St. George Greek Orthodox Cathedral

650 Hanover Street, Manchester

Free and open to all. Kid friendly. Bring a dish to share!

2:00 pm – Meal & Live Music
3:00 – 5:00pm – Celebration and Awards

Keynote Speaker: Hedrick Smith, Pulitzer Prize winner and author of “Who Stole the American Dream”.

MLK Award Recipient: JerriAnne Boggis

Community Service Award: Dorothy Krasner

Awards to winners of student arts and writing competition

Music by Memorial High School Jazz Band.

Today, in a significant victory for ballot access and voter choice in New Hampshire, the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire denied the State’s motion to dismiss a lawsuit filed by the Libertarian Party of New Hampshire challenging the constitutionality of HB1542.  The Libertarian Party is represented by the American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire and its attorneys William Christie and Courtney Hart of the law firm Shaheen & Gordon, P.A.

HB1542 is a state law passed in 2014 that imposes onerous restrictions on the ability of third parties to gain access to the ballot in future elections.  “This law limits voter choice and stacks the deck against candidates who—like roughly 40% of Granite Staters—don’t belong to a major party,” said Gilles Bissonnette, the staff attorney for the ACLU of New Hampshire who is co-counsel on the case.

HB1542 is wrong and unconstitutional, and the Court today unequivocally rejected the State’s claim that the case should be dismissed, holding that “The Libertarian Party is entitled to proceed with its case under the fact-dependent framework that the Supreme Court has formulated for ballot access claims.”  The Court added: “The State offers a number of arguments in favor of dismissal, but none are persuasive.”

HB1542 addresses the ability of a third party to gain access to the ballot as a recognized political party.  Gaining access to the ballot as a recognized party has substantial advantages, including the ability to run a slate of candidates and engage in pre-election organizing.

HB1542 states that, when a third party seeks to gain access to the ballot before an election by collecting certified signatures, those signatures “shall be signed and dated in the year of the election.”  In short, HB1542 prohibits third parties from collecting signatures before January 1 of the election year.  This may sound benign, but it will make the task of obtaining ballot access far more difficult—if not impossible—for third parties.  As explained in the lawsuit, this is true for two key reasons.

First, under HB1542, third parties now have only 7 months—from January 1 to early August—to collect the number of signatures necessary to get on the ballot.  Given the harsh winter months, this new compressed time period is, in reality, much shorter.  And the number of signatures that must be collected during this time frame is huge—3% of the total votes cast during the prior election.  For example, to get on the ballot for the 2014 election, 21,330 signatures were required.

During the 2000 and 2012 election cycles, the Libertarian Party was able to collect the nearly 10,000 and over 13,600 certified signatures, respectively, necessary for the Party to get on the ballot.  But to meet these high thresholds in what was already an arduous process, the Party had to start collecting signatures before the year of the actual election—namely, in 1999 and 2011.  However, under HB1542, the Libertarian Party is now prohibited from collecting signatures prior to the election year, thus hampering its ability to obtain ballot access in future elections.

“To use a metaphor, this signature-collection process is like a marathon that’s hard enough just to finish, and now the State is essentially demanding that the Libertarian Party run the marathon in less than two hours.  This is unfair and unconstitutional,” said William Christie of Shaheen & Gordon, P.A. who is co-counsel on the case.

Second, HB1542 will also put third parties at a disadvantage compared to major parties.  Using the upcoming 2016 election as an example, a third party must now “sit on the sidelines” for all of 2015.  Then, once January 1, 2016 arrives, the third party must use its limited resources to, rather than campaigning and fundraising like the major parties, rush to collect thousands of signatures.  Once the third party completes this process by early August of the election year, the third party is further disadvantaged due to the drastically shortened remaining time frame to campaign.  The result is to foreclose the third party from meaningfully participating in the general election and to substantially burden ballot access.

“Unfortunately, by restricting ballot access and voter choice, HB1542 hinders our democratic process from functioning vigorously,” said Courtney Hart of Shaheen & Gordon, P.A. who is also co-counsel on the case.  As a Rhode Island court concluded in striking down a similar law, “[s]ociety is best served when political parties outside the two existing major parties play an active, ‘robust’ role in the entire campaign process—not simply appear on the final election ballot.”  HB1542 prevents third parties from playing such a “robust” role.  Voters deserve more choices at the ballot box, not fewer.

Thus, when an officer arrests someone in clear violation of the law, his employer should not escape liability if the officer simply says “I thought I was acting lawfully.”  All citizens are presumed to know the law.  We should expect the same of police officers.

Indeed, if an officer’s beliefs can immunize an unlawful arrest, then the innocent conduct of citizens may lead not only to arrests, but also to vehicle stops, searches, and interrogations—all arising from a citizen’s behavior or speech that (i) is not prohibited under any applicable law or (ii) is even expressly protected by the Constitution.  We should not invite such civil liberties intrusions.

This question is now before the New Hampshire Supreme Court, and the ACLU of New Hampshire has addressed these issues in an amicus brief.

In the case Farrelly v. City of Concord, et. al., the plaintiff has asserted intentional tort claims against the City of Concord after Concord police officers arrested and prosecuted him pursuant to a statute, RSA 644:4, I(f), that had been struck down by the New Hampshire Supreme Court four years earlier in State v. Pierce, 152 N.H. 790 (2005) as violating free speech rights.  The lower court held that the City was entitled to official immunity against the plaintiff’s claims simply because the police officers were unaware that the statute was unconstitutional at the time of the arrest despite being provided this information by the City.

As we argue in the brief, the lower court’s decision to not examine whether the officers’ conduct was objectively reasonable when measured against what would be expected of reasonably well-trained officers violated Part I, Article 14 of the New Hampshire Constitution.  Indeed, the lower court’s ruling, if adopted, would considerably restrict—if not outright eliminate—the ability of plaintiffs to seek redress for intentional torts in state courts against police officers and municipalities, including intentional torts arising out of clear violations of rights protected under the federal and state constitutions.  Under the lower court’s ruling, a municipality can obtain immunity for an intentional tort simply if the officer in question subjectively believed in the lawfulness of his or her actions, including relying on a statute that clearly has been held unconstitutional but has not been formally repealed.  Such a rule would immunize, based solely on the officer’s subjective beliefs, even objectively improper conduct that no reasonably well-trained officer would ever think is appropriate.  As we argue, an objective standard, on the other hand, recognizes the principle that it has always been the province of the courts, not law enforcement, to determine the reasonableness of an officer’s conduct in ascertaining whether immunity principles apply to violations of fundamental rights.

This case raises an important question as to whether, for a police officer and his employer to obtain official immunity for intentional torts, the officer in question must have acted under a “reasonable belief” that his conduct is authorized by law as required under Part I, Article 14 of the New Hampshire Constitution.  Under this “reasonable belief” standard, (i) the officer must have subjectively believed that his conduct was unlawful, and(ii) that belief must be objectively reasonable when measured against that of a reasonably well-trained officer.  The lower court examined the former and not the latter and, therefore, we argue that its decision did not comply with Article 14 of the New Hampshire Constitution.

As we argue in the brief, the policy considerations of the lower court’s decision to not apply an objectively reasonable standard are significant.  Indeed, the lower court’s ruling, if affirmed, would considerably restrict—if not outright eliminate—the ability of plaintiffs to seek redress for intentional torts in state courts against police officers and municipalities, including intentional torts arising out of clear violations of rights protected under the federal and state constitutions.  Under the lower court’s ruling, a municipality can obtain immunity for an intentional tort simply if the officer in question subjectively believed in the lawfulness of his or her actions, including relying on a statute that clearly has been held unconstitutional but has not been formally repealed.  Such a rule would immunize, based solely on the officer’s subjective beliefs, even objectively improper conduct that no reasonably well-trained officer would ever think is appropriate.  An objective standard, on the other hand, recognizes the axiomatic principle that it has always been the province of the courts, not law enforcement, to determine the reasonableness of an officer’s conduct in ascertaining whether immunity principles apply to violations of fundamental rights.

Cooperating Attorney: Lawrence Vogelman of Nixon, Vogelman, Barry, Slawsky & Simoneau, P.A.

Legal Documents: ACLU-NH Amicus Brief

Jeff was arrested for criminal trespass in violation of a verbal “no trespass” order he received a month earlier.  This order banned him from the library and the adjacent park, including its walkways, green space, and benches.  His bail was $100 but he did not have the money so he had to spend the next 33 days in jail.  After his release, the NHCLU secured the dismissal of the criminal charge.

Parks are protected places under the First Amendment.  They are places for the public—the poor and affluent alike—to congregate and enjoy.  Jeff had every right to be in the walkway in that park.  Moreover, the verbal “no trespass” order violated his due process rights because it denied him the opportunity to challenge the order.  The NHCLU has sought civil relief for these constitutional violations.

Cooperating Attorney: Lawrence Vogelman of Nixon, Vogelman, Barry, Slawsky & Simoneau, P.A.

 *          *           *

In May 2014, Jeff Pendleton was hauled off to jail for walking along a public foot path in the park adjacent to the Nashua public library.  Jeff was arrested for criminal trespass in violation of a verbal “no trespass” order he received a month earlier.  This order banned him from the library and the adjacent park, including its walkways, green space, and benches.  His bail was $100 but he did not have the money so he had to spend the next 33 days in jail.  After his release, the NHCLU secured the dismissal of the criminal charge.

Parks are protected places under the First Amendment.  They are places for the public—the poor and affluent alike—to congregate and enjoy.  Jeff had every right to be in the walkway in that park.  Moreover, the verbal “no trespass” order violated his due process rights because it denied him the opportunity to challenge the order.  The NHCLU has sought civil relief for these constitutional violations.

Using law enforcement to target the poor dehumanizes these members of our community and ostracizes them from the services they need most to get out of poverty.  New Hampshire can’t shut its eyes to poverty or sweep it out of sight.  The NHCLU will continue to fight for the constitutional rights of the poor and homeless.

RSA 659:35(I) violates the First Amendment by banning pure political speech on matters of public concern beyond the polling place (including in one’s home) that is not remotely related to the State’s purported interest in enacting the law—namely, addressing vote-buying and voter coercion.  “Political speech is essential to a functioning democracy.  The First Amendment does not allow the State to, as it is doing here, broadly ban innocent political speech with the hope that such a sweeping ban will address underlying criminal conduct,” says Gilles Bissonnette, staff attorney of the ACLU of NH.

Troublingly, the New Hampshire Attorney General’s Office is currently investigating people for engaging in political speech purportedly in violation of RSA 659:35(I) arising from the September 9, 2014 primary election.  Two of the Plaintiffs in the lawsuit—Representative Leon H. Rideout and Andrew Langlois—are currently being investigated under the law.  For example, on Mr. Langlois’ marked ballot that he later published on Facebook, he wrote the name of his recently-deceased dog “Akira” as his Republican choice for U.S. Senate.  Mr. Langlois’ vote and the publication of his ballot on social media were acts of protest against his choices for Senate—each of whom he disapproved.  Mr. Langlois’ story is depicted here.  It is clear that this posting plainly bears no relationship to vote corruption and is pure political speech that is now banned under RSA 659:35(I).

What this law ignores is that displaying a photograph of a marked ballot on the Internet is a powerful form of political speech that conveys various constitutionally-protected messages.  This form of speech can convey a sense of pride from an 18-year-old, newly-minted voter who is enthusiastic about voting in her first presidential selection.  It can convey, as it did with Plaintiff Andrew Langlois, the political message of disappointment with one’s choices of candidates.  It can convey, as it did with Plaintiffs Representative Leon H. Rideout and Brandon D. Ross who each posted photographs of their marked ballots on social media following the September 9, 2014 primary election, both protest against the law and enthusiasm in voting for oneself as a political candidate for office.  These messages lose their salience without the photograph of the marked ballot.

Voting is an act of extraordinary importance.  And it is because of this importance that the First Amendment also ensures that citizens are free to communicate their experiences at the polls, including the people for whom they voted if they so wish.  There is no more potent way to communicate one’s support for a candidate than to voluntarily display a photograph of one’s marked ballot depicting one’s vote for that candidate.  However, RSA 659:35(I) totally bans this form of political speech.  This ban is wrong and it violates the First Amendment.

UPDATE: On November 12, 2014, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction asking the Court to prevent enforcement of the law while this lawsuit is pending.