New York divorce lawyers

NY CLS Dom Rel § 5. Incestuous and void marriages

A marriage is incestuous and void whether the relatives are legitimate or illegitimate between either:

1. An ancestor and a descendant;

2. A brother and sister of either the whole or the half blood;

3. An uncle and niece or an aunt and nephew.

If a marriage prohibited by the foregoing provisions of this section be solemnized it shall be void, and the parties thereto shall each be fined not less than fifty nor more than one hundred dollars and may, in the discretion of the court in addition to said fine, be imprisoned for a term not exceeding six months. Any person who shall knowingly and wilfully solemnize such marriage, or procure or aid in the solemnization of the same, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be fined or imprisoned in like manner.

NY CLS Dom Rel § 6. Void marriages

A marriage is absolutely void if contracted by a person whose husband or wife by a former marriage is living, unless either:

1. Such former marriage has been annulled or has been dissolved for a cause other than the adultery of such person; provided, that if such former marriage has been dissolved for the cause of the adultery of such person, he or she may marry again in the cases provided for in section eight of this chapter and such subsequent marriage shall be valid;

2. [Repealed]

3. Such former marriage has been dissolved pursuant to section seven-aof this chapter.

NY CLS Dom Rel § 7. Voidable marriages

A marriage is void from the time its nullity is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction if either party thereto:

1. Is under the age of legal consent, which is eighteen years, provided that such nonage shall not of itself constitute an absolute right to the annulment of such marriage, but such annulment shall be in the discretion of the court which shall take into consideration all the facts and circumstances surrounding such marriage;

2. Is incapable of consenting to a marriage for want of understanding;

3. Is incapable of entering into the married state from physical cause;

4. Consent to such marriage by reason of force, duress or fraud;

5. Has been incurably mentally ill for a period of five years or more.

NY CLS Dom Rel § 8. Marriage after divorce

Whenever, and whether prior or subsequent to September first, nineteen hundred sixty-seven, a marriage has been dissolved by divorce, either party may marry again.

 CLS Dom Rel § 10. Marriage a civil contract

Marriage, so far as its validity in law is concerned, continues to be a civil contract, to which the consent of parties capable in law of making a contract is essential.

NY CLS Dom Rel § 10-a. [Eff July 24, 2011] Parties to a marriage

1. A marriage that is otherwise valid shall be valid regardless of whether the parties to the marriage are of the same or different sex.

2. No government treatment or legal status, effect, right, benefit, privilege, protection or responsibility relating to marriage, whether deriving from statute, administrative or court rule, public policy, common law or any other source of law, shall differ based on the parties to the marriage being or having been of the same sex rather than a different sex. When necessary to implement the rights and responsibilities of spouses under the law, all gender-specific language or terms shall be construed in a gender-neutral manner in all such sources of law.

 NY CLS Dom Rel § 11-b. Registration of persons performing marriage ceremonies in the city of New York

Every person authorized by law to perform the marriage ceremony, before performing any such ceremonies in the city of New York, shall register his or her name and address in the office of the city clerk of the city of New York. Every such person, before performing any marriage ceremonies subsequent to a change in his or her address, shall likewise register such change of address. Such city clerk is hereby empowered to cancel the registration of any person so registered upon satisfactory proof that the registration was fraudulent, or upon satisfactory proof that such person is no longer entitled to perform such ceremony.

NY CLS Dom Rel § 13. Marriage licenses

It shall be necessary for all persons intended to be married in New York state to obtain a marriage license from a town or city clerk in New York state and to deliver said license, within sixty days, to the clergyman or magistrate who is to officiate before the marriage ceremony may be performed. In case of a marriage contracted pursuant to subdivision four of section eleven of this chapter, such license shall be delivered to the judge of the court of record before whom the acknowledgment is to be taken. If either party to the marriage resides upon an island located not less than twenty-five miles from the office or residence of the town clerk of the town of which such island is a part, and if such office or residence is not on such island such license may be obtained from any justice of the peace residing on such island, and such justice, in respect to powers and duties relating to marriage licenses, shall be subject to the provisions of this article governing town clerks and shall file all statements or affidavits received by him while acting under the provisions of this section with the town clerk of such town. No application for a marriage license shall be denied on the ground that the parties are of the same, or a different, sex.

NY CLS Dom Rel § 15-a. Marriages of minors under fourteen years of age

Any marriage in which either party is under the age of fourteen years is hereby prohibited. Any town or city clerk who shall knowingly issue a marriage license to any persons, one or both of whom shall be at the time of their contemplated marriage actually under the age of fourteen years, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction thereof shall be fined in the sum of one hundred dollars.

NY CLS Dom Rel § 24. Effect of marriage on legitimacy of children

1. A child heretofore or hereafter born of parents who prior or subsequent to the birth of such child shall have entered into a civil or religious marriage, or shall have consummated a common-law marriage where such marriage is recognized as valid, in the manner authorized by the law of the place where such marriage takes place, is the legitimate child of both birth parents notwithstanding that such marriage is void or voidable or has been or shall hereafter be annulled or judicially declared void.

2. Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to affect the construction of any will or other instrument executed before the time this act shall take effect or any right or interest in property or right of action vested or accrued before the time this act shall take effect, or to limit the operation of any judicial determination heretofore made containing express provision with respect to the legitimacy, maintenance or custody of any child, or to affect any adoption proceeding heretofore commenced, or limit the effect of any order or orders entered in such adoption proceeding.

NY CLS Dom Rel § 77-c. Temporary visitation

1. A court of this state which does not have jurisdiction to modify a child custody determination, may, if consistent with subdivision one-c of section two hundred forty of this chapter or section one thousand eighty-five of the family court act, issue a temporary order enforcing:

(a) a visitation schedule made by a court of another state; or

(b) the visitation provisions of a child custody determination of another state that does not provide for a specific visitation schedule.

2. If a court of this state makes an order under paragraph (b) of subdivision one of this section, it shall specify in the order a period that it considers adequate to allow the petitioner to obtain an order from a court having jurisdiction under the criteria specified in title two of this article. The order remains in effect until an order is obtained from the other court or the period expires.

NY CLS Dom Rel § 77-d. Registration of child custody determination

1. A child custody determination issued by a court of another state may be registered in this state, with or without a simultaneous request for enforcement, by sending to the appropriate court in this state;

(a) a letter or other document requesting registration;

(b) two copies, including one certified copy, of the determination sought to be registered, and a statement under penalty of perjury that to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person seeking registration the order has not been modified; and

(c) except as otherwise provided in section seventy-six-h of this article, the name and address of the person seeking registration and any parent or person acting as a parent who has been awarded custody or visitation in the child custody determination sought to be registered.

2. On receipt of the documents required by subdivision one of this section, the registering court shall:

(a) cause the determination to be filed as a foreign judgment, together with one copy of any accompanying documents and information, regardless of their form; and

(b) serve notice upon the persons named pursuant to subdivision one of this section and provide them with an opportunity to contest the registration in accordance with this section.

3. The notice required by paragraph (b) of subdivision two of this section must state that:

(a) a registered determination is enforceable as of the date of the registration in the same manner as a determination issued by a court of this state;

(b) a hearing to contest the validity of the registered determination must be requested within twenty days after service of notice; and

(c) failure to contest the registration will result in confirmation of the child custody determination and preclude further contest of that determination with respect to any matter that could have been asserted.

4. A person seeking to contest the validity of a registered order must request a hearing within twenty days after service of the notice. At that hearing, the court shall confirm the registered order unless the person contesting registration establishes that:

(a) the issuing court did not have jurisdiction under title two of this article;

(b) the child custody determination sought to be registered has been vacated, stayed, or modified by a court having jurisdiction to do so under title two of this article; or

(c) the person contesting registration was entitled to notice, but notice was not given in accordance with the standards of section seventy-five-g of this article, in the proceedings before the court that issued the order for which registration is sought.

5. If a timely request for a hearing to contest the validity of the registration is not made, the registration is confirmed as a matter of law and the person requesting registration and all persons served must be notified of the confirmation.

6. Confirmation of a registered order, whether by operation of law or after notice and hearing, precludes further contest of the order with respect to any matter that could have been asserted at the time of registration.

NY CLS Dom Rel § 77-g. Expedited enforcement of child custody determination

1. A petition under this title must be verified. Certified copies of all orders sought to be enforced and of any order confirming registration must be attached to the petition. A copy of a certified copy of an order may be attached instead of the original.

2. A petition for enforcement of a child custody determination must state:

(a) whether the court that issued the determination identified the jurisdictional basis it relied upon in exercising jurisdiction and, if so, what the basis was;

(b) whether the determination for which enforcement is sought has been vacated, stayed, or modified by a court whose decision must be enforced under this article and, if so, identify the court, the case number, and the nature of the proceeding;

(c) whether any proceeding has been commenced that could affect the current proceeding, including proceedings relating to domestic violence, child abuse or neglect, protective orders, termination of parental rights, and adoptions and, if so, identify the court, the case number, and the nature of the proceeding;

(d) the present physical address of the child and the respondent, if known;

(e) whether relief in addition to the immediate physical custody of the child and attorney’s fees is sought, including a request for assistance from law enforcement officials and, if so, the relief sought; and

(f) if the child custody determination has been registered and confirmed under section seventy-seven-d of this title, the date and place of registration.

3. Upon the filing of a petition, the court shall issue an order directing the respondent to appear in person with or without the child at a hearing within three court days and may enter any order necessary to ensure the safety of the parties and the child. The hearing must be held not more than three court days after the filing of the petition, provided that the petition has been served not less than twenty-four hours prior to the hearing. Service may be by any means directed by the court pursuant to section three hundred eight of the civil practice law and rules. The court may extend the date of the hearing briefly for good cause shown or upon the request of the petitioner.

4. An order issued under subdivision three of this section must state the time and place of the hearing and advise the respondent that at the hearing the court will order that the petitioner may take immediate physical custody of the child and the payment of fees, costs, and expenses under section seventy-seven-k of this title, and may schedule a hearing to determine whether further relief is appropriate, unless the respondent appears and establishes that:

(a) the child custody determination has not been registered and confirmed under section seventy-seven-d of this title and that:

(1) the issuing court did not have jurisdiction under title two of this article;

(2) the child custody determination for which enforcement is sought has been vacated, stayed, or modified by a court having jurisdiction to do so under title two of this article or that enforcement would violate subdivision one-c of section two hundred forty of this chapter or section one thousand eighty-five of the family court act;

(3) the respondent was entitled to notice, but notice was not given in accordance with the standards of section seventy-five-g of this article, in the proceedings before the court that issued the order for which enforcement is sought; or

(b) the child custody determination for which enforcement is sought was registered and confirmed under section seventy-seven-c of this title, but has been vacated, stayed, or modified by a court of a state having jurisdiction to do so under title two of this article.

NY CLS Dom Rel § 77-j. Warrant to take physical custody of child

1. Upon the filing of a petition seeking enforcement of a child custody determination, the petitioner may file a verified application for the issuance of a warrant to take physical custody of the child if the child is at imminent risk of suffering serious physical harm or of removal from this state.

2. If the court, upon the testimony of the petitioner or other witness, finds that the child is likely to suffer imminent serious physical harm or to be removed from this state, it may issue a warrant to take physical custody of the child. Except in extraordinary circumstances, the petition must be heard on the next court day after the warrant is executed. Any adjournment for extraordinary circumstances shall be for not more than three court days. The application for the warrant must include the statements required by subdivision two of section seventy-seven-g of this title.

3. A warrant to take physical custody of a child must:

(a) recite the facts upon which a conclusion of imminent serious physical harm or removal from the jurisdiction is based;

(b) direct law enforcement officers to take physical custody of the child immediately and deliver the child to the petitioner or, where necessary, to act jointly with the local child protective service to take immediate steps to protect the child; and

(c) provide for the placement of the child pending final relief.

4. The respondent must be served with the petition, warrant, and order immediately after the child is taken into physical custody.

5. A warrant to take physical custody of a child is enforceable throughout this state. If the court finds on the basis of the testimony of the petitioner or other witness that a less intrusive remedy is not effective, it may authorize law enforcement officers to enter private property in order to execute the warrant and take physical custody of the child. If required by exigent circumstances of the case and necessary to the protection of the child, the court may authorize law enforcement officers to make a forcible entry at any hour.

6. The court may impose conditions upon placement of a child to ensure the appearance of the child and the child’s custodian.

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NY CLS Veh & Tr § 1192.  Operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs

1.    1. Driving while ability impaired. No person shall operate a motor vehicle while the person’s ability to operate such motor vehicle is impaired by the consumption of alcohol.

1. Driving while intoxicated; per se. No person shall operate a motor vehicle while such person has [fig 1] .08 of one per centum or more by weight of alcohol in the person’s blood as shown by chemical analysis of such person’s blood, breath, urine or saliva, made pursuant to the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-four of this article.

2-a. Aggravated driving while intoxicated [fig 1] .

(a) Per se. No person shall operate a motor vehicle while such person has .18 of one per centum or more by weight of alcohol in such person’s blood as shown by chemical analysis of such person’s blood, breath, urine or saliva made pursuant to the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-four of this article.

(b) With a child. No person shall operate a motor vehicle in violation of subdivision two, three, four or four-a of this section while a child who is fifteen years of age or less is a passenger in such motor vehicle.

1. Driving while intoxicated. No person shall operate a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated condition.

1. Driving while ability impaired by drugs. No person shall operate a motor vehicle while the person’s ability to operate such a motor vehicle is impaired by the use of a drug as defined in this chapter.

4-a. Driving while ability impaired by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs. No person shall operate a motor vehicle while the person’s ability to operate such motor vehicle is impaired by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs.

1. Commercial motor vehicles: per se – level I. Notwithstanding the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-five of this article, no person shall operate a commercial motor vehicle while such person has .04 of one per centum or more but not more than [fig 1] .06 of one per centum by weight of alcohol in the person’s blood as shown by chemical analysis of such person’s blood, breath, urine or saliva, made pursuant to the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-four of this article; provided, however, nothing contained in this subdivision shall prohibit the imposition of a charge of a violation of subdivision one of this section, or of section eleven hundred ninety-two-a of this article where a person under the age of twenty-one operates a commercial motor vehicle where a chemical analysis of such person’s blood, breath, urine, or saliva, made pursuant to the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-four of this article, indicates that such operator has .02 of one per centum or more but less than .04 of one per centum by weight of alcohol in such operator’s blood.

1. Commercial motor vehicles; per se – level II. Notwithstanding the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-five of this article, no person shall operate a commercial motor vehicle while such person has more than [fig 1] .06 of one per centum but less than .08 of one per centum by weight of alcohol in the person’s blood as shown by chemical analysis of such person’s blood, breath, urine or saliva, made pursuant to the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-four of this article; provided, however, nothing contained in this subdivision shall prohibit the imposition of a charge of a violation of subdivision one of this section.

1. Where applicable. The provisions of this section shall apply upon public highways, private roads open to motor vehicle traffic and any other parking lot. For the purposes of this section “parking lot” shall mean any area or areas of private property, including a driveway, near or contiguous to and provided in connection with premises and used as a means of access to and egress from a public highway to such premises and having a capacity for the parking of four or more motor vehicles. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any area or areas of private property comprising all or part of property on which is situated a one or two family residence.

1. Effect of prior out-of-state conviction. A prior out-of-state conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs shall be deemed to be a prior conviction of a violation of [fig 1] this section for purposes of determining penalties imposed under this section or for purposes of any administrative action required to be taken pursuant to subdivision two of section eleven hundred ninety-three of this article; provided, however, that such conduct, had it occurred in this state, would have constituted a misdemeanor or felony violation of any of the provisions of this section. [fig 2] Provided, however, that if such conduct, had it occurred in this state, would have constituted a violation of any provisions of this section which are not misdemeanor or felony offenses, then such conduct shall be deemed to be a prior conviction of a violation of subdivision one of this section for purposes of determining penalties imposed under this section or for purposes of any administrative action required to be taken pursuant to subdivision two of section eleven hundred ninety-three of this article.

8-a. Effect of prior finding of having consumed alcohol. A prior finding that a person under the age of twenty-one has operated a motor vehicle after having consumed alcohol pursuant to section eleven hundred ninety-four-a of this article shall have the same effect as a prior conviction of a violation of subdivision one of this section solely for the purpose of determining the length of any license suspension or revocation required to be imposed under any provision of this article, provided that the subsequent offense is committed prior to the expiration of the retention period for such prior offense or offenses set forth in paragraph (k) of subdivision one of section two hundred one of this chapter.

1. Conviction of a different charge. A driver may be convicted of a violation of subdivision one, two or three of this section, notwithstanding that the charge laid before the court alleged a violation of subdivision two or three of this section, and regardless of whether or not such conviction is based on a plea of guilty.

1. Plea bargain limitations.

(a) (i) In any case wherein the charge laid before the court alleges a violation of subdivision two, three [fig 1] , four or four-a of this section, any plea of guilty thereafter entered in satisfaction of such charge must include at least a plea of guilty to the violation of the provisions of one of the subdivisions of this section, other than subdivision five or six, and no other disposition by plea of guilty to any other charge in satisfaction of such charge shall be authorized; provided, however, if the district attorney, upon reviewing the available evidence, determines that the charge of a violation of this section is not warranted, such district attorney may consent, and the court may allow a disposition by plea of guilty to another charge in satisfaction of such charge; provided, however, in all such cases, the court shall set forth upon the record the basis for such disposition.

(ii) In any case wherein the charge laid before the court alleges a violation of subdivision two, three, four or four-a of this section, no plea of guilty to subdivision one of this section shall be accepted by the court unless such plea includes as a condition thereof the requirement that the defendant attend and complete the alcohol and drug rehabilitation program established pursuant to section eleven hundred ninety-six of this article, including any assessment and treatment required thereby; provided, however, that such requirement may be waived by the court upon application of the district attorney or the defendant demonstrating that the defendant, as a condition of the plea, has been required to enter into and complete an alcohol or drug treatment program prescribed pursuant to an alcohol or substance abuse screening or assessment conducted pursuant to section eleven hundred ninety-eight-a of this article or for other good cause shown. The provisions of this subparagraph shall apply, notwithstanding any bars to participation in the alcohol and drug rehabilitation program set forth in section eleven hundred ninety-six of this article; provided, however, that nothing in this paragraph shall authorize the issuance of a conditional license unless otherwise authorized by law.

(iii) In any case wherein the charge laid before the court alleges a violation of subdivision one of this section and the operator was under the age of twenty-one at the time of such violation, any plea of guilty thereafter entered in satisfaction of such charge must include at least a plea of guilty to the violation of such subdivision; provided, however, such charge may instead be satisfied as provided in paragraph (c) of this subdivision, and, provided further that, if the district attorney, upon reviewing the available evidence, determines that the charge of a violation of subdivision one of this section is not warranted, such district attorney may consent, and the court may allow a disposition by plea of guilty to another charge in satisfaction of such charge; provided, however, in all such cases, the court shall set forth upon the record the basis for such disposition.

(b) In any case wherein the charge laid before the court alleges a violation of subdivision one or six of this section while operating a commercial motor vehicle, any plea of guilty thereafter entered in satisfaction of such charge must include at least a plea of guilty to the violation of the provisions of one of the subdivisions of this section and no other disposition by plea of guilty to any other charge in satisfaction of such charge shall be authorized; provided, however, if the district attorney upon reviewing the available evidence determines that the charge of a violation of this section is not warranted, he may consent, and the court may allow, a disposition by plea of guilty to another charge is satisfaction of such charge.

(c) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subdivision, in any case wherein the charge laid before the court alleges a violation of subdivision one of this section by a person who was under the age of twenty-one at the time of commission of the offense, the court, with the consent of both parties, may allow the satisfaction of such charge by the defendant’s agreement to be subject to action by the commissioner pursuant to section eleven hundred ninety-four-a of this article. In any such case, the defendant shall waive the right to a hearing under section eleven hundred ninety-four-a of this article and such waiver shall have the same force and effect as a finding of a violation of section eleven hundred ninety-two-a of this article entered after a hearing conducted pursuant to such section eleven hundred ninety-four-a. The defendant shall execute such waiver in open court, and, if represented by counsel, in the presence of his attorney, on a form to be provided by the commissioner, which shall be forwarded by the court to the commissioner within ninety-six hours. To be valid, such form shall, at a minimum, contain clear and conspicuous language advising the defendant that a duly executed waiver: (i) has the same force and effect as a guilty finding following a hearing pursuant to section eleven hundred ninety-four-a of this article; (ii) shall subject the defendant to the imposition of sanctions pursuant to such section eleven hundred ninety-four-a; and (iii) may subject the defendant to increased sanctions upon a subsequent violation of this section or section eleven hundred ninety-two-a of this article. Upon receipt of a duly executed waiver pursuant to this paragraph, the commissioner shall take such administrative action and impose such sanctions as may be required by section eleven hundred ninety-four-a of this article.

(d) In any case wherein the charge laid before the court alleges a violation of subdivision two-a of this section, any plea of guilty thereafter entered in satisfaction of such charge must include at least a plea of guilty to the violation of the provisions of subdivision two, two-a or three of this section, and no other disposition by plea of guilty to any other charge in satisfaction of such charge shall be authorized; provided, however, if the district attorney, upon reviewing the available evidence, determines that the charge of a violation of this section is not warranted, such district attorney may consent and the court may allow a disposition by plea of guilty to another charge in satisfaction of such charge, provided, however, in all such cases, the court shall set forth upon the record the basis for such disposition. Provided, further, however, that no such plea shall be accepted by the court unless such plea includes as a condition thereof the requirement that the defendant attend and complete the alcohol and drug rehabilitation program established pursuant to section eleven hundred ninety-six of this article, including any assessment and treatment required thereby; provided, however, that such requirement may be waived by the court upon application of the district attorney or the defendant demonstrating that the defendant, as a condition of the plea, has been required to enter into and complete an alcohol or drug treatment program prescribed pursuant to an alcohol or substance abuse screening or assessment conducted pursuant to section eleven hundred ninety-eight-a of this article or for other good cause shown. The provisions of this paragraph shall apply, notwithstanding any bars to participation in the alcohol and drug rehabilitation program set forth in section eleven hundred ninety-six of this article; provided, however, that nothing in this paragraph shall authorize the issuance of a conditional license unless otherwise authorized by law.

1. No person other than an operator of a commercial motor vehicle may be charged with or convicted of a violation of subdivision five or six of this section.

1. Driving while intoxicated or while ability impaired by drugs–serious physical injury or death or child in the vehicle.

(a) In every case where a person is charged with a violation of subdivision two, two-a, three, four or four-a of this section, the law enforcement officer alleging such charge shall make a clear notation in the “Description of Violation” section of a simplified traffic information (i) if, arising out of the same incident, someone other than the person charged was killed or suffered serious physical injury as defined in section 10.00 of the penal law; such notation shall be in the form of a “D” if someone other than the person charged was killed and such notation shall be in the form of a “S.P.I.” if someone other than the person charged suffered serious physical injury; [fig 1] and (ii) if a child aged fifteen years or less was present in the vehicle of the person charged with a violation of subdivision two, two-a, three, four or four-a of this section; such notation shall be in the form of “C.I.V.”. Provided, however, that the failure to make such [fig 2] notations shall in no way affect a charge for a violation of subdivision two, two-a, three, four or four-a of this section.

(b) Where a law enforcement officer alleges a violation of paragraph (b) of subdivision two-a of this section and the operator of the vehicle is a parent, guardian, or custodian of, or other person legally responsible for, a child aged fifteen years or less who is a passenger in such vehicle, then the officer shall report or cause a report to be made, if applicable, in accordance with title six of article six of the social services law.

NY CLS Veh & Tr § 1192-a.  Operating a motor vehicle after having consumed alcohol; under the age of twenty-one; per se

No person under the age of twenty-one shall operate a motor vehicle after having consumed alcohol as defined in this section. For purposes of this section, a person under the age of twenty-one is deemed to have consumed alcohol only if such person has .02 of one per centum or more but not more than .07 of one per centum by weight of alcohol in the person’s blood, as shown by chemical analysis of such person’s blood, breath, urine or saliva, made pursuant to the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-four of this article. Any person who operates a motor vehicle in violation of this section, and who is not charged with a violation of any subdivision of section eleven hundred ninety-two of this article arising out of the same incident shall be referred to the department for action in accordance with the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-four-a of this article. Except as otherwise provided in subdivision five of section eleven hundred ninety-two of this article, this section shall not apply to a person who operates a commercial motor vehicle. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, a finding that a person under the age of twenty-one operated a motor vehicle after having consumed alcohol in violation of this section is not a judgment of conviction for a crime or any other offense.

NY CLS Veh & Tr § 1194-a. Driving after having consumed alcohol; under twenty-one; procedure

1.    1. Chemical test report and hearing.

(a) Whenever a chemical test of the breath, blood, urine or saliva of an operator who is under the age of twenty-one indicates that such person has operated a motor vehicle in violation of section eleven hundred ninety-two-a of this article, and such person is not charged with violating any subdivision of section eleven hundred ninety-two arising out of the same incident, the police officer who administered the test shall forward a report of the results of such test to the department within twenty-four hours of the time when such results are available in a manner prescribed by the commissioner, and the operator shall be given a hearing notice as provided in subdivision one-a of this section, to appear before a hearing officer in the county where the chemical test was administered, or in an adjoining county under such circumstances as prescribed by the commissioner, on a date to be established in accordance with a schedule promulgated by the commissioner. Such hearing shall occur within thirty days of, but not less than forty-eight hours from, the date that the chemical test was administered, provided, however, where the commissioner determines, based upon the availability of hearing officers and the anticipated volume of hearings at a particular location, that the scheduling of such hearing within thirty days would impair the timely scheduling or conducting of other hearings pursuant to this chapter, such hearing shall be scheduled at the next hearing date for such particular location. When providing the operator with such hearing notice, the police officer shall also give to the operator, and shall, prior to the commencement of the hearing, provide to the department, copies of the following reports, documents and materials: any written report or document, or portion thereof, concerning a physical examination, a scientific test or experiment, including the most recent record of inspection, or calibration or repair of machines or instruments utilized to perform such scientific tests or experiments and the certification certificate, if any, held by the operator of the machine or instrument, which tests or examinations were made by or at the request or direction of a public servant engaged in law enforcement activity. The report of the police officer shall be verified by having the report sworn to, or by affixing to such report a form notice that false statements made therein are punishable as a class A misdemeanor pursuant to section 210.45 of the penal law and such form notice together with the subscription of the deponent shall constitute verification of the report.

(b) Every person under the age of twenty-one who is alleged to have operated a motor vehicle after having consumed alcohol as set forth in section eleven hundred ninety-two-a of this article, and who is not charged with violating any subdivision of section eleven hundred ninety-two of this article arising out of the same incident, is entitled to a hearing before a hearing officer in accordance with the provisions of this section. Unless otherwise provided by law, the license or permit to drive or any non-resident operating privilege of such person shall not be suspended or revoked prior to the scheduled date for such hearing.

(i) The hearing shall be limited to the following issues: (1) did such person operate the motor vehicle; (2) was a valid request to submit to a chemical test made by the police officer in accordance with the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-four of this article; (3) was such person less than twenty-one years of age at the time of operation of the motor vehicle; (4) was the chemical test properly administered in accordance with the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-four of this article; (5) did the test find that such person had driven after having consumed alcohol as defined in section eleven hundred ninety-two-a of this article; and (6) did the police officer make a lawful stop of such person. The burden of proof shall be on the police officer to prove each of these issues by clear and convincing evidence.

(ii) Every person who is entitled to a hearing pursuant to this subdivision has the right to be present at the hearing; the right to be represented by attorney, or in the hearing officer’s discretion, by any other person the operator chooses; the right to receive and review discovery materials as provided in this subdivision; the right not to testify; the right to present evidence and witnesses in his own behalf, the right to cross examine adverse witnesses, and the right to appeal from an adverse determination in accordance with article three-A of this chapter. Any person representing the operator must conform to the standards of conduct required of attorneys appearing before state courts, and failure to conform to these standards will be grounds for declining to permit his continued appearance in the hearing.

(iii) Hearings conducted pursuant to this subdivision shall be in accordance with this subdivision and with the provisions applicable to the adjudication of traffic infractions pursuant to the following provisions of part 124 of title fifteen of the codes, rules and regulations of the state of New York: paragraph (b) of section 124.1 regarding the opening statement; paragraph (b) of section 124.2 regarding the right to representation and to remain silent and paragraphs (a) through (e) of section 124.4 regarding the conduct of the hearing, procedure and recusal; provided, however, that nothing contained in this subparagraph shall be deemed to preclude a hearing officer from changing the order of a hearing conducted pursuant to this subdivision as justice may require and for good cause shown.

(iv) The rules governing receipt of evidence in a court of law shall not apply in a hearing conducted pursuant to this subdivision except as follows:

(1) on the merits of the charge, and whether or not a party objects, the hearing officer shall exclude from consideration the following: a privileged communication; evidence which, for constitutional reasons, would not be admissible in a court of law; evidence of prior misconduct, incompetency or illness, except where such evidence would be admissible in a court of law; evidence which is irrelevant or immaterial;

(2) no negative inference shall be drawn from the operator’s exercising the right not to testify.

(v) If, after such hearing, the hearing officer, acting on behalf of the commissioner, finds all of the issues set forth in this subdivision in the affirmative, the hearing officer shall suspend or revoke the license or permit to drive or non-resident operating privilege of such person in accordance with the time periods set forth in subdivision two of section eleven hundred ninety-three of this article. If, after such hearing, the hearing officer, acting on behalf of the commissioner, finds any of said issues in the negative, the hearing officer must find that the operator did not drive after having consumed alcohol.

(vi) A person who has had a license or permit to drive or non-resident operating privilege suspended or revoked pursuant to the provisions of this section may appeal the finding of the hearing officer in accordance with the provisions of article three-A of this chapter.

(c) Unless an adjournment of the hearing date has been granted, upon the operator’s failure to appear for a scheduled hearing, the commissioner shall suspend the license or permit to drive or non-resident operating privilege until the operator petitions the commissioner and a rescheduled hearing is conducted, provided, however, the commissioner shall restore such person’s license or permit to drive or non-resident operating privilege if such rescheduled hearing is adjourned at the request of a person other than the operator. Requests for adjournments shall be made and determined in accordance with regulations promulgated by the commissioner. If such a request by the operator for an adjournment is granted, the commissioner shall notify the operator of the rescheduled hearing, which shall be scheduled for the next hearing date. If a second or subsequent request by the operator for an adjournment is granted, the operator’s license or permit to drive or non-resident operating privilege may be suspended pending the hearing at the time such adjournment is granted; provided, however, that the records of the department or the evidence already admitted furnishes reasonable grounds to believe such suspension is necessary to prevent continuing violations or a substantial traffic safety hazard; and provided further, that such hearing shall be scheduled for the next hearing date.

If a police officer does not appear for a hearing, the hearing officer shall have the authority to dismiss the charge. Any person may waive the right to a hearing under this subdivision, in a form and manner prescribed by the commissioner, and may enter an admission of guilt, in person or by mail, to the charge of operating a motor vehicle in violation of section eleven hundred ninety-two-a of this article. Such admission of guilt shall have the same force and effect as a finding of guilt entered following a hearing conducted pursuant to this subdivision.

1-a. Hearing notice. The hearing notice issued to an operator pursuant to subdivision one of this section shall be in a form as prescribed by the commissioner. In addition to containing information concerning the time, date and location of the hearing, and such other information as the commissioner deems appropriate, such hearing notice shall also contain the following information: the date, time and place of the offense charged; the procedures for requesting an adjournment of a scheduled hearing as provided in this section, the operator’s right to a hearing conducted pursuant to this section and the right to waive such hearing and plead guilty, either in person or by mail, to the offense charged.

1. Civil penalty. Unless otherwise provided, any person whose license, permit to drive, or any non-resident operating privilege is suspended or revoked pursuant to the provisions of this section shall also be liable for a civil penalty in the amount of one hundred twenty-five dollars, which shall be distributed in accordance with the provisions of subdivision nine of section eighteen hundred three of this chapter.

1. Refusal report and hearing.

(a) Any person under the age of twenty-one who is suspected of operating a motor vehicle after having consumed alcohol in violation of section eleven hundred ninety-two-a of this chapter, and who is not charged with violating any subdivision of section eleven hundred ninety-two of this article arising out of the same incident, and who has been requested to submit to a chemical test pursuant to paragraph (a) of subdivision two of section eleven hundred ninety-four of this article and after having been informed that his license or permit to drive and any non-resident operating privilege shall be revoked for refusal to submit to such chemical test or any portion thereof, whether or not there is a finding of driving after having consumed alcohol, and such person refuses to submit to such chemical test or any portion thereof, shall be entitled to a hearing in accordance with a schedule promulgated by the commissioner, and such hearing shall occur within thirty days of, but not less than forty-eight hours from, the date of such refusal, provided, however, where the commissioner determines, based upon the availability of hearing officers and the anticipated volume of hearings at a particular location, that the scheduling of such hearing within thirty days would impair the timely scheduling or conducting of other hearings pursuant to this chapter, such hearing shall be scheduled at the next hearing date for such particular location.

(b) Unless an adjournment of the hearing date has been granted, upon the operator’s failure to appear for a scheduled hearing, the commissioner shall suspend the license or permit to drive or non-resident operating privilege until the operator petitions the commissioner and a rescheduled hearing is conducted, provided, however, the commissioner shall restore such person’s license or permit to drive or non-resident operating privilege if such rescheduled hearing is adjourned at the request of a person other than the operator. Requests for adjournments shall be made and determined in accordance with regulations promulgated by the commissioner. If such a request by the operator for an adjournment is granted, the commissioner shall notify the operator of the rescheduled hearing, which shall be scheduled for the next hearing date. If a second or subsequent request by the operator for an adjournment is granted, the operator’s license or permit to drive or non-resident operating privilege may be suspended pending the hearing at the time such adjournment is granted; provided, however, that the records of the department or the evidence already admitted furnishes reasonable grounds to believe such suspension is necessary to prevent continuing violations or a substantial traffic safety hazard; and provided further, that such hearing shall be scheduled for the next hearing date.

If a police officer does not appear for a hearing, the hearing officer shall have the authority to dismiss the charge. Any person may waive the right to a hearing under this subdivision.

(c) The hearing on the refusal to submit to a chemical test pursuant to this subdivision shall be limited to the following issues: (1) was a valid request to submit to a chemical test made by the police officer in accordance with the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-four of this article; (2) was such person given sufficient warning, in clear or unequivocal language, prior to such refusal that such refusal to submit to such chemical test or any portion thereof, would result in the revocation of such person’s license or permit to drive or nonresident operating privilege, whether or not such person is found to have operated a motor vehicle after having consumed alcohol; (3) did such person refuse to submit to such chemical test or any portion thereof; (4) did such person operate the motor vehicle; (5) was such person less than twenty-one years of age at the time of operation of the motor vehicle; (6) did the police officer make a lawful stop of such person. If, after such hearing, the hearing officer, acting on behalf of the commissioner, finds on any one said issue in the negative, the hearing officer shall not revoke the operator’s license or permit to drive or non-resident operating privilege and shall immediately terminate any outstanding suspension of the operator’s license, permit to drive or non-resident operating privilege arising from such refusal. If, after such hearing, the hearing officer, acting on behalf of the commissioner, finds all of the issues in the affirmative, such hearing officer shall immediately revoke the license or permit to drive or any non-resident operating privilege in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (d) of subdivision two of section eleven hundred ninety-four of this article. A person who has had a license or permit to drive or non-resident operating privilege suspended or revoked pursuant to the provisions of this section may appeal the findings of the hearing officer in accordance with the provisions of article three-A of this chapter.

• New YorK § 140.00. Criminal trespass and burglary; definitions of terms

The following definitions are applicable to this article:

1. “Premises” includes the term “building,” as defined herein, and any real property.

1. “Building,” in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any structure, vehicle or watercraft used for overnight lodging of persons, or used by persons for carrying on business therein, or used as an elementary or secondary school, or an inclosed motor truck, or an inclosed motor truck trailer. Where a building consists of two or more units separately secured or occupied, each unit shall be deemed both a separate building in itself and a part of the main building.

1. “Dwelling” means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night.

1. “Night” means the period between thirty minutes after sunset and thirty minutes before sunrise.

1. “Enter or remain unlawfully.” A person “enters or remains unlawfully” in or upon premises when he is not licensed or privileged to do so. A person who, regardless of his intent, enters or remains in or upon premises which are at the time open to the public does so with license and privilege unless he defies a lawful order not to enter or remain, personally communicated to him by the owner of such premises or other authorized person. A license or privilege to enter or remain in a building which is only partly open to the public is not a license or privilege to enter or remain in that part of the building which is not open to the public. A person who enters or remains upon unimproved and apparently unused land, which is neither fenced nor otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders, does so with license and privilege unless notice against trespass is personally communicated to him by the owner of such land or other authorized person, or unless such notice is given by posting in a conspicuous manner. A person who enters or remains in or about a school building without written permission from someone authorized to issue such permission or without a legitimate reason which includes a relationship involving custody of or responsibility for a pupil or student enrolled in the school or without legitimate business or a purpose relating to the operation of the school does so without license and privilege.
   

• New YorK § 140.05. Trespass

A person is guilty of trespass when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in or upon premises.

Trespass is a violation.

• New YorK  § 140.10. Criminal trespass in the third degree

A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the third degree when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building or upon real property

(a) which is fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders; or

(b) where the building is utilized as an elementary or secondary school or a children’s overnight camp as defined in section one thousand three hundred [fig 1] ninety-two of the public health law or a summer day camp as defined in section one thousand three hundred [fig 2] ninety-two of the public health law in violation of conspicuously posted rules or regulations governing entry and use thereof; or

(c) located within a city with a population in excess of one million and where the building or real property is utilized as an elementary or secondary school in violation of a personally communicated request to leave the premises from a principal, custodian or other person in charge thereof; or

(d) located outside of a city with a population in excess of one million and where the building or real property is utilized as an elementary or secondary school in violation of a personally communicated request to leave the premises from a principal, custodian, school board member or trustee, or other person in charge thereof; or

(e) where the building is used as a public housing project in violation of conspicuously posted rules or regulations governing entry and use thereof; or

(f) where a building is used as a public housing project in violation of a personally communicated request to leave the premises from a housing police officer or other person in charge thereof; or

(g) where the property consists of a right-of-way or yard of a railroad or rapid transit railroad which has been designated and conspicuously posted as a no-trespass railroad zone, pursuant to section eighty-three-b of the railroad law, by the city or county in which such property is located.

Criminal trespass in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor.

• § 240.30.  Aggravated harassment in the second degree
  

A person is guilty of aggravated harassment in the second degree when, with intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another person, he or she:

1. Either

(a) communicates with a person, anonymously or otherwise, by telephone, [fig 1] by telegraph, or by mail, or by transmitting or delivering any other form of written communication, in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm; or

(b) causes a communication to be initiated by mechanical or electronic means or otherwise with a person, anonymously or otherwise, by telephone, [fig 1] by telegraph, or by mail, or by transmitting or delivering any other form of written communication, in a manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm; or

1. Makes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues, with no purpose of legitimate communication; or

1. Strikes, shoves, kicks, or otherwise subjects another person to physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same because of a belief or perception regarding such person’s race, color, national origin, ancestry, gender, religion, religious practice, age, disability or sexual orientation, regardless of whether the belief or perception is correct; or

1. Commits the crime of harassment in the first degree and has previously been convicted of the crime of harassment in the first degree as defined by section 240.25 of this article within the preceding ten years.

1. For the purposes of subdivision one of this section, “form of written communication” shall include, but not be limited to, a recording as defined in subdivision six of section 275.00 of this part.

Aggravated harassment in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.

• New York § 120.00. Assault in the third degree

A person is guilty of assault in the third degree when:

1. With intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or

1. He recklessly causes physical injury to another person; or

1. With criminal negligence, he causes physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument.

Assault in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor.

• New York § 120.01. Reckless assault of a child by a child day care provider

A person is guilty of reckless assault of a child when, being a child day care provider or an employee thereof, he or she recklessly causes serious physical injury to a child under the care of such provider or employee who is less than eleven years of age.

Reckless assault of a child by a child day care provider is a class E felony.

• New York § 120.02. Reckless assault of a child

1.   1. A person is guilty of reckless assault of a child when, being eighteen years of age or more, such person recklessly causes serious physical injury to the brain of a child less than five years old by shaking the child, or by slamming or throwing the child so as to impact the child’s head on a hard surface or object.

1. For purposes of subdivision one of this section, the following shall constitute “serious physical injury”:

1. “serious physical injury” as defined in subdivision ten of section 10.00 of this chapter; or

1. extreme rotational cranial acceleration and deceleration and one or more of the following: (i) subdural hemorrhaging; (ii) intracranial hemorrhaging; or (iii) retinal hemorrhaging.

Reckless assault of a child is a class D felony.

• New York § 120.05. Assault in the second degree
  

A person is guilty of assault in the second degree when:

1. With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or

1. With intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or

1. [As amended, L 2010, ch 318, § 2 and L 2010, ch 345, § 1]  With intent to prevent a peace officer, a police officer, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, [fig 1] sanitation enforcement agent, [fig 2] a firefighter, including a firefighter acting as a paramedic or emergency medical technician administering first aid in the course of performance of duty as such firefighter, an emergency medical service paramedic or emergency medical service technician, or medical or related personnel in a hospital emergency department, a city marshal, a traffic enforcement officer or traffic enforcement agent, from performing a lawful duty, by means including releasing or failing to control an animal under circumstances evincing the actor’s intent that the animal obstruct the lawful activity of such peace officer, police officer, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, [fig 3] sanitation enforcement agent, [fig 4] firefighter, paramedic, technician, city marshal, traffic enforcement officer or traffic enforcement agent, he or she causes physical injury to such peace officer, police officer, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, [fig 5] sanitation enforcement agent, [fig 6] firefighter, paramedic, technician or medical or related personnel in a hospital emergency department, city marshal, traffic enforcement officer or traffic enforcement agent; or

1. He recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or

1. For a purpose other than lawful medical or therapeutic treatment, he intentionally causes stupor, unconsciousness or other physical impairment or injury to another person by administering to him, without his consent, a drug, substance or preparation capable of producing the same; or

1. In the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted commission of a felony, other than a felony defined in article one hundred thirty which requires corroboration for conviction, or of immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant if there be any, causes physical injury to a person other than one of the participants; or

1. Having been charged with or convicted of a crime and while confined in a correctional facility, as defined in subdivision three of section forty of the correction law, pursuant to such charge or conviction, with intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or

1. Being eighteen years old or more and with intent to cause physical injury to a person less than eleven years old, the defendant recklessly causes serious physical injury to such person; or

1. Being eighteen years old or more and with intent to cause physical injury to a person less than seven years old, the defendant causes such injury to such person [fig 1] ; or

1. Acting at a place the person knows, or reasonably should know, is on school grounds and with intent to cause physical injury, he or she:

(a) causes such injury to an employee of a school or public school district; or

(b) not being a student of such school or public school district, causes physical injury to another, and such other person is a student of such school who is attending or present for educational purposes. For purposes of this subdivision the term “school grounds” shall have the meaning set forth in subdivision fourteen of section 220.00 of this chapter.

1. [As amended, L 2010, ch 318, § 1 and L 2010, ch 345, § 1]  With intent to cause physical injury to a train operator, ticket inspector, conductor, signalperson, bus operator or station agent employed by any transit agency, authority or company, public or private, whose operation is authorized by New York state or any of its political subdivisions, a city marshal, a traffic enforcement officer [fig 1] , traffic enforcement agent or sanitation enforcement agent, [fig 2] registered nurse or licensed practical nurse [fig 3] he or she causes physical injury to such train operator, ticket inspector, conductor, signalperson, bus operator or station agent, city marshal, traffic enforcement officer [fig 4] , traffic enforcement agent [fig 5] , registered nurse or licensed practical nurse [fig 6] or sanitation enforcement agent, while such employee is performing an assigned duty on, or directly related to, the operation of a train or bus, or such city marshal, traffic enforcement officer [fig 7] , traffic enforcement agent [fig 8] , registered nurse or licensed practical nurse [fig 9] or sanitation enforcement agent is performing an assigned duty.

1. With intent to cause physical injury to a person who is sixty-five years of age or older, he or she causes such injury to such person, and the actor is more than ten years younger than such person.

Assault in the second degree is a class D felony.

• New York § 120.10. Assault in the first degree
  

• § 120.10.  Assault in the first degree

A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when:

1. With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or

1. With intent to disfigure another person seriously and permanently, or to destroy, amputate or disable permanently a member or organ of his body, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or

1. Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes serious physical injury to another person; or

1. In the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted commission of a felony or of immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant if there be any, causes serious physical injury to a person other than one of the participants.

Assault in the first degree is a class B felony.

• New York § 155.00. Larceny; definitions of terms
  

The following definitions are applicable to this title:

1. “Property” means any money, personal property, real property, computer data, computer program, thing in action, evidence of debt or contract, or any article, substance or thing of value, including any gas, steam, water or electricity, which is provided for a charge or compensation.

“Obtain” includes, but is not limited to, the bringing about of a transfer or purported transfer of property or of a legal interest therein, whether to the obtainer or another.

1. “Deprive.” To “deprive” another of property means (a) to withhold it or cause it to be withheld from him permanently or for so extended a period or under such circumstances that the major portion of its economic value or benefit is lost to him, or (b) to dispose of the property in such manner or under such circumstances as to render it unlikely that an owner will recover such property.

1. “Appropriate.” To “appropriate” property of another to oneself or a third person means (a) to exercise control over it, or to aid a third person to exercise control over it, permanently or for so extended a period or under such circumstances as to acquire the major portion of its economic value or benefit, or (b) to dispose of the property for the benefit of oneself or a third person.

1. “Owner.” When property is taken, obtained or withheld by one person from another person, an “owner” thereof means any person who has a right to possession thereof superior to that of the taker, obtainer or withholder.

A person who has obtained possession of property by theft or other illegal means shall be deemed to have a right of possession superior to that of a person who takes, obtains or withholds it from him by larcenous means.

A joint or common owner of property shall not be deemed to have a right of possession thereto superior to that of any other joint or common owner thereof.

In the absence of a specific agreement to the contrary, a person in lawful possession of property shall be deemed to have a right of possession superior to that of a person having only a security interest therein, even if legal title lies with the holder of the security interest pursuant to a conditional sale contract or other security agreement.

1. “Secret scientific material” means a sample, culture, micro-organism, specimen, record, recording, document, drawing or any other article, material, device or substance which constitutes, represents, evidences, reflects, or records a scientific or technical process, invention or formula or any part or phase thereof, and which is not, and is not intended to be, available to anyone other than the person or persons rightfully in possession thereof or selected persons having access thereto with his or their consent, and when it accords or may accord such rightful possessors an advantage over competitors or other persons who do not have knowledge or the benefit thereof.

1. “Credit card” means any instrument or article defined as a credit card in section five hundred eleven of the general business law.

7-a. ”Debit card” means any instrument or article defined as a debit card in section five hundred eleven of the general business law.

7-b. ”Public benefit card” means any medical assistance card, food stamp assistance card, public assistance card, or any other identification, authorization card or electronic access device issued by the state or a social services district as defined in subdivision seven of section two of the social services law, which entitles a person to obtain public assistance benefits under a local, state or federal program administered by the state, its political subdivisions or social services districts.

7-c. ”Access device” means any telephone calling card number, credit card number, account number, mobile identification number, electronic serial number or personal identification number that can be used to obtain telephone service.

1. “Service” includes, but is not limited to, labor, professional service, a computer service, transportation service, the supplying of hotel accommodations, restaurant services, entertainment, the supplying of equipment for use, and the supplying of commodities of a public utility nature such as gas, electricity, steam and water. A ticket or equivalent instrument which evidences a right to receive a service is not in itself service but constitutes property within the meaning of subdivision one.

1. “Cable television service” means any and all services provided by or through the facilities of any cable television system or closed circuit coaxial cable communications system, or any microwave or similar transmission service used in connection with any cable television system or other similar closed circuit coaxial cable communications system.
   

• New York § 155.05. Larceny; defined
  

1.    1. A person steals property and commits larceny when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or to a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof.

1. Larceny includes a wrongful taking, obtaining or withholding of another’s property, with the intent prescribed in subdivision one of this section, committed in any of the following ways:

(a) By conduct heretofore defined or known as common law larceny by trespassory taking, common law larceny by trick, embezzlement, or obtaining property by false pretenses;

(b) By acquiring lost property.

A person acquires lost property when he exercises control over property of another which he knows to have been lost or mislaid, or to have been delivered under a mistake as to the identity of the recipient or the nature or amount of the property, without taking reasonable measures to return such property to the owner;

(c) By committing the crime of issuing a bad check, as defined in section 190.05;

(d) By false promise.

A person obtains property by false promise when, pursuant to a scheme to defraud, he obtains property of another by means of a representation, express or implied, that he or a third person will in the future engage in particular conduct, and when he does not intend to engage in such conduct or, as the case may be, does not believe that the third person intends to engage in such conduct.

In any prosecution for larceny based upon a false promise, the defendant’s intention or belief that the promise would not be performed may not be established by or inferred from the fact alone that such promise was not performed. Such a finding may be based only upon evidence establishing that the facts and circumstances of the case are wholly consistent with guilty intent or belief and wholly inconsistent with innocent intent or belief, and excluding to a moral certainty every hypothesis except that of the defendant’s intention or belief that the promise would not be performed;

(e) By extortion.

A person obtains property by extortion when he compels or induces another person to deliver such property to himself or to a third person by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the property is not so delivered, the actor or another will:

(i) Cause physical injury to some person in the future; or

(ii) Cause damage to property; or

(iii) Engage in other conduct constituting a crime; or

(iv) Accuse some person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against him; or

(v) Expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject some person to hatred, contempt or ridicule; or

(vi) Cause a strike, boycott or other collective labor group action injurious to some person’s business; except that such a threat shall not be deemed extortion when the property is demanded or received for the benefit of the group in whose interest the actor purports to act; or

(vii) Testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another’s legal claim or defense; or

(viii) Use or abuse his position as a public servant by performing some act within or related to his official duties, or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect some person adversely; or

(ix) Perform any other act which would not in itself materially benefit the actor but which is calculated to harm another person materially with respect to his health, safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation or personal relationships.

• New York  § 155.10. Larceny; no defense
  

The crimes of (a) larceny committed by means of extortion and an attempt to commit the same, and (b) bribe receiving by a labor official as defined in section 180.20, and bribe receiving as defined in section 200.05, are not mutually exclusive, and it is no defense to a prosecution for larceny committed by means of extortion or for an attempt to commit the same that, by reason of the same conduct, the defendant also committed one of such specified crimes of bribe receiving.

• New York  § 155.15. Larceny; defenses
  

1.    1. In any prosecution for larceny committed by trespassory taking or embezzlement, it is an affirmative defense that the property was appropriated under a claim of right made in good faith.

1. In any prosecution for larceny by extortion committed by instilling in the victim a fear that he or another person would be charged with a crime, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant reasonably believed the threatened charge to be true and that his sole purpose was to compel or induce the victim to take reasonable action to make good the wrong which was the subject of such threatened charge.
   

• New York  § 155.20. Larceny; value of stolen property

For the purposes of this title, the value of property shall be ascertained as follows:

1. Except as otherwise specified in this section, value means the market value of the property at the time and place of the crime, or if such cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within a reasonable time after the crime.

1. Whether or not they have been issued or delivered, certain written instruments, not including those having a readily ascertainable market value such as some public and corporate bonds and securities, shall be evaluated as follows:

(a) The value of an instrument constituting an evidence of debt, such as a check, draft or promissory note, shall be deemed the amount due or collectable thereon or thereby, such figure ordinarily being the face amount of the indebtedness less any portion thereof which has been satisfied.

(b) The value of a ticket or equivalent instrument which evidences a right to receive a transportation, entertainment or other service shall be deemed the price stated thereon, if any; and if no price is stated thereon the value shall be deemed the price of such ticket or equivalent instrument which the issuer charges the general public.

(c) The value of any other instrument which creates, releases, discharges or otherwise affects any valuable legal right, privilege or obligation shall be deemed the greatest amount of economic loss which the owner of the instrument might reasonably suffer by virtue of the loss of the instrument.

1. Where the property consists of gas, steam, water or electricity, which is provided for charge or compensation, the value shall be the value of the property stolen in any consecutive twelve-month period.

1. When the value of property cannot be satisfactorily ascertained pursuant to the standards set forth in subdivisions one and two of this section, its value shall be deemed to be an amount less than two hundred fifty dollars.
   

• New York  § 155.25. Petit larceny
  

A person is guilty of petit larceny when he steals property.

Petit larceny is a class A misdemeanor.

• New York  § 155.30. Grand larceny in the fourth degree
  

A person is guilty of grand larceny in the fourth degree when he steals property and when:

1. The value of the property exceeds one thousand dollars; or

1. The property consists of a public record, writing or instrument kept, filed or deposited according to law with or in the keeping of any public office or public servant; or

1. The property consists of secret scientific material; or

1. The property consists of a credit card or debit card; or

1. The property, regardless of its nature and value, is taken from the person of another; or

1. The property, regardless of its nature and value, is obtained by extortion; or

1. The property consists of one or more firearms, rifles or shotguns, as such terms are defined in section 265.00 of this chapter; or

1. The value of the property exceeds one hundred dollars and the property consists of a motor vehicle, as defined in section one hundred twenty-five of the vehicle and traffic law, other than a motorcycle, as defined in section one hundred twenty-three of such law; or

1. The property consists of a scroll, religious vestment, a vessel, an item comprising a display of religious symbols which forms a representative expression of faith, or other miscellaneous item of property [fig 1] which:

(a) has a value of at least one hundred dollars; and

(b)  is kept for or used in connection with religious worship in any building [fig 1] , structure or upon the curtilage of such building or structure used as a place of religious worship by a religious corporation, as incorporated under the religious corporations law or the education law.

1. The property consists of an access device which the person intends to use unlawfully to obtain telephone service.

1. The property consists of anhydrous ammonia or liquified ammonia gas and the actor intends to use, or knows another person intends to use, such anhydrous ammonia or liquified ammonia gas to manufacture methamphetamine.

Grand larceny in the fourth degree is a class E felony.

• New York  § 155.35. Grand larceny in the third degree
  

A person is guilty of grand larceny in the third degree when he or she steals property and:

1. when the value of the property exceeds three thousand dollars, or

1. the property is an automated teller machine or the contents of an automated teller machine.

Grand larceny in the third degree is a class D felony.

• New York  § 155.40. Grand larceny in the second degree

A person is guilty of grand larceny in the second degree when he steals property and when:

1. The value of the property exceeds fifty thousand dollars; or

1. The property, regardless of its nature and value, is obtained by extortion committed by instilling in the victim a fear that the actor or another person will (a) cause physical injury to some person in the future, or (b) cause damage to property, or (c) use or abuse his position as a public servant by engaging in conduct within or related to his official duties, or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect some person adversely.

Grand larceny in the second degree is a class C felony.

• New York  § 155.42. Grand larceny in the first degree
  

A person is guilty of grand larceny in the first degree when he steals property and when the value of the property exceeds one million dollars.

Grand larceny in the first degree is a class B felony.

• New York  § 155.43. Aggravated grand larceny of an automated teller machine
  

A person is guilty of aggravated grand larceny of an automated teller machine when he or she commits the crime of grand larceny in the third degree, as defined in subdivision two of section 155.35 of this article and has been previously convicted of grand larceny in the third degree within the previous five years.

Aggravated grand larceny of an automated teller machine is a class C felony.

• New York § 235.15. Obscenity or disseminating indecent material to minors in the second degree; defense

1.    1. In any prosecution for obscenity, or disseminating indecent material to minors in the second degree in violation of subdivision three of section 235.21 of this article, it is an affirmative defense that the persons to whom allegedly obscene or indecent material was disseminated, or the audience to an allegedly obscene performance, consisted of persons or institutions having scientific, educational, governmental or other similar justification for possessing, disseminating or viewing the same.

1. In any prosecution for obscenity, it is an affirmative defense that the person so charged was a motion picture projectionist, stage employee or spotlight operator, cashier, doorman, usher, candy stand attendant, porter or in any other non-managerial or non-supervisory capacity in a motion picture theatre; provided he has no financial interest, other than his employment, which employment does not encompass compensation based upon any proportion of the gross receipts, in the promotion of obscene material for sale, rental or exhibition or in the promotion, presentation or direction of any obscene performance, or is in any way responsible for acquiring obscene material for sale, rental or exhibition.
   

• New York  § 235.20. Disseminating indecent material to minors; definitions of terms

The following definitions are applicable to sections 235.21, 235.22, 235.23 and 235.24 of this article:

1. “Minor” means any person less than seventeen years old.

1. “Nudity” means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area or buttocks with less than a full opaque covering, or the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any portion thereof below the top of the nipple, or the depiction of covered male genitals in a discernably turgid state.

1. “Sexual conduct” means acts of masturbation, homosexuality, sexual intercourse, or physical contact with a person’s clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks or, if such person be a female, breast.

1. “Sexual excitement” means the condition of human male or female genitals when in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal.

1. “Sado-masochistic abuse” means flagellation or torture by or upon a person clad in undergarments, a mask or bizarre costume, or the condition of being fettered, bound or otherwise physically restrained on the part of one so clothed.

“Harmful to minors” means that quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sado-masochistic abuse, when it:

(a) Considered as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex of minors; and

(b) Is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors; and

(c) Considered as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political and scientific value for minors.

1. The term “access software” means software (including client or server software) or enabling tools that do not create or provide the content of the communication but that allow a user to do any one or more of the following:

(a) filter, screen, allow or disallow content;

(b) pick, choose, analyze or digest content; or

(c) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, search, subset, organize, reorganize or translate content.

• New York  § 235.21. Disseminating indecent material to minors in the second degree

A person is guilty of disseminating indecent material to minors in the second degree when:

1. With knowledge of its character and content, he sells or loans to a minor for monetary consideration:

(a) Any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion picture film, or similar visual representation or image of a person or portion of the human body which depicts nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which is harmful to minors; or

(b) Any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter however reproduced, or sound recording which contains any matter enumerated in paragraph (a) hereof, or explicit and detailed verbal descriptions or narrative accounts of sexual excitement, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which, taken as a whole, is harmful to minors; or

1. Knowing the character and content of a motion picture, show or other presentation which, in whole or in part, depicts nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse, and which is harmful to minors, he:

(a) Exhibits such motion picture, show or other presentation to a minor for a monetary consideration; or

(b) Sells to a minor an admission ticket or pass to premises whereon there is exhibited or to be exhibited such motion picture, show or other presentation; or

(c) Admits a minor for a monetary consideration to premises whereon there is exhibited or to be exhibited such motion picture show or other presentation; or

1. Knowing the character and content of the communication which, in whole or in part, depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse, and which is harmful to minors, he intentionally uses any computer communication system allowing the input, output, examination or transfer, of computer data or computer programs from one computer to another, to initiate or engage in such communication with a person who is a minor.

Disseminating indecent material to minors in the second degree is a class E felony.

• New York § 235.22. Disseminating indecent material to minors in the first degree

A person is guilty of disseminating indecent material to minors in the first degree when:

1. knowing the character and content of the communication which, in whole or in part, depicts or describes, either in words or images actual or simulated nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse, and which is harmful to minors, he intentionally uses any computer communication system allowing the input, output, examination or transfer, of computer data or computer programs from one computer to another, to initiate or engage in such communication with a person who is a minor; and

1. by means of such communication he importunes, invites or induces a minor to engage in sexual intercourse, [fig 1] oral sexual conduct or anal sexual conduct, or sexual contact with him, or to engage in a sexual performance, obscene sexual performance, or sexual conduct for his benefit.

Disseminating indecent material to minors in the first degree is a class D felony.

• New York  § 235.23. Disseminating indecent material to minors; presumption and defenses

1.    1. A person who engages in the conduct proscribed by section 235.21 is presumed to do so with knowledge of the character and content of the material sold or loaned, or the motion picture, show or presentation exhibited or to be exhibited.

1. In any prosecution for disseminating indecent material to minors in the second degree pursuant to subdivision one or two of section 235.21 of this article, it is an affirmative defense that:

(a) The defendant had reasonable cause to believe that the minor involved was seventeen years old or more; and

(b) Such minor exhibited to the defendant a draft card, driver’s license, birth certificate or other official or apparently official document purporting to establish that such minor was seventeen years old or more.

1. In any prosecution for disseminating indecent material to minors in the second degree pursuant to subdivision three of section 235.21 of this article or disseminating indecent material to minors in the first degree pursuant to section 235.22 of this article, it shall be a defense that:

(a) The defendant made a reasonable effort to ascertain the true age of the minor and was unable to do so as a result of actions taken by the minor; or

(b) The defendant has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective and appropriate actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to materials specified in such subdivision, which may involve any appropriate measures to restrict minors from access to such communications, including any method which is feasible under available technology; or

(c) The defendant has restricted access to such materials by requiring use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code or adult personal identification number; or

(d) The defendant has in good faith established a mechanism such that the labelling, segregation or other mechanism enables such material to be automatically blocked or screened by software or other capabilities reasonably available to responsible adults wishing to effect such blocking or screening and the defendant has not otherwise solicited minors not subject to such screening or blocking capabilities to access that material or to circumvent any such screening or blocking.

• New York  § 235.24. Disseminating indecent material to minors; limitations
  

In any prosecution for disseminating indecent material to minors in the second degree pursuant to subdivision three of section 235.21 of this article or disseminating indecent material to minors in the first degree pursuant to section 235.22 of this article:

1. No person shall be held to have violated such provisions solely for providing access or connection to or from a facility, system, or network not under that person’s control, including transmission, downloading, intermediate storage, access software, or other related capabilities that are incidental to providing such access or connection that do not include the creation of the content of the communication.

(a) The limitations provided by this subdivision shall not be applicable to a person who is a conspirator with an entity actively involved in the creation or knowing distribution of communications that violate such provisions, or who knowingly advertises the availability of such communications.

(b) The limitations provided by this subdivision shall not be applicable to a person who provides access or connection to a facility, system, or network engaged in the violation of such provisions that is owned or controlled by such person.

1. No employer shall be held liable under such provisions for the actions of an employee or agent unless the employee’s or agent’s conduct is within the scope of his employment or agency and the employer having knowledge of such conduct, authorizes or ratifies such conduct, or recklessly disregards such conduct.
   

• New York  § 245.01. Exposure of a person
  

A person is guilty of exposure if he appears in a public place in such a manner that the private or intimate parts of his body are unclothed or exposed. For purposes of this section, the private or intimate parts of a female person shall include that portion of the breast which is below the top of the areola. This section shall not apply to the breastfeeding of infants or to any person entertaining or performing in a play, exhibition, show or entertainment.

Exposure of a person is a violation.

Nothing in this section shall prevent the adoption by a city, town or village of a local law prohibiting exposure of a person as herein defined in a public place, at any time, whether or not such person is entertaining or performing in a play, exhibition, show or entertainment.

• New York § 245.02. Promoting the exposure of a person
  

A person is guilty of promoting the exposure of a person when he knowingly conducts, maintains, owns, manages, operates or furnishes any public premise or place where a person in a public place appears in such a manner that the private or intimate parts of his body are unclothed or exposed. For purposes of this section, the private or intimate parts of a female person shall include that portion of the breast which is below the top of the areola. This section shall not apply to the breastfeeding of infants or to any person entertaining or performing in a play, exhibition, show or entertainment.

Promoting the exposure of a person is a violation.

Nothing in this section shall prevent the adoption by a city, town or village of a local law prohibiting the exposure of a person substantially as herein defined in a public place, at any time, whether or not such person is entertaining or performing in a play, exhibition, show or entertainment.

• New York § 235.15. Obscenity or disseminating indecent material to minors in the second degree; defense

1.    1. In any prosecution for obscenity, or disseminating indecent material to minors in the second degree in violation of subdivision three of section 235.21 of this article, it is an affirmative defense that the persons to whom allegedly obscene or indecent material was disseminated, or the audience to an allegedly obscene performance, consisted of persons or institutions having scientific, educational, governmental or other similar justification for possessing, disseminating or viewing the same.

1. In any prosecution for obscenity, it is an affirmative defense that the person so charged was a motion picture projectionist, stage employee or spotlight operator, cashier, doorman, usher, candy stand attendant, porter or in any other non-managerial or non-supervisory capacity in a motion picture theatre; provided he has no financial interest, other than his employment, which employment does not encompass compensation based upon any proportion of the gross receipts, in the promotion of obscene material for sale, rental or exhibition or in the promotion, presentation or direction of any obscene performance, or is in any way responsible for acquiring obscene material for sale, rental or exhibition.
   

• New York § 235.20. Disseminating indecent material to minors; definitions of terms

The following definitions are applicable to sections 235.21, 235.22, 235.23 and 235.24 of this article:

1. “Minor” means any person less than seventeen years old.

1. “Nudity” means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area or buttocks with less than a full opaque covering, or the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any portion thereof below the top of the nipple, or the depiction of covered male genitals in a discernably turgid state.

1. “Sexual conduct” means acts of masturbation, homosexuality, sexual intercourse, or physical contact with a person’s clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks or, if such person be a female, breast.

“Sexual excitement” means the condition of human male or female genitals when in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal.

1. “Sado-masochistic abuse” means flagellation or torture by or upon a person clad in undergarments, a mask or bizarre costume, or the condition of being fettered, bound or otherwise physically restrained on the part of one so clothed.

1. “Harmful to minors” means that quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sado-masochistic abuse, when it:

(a) Considered as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex of minors; and

(b) Is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors; and

(c) Considered as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political and scientific value for minors.

1. The term “access software” means software (including client or server software) or enabling tools that do not create or provide the content of the communication but that allow a user to do any one or more of the following:

(a) filter, screen, allow or disallow content;

(b) pick, choose, analyze or digest content; or

(c) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, search, subset, organize, reorganize or translate content.

• New York  § 235.21. Disseminating indecent material to minors in the second degree

A person is guilty of disseminating indecent material to minors in the second degree when:

1. With knowledge of its character and content, he sells or loans to a minor for monetary consideration:

(a) Any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion picture film, or similar visual representation or image of a person or portion of the human body which depicts nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which is harmful to minors; or

(b) Any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter however reproduced, or sound recording which contains any matter enumerated in paragraph (a) hereof, or explicit and detailed verbal descriptions or narrative accounts of sexual excitement, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse and which, taken as a whole, is harmful to minors; or

1. Knowing the character and content of a motion picture, show or other presentation which, in whole or in part, depicts nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse, and which is harmful to minors, he:

(a) Exhibits such motion picture, show or other presentation to a minor for a monetary consideration; or

(b) Sells to a minor an admission ticket or pass to premises whereon there is exhibited or to be exhibited such motion picture, show or other presentation; or

(c) Admits a minor for a monetary consideration to premises whereon there is exhibited or to be exhibited such motion picture show or other presentation; or

1. Knowing the character and content of the communication which, in whole or in part, depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse, and which is harmful to minors, he intentionally uses any computer communication system allowing the input, output, examination or transfer, of computer data or computer programs from one computer to another, to initiate or engage in such communication with a person who is a minor.

Disseminating indecent material to minors in the second degree is a class E felony.

• New York  § 235.22. Disseminating indecent material to minors in the first degree

A person is guilty of disseminating indecent material to minors in the first degree when:

1. knowing the character and content of the communication which, in whole or in part, depicts or describes, either in words or images actual or simulated nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse, and which is harmful to minors, he intentionally uses any computer communication system allowing the input, output, examination or transfer, of computer data or computer programs from one computer to another, to initiate or engage in such communication with a person who is a minor; and

1. by means of such communication he importunes, invites or induces a minor to engage in sexual intercourse, [fig 1] oral sexual conduct or anal sexual conduct, or sexual contact with him, or to engage in a sexual performance, obscene sexual performance, or sexual conduct for his benefit.

Disseminating indecent material to minors in the first degree is a class D felony.

• New York  § 235.23. Disseminating indecent material to minors; presumption and defenses

1.    1. A person who engages in the conduct proscribed by section 235.21 is presumed to do so with knowledge of the character and content of the material sold or loaned, or the motion picture, show or presentation exhibited or to be exhibited.

1. In any prosecution for disseminating indecent material to minors in the second degree pursuant to subdivision one or two of section 235.21 of this article, it is an affirmative defense that:

(a) The defendant had reasonable cause to believe that the minor involved was seventeen years old or more; and

(b) Such minor exhibited to the defendant a draft card, driver’s license, birth certificate or other official or apparently official document purporting to establish that such minor was seventeen years old or more.

1. In any prosecution for disseminating indecent material to minors in the second degree pursuant to subdivision three of section 235.21 of this article or disseminating indecent material to minors in the first degree pursuant to section 235.22 of this article, it shall be a defense that:

(a) The defendant made a reasonable effort to ascertain the true age of the minor and was unable to do so as a result of actions taken by the minor; or

(b) The defendant has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective and appropriate actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to materials specified in such subdivision, which may involve any appropriate measures to restrict minors from access to such communications, including any method which is feasible under available technology; or

(c) The defendant has restricted access to such materials by requiring use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code or adult personal identification number; or

(d) The defendant has in good faith established a mechanism such that the labelling, segregation or other mechanism enables such material to be automatically blocked or screened by software or other capabilities reasonably available to responsible adults wishing to effect such blocking or screening and the defendant has not otherwise solicited minors not subject to such screening or blocking capabilities to access that material or to circumvent any such screening or blocking.

• New York  § 235.24. Disseminating indecent material to minors; limitations
  

In any prosecution for disseminating indecent material to minors in the second degree pursuant to subdivision three of section 235.21 of this article or disseminating indecent material to minors in the first degree pursuant to section 235.22 of this article:

1. No person shall be held to have violated such provisions solely for providing access or connection to or from a facility, system, or network not under that person’s control, including transmission, downloading, intermediate storage, access software, or other related capabilities that are incidental to providing such access or connection that do not include the creation of the content of the communication.

(a) The limitations provided by this subdivision shall not be applicable to a person who is a conspirator with an entity actively involved in the creation or knowing distribution of communications that violate such provisions, or who knowingly advertises the availability of such communications.

(b) The limitations provided by this subdivision shall not be applicable to a person who provides access or connection to a facility, system, or network engaged in the violation of such provisions that is owned or controlled by such person.

1. No employer shall be held liable under such provisions for the actions of an employee or agent unless the employee’s or agent’s conduct is within the scope of his employment or agency and the employer having knowledge of such conduct, authorizes or ratifies such conduct, or recklessly disregards such conduct.
   

• New York  § 245.01. Exposure of a person
  

A person is guilty of exposure if he appears in a public place in such a manner that the private or intimate parts of his body are unclothed or exposed. For purposes of this section, the private or intimate parts of a female person shall include that portion of the breast which is below the top of the areola. This section shall not apply to the breastfeeding of infants or to any person entertaining or performing in a play, exhibition, show or entertainment.

Exposure of a person is a violation.

Nothing in this section shall prevent the adoption by a city, town or village of a local law prohibiting exposure of a person as herein defined in a public place, at any time, whether or not such person is entertaining or performing in a play, exhibition, show or entertainment.

• New York  § 245.02. Promoting the exposure of a person
  

A person is guilty of promoting the exposure of a person when he knowingly conducts, maintains, owns, manages, operates or furnishes any public premise or place where a person in a public place appears in such a manner that the private or intimate parts of his body are unclothed or exposed. For purposes of this section, the private or intimate parts of a female person shall include that portion of the breast which is below the top of the areola. This section shall not apply to the breastfeeding of infants or to any person entertaining or performing in a play, exhibition, show or entertainment.

Promoting the exposure of a person is a violation.

Nothing in this section shall prevent the adoption by a city, town or village of a local law prohibiting the exposure of a person substantially as herein defined in a public place, at any time, whether or not such person is entertaining or performing in a play, exhibition, show or entertainment.

• New York Penal § 55.05. Classifications of felonies and misdemeanors

1. Felonies. Felonies are classified, for the purpose of sentence, into five categories as follows:

(a) Class A felonies;

(b) Class B felonies;

(c) Class C felonies;

(d) Class D felonies; and

(e) Class E felonies.

Class A felonies are subclassified, for the purpose of sentence, into two categories as follows: subclass I and subclass II, to be known as class A-I and class A-II felonies, respectively.

1. Misdemeanors. Misdemeanors are classified, for the purpose of sentence, into three categories as follows:

(a) Class A misdemeanors;

(b) Class B misdemeanors; and

(c) Unclassified misdemeanors.

• New York Penal § 60.04. Authorized disposition; controlled substances and marihuana felony offenses

1. Applicability. Notwithstanding the provisions of any law, this section shall govern the dispositions authorized when a person is to be sentenced upon a conviction of a felony offense defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of this chapter or when a person is to be sentenced upon a conviction of such a felony as a multiple felony offender as defined in subdivision five of this section.

1. Class A felony. Every person convicted of a class A felony must be sentenced to imprisonment in accordance with section 70.71 of this title, unless such person is convicted of a class A-II felony and is sentenced to probation for life in accordance with section 65.00 of this title.

1. Class B felonies. Every person convicted of a class B felony must be sentenced to imprisonment in accordance with the applicable provisions of section 70.70 of this [fig 1] chapter, [fig 2] a definite sentence of imprisonment with a term of one year or less or probation in accordance with section 65.00 of this [fig 3] chapter provided, however, a person convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance to a child as defined in section 220.48 of this chapter must be sentenced to a determinate sentence of imprisonment in accordance with the applicable provisions of section 70.70 of this chapter or to a sentence of probation in accordance with the opening paragraph of paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 65.00 of this chapter.

1. Alternative sentence. Where a sentence of imprisonment or a sentence of probation as an alternative to imprisonment is not required to be imposed pursuant to subdivision two, three or five of this section, the court may impose any other sentence authorized by section 60.01 of this article, provided that when the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment, such sentence must be in accordance with section 70.70 of this title. Where the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment in accordance with this section, the court may also impose a fine authorized by article eighty of this title and in such case the sentence shall be both imprisonment and a fine.

1. Multiple felony offender. Where the court imposes a sentence pursuant to subdivision three of section 70.70 of this chapter upon a second felony drug offender, as defined in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 70.70 of this [fig 1] chapter, it must sentence such offender to imprisonment in accordance with the applicable provisions of section 70.70 of this [fig 2] chapter, a definite sentence of imprisonment with a term of one year or less, or probation in accordance with section 65.00 of this chapter, provided, however, that where the court imposes a sentence upon a class B second felony drug offender, it must sentence such offender to a determinate sentence of imprisonment in accordance with the applicable provisions of section 70.70 of this chapter or to a sentence of probation in accordance with the opening paragraph of paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 65.00 of this chapter. When the court imposes sentence on a second felony drug offender pursuant to subdivision four of section 70.70 of this chapter, it must impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment in accordance with such subdivision.

1. Substance abuse treatment. When the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment which requires a commitment to the state department of [fig 1] corrections and community supervision upon a person who stands convicted of a controlled substance or marihuana offense, the court may, upon motion of the defendant in its discretion, issue an order directing that the department of [fig 2] corrections and community supervision enroll the defendant in the comprehensive alcohol and substance abuse treatment program in an alcohol and substance abuse correctional annex as defined in subdivision eighteen of section two of the correction law, provided that the defendant will satisfy the statutory eligibility criteria for participation in such program. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this subdivision, any defendant to be enrolled in such program pursuant to this subdivision shall be governed by the same rules and regulations promulgated by the department of [fig 3] corrections and community supervision, including without limitation those rules and regulations establishing requirements for completion and those rules and regulations governing discipline and removal from the program. No such period of court ordered corrections based drug abuse treatment pursuant to this subdivision shall be required to extend beyond the defendant’s conditional release date.

1. a. Shock incarceration participation. When the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment which requires a commitment to the department of [fig 1] corrections and community supervision upon a person who stands convicted of a controlled substance or marihuana offense, upon motion of the defendant, the court may issue an order directing that the department of [fig 2] corrections and community supervision enroll the defendant in the shock incarceration program as defined in article twenty-six-A of the correction law, provided that the defendant is an eligible inmate, as described in subdivision one of section eight hundred sixty-five of the correction law. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this subdivision, any defendant to be enrolled in such program pursuant to this subdivision shall be governed by the same rules and regulations promulgated by the department of [fig 3] corrections and community supervision, including without limitation those rules and regulations establishing requirements for completion and such rules and regulations governing discipline and removal from the program.

1. (i) In the event that an inmate designated by court order for enrollment in the shock incarceration program requires a degree of medical care or mental health care that cannot be provided at a shock incarceration facility, the department, in writing, shall notify the inmate, provide a proposal describing a proposed alternative-to-shock-incarceration program, and notify him or her that he or she may object in writing to placement in such alternative-to-shock-incarceration program. If the inmate objects in writing to placement in such alternative-to-shock-incarceration program, the department of [fig 1] corrections and community supervision shall notify the sentencing court, provide such proposal to the court, and arrange for the inmate’s prompt appearance before the court. The court shall provide the proposal and notice of a court appearance to the people, the inmate and the appropriate defense attorney. After considering the proposal and any submissions by the parties, and after a reasonable opportunity for the people, the inmate and counsel to be heard, the court may modify its sentencing order accordingly, notwithstanding the provisions of section 430.10 of the criminal procedure law.

(ii) An inmate who successfully completes an alternative-to-shock-incarceration program within the department of [fig 1] corrections and community supervision shall be treated in the same manner as a person who has successfully completed the shock incarceration program, as set forth in subdivision four of section eight hundred sixty-seven of the correction law.

• New York Penal § 60.05. Authorized dispositions; other class A, B, certain C and D felonies and multiple felony offenders

1. Applicability. Except as provided in section 60.04 of this article governing the authorized dispositions applicable to felony offenses defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of this chapter or in section 60.13 of this article governing the authorized dispositions applicable to felony sex offenses defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 70.80 of this title, this section shall govern the dispositions authorized when a person is to be sentenced upon a conviction of a class A felony, a class B felony or a class C, class D or class E felony specified herein, or when a person is to be sentenced upon a conviction of a felony as a multiple felony offender.

1. Class A felony. Except as provided in subdivisions three and four of section 70.06 of this chapter, every person convicted of a class A felony must be sentenced to imprisonment in accordance with section 70.00 of this title, unless such person is convicted of [fig 1] murder in the first degree and is sentenced in accordance with section 60.06 [fig 2] of this article.

1. Class B felony. Except as provided in subdivision six of this section, every person convicted of a class B violent felony offense as defined in subdivision one of section 70.02 of this title, must be sentenced to imprisonment in accordance with such section 70.02; and, except as provided in subdivision six of this section, every person convicted of any other class B felony must be sentenced to imprisonment in accordance with section 70.00 [fig 1] of this title.

1. Certain class C felonies. Except as provided in subdivision six, every person convicted of a class C violent felony offense as defined in subdivision one of section 70.02 of this title, must be sentenced to imprisonment in accordance with section 70.02 of this title; and, except as provided in subdivision six of this section, every person convicted of the class C felonies of: attempt to commit any of the class B felonies of bribery in the first degree as defined in section 200.04, bribe receiving in the first degree as defined in section 200.12, conspiracy in the second degree as defined in section 105.15 and criminal mischief in the first degree as defined in section 145.12; criminal usury in the first degree as defined in section 190.42, rewarding official misconduct in the first degree as defined in section 200.22, receiving reward for official misconduct in the first degree as defined in section 200.27, [fig 1] attempt to promote prostitution in the first degree as defined in section 230.32, promoting prostitution in the second degree as defined in section 230.30, arson in the third degree as defined in section 150.10 of this chapter, must be sentenced to imprisonment in accordance with section 70.00 of this title.

1. Certain class D felonies. Except as provided in subdivision six of this section, every person convicted of the class D felonies of assault in the second degree as defined in section 120.05, strangulation in the second degree as defined in section 121.12 or attempt to commit a class C felony as defined in section 230.30 of this chapter, must be sentenced in accordance with section 70.00 or 85.00 of this title.

1. Multiple felony offender. When the court imposes sentence upon a second violent felony offender, as defined in section 70.04, or a second felony offender, as defined in section 70.06, the court must impose a sentence of imprisonment in accordance with section 70.04 or 70.06, as the case may be, unless it imposes a sentence of imprisonment in accordance with section 70.08 or 70.10.

1. Fines. Where the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment in accordance with this section, the court also may impose a fine authorized by article eighty and in such case the sentence shall be both imprisonment and a fine.

• New York Penal § 60.13. Authorized dispositions; felony sex offenses

When a person is to be sentenced upon a conviction for any felony defined in article one hundred thirty of this chapter, including a sexually motivated felony, or patronizing a prostitute in the first degree as defined in section 230.06 of this chapter, incest in the second degree as defined in section 255.26 of this chapter, or incest in the first degree as defined in section 255.27 of this chapter, or a felony attempt or conspiracy to commit any of these crimes, the court must sentence the defendant in accordance with the provisions of section 70.80 of this title.

• New York Penal § 70.00. Sentence of imprisonment for felony

1.    1. [Until Sept 1, 2013 (see 1995 note below), as amended L 2004, ch 738, § 28 and L 2007, ch 7, § 36]  Indeterminate sentence. Except as provided in subdivisions four, five and six of this section or section 70.80 of this article, a sentence of imprisonment for a felony, other than a felony defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of this chapter, shall be an indeterminate sentence. When such a sentence is imposed, the court shall impose a maximum term in accordance with the provisions of subdivision two of this section and the minimum period of imprisonment shall be as provided in subdivision three of this section.

1. [Eff Sept 1, 2013 (see 1995 note below), as amended L 2004, ch 738, § 29 and L 2007, ch 7, § 37]  Indeterminate sentence. Except as provided in subdivisions four and five of this section or section 70.80 of this article, a sentence of imprisonment for a felony, other than a felony defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of this chapter, shall be an indeterminate sentence. When such a sentence is imposed, the court shall impose a maximum term in accordance with the provisions of subdivision two of this section and the minimum period of imprisonment shall be as provided in subdivision three of this section.

1. Maximum term of sentence. The maximum term of an indeterminate sentence shall be at least three years and the term shall be fixed as follows:

(a) For a class A felony, the term shall be life imprisonment;

(b) For a class B felony, the term shall be fixed by the court, and shall not exceed twenty-five years; [fig 1]

(c) For a class C felony, the term shall be fixed by the court, and shall not exceed fifteen years;

(d) For a class D felony, the term shall be fixed by the court, and shall not exceed seven years; and

(e) For a class E felony, the term shall be fixed by the court, and shall not exceed four years.

1. Minimum period of imprisonment. The minimum period of imprisonment under an indeterminate sentence shall be at least one year and shall be fixed as follows:

(a) In the case of a class A felony, the minimum period shall be fixed by the court and specified in the sentence.

(i) For a class A-I felony, such minimum period shall not be less than fifteen years nor more than twenty-five years; provided, however, that (A) where a sentence, other than a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole, is imposed upon a defendant convicted of murder in the first degree as defined in section 125.27 of this chapter such minimum period shall be not less than twenty years nor more than twenty-five years, and, (B) where a sentence is imposed upon a defendant convicted of murder in the second degree as defined in subdivision five of section 125.25 of this chapter or convicted of aggravated murder as defined in section 125.26 of this chapter, the sentence shall be life imprisonment without parole, and, (C) where a sentence is imposed upon a defendant convicted of attempted murder in the first degree as defined in article one hundred ten of this chapter and subparagraph (i), (ii) or (iii) of paragraph (a) of subdivision one and paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 125.27 of this chapter or attempted aggravated murder as defined in article one hundred ten of this chapter and section 125.26 of this chapter such minimum period shall be not less than twenty years nor more than forty years.

(ii) For a class A-II felony, such minimum period shall not be less than three years nor more than eight years four months, except that for the class A-II felony of predatory sexual assault as defined in section 130.95 of this chapter or the class A-II felony of predatory sexual assault against a child as defined in section 130.96 of this chapter, such minimum period shall be not less than ten years nor more than twenty-five years.

(b) For [fig 1] any other felony, the minimum period shall be fixed by the court and specified in the sentence and shall be not less than one year nor more than one-third of the maximum term imposed.

1. Alternative definite sentence for class D [fig 1] and E [fig 2] felonies. When a person, other than a second or persistent felony offender, is sentenced for a class D or class E felony, [fig 3] and the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and to the history and character of the defendant, is of the opinion that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary but that it would be unduly harsh to impose an indeterminate or determinate sentence, the court may impose a definite sentence of imprisonment and fix a term of one year or less.

1. Life imprisonment without parole. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a defendant sentenced to life imprisonment without parole shall not be or become eligible for parole or conditional release. For purposes of commitment and custody, other than parole and conditional release, such sentence shall be deemed to be an indeterminate sentence. A defendant may be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole upon conviction for the crime of murder in the first degree as defined in section 125.27 of this chapter and in accordance with the procedures provided by law for imposing a sentence for such crime. A defendant must be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole upon conviction for the crime of terrorism as defined in section 490.25 of this chapter, where the specified offense the defendant committed is a class A-I felony; the crime of criminal possession of a chemical weapon or biological weapon in the first degree as defined in section 490.45 of this chapter; or the crime of criminal use of a chemical weapon or biological weapon in the first degree as defined in section 490.55 of this chapter; provided, however, that nothing in this subdivision shall preclude or prevent a sentence of death when the defendant is also convicted of the crime of murder in the first degree as defined in section 125.27 of this chapter. A defendant must be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole upon conviction for the crime of murder in the second degree as defined in subdivision five of section 125.25 of this chapter or for the crime of aggravated murder as defined in subdivision one of section 125.26 of this chapter. A defendant may be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole upon conviction for the crime of aggravated murder as defined in subdivision two of section 125.26 of this chapter.

1. [Repealed eff Sept 1, 2013 (see 1995 note below)]  Determinate sentence. [fig 1] Except as provided in subdivision four of this section and subdivisions two and four of section 70.02, when a person is sentenced as a violent felony offender pursuant to section 70.02 or as a second violent felony offender pursuant to section 70.04 or as a second felony offender on a conviction for a violent felony offense pursuant to section 70.06, the court must impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of such sections and such sentence shall include, as a part thereof, a period of post-release supervision in accordance with section 70.45.

• § 70.02. Sentence of imprisonment for a violent felony offense

1. Definition of a violent felony offense. A violent felony offense is a class B violent felony offense, a class C violent felony offense, a class D violent felony offense, or a class E violent felony offense, defined as follows:

(a) Class B violent felony offenses: an attempt to commit the class A-I felonies of murder in the second degree as defined in section 125.25, kidnapping in the first degree as defined in section 135.25, and arson in the first degree as defined in section 150.20; manslaughter in the first degree as defined in section 125.20, aggravated manslaughter in the first degree as defined in section 125.22, rape in the first degree as defined in section 130.35, criminal sexual act in the first degree as defined in section 130.50, aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree as defined in section 130.70, course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree as defined in section 130.75; assault in the first degree as defined in section 120.10, kidnapping in the second degree as defined in section 135.20, burglary in the first degree as defined in section 140.30, arson in the second degree as defined in section 150.15, robbery in the first degree as defined in section 160.15, incest in the first degree as defined in section 255.27, criminal possession of a weapon in the first degree as defined in section 265.04, criminal use of a firearm in the first degree as defined in section 265.09, criminal sale of a firearm in the first degree as defined in section 265.13, aggravated assault upon a police officer or a peace officer as defined in section 120.11, gang assault in the first degree as defined in section 120.07, intimidating a victim or witness in the first degree as defined in section 215.17, hindering prosecution of terrorism in the first degree as defined in section 490.35, criminal possession of a chemical weapon or biological weapon in the second degree as defined in section 490.40, and criminal use of a chemical weapon or biological weapon in the third degree as defined in section 490.47.

(b) Class C violent felony offenses: an attempt to commit any of the class B felonies set forth in paragraph (a) of this subdivision; aggravated criminally negligent homicide as defined in section 125.11, aggravated manslaughter in the second degree as defined in section 125.21, aggravated sexual abuse in the second degree as defined in section 130.67, assault on a peace officer, police officer, fireman or emergency medical services professional as defined in section 120.08, gang assault in the second degree as defined in section 120.06, strangulation in the first degree as defined in section 121.13, burglary in the second degree as defined in section 140.25, robbery in the second degree as defined in section 160.10, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree as defined in section 265.03, criminal use of a firearm in the second degree as defined in section 265.08, criminal sale of a firearm in the second degree as defined in section 265.12, criminal sale of a firearm with the aid of a minor as defined in section 265.14, soliciting or providing support for an act of terrorism in the first degree as defined in section 490.15, hindering prosecution of terrorism in the second degree as defined in section 490.30, and criminal possession of a chemical weapon or biological weapon in the third degree as defined in section 490.37.

(c) Class D violent felony offenses: an attempt to commit any of the class C felonies set forth in paragraph (b); reckless assault of a child as defined in section 120.02, assault in the second degree as defined in section 120.05, menacing a police officer or peace officer as defined in section 120.18, stalking in the first degree, as defined in subdivision one of section 120.60, strangulation in the second degree as defined in section 121.12, rape in the second degree as defined in section 130.30, criminal sexual act in the second degree as defined in section 130.45, sexual abuse in the first degree as defined in section 130.65, course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree as defined in section 130.80, aggravated sexual abuse in the third degree as defined in section 130.66, facilitating a sex offense with a controlled substance as defined in section 130.90, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree as defined in subdivision five, six, seven or eight of section 265.02, criminal sale of a firearm in the third degree as defined in section 265.11, intimidating a victim or witness in the second degree as defined in section 215.16, soliciting or providing support for an act of terrorism in the second degree as defined in section 490.10, and making a terroristic threat as defined in section 490.20, falsely reporting an incident in the first degree as defined in section 240.60, placing a false bomb or hazardous substance in the first degree as defined in section 240.62, placing a false bomb or hazardous substance in a sports stadium or arena, mass transportation facility or enclosed shopping mall as defined in section 240.63, and aggravated unpermitted use of indoor pyrotechnics in the first degree as defined in section 405.18.

(d) Class E violent felony offenses: an attempt to commit any of the felonies of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree as defined in subdivision [fig 1] five, six, seven or eight of section 265.02 as a lesser included offense of that section as defined in section 220.20 of the criminal procedure law, persistent sexual abuse as defined in section 130.53, aggravated sexual abuse in the fourth degree as defined in section 130.65-a, falsely reporting an incident in the second degree as defined in section 240.55 and placing a false bomb or hazardous substance in the second degree as defined in section 240.61.

1. Authorized sentence.

(a) [Until Sept 1, 2013 (see 1995 note below)]  Except as provided in subdivision six of section 60.05, the sentence imposed upon a person who stands convicted of a class B or class C violent felony offense must be a determinate sentence of imprisonment which shall be in whole or half years. The term of such sentence must be in accordance with the provisions of subdivision three of this section.

(a) [Eff Sept 1, 2013 (see 1995 note below]  The sentence imposed upon a person who stands convicted of a class B or class C violent felony offense must be an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment. Except as provided in subdivision five of section 60.05, the maximum term of such sentence must be in accordance with the provisions of subdivision three of this section and the minimum period of imprisonment under such sentence must be in accordance with subdivision four of this section.

(b) Except as provided in paragraph (b-1) of this subdivision, subdivision six of section 60.05 and subdivision four of this section, the sentence imposed upon a person who stands convicted of a class D violent felony offense, other than the offense of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree as defined in subdivision [fig 1] five, seven or eight of section 265.02 or criminal sale of a firearm in the third degree as defined in section 265.11, must be in accordance with the applicable provisions of this chapter relating to sentencing for class D felonies provided, however, that where a sentence of imprisonment is imposed which requires a commitment to the state department of [fig 1] corrections and community supervision, such sentence shall be a determinate sentence in accordance with paragraph (c) of subdivision three of this section.

(b-1) Except as provided in subdivision six of section 60.05, the sentence imposed upon a person who stands convicted of the class D violent felony offense of menacing a police officer or peace officer as defined in section 120.18 of this chapter must be a determinate sentence of imprisonment.

(c) Except as provided in subdivision six of section 60.05, the sentence imposed upon a person who stands convicted of the class D violent felony offenses of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree as defined in subdivision four, five, seven or eight of section 265.02, criminal sale of a firearm in the third degree as defined in section 265.11 or the class E violent felonies of attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree as defined in subdivision four, five, seven or eight of section 265.02 must be a sentence to a determinate period of imprisonment, or, in the alternative, a definite sentence of imprisonment for a period of no less than one year, except that:

(i) the court may impose any other sentence authorized by law upon a person who has not been previously convicted in the five years immediately preceding the commission of the offense for a class A misdemeanor defined in this chapter, if the court having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and to the history and character of the defendant, finds on the record that such sentence would be unduly harsh and that the alternative sentence would be consistent with public safety and does not deprecate the seriousness of the crime; and

(ii) the court may apply the provisions of paragraphs (b) and (c) of subdivision four of this section when imposing a sentence upon a person who has previously been convicted of a class A misdemeanor defined in this chapter in the five years immediately preceding the commission of the offense.

1. Term of sentence. The term of a determinate sentence for a violent felony offense must be fixed by the court as follows:

(a) For a class B felony, the term must be at least five years and must not exceed twenty-five years, provided, however, that the term must be: (i) at least ten years and must not exceed thirty years where the sentence is for the crime of aggravated assault upon a police officer or peace officer as defined in section 120.11 of this chapter; and (ii) at least ten years and must not exceed thirty years where the sentence is for the crime of aggravated manslaughter in the first degree as defined in section 125.22 of this chapter;

(b) For a class C felony, the term must be at least three and one-half years and must not exceed fifteen years, provided, however, that the term must be: (i) at least seven years and must not exceed twenty years where the sentence is for the crime of aggravated manslaughter in the second degree as defined in section 125.21 of this chapter; (ii) at least seven years and must not exceed twenty years where the sentence is for the crime of attempted aggravated assault upon a police officer or peace officer as defined in section 120.11 of this chapter; and (iii) at least three and one-half years and must not exceed twenty years where the sentence is for the crime of aggravated criminally negligent homicide as defined in section 125.11 of this chapter;

(c) For a class D felony, the term must be at least two years and must not exceed seven years, provided, however, that the term must be at least two years and must not exceed eight years where the sentence is for the crime of menacing a police officer or peace officer as defined in section 120.18 of this chapter; and

(d) For a class E felony, the term must be at least one and one-half years and must not exceed four years.

1. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this [fig 1] subdivision, where a plea of guilty to a class D violent felony offense is entered pursuant to section 220.10 or 220.30 of the criminal procedure law in satisfaction of an indictment charging the defendant with an armed felony, as defined in subdivision forty-one of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law, the court must impose [fig 2] a determinate sentence of imprisonment [fig 3] .

(b) In any case in which the provisions of paragraph (a) [fig 1] of this subdivision or the provisions of subparagraph (ii) of paragraph (c) of subdivision two of this section apply, the court may impose a sentence other than [fig 2] a determinate sentence of imprisonment, or a definite sentence of imprisonment for a period of no less than one year, if it finds that the alternate sentence is consistent with public safety and does not deprecate the seriousness of the crime and that one or more of the following factors exist:

(i) mitigating circumstances that bear directly upon the manner in which the crime was committed; or

(ii) where the defendant was not the sole participant in the crime, the defendant’s participation was relatively minor although not so minor as to constitute a defense to the prosecution; or

(iii) possible deficiencies in proof of the defendant’s commission of an armed felony.

(c) The defendant and the district attorney shall have an opportunity to present relevant information to assist the court in making a determination pursuant to paragraph (b) [fig 1] of this subdivision, and the court may, in its discretion, conduct a hearing with respect to any issue bearing upon such determination. If the court determines that [fig 2] a determinate sentence of imprisonment should not be imposed pursuant to the provisions of such paragraph (b), it shall make a statement on the record of the facts and circumstances upon which such determination is based. A transcript of the court’s statement, which shall set forth the recommendation of the district attorney, shall be forwarded to the state division of criminal justice services along with a copy of the accusatory instrument.

• New York Penal § 70.04. Sentence of imprisonment for second violent felony offender

1.    1. Definiton of second violent felony offender.

(a) A second violent felony offender is a person who stands convicted of a violent felony offense as defined in subdivision one of section 70.02 after having previously been subjected to a predicate violent felony conviction as defined in paragraph (b) of this subdivision.

(b) For the purpose of determining whether a prior conviction is a predicate violent felony conviction the following criteria shall apply:

(i) The conviction must have been in this state of a class A felony (other than one defined in article two hundred twenty) or of a violent felony offense as defined in subdivision one of section 70.02, or of an offense defined by the penal law in effect prior to September first, nineteen hundred sixty-seven, which includes all of the essential elements of any such felony, or in any other jurisdiction of an offense which includes all of the essential elements of any such felony for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year or a sentence of death was authorized and is authorized in this state irrespective of whether such sentence was imposed;

(ii) Sentence upon such prior conviction must have been imposed before commission of the present felony;

(iii) Suspended sentence, suspended execution of sentence, a sentence of probation, a sentence of conditional discharge or of unconditional discharge, and a sentence of certification to the care and custody of the division of substance abuse services, shall be deemed to be a sentence;

(iv) Except as provided in subparagraph (v) of this paragraph, sentence must have been imposed not more than ten years before commission of the felony of which the defendant presently stands convicted;

(v) In calculating the ten year period under subparagraph (iv), any period of time during which the person was incarcerated for any reason between the time of commission of the previous felony and the time of commission of the present felony shall be excluded and such ten year period shall be extended by a period or periods equal to the time served under such incarceration;

(vi) An offense for which the defendant has been pardoned on the ground of innocence shall not be deemed a predicate violent felony conviction.

1. [Until Sept 1, 2013 (see 1995 note below)]  Authorized sentence. When the court has found, pursuant to the provisions of the criminal procedure law, that a person is a second violent felony offender the court must impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment which shall be in whole or half years. Except where sentence is imposed in accordance with the provisions of section 70.10, the term of such sentence must be in accordance with the provisions of subdivision three of this section.

1. [Eff Sept 1, 2013 (see 1995 note below)]  Authorized sentence. When the court has found, pursuant to the provisions of the criminal procedure law, that a person is a second violent felony offender the court must impose an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment. Except where sentence is imposed in accordance with the provisions of section 70.10, the maximum term of such sentence must be in accordance with the provisions of subdivision three of this section and the minimum period of imprisonment under such section must be in accordance with subdivision four of this section.

1. [Until Sept 1, 2013 (see 1995 note below)]  Term of sentence. The term of a determinate sentence for a second violent felony offender must be fixed by the court as follows:

(a) For a class B felony, the term must be at least ten years and must not exceed twenty-five years;

(b) For a class C felony, the term must be at least seven years and must not exceed fifteen years; and

(c) For a class D felony, the term must be at least five years and must not exceed seven years.

(d) For a class E felony, the term must be at least three years and must not exceed four years.

1. [Eff Sept 1, 2013 (see 1995 note below)]  Maximum term of sentence. The maximum term of an indeterminate sentence for a second violent felony offender must be fixed by the court as follows:

(a) For a class B felony, the term must be at least twelve years and must not exceed twenty-five years;

(b) For a class C felony, the term must be at least eight years and must not exceed fifteen years; and

(c) For a class D felony, the term must be at least five years and must not exceed seven years.

(d) For a class E felony, the term must be at least four years.

1. [Repealed until Sept 1, 2013 (see 1995 note below)]

1. [Eff Sept 1, 2013 (see 1995 note below)]  Minimum period of imprisonment. The minimum period of imprisonment under an indeterminate sentence for a second violent felony offender must be fixed by the court at one-half of the maximum term imposed and must be specified in the sentence.
   

• New York Penal  § 70.06. Sentence of imprisonment for second felony offender

1.    1. Definition of second felony offender.

(a) A second felony offender is a person, other than a second violent felony offender as defined in section 70.04, who stands convicted of a felony defined in this chapter, other than a class A-I felony, after having previously been subjected to one or more predicate felony convictions as defined in paragraph (b) of this subdivision.

(b) For the purpose of determining whether a prior conviction is a predicate felony conviction the following criteria shall apply:

(i) The conviction must have been in this state of a felony, or in any other jurisdiction of an offense for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year or a sentence of death was authorized and is authorized in this state irrespective of whether such sentence was imposed;

(ii) Sentence upon such prior conviction must have been imposed before commission of the present felony;

(iii) Suspended sentence, suspended execution of sentence, a sentence of probation, a sentence of conditional discharge or of unconditional discharge, and a sentence of certification to the care and custody of the division of substance abuse services, shall be deemed to be a sentence;

(iv) Except as provided in subparagraph (v) of this paragraph, sentence must have been imposed not more than ten years before commission of the felony of which the defendant presently stands convicted;

(v) In calculating the ten year period under subparagraph (iv), any period of time during which the person was incarcerated for any reason between the time of commission of the previous felony and the time of commission of the present felony shall be excluded and such ten year period shall be extended by a period or periods equal to the time served under such incarceration;

(vi) An offense for which the defendant has been pardoned on the ground of innocence shall not be deemed a predicate felony conviction.

1. [Until Sept 1, 2013 (see 1995 note below), as amended L 2007, ch 7, § 38]  Authorized sentence. Except as provided in subdivision five or six of this section, or as provided in subdivision five of section 70.80 of this article, when the court has found, pursuant to the provisions of the criminal procedure law, that a person is a second felony offender the court must impose an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment. The maximum term of such sentence must be in accordance with the provisions of subdivision three of this section and the minimum period of imprisonment under such sentence must be in accordance with subdivision four of this section.

1. [Eff Sept 1, 2013 (see 1995 note below), as amended L 2007, ch 7, § 39]  Authorized sentence. Except as provided in subdivision five of this section, or as provided in subdivision five of section 70.80 of this article, when the court has found, pursuant to the provisions of the criminal procedure law, that a person is a second felony offender the court must impose an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment. The maximum term of such sentence must be in accordance with the provisions of subdivision three of this section and the minimum period of imprisonment under such sentence must be in accordance with subdivision four of this section.

1. [Until Sept 1, 2013 (see 1995 note below), as amended L 2007, ch 7, § 38]  Maximum term of sentence. Except as provided in subdivision five or six of this section, or as provided in subdivision five of section 70.80 of this article, the maximum term of an indeterminate sentence for a second felony offender must be fixed by the court as follows:

(a) For a class A-II felony, the term must be life imprisonment;

(b) For a class B felony, the term must be at least nine years and must not exceed twenty-five years;

(c) For a class C felony, the term must be at least six years and must not exceed fifteen years;

(d) For a class D felony, the term must be at least four years and must not exceed seven years; and

(e) For a class E felony, the term must be at least three years and must not exceed four years; provided, however, that where the sentence is for the class E felony offense specified in section 240.32 of this chapter, the maximum term must be at least three years and must not exceed five years.

1. [Eff Sept 1, 2013 (see 1995 note below), as amended L 2007, ch 7, § 39]  Maximum term of sentence. Except as provided in subdivision five of this section, or as provided in subdivision five of section 70.80 of this article, the maximum term of an indeterminate sentence for a second felony offender must be fixed by the court as follows:

(a) For a class A-II felony, the term must be life imprisonment;

(b) For a class B felony, the term must be at least nine years and must not exceed twenty-five years;

(c) For a class C felony, the term must be at least six years and must not exceed fifteen years;

(d) For a class D felony, the term must be at least four years and must not exceed seven years; and

(e) For a class E felony, the term must be at least three years and must not exceed four years.

1. Minimum period of imprisonment

(a) The minimum period of imprisonment for a second felony offender convicted of a class A-II felony must be fixed by the court at no less than six years and not to exceed twelve and one-half years and must be specified in the sentence, except that for the class A-II felony of predatory sexual assault as defined in section 130.95 of this chapter or the class A-II felony of predatory sexual assault against a child as defined in section 130.96 of this chapter, such minimum period shall be not less than ten years nor more than twenty-five years.

(b) Except as provided in paragraph (a), the minimum period of imprisonment under an indeterminate sentence for a second felony offender must be fixed by the court at one-half of the maximum term imposed and must be specified in the sentence.

1. [Repealed]

1. [Repealed Sept 1, 2013 (see 1995 note below)]  Determinate sentence. When the court has found, pursuant to the provisions of the criminal procedure law, that a person is a second felony offender and the sentence to be imposed on such person is for a violent felony offense, as defined in subdivision one of section 70.02, the court must impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment the term of which must be fixed by the court as follows:

(a) For a class B violent felony offense, the term must be at least eight years and must not exceed twenty-five years;

(b) For a class C violent felony offense, the term must be at least five years and must not exceed fifteen years;

(c) For a class D violent felony offense, the term must be at least three years and must not exceed seven years; and

(d) For a class E violent felony offense, the term must be at least two years and must not exceed four years.

1. [Repealed Sept 1, 2013 (see 1995 note below)]  Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in the case of a person sentenced for a specified offense or offenses as defined in subdivision five of section 410.91 of the criminal procedure law, who stands convicted of no other felony offense, who has not previously been convicted of either a violent felony offense as defined in section 70.02 of this article, a class A felony offense or a class B felony offense, and is not under the jurisdiction of or awaiting delivery to the department of [fig 1] corrections and community supervision, the court may direct that such sentence be executed as a parole supervision sentence as defined in and pursuant to the procedures prescribed in section 410.91 of the criminal procedure law.
   

• New York Penal § 70.07. Sentence of imprisonment for second child sexual assault felony offender

1.    1. A person who stands convicted of a felony offense for a sexual assault against a child, having been subjected to a predicate felony conviction for [fig 1] a sexual assault against a child, must be sentenced in accordance with the provisions of subdivision four or five of this section.

1. A “sexual assault against a child” means a felony offense, other than persistent sexual abuse as defined in section 130.53 of this chapter, (a) the essential elements of which include the commission or attempted commission of sexual conduct, as defined in subdivision ten of section 130.00 of this chapter, (b) committed or attempted to be committed against a child less than fifteen years old.

1. For purposes of determining whether a person has been subjected to a predicate felony conviction under this section, the criteria set forth in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 70.06 shall apply provided however that for purposes of this subdivision, the terms “ten year” or “ten years”, as provided in subparagraphs (iv) and (v) of paragraph (b) of subdivision one of such section 70.06, shall be “fifteen year” or “fifteen years”. The provisions of section 400.19 of the criminal procedure law shall govern the procedures that must be followed to determine whether a person who stands convicted of a sexual assault against a child has been previously subjected to a predicate felony conviction for such a sexual assault and whether such offender was eighteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of the predicate felony.

1. Where the court has found pursuant to subdivision three of this section that a person who stands convicted of a felony offense defined in article one hundred thirty of this chapter for the commission or attempted commission of a sexual assault against a child has been subjected to a predicate felony conviction for a sexual assault against a child, the court shall sentence the defendant as follows:

(a) where the defendant stands convicted of such sexual assault against a child and such conviction is for a class A-II or class B felony offense, and the predicate conviction for such sexual assault against a child is for a class A-II, class B or class C felony offense, the court shall impose an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment, the maximum term of which shall be life and the minimum period of which shall be at least fifteen years and no more than twenty-five years;

(b) where the defendant stands convicted of such sexual assault against a child and the conviction is for a class C felony offense, and the predicate conviction for such sexual assault against a child is for a class A-II, class B or class C felony offense, the court shall impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment, the term of which must be at least twelve years and must not exceed thirty years; provided however, that if the court determines that a longer sentence is warranted, the court shall set forth on the record the reasons for such determination and, in lieu of imposing such sentence of imprisonment, may impose an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment, the maximum term of which shall be life and the minimum period of which shall be at least fifteen years and no more than twenty-five years;

(c) where the defendant stands convicted of such sexual assault against a child and the conviction is for a class B felony offense, and the predicate conviction for such sexual assault against a child is for a class D or class E felony offense, the court shall impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment, the term of which must be at least twelve years and must not exceed thirty years;

(d) where the defendant stands convicted of such sexual assault against a child and the conviction is for a class C felony offense, and the predicate conviction for such sexual assault against a child is for a class D or class E felony offense, the court shall impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment, the term of which must be at least ten years and must not exceed twenty-five years;

(e) where the defendant stands convicted of such sexual assault against a child and the conviction is for a class D felony offense, and the predicate conviction for such sexual assault against a child is for a felony offense, the court shall impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment, the term of which must be at least five years and must not exceed fifteen years; and

(f) where the defendant stands convicted of such sexual assault against a child and the conviction is for a class E felony offense, and the predicate conviction for such sexual assault against a child is for a felony offense, the court shall impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment, the term of which must be at least four years and must not exceed twelve years.

1. Notwithstanding subdivision four of this section, where the court has found pursuant to subdivision three of this section that a person: (a) stands convicted of a felony offense defined in article one hundred thirty of this chapter for the commission or attempted commission of a sexual assault against a child; and (b) has been subjected to a predicate felony conviction for sexual assault against a child as defined in subdivision two of this section; and (c) who was under the age of eighteen years at the time of the commission of such predicate felony offense, then the court may, in lieu of the sentence authorized by subdivision four of this section, sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment in accordance with the sentence authorized for the instant felony offense pursuant to subdivision three of section 70.04 of this article. The court shall set forth on the record the reasons for such determination.
   

• New York Penal § 70.08. Sentence of imprisonment for persistent violent felony offender; criteria

1.    1. Definition of persistent violent felony offender.

(a) A persistent violent felony offender is a person who stands convicted of a violent felony offense as defined in subdivision one of section 70.02 or the offense of predatory sexual assault as defined in section 130.95 of this chapter or the offense of predatory sexual assault against a child as defined in section 130.96 of this chapter, after having previously been subjected to two or more predicate violent felony convictions as defined in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 70.04 of this article.

(b) For the purpose of determining whether a person has two or more predicate violent felony convictions, the criteria set forth in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 70.04 shall apply.

1. Authorized sentence. When the court has found, pursuant to the provisions of the criminal procedure law, that a person is a persistent violent felony offender the court must impose an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment, the maximum term of which shall be life imprisonment. The minimum period of imprisonment under such sentence must be in accordance with subdivision three of this section.

1. [Until Sept 1, 2013 (see 1995 note below), as amended by L 2006, ch 107, § 7]  Minimum period of imprisonment. The minimum period of imprisonment under an indeterminate life sentence for a persistent violent felony offender must be fixed by the court as follows:

(a) For the class A-II felony of predatory sexual assault as defined in section 130.95 of this chapter or the class A-II felony of predatory sexual assault against a child as defined in section 130.96 of this chapter, the minimum period must be twenty-five years;

(a-1) For a class B felony, the minimum period must be at least twenty years and must not exceed twenty-five years;

(b) For a class C felony, the minimum period must be at least sixteen years and must not exceed twenty-five years;

(c) For a class D felony, the minimum period must be at least twelve years and must not exceed twenty-five years.

1. [Eff Sept 1, 2013 (see 1995 note below), as amended by L 2006, ch 107, § 8]  Minimum period of imprisonment. The minimum period of imprisonment under an indeterminate life sentence for a persistent violent felony offender must be fixed by the court as follows:

(a) For the class A-II felony of predatory sexual assault as defined in section 130.95 of this chapter or the class A-II felony of predatory sexual assault against a child as defined in section 130.96 of this chapter, the minimum period must be twenty-five years;

(a-1) For a class B felony, the minimum period must be at least ten years and must not exceed twenty-five years;

(b) For a class C felony, the minimum period must be at least eight years and must not exceed twenty-five years;

(c) For a class D felony, the minimum period must be at least six years and must not exceed twenty-five years.

• New York Penal § 70.10. Sentence of imprisonment for persistent felony offender

1.    1. Definition of persistent felony offender.

(a) A persistent felony offender is a person, other than a persistent violent felony offender as defined in section 70.08, who stands convicted of a felony after having previously been convicted of two or more felonies, as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this subdivision.

(b) A previous felony conviction within the meaning of paragraph (a) of this subdivision is a conviction of a felony in this state, or of a crime in any other jurisdiction, provided:

(i) that a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year, or a sentence to death, was imposed therefor; and

(ii) that the defendant was imprisoned under sentence for such conviction prior to the commission of the present felony; and

(iii) that the defendant was not pardoned on the ground of innocence [fig 1] ; and

(iv) that such conviction was for a felony offense other than persistent sexual abuse, as defined in section 130.53 of this chapter.

(c) For the purpose of determining whether a person has two or more previous felony convictions, two or more convictions of crimes that were committed prior to the time the defendant was imprisoned under sentence for any of such convictions shall be deemed to be only one conviction.

1. Authorized sentence. When the court has found, pursuant to the provisions of the criminal procedure law, that a person is a persistent felony offender, and when it is of the opinion that the history and character of the defendant and the nature and circumstances of his criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration and life-time supervision will best serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 70.00, 70.02, 70.04 [fig 1] , 70.06 or subdivision five of section 70.80 for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by that section for a class A-I felony. In such event the reasons for the court’s opinion shall be set forth in the record.
   

• New York Penal § 70.70. Sentence of imprisonment for felony drug offender other than a class A felony

1.    1. For the purposes of this section, the following terms shall mean:

(a) ”Felony drug offender” means a defendant who stands convicted of any felony, defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of this chapter other than a class A felony.

(b) ”Second felony drug offender” means a second felony offender as that term is defined in subdivision one of section 70.06 of this article, who stands convicted of any felony, defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of this chapter other than a class A felony.

(c) ”Violent felony” shall have the same meaning as that term is defined in subdivision one of section 70.02 of this article.

1. Except as provided in subdivision three or four of this section, a sentence of imprisonment for a felony drug offender shall be a determinate sentence as provided in paragraph (a) of this subdivision.

(a) Term of determinate sentence. Except as provided in paragraph (b) or (c) of this subdivision, the court shall impose a determinate term of imprisonment upon a felony drug offender which shall be imposed by the court in whole or half years, which shall include as a part thereof a period of post-release supervision in accordance with section 70.45 of this article. The terms of imprisonment authorized for such determinate sentences are as follows:

(i) for a class B felony, the term shall be at least one year and shall not exceed nine years, except that for the class B felony of criminal sale of a controlled substance in or near school grounds as defined in subdivision two of section 220.44 of this chapter or on a school bus as defined in subdivision seventeen of section 220.00 of this chapter or criminal sale of a controlled substance to a child as defined in section 220.48 of this chapter, the term shall be at least two years and shall not exceed nine years;

(ii) for a class C felony, the term shall be at least one year and shall not exceed five and one-half years;

(iii) for a class D felony, the term shall be at least one year and shall not exceed two and one-half years; and

(iv) for a class E felony, the term shall be at least one year and shall not exceed one and one-half years.

(b) Probation. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court may sentence a defendant convicted of a class B, class C, class D or class E felony offense defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of this chapter to probation in accordance with the provisions of [fig 1] sections 60.04 and 65.00 of this chapter.

(c) Alternative definite sentence for class B, class C, class D, and class E felonies. If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and to the history and character of the defendant, is of the opinion that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary but that it would be unduly harsh to impose a determinate sentence upon a person convicted of a class C, class D or class E felony offense defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of this chapter, or a class B felony defined in article two hundred twenty of this chapter, other than the class B felony defined in section 220.48 of this chapter, as added by a chapter of the laws of two thousand nine the court may impose a definite sentence of imprisonment and fix a term of one year or less.

(d) The court may direct that a determinate sentence imposed on a defendant convicted of a class B felony, other than the class B felony defined in section 220.48 of this chapter, pursuant to this subdivision be executed as a sentence of parole supervision in accordance with section 410.91 of the criminal procedure law.

1. Sentence of imprisonment for second felony drug offender.

(a) Applicability. This subdivision shall apply to a second felony drug offender whose prior felony conviction was not a violent felony.

(b) Authorized sentence. Except as provided in [fig 1] paragraphs (c) [fig 2] , (d) and (e) of this subdivision, when the court has found pursuant to the provisions of section 400.21 of the criminal procedure law that a defendant is a second felony drug offender who stands convicted of a class B, class C, class D or class E felony offense defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of this chapter the court shall impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment. Such determinate sentence shall include as a part thereof a period of post-release supervision in accordance with section 70.45 of this article. The terms of such determinate sentence shall be imposed by the court in whole or half years as follows:

(i) for a class B felony, the term shall be at least [fig 1] two years and shall not exceed twelve years;

(ii) for a class C felony, the term shall be at least [fig 1] one and one-half years and shall not exceed eight years;

(iii) for a class D felony, the term shall be at least one and one-half years and shall not exceed four years; and

(iv) for a class E felony, the term shall be at least one and one-half years and shall not exceed two years.

(c)  [fig 1] Probation. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court may sentence a [fig 2] second felony drug offender convicted of a class B felony [fig 3] to lifetime probation in accordance with the provisions of section 65.00 of this chapter and may sentence a second felony drug offender convicted of a class C, class D or class E felony to probation in accordance with the provisions of section 65.00 of this chapter.

(d) Sentence of parole supervision. In the case of a person sentenced for a specified offense or offenses as defined in subdivision five of section 410.91 of the criminal procedure law, who stands convicted of no other felony offense, who has not previously been convicted of either a violent felony offense as defined in section 70.02 of this article, a class A felony offense or a class B felony offense, and is not under the jurisdiction of or awaiting delivery to the department of [fig 1] corrections and community supervision, the court may direct that a determinate sentence imposed pursuant to this subdivision shall be executed as a parole supervision sentence as defined in and pursuant to the procedures prescribed in section 410.91 of the criminal procedure law.

(e) Alternate definite sentence for class C, class D and class E felonies. If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and to the history and character of the defendant, is of the opinion that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary but that it would be unduly harsh to impose a determinate sentence upon a person convicted of a class C, class D or class E felony offense defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of this chapter, the court may impose a definite sentence of imprisonment and fix a term of one year or less.

1. Sentence of imprisonment for second felony drug offender previously convicted of a violent felony.

(a) Applicability. This subdivision shall apply to a second felony drug offender whose prior felony conviction was a violent felony.

(b) Authorized sentence. When the court has found pursuant to the provisions of section 400.21 of the criminal procedure law that a defendant is a second felony drug offender whose prior felony conviction was a violent felony, who stands convicted of a class B, class C, class D or class E felony offense defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of this chapter, the court shall impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment. Such determinate sentence shall include as a part thereof a period of post-release supervision in accordance with section 70.45 of this article. The terms of such determinate sentence shall be imposed by the court in whole or half years as follows:

(i) for a class B felony, the term shall be at least six years and shall not exceed fifteen years;

(ii) for a class C felony, the term shall be at least three and one-half years and shall not exceed nine years;

(iii) for a class D felony, the term shall be at least two and one-half years and shall not exceed four and one-half years; and

(iv) for a class E felony, the term shall be at least two years and shall not exceed two and one-half years.

• New York Penal § 70.71. Sentence of imprisonment for a class A felony drug offender

1.    1. For the purposes of this section, the following terms shall mean:

(a) ”Felony drug offender” means a defendant who stands convicted of any class A felony as defined in article two hundred twenty of this chapter.

(b) ”Second felony drug offender” means a second felony offender as that term is defined in subdivision one of section 70.06 of this article, who stands convicted of and is to be sentenced for any class A felony as defined in article two hundred twenty of this chapter.

(c) ”Violent felony offense” shall have the same meaning as that term is defined in subdivision one of section 70.02 of this article.

1. Sentence of imprisonment for a first felony drug offender.

(a) Applicability. Except as provided in subdivision three [fig 1] , four or five of this section, this subdivision shall apply to a person convicted of a class A felony as defined in article two hundred twenty of this chapter.

(b) Authorized sentence. The court shall impose a determinate term of imprisonment which shall be imposed by the court in whole or half years and which shall include as a part thereof a period of post-release supervision in accordance with section 70.45 of this article. The terms authorized for such determinate sentences are as follows:

(i) for a class A-I felony, the term shall be at least eight years and shall not exceed twenty years;

(ii) for a class A-II felony, the term shall be at least three years and shall not exceed ten years.

(c) Lifetime probation. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court may sentence a defendant convicted of a class A-II felony defined in article two hundred twenty of this chapter to lifetime probation in accordance with the provisions of section 65.00 of this chapter.

1. Sentence of imprisonment for a second felony drug offender.

(a) Applicability. This subdivision shall apply to a second felony drug offender whose prior felony conviction or convictions did not include one or more violent felony offenses.

(b) Authorized sentence. When the court has found pursuant to the provisions of section 400.21 of the criminal procedure law that a defendant is a second felony drug offender who stands convicted of a class A felony as defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of this chapter, the court shall impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment. Such determinate sentence shall include as a part thereof a period of post-release supervision in accordance with section 70.45 of this article. Such determinate sentence shall be imposed by the court in whole or half years as follows:

(i) for a class A-I felony, the term shall be at least twelve years and shall not exceed twenty-four years;

(ii) for a class A-II felony, the term shall be at least six years and shall not exceed fourteen years.

(c) Lifetime probation. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court may sentence a defendant convicted of a class A-II felony defined in article two hundred twenty of this chapter to lifetime probation in accordance with the provisions of section 65.00 of this chapter.

1. Sentence of imprisonment for a second felony drug offender previously convicted of a violent felony offense.

(a) Applicability. This subdivision shall apply to a second felony drug offender whose prior felony conviction was a violent felony.

(b) Authorized sentence. When the court has found pursuant to the provisions of section 400.21 of the criminal procedure law that a defendant is a second felony drug offender whose prior felony conviction was a violent felony, who stands convicted of a class A felony as defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of this chapter, the court shall impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment. Such determinate sentence shall include as a part thereof a period of post-release supervision in accordance with section 70.45 of this article. Such determinate sentence shall be imposed by the court in whole or half years as follows:

(i) for a class A-I felony, the term shall be at least fifteen years and shall not exceed thirty years;

(ii) for a class A-II felony, the term shall be at least eight years and shall not exceed seventeen years.

1. Sentence of imprisonment for operating as a major trafficker.

(a) Applicability. This subdivision shall apply to a person convicted of the class A-I felony of operating as a major trafficker as defined in section 220.77 of this chapter.

(b) Authorized sentence. Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this subdivision, the court shall impose an indeterminate term of imprisonment for an A-I felony, in accordance with the provisions of section 70.00 of this article.

(c) Alternative determinate sentence. If a defendant stands convicted of violating section 220.77 of this chapter, and if the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history and character of the defendant, is of the opinion that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary but that it would be unduly harsh to impose the indeterminate sentence for a class A-I felony specified under section 70.00 of this article, the court may instead impose the determinate sentence of imprisonment authorized by clause (i) of subparagraph (b) of subdivision two of this section for a class A-I drug felony; in such case, the reasons for the court’s opinion shall be set forth on the record.

• New York Penal § 70.80. Sentences of imprisonment for conviction of a felony sex offense
•    1. Definitions.

(a) For the purposes of this section, a “felony sex offense” means a conviction of any felony defined in article one hundred thirty of this chapter, including a sexually motivated felony, or patronizing a prostitute in the first degree as defined in section 230.06 of this chapter, incest in the second degree as defined in section 255.26 of this chapter, or incest in the first degree as defined in section 255.27 of this chapter, or a felony attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the above.

(b) A felony sex offense shall be deemed a “violent felony sex offense” if it is for an offense defined as a violent felony offense in section 70.02 of this article, or for a sexually motivated felony as defined in section 130.91 of this chapter where the specified offense is a violent felony offense as defined in section 70.02 of this article.

(c) For the purposes of this section, a “predicate felony sex offender” means a person who stands convicted of any felony sex offense as defined in paragraph (a) of this subdivision, other than a class A-I felony, after having previously been subjected to one or more predicate felony convictions as defined in subdivision one of section 70.06 or subdivision one of section 70.04 of this article.

(d) For purposes of this section, a “violent felony offense” is any felony defined in subdivision one of section 70.02 of this article, and a “non-violent felony offense” is any felony not defined therein.

1. In imposing a sentence within the authorized statutory range for any felony sex offense, the court may consider all relevant factors set forth in section 1.05 of this chapter, and in particular, may consider the defendant’s criminal history, if any, including any history of sex offenses; any mental illness or mental abnormality from which the defendant may suffer; the defendant’s ability or inability to control his sexual behavior; and, if the defendant has difficulty controlling such behavior, the extent to which that difficulty may pose a threat to society.

1. Except as provided by subdivision four, five, six, seven or eight of this section, or when a defendant is being sentenced for a conviction of the class A-II felonies of predatory sexual assault and predatory sexual assault against a child as defined in sections 130.95 and 130.96 of this chapter, or for any class A-I sexually motivated felony for which a life sentence or a life without parole sentence must be imposed, a sentence imposed upon a defendant convicted of a felony sex offense shall be a determinate sentence. The determinate sentence shall be imposed by the court in whole or half years, and shall include as a part thereof a period of post-release supervision in accordance with subdivision two-a of section 70.45 of this article. Persons eligible for sentencing under section 70.07 of this article governing second child sexual assault felonies shall be sentenced under such section and paragraph (j) of subdivision two-a of section 70.45 of this article.

1. (a) Sentences of imprisonment for felony sex offenses. Except as provided in subdivision five, six, seven, or eight of this section, the term of the determinate sentence must be fixed by the court as follows:

(i) for a class B felony, the term must be at least five years and must not exceed twenty-five years;

(ii) for a class C felony, the term must be at least three and one-half years and must not exceed fifteen years;

(iii) for a class D felony, the term must be at least two years and must not exceed seven years; and

(iv) for a class E felony, the term must be at least one and one-half years and must not exceed four years.

(b) Probation. The court may sentence a defendant convicted of a class D or class E felony sex offense to probation in accordance with the provisions of section 65.00 of this title.

(c) Alternative definite sentences for class D and class E felony sex offenses. If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and to the history and character of the defendant, is of the opinion that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary but that it would be unduly harsh to impose a determinate sentence upon a person convicted of a class D or class E felony sex offense, the court may impose a definite sentence of imprisonment and fix a term of one year or less.

1. Sentence of imprisonment for a predicate felony sex offender.

(a) Applicability. This subdivision shall apply to a predicate felony sex offender who stands convicted of a non-violent felony sex offense and who was previously convicted of one or more felonies.

(b) Non-violent predicate felony offense. When the court has found, pursuant to the provisions of the criminal procedure law, that a person is a predicate felony sex offender, and the person’s predicate conviction was for a non-violent felony offense, the court must impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment, the term of which must be fixed by the court as follows:

(i) for a class B felony, the term must be at least eight years and must not exceed twenty-five years;

(ii) for a class C felony, the term must be at least five years and must not exceed fifteen years;

(iii) for a class D felony, the term must be at least three years and must not exceed seven years; and

(iv) for a class E felony, the term must be at least two years and must not exceed four years.

(c) Violent predicate felony offense. When the court has found, pursuant to the provisions of the criminal procedure law, that a person is a predicate felony sex offender, and the person’s predicate conviction was for a violent felony offense, the court must impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment, the term of which must be fixed by the court as follows:

(i) for a class B felony, the term must be at least nine years and must not exceed twenty-five years;

(ii) for a class C felony, the term must be at least six years and must not exceed fifteen years;

(iii) for a class D felony, the term must be at least four years and must not exceed seven years; and

(iv) for a class E felony, the term must be at least two and one-half years and must not exceed four years.

(d) A defendant who stands convicted of a non-violent felony sex offense, other than a class A-I or class A-II felony, who is adjudicated a persistent felony offender under section 70.10 of this article, shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of section 70.10 or pursuant to this subdivision.

1. Sentence of imprisonment for a violent felony sex offense. Except as provided in subdivisions seven and eight of this section, a defendant who stands convicted of a violent felony sex offense must be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of section 70.02, section 70.04, subdivision six of section 70.06, section 70.08, or section 70.10 of this article, as applicable.

1. Sentence for a class A felony sex offense. When a person stands convicted of a sexually motivated felony pursuant to section 130.91 of this chapter and the specified offense is a class A felony, the court must sentence the defendant in accordance with the provisions of:

(a) section 60.06 of this chapter and section 70.00 of this article, as applicable, if such offense is a class A-I felony; and

(b) section 70.00, 70.06 or 70.08 of this article, as applicable, if such offense is a class A-II felony.

1. Whenever a juvenile offender stands convicted of a felony sex offense, he or she must be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of sections 60.10 and 70.05 of this chapter.

1. Every determinate sentence for a felony sex offense, as defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of this section, imposed pursuant to any section of this article, shall include as a part thereof a period of post-release supervision in accordance with subdivision two-a of section 70.45 of this article.
   

• New York Penal § 80.00. Fine for felony

1.    1. A sentence to pay a fine for a felony shall be a sentence to pay an amount, fixed by the court, not exceeding the higher of

1. five thousand dollars; or

1. double the amount of the defendant’s gain from the commission of the crime; or

1. if the conviction is for any felony defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of this chapter, according to the following schedule:

(i) for A-I felonies, one hundred thousand dollars;

(ii) for A-II felonies, fifty thousand dollars;

(iii) for B felonies, thirty thousand dollars;

(iv) for C felonies, fifteen thousand dollars.

When imposing a fine pursuant to the provisions of this paragraph, the court shall consider the profit gained by defendant’s conduct, whether the amount of the fine is disproportionate to the conduct in which defendant engaged, its impact on any victims, and defendant’s economic circumstances, including the defendant’s ability to pay, the effect of the fine upon his or her immediate family or any other persons to whom the defendant owes an obligation of support.

1. As used in this section the term “gain” means the amount of money or the value of property derived from the commission of the crime, less the amount of money or the value of property returned to the victim of the crime or seized by or surrendered to lawful authority prior to the time sentence is imposed.

1. When the court imposes a fine for a felony pursuant to paragraph b of subdivision one of this section, the court shall make a finding as to the amount of the defendant’s gain from the crime. If the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support such a finding or to permit adequate consideration of the matters specified in paragraph c of subdivision one of this section, the court may conduct a hearing upon such issues.

1. Exception. The provisions of this section shall not apply to a corporation.

1. All moneys in excess of five thousand dollars received or collected in payment of a fine imposed pursuant to paragraph c of subdivision one of this section are the property of the state and the state comptroller shall deposit all such fines to the rehabilitative alcohol and substance treatment fund established pursuant to section ninety-seven-cc of the state finance law.

Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of subdivision one of this section a sentence to pay a fine for a felony set forth in the vehicle and traffic law shall be a sentence to pay an amount fixed by the court in accordance with the provisions of the law that defines the crime.

1. When the court imposes a fine pursuant to section 145.22 or 145.23 of this chapter, the court shall direct that no less than ten percent of such fine be credited to the state cemetery vandalism restoration and administration fund created pursuant to section ninety-seven-r of the state finance law.

 New York Penal § 130.91. Sexually motivated felony

1.    1. A person commits a sexually motivated felony when he or she commits a specified offense for the purpose, in whole or substantial part, of his or her own direct sexual gratification.

1. A “specified offense” is a felony offense defined by any of the following provisions of this chapter: assault in the second degree as defined in section 120.05, assault in the first degree as defined in section 120.10, gang assault in the second degree as defined in section 120.06, gang assault in the first degree as defined in section 120.07, stalking in the first degree as defined in section 120.60, strangulation in the second degree as defined in section 121.12, strangulation in the first degree as defined in section 121.13, manslaughter in the second degree as defined in subdivision one of section 125.15, manslaughter in the first degree as defined in section 125.20, murder in the second degree as defined in section 125.25, aggravated murder as defined in section 125.26, murder in the first degree as defined in section 125.27, kidnapping in the second degree as defined in section 135.20, kidnapping in the first degree as defined in section 135.25, burglary in the third degree as defined in section 140.20, burglary in the second degree as defined in section 140.25, burglary in the first degree as defined in section 140.30, arson in the second degree as defined in section 150.15, arson in the first degree as defined in section 150.20, robbery in the third degree as defined in section 160.05, robbery in the second degree as defined in section 160.10, robbery in the first degree as defined in section 160.15, promoting prostitution in the second degree as defined in section 230.30, promoting prostitution in the first degree as defined in section 230.32, compelling prostitution as defined in section 230.33, disseminating indecent material to minors in the first degree as defined in section 235.22, use of a child in a sexual performance as defined in section 263.05, promoting an obscene sexual performance by a child as defined in section 263.10, promoting a sexual performance by a child as defined in section 263.15, or any felony attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses.