what is worth choosing. In this sense, modern individuals are often free, but disoriented. They are protected from imposition, but left alone in the task of constructing meaning.

This is where the Ignatian tradition offers a powerful complement. Saint Ignatius of Loyola begins not with institutions or abstract principles, but with the human person. His starting point is deeply realistic. The human being is finite, vulnerable, unstable, and often internally conflicted. We are not fully self-transparent or consistently rational. Our desires are shaped by emotional patterns, unconscious attachments, and the search for recognition. We are, in many ways, less free than we assume.

Ignatius therefore reframes the problem. The question is not simply how to protect external freedom, but how to recover internal freedom. He calls attention to what he terms “disordered affections,” which are the emotional and psychological dynamics that condition our choices without our awareness. These include anxiety, resentment, dependency, ego-driven needs for validation, and habitual ways of interpreting reality. These forces do not eliminate freedom, but they distort it. They make us reactive rather than deliberate, driven rather than discerning.

The first step in the Ignatian process is therefore not to define the good life, but to become aware of oneself. This involves asking simple but demanding questions: how am I, what do I feel, what is moving me? It requires the cultivation of attention, distance from one’s own assumptions, and the creation of silence. These practices are not about achieving perfection, but about gaining lucidity. They allow the individual to recognize the internal dynamics that limit freedom and to begin loosening their grip.

Only after this process of interior clarification does Ignatius introduce the idea that human life has a direction. He expresses this through the famous formulation that the human being is created “for” something. This small word, “for,” carries enormous weight. It suggests that life is not merely a sequence of events, but something that can be oriented. It does not guarantee success or eliminate uncertainty, but it affirms that meaning is possible.

In contrast to modern assumptions, Ignatius does not define this meaning through abstract ideals such as justice, liberty, or equality, even though these may be valuable. Instead, he proposes three concrete attitudes that shape how we live: praise, reverence, and service. These attitudes are fundamentally relational. They describe how we stand in relation to others and to the world.

Praise, in this context, can be understood as the capacity for genuine appreciation. It is not flattery or strategic recognition, but a form of gratuitous friendship. It involves recognizing the value of another person without seeking advantage. It is an expression of openness and generosity in the relationship.

Reverence refers to respect, particularly respect for difference. It is not a subjective feeling of being respectful, but an objective reality measured by whether others experience themselves as free in our presence. Reverence requires accepting that others do not think, believe, or act as we do. It challenges the tendency to absolutize one’s own perspective and invites a recognition of the limits of one’s own understanding.

Service, finally, is the willingness to respond to the needs of others. It is not necessarily institutional or formal, but rooted in everyday interactions. It involves a shift from self-centeredness toward participation in a shared life. It is the movement from “I” to “we.”

What is striking is that these insights are not only theological, but empirically supported. The Harvard Study of Adult Development, one of the longest-running studies on human well-being, has reached a similar conclusion after more than eighty years of research. The study finds that the most significant predictor of a good life is not wealth, status, or recognition, but the quality of relationships. People who cultivate stable, meaningful, and supportive connections tend to live healthier, longer, and more satisfying lives.

This convergence between Ignatian spirituality and modern social science is significant. It suggests that meaning is not primarily found in accumulation, achievement, or external validation, but in the structure of our relationships. It also highlights a limitation of contemporary culture, which often emphasizes consumption, performance, and individual success. These pursuits may satisfy certain needs, but they do not necessarily produce a meaningful life.

The tension, then, is not between freedom and meaning, but between different uses of freedom. Liberalism rightly protects individuals from coercion and allows for pluralism. However, without a deeper account of human flourishing, freedom risks becoming empty or purely instrumental. The Ignatian tradition does not seek to replace liberalism, but to complement it. It offers a way of understanding what freedom can be used for.

A meaningful life, in this perspective, is not one that is perfect or free from difficulty. On the contrary, it is forged through complexity, conflict, and vulnerability. It is not achieved once and for all, but unfolds over time. It requires effort, reflection, and a willingness to move beyond oneself.

Ultimately, the question is not whether we are free, but how we choose to live that freedom. Liberalism gives us the space to decide. Ignatius invites us to orient that decision toward relationships that are marked by generosity, respect, and shared life. In doing so, he suggests that the good life is not something we possess, but something we build together.

Media Appearances

noreply@blogger.com (Unknown) — Thu, 19 Mar 2026 23:41:15 +0000

Media Appearances | Heidi Jane M. Smith

Media Appearances

Selected television, radio, print, and digital media contributions by Heidi Jane M. Smith on public policy, democracy, political economy, U.S.–Mexico relations, trade, and governance.

This page brings together interviews, commentary, op-eds, press citations, and public-facing media contributions. It is organized by format and year for easier browsing.

Recent TV Radio Newspaper Quotes Media Contributions by Year Online Profiles

Recent TV Appearances

MVS Noticias, 2025: “Zohran Mamdani: Who is the young progressive mayor of NY?” [Nov 5]
Radio Ibero 90.9, 2025: Zohran Mamdani – análisis político con Mario Campos [Nov 6]
CNN en Español, 2025: “Dra. Heidi Smith (Ibero): Desempleo en EU e insatisfacción por marcha de la economía” [Nov 20]
Milenio, 2025: TV Opinión – “Donald Trump se tendrá que enfrentar a una deuda interna al llegar al poder” [Jan 19]
TeleSur, 2024: De Notables interview [Nov 5]
TeleSur, 2024: US Election Coverage Live YouTube Event [Nov 6]
Milenio, 2024: Interview with Alex Dominguez [Nov 6]
NTN 24, 2024: Trump y Harris suben el tono y se insultan en la recta final de la campaña por la Presidencia [Oct 23]
France24, 2024: Super Tuesday, interview with France24 [Mar 5]
NTN 24, 2022: Un año de la toma del Capitolio de EEUU: ¿qué lecciones dejó para la democracia? [Jan 6]
NTN 24, 2022: Is inflation getting out of control in the United States [Jan 10]
France24, 2022: In Florida, out of 10 Latinos who register to vote, 8 vote for Republicans [Nov 9, 2022]
France24, 2022: Esta noche se definirá cómo van a resolverse muchos asuntos antes de 2024 [Nov 9, 2022]
France24, 2021: Is the United States in Decline? / ¿Está el papel de Estados Unidos como gran potencia mundial en declive? [Dec 16, 2021]
CNN en Español, 2020: ¿Qué representa la transición de Biden sin el reconocimiento? [Nov 24, 2020]
CNN en Español, 2020: Avanza la transición presidencial en EE.UU. [Nov 24, 2020]
Fox News / Newsy, 2020: Fox News: Discussed the effects of COVID-19 [May 4, 2020]
Newsy Cable TV, 2020: Comments on Mexico’s response to COVID-19 [Apr 2, 2020]
Imagen Noticias con Francisco Zea, 2020: ¿Cómo funciona el proceso electoral en Estados Unidos? [Nov 5, 2020]
BBC, 2019: Mexico’s role in international trade for Global Trade Week [Jun 24, 2019]
El Financiero/Bloomberg, 2019: Discussion on ICE raids and migration policy [Jul 12, 2019]

Radio Appearances

Radio France Internationale (RFI), 2025: Interview on U.S.–Mexico trade dynamics (segment not archived)
Imagen Radio, 2021: Joe Biden marcará un cambio en la historia de EU [Jan 20, 2021]
NPR, 2021: The U.S. and Joe Biden, Mexico and AMLO: What’s Next? [Jan 21, 2021]
NPR, 2021: Economic Benefits for Mexico and the U.S. If They Fight COVID-19 Together [Jan 25, 2021]
NPR Fronteras Desk, 2021: The Reforms in Mexico's Electoral System: What Can the U.S. Learn from It? [Jan 8, 2021]
NPR Fronteras Desk, 2020: Republicans, Democrats End Campaigning in Mexico [Nov 3, 2020]

Newspaper Quotes, Commentary & Press Mentions

El Heraldo de México, 2025: “Aduanas son la pieza clave” [Mar 25]
Americas Quarterly, 2025: REACTION: Trump Threatens February 1 Tariffs on Mexico and Canada [Jan 21]
Americas Quarterly, 2025: U.S. Policy Reaction: The Impacts of Trump’s Tariffs [Feb 3]
Americas Quarterly, 2025: REACTION: Trump Orders Armed Forces to Fight Latin American Cartels [Aug 11]
The Washington Post, 2025: Letter to the Editor — Preserving the Inter-American Foundation [Jun 12] (archives/subscription)
Universidad Iberoamericana, 2025: “Académica de Economía IBERO analiza cómo inversión china puede generar vínculos sostenibles en México” [Jun 30]
Survival (IISS), 2025: “DOGE and the Future of U.S. Foreign Aid” [Jun 3]
Newsweek, 2024: President Biden's Pragmatic Middle East Policy | Opinion [Jan 22]
Inter-American Dialogue, 2024: Will Mexico’s New Olmeca Refinery Achieve its Targets? [Jan 26]
Inter-American Dialogue, 2023: Will Mexico be able to reach its clean energy goals? [Oct 18]
Mexico Today / Reforma, 2022: The Challenge to Fund Mexico’s Climate Commitments [Nov 17]
Morning Consult, 2022: Biden’s Pivot to Asia Has a Crucial Latin American Component [May 31]
Financial Services Advisor, 2023: Commentary with Pablo Colter on financial inclusion [Feb 23–Mar 8]
Nexos, 2022: Políticas prodensificación y cambio climático [Mar 17]
Latin America Advisor, 2022: Commentary on Tax Reforms in Colombia [Sept 27]
SinEmbargo, 2021: Trump deja un país dividido, los racistas desatados. Biden deberá unir: demócratas [Jan 20]
Aristegui Noticias, 2020: Institutions and the 2020 presidential election in the United States [Oct 7]
La Neta Neta, 2020: USA: Voter suppression and “electoral fraud” in the context of great social tension [Nov 2]
Reforma, 2020: Why is it important to vote? [Sep 4]
Scripps News, 2020: Experts Worry Mexico's Response To COVID-19 Is Too Little, Too Late [Apr 1]
Cuestione.com, 2019: ¿Nos afecta que bajen calificación a Pemex? [2019]
Washington Post Op-Ed, 2005: Red Lake: Tough Choices in a Harsh Climate [Mar 23]

Media Contributions by Year

2025

TV Opinión: “Donald Trump se tendrá que enfrentar a una deuda interna al llegar al poder.” Milenio [Jan 19]
Reaction: Trump Threatens February 1 Tariffs on Mexico and Canada. Americas Quarterly [Jan 21]
U.S. Policy Reaction: The Impacts of Trump’s Tariffs. Americas Quarterly [Feb 3]
Interview: U.S.–Mexico trade dynamics. RFI (segment not archived)
Cited in: El Heraldo de México, “Aduanas son la pieza clave” [Mar 25]
Letter to the Editor: Preserving the Inter-American Foundation. The Washington Post [Jun 12]
Article: “DOGE and the Future of U.S. Foreign Aid.” Survival [Jun 3]
Press note: “Académica de Economía IBERO analiza cómo inversión china puede generar vínculos sostenibles en México.” Universidad Iberoamericana [Jun 30]
Reaction (co-author): Trump Orders Armed Forces to Fight Latin American Cartels. Americas Quarterly [Aug 11]
Blog: “El dólar, la FED y la política subnacional...” Red Subnacional [Dec 5]

2024

TV Opinión: Aniversario de la toma del Capitolio de EEUU. NTN 24 [Jan 6]
Opinion Piece: President Biden's Pragmatic Middle East Policy. Newsweek [Jan 22]
Blog: Will Mexico’s New Olmeca Refinery Achieve its Targets? Inter-American Dialogue [Jan 26]
Interview: Super Tuesday. France24 [Mar 5]
Interview: Telediario Matutino — Kamala Harris y perspectivas de México [Aug 23]
TV Opinion: Trump y Harris suben el tono... NTN 24 [Oct 23]
Blog: Will Mexico be able to reach its clean energy goals? Inter-American Dialogue [Oct 18]

2023

TV Opinión: ¿Quién se unirá a Haley y Trump...? France24 [Feb 16]
Blog: Commentary with Pablo Colter on financial inclusion. Inter-American Dialogue [Feb 23–Mar 8]
Article: EU llevaba preparándose para el regreso del Título 8 [May 11]

2022

TV Opinion: Capitolio de EEUU y democracia. NTN 24 [Jan 6]
TV Interview: La toma del Capitolio con Arturo Alba. NTN 24 [Jan 6]
TV Opinion: Is inflation getting out of control? NTN 24 [Jan 10]
Article: Biden’s Pivot to Asia... Morning Consult [May 31]
Article: Políticas prodensificación y cambio climático. Ibero Economía [Mar 17]
Commentary: Sembrando Vida. Latin America Advisor [Jun 29]
Commentary: Tax Reforms in Colombia. Latin America Advisor [Sept 27]
Opinion Piece: The challenge to fund Mexico’s climate commitments. Mexico Today/Reforma [Nov 17]

2021

National Public Radio (NPR) Frontera’s Desk: The Reforms in Mexico's Electoral System: What Can the U.S. Learn from It? [Jan 8]
The U.S. and Joe Biden, Mexico and AMLO: What’s Next? [Jan 21]
Joe Biden marcará un cambio en la historia de EU. Imagen Radio [Jan 20]
Economic Benefits for Mexico and the U.S. If They Fight COVID-19 Together [Jan 25]
Trump deja un país dividido... SinEmbargo [Jan 20]
Inicio de la Nueva Era Biden: ¿Qué se espera en la relación bilateral México-EU? Imagen Radio [Jan 20]
Ties that Bind While Working During a Crisis. The North American Project [Oct 11]
President Biden hospitalized and US Presidential Succession. El Financiero/Bloomberg [Nov 19]
Roundtable: Is the United States in Decline? France24 [Dec 16]

2020–2005

2020: COVID-19 commentary, U.S. election coverage, CNN en Español, NPR Fronteras Desk, Aristegui Noticias, Reforma, and others.
2019: BBC Global Trade Week, El Financiero/Bloomberg, migration and trade commentary.
2018: Radio Ibero, EfectoTV, Mexican Congress testimony, U.S. policy coverage.
2016: Democratic Convention, debates, election-day coverage, Expansión opinion.
2005: Washington Post op-ed and related civic engagement publications.

Online Profiles

SheSource Academia.edu ResearchGate REPEC Econ Papers LinkedIn Wilson Center

Media Inquiries

For media inquiries, please email heidi.smith@ibero.mx.

Beyond the Stability Trap: Rethinking Debt, Democracy, and Fiscal Federalism in Mexico

noreply@blogger.com (Unknown) — Thu, 19 Mar 2026 23:01:00 +0000

Beyond the Stability Trap: Rethinking Debt, Democracy, and Fiscal Federalism in Mexico

By Heidi Jane M. Smith

In policy circles, few ideas are as widely accepted as the notion that low public debt and strict fiscal discipline are synonymous with good governance. Balanced budgets signal responsibility; austerity signals credibility. Yet, in my research on subnational finance in Mexico, I argue that this conventional wisdom is not only incomplete—it can be counterproductive.

In Varieties of Subnational Debt Management and Governance in Mexico (2025), I show that state capacity—particularly fiscal and administrative capacity—is a double-edged sword. While it enables governments to manage resources and access capital markets, it can also generate perverse incentives that undermine long-term development and democratic resilience.

The Stability Trap

One of the central arguments of my work is what I call the “stability trap.” Governments—particularly in emerging federal systems like Mexico—often become overly focused on maintaining low levels of public debt and strict budgetary balance. While this approach is typically framed as prudent, it frequently constrains the state’s ability to:

Invest in infrastructure
Respond effectively to economic shocks
Address persistent inequality

In this sense, fiscal stability becomes passive stability—a rigid adherence to expenditure control that leads to policy immobilism. The paradox is that, in trying to preserve stability, governments may undermine the very foundations of sustainable development.

Fiscal Capacity as a Driver of Debt

Contrary to what we might expect, higher fiscal capacity does not necessarily lead to more prudent fiscal behavior. My findings suggest that states and municipalities with higher revenue per capita are often more likely to incur higher levels of debt.

Why? Because fiscal capacity improves access to credit markets. Subnational governments that are better able to generate revenue are perceived as more creditworthy. However, in the absence of strong intergovernmental rules and oversight, this access can translate into profligate borrowing rather than strategic investment.

This challenges a core assumption in public finance: that more resources automatically lead to better outcomes. Instead, institutional context and political incentives play a decisive role.

The Limits of Administrative Capacity

Another surprising finding from my research on Mexican municipalities is that administrative capacity—often emphasized in development policy—has limited explanatory power when it comes to debt decisions.

Even well-trained bureaucracies operate within political and institutional constraints. Debt accumulation is often driven less by technical capacity and more by:

Political competition
Electoral incentives
Intergovernmental transfer systems
Regulatory loopholes

In other words, improving bureaucratic skills alone is insufficient. Without addressing the broader political economy, fiscal outcomes are unlikely to change.

COVID-19 and the Paradox of Prudence

These dynamics became particularly visible during Mexico’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. I describe this as the “paradox of prudence.” While many countries adopted expansive fiscal policies to mitigate the crisis, Mexico maintained a strict commitment to fiscal balance and debt avoidance.

This decision had profound implications:

Democratic narrowing: The refusal to deploy fiscal tools limited the range of policy responses available to elected officials, effectively constraining democratic choice.
Institutional erosion: By prioritizing macroeconomic indicators over public welfare, the state weakened its ability to provide collective goods, particularly at the subnational level.

The result was not just an economic outcome, but a political one: a reduction in the state’s capacity to respond to citizens’ needs in times of crisis.

Corruption and the Political Economy of Debt

My research also highlights a strong relationship between public corruption and subnational debt expansion. In contexts where corruption is prevalent:

Debt levels tend to be higher
Fiscal rules are more easily circumvented
Oversight mechanisms are less effective

Corruption acts as a catalyst for unsustainable borrowing, not simply because resources are misused, but because institutional controls themselves are undermined. This creates a cycle in which higher debt and weaker governance reinforce each other.

Toward Dynamic Stability

If passive stability is insufficient, what is the alternative?

I propose a framework of “dynamic stability.” Rather than focusing narrowly on debt reduction, dynamic stability emphasizes the need to balance:

Fiscal responsibility
Public investment
Territorial development

This approach recognizes that not all debt is equal. Borrowing to finance productive investments—such as infrastructure, climate adaptation, and urban development—can enhance long-term fiscal sustainability.

Policy Implications for Fiscal Federalism

Moving beyond the stability trap requires rethinking the structure of fiscal federalism in Mexico. Key reforms include:

1. Strengthening local revenue generation
Subnational governments must have greater control over their own revenue sources—particularly property taxes—to reduce dependence on federal transfers.

2. Designing smarter fiscal rules
Rules should distinguish between current spending and investment, allowing for strategic borrowing while maintaining oversight.

3. Enhancing accountability and transparency
Improving technical capacity is important, but must be paired with stronger accountability mechanisms to reduce corruption and moral hazard.

4. Leveraging debt for the green transition
Subnational governments should use credit strategically to finance climate and sustainability initiatives, integrating environmental priorities into fiscal planning.

Rethinking Governance

Ultimately, the challenge is not simply technical—it is political. Fiscal systems are embedded in broader structures of power, incentives, and governance. As such, effective reform requires:

Aligning incentives across levels of government
Strengthening institutions of accountability
Expanding the policy space for democratic decision-making

The goal is not to abandon fiscal discipline, but to redefine it. Stability should not mean immobility. Instead, it should enable governments to act—responsibly, strategically, and democratically—in pursuit of long-term development.

Intervenciones en medios y espacios de divulgación (2025):

noreply@blogger.com (Unknown) — Thu, 19 Mar 2026 22:24:29 +0000

Intervenciones en medios y espacios de divulgación (2025):

MVS Noticias (5 de noviembre de 2025): “Zohran Mamdani: Who is the young progressive mayor of NY?”
https://mvsnoticias.com/entrevistas/2025/11/5/vemos-un-momento-progresista-en-nueva-york-que-podria-marcar-las-proximas-elecciones-heidi-smith-718662.html
Un ano del mandato de Trump (20 de enero del 2026)
https://mvsnoticias.com/entrevistas/2026/1/20/donald-trump-la-ruptura-mundial-lo-que-oculta-su-segundo-mandato-en-eu-tras-sus-logros-728127.html

Radio Ibero 90.9 (6 de noviembre de 2025): Análisis político sobre Zohran Mamdani con Mario Campos.
CNN en Español (20 de noviembre de 2025): “Dra. Heidi Smith (IBERO): Desempleo en EE.UU. e insatisfacción por el desempeño de la economía.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XYZW6LVqAPs
Milenio TV Opinión (19 de enero de 2025): “Donald Trump se tendrá que enfrentar a una deuda interna al llegar al poder.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q4BQBoeDOEw
Radio France Internationale (RFI, 2025): Entrevista sobre la dinámica comercial EE.UU.–México (segmento no archivado).
France 24 (6 de julio de 2025): Entrevista sobre el proceso presupuestario en Estados Unidos y política fiscal. https://www.france24.com/es/ee-uu-y-canad%C3%A1/20250607-as%C3%AD-es-el-gran-y-hermoso-proyecto-de-ley-presupuestario-de-trump-que-divide-a-ee-uu
Universidad Iberoamericana (30 de junio de 2025): Nota de prensa, “Académica de Economía IBERO analiza cómo la inversión china puede generar vínculos sostenibles en México.” (no lo encuentro)
Nexos – Federalismo (11 de diciembre de 2025): “La trampa de la estabilidad.”
https://federalismo.nexos.com.mx/2025/12/la-trampa-de-la-estabilidad/
Red Subnacional (5 de diciembre de 2025): “El dólar, la FED y la política subnacional: ¿Qué nos enseña América Latina sobre finanzas descentralizadas?” https://sites.google.com/view/redsubnacional/blog

Can Public Policy Analysis Remain Relevant in a Post-Liberal Order?

noreply@blogger.com (Unknown) — Thu, 19 Mar 2026 22:09:00 +0000

Can public policy analysis remain relevant in a world where the liberal order that once structured it is no longer taken for granted?

This is not just an academic question—it is a political one.

For decades, public policy analysis has operated under a set of assumptions so deeply embedded that they were rarely questioned. Governments were expected to follow rules. Institutions were presumed to be neutral. Policy design was treated as a technical exercise aimed at improving efficiency, equity, or welfare outcomes. Whether in trade, social policy, or regulation, the underlying belief was that policy could be designed rationally and implemented impartially.

These assumptions were not accidental. They were rooted in a broader liberal framework that treated politics as something to be managed through procedures rather than contested as a struggle over power. Policy analysis emerged as the applied arm of that framework—an effort to translate liberal principles into administrative practice.

Today, that foundation is eroding.

Across democracies and non-democracies alike, the liberal order is no longer widely perceived as a neutral container for managing differences. Instead, it is increasingly viewed as a political project associated with particular elites, institutions, and coalitions. As a result, the very premises on which public policy analysis rests are under strain.

Historically, liberalism arose as a response to governing societies marked by deep and persistent disagreement. After the wars of religion, thinkers such as John Locke argued that political authority should not impose a single conception of truth but should instead create conditions for coexistence. John Rawls later formalized this idea through the concept of the “fact of pluralism,” emphasizing that reasonable disagreement is an enduring feature of modern societies (Rawls, 1993). In this framework, the role of institutions is not to resolve moral conflict but to provide fair procedures through which diverse actors can interact.

Public policy analysis grew out of this vision. It assumed that, even in the presence of disagreement, policy could be evaluated using shared criteria—efficiency, cost-benefit analysis, welfare maximization. It treated governance as a problem of design and implementation, rather than as a fundamentally political contest over competing visions of society.

But this approach has always depended on a fragile condition: the belief that institutions are legitimate and that the rules they apply are fair.

As Judith Shklar (1989) noted, liberalism rests on a minimal consensus—the avoidance of cruelty and domination. Yet even this minimalism requires a shared commitment to toleration and restraint. When that commitment weakens, the neutrality of institutions becomes questionable. And when neutrality is questioned, policy analysis itself becomes politicized.

The challenge is not merely theoretical. It is institutional.

The modern policy apparatus is deeply intertwined with what has been described as a managerial elite—a class of actors defined not by ownership of capital but by control over knowledge, institutions, and decision-making processes (Burnham, 1941; Bourdieu, 1998; Lasch, 1994). These actors populate bureaucracies, universities, think tanks, international organizations, and regulatory agencies. They are trained in abstraction—data, models, legal reasoning—and are highly mobile across sectors and borders.

Within this structure, public policy analysis serves as both a tool and a justification. It provides the language of expertise and neutrality that legitimizes decision-making. It allows policies to be framed as technical solutions rather than political choices.

However, as scholars of public policy have long emphasized, this neutrality is more aspirational than real. Institutions embed power relations and reflect underlying value conflicts (Lowi, 1972; Stone, 2012). As the managerial elite has become more socially concentrated and ideologically cohesive, these underlying dynamics have become more visible.

This visibility is key.

Large segments of the population—particularly those less integrated into globalized, knowledge-based economies—now perceive policy processes as:
not neutral, but biased;
not inclusive, but exclusionary;
not responsive, but insulated.

Whether or not these perceptions are entirely accurate is less important than their political consequences. As David Easton (1965) argued, political systems depend on diffuse support—a general belief in their legitimacy. When that support erodes, compliance with rules becomes conditional, and institutions become contested arenas rather than accepted authorities.

This has profound implications for public policy analysis.

In a post-liberal context, policy analysis can no longer assume:
that problems are agreed upon;
that goals are shared;
or that evaluation criteria are neutral.

Instead, policy becomes an arena of coalitional conflict, where different groups compete not only over outcomes but over the rules and frameworks that define those outcomes.

Selectorate theory helps clarify this transformation. Political stability depends on alignment between leaders, their governing coalition, and the broader population (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). When significant groups perceive themselves as excluded from the coalition, they challenge both policies and the institutions that produce them.

This dynamic is visible across contexts. In the United States, populist movements have exposed tensions within a liberal-managerial order that many perceive as unrepresentative. In Mexico, where liberal neutrality was never fully institutionalized, policy has long been more explicitly political, shaped by coalition-building and centralization of authority. In China, a highly capable managerial state operates without any pretense of liberal neutrality, demonstrating that effective governance does not necessarily require liberal frameworks, but does require institutional coherence and capacity.

These cases suggest that public policy analysis cannot be understood apart from the coalitional and institutional contexts in which it operates.

So where does this leave the field?

If public policy analysis is to remain relevant, it must move beyond the illusion of neutrality. It must recognize that policy design is inherently political, embedded in struggles over power, legitimacy, and representation. This does not mean abandoning rigor or evidence. It means situating analysis within the realities of political contestation.

In practical terms, this requires a shift:
from viewing policy as technical optimization to understanding it as political negotiation;
from assuming consensus to analyzing conflict;
from prioritizing efficiency alone to incorporating legitimacy and inclusion.

The central challenge is no longer simply to design better policies, but to design policies that can command political support in fragmented societies.

We are entering a world in which the rules of the game are no longer agreed upon. In such a world, public policy analysis cannot stand above politics. It must engage with it directly.

The future of the field will depend on its ability to adapt—to recognize that the question is no longer how to manage disagreement within a neutral framework, but how to govern when neutrality itself is contested.

That is a harder task. But it is also a more honest one.

References

Bourdieu, P. (1998). Practical reason: On the theory of action. Stanford University Press.

Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003). The logic of political survival. MIT Press.

Burnham, J. (1941). The managerial revolution. John Day.

Easton, D. (1965). A systems analysis of political life. Wiley.

Lasch, C. (1994). The revolt of the elites and the betrayal of democracy. W.W. Norton.

Lowi, T. J. (1972). Four systems of policy, politics, and choice. Public Administration Review, 32(4), 298–310.

Rawls, J. (1993). Political liberalism. Columbia University Press.

Sen, A. (2009). The idea of justice. Harvard University Press.

Shklar, J. N. (1989). The liberalism of fear. In N. Rosenblum (Ed.), Liberalism and the moral life (pp. 21–38). Harvard University Press.

Stone, D. (2012). Policy paradox: The art of political decision making (3rd ed.). W.W. Norton.

Can USMCA Survive the End of the Liberal Order?

noreply@blogger.com (Unknown) — Thu, 19 Mar 2026 22:06:00 +0000

Can USMCA Survive the End of the Liberal Order?

Can the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement survive in a world where the liberal order that created it is no longer taken for granted?

This is not just a technical question about trade. It is a political question about power, legitimacy, and who gets to shape the rules of the game.

For decades, agreements like USMCA rested on a quiet consensus. Governments would follow rules. Institutions would be seen as neutral. Economic integration would benefit everyone—or at least enough people to sustain political support. These assumptions were rarely debated because they were embedded in a broader liberal framework that treated politics as something to be managed through procedures rather than fought over directly.

That world is fading.

Across North America, and indeed much of the world, the problem is no longer simply disagreement over policy. It is a deeper loss of confidence in the neutrality of institutions themselves. Liberalism is no longer the invisible operating system of politics. It has become visible—and once visible, it has become contestable.

This matters because trade agreements like USMCA depend on something more fragile than tariffs and supply chains. They depend on trust.

At its core, USMCA is not just an economic instrument. It is an institutional expression of a particular political order—one built on rules, predictability, and cooperation. It assumes that governments will comply with agreed standards even when it is politically inconvenient to do so. It assumes that disputes can be resolved through procedures rather than power.

But those assumptions only hold if people believe the system is fair.

Increasingly, they do not.

In the United States, Mexico, and even Canada, large segments of society view trade agreements not as neutral frameworks but as projects that serve particular interests. They see them as products of elite decision-making, disconnected from local realities and insulated from democratic accountability. This perception is not limited to any one ideology. It cuts across political divides, feeding both populist backlash and progressive skepticism.

The result is a profound shift: trade is no longer just about economics. It has become a proxy for broader struggles over representation and inclusion.

To understand this, we need to look at who built the system in the first place. Agreements like NAFTA and USMCA were designed by a class of actors who operate across government, academia, finance, and international organizations. They are highly educated, globally connected, and fluent in the language of policy, law, and data. Their power does not come primarily from wealth, but from their position within institutions.

For this group, liberalism was not just an ideal—it was a practical framework. It allowed them to govern complex societies by emphasizing rules over politics, expertise over conflict, and coordination over confrontation. It made it possible to present trade agreements as technical solutions rather than political choices.

But what looks like neutrality from within institutions often looks very different from the outside.

For many citizens, especially those whose livelihoods are tied to local economies rather than global networks, the system appears anything but neutral. It appears selective, exclusionary, and unresponsive. Whether that perception is entirely accurate is almost beside the point. In politics, perception is reality.

And once people begin to believe they are excluded from the system, they stop playing by its rules.

This is where the real challenge for USMCA lies. The agreement assumes that governments will prioritize compliance with its provisions. But what happens when political survival depends on doing the opposite?

We are already seeing the answer. Disputes over energy policy in Mexico are not just legal disagreements—they are political statements about sovereignty and national priorities. Labor provisions have become flashpoints for domestic political battles. In the United States, skepticism toward global supply chains has become a bipartisan concern.

These tensions are not temporary. They reflect a structural shift. Trade agreements are no longer insulated from domestic politics. They are arenas where political conflicts are fought.

In this sense, USMCA is operating in a post-liberal environment. The rules no longer stand above politics. They are part of it.

So can USMCA survive?

Yes—but not in its current form.

If the agreement is to endure, it must adapt to a world in which legitimacy cannot be assumed. It must recognize that trade is not just about efficiency, but about distribution—who wins, who loses, and who gets to decide. It must move beyond the idea that neutrality alone can sustain cooperation.

This does not mean abandoning rules. It means grounding those rules in political reality.

That requires acknowledging that different countries—and different groups within those countries—have competing interests that cannot simply be managed away. It requires building mechanisms that make trade agreements more responsive to domestic concerns, not less. And it requires a willingness to treat trade not as a technical exercise, but as a political negotiation over the future of economic and social life.

The alternative is clear. If USMCA continues to rely on assumptions that no longer hold, it risks becoming another symbol of a system that people no longer trust.

We are entering a world where the rules of the game are themselves contested. That makes governance more difficult, but also more honest. The pretense of neutrality is giving way to open political struggle.

The real question is not whether we can return to the old liberal order. That world is gone.

The question is whether we can build a new framework—one that can sustain cooperation without pretending that politics has disappeared.

USMCA may well be the first major test of whether that is possible.

Politics of a Post-Neutral World

noreply@blogger.com (Unknown) — Thu, 19 Mar 2026 21:57:00 +0000

Is Liberalism Breaking Down? Elites, Justice, and the Politics of a Post-Neutral World

For much of the late twentieth century, liberalism functioned less as an ideology and more as a background consensus. It provided the rules of the game: individual rights, tolerance, procedural fairness, and institutional neutrality. Whether one leaned left or right, these principles were rarely questioned. Liberalism was not debated—it was assumed.

Today, that assumption is unraveling.

Across the United States, Mexico, and even in global governance frameworks such as USMCA, what is at stake is no longer simply policy outcomes but the legitimacy of the institutional order itself. Liberalism is increasingly perceived not as a neutral framework, but as a substantive political project tied to specific elites and interests. Understanding this shift requires moving beyond ideological explanations and toward a political economy of institutions, coalitions, and justice.

Liberalism as a Solution to Conflict—and Its Limits

Liberalism historically emerged as a response to the problem of irreconcilable disagreement, particularly in the aftermath of the European wars of religion. The key innovation was to decouple political order from substantive moral agreement. Rather than determining the “true” conception of the good life, liberalism sought to enable peaceful coexistence under conditions of pluralism.

John Locke’s vision of the state as an impartial arbiter and John Rawls’ later formulation of the “fact of pluralism” both rest on this premise: societies are inherently diverse, and politics must manage—not resolve—this diversity (Rawls 1993). Judith Shklar further emphasized that liberalism’s primary aim is to avoid cruelty, not to perfect human life (Shklar 1989).

Yet, as Rawls himself acknowledged, this system depends on a deeper condition: a shared willingness to abide by fair terms of cooperation. Liberalism requires citizens to accept limits on their own claims in the name of coexistence. In this sense, liberalism is not entirely neutral—it presupposes a moral commitment to toleration and restraint.

This creates a foundational tension:

liberalism seeks to manage disagreement, but it depends on agreement about how disagreement should be managed.

From Toleration to Indifference

Over time, liberal societies have undergone a subtle but significant transformation. The earlier model of liberalism assumed that individuals would maintain strong, truth-based commitments—religious, moral, or cultural—while refraining from imposing them politically. This is toleration in its classical sense.

Increasingly, however, liberalism has shifted toward something closer to normative indifference. Beliefs are treated less as claims about truth and more as expressions of preference or identity. The language of “I believe” has been replaced by “I feel.”

This shift has implications for democratic life. As Michael Sandel (1996) and Charles Taylor (1994) have argued, a political order that brackets substantive moral commitments risks hollowing out the sources of civic meaning and collective purpose. What begins as a strategy for managing pluralism may evolve into a system that weakens the very foundations of shared life.

The Managerial Elite and the Institutionalization of Liberalism

To understand how this transformation is sustained, we must examine the role of institutions and the emergence of what can be described as a managerial elite.

This group—composed of highly educated, mobile professionals operating across academia, government, finance, and international organizations—derives its power not from ownership of capital but from control over knowledge, policy design, and institutional processes (Burnham 1941; Bourdieu 1998). Its members are trained in abstraction: data analysis, legal reasoning, policy modeling. They are geographically mobile, socially networked, and culturally aligned.

Importantly, their position is not defined by income alone. As Weber (1978) and Bourdieu (1984) suggest, class must be understood in terms of status, cultural capital, and access to institutional power, not merely economic resources. A junior academic or policy analyst may earn less than a skilled tradesperson, yet possess far greater influence over decision-making structures.

Within this framework, liberalism functions as the ideological infrastructure of managerial governance. Its emphasis on neutrality, expertise, and proceduralism legitimizes the authority of those who operate within these systems. It also facilitates global coordination—whether through trade agreements, regulatory standards, or international institutions.

When Neutrality Becomes Political

The stability of this arrangement depends on a critical assumption: that institutions are perceived as neutral and fair. However, as policy analysis literature has long emphasized, institutions are never purely neutral—they embody distributions of power and values (Lowi 1972; Stone 2012).

As managerial elites have become more socially concentrated and ideologically cohesive, this neutrality has increasingly been questioned. Large segments of the population—particularly those embedded in local economies and less integrated into elite networks—perceive institutions as:

Reflecting elite preferences
Dismissing alternative viewpoints
Failing to provide meaningful representation

This perception matters. As David Easton (1965) argued, political systems depend on diffuse support—a generalized belief in their legitimacy. When that support erodes, compliance declines, and institutions become vulnerable to challenge.

At this point, liberalism ceases to function as a background framework and becomes a contested political position.

Populism and the Reconfiguration of Coalitions

The rise of populist movements can be understood within this context. Rather than representing a deviation from rational politics, populism reflects an attempt to reconfigure governing coalitions.

Selectorate theory provides a useful lens here (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Political stability depends on the alignment between leaders, their winning coalition, and the broader selectorate. When significant groups perceive themselves as excluded from the coalition—whether materially or symbolically—they become available for mobilization.

Populist figures did not create this discontent; they activated it. Many of their supporters were not ideologically fixed but had moved across parties over time, seeking representation that they did not find within existing institutional arrangements.

From this perspective, populism is not simply anti-liberal—it is a response to perceived coalition exclusion and institutional bias.

Justice, Democracy, and State Capacity

This crisis also raises deeper questions about justice and democracy. Rawls’ theory of justice assumes the existence of institutions capable of ensuring fairness and adjudicating claims. Yet, as Amartya Sen (2009) emphasizes, justice cannot be reduced to ideal principles—it must be assessed in terms of real-world capabilities and institutional performance.

In contexts such as Mexico, where state capacity is uneven and bureaucratic institutions are weak, the liberal model of neutral adjudication is difficult to sustain. Justice becomes entangled with political power, and democratic competition often centers on redistribution and coalition-building rather than procedural neutrality.

China, by contrast, demonstrates a different model: a highly capable managerial state without liberal pluralism. This suggests that managerial governance and liberalism are not inherently linked. What varies is how authority is structured and legitimized.

The End of Neutrality?

What we are witnessing, then, is not simply ideological polarization, but a transition from a system grounded in assumed neutrality to one characterized by explicit contestation.

Liberalism is no longer the uncontested operating system. It must now compete with alternative visions—some progressive, some nationalist, some authoritarian—each offering different answers to the question of how societies should be organized.

This does not necessarily mean the end of liberalism. But it does mean that its future depends on its ability to address the structural conditions that have undermined its legitimacy:

the concentration of institutional power
the misalignment of governing coalitions
and the gap between normative ideals and institutional realities

The central challenge is no longer how to manage disagreement under neutrality, but how to rebuild legitimacy in a world where neutrality itself is in question.

And that is a far more difficult task.

References

Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction. Harvard University Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1998). Practical Reason. Stanford University Press.
Bueno de Mesquita, B. et al. (2003). The Logic of Political Survival. MIT Press.
Burnham, J. (1941). The Managerial Revolution.
Easton, D. (1965). A Systems Analysis of Political Life.
Lowi, T. (1972). “Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice.”
Rawls, J. (1993). Political Liberalism.
Sandel, M. (1996). Democracy’s Discontent.
Sen, A. (2009). The Idea of Justice.
Shklar, J. (1989). “The Liberalism of Fear.”
Stone, D. (2012). Policy Paradox.
Taylor, C. (1994). “The Politics of Recognition.”

Mental Load and the Gendered Organization of Care in Mexico

noreply@blogger.com (Unknown) — Tue, 10 Mar 2026 22:12:00 +0000

Unpaid care work constitutes one of the most fundamental yet frequently invisible pillars sustaining economic and social life. Although national statistical systems increasingly recognize the economic value of domestic and care work, much of the policy and academic debate continues to focus primarily on the material dimension of care, measured in hours spent performing tasks such as cooking, cleaning, and caring for dependents. Far less attention has been given to the cognitive and emotional labor involved in organizing, anticipating, and coordinating care, often described as the mental load of caregiving.

This omission represents a critical analytical gap. Mental load reflects the invisible processes through which individuals—predominantly women—plan, monitor, and manage the well-being of others within households and families. It includes anticipating needs, organizing schedules, coordinating responsibilities, and maintaining emotional accountability for the functioning of everyday life. Because these forms of labor are rarely recognized as work, they remain largely invisible within both statistical systems and public policy frameworks (Folbre, 2001; Hochschild & Machung, 2012).

Recent research in Mexico seeks to address this gap by examining the gendered distribution of mental load and its broader implications for economic participation, well-being, and public policy. Drawing on insights from feminist economics, the ethics of care, and interdisciplinary approaches in social science, this study explores how mental load operates as a form of invisible labor embedded within social norms and family structures.

Using a national survey conducted in 2025, the research analyzes the multidimensional nature of mental load and the structural factors shaping its distribution across gender and socioeconomic contexts. The findings reveal that mental load is not distributed equally. Instead, it is disproportionately borne by women and reinforced by structural inequalities associated with household composition, labor market conditions, and gender norms.

Intro

This research builds on contributions from feminist economics, which highlight the central role of unpaid reproductive and care labor in sustaining economic systems and social life (Folbre, 2001; Waring, 1988). Feminist scholars argue that conventional economic analysis systematically undervalues domestic labor because it occurs outside formal markets, despite being essential for reproducing the labor force and maintaining social stability.

Within this perspective, care work is understood as a key component of social reproduction, the processes through which societies reproduce and sustain human life across generations (Fraser, 2016). The concept of a “crisis of care”has emerged to describe the tensions between economic accumulation and the reproduction of social life in contemporary capitalist societies (Fraser, 2016). As labor markets intensify and public welfare systems are retrenched, households increasingly absorb the responsibility for providing care, often exacerbating gender inequalities.

The ethics of care further expands this perspective by conceptualizing caregiving as a collective social responsibility rather than a private obligation assigned primarily to women (Held, 2006; Tronto, 1993). From this standpoint, care reflects broader relationships of interdependence and vulnerability that characterize human societies.

Joan Tronto’s concept of a “caring democracy” argues that care should be recognized as a central political and social activity shaping democratic institutions (Tronto, 2013). This perspective contrasts with Ulrich Beck’s notion of the “risk society,” in which individuals must increasingly manage social risks previously addressed collectively (Beck, 1992). By foregrounding human interdependence and vulnerability, care-centered approaches challenge the individualistic assumptions that underpin many contemporary policy frameworks.

Under this theoretical framework, care is not merely a private act motivated by affection but a social practice that materially and symbolically sustains collective life (Tronto, 1993). Recognizing care as such requires making visible the multiple forms of labor—physical, cognitive, and emotional—that sustain households and communities.

Although research on unpaid care work has expanded significantly in recent decades, much of this work focuses on time-use measures that capture physical caregiving activities (OECD, 2019). Yet these measures overlook the mental and emotional dimensions of caregiving that occur simultaneously with or independent of physical tasks.

Mental load refers to the cognitive and emotional effort required to anticipate, organize, and supervise caregiving responsibilities. This includes planning schedules, monitoring family needs, coordinating tasks among household members, and maintaining emotional accountability for the well-being of others (Daminger, 2019).

This study conceptualizes mental load as a multidimensional phenomenon encompassing several interrelated processes:

Anticipation and planning of care tasks
Emotional fatigue associated with planning responsibilities
Difficulty disconnecting from caregiving concerns
Stress associated with caregiving coordination
Perceptions of unequal distribution of care responsibilities
Feelings of guilt associated with caregiving expectations
Impacts on mental health and emotional well-being

Together, these dimensions reveal forms of labor that have historically remained invisible within domestic spaces, particularly those associated with the mental management of family well-being.

Importantly, mental load is strongly shaped by gender norms and cultural expectations. Studies consistently show that women assume responsibility for the cognitive coordination of care tasks even when physical caregiving duties are shared within households (Daminger, 2019; Hochschild & Machung, 2012).

To examine the distribution and consequences of mental load in Mexico, this study employed an exploratory mixed-method research design combining survey data with interpretive analysis.

The survey was conducted between November 11 and December 10, 2025, using a probabilistic mobile phone sampling strategy based on randomly generated telephone numbers from the national dialing plan. A total of 680 interviews were conducted with adults aged 18 and older across the Mexican Republic.

Participants were selected based on a screening criterion requiring them to perform at least two hours of care work per week. Data collection was carried out through computer-assisted telephone interviews using a structured questionnaire containing 58 items. Interviews lasted approximately 20 minutes.

The questionnaire was organized into five sections:

Identification and screening questions
Caregiving context
Experiences related to mental load
Sociodemographic characteristics
Enumerator observations and final evaluation

In addition to measuring mental load across multiple dimensions, the survey collected contextual data on household composition, time allocation, and income sufficiency, enabling analysis of structural factors shaping caregiving experiences.

Understanding mental load requires situating caregiving within the broader social and economic context of everyday life. From an anthropological perspective, care is not simply a task but a situated social practice embedded within kinship relations and household dynamics (Kleinman, 2009).

Survey findings reveal significant gender differences in household composition. Women caregivers are more likely to live in extended households with other relatives (28.5%) compared with men (18.3%). Women are also more likely to reside in single-parent households headed by mothers, representing 15.5% of female respondents compared with 6% of men.

Men, by contrast, more frequently report living in nuclear biparental households (44.1% of men versus 36% of women) or living alone (11.6% of men compared with 3% of women).

These household structures shape caregiving responsibilities in important ways. Women in extended households often coordinate care among multiple family members, while women in single-parent households may face caregiving responsibilities with limited support networks.

Economic conditions further influence caregiving experiences. Women are less likely than men to report that their income consistently covers basic household needs. Approximately 30.1% of women report income sufficiency, compared with 40% of men.

This economic disparity reflects broader structural inequalities such as the gender wage gap and labor market segmentation, which limit women’s access to resources that could alleviate caregiving burdens (ILO, 2018).

The survey findings reveal that the mental load of caregiving is unevenly distributed across gender lines.

Women report significantly higher levels of responsibility for planning and coordinating care tasks. Women are more likely to spend between 30 minutes and one hour per day planning caregiving activities, while men more frequently report spending less than 30 minutes on these responsibilities.

Qualitative comments collected during the survey provide further insight into the social norms shaping these patterns. Many respondents—particularly women—reported that it is expected that women will anticipate, organize, and coordinate caregiving activities simply because they are women.

These expectations reinforce the naturalization of caregiving roles, making mental load appear as an inherent aspect of femininity rather than a form of labor requiring recognition and redistribution (Hochschild & Machung, 2012).

As a result, women frequently assume both the physical tasks of caregiving and the cognitive responsibility for ensuring the functioning of everyday family life.

The unequal distribution of mental load has significant consequences for caregivers’ well-being. Survey results indicate that high levels of mental load are associated with increased stress, emotional fatigue, and difficulty disconnecting from caregiving responsibilities.

These effects extend beyond mental health. Persistent cognitive responsibility for caregiving can limit individuals’ capacity to pursue employment opportunities, career advancement, and educational goals.

For women in particular, the combination of unpaid caregiving responsibilities and economic vulnerability creates a cycle in which caregiving obligations reinforce existing inequalities in labor markets and household resources (Folbre, 2001).

The invisibility of mental load presents significant challenges for public policy. While many countries have begun to recognize the economic value of unpaid care work, policy frameworks often rely primarily on time-use statistics, which fail to capture the cognitive and emotional dimensions of caregiving.

Recognizing mental load as a form of labor requires expanding measurement frameworks used in care policy and social statistics. Without incorporating mental load into policy debates, initiatives aimed at redistributing care responsibilities may fail to address the full scope of caregiving inequalities.

Making mental load visible is therefore a crucial first step toward more equitable care systems. By identifying and measuring these hidden dimensions of caregiving, policymakers and researchers can develop more effective strategies to support caregivers and promote gender equality.

The mental load of caregiving represents a crucial yet largely invisible component of social reproduction. By focusing on the cognitive and emotional dimensions of care, this research reveals the hidden architecture that sustains everyday life.

The findings demonstrate that mental load is not merely a private household concern but a public issue with implications for gender equality, labor market participation, and social policy.

Women disproportionately bear the cognitive and emotional responsibilities associated with caregiving, reflecting broader patterns of gender inequality embedded within household structures and economic systems.

Addressing these inequalities requires recognizing mental load as a form of work and incorporating it into both research agendas and policy frameworks. Only by making the invisible visible can societies begin to develop more equitable systems for distributing care and sustaining social well-being.

Beck, U. (1992). Risk society: Towards a new modernity. Sage.

Daminger, A. (2019). The cognitive dimension of household labor. American Sociological Review, 84(4), 609–633. https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122419859007

Folbre, N. (2001). The invisible heart: Economics and family values. New Press.

Fraser, N. (2016). Contradictions of capital and care. New Left Review, 100, 99–117.

Held, V. (2006). The ethics of care: Personal, political, and global. Oxford University Press.

Hochschild, A. R., & Machung, A. (2012). The second shift: Working families and the revolution at home (Revised ed.). Penguin.

International Labour Organization (ILO). (2018). Care work and care jobs for the future of decent work. ILO.

Kleinman, A. (2009). Caregiving: The odyssey of becoming more human. The Lancet, 373(9660), 292–293.

OECD. (2019). Gender equality: Balancing paid work, unpaid work and leisure. OECD Publishing.

Tronto, J. (1993). Moral boundaries: A political argument for an ethic of care. Routledge.

Tronto, J. (2013). Caring democracy: Markets, equality, and justice. NYU Press.

Waring, M. (1988). If women counted: A new feminist economics. Harper & Row.

Power, Corruption, and Gender: Rethinking Authority in Mexican Governance

noreply@blogger.com (Unknown) — Thu, 05 Mar 2026 18:30:00 +0000

Power, Corruption, and Gender: Rethinking Authority in Mexican Governance

“Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”

This famous line by the British historian Lord Acton, written in 1887 in a letter to Bishop Mandell Creighton, has become one of the most enduring warnings about political authority. The phrase captures a simple but powerful idea: when individuals hold unchecked authority, the risk of moral decline increases. Power can encourage leaders to prioritize self-interest, ignore rules, and exploit institutions designed to serve the public good.

For scholars of governance, corruption, and political economy, Acton’s observation raises a deeper question: Does power inherently corrupt, or does it simply amplify the traits already present in those who hold it?

Recent research suggests the latter may often be the case. Power does not necessarily create corruption from nothing; rather, it can magnify existing behavioral tendencies. Individuals with strong ethical commitments may use authority responsibly, while those with weaker norms may become more opportunistic when institutional constraints are weak.

This debate is particularly relevant in the study of public institutions in Mexico, where questions of accountability, institutional design, and corruption remain central to political and economic development.

Power, Institutions, and Corruption

The insight behind Acton’s warning has influenced generations of institutional design. Modern democracies attempt to limit abuses of authority through checks and balances, independent oversight institutions, transparency rules, and distributed decision-making.

In theory, these mechanisms prevent the concentration of authority that allows corruption to flourish.

In practice, however, institutional structures are only as effective as the political incentives surrounding them. When oversight bodies are weakened, regulatory systems become opaque, or political actors consolidate authority, the risks Acton described become more pronounced.

In Mexico, the last decade has witnessed intense debates over the future of autonomous institutions, regulatory agencies, and anti-corruption mechanisms. The creation of the National Anti-Corruption System (SNA) was intended to strengthen accountability, yet its implementation has faced political and institutional constraints.

The central challenge remains familiar: how to design institutions that prevent the abuse of power while maintaining effective governance capacity.

Gender and the Political Economy of Corruption

A growing body of research asks an additional question that Acton could not have anticipated: does gender shape how power is exercised?

Studies in political economy increasingly examine whether the greater participation of women in public institutionsinfluences patterns of governance, accountability, and corruption. Some findings suggest that higher representation of women in public office is associated with lower perceived corruption levels and stronger compliance with institutional rules.

Several explanations have been proposed.

First, women entering political institutions often face higher scrutiny and reputational expectations, which may encourage more rule-bound behavior. Second, women may be less embedded in traditional patronage networks that historically structured political power in many countries. Third, gender diversity in decision-making bodies can introduce different perspectives and reduce the concentration of informal authority within closed networks.

These explanations remain debated, and the relationship between gender and corruption is far from deterministic. Women are not inherently more virtuous political actors. However, the composition of institutions matters, and greater diversity can alter incentive structures, networks of influence, and policy priorities.

Mexico’s Institutional Context

Mexico provides an especially interesting case for examining these dynamics.

Over the last two decades, the country has made significant progress in gender parity in political representation, including constitutional reforms that require gender parity in legislative bodies. Today, women occupy a substantial share of positions in Congress and increasingly hold leadership roles in public administration.

Yet parity in representation does not automatically translate into parity in institutional power. Informal networks, party structures, and budgetary authority still shape how influence is distributed within the political system.

Understanding how gender intersects with institutional capacity, corruption risks, and governance outcomes is therefore an important area of ongoing research.

The Power Paradox

Lord Acton’s warning remains relevant because it highlights a paradox at the heart of governance: societies need authority to function, but concentrated authority can also undermine the institutions meant to sustain public trust.

The challenge is not simply to limit power, but to structure it in ways that align incentives with public accountability.

Research on corruption increasingly suggests that the solution lies in a combination of institutional design, transparency, and broader participation in governance—including greater representation of women in public decision-making.

Power does not inevitably corrupt. But without oversight, diversity, and institutional constraints, it can easily do so.

Understanding how these forces interact is essential for strengthening democratic governance—not only in Mexico, but globally.

China’s Influence in the USMCA

noreply@blogger.com (Unknown) — Thu, 05 Mar 2026 18:25:00 +0000

China’s Influence in the USMCA

Much of the debate about security in North America focuses on what is visible: military deployments, maritime routes, or geopolitical rivalry understood in territorial terms. Yet the decisive terrain today is largely invisible. Digital trade, cybersecurity, and the rules governing servers, networks, algorithms, and digital platforms increasingly shape economic and political power more profoundly than many traditional defense measures.

Looking ahead to the 2026 review of the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA), the central challenge is not territorial but institutional and technological. The key question is how digital infrastructure, data governance, and technological standards will be regulated within a deeply integrated North American market under conditions of growing strategic rivalry between the United States and China. The debate increasingly revolves around data, networks, and technological architecture, displacing traditional concerns centered on physical goods.

Digital Trade as the Backbone of Integration and Security

Digital trade has become the backbone of the global economy. Cross-border manufacturing, logistics, finance, and energy increasingly rely on interconnected digital systems. These systems, however, are not neutral: they embed technical standards, governance models, and dependencies that affect states’ regulatory autonomy.

The USMCA acknowledged this transformation by including a specific chapter on digital trade. However, its treatment of cybersecurity—particularly in Article 19.15—is limited to promoting cooperation and information sharing, without establishing binding standards or regional oversight mechanisms for critical digital infrastructure. While this flexibility had political utility during the negotiations, it now reveals a structural gap. In a highly integrated market, regulatory asymmetries in the digital sphere can generate systemic vulnerabilities.

China, Nearshoring, and Digital Governance

China’s global technology strategy has sought to expand its presence in telecommunications, industrial automation, logistics platforms, and cloud services by offering financing and integrated technological solutions. In the context of nearshoring, Mexico has become a key space for these dynamics, consolidating its role as a strategic platform for manufacturing aimed at the North American market.

Demand for digital infrastructure—automated ports, smart industrial parks, and robust telecommunications networks—has increased significantly. Chinese technology companies have sought to position themselves within these sectors, often gradually. From the U.S. perspective, the debate is not purely commercial. Various reports have noted that Chinese technology firms operate under legal frameworks that contemplate cooperation with the Chinese state in matters of national security. When such firms participate in critical infrastructure, commercial investment can therefore acquire strategic dimensions.

The issue, then, does not lie primarily in isolated Mexican industrial policy decisions. The structural problem is that the USMCA created deep economic integration without developing an equivalent level of regional digital governance.

A central dimension of digital trade is the phenomenon of technological lock-in. Unlike traditional trade—where suppliers can often be substituted relatively easily—digital infrastructure creates long-term structural dependencies. Once a country adopts a technological ecosystem, whether in telecommunications, industrial automation, or logistics platforms, switching providers entails high financial, technical, and regulatory costs, as well as complex institutional adjustments.

It is therefore crucial to distinguish between conventional foreign direct investment and investment in digital infrastructure. The latter—including telecommunications networks, data centers, logistics systems, and digital platforms—not only generates economic activity but also shapes markets and establishes durable operational rules. Because such infrastructure often exhibits monopolistic or oligopolistic characteristics and high switching costs, its economic and political effects tend to be persistent.

China’s technological strategy has effectively exploited this first-mover logic: combining speed of execution, integrated financing, and turnkey solutions to secure early adoption of technological standards that become difficult to reverse over time. Technological lock-in does not operate immediately, nor is it always visible, but it functions cumulatively and structurally.

This dynamic is evident in sectors such as digitalized urban systems, advanced manufacturing based on artificial intelligence, and next-generation telecommunications networks. In each case, infrastructure not only enables economic efficiency but also embeds governance models and technical dependencies that may generate friction within a deeply integrated regional market.

Regulatory differences among the United States, Canada, and Mexico regarding strategic technology providers illustrate how the absence of common standards can generate institutional tensions within the USMCA framework. The United States systematically incorporates national security considerations into its oversight of digital infrastructure and applies strict investment screening mechanisms and restrictions on certain suppliers. Canada has strengthened its scrutiny processes and has increasingly aligned with these security criteria.

Mexico, by contrast, maintains a more flexible approach, with fewer binding restrictions related to digital security and more limited regulatory capacity, often prioritizing economic development and investment attraction.

Toward the 2026 Review

The digital chapter of the USMCA was negotiated before digital infrastructure consolidated its role as a central arena of global strategic competition. The flexibility embedded in its design—initially useful for achieving political consensus—now reveals the need for updating.

What is missing is not a policy of generalized prohibitions or automatic technological decoupling. Rather, what is needed is a regional institutional framework that includes shared standards, coordinated risk assessments, and common principles for evaluating foreign participation in critical digital infrastructure.

Digital trade agreements increasingly function not only as mechanisms for market access but also as instruments of strategic alignment.

For this reason, as the 2026 USMCA review approaches, digital trade must occupy a central place in the negotiations. The objective is not to present China as an external threat, but rather to close governance gaps within North America itself.

The success of nearshoring will depend on resilient, interoperable, and jointly supervised digital systems. Without explicitly addressing technological lock-in and the governance of digital infrastructure, the USMCA risks remaining anchored in a conception of integration based on physical goods—while real competition increasingly shifts toward data, code, and networks.

Heidi Jane M. Smith holds a PhD in Public Affairs and specializes in public finance, governance, and anti-corruption policy, with more than two decades of professional experience. She is a Professor of Economics at Universidad Iberoamericana and has served as an affiliated professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University. Her research examines fiscal decentralization, subnational debt, and institutional reform through comparative analysis and empirical evidence. She is the author of two books, more than twenty academic articles, and numerous policy reports that have contributed to legislative debates and public discussions in national and international media.

8M and Real vs. Symbolic Power

noreply@blogger.com (Unknown) — Thu, 05 Mar 2026 17:13:00 +0000

8M and Real vs. Symbolic Power

Every March 8th invites celebration, but it also demands interrogation. We celebrate the growing presence of women in positions of power, yet we rarely pause to ask the more unsettling question: does that presence transform the state itself? It is not enough for women to occupy public office. The central issue is whether they exercise power in ways that reshape institutions, priorities, and outcomes. The distinction between symbolic representation and substantive representation is therefore not semantic; it is structural.

Classical theories of bureaucracy, especially those associated with Max Weber and Woodrow Wilson, framed the administrative state as rational, hierarchical, rule-bound, and above all neutral. For Weber, bureaucracy represented the pinnacle of legal-rational authority: impersonal, predictable, insulated from arbitrary power. Wilson, writing in the American context, argued for a sharp distinction between politics and administration, envisioning a professional civil service devoted to efficiency rather than partisan influence. Embedded in both approaches is a normative aspiration: bureaucracy should function as a neutral instrument of governance, guided by rules rather than by social identities or moral claims.

Yet neutrality has always been more normative ideal than empirical reality. Bureaucracies do not float above society; they are built within it. The supposedly impersonal administrative order has historically reflected the assumptions of those who designed and staffed it. The “ideal” bureaucrat imagined in classical theory was abstract and universal, but in practice he was quite concrete: a worker without caregiving responsibilities, available for uninterrupted career progression, detached from domestic labor, and embedded in hierarchies shaped by male dominance. What Weber and Wilson presented as neutral rationality carried implicit gendered premises.

Feminist organizational theory has exposed this contradiction with clarity. Scholars such as Joan Acker have argued that modern organizations are fundamentally gendered structures. Their job classifications, promotion pathways, expectations of availability, and definitions of merit presume a worker whose life is organized around paid labor rather than unpaid care. When women enter such institutions, they do not enter a neutral arena; they enter a system already coded by gendered norms. The claim of neutrality thus masks structural inequalities.

This recognition reframes the question of representation. Symbolic representation occurs when women are visibly present in public office—when they become ministers, legislators, judges, presidents, senior administrators. Symbolic presence matters. It signals inclusion, challenges historical exclusion, and carries profound democratic significance. It can disrupt stereotypes and expand the imagination of who belongs in power. But symbolic representation does not necessarily alter the architecture of governance.

Substantive representation, by contrast, occurs when women’s presence influences what institutions do. It manifests in shifts in budgetary priorities, policy design, administrative practices, and evaluative criteria. It is not measured simply by the number of women in office, but by whether public decisions reflect concerns historically marginalized within state structures.

The theory of representative bureaucracy offers an important bridge between institutional design and social outcomes. It argues that public institutions function more effectively and equitably when their composition reflects the population they serve. When women are present in significant numbers—particularly in decision-making roles—they are more likely to advance policies attentive to health, education, family well-being, and protection from violence. These outcomes are not reducible to biological determinism or essentialist claims about women’s nature. Rather, they reflect the political salience of lived experience. Social location shapes perception, and perception shapes agenda-setting.

One of the clearest domains in which substantive representation becomes visible is the sphere of care. For generations, care work—childrearing, eldercare, reproductive health management, domestic labor—was relegated to the private realm. Classical administrative thought prioritized fiscal discipline, rule compliance, and procedural efficiency. Care was invisible within that framework, treated as external to the rational concerns of the state.

When women exercise real influence within public institutions, care becomes legible as public infrastructure. Policies addressing maternal health, reproductive autonomy, early childhood education, workplace protections for caregivers, and support for families balancing multigenerational responsibilities gain institutional traction. These shifts are not merely redistributive; they are developmental. A society that neglects care undermines its own economic sustainability. Human capital formation, labor force participation, and social cohesion depend upon the very domains historically dismissed as private.

To foreground care is not to abandon efficiency. It is to redefine it. The normative commitments of Weberian and Wilsonian bureaucracy emphasized predictability, legality, and technical competence. Feminist critiques do not reject these principles outright; rather, they question their incompleteness. An administration that measures success solely in procedural compliance or fiscal balance while ignoring structural inequality cannot claim genuine neutrality. Indifference to inequality is not neutrality; it is reproduction of existing hierarchies.

The tension between symbolic and substantive representation therefore becomes a test of democratic depth. A state may achieve gender parity in formal terms while leaving its underlying logic intact. Women may occupy offices without altering the metrics by which policies are evaluated or the categories through which problems are defined. In such cases, representation remains symbolic: visible, powerful in imagery, yet constrained in impact.

Conversely, when women reshape institutional priorities, the transformation can be profound. Historical examples illustrate this dynamic. Reformers such as Jane Addams reoriented public attention toward urban poverty and labor protections by grounding policy in community experience. Jane Jacobs challenged technocratic urban planning models that ignored lived social networks. Eleanor Roosevelt helped expand the normative scope of social rights, embedding dignity within the discourse of governance. These figures did not merely occupy positions; they altered what governance meant.

The broader implication is that bureaucracy is not fixed. Its normative foundations can evolve. The early twentieth century’s emphasis on impersonal rule and administrative insulation emerged in response to patronage and corruption. That project was necessary and transformative in its time. Yet the contemporary challenge is different. It is not simply to shield administration from politics; it is to ensure that administration does not shield itself from social reality.

Substantive representation requires institutional redesign. It demands performance metrics that account for equity outcomes, budget processes attentive to social reproduction, and professional training that integrates gender analysis into administrative reasoning. It requires acknowledging that neutrality conceived as blindness to difference may perpetuate injustice.

On International Women’s Day, then, the most pressing question is not how many women hold office, but whether the state’s priorities reflect the realities of those who sustain families, navigate unequal labor markets, and bear disproportionate burdens of unpaid work. Symbolic breakthroughs matter; they expand the democratic imagination. But without substantive shifts, they risk becoming commemorative milestones rather than engines of transformation.

The path from symbolic presence to substantive power is neither automatic nor guaranteed. It depends on whether institutions are willing to interrogate their own assumptions—about neutrality, efficiency, merit, and value. If bureaucracy remains anchored exclusively in its classical normative vision, it may preserve order while reproducing inequality. If it integrates the insights of feminist organizational critique and representative theory, it can become more responsive, more legitimate, and ultimately more effective.

Representation, in this sense, is not the endpoint of reform but its beginning. To move beyond symbolism is to recognize that governing is not only about enforcing rules; it is about structuring the conditions under which people live. When women’s participation leads to a redefinition of what counts as policy success—when care, safety, health, and dignity are treated as central rather than peripheral—the administrative state itself is transformed.

That transformation is the deeper promise of representation. And it is a promise that extends beyond gender, toward a more reflective and just conception of public authority.

This article was published in spanish here https://www.cronica.com.mx/opinion/2026/03/09/del-simbolo-al-poder-real/

After El Mencho: Decapitation, Federalism, and the Territorial Problem

noreply@blogger.com (Unknown) — Thu, 05 Mar 2026 17:12:00 +0000

After El Mencho: Decapitation, Federalism, and the Territorial Problem

Translation of the post made here

https://blog.economia.ibero.mx/despues-de-el-mencho-decapitacion-federalismo-y-el-problema-territorial/

The death of “El Mencho” will inevitably be presented as a success. In the United States, the operation can be interpreted as evidence of effective bilateral security cooperation. In Mexico, the official narrative will emphasize the state’s ability to reach the leader of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), one of the country’s most expansive criminal organizations. Yet the real question is not whether the state can capture or kill a cartel leader. The question is whether it can govern the territory afterward.

Comparative research on the “decapitation” of criminal organizations shows a consistent pattern: removing a leader does not necessarily reduce violence. In some contexts, violence actually increases. The explanation is both economic and institutional. When a leader controls highly profitable illegal rents and is removed without a plan to reorganize the market or secure the territory, what follows is not necessarily disarticulation but competition.

The CJNG is not simply a drug trafficking organization. It is a network for extracting rents across multiple illicit markets: narcotics, extortion, protection payments, and control of local informal economies. These activities generate decentralized and constant flows of revenue. From a political economy perspective, this is a territorial rent-extraction system.

When a leader disappears, those rents do not disappear. They remain. If the market remains highly profitable, local actors have incentives to compete to capture those revenues. The problem is therefore not only criminal but structural: can the state interrupt those flows and replace the coercive order that organized them?

The answer depends on three variables: the profitability of illegal markets, the organizational structure of the group, and the territorial capacity of the state.

First, profitability. Mexico faces an adverse scenario. The CJNG expanded across multiple states precisely because it diversified its criminal portfolio. It does not rely exclusively on international drug trafficking; it controls local economies as well. This means that even if central coordination weakens, the incentives to maintain the business remain intact.

Second, organizational structure. Unlike traditional hierarchical cartels, the CJNG operates more like a nodal network. It recruits local cells that function with a degree of autonomy. It is not a vertically integrated corporation. This feature introduces ambiguity. On one hand, the absence of clear succession rules could trigger internal disputes. On the other, decentralization can limit large-scale internal wars because local nodes already control territories and may prefer stability over confrontation.

At the same time, decentralization creates resilience. If one node collapses, others continue to operate. The organization does not depend entirely on a rigid command center. Institutionally, this makes it more adaptable to external shocks.

Third, the territorial capacity of the state. This is the most delicate issue. Capturing a cartel leader is a concentrated operation based on intelligence and tactical force. Maintaining control over the territories that leader influenced requires something different: sustained policing, intergovernmental coordination, functioning justice systems, and capable local administrations.

This is where the deeper challenge emerges: Mexican federalism.

Mexico is a federal democracy with uneven state capacity. Some states and municipalities possess relatively strong institutions; others face deep weaknesses in policing, fiscal capacity, and administrative control. The country’s fiscal structure centralizes resources while decentralizing responsibilities. Subnational governments depend heavily on federal transfers, limiting local autonomy.

In security policy, this creates a structural tension. The federal government may carry out a high-profile operation, but day-to-day stabilization falls to state and municipal authorities that often lack sufficient resources or aligned incentives.

The coordinated blockades, vehicle burnings, and attacks reported after the death of El Mencho illustrate this problem. The state was prepared for the operation itself, but not necessarily for the chain reaction that followed. This reveals a gap between tactical coercive capacity and sustained administrative control.

Comparative experience suggests that decapitation strategies are effective only when three conditions align: the illegal market becomes less profitable, the criminal organization is highly hierarchical and vulnerable to succession conflicts, and the state has the capacity to immediately occupy the territory afterward. Mexico, at best, partially meets one of these conditions.

The primary risk is not a single nationwide succession war but territorial fragmentation. When a decentralized network loses its leader, local nodes may autonomize. The result can be localized violence, disputes over micro-regions, and adjustments among competing actors. The outcome is not necessarily spectacular national conflict but a multiplication of smaller zones of instability.

From a governance perspective, what is at stake is the substitution of authority. If the state cannot quickly replace the coercive capacity of the criminal organization, a vacuum emerges—and in highly profitable illegal markets, vacuums rarely remain empty.

There is also a political dimension. For the federal executive, the operation carries immediate symbolic value, reinforcing a narrative of decisive action. Yet the costs of any subsequent violence are delayed and territorialized. They fall on state governments, municipalities, and specific communities. In other words, the political benefit is centralized while the administrative cost is local.

The deeper question is whether Mexico can move from a strategy centered on dramatic enforcement events to one focused on territorial consolidation. This requires more than temporary military deployments. It demands investment in professional civilian policing, stronger prosecutors’ offices, financial intelligence, and genuine coordination across levels of government.

It also requires addressing the structure of illegal rents. As long as extortion and control of local economies remain highly profitable, incentives for criminal reorganization will persist. Security policy cannot focus solely on removing leaders; it must intervene in the markets that sustain criminal power.

International experience shows that successful campaigns against organized crime combine selective repression with economic disruption and institutional strengthening. Eliminating the leader is not enough; the ecosystem must also be dismantled.

Ultimately, the episode highlights a broader tension in Mexican democracy: the coexistence of tactical state strength and administrative fragility. The state can demonstrate force, yet its territorial penetration remains uneven. Criminal organizations, meanwhile, have learned to operate as flexible networks adapted to that inequality.

The death of El Mencho could mark the beginning of a decline in violence—or the start of a more fragmented criminal landscape. The outcome will depend less on the operation itself than on the state’s capacity to occupy territory, reduce the profitability of illegal markets, and coordinate across levels of government.

Real success will not be measured in arrests or operations, but in everyday perceptions of security. Not in the announcement of a capture, but in the sustained stability of affected communities.

If the state can transform a tactical blow into institutional consolidation, the moment may become a turning point. If not, it will serve as another reminder that force without governance rarely dismantles criminal markets; it merely reorganizes them.

Institutional Pragmatism

noreply@blogger.com (Unknown) — Sun, 22 Feb 2026 15:25:00 +0000

Dr. Heidi Jane M. Smith’s "orthodoxy" is not found in traditional left-right politics, but rather in

Institutional Pragmatism. Her work focuses on the "how" of governance—how money moves, how laws are enforced, and how institutions survive—rather than the "why" of ideological debate.

When we connect her academic framework to Metamodernism, we see a fascinating alignment. Metamodernism is characterized by "oscillation" between modern sincerity (believing we can fix the world) and postmodern irony (knowing the system is broken).

1. Her Orthodoxy: Institutional Pragmatism

Dr. Smith’s professional "creed" can be broken down into three pillars:

Fiscal Decentralization: The belief that power is most effective when it is closest to the people (local tax collection).
Transparency as a Moral Imperative: Her "Access Money" theory suggests that corruption isn't just a legal fail; it’s an economic tax on the poor.
Evidence-Based State Building: She treats the state like a machine that needs constant maintenance. If the gears (tax codes) are rusty, the machine (democracy) fails.

2. The Metamodern Connection

Metamodernism is the "structure of feeling" of our current era. Here is how Dr. Smith’s work relates to it:

A. Informed Naivety (The "Sincere" Fix)

Metamodernists acknowledge that global systems (like the World Bank or IMF) are flawed, yet they choose to work within them to create incremental change.

Relation: Dr. Smith doesn’t call for the "overthrow" of the global financial system. Instead, she applies rigorous academic study to make it work better. This is Metamodern Sincerity: knowing the system is "rigged" but working tirelessly to reform a municipal tax code anyway.

B. The "Oscillation" Between Local and Global

Metamodernism rejects the idea that we are only global citizens or only local ones.

Relation: Her work on "Paradiplomacy"(cities acting like countries) is a perfect metamodern example. She studies how a mayor in a small Mexican town must now understand global trade routes. She bridges the gap between the "grand narrative" of Globalism and the "micro-narrative" of a local neighborhood.

C. Pragmatic Idealism

Metamodernism moves past Postmodern cynicism (where nothing matters) into a space where we act as if we can reach a better future.

Relation: Her focus on Social Equity Competencies in public finance is an attempt to inject human values (Idealism) into the cold, hard world of math and budgeting (Pragmatism).

3. "Access Money" as a Metamodern Critique

Her analysis of "Access Money" is particularly metamodern because it looks at corruption not just as "bad guys taking money," but as a systemic feedback loop.

She realizes that in growth-oriented economies, "access" is a commodity.
By mapping this, she moves away from the Postmodern "everything is corrupt" attitude and toward a Modernist "let's build a better ledger" solution.

Summary Table: Orthodoxy vs. Metamodernism

Feature	Her Orthodoxy (Institutionalist)	Metamodern Relation
View of the State	A tool that needs technical tuning.	A flawed but necessary project for human progress.
View of Debt	A lever for growth if managed transparently.	An "oscillation" between future risk and present need.
View of Truth	Found in data, budgets, and fiscal rules.	Found in the tension between data and human experience.

Typologies of Corruption in Middle-Income States

noreply@blogger.com (Unknown) — Fri, 06 Feb 2026 19:48:00 +0000

Typologies of Corruption in Middle-Income States

Before analyzing how subnational authoritarianism fragments sovereignty, it is necessary to define the types of corruption that permeate middle-income countries and structure coalition behavior. Contemporary research converges on a key insight: corruption is not a single phenomenon but a set of distinct practices that vary by scale, institutional location, and political purpose. These differences matter because they shape coalition behavior, state capacity, and the ways in which both domestic and foreign actors interact with public authority—often most visibly at the local level.

Yuen Yuen Ang’s “unbundled” framework provides a micro-level typology that disaggregates corruption into four analytically distinct forms: petty theft, speed money, grand theft, and access money (Ang, 2020). Petty theft and speed money occur at the bureaucratic margins, typically involving low-level officials and small transactions aimed at supplementing income or bypassing administrative delays. While corrosive to trust, these forms tend to reflect weak administrative capacity rather than elite strategy. By contrast, grand theft and access money operate at the apex of the political system. Grand theft involves large-scale embezzlement by senior officials, while access money refers to exchanges in which firms or elites provide substantial financial or political benefits in return for privileged access to licenses, contracts, land, or regulatory exemptions.

Ang’s contribution is particularly valuable for understanding corruption in dynamic, growth-oriented middle-income economies. She shows that access money—rather than petty corruption—often dominates in contexts where development is occurring alongside institutional weakness. Crucially, access money is not accidental or chaotic; it is structured around elite bargains that channel investment toward politically favored actors. This makes Ang’s framework especially well suited to analyzing how corruption functions in subnational settings, where governors, mayors, and regulatory agencies control land use, permits, infrastructure siting, and public–private partnerships. In such environments, corruption is less about bureaucratic dysfunction than about political allocation. Michael Johnston’s typology complements this approach by shifting the analytical lens from transactions to regimes.

Rather than categorizing types of corrupt acts, Johnston (2005) identifies “corruption syndromes” that emerge from particular combinations of political competition, economic concentration, and institutional strength. His “Oligarchs and Clans” syndrome—under which Mexico is often classified—describes systems in which political and economic power is concentrated among interlinked elites who rely on personalist networks, party machines, and family or business ties. Corruption in this context is institutionalized rather than episodic, embedded in how authority is exercised and resources are distributed.

The key difference between Ang and Johnston lies in analytical scale and emphasis. Ang explains how corruption works by dissecting the mechanisms through which elites extract and allocate rents. Johnston explains where and why those mechanisms become durable by linking them to broader political configurations. Together, the two frameworks illuminate why corruption at the local level in middle-income democracies is often systematic rather than opportunistic. Subnational governments become critical sites where access money is exchanged and oligarchic networks are reproduced, particularly in federal systems with uneven oversight.

These distinctions are essential for understanding sovereignty under conditions of decentralization and globalization. Petty theft and speed money erode administrative effectiveness, but they rarely alter strategic state behavior. By contrast, access money and oligarchic corruption directly shape policy choices, regulatory enforcement, and investment decisions. They determine which firms gain entry, which standards are adopted, and which projects receive political protection. From a selectorate perspective, this pattern is predictable: in systems where winning coalitions at the local level are relatively narrow, leaders prioritize targeted private benefits over broad public goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). In such settings, political elites exchange market access or regulatory exceptions for campaign finance, private rents, or control over state contracts).

Access money becomes a tool for maintaining elite loyalty, particularly at the subnational level where distributive politics are most visible. This dynamic aligns with selectorate theory; regimes with narrow winning coalitions prioritize private goods over public benefit (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003), and access money becomes a primary instrument for rewarding insiders.

This typological clarity also helps explain how foreign capital interacts with domestic political structures. In environments dominated by access money and oligarchic networks, foreign investors may secure entry not through transparent competition but through alignment with local elites who control regulatory choke points. Sovereignty, in this sense, is not first compromised between states, but within them—through subnational bargains that trade regulatory discretion for political survival.

Making subnational authoritarianism as the institutional setting in which access money and oligarchic corruption are most likely to flourish, and through which national sovereignty becomes fragmented from below.

Understanding these corruption types also clarifies how foreign capital interacts with domestic institutions. In narrow-coalition regimes, foreign investors may provide access money—direct or indirect payments to political elites—to secure favorable treatment.

By contrast, broader-coalition systems may face pressure from civil society to channel foreign funds into public goods and transparent projects. Thus, before sovereignty is negotiated between states, it is often sold or repurposed within them. This typological clarity is essential as we now turn to how subnational authoritarianism functions as both a vessel for elite corruption and a constraint on national autonomy.

Mexico as a Bridge Case: Corruption Typologies, Organized Crime, and External Capital

Mexico provides a particularly revealing case for applying these corruption typologies because it combines formal democratic institutions with profound subnational variation in state capacity. While national-level governance exhibits competitive elections, fiscal centralization, and formal anticorruption frameworks, many states and municipalities operate under markedly different incentive structures. This unevenness makes Mexico an archetypal setting in which Ang’s corruption types and Johnston’s syndromes coexist spatially rather than temporally.

At the local level, Mexico displays the full spectrum of Ang’s unbundled corruption. Petty theft and speed money persist in everyday interactions with police, municipal bureaucracies, and regulatory offices, reflecting administrative weakness rather than elite strategy. More consequential, however, are grand theft and access money, which dominate at the subnational executive level. Governors and mayors control zoning, procurement, infrastructure siting, and security enforcement, creating powerful choke points through which access money can be exchanged. These dynamics align closely with Johnston’s “Oligarchs and Clans” syndrome: corruption is not episodic but embedded in political machines, business networks, and—critically—relationships with organized crime.

This is where the contribution of Transnational Organized Crime in Latin America and the Caribbean becomes central. Ellis demonstrates that in much of Latin America, and particularly in Mexico, organized crime does not merely exploit corruption but actively reshapes governance by embedding itself within local political coalitions. Criminal organizations operate as economic actors that supply coercion, liquidity, and territorial control, often substituting for weak state capacity. In subnational contexts characterized by narrow winning coalitions, alliances between political elites and criminal groups become mutually reinforcing: politicians gain enforcement power and campaign finance, while criminal actors secure regulatory tolerance and market access. This fusion intensifies grand theft and access money, transforming corruption from rent-seeking into a mode of territorial governance.

Ellis’s later work, China Engages Latin America: Distorting Development and Democracy?, adds a crucial external dimension to this domestic picture. He shows that Chinese economic engagement—particularly in infrastructure, extractive industries, logistics, and digital systems—often enters precisely those institutional spaces where local governance is weakest and access money is most effective. In Mexico, this does not imply that Chinese firms drive corruption uniquely, but rather that they encounter and adapt to existing subnational political economies shaped by oligarchic networks and uneven enforcement. Where regulatory authority is fragmented and political survival depends on narrow coalitions, foreign capital—whether Chinese, American, or otherwise—may be absorbed into local access-money systems.

Taken together, Ang, Johnston, and Ellis help explain why corruption in Mexico is not merely a governance failure but a mechanism through which sovereignty is fragmented from below. Subnational authoritarian enclaves—maintained through access money, elite collusion, and in some cases organized crime—mediate the relationship between the Mexican state and external actors. Sovereignty is thus not first compromised at the level of international negotiation, but internally, through local bargains that trade regulatory discretion, security enforcement, or territorial control for political survival.

This Mexico-specific configuration sets the stage for the next section. Subnational authoritarianism emerges not as an anomaly within Mexican democracy, but as a predictable institutional outcome of narrow coalitions, decentralized authority, and external economic pressures. Understanding how these enclaves operate is essential for explaining why national strategies toward foreign investment, trade integration, and security cooperation are repeatedly constrained by local political economies.

Key Points: Typologies of Corruption in Middle-Income States

1. Corruption is heterogeneous, not monolithic

Corruption varies by scale, institutional location, and political purpose.
Different forms of corruption have distinct effects on governance, state capacity, and sovereignty.
Local and subnational arenas are often where these differences are most visible.

2. Ang’s “unbundled” framework explains how corruption operates

Corruption can be analytically disaggregated into four types:
- Petty theft: small-scale embezzlement by low-level officials.
- Speed money: minor bribes to accelerate routine services.
- Grand theft: large-scale embezzlement by senior officials.
- Access money: elite exchanges of money or favors for privileged access to markets, contracts, or regulation.
Petty theft and speed money reflect administrative weakness, not elite strategy.
Grand theft and access money reflect elite bargaining and coalition maintenance.

3. Access money dominates in growth-oriented middle-income economies

In contexts of development combined with weak institutions, access money is the most consequential form of corruption.
Access money is structured, predictable, and tied to investment allocation.
It is especially prevalent at the subnational level, where officials control land use, permits, infrastructure, and public–private partnerships.
Corruption here is about political allocation, not bureaucratic dysfunction.

4. Johnston’s corruption syndromes explain where and why corruption becomes durable

Johnston shifts the focus from transactions to political regimes and institutional environments.
The “Oligarchs and Clans” syndrome describes:
- Concentrated political and economic power.
- Personalist networks, party machines, and family–business alliances.
- Corruption that is institutionalized rather than episodic.
This framework is especially useful for understanding subnational variation within formally democratic states.

5. Ang and Johnston are complementary, not competing

Ang explains the mechanisms of corruption (how rents are extracted and allocated).
Johnston explains the conditions of persistence (why those mechanisms endure).
Together, they show why corruption in middle-income democracies is often:
- Systematic rather than opportunistic.
- Embedded in local political economies.
- Reproduced through subnational governance structures.

6. Corruption types have different implications for sovereignty

Petty theft and speed money:
- Undermine administrative effectiveness.
- Rarely shape strategic state behavior.
Access money and oligarchic corruption:
- Directly affect policy choices, regulatory enforcement, and investment outcomes.
- Determine market entry, standards adoption, and project protection.
- Pose the greatest threat to sovereignty.

7. Selectorate theory explains elite incentives

In narrow winning-coalition systems, leaders prioritize private over public goods.
Access money becomes a primary tool for:
- Maintaining elite loyalty.
- Financing political survival.
- Rewarding insiders at the subnational level.
Distributive politics are most visible and consequential locally.

8. Foreign capital interacts differently across corruption regimes

In access-money–dominated and oligarchic settings:
- Foreign investors gain entry through alignment with local elites, not open competition.
In broader-coalition systems:
- Civil society and institutions pressure foreign capital toward transparency and public goods.
Sovereignty is often compromised within states before it is negotiated between them.

9. Subnational authoritarianism is the key institutional conduit

Subnational authoritarianism provides:
- The political shelter for access money.
- The institutional space for oligarchic networks.
It fragments national sovereignty from below, through local bargains that trade regulatory discretion for political survival.
This sets the stage for the next analytical move: examining how subnational authoritarianism constrains national autonomy.

References

Ellis, R. E. (2018). Transnational organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean. Lexington Books.

Ellis, R. E. (2022). China engages Latin America: Distorting development and democracy? Lexington Books.

Johnston, M. (2005). Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ang, Y. Y. (2016). How China Escaped the Poverty Trap. Cornell University.

Ang, Y. Y. (2020). China’s gilded age: The paradox of economic boom and vast corruption. Cambridge University.

Conceptualizing State Capacity

noreply@blogger.com (Unknown) — Wed, 28 Jan 2026 21:05:00 +0000

Conceptualizing State Capacity: Clarifying Neighboring Concepts and Re-centering the State in Public Policy Analysis

Introduction

The concept of state capacity has become a central analytical tool across multiple disciplines, including sociology, economics, political science, international relations, and public administration. Scholars deploy the term to explain why some states are better able than others to design policies, implement reforms, enforce rules, extract revenue, maintain order, and deliver public goods. This renewed interest is driven by empirical puzzles ranging from uneven development outcomes and fiscal crises to democratic backsliding, governance failures, and the uneven performance of public administrations during shocks such as financial crises, pandemics, and climate-related disasters.

Yet, despite—or perhaps because of—its widespread use, the concept of state capacity suffers from significant conceptual ambiguity. The term is frequently conflated with, or substituted by, related notions such as institutional capacity, administrative capacity, organizational capacity, and policy capacity. These “neighboring concepts” often describe overlapping empirical phenomena but are grounded in distinct theoretical traditions and units of analysis. As a result, the literature risks analytical imprecision, weak measurement strategies, and conceptual stretching.

This essay argues that clarifying the relationship between state capacity and its neighboring concepts is not merely a semantic exercise but a necessary step for advancing comparative public policy and political economy research. Building on classic contributions—most notably Weber’s theory of bureaucracy and Mann’s distinction between despotic and infrastructural power—as well as contemporary work on policy capacity, the essay proposes a structured way to understand how these concepts relate to one another while preserving their analytical distinctiveness.

The central claim is threefold. First, state capacity should be understood as a macro-level property of the state that reflects its ability to formulate, coordinate, and implement authoritative decisions across territory and policy domains. Second, administrative, organizational, and institutional capacities are best understood as component capacities that contribute to state capacity but are not interchangeable with it. Third, policy capacity represents a valuable meso-level framework that shifts the unit of analysis to specific policy processes, allowing for more fine-grained empirical analysis without abandoning the broader state-centric perspective.

The Proliferation of Capacity Concepts and the Problem of Conceptual Overlap

The expansion of the state capacity literature has been accompanied by the proliferation of related concepts that seek to capture specific aspects of governance performance. While this diversification reflects theoretical innovation, it has also produced conceptual confusion.

One of the most problematic cases is institutional capacity. In some strands of the literature, institutional capacity refers to the quality and stability of formal rules, legal frameworks, and enforcement mechanisms. This usage draws heavily on new institutional economics, particularly North’s (1990) definition of institutions as “the rules of the game” that structure incentives and reduce uncertainty. From this perspective, a state with strong institutional capacity is one that possesses credible property rights, contract enforcement, and predictable legal systems.

However, other authors use institutional capacity to describe budgeting procedures, intergovernmental coordination mechanisms, or even human resource systems within the public sector (Arenilla Sáez, 2019). Acemoglu et al. (2015), for example, link institutional capacity to the state’s ability to tax, regulate, and provide public goods, blurring the line between institutions as rules and institutions as organizations. As a result, institutional capacity becomes a catch-all term that lacks a stable referent.

This ambiguity has methodological consequences. If institutional capacity refers simultaneously to constitutional rules, bureaucratic professionalism, fiscal extraction, and policy coordination, it becomes difficult to operationalize empirically or to distinguish causes from outcomes. Strong institutions may be both a determinant and a manifestation of state capacity, leading to circular explanations.

By contrast, administrative capacity is more narrowly defined, though it still overlaps with other concepts. Olavarría Gambi (2013) conceptualizes administrative capacity as the ability of public officials and agencies to implement policies through coordination, technical competence, and procedural compliance. In this view, administrative capacity resides primarily in the bureaucracy and is closely linked to professionalization, merit-based recruitment, and internal coherence.

Similarly, Molina-Garzón et al. (2022) emphasize administrative capacity as the state’s operational ability to translate political decisions into effective service delivery. Their empirical work illustrates how variations in administrative capacity explain differences in policy outcomes even when formal rules and political commitments are similar. For example, decentralized states may adopt identical social policies, but differences in subnational administrative capacity lead to uneven implementation and service quality.

Organizational capacity further narrows the focus to specific ministries or agencies. Camerlo and Coutinho (2022) define organizational capacity as the ability of central ministries—particularly finance or planning ministries—to coordinate, steer, and discipline other public organizations. Rodríguez Balmaceda (2022) similarly highlights the internal structures, leadership, and coordination mechanisms that allow organizations to exert influence within the state apparatus.

While these distinctions are analytically useful, the frequent substitution of one term for another obscures the fact that they operate at different levels of analysis. Administrative and organizational capacities are components of state capacity, not alternatives to it. Treating them as interchangeable risks fragmenting the concept of the state into isolated bureaucratic units, thereby losing sight of systemic properties such as territorial reach, legitimacy, and authority.

Policy Capacity: A Shift in the Unit of Analysis

The concept of policy capacity represents one of the most theoretically coherent attempts to resolve these ambiguities by explicitly shifting the unit of analysis from the state to the policy process. Koga et al. (2022) and Koga et al. (2023) define policy capacity as the ability to mobilize skills, resources, and information flows to design, implement, and adapt public policies under conditions of uncertainty.

Their framework distinguishes three interrelated dimensions:

Analytical capacity, referring to the ability to generate, interpret, and use evidence to diagnose problems, evaluate alternatives, and monitor outcomes.
Operational capacity, defined as the ability to implement decisions through coordination, resource management, and administrative routines.
Political capacity, understood as the ability to secure legitimacy, manage stakeholder relations, and sustain political support for policy action.

This tripartite framework has several advantages. First, it clarifies that capacity is not a single attribute but a bundle of capabilities that may vary independently. A government may possess strong analytical capacity (e.g., sophisticated policy analysis units) but weak political capacity, leading to reform failure. Second, it explicitly incorporates uncertainty, recognizing that policymaking occurs in dynamic environments where learning and adaptation are essential.

Empirically, policy capacity allows researchers to explain why governments facing similar structural constraints produce divergent policy outcomes. For instance, during the COVID-19 pandemic, countries with comparable levels of economic development displayed starkly different responses. Differences in analytical capacity (use of epidemiological data), operational capacity (health system coordination), and political capacity (public trust and compliance) proved decisive.

However, while policy capacity offers analytical precision, it also entails a conceptual trade-off. By centering the analysis on specific policies, it risks downplaying the broader state structures that condition policy processes. Analytical units such as policy advisory systems or implementation networks do not exist independently of the state’s authority, legal monopoly, and territorial control. Thus, policy capacity should be understood as nested within state capacity rather than as a substitute for it.

Mann’s Contribution: Despotic and Infrastructural Power

A foundational contribution that bridges state theory and capacity analysis is Michael Mann’s distinction between despotic power and infrastructural power (Mann, 1984, 2008). Despotic power refers to the range of actions that state elites can undertake without routine consultation with civil society. It captures the discretionary authority of rulers, often associated with authoritarian or patrimonial systems.

Infrastructural power, by contrast, refers to the state’s ability to penetrate society, implement decisions, and coordinate social life through administrative and logistical means. This includes taxation, census-taking, policing, education systems, and public service provision. Importantly, infrastructural power is not inherently authoritarian; liberal democracies often possess high infrastructural power precisely because they rely on rule-based administration rather than arbitrary coercion.

Mann’s framework introduced two critical insights that continue to shape the study of state capacity. First, it shifted attention from regime type to administrative effectiveness. A state may be democratic yet weak in infrastructural power, or authoritarian yet administratively incapable. Second, it implicitly incorporated public policy into the analysis of state power. Policies are the mechanisms through which infrastructural power is exercised, whether in health, education, taxation, or regulation.

For example, Mann’s historical analysis shows how the expansion of taxation and welfare states in Europe depended less on despotic authority than on the development of bureaucratic infrastructures capable of extracting information and resources from society. This insight resonates with contemporary studies of fiscal capacity, which emphasize the role of administrative systems in enabling redistribution and development.

Weberian Foundations and the Administrative State

The concept of state capacity is deeply rooted in Weberian state theory. Weber’s definition of the state as an organization that successfully claims a monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory (Weber, 2002) provides the ontological foundation for capacity analysis. Capacity, in this sense, is what allows the state to make that monopoly effective rather than merely formal.

Weber’s theory of bureaucracy further specifies the mechanisms through which state capacity is realized. Rational-legal authority, hierarchical organization, rule-bound decision-making, and merit-based recruitment are not merely normative ideals but functional prerequisites for large-scale administration. Bureaucracy enables predictability, calculability, and continuity—key components of infrastructural power.

Empirical research consistently shows that Weberian bureaucratic features correlate with improved development outcomes, lower corruption, and more effective policy implementation. States that lack professional bureaucracies may enact ambitious reforms on paper but fail to implement them in practice, a phenomenon often observed in developing and middle-income countries.

At the same time, Weberian theory cautions against equating capacity with coercion. Effective states rely not only on enforcement but also on legitimacy and compliance. This insight aligns with the political dimension of policy capacity, which emphasizes trust, social acceptance, and coalition-building.

Integrating the Concepts: Toward an Analytical Hierarchy

Taken together, the literature suggests the need for an analytical hierarchy that preserves conceptual clarity while acknowledging empirical interdependence.

At the macro level, state capacity refers to the state’s overall ability to formulate and implement authoritative decisions across territory and policy domains. It encompasses infrastructural power, legitimacy, and coordination across institutions.

At the meso level, policy capacity captures the capabilities involved in specific policy processes, including analysis, implementation, and political management. It allows scholars to explain variation within states and across policy sectors.

At the micro and organizational levels, administrative and organizational capacities refer to the skills, structures, and coordination mechanisms of bureaucracies and agencies. These capacities are necessary but not sufficient for high state capacity.

This hierarchical approach avoids the pitfalls of conceptual substitution while enabling cumulative research. It also aligns with empirical strategies that combine macro indicators (e.g., fiscal capacity, bureaucratic quality) with policy-specific analysis.

Conclusion

The renewed interest in state capacity reflects both empirical necessity and theoretical opportunity. However, without conceptual clarity, the term risks becoming an empty signifier. By distinguishing state capacity from its neighboring concepts and situating it within Weberian and Mannian state theory, this essay has argued for a structured and integrated framework.

Policy capacity offers a valuable lens for analyzing governance performance under uncertainty, but it should be understood as nested within broader state structures. Administrative and organizational capacities are critical components, yet they do not exhaust the concept of state capacity.

Ultimately, improving state capacity is not merely a technical challenge but a political and institutional one. It requires investments in bureaucracy, legitimacy, and coordination—elements that cannot be reduced to individual policies or organizations. Clarifying these concepts is therefore a prerequisite for both rigorous scholarship and effective public sector reform.

References (APA)

Acemoglu, D., García-Jimeno, C., & Robinson, J. A. (2015). State capacity and economic development. American Economic Review, 105(5), 236–241.

Arenilla Sáez, M. (2019). Capacidad institucional y políticas públicas. Madrid: Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública.

Camerlo, M., & Coutinho, M. (2022). Organizational capacity and inter-ministerial coordination. Public Administration, 100(3), 623–640.

Koga, N., Howlett, M., Fattore, G., & Xun, W. (2022). Policy capacity and policy success. Policy Sciences, 55(2), 227–248.

Koga, N. M., Howlett, M., & Fattore, G. (2023). Policy capacity: Conceptual foundations and empirical applications. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, 25(1), 1–18.

Mann, M. (1984). The autonomous power of the state. European Journal of Sociology, 25(2), 185–213.

Mann, M. (2008). The sources of social power (Vol. 3). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Molina-Garzón, A., et al. (2022). Administrative capacity and policy implementation. Governance, 35(4), 1011–1030.

North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Olavarría Gambi, M. (2013). Capacidades estatales y políticas públicas. Revista de Ciencia Política, 33(2), 305–325.

Rodríguez Balmaceda, F. (2022). Organizational capacity and state steering. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 88(1), 123–140.

Weber, M. (2002). Economy and society. Berkeley: University of California Press.

North America First: Why Mexico and USMCA Now Define U.S. Security

noreply@blogger.com (Unknown) — Mon, 12 Jan 2026 22:19:00 +0000

Securing North America: Mexico, USMCA, and the Strategic Logic of Trump’s Western Hemisphere Pivot

The 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) marks a decisive reorientation of U.S. foreign policy toward the Western Hemisphere. At its core lies a simple but consequential premise: the United States cannot sustain global power without first securing its immediate neighborhood. While the document ranges broadly—from great-power competition to transnational crime—its strategic logic converges on one country above all others: Mexico. In this context, the USMCA is no longer merely a trade agreement. It becomes the institutional backbone of a fused economic-security strategy for North America.

Mexico as the Strategic Hinge

Mexico occupies a structurally unique position in U.S. strategy. It is simultaneously the United States’ largest trading partner, its most critical manufacturing platform, and the primary corridor for both irregular migration and illicit drug flows. The NSS implicitly recognizes that instability in Mexico directly translates into insecurity inside the United States. For this reason, Mexico is not treated as just another regional partner but as a strategic hinge upon which hemispheric security turns.

The NSS’s emphasis on border security, cartel suppression, and nearshoring all intersect in Mexico. Bilateral trade nearing $1 trillion annually and deep supply-chain integration mean that economic disruption in Mexico would reverberate immediately across the U.S. economy. Conversely, successful stabilization in Mexico would amplify U.S. competitiveness, reduce migration pressures, and weaken the influence of external rivals—especially China—without the need for overt confrontation.

Within this framework, USMCA functions as more than a commercial treaty. It operates as a geoeconomic security instrument. Its rules of origin, labor provisions, and dispute-settlement mechanisms incentivize supply-chain integration within North America while raising the cost of dependence on non-hemispheric competitors. Nearshoring is thus not simply an efficiency strategy; it is a form of strategic consolidation consistent with the NSS’s broader objective of denying rivals control over “strategically vital assets” in the hemisphere.

This reinterpretation carries policy consequences. Trade compliance, labor enforcement, and customs inspections increasingly overlap with national security priorities. While the NSS does not explicitly condition USMCA benefits on security cooperation, the logic is clear: economic integration and security alignment are becoming inseparable. This blurring raises the stakes for Mexico, which must simultaneously deliver economic competitiveness and territorial control.

The Cartel Paradigm Shift

The most destabilizing element of the NSS for U.S.–Mexico relations is its reframing of transnational criminal organizations. By treating cartels as national security threats—rather than law-enforcement challenges—the strategy authorizes the use of military tools, including targeted deployments and lethal force. This represents a profound break with decades of bilateral cooperation grounded in sovereignty-sensitive policing and judicial assistance.

For Mexico, this shift creates acute tensions. Expanded U.S. security actions risk undermining Mexican sovereignty, inflaming domestic politics, and increasing uncertainty for investors who anchor their decisions in USMCA’s promise of stability. Yet from Washington’s perspective, cartel violence directly threatens supply chains, public safety, and border integrity. The NSS resolves this dilemma by prioritizing outcomes over process, even at the cost of diplomatic friction.

Mexico as the Make-or-Break Case

Although the NSS highlights Venezuela as an urgent challenge, it identifies Mexico—implicitly but unmistakably—as the decisive long-term case. Venezuela tests U.S. resolve; Mexico tests U.S. strategy. Without Mexican stability, the NSS’s core objectives collapse. Migration pressures intensify, nearshoring falters, and cartel networks continue to operate as para-state actors with global reach.

At the same time, the strategy exposes an institutional gap. While USMCA provides robust mechanisms for trade enforcement, North America lacks an equally strong framework for joint security governance. The division of responsibilities between U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command further fragments policy toward Mexico, complicating the integration the NSS envisions.

Policy Implications

The success of the Western Hemisphere pivot depends on whether the United States can secure Mexico without militarizing the economic relationship that underpins North American prosperity. This requires aligning USMCA’s economic incentives with sustained investment in Mexican state capacity—particularly in public security, customs administration, and local governance—rather than relying primarily on coercive tools.

Ultimately, the NSS reframes North America as a single strategic theater. Trade, security, migration, and great-power competition are no longer separable domains. USMCA is the operating system of this new model, and Mexico is its critical node. Whether this strategy produces stability or strain will determine not only the future of U.S.–Mexico relations, but the credibility of the United States’ claim that securing its hemisphere is the foundation of its global power.